24 Sport April 2012 ILLUSTRATION BY CHRIS LIVIERI

024-028_FuelStarvationAPR_alt.indd 24 3/13/12 2:04 PM RUNNING OUT OF FUEL ONLY HAPPENS TO THE OTHER GUY, RIGHT? I USUALLY DON’T WRITE ABOUT experimental haps to change some of your most basic fl ying habits. because my 45 years of aviation experience have been At least I hope so. almost exclusively with certifi cated, normal-category . However, I’m making an exception this TONY WHO? month. This column was prompted by the June 16, Anthony J. “Tony” Durizzi’s fl ying career started 2001, crash of an experimental IV-P (NTSB well before my time. Back in the mid-1960s, when reference LAX01FA212) that claimed the life of vet- I was just earning my private ticket, Tony was fl ying eran pilot Tony Durizzi. big radial-engine transports in Southeast Asia for I didn’t know Tony personally, but I did research Air America, the big airline operated covertly by his accident carefully, and I believe there are some the CIA. Colleagues who shared a cockpit with Tony terribly important lessons to be learned from it—les- agreed that he was an outstanding pilot with superb sons that might just cause you to question some of stick-and- skills. You had to be to survive in BY MIKE BUSCH the most basic things your CFI taught you, and per- Air America.

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024-028_FuelStarvationAPR_alt.indd 25 3/13/12 2:06 PM In the early 1970s, Tony went to work wood producer and the other a member of Flagstaff airport. Tony radioed the tower aas a pilot for Japan Airlines (JAL), where Eric Clapton’s band. that he was not going to be able to make the he fl ew for three decades and 30,000 hours Tony had been fl ying the plane around fi eld and made a forced landing in a small (give or take) until his retirement at age 60. the country with the Clapton band member clearing two miles northeast of the airport. Tony had a keen interest in general to help him attain the necessary experience Rescue workers arrived on the scene very aviation. He was an active CFI with single, in it. After dropping off the owner at an East quickly. They found no sign of fuel in either multi, and instrument instructor ratings. Coast gig, Tony fl ew the plane to an avion- tank, and no evidence of any post-crash fi re. After retiring from JAL, Tony and airline ics shop in Charlottesville, Virginia (where it The Lancair’s beefy composite cabin struc- pilot friend Mike Raney built a pressur- remained for four days), to correct problems ture survived the crash remarkably intact, ized Lancair IV-P (serial No. 76), one of the with noise in the radios, wiring, and but Tony was killed on impact when his most sophisticated, highest-performance kit problems with the fuel quantity indicating head struck the instrument panel. planes in existence. system. The technician troubleshot the fuel quantity indication problems IT JUST DOESN’T ADD UP and determined that the right send- When Tony had lunch with the TATI ing unit was out of calibration and the engineer shortly before the accident fl ight, left sending unit was totally inopera- their conversation included discussion of tive. Replacement of the sending units the speed, fuel capacity, and range of the would require removal, so Tony Lancair IV-P, as well as Tony’s leaning elected to defer the work until the habits and fuel burn. Tony told the engineer aircraft was back in California. that N424E, being an early serial-number On June 16, 2001, Tony commenced aircraft, had two 40-gallon integral wing his trip from Virginia to California. He tanks, with 78 gallons usable. Later models refueled the in Little Rock, (including Tony’s own Lancair IV-P) had Arkansas, then fl ew on to Ada, Okla- more fuel capacity: 90 gallons standard, with homa, where he asked the mechanics 110 gallons optional. at Tornado Alley Turbo Inc. (TATI) Tony said that he normally leaned the to take a look at the engine to fi nd out big 350-hp Continental TSIO-550-E engine why the airplane wasn’t getting as to 50°F lean-of-peak in cruise, resulting in much turbo boost at altitudes above a miserly 15 gph fuel burn (as shown on the Tony became very active in the Lancair FL200 as other Lancair IVs. The TATI techs aircraft’s digital fuel fl ow and totalizer sys- builder community and before long gained pulled the engine cowling and found and tem) and a cruise speed up at the fl ight levels a reputation as a top Lancair guru. And fi xed a few minor induction leaks. around 260 KTAS. Allowing for the higher although he did not hold an FAA mechanic While the techs were working on the air- fuel burn and lower speed during takeoff and certifi cate—just a limited repairman cer- plane, Tony went to lunch with a TATI en- climb, this would put the aircraft’s calculat- tifi cate for the aircraft that he built—Tony gineer. When the two returned from lunch, ed no-reserve endurance at about four and a ultimately was appointed by the FAA as N424E was topped off with 24.5 gallons of half hours. a designated airworthiness representative 100LL—almost exactly what accident inves- (DAR), empowered to inspect and sign tigators calculated it should have consumed off on the airworthiness of Lancairs and during the fl ight from Little Rock to Ada. TONY’S FINAL FLIGHT WAS IN other homebuilt aircraft. Many considered It was hot in Ada that day. Not long after A LANCAIR IV-P, BUT NOT THE Tony the most knowledgeable individual the fuel truck drove off , the TATI engineer about the Lancair IV outside of the Lan- noticed fuel coming out of the Lancair’s wing- ONE HE BUILT AND OWNED. cair factory. tip-mounted fuel vents. He was struck by the fact that there was only a slow drip coming It’s 750 nautical miles from Ada to BACKGROUND OF THE CRASH from the left wingtip, but a steady stream Flagstaff . The fl ight encountered 20- to 30- Tony’s fi nal fl ight was in a Lancair IV-P, but coming from the right one—despite the fact knot head winds (as forecast) and arrived not the one he built and owned. The acci- that the aircraft was on a level ramp. The at Flagstaff less than three and a half hours dent airplane, N424E, was an early Lancair engineer remarked about this to Tony, who after takeoff . That means that Tony should IV kit (serial No. 11) originally purchased responded that it was normal for this aircraft. have landed safely with more than an hour’s in 1990. The partially built aircraft changed Shortly thereafter, Tony took off from worth of reserve fuel on board. Obviously, hands a few times and was fi nally completed Ada on an IFR fl ight to Flagstaff , Arizona. he didn’t. But why? by professional “hired gun” A&Ps in 1998. He didn’t make it. That’s exactly the question that the NTSB The aircraft was acquired by two friends in The fl ight was uneventful until the investigators wrestled with. There are really the entertainment business: one a Holly- engine quit during a visual approach to only three possibilities: the aircraft consumed

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024-028_FuelStarvationAPR_alt.indd 26 3/13/12 2:07 PM a lot more than 15 gph, the tanks held a lot originally held only 72 gallons of fuel, but SO WHAT REALLY HAPPENED? less than 78 gallons usable, or a substantial the problem was fi xed and it now held 80 So far, I’ve reported the facts as I know themm quantity of fuel was somehow lost in-fl ight. gallons (78 usable). That’s presumably the from the NTSB factual report and other Or perhaps some combination of these. fi gure he used to plan the fl ight. reliable sources who were involved in the Post-crash investigation suggests the investigation. In the remainder of this article, INTEGRAL FUEL TANKS correct number may have been 72 gallons. I will go way out on a limb and speculate Like most composite aircraft, the Lancair Examination of the right wing revealed that shamelessly about what I think really hap- uses a “wet wing” integral tank fuel system a critical 1/4 inch hole in the main that pened. (Even if my speculation is wrong, the in which a substantial portion of each wing serves to vent the outboard D-section, was fact that it could have happened makes this a is sealed up and used as a . The fuel not present in N424E. This means that air useful discussion.) tank area of the wing includes a number of had no way of escaping from the outboard D- Let’s theorize that when N424E was wing ribs. The Lancair carries fuel not only section, and the entrapped air would prevent topped off in Ada, there were only 70 usable behind the main spar, but also in front of fuel from fi lling that section. This would gallons of fuel on board (instead of the 78 it in the so-called “D-section” of the wing account for the 8-gallon loss of fuel capacity. that Tony believed), because there was 8 between the spar and the . gallons worth of entrapped air in the right This requires the ribs and the spar to outboard D-section that couldn’t get out. contain a series of holes and notches to THE FUEL TANK AREA OF As the aircraft warmed under the hot permit the free fl ow of fuel and air between THE WING INCLUDES A Oklahoma sun, the entrapped air would the various structural “compartments” of have expanded, displacing more fuel and the wing’s wet bay. Specifi cally, holes and NUMBER OF WING RIBS. forcing it out of the right tank vent onto the notches on the bottom of the ribs and spar ramp. Air expands far more rapidly than allow fuel to fl ow from one compartment to Still, this alone does not provide a com- fuel, which could account for why fuel was another, while holes and notches on the top plete explanation of the crash. Based on observed venting overboard from the right of the ribs and spar allow air to fl ow between the 15 gph cruise fuel burn fi gure that Tony tank so much more rapidly than from the the compartments. (For fuel to fl ow into a quoted, I calculate that the aircraft should left tank. compartment, air must be able to fl ow out of have burned about 62 or 63 gallons of fuel it—and vice versa.) from the time he departed Ada to the time History has shown that this has been a he crashed a couple of miles short of the recurring problem area for Lancairs. In some runway at Flagstaff . Even assuming the most cases, builders may not have understood the pessimistic fuel capacity fi gure for N424E importance of these holes and neglected to (72 gallons total, 70 gallons usable), Tony drill them as called for in the plans. In other should have landed at Flagstaff with at least cases, have been assembled using ex- 7 gallons remaining—a half-hour’s worth— cess resin that wound up plugging up some not exactly legal IFR reserves, but not a of the holes. Unfortunately, once the wings fl ameout either. have been closed up during construction, it In the probable cause report, NTSB inves- can be very diffi cult to detect such problems. tigators assumed a more pessimistic fuel burn In fact, the owners of N424E had com- of 20.5 gph (based on the engine performance plained of precisely such a problem: The right charts found in the airplane), but those as- wing tank did not seem to hold as much fuel sumed ROP operation, and we’re pretty sure as it should. An experienced Lancair mechan- that’s not how Tony operated the airplane. ic had determined that the outboard D-sec- The airplane was equipped with an tion of the right wing was not taking fuel and Archangel engine fuel data system, and drilled additional holes in the wing structure Archangel was able to extract stored data in an attempt to correct the problem. from the system’s non-volatile memory. The After the crash, there was considerable fi nal fuel totalizer value was 14.8 gallons. confusion over the actual fuel capacity of That’s presumably how much fuel Tony Now let’s theorize that Tony took off N424E. NTSB investigators based their thought he had left when the engine quit. from Ada with the left tank selected (as initial calculations on the 90-gallon capac- Assuming he entered 78 gallons into the to- was his habit) and climbed to his cruising ity listed by Lancair, which would have put talizer before takeoff at Ada, the engine most altitude in the fl ight levels. The entrapped the aircraft into Flagstaff with one and a half likely consumed 63.2 gallons, which agrees air in the problematic right wing would have hours of fuel remaining. Tony told the TATI precisely with the 62-63 gallon calculation expanded to more than twice its original engineer at lunch that the aircraft had an based on what Tony said about his power- volume. (Remember, air pressure drops by 80-gallon capacity, adding that the aircraft plant management procedure. half going from sea level to FL180, so volume

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024-028_FuelStarvationAPR_alt.indd 27 3/13/12 2:08 PM doubles.)dou So the entrapped air would now only happens “to the other guy” because he instrument or one technique. The clock and ddisplace 16 gallons of fuel rather than the 8 (or she) just wasn’t paying attention. None of fuel-fl ow gauge (which is essentially a poor it displaced at sea level, and an additional us would ever do anything as dumb as run- man’s totalizer) do indeed provide the prima- 8 gallons would have been expelled out the ning out of fuel, right? ry method of keeping track of fuel used, but right wingtip fuel vent in-fl ight. Tony’s accident provides a vivid counter- the fuel quantity gauges provide an essential Under this scenario, the not-yet-selected example. Here was a professional pilot, an cross-check by measuring actual fuel remain- right fuel tank would contain not 40 gal- ATP and CFI with four decades and countless ing. If there’s any disagreement, I will trust lons (its assumed capacity) or even 32 gal- hours of fl ying experience, who also turned whichever method (clock, totalizer, or fuel lons (what it probably actually held on the out to be a renowned expert on the type of gauges) gives the most pessimistic answer, ground), but only 24 gallons. Total usable fuel airplane he was fl ying, and even had lots of and make plans accordingly (including land- becomes not 78 gallons or even 70 gallons, but hours in the particular aircraft involved. He ing short of the planned destination if there’s 62 gallons—almost exactly the calculated fuel topped the tanks before takeoff . His prefl ight even the slightest doubt about fuel reserves). burn from Ada to 2 miles short of Flagstaff ! planning was unimpeachable. His only real Of course, if you’re going to use your fuel The accident airplane was equipped with sin was believing that his tanks actually held gauges as a cross-check, then they actually both fuel gauges and a digital fuel totalizer. what the book said they should hold. have to work—and they have to be reason- However, the fuel gauges were inoperative When was the last time you had your air- ably well calibrated. Actually, it’s not terribly (Tony knew this), while the totalizer was plane defueled and then recorded precisely important for the fuel gauges to be anywhere working fi ne. It’s reasonable to assume, how much fuel it took to top off each tank? close to accurate when the tanks are full, therefore, that Tony knew precisely how I know, I know—you don’t fl y a Lancair, so long as they’re in the ballpark when the much fuel he’d burned, but had no way of and your 1968 Skylane has fuel bladders, tanks are approaching empty. telling directly how much fuel was left in not integral tanks. But it’s even easier for a the tanks. Without working fuel gauges, he bladder tank to have less-than-book capac- SHOULDER HARNESSES could not have detected the postulated in- ity than for an integral tank. All it takes is a Finally, seat and shoulder belts often make fl ight loss of fuel. disconnected snap that allows the bladder to a life-and-death diff erence in a forced land- collapse partially in the wing bay, or an in- ing. While I’ve never known a pilot not to WAS THIS CRASH SURVIVABLE? dustrious mud dauber who decides your tank buckle up his or her seat belt prior to engine After the engine quit, Tony apparently did vent looks like prime residential real estate. start, I’m amazed at how often I see pilots exactly what you or I would have done in fail to use a shoulder belt, or even see them his situation: He turned the electric boost consciously disconnect it. Bad move! pump on “high” (that’s where the switch “THE ONLY FUEL GAUGE THAT In the event of a crash, don’t count on was found in the wreckage) and tried MATTERS IS THE CLOCK.” buckling up at the last minute—believe me, switching tanks. When this failed to bring that shoulder belt will be the very last thing the engine back to life, Tony made a remark- TO WHICH I SAY, “BALONEY!” on your mind. When your head slams into able forced landing in a very small clear- the instrument panel on impact, the fact that ing, reportedly half the size of a football No matter what sort of fuel system you your hips were securely restrained won’t fi eld. The composite cabin structure of the have, it’s absolutely crucial that you know matter much. pressurized Lancair remained remarkably the actual capacity of each tank, and that you If you have to disconnect your shoulder unscathed and intact. recheck it on a regular basis to make sure belt to reach the fuel selector, cowl fl ap Why didn’t Tony survive the forced land- something hasn’t changed. handle, or some other important control, ing? Post-crash investigation suggests that then replace your shoulder belt with a bet- Tony was not wearing his shoulder harness TRUST THOSE FUEL GAUGES? ter restraint system. Inertial reels are an at the time of the crash, and on impact he How many times have you heard a CFI say absolute must-have in most airplanes. A full wound up splitting his head open on the something like this: “Ignore the fuel gauges. four-belt harness is a huge improvement instrument panel. In a fi nal tragic irony, They’re notoriously inaccurate, and basically over the automotive-style single shoulder there may be a very good reason that he worthless. The only fuel gauge that matters belt in most spam cans. wasn’t wearing his shoulder harness: It was is the clock.” Buckle up—and be careful up there. not equipped with an inertial reel, and it was To which I say, “Baloney!” What if your reportedly impossible for the pilot to reach fuel capacity isn’t what you thought it was Mike Busch, EAA 740170, was the 2008 National Aviation the fuel selector without fi rst unbuckling the because you’ve got a collapsed bladder or a Maintenance Technician of the Year and has been a pilot shoulder harness! plugged vent? Or what if something has caused for 44 years, logging more than 7,000 hours. He’s a CFI a bunch of fuel to siphon overboard in-fl ight? and A&P/IA. E-mail him at [email protected]. CAN WE LEARN FROM THIS? How accurate a fuel gauge is your Rolex then? Mike also hosts free monthly online presentations as part It’s easy to blow off these accidents as avia- To my mind, fuel remaining is too impor- of EAA’s webinar series on the fi rst Wednesday of each tion’s most unforgivable sin—something that tant a parameter to measure solely with one month. For a schedule visit www.EAA.org/webinars.

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