Issue 2 (4), 2016

CHALLENGES CHALLENGES GERMANY multilateral NATIONAL

MINORITY

INITIATIVES

JOINT JOINT perspectives ROMANIA STRATEGIC PARTNERS culture TREATY LATVIA TURKEY RELATIONS

FOREIGN POLICY SECURITYSCORECARDS

TRADE Ukraine NEIGHBOURS

B i l atMOLDOVA e raSLOVAKIA l

CANADA USA AGREEMENTS

• BILATERAL RELATIONS • FOREIGN POLICY OF UKRAINE • NEIGHBOURS, PARTNERS AND PERSPECTIVES UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 1 BOARD OF ADVISERS

Issue 2 (4), 2016 Dr. Dimitar Bechev (Bulgaria, Research fellow, London School of Economics and Social Science)

Dr. Iulian Chifu (Romania, Director of the Bilateral Relations Conflict Analysis and Early Warning Center) Dr. Igor Koval (Ukraine, Rector of Odessa National University by I.I. Mechnikov) Editors Dr. Hanna Shelest Dr. Sergey Minasyan (Armenia, Deputy Director Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko at the Caucasus Institute)

Stephan Meuser (Germany, Director of the Publisher: Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation Published by NGO “Promotion of Intercultural in Romania) Cooperation” (Ukraine), Centre of International Studies (Ukraine), James Nixey (United Kingdom, Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, the the Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Royal Institute of International Affairs) with the financial support of Foundation in Ukraine and International Renaissance Foundation (Ukraine). Dr. Róbert Ondrejcsák (Slovakia, Director of STRATPOL-Strategic Policy Institute)

academic/analytical journal in English H.E., Dr. Oleg Shamshur (Ukraine, Ambassador UA: Ukraine Analytica is the first Ukrainian on International Relations, Politics and Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Economics. The journal is aimed for experts, France) diplomats, academics, students interested in the international relations and Ukraine in Dr. Stephan De Spiegeleire (The Netherlands, particular. Director Defence Transformation at The Hague Center for Strategic Studies)

Contacts: Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (Ukraine, Vice- website: http://ukraine-analytica.org/ Prime Minister on European and Euroatlantic e-mail: [email protected] Integration of Ukraine) Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ ukraineanalytica Dr. Dimitris Triantaphyllou (Greece, Director Twitter: https://twitter.com/UA_Analytica of the Center for International and European Studies, Kadir Has University (Turkey))

The views and opinions expressed in Dr. Asle Toje (Norway, Research Director at the articles are those of the authors and do not Norwegian Nobel Institute)

Analytica or its editors and Board of Advisors necessarily reflect the position of UA: Ukraine

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TO TURN HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS INTO POWERFUL, PRAGMATIC AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL PARTNERSHIP...... 3 Interview with H.E. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Canada Andriy Shevchenko

WE HAVE EXPERIENCE THAT MIGHT BE OF INTEREST TO UKRAINE...... 5 Interview with H.E. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Latvia to Ukraine Juris Poikāns

“UKRAINIAN PRISM: FOREIGN POLICY 2015”: OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINE’S FOREIGN POLICY...... 8

THE 2016 U.S. ELECTIONS AND THE CRISIS OVER UKRAINE...... 15 Volodymyr Dubovyk

UKRAINE AND TURKEY IN A NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: BRINGING CREDIBILITY TO STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP...... 23 Yevgeniya Gaber

COMMON SENSE IN KAZAKHSTAN AND UKRAINE RELATIONS: INCENTIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES...... 34 Anna Gussarova

UKRAINE-MOLDOVA: COMPLICATED BUT PROMISING RELATIONS...... 41 Sergiy Gerasymchuk

UKRAINIAN DIASPORIC COMMUNITY IN GERMANY: MAIN CHARACTERISTICS AND ITS ENGAGEMENT FOR ITS HOME COUNTRY...... 49 Ljudmyla Melnyk, Magdalena Patalong, Richard Steinberg

REBIRTH OF UKRAINIAN-ROMANIAN FRIENDSHIP: NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES ...... 58 Reghina Dimitrisina

SLOVAKIA AND UKRAINE: EASTERN PARTNERS...... 65 Aaron T. Walter

2 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 UKRAINIAN DIASPORIC COMMUNITY IN GERMANY: MAIN CHARACTERISTICS AND ITS ENGAGEMENT FOR ITS HOME COUNTRY

Ljudmyla Melnyk, Magdalena Patalong, Richard Steinberg Institut für Europäische Politik,

During Euromaidan and its aftermath, the Ukrainian community in Germany experienced the emergence of new non-state actors: civically engaged , forming a new diasporic community. Based on the research project “#EngageEUkraine – Engagement of and Germany”, the paper examines selected aspects of the study. By asking if the diasporic community could act as a new homogenous non-state actor, the analysis shows that such potential exists: with their activities, the diasporic community does not only indirectly contribute to the democratization of Ukraine, but at the same time acts as a cultural bridge between German and Ukrainian societies, thereby potentially contributing to the improvement of relations between both states. Therefore, its support should also be of interest to Ukrainian government.

The Euromaidan protests in 2013 and 2014 Focusing on this question, this paper gives in Kiev can be regarded as an initial trigger an overview of the history of Ukrainian for the formation and engagement of a civil diaspora in Germany since 1945 up to the society not only within Ukraine but also emergence of new Ukrainian non-state in Ukrainian communities in Germany. actors since November 2013, forming a new In addition, the annexation of the Crimea diasporic community. From a historical and by the Russian Federation and the war in empirical perspective the paper explains Eastern Ukraine raised a common feeling, a how and why the evolution of the “old sense of belonging to Ukrainian community, ” has led to a “white spot” which led to the support of Ukraine in a in the mental map of Germans concerning vast number of diasporic activities, from Ukraine and Ukrainian matters and asks political demonstrations and cultural events to military and humanitarian aid. this gap. In order to answer the question This tendency was further increased by whether this the diasporicdiasporic communitycommunity can fillbe the interconnectedness of Ukrainians in viewed as a new homogenous non-state different parts and regions of the globalised actor, this paper will focus on the content and development of its engagement as well as on information about the developments in connecting factors within the community. It Ukraineworld. Thehas resulted constant, in immediatestrong ties between flow of will also analyse the two main forms of its the “homeland” and its diaspora. This raises engagement: humanitarian aid in Ukraine the question whether and how the Ukrainian on one side and cultural and informative diaspora can contribute to the stabilization activities in Germany on the other side.1 and democratization of Ukraine. Thereby, the paper gives an overview of

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 49 For this purpose, 88 structured interviews, concludes with policy recommendations for 44 in each country, were conducted. The Ukrainianthe potential government influence in on order both to states. support It interviewees were Ukrainians who are and strengthen Ukrainian diaspora. civically engaged either individually, in formal organisations, or in non-formalised Research Project und Design initiatives. Besides civic engaged interviewees, a group of “experts” was This paper stems from a larger research interviewed, consisting of people who are project “#EngageEUkraine – Engagement of well informed about Ukrainian diaspora in Ukrainians in Poland and Germany” that was these two countries. In order to guarantee conducted in 2015 and 2016 by the Institut a high degree of heterogeneity in terms für Europäische Politik (IEP), Berlin, and the of age, gender, place of activity etc., and to include people from the whole range and funded by the German Polish Science Foundation.Institute of PublicThe results Affairs of (IPA), the Warsawproject research.of civic engagement,To control thethe firstcriterion selection of were published in May 2016.2 The joined heterogeneity,of interviewees the was following identified interviews in a were desk project of IPA and IEP dealt with the civic conducted in waves, using the snowball engagement of Ukrainians living in Germany system to identify further interviewees. and in Poland. The main objectives of the project were: The interviews were transcribed and analysed following Mayring’s (2003) qualitative content analysis using the structure of Ukrainians’ engagement as software “f4transkript” and “f4analyse”. The 1. Mapping the fields, intensity and well as its potential contribution to the initial code system was systematically and process of democratization in Ukraine; inductively extended during the process of coding. 2. Exploring how Ukrainian diaspora has Main facts about Ukrainians in Germany in Ukraine since November 2013; been influenced by recent developments 3. Providing recommendations on how of Germany, there were around 128.000 public and private actors on the EU level UkrainiansAccording to with the FederalUkrainian Statistical citizenship Office as well as in Poland, Germany and Ukraine living in Germany in 2014.4 Therefore, can support Ukrainian civic engagement comparing the numbers of Ukrainians in both countries to indirectly support the process of democratization in Ukraine.3 growth can be observed. The largest groups of 1995 (30.000) and 2014, significant

1 At the beginning of the Ukrainian engagement in Germany in the end of 2013/beginning of 2014, solidarity demonstrations were playing a major role. Nevertheless, in the following we will concentrate on engagement that was mainly pursued during the interview phase (August-November 2015) and still remains important, in order to analyse the potential long-term effects of the engagement of the diasporic community. 2 published in May 2016. 3 Melnyk/Patalong/Plottka/SteinbergKatrin Böttger/Agnieszka Lada (Eds.): (2016): “#EngageEUkraine How the Ukrainian – Engagement Diasporic der Community Ukrainer inin PolenGermany und ContributesDeutschland”, to EU’s Policy in its Home Country, p. 3. 4 - ble at: https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/StatistischesJahrbuch/StatistischesJahrbuch2015.pdf?__blob=- FederalpublicationFile Statistical [27.03.2016] Office Germany (2015): Statistisches Jahrbuch. Deutschland und Internationales 2015. Accessi

50 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 of Ukrainians are found in North Rhine- The inhabitants organized many cultural, educational, social and political activities. 5 In order to protect the rights of Ukrainians TheWestphalia main reasons (28.000), to move in Bavaria to Germany (24.000) are and to coordinate the life in DP camps, familyand in (18.810), Baden-Wuerttemberg education (5.830) (14.000). and work (4.550).6 Ukrainian Emigration13 was created in the official Central Representation of the Due to historical circumstances, Southern institutions, medical assistance was also Germany can be regarded as a center provided1945. In by addition institutions to official like the international Ukrainian of the Ukrainian diaspora. About three recognized but worked as an independent body.Red 14 Cross, Furthermore, which a was lot of not educational officially million7 Around Ukrainians 2.3 million were driven Ukrainians to Western were institutions such as kindergartens, primary Europedeported during as forced and afterlabourers the Second to Germany. World8 and secondary schools and institutions War.After the end of the war, many Ukrainians of higher education were established, returned home either voluntarily or were for example the Ukrainian Higher School forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union. of Economics (), the Ukrainian A small part of them remained in German Free Academy of Science (Augsburg) or and Austrian camps for Displaced Persons the Ukrainian Free University (Munich). (DPs), with an estimated number of However, with the migration of most 140.000 Ukrainians living in German DP Ukrainians to other western countries in camps in 1947.9 By autumn 194510, 50 the end of the 1940s and in the beginning percent of Ukrainian refugees remained in of the 1950s, many institutions of higher the US Zone (mainly in Bavaria), 25 percent education also moved to other countries. in the British Zone and 5 percent in the The only exception is the Ukrainian Free 11 At the end University, which still exists in Munich of 1951, only around 22.000 Ukrainians today. French Zone of West Germany. majority migrated to other western countries.remained 12 in The West DP Germanycamps were whilst both the a Ukrainian DPs, including many scientists, political and social asylum for Ukrainians. writersWith the and emigration journalists, of the majorityshort period of the of

5 - - id=5180E542575D4996027CEF8379A13ED3.tomcat_GO_1_2?operation=abruftabelleBearbeiten&levelindexFederal Statistical Office Germany (2016): Ausländer: Bundesländer, Stichtag, Geschlecht, Ländergruppi - erungen/Staatsangehörigkeit.=2&levelid=1463484116805&auswahloperation=abruftabelleAuspraegungAuswaehlen&auswahlverzeichnis=ord Accessible at: https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online/data;jsession - nungsstruktur&auswahlziel=werteabruf&selectionname=12521-0021&auswahltext=%23SSTAAG6-ST166&num-

6 bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Broschueren/2016/migrationsbericht_2014_de.pdf?__blob=publicamer=5&variable=3&name=STAAG6&werteabruf=Werteabruf [27.03.2016] - FederaltionFile Office[27.03.2016] for Migration and Refugees Germany (2016): Migrationsbericht 2014. Accessible at: https://www. 7 8 Dyczok, Marta (2000): The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees. New York., p. 18. Kubijovyč, Volodymyr (1984): Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Toronto, p. 822. 9 -

10 FirstJacobmeyer, statistical Wolfgang data on (1985):Ukrainians Vom living Zwangsarbeiter in Germany zum can onlyheimatlosen be found Ausländer for the year – die 1945. ‚Displaced Persons‘ in West deutschland 1945–1951. Göttingen, p. 271. 11 Dyczok (2000): The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees, p. 76–77. 12 13 In Ukrainian: „Centralne Predstavnyctvo Ukrajinskoji Emihraciji“ Marunjak, Volodymyr (1985): Ukrajinska Emihracija v Nimeččyni i Avstriji po druhij svitovij vijni. Munich, p. 116. 14 Dyczok (2000): The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees, p. 70.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 51 Germany as a center of Ukrainian cultural particular Soviet republics in order not to complicate the relations with the Soviet The consequence of this development Union. Consequently, Ukraine, for many and scientific life in Western Europe ended. years, became a “white spot” in the German institutions in Germany but also a lack society. This perception remained after ofwas bilateral not only institutional a lack of Ukrainian platforms. scientific Thus, the collapse of the Soviet Union, leading to Ukrainians neither participated directly Ukraine still being frequently regarded as a in the public debate about Ukraine in Germany nor did they comment on other historical events from a Ukrainian point Ukrainianpart of the Russiandiasporic sphere communityof influence. in of view after early 1950s. Along with Germany – the rise of a new non-state the general post-war circumstances in actor? Germany, this lack of Ukrainian perspective and Ukrainian players in the German public sphere led to a certain “invisibility” many Germans regarding Ukrainian matters of Ukrainians and Ukrainian matters. This stillWhile exists this “white today, spot” this on“gap” the mentalmight mapslowly of effect was further enhanced by the fact that Ukraine was not an independent state and emergence of a possible new non-state actor, the Soviet Union was mostly perceived as thebe filledUkrainian in. This diasporic mainly community. results from This the community includes a considerable number of Ukrainians living in Germany who are not Within the framework of the a part of the “old diaspora”16, as described Ostpolitik, it was not in the above, and who can be characterized by «main interest of the West a high level of interconnectedness with German government to get involved other Ukrainians both on a national and with particular Soviet republics international levels. This group mainly in order not to complicate the consists of labour migrants, students and relations with the Soviet Union Jewish Ukrainians17 who came to Germany in the last decade as well as (German) spouses of Ukrainians. During the interviews, it a homogenous political actor. The policies became clear that many of them do not pursued by the German government, consider themselves as part of Ukrainian particularly the so-called Ostpolitik (new diaspora. Instead, they rather see themselves as Ukrainians living abroad for a certain time

andEastern Eastern policy) Europe, of Willy could Brandt be regarded that aimed as willingness to integrate into the German anat easingadditional tensions factor between for this West“invisibility”. Germany15 society,or indefinitely. and are Quitecharacterized often they by showlow levels high of interconnectedness amongst each other and low civic engagement with regard to GermanWithin thegovernment framework to get of theinvolved Ostpolitik, with Ukrainian issues before Euromaidan. it was not in the main interest of the West

15 Kappeler, Andreas (2001): Die Ukraine in der deutschsprachigen Historiographie. In (Hrsg.): Jordan, Peter et al.: Ukraine: Geographie – Ethnische Struktur, Geschichte – Sprache und Literatur, Kultur – Politik – Bildung –

16 Wirtschaft – Recht. Frankfurt/M., Berlin, Berlin, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien, p. 216. UkrainiansIn the context in Germany”.of this paper the “old diaspora” is defined as a rather homogenous group of people of Ukrainian 17 Sincedecent the lining collapse in Germany of the Soviet in the Union first, second Jewish orpersons third generation. and persons Further of Jewish explained heritage in are the accepted section “Main to migrate facts toabout

Germany as so called quota refugees (Kontingentflüchtlinge). 52 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 As the events of Euromaidan in Kyiv led joint events. Furthermore, the interviews to mobilization and manifestation of a revealed that a major factor uniting the civil society within Ukraine, a similar members of the diasporic community development can be observed in Germany. and their different forms of engagement Euromaidan was the initial trigger for are common values as a group. Especially, networking among Ukrainians in Germany “Euromaidan values” or “European values” and for their engagement leading to the as listed in art. 2 of the Treaty on European emergence of a diasporic community. The Union (TEU), i.e. human dignity, freedom, perceived necessity to help and a growing democracy, equality, the rule of law and sense of belonging to a Ukrainian group in respect for human rights, were named. For Germany motivated many to take part in the interviewees, this overlap also creates a solidarity protests and common activities. constant link to Euromaidan in Kyiv and the civil society in Ukraine. emergence of a new diasporic community, theWhereas annexation Euromaidan of the Crimea triggered and the war the in Ukraine were additional drivers for the institutionalization of the engagement formation and civic engagement of this ofWith Ukrainians regard to in the Germany, variety anda stabilized ongoing new community. In late 2013 and early diasporic community has the potential to 2014, a plethora of political initiatives was function as a non-state actor in the long term. started, which since then have experienced To date, we can observe the mobilization of a continuous change concerning intensity, new individual actors starting to establish a organization, goals and means. The homogenous community. This becomes not interviews showed that many engagements only evident in their transnational activities are undergoing a process of further with Ukrainian civil society, but also in their institutionalization and professionalization interaction with the German society, thus since their formation. acting as an intercultural link between Ukrainians and Germans. Recently, bilateral The use of social media considerably activities between Ukrainians and Germans facilitated this process not only as a tool to have gained in importance. As such joint initiate protests and common activities but activities are increasingly initiated by also as a means to establish new contacts the German side, it can be assumed that and to extend personal networks. Besides social media, another factor that played visible in Germany. The next section will a decisive role for networking among elaborateUkrainians on finallythe two are main becoming forms of morecivic members of the diasporic community was engagement – humanitarian aid in Ukraine the Church. Before Euromaidan, the Church and engagement in Germany – and their (especially the Greek-Catholic Church) provided the only platform for Ukrainians in Germany to meet, discuss and share ideas. Thepotential engagement internal and externalof the influence.diasporic This exchange became even more important community during Euromaidan. Furthermore, the process of networking was actively promoted by Ukrainians themselves, Ukrainian diasporic initiatives, which e.g. by holding so-called “Stammtische” emergedStarting in in Germany, November were 2013, mainly the focusing first (regular’s tables). Additionally, since 2014, on political protest and information the Ukrainian embassy and the consulate generals in Germany have been increasingly Not only did the engagement during this focused on connecting Ukrainians in timeactivities focus (e.g. on showing Euromaidan solidarity Wache with Berlin). the Germany, e.g. through the organization of protests in Kiev, but many informative

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 53 initiatives were aimed at the German of democratization in Ukraine.18 At the public as well. The interviewees describe same time, there is a risk that the reduction of reform pressure will only have positive on Euromaidan and the following effects in the short term. In the long run, warthat alongin Eastern with the Ukraine first violent many incidents of the reversed consequences could occur, with formerly political initiatives broadened the continuous support of the diasporic their range of activities – now mainly community leading to the omission of focusing on activities aimed at Ukraine, needed reforms.19 e.g. humanitarian aid for Ukrainians suffering from the outcomes of the war The indirect stabilization of Ukraine in Eastern Ukraine or military support is not the only process contributing to for the Ukrainian army. At the same time, democratization. To provide humanitarian with the manifestation of the situation in aid, Ukrainian activists in Germany often Ukraine, cultural and informative activities cooperate with civil society in Ukraine. The in Germany are gaining importance again interviewees pointed out that this does with the intention to explain Ukraine and not only serve as a control mechanism Ukrainian matters to the German public, to ensure that donations reach their recipients, but is also crucial to receive mental map of Germans. information from Ukraine. Furthermore, thus trying to fill in the “white spot” on the the members of the diasporic community The engagement in Ukraine sharing European values as described in the section before, strictly insist upon Humanitarian and military aid plays a major these values in their activities and in their role in the engagement of the diasporic cooperation with Ukrainian partners. community. The main activities include For example, engagement is structured supplying hospitals and social institutions in a democratic way, as decision-making like orphanages with equipment and drugs, is often based on discussions where the support of families and the bereaved everyone can participate. Furthermore, the of soldiers and displaced persons and – at interviewees follow rules of transparency

Ukraine – the provision of equipment expenses public and publishing reports forthe the beginning Ukrainian of army, the conflict such as in uniforms Eastern onin theirtheir activities,activities e.g.– not by only making to gain financial trust and protective vests. This engagement from German partners, but also to support was deemed necessary as the state itself, the underlying normative concept. This suffering from the consequences of the war in the East and the economic crisis, in Ukraine – interviewees describe that theyalso influencesare not only their making work sure with that partners their Therefore, the diasporic community partners are reliable, but also expect indirectlydid not seem contributed fit to provide to the these stabilization services. transparency from their side. In the long of the Ukrainian government, especially term, the advocacy of democratic norms and the demand that partners in Ukraine potentially, by reducing reform pressure in adjust to these norms can considerably in the beginning of the conflict – which

some fields, could also support the process influence civil society in Ukraine, leading

18 Melnyk/Patalong/Plottka/Steinberg (2016): How the Ukrainian Diasporic Community in Germany Contributes to EU’s Policy in its Home Country, p. 9. 19 Ibid. p. 9.

54 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 to the democratization of Ukraine from the this perception, activists are organizing bottom up.20 different events to promote Ukrainian culture and history. The engagement in Germany Another problem perceived by the diasporic community is the indifference of activities in Germany aim at the support many Germans regarding the engagement andWhile stabilization an important of civil part society of the in Ukrainian Ukraine, of Ukrainians. Even though Euromaidan, therefore indirectly contributing to the the annexation of the Crimea and the democratization of the country, the trend war in Eastern Ukraine were present in of activists to refocus on cultural and German media over a long period of time informative activities in Germany can be and Germans supported humanitarian aid observed. These are not only addressing to Ukraine, many interviewees described the members of the diasporic community, a lack of support for the activities of the but also the German society – to close diasporic community. This became also the gap between the German society and apparent in the low interconnectedness Ukrainians and to counter their limited between the diasporic community and visibility, as interviewees often highlighted. other German actors, e.g. civil society, This gap is of historical origin as described media and political institutions. This in the historical overview. For example, problem does not only result from the active Ukrainians feel that Euromaidan missing or critical perception of Ukrainian was incorrectly perceived by the German engagement in the German society, but society as it was often equalized with a also from a lacking platform for joint right wing movement in the German public initiatives. Only few German institutions debate. They actively tried to change this view, e.g. by translating Ukrainian news into German, using their slogans in German Ukrainians feel that Euromaidan during numerous demonstrations and was incorrectly perceived by the the organization of informative events to «German society as it was often explain that the Euromaidan was not about equalized with a right wing movement nationalism but about European values. in the German public debate

At the same time, the interviewees expressed the feeling that Ukrainian culture have been working with Ukrainians actors and history is often associated with the within the country itself or in Germany. Russian one. This seems to be mainly due The few organizations mentioned by the to the historical perception of Ukraine as interviewees most often only organize being merely a “post-soviet” state, which annual conferences or hold round tables, but remains a part of the Russian sphere of are not pursuing long-term activities, e.g. in capacity building in Ukraine, where skills and Russia enhance this understanding and intercultural competence of Ukrainians ofinfluence. Ukraine The as close well links as betweenthe large Germany impact living in Germany could contribute as of Russian propaganda in Germany, as the interviewees describe. To counter the “Kiev Dialogue”, bilateral initiatives well. With only some exceptions like

20 Melnyk/Patalong/Plottka/Steinberg (2016): How the Ukrainian Diasporic Community in Germany Contributes to EU’s Policy in its Home Country, p. 8.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 55 like the Ukrainian-German Historical activists are working in German projects Commission, the UKRAINE Network or that aim at capacity building in Ukraine. the UkraineLab-Forum were founded Thus, they are not only contributing their only after Euromaidan, mainly providing expertise but also serve as a bridge between a platform for networking. Despite these the German and Ukrainian civil society initiatives, the overall cooperation between through their intercultural competence. German and Ukrainian civic actors remains limited. Overall, the attempts of Ukrainians diasporic community indeed can predominantly lacking long-term success. be perceived as a new non-state Nevertheless,to find access towith the their German engagement public are «actor acting as an intercultural the diasporic community actively tries link between Ukrainians and Germans

Ukraine, which – in the long-term – has to influence the German perception of These trends show that the diasporic spot” in the German mental map, but also community indeed can be perceived the potential not only to fill in the “white as a new non-state actor acting as an between Germany and Ukraine. intercultural link between Ukrainians and positively influence bilateral relations Germans. Conclusion Recommendations Ukrainians are looking back on the mixed Due to the diasporic community’s potential, it becomes apparent that its support should processhistory inof Germany. institutionalizing While after its theactivities, World also of interest to Ukrainian government theWar emigration II the Ukrainian of the majority diaspora of wasUkrainians in the – not only as a contributor to stabilization interrupted this development. Ukrainians and transformation of the state but also as became an invisible community, a „white a bridge between Ukrainian and German spot“ on the mental map of the German societies. public. Euromaidan led to the emergence of a new group: the diasporic community. • Therefore, Ukrainian government should Characterized by a high interconnectedness support the diasporic community by amongst its members and common setting up a Ukrainian cultural institute European democratic values, this group has in Germany. Ukrainians in Germany often the potential to act as a new non-state actor complain about the lack of a “Ukrainian if the process of institutionalization and House”. Such a “Ukrainian House” professionalization of their engagement could not only provide a platform for continues. To estimate this potential, two networking and space for joint activities, but would also strengthen both the The analysis showed that the activities visibility of Ukrainian culture and the havemain the fields potential of engagement to support were the process analyzed. of diaspora in Germany – thus supporting democratization of Ukraine in the long term the diasporic engagement both in – both through the indirect stabilization Ukraine and in Germany. of the Ukrainian government and the diffusion of norms in the cooperation with • Ukrainian government should also invest in the establishment and support reduced reform pressure. At the same time, of bilateral forums – both between the theUkrainian diasporic civic communityactors − besides in Germany the risk of is a diasporic community and German civic experiencing a new trend: more and more actors as well as between the diasporic

56 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 community and Ukrainian civil society. First, bilateral forums between Ukrainian Ljudmyla Melnyk works as a Research Associate at diasporic and German civic actors would the Institut für Europäische Politik. Since 2015–2016 she has been a part of the project team “Ukrainians in foster their interconnectedness. The Poland and Germany – Civic and Political Engagement, engagement of Ukrainians, often still Expectations and Courses of Actions” supported by lacking institutionalized structures, the German Polish Science Foundation. Currently, she could gain expertise and resources is the leader of the project “Strengthening Ukrainian from the cooperation with German Think Tanks: institutional capacity building and organizations and initiatives, thus empowering cooperation with partners from the EU” contributing to the formalization and supported by the German Federal Foreign Office. Her professionalization of their activities. research focuses on civil society, the language situation This, in turn, could lead to the extension in Ukraine, intercultural communication and German- of their engagement, both in Germany Ukrainian relations. and Ukraine. Second, the engagement of Magdalena Patalong works as a Research Assistant the diasporic community might gain in at the Institut für Europäische Politik. From 2015 to credibility and visibility when working 2016 she was a part of the project team “Ukrainians in in joint projects with established Poland and Germany – Civic and Political Engagement, German actors and organizations. Expectations and Courses of Actions”, supported by the German Polish Science Foundation, and is now part • The Ukrainian government should also of the project team “Strengthening Ukrainian Think foster bilateral platforms between the Tanks: institutional capacity building and empowering diasporic community and civic actors cooperation with partners from the EU” supported by in Ukraine. Especially the latter would the German Federal Foreign Office. She is currently studying East European Studies at the Free University, interconnectedness and exchange Berlin. considerably profit from extensive Richard Steinberg works as a Research Associate at between both groups, as they could the Institut für Europäische Politik. He studied history learn from the experiences of diasporic and social sciences at the Humboldt-University of activists and thus professionalize Berlin, the Université de Toulouse II – Le Mirail and the and extend their activities in Ukraine. University of Erfurt. From 2015 to 2016 he was a part Furthermore, the above mentioned of the project “Ukrainians in Poland and Germany– mechanism of norm diffusion could Civic and Political Engagement, Expectations and take place when actors from both states Courses of Actions” supported by the German Polish cooperate – thus leading to the bottom- Science Foundation. Richard Steinberg is an alumnus up democratization of Ukraine in the of the Foundation of German Business and was Junior long term. Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2010).

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 57