COVER PHOTO SMILE / HUNTER BAKER

is photo was taken in March of 2012 in Havana, Cuba. is trip was part of a class in Tisch Open Arts called Topics in Cuban Culture, in which we studied the history, politics, religion and expressive culture of Cuba prior to traveling there. is photo is in Habana Vieja, or Old Havana. EDITOR-IN-CHIEF ANITA ROJAS CARROLL

ADVISING EDITOR MAGGIE CARTER

MANAGING EDITORS HENRY TOPPER DECLAN GALVIN ALEXANDRA KELLY HANSEN KIARA WHITNEY

COPY EDITOR MATTHEW BERENBAUM

CREATIVE DIRECTOR ELISA YI

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DALA TOWNSHIP, YANGON, MYANMAR (BURMA) / NADÈGE GIRAUDET

At dusk, a young boy walks through his village in Dala Township. Rice elds surround houses on stilts opposite the river from the city of Yangon, Myanmar’s former capital. July 2012.

iii 1 RAP Y REVOLUCIÓN: AFROCUBANISMO AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY CUBA / ANITA ROJAS CARROLL 14 THE TRIALS OF THE WRETCHED / RHONDA KHALIFEH 21 REHABILITATING CHILD SOLDIERS: ALLEVIATING VIOLATIONS OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS / ALIX COHEN 31 PHOTO SUBMISSION 1 / DIANE KANG 33 EDUARDITO / GABRIELA GARCIA 35 CIVIL SOCIETY OCCUPIES THE RIO+ 20 EARTH SUMMIT / MIKE SAMDEL 40 STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE: BETWEEN TERROR AND COUNTERTERROR / NICHOLAS GLASTONBURY 47 CROSS CLASS OPPOSITION TO HUSNI MUBARAK / JULIAN PHILLIPS 57 BITTERSWEET: CHOCOLATE TOURISM IN THE CARIBBEAN / MAGGIE CARTER 63 KASHMIR AND OPPOSING NATIONALISMS / BEN KELLERMAN 69 PHOTO SUBMISSION 2 / DANIELLE GRANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

iv TAIPEI GAY PRIDE PARADE / DANIELLE GRANT Taipei, Taiwan 2012 LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

In its founding in 2010, the Journal of Global Aairs began as a small collaborative e ort amongst a group of frien ds with shared interests and goals to create an integrative, globally conscious student-run conference, which included a supplementary publication.

ree years later, the Journal of Global Aairs has grown into an organization that is truly Gallatin in its interdisciplinary nature: integrating symposiums, panel discussions and conferences, and lm screenings with a publication whose denition of “global a airs” ranges from the political, the critical and theoretical, to creative expression and visual art.

is edition has traveled great lengths to reach the point of publication. Aer working together throughout di erent countries, continents and time zones, our team pulled together to create yet another beautiful, thoughtful and synthetic issue. Our issue travels throughout Cuba, the Middle East, Brazil, Egypt, Jamaica, Pakistan, Malaysia, and countless other locations, exploring topics from terrorism, child soldiers, ecotourism, hip-hop, and the intense connections formed between places, people, and memory.

Each article and each photograph portrays true passion and the hunger for intellectual curiosity that Gallatin encourages. Let this issue serve as a visual and literary journey throughout a vast and complicated world, seen through countless di erent lenses, stories told through words and images alike. Keep searching for more questions, keep writing, keep thinking, keep moving and traveling and documenting everything you see and hear and wonder.

I am so honored to be editor-in-chief my senior year at Gallatin. I am proud of this beautiful and thought-provoking publication, and look forward to a fruitful and inspiring year.

Happy reading,

Anita Rojas Carroll Editor-in-Chief

vi JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS | FALL 2013 EDITION RAP Y REVOLUCIÓN: AFROCUBANISMO AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY CUBA ANITA ROJAS CARROLL

Rapper Julio Cardenas, speaking of his introduction to hip-hop through the song “Boricuas on da Set” by Fat Joe:

“ ‘ Conyo, ‘ta Buena,’ (‘Damn, that’s good’) I said when I heard it. It was a moment that touched my heart and opened my mind. I was hearing a lot of music from Miami radio, LL Cool J, 2 Live Crew, Queen Latifah, Monie Love, but the song inspired me. I thought it could really be the Latino-American-Cuban connection… When Fat Joe said, ‘ Oh, Boricuas, clap your hands, I started saying, ‘ Todo el mundo con las manos arriba, negros, mulatos, blancos.’ (‘Everybody with their hands up, black, white, mixed.’) at was the basis of my rst rap, ‘ Hip-Hop Es Mi Cultura.’ (‘Hip-Hop Is My Culture’) It was an old-school rap, but it reached the people.” - Excerpt from Close to the Edge, In Search of the Global Hip-Hop Generation

In June of 1961, Fidel Castro delivered his hop in Cuba. famous speech “Words to the Intellectuals,” in rough my research, I intend to which he highlighted cinema, television and explore rap cubano as a manifestation of the arts as important vehicles for propaganda nationalism, identity, and sociopolitical and “the ideological construction of the discourse. Specically, I am interested in its p e op l e .” i ere is no doubt that Cuban culture representation of the post-Revolutionary and identity are markedly shaped by the visual Cuban state’s relationship with art in the and performing arts - a fact that has provoked public sphere. I have found that these much scholarly interest in the somewhat questions can be examined through schemas contradictory relationship between artistic of race, socialism, and globalization. I will expression and the state. An examination of begin by analyzing the specic conditions history shows varying degrees of censorship in which Cuban hip-hop emerged, and by and freedom in the arts, shaping a society using the characteristics of the Special Period in which the artist is both autonomous and as a basis for examining rap’s representation dependent. e Special Period, from 1991- of Afrocentrism, politics and the global 1998, resulted in drastic changes in every market, and its expression of the conicts of aspect of life in Cuba, including the arts, as Revolution and counterrevolution, socialism well as Cuba’s position in the global market. and capitalism, race and nationalism, and It was an era of crisis, contradictions, and autonomy and hegemony. Rap cubano is a confusion, but it also marked the birth of hip- genre of crossing borders and contradictions.

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LA HABANA / NILI BLANCK

It is a generational phenomenon that seeks movement in New York. In the 1960s, black to express the narrative of a displaced and communities in New York were moved from questioning youth. their homes by slum-clearance programs ough the Cuban Revolution was and were relocated to areas such as the South generally seen as an empowering and Bronx. Displacement ruined long-existing equalizing force for most Afro-Cubans, the community structures, and hip-hop became a Special Period (1991-1998) subverted many way for displaced New Yorkers to voice their of the Afro-Cuban revolutionary ideals of frustrations about marginalization and racism equality and nationalism. e demographic and to form new communities.iii restructuring of urban areas resulted in an People of all social levels were relocated increase in racial inequality, causing Afro- to the Alamar district of Havana, but the Cuban youth to identify closely with the majority were people from marginalized black themes presented in American rap music. In communities and from slum areas. Isolated the early 90’s, large numbers of primarily black from the city, with fewer opportunities for Cubans were moved to the outskirts of Havana, employment and higher education, Alamar resulting in a weakened sense of community residents found it dicult to recreate a sense of and fewer economic opportunitiesii the community.iv e need to rebuild community same conditions that spawned the hip-hop and personal bonds gave rise to the popularity 2 JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS | VOLUME 8 | FALL 2013

of hip-hop music among the young Afro- policies were most strongly felt by blacks. Cuban residents of Alamar. It was also easier to vi e legalization of the dollar created a gain access to Miami radio stations in Alamar dichotomy of those who had access and those and there was less social control than in the who did not. White people usually received city. Cuban hip-hop was a local reaction to family remittances from the United States, displacement and impoverishment. Although while blacks did not. In the tourism sector, Alamar is considered the birthplace of Cuban blacks were usually excluded because they hip-hop, rap music and hip hop culture also lacked the education or proper appearance to experienced rapid popularity in urban areas interact with tourists. Racial prejudice became that mainly consisted of black working-class increasingly visible and accepted in the Special communities, including Old Havana, Central Period. Havana, Santo Suarez and Playa.v Inspired by racial democracy, the Cuban e crisis of the Special Period forced revolution attempted to create a “color- the government to adopt policies of austerity blind society.”vii As in many Latin American in order to increase Cuba’s competitiveness countries characterized by miscegenation, in the global economy, but anthropologist nation subsumes race in Cuba. Although and historian Alejandro de la Fuente argues the revolutionary government desegregated that the hardships that resulted from these schools, parks and recreational facilities, and o ered housing and education to black Cubans, it also closed down Afro-Cuban clubs and the black press. de la Fuente believes that racially-based mobilization was spawned by contradictions in the Special Period: “e revival of racism and racially discriminatory practices under the Special Period has led to a growing resentment and resistance in the black population which suddenly nds itself in a hostile environment without the political and organizational tools to ght against it.”viii Although the police brutality described in American rap was more violent and extreme, Afro-Cubans found themselves being subjected to more severe forms of policing during this time of economic crisis than before. It was not uncommon for young blacks to be stopped by the police or asked randomly for ID if they were out at certain hours or talking to tourists.ix Because of the increasingly tangible racism and class separation, the young black LA HABANA / NILI BLANCK population of Alamar and similar areas were

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LA HABANA / NILI BLANCK drawn to the militant attitude and powerful perform publicly on an open-air stage near message of early American hip-hop. e the Malecon, called the piragua. Some time young people of the late 20th and early 21st later, a DJ known as Adalberto created a space century did not live through the revolution’s near the Plaza del Carlos III and Avenida most glorious days, even though their parents Infanta.xi is was a turning point for the and grandparents may look back on those days popularization of Cuban hip-hop, launching fondly. ese youth were disappointed and some of the earliest Cuban hip-hop stars, such confused by the revolution’s failures to maintain as SBS, Primera Base, Triple A, Al Corte, and their anti-racist and classist institutions. With Amenaza. A network of rappers called Grupo American rap as an inspiration, Cuban hip- Uno (Group One) came together to form the hop began on the streets, in the parks, on the rst Cuban hip-hop festival in 1995.xii coastal avenue known as the Malecon, and at Before elaborating on the relationship small suburban house parties called bonches.x between state and music, it is essential to Before 1994, the only signicant Cuban understand the roots of and the global rap movement was freestyle. With the help of signicance ingrained in Cuban hip-hop. the cultural wing of the ocial Cuban youth Ethnomusicologist Alan Duran calls Cuban organization, however, rappers were able to and other Caribbean rap a “diasporic dialogue”.

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xii While the rst rap that many Cubans were no matter how di erent their region-specic exposed to was of a more commercialized relationships may be.xvii nature, the 1995 festival featured many When young Afro-Cubans started American rappers and introduced Cuba to an creating their own raps, they used them as “African-American conscious” rap. e visits an expression of protest against the racial from American rappers, organized largely hierarchy, demanding social and political through a network called the Black August Hip- justice. Historian Paul Gilroy credits the Hop Collective, were essential to the formation somewhat uid intercontinental transference of rap cubano. e Black August Collective of black culture, specically hip-hop, to “an originated in the California prison system in inescapably political language of citizenship, the 1970s as a link between di erent resistance racial justice, and equality.”xviii Cuban rappers, movements throughout the Americas. e through lyrics and performances, ght for hip-hop collective specically tried to create the inclusion of young Afro-Cubans in the intercontinental bonds through black activism institution, asking the state to live up to the and hip-hop culture.xiv e collective’s goals original promises of egalitarianism that are so are to “support the global development of hip- central to Cuban socialism. Rappers (especially hop culture by facilitating exchanges between those who identify as “underground”) address international communities where hip-hop is a the supposed race-blindness that exists in vital part of youth culture, and by promoting the ocial race dialectic and how this makes awareness about the social and political issues the hardships of marginalized communities that a ect these communities”.xv invisible.xix Early African-American rappers such as By 1962, all discussions of race except Talib Kweli, Paris, Mos Def, and Common those touting Cuba’s success as a color-blind Sense exuded an aggressive and powerful society had been erased. e revolution had message of black militancy that appealed supposedly solved all racial conicts. For this heavily to the Cuban youth. Sekuo Umoka, reason, identifying oneself in racial or ethnic a member of one of Cuba’s biggest current terms, as opposed to simply as “Cuban” was rap groups, Anonimo Consejo (Anonymous considered unpatriotic. A husband-and- Council), said “We had the same vision as wife rap duo called Obsesion, one of Cuba’s rappers such as Paris, who was one of the rst more well-known rap groups, referred to this to come here to Cuba. His music drew my silencing of race in their 2001 song “Mambi” attention, because here is something from the - which refers to mambises, the Afro-Cuban barrio, something black. Of blacks, and made ghters in the war for independence from principally by blacks, which in a short time Spain. Obsesion employs a spoken-word style became something very much our own, related and uses the berimbau, a Brazilian instrument, to our lives here in Cuba.”xvi In countries such and water sounds to evoke the slave era and as Cuba, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela, Cuba’s rural roots. and even some African countries like Senegal, South Africa and Mali, black communities Resulta q’asi extract heavily from African American rap to Un monton de cualidades cayo encima de mi raza address local issues of marginality and race,

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Y muchos fueron en masa a pasar un One of Cuba’s most lauded Afro-Cuban poets, curso Nicolas Guillen, wrote a poem in 1964 entitled De como no ser racistas. “Tengo” (“I Have”) that listed the revolutionary Se graduaron con honores y estas Y hasta el sol de hoy permanecen changes that empowered blacks. Escondidos en la frase esta: SOMOS IGUALES Tengo by Nicolas Guillen TODOS LOS SERES HUMANOS. Tengo, vamos a ver, (It turns out like this Que ya aprendi a leer A ton of qualities fell upon my race A contar And so many went in masses to pass a Tengo que ya aprendi a escribir course Y a pensar On how to not be racists. Y a reir. ey graduated with honors and parties Tengo que ya tengo And until today they stay Donde trabajar Hidden within this phrase Y ganar WE ARE EQUAL Lo que me tengo que comer. WE ARE ALL HUMAN BEINGS.)xx Tengo, vamos a ver, Tengo lo que tenia que tener. Obesion describes the transition blacks (I have, let’s see, experienced from being in a low social at I’ve learned to read standing before the revolution to having “un To count monton de cualidades”, or a number of good I have that I learned to write qualities, when the revolution turned them And to think into social subjects. Yet, the line “fueron en And to laugh. I have what I already have masa a pasar un curso/de como ser racista” A place to work suggests that the white revolutionaries’ And earn dedication to anti-racism was mere lip service What I have to eat. they paid to the ideal of color-blindness while I have, let’s see, xxi avoiding the realities and racism of Cuban I have what I needed to have.) society. “Se graduaron con honores y estas” refers to the self-congratulatory and self- In a dark satire of this famous poem, the praising discourse of revolutionaries who rap group Hermanos de Causa (Brothers of marketed the eradication of racism as one of the Cause) borrowed the title and structure the revolution’s greatest achievements. to manifest the reality faced by young Afro- Part of the reason the young Afro- Cubans during the Special Period. Cubans of the Special Period and the early Tengo una raza oscura y discriminada 21st century were so disillusioned by the re- Tengo una jornada que me exige, no da emergence of racism and class distinction nada, was the huge contrast between reality and the Tengo tantas cosas que no puedo ni hopes of the previous generation of blacks that tocarlas, the revolution would mean the end of racism. Tengo instalaciones que no puedo ni pisarlas,

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Tengo libertad entre parenthesis de aspect of Cuban rap, it is very common to see hierro songs that make direct reference to political Tengo tantos provechos sin derechos que authorities or the state, referring to police a mi encierro, Tengo tantas cosas sin tener lo que he harassment, government corruption or the tenido. state’s tendency to silence any dissenting voices. One of the most notable political (I have a race that is dark and rap songs by an underground group is “A discriminated veces” (“Sometimes”) by the group Anonimo I have a day that takes from me, doesn’t give anything. Consejo. In the song, Anonimo Consejo refers I have so many things that I can’t even to corruption, the black market, and bribery touch within the government. I have buildings I can’t even step in I have freedoms between parentheses of Los tipos con “money” tracan en sus iron ocinas, I have so many benets without rights, Gritan resistimos y anda en carro noche that I am imprisoned. y dia I have so many things without having Robandole al pueblo como el alacaran a what I had.)xxii su cria

e rst line of the song is very explicit: e men with money track in their “I have a race that is dark and discriminated.” oces ey shout “Resist” and ride around in e rappers then refer to the institutions the their cars day and night revolutionary government has supposedly Robbing the city like the scorpion his provided for blacks: health, education, welfare, Young. xxiv but say that they do not see them, cannot set foot in them, cannot touch them. e line e rapper depicts the state and the police “Tengo libertad entre parenthesis de hierro” as criminals. Anonimo Consejo wanted to refers to the hypocrisy of the revolution that subvert stereotypes about crime, pinning Cuba fought to free itself from neocolonialism these actions on the authorities instead of on but whose victors now hold black Cubans’ the black population that is oen accused of liberties in ironclad limits. e last two lines, them. Government ocials are depicted as where the singer says “I have so many benets hypocrites who employ the revolutionary without rights that I’m imprisoned/I have language of resistance but in fact create a wall so many things without having what I had” between themselves and the rest of society with imply that despite the material benets the their expensive cars and their oces. Anonimo revolution may have provided for blacks, it Consejo accuses them of “robbing” the people. has taken away young black people’s rights to In the same song, Anonimo Consejo draws speak out as an ethnic minority. e group a link between slavery and modern times to Junior Clan has a song that asks “Para mis demonstrate how a history of exploitation is negros sigo preguntando, donde esta tu voz?” still seen in contemporary race relations. e (“For my brothers keep wondering, where is link between slavery and the modern day your voice?”)xxiii is a trope that presents itself oen in global ough the state controls virtually every rap. Ethnomusicologist Paul Gilroy asserts 7 RAP Y REVOLUCIÓN: AFROCUBANISMO AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY CUBA | ANITA ROJAS CARROLL that history is central to African diaspora One of Cuba’s most notable female rap music: “it demands that the experience of groups, Las Krudas, is composed of three slavery is also recovered and rendered vivid black lesbians. Las Krudas insist that women and immediate.”xxv Musicians use slavery as a are “marginalized by the marginalized, at the metaphor for their current struggles. bottom, in all senses.”xxviii While male rappers commonly refer to slavery on a racial basis, Hoy parece que no es asi women refer to slavery by machismo. Las El ocial me dice a mi, “no puede estar alla, mucho menos salir de aqui.” Krudas ght against the objectication and En cambia al turista se la trata diferente. silencing of the black woman both in society Sera posibile que en mi pais yo no and in pop culture. e goal is to give black cuente? women subjectivity and agency. e all-female rap group Oye Habana (Look, Havana), Today it seems it’s not like that composed of three members, commonly e ocial tells me, “You can’t be there, even less can you leave here.” features themes of black womanhood and On the other hand, the tourist is treated empowerment in their songs. eir song di erently. “Negra” (“Black Woman”) speaks of the Is it possible that in my country, I don’t physical beauty of the black woman that xxvi count? stands in stark contrast to traditional Western standards of beauty. Here the rapper points to the evident racial hierarchy that has presented itself in Negra con mi bemba, his country: police targeting young black No hay que me sorprenda. people to harass, and tourists receiving special Negra con mi nata y mi grande pata, treatment. At a di erent point in the song, the Negra… Quien dijo que por mi color oscuro rapper refers to himself as the descendant of Debo bajar mi cabeza? a “cimmarón desobediente”, a runaway slave. Asi soy yo, negra! e allusion to Cuba’s past as a slave nation in a song about modern race inequalities Black woman with my lips connects the rapper to his slave roots and ere’s nothing that surprises me. leads him to ask the question “Is it possible Black woman with my cream and my xxvii curvy girlfriend that in my country, I don’t count?” Black woman… Part of the appeal that rap had to young Who says that because of my dark skin black Cubans was that it provided a venue I should lower my head? for them to manifest their racial or ethnic at’s how I am — a black woman!xxix identities: something that, due to the color- blindness of the Cuban government, was As in many Afro communities, it is not considered taboo. Yet, hip-hop was viewed as uncommon to hear negative or derogatory something specically and especially black. descriptions of typically black features. ere In addition to providing a black voice, hip- is a xation on “pelo malo” (“bad hair”) and hop has also become a venue of expression even talk of “mejorando la raza” (“improving for another voice that oen goes unheard in the race”) by having lighter-skinned children. Cuba: that of the black woman. Oye Habana wishes to subvert the stereotype

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of beauty by presenting black features in a way By machismo.xxxi that renders them beautiful and powerful.xxx Apart from Las Krudas, Instinto (Instinct), Mariana wishes to dispel the belief that Magia (Magic), and Explosion Feminina the black or mixed race woman must be an (Feminine Explosion) are prominent women eroticized gure for the purpose of the tourist in the Cuban rap scene. Inspired by Afrocentric economy: they are marketed as products for feminism, they deploy race and gender their lovemaking and sexual dancing. Mariana simultaneously to create a specic space of underlines the importance for women to empowerment. Female Cuban rappers use create art, to be present in the hip-hop world, their personal style wearing African hairstyles and to use their minds instead of their bodies. and jewelry while writing and performing “I am a protagonist on the street, not in bed,” songs and raps with politically charged lyrics she asserts. She wishes to show the world that to project their individuality and condence. “the Cuban woman does not only know how Magia and Las Krudas are known for wearing to use her hips.” Women are discriminated baggy t-shirts, head wraps and clothing with against by machismo, and she is calling for an traditional African prints on stage. Mariana, end to this norm. In many senses, black female an underground female rapper, speaks of rappers are the epitome of the original hip- her desire to be taken seriously as a woman hop message. ey represent a voice that is the performer without fullling the stereotypical most silenced, the most forgotten, a population female appearance. that sits the lowest on social and racial ladders. ey ght for change and demand justice with Yo me nombro Protagonista pero the same aggression and condence as their En la pista y no en la cama, male counterparts.xxxii Como muchos preeren ir de rapero en Considering Cuba’s history with rapero para comer fama. Yo, Mariana, hago demostrar al mundo censorship, it may be surprising to the outside que la mujer cubano no world how much rap is controlled by the state Solo sabe mover sus caderas, that it regularly criticizes. Yet, just as hip-hop Sino cuando se habla de hip hop emerged under extremely specic conditions Somos las primeras, during the Special Period that led to the Las realistas, Afro-Cuban community’s identication with Aunque seamos discriminados por Conceptos machistas. American rap, the Special Period is likewise responsible for the somewhat contradictory I call myself a protagonist but relationship of state and music. On the streets and not in bed, With the fall of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s Like the many prefer going from rapper cultural industries underwent considerable to rapper to gain fame. I, Mariana, will show the world that the transformations due to the decline in the xxxiii Cuban woman traditional export market. Culture itself Doesn’t only know how to move her hips became an exportable commodity, partly But when speaking of hip hop commercialized as a way of enticing foreign We are the rsts, investment into Cuba. rough foreign e Realists licensing of Cuban records, overseas contracts Although we are discriminated against for musicians, joint lm productions with 9 RAP Y REVOLUCIÓN: AFROCUBANISMO AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY CUBA | ANITA ROJAS CARROLL

LA HABANA / NILI BLANCK overseas companies, and foreign sales of of Cuba’s proclaimed “racelessness” have Cuban art, the Cuban government was able become more visible because the global to attract revenue. International projections market nds the “di erent” alluring. Afro- of vibrant Cuban culture have been vital Cuban culture is being simplied and made to promoting the tourism industry. “e into a commodity to be sold to tourists. e international prominence and marketability Cuban state, while in some senses creating of the arts has reduced the importance of more leeway for artistic expression due to ideological considerations for the Cuban this need to sell culture, still monitors and government.”xxxiv determines domestic cultural production. is international marketing of culture has e Cuban state uses cultural expressions produced a “politics of di erence,” according to its advantage “by partially incorporating to anthropologists Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd. them into visions of a revised revolutionary xxxv is “othering” of one’s own culture reies project.”xxxvi e Cuban state tolerates some the exotic features of a non-Western culture for counterhegemonic expression (in the form the purpose of mass consumption: in Cuba’s of critical art) because this expression can be case, Afro-Cuban themes that had previously deployed by and incorporated into ocial been either marginalized or silenced because institutions to raise state popularity, set

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of more politically engaged groups [such as] Obsesion and Primera Base gathered dust on the shelves of music stores and broadcasting studios, and the more commercial discs of SBS, with its dance-oriented mixture of salsa and rap, was heavily marketed.”xi Hernandez states that SBS was more heavily promoted because its qualities were popular and commercial, its lyrics were harmless, and it was good dance music. e state initially tried to promote more commercialized and less politically- or socially-oriented rap to try to undermine rap’s LA HABANA / NILI BLANCK attempts at radicalism. Foreign producers were attracted to the sounds of groups such as boundaries and limits, and promote a specic SBS because their music used Cuban culture vision of national unity despite the growing in a way that was accessible and enjoyable racial and economic disparities of the Special xxxvii to the outsider. “e Cuban state exploited Period. the commercial rap for its revenue earning ough early rap was looked at with much potential, as part of a push to attract foreign suspicion during the early 1990s because funding through Cuban music and art.”xli it was an import from the United States, At the start of the 21st century, however, the the state gradually came to accept rap as an Cuban state realized that it needed to identify authentic expression of Cuban culture once more with underground rappers, mostly due Cubans started to produce their own music. to the increasing radicalism that was starting Later, by adopting rap into ocial discourse, to appeal to Afro-Cuban youth. Minister the state gained the power to exercise more of Culture Abel Prieto put an emphasis on control and limitations on its distribution. supporting rappers who were pro-Revolution. e relationship the Cuban state has with rap Prieto stated that he was impressed with the can best be described as ambivalent. Certain young rappers he had encountered, “the level sectors of various state institutions try to build of commitment they have to this country and alliances with rap networks, and political the seriousness and rigor with which they ocials sometimes attempt to appropriate take on real problems, and at the same time transnational agencies for their own benet. xxxviii rejecting commercialism.” Additionally, the state realized how it could possibly appropriate e state has formed its own record label, underground rap to bolster Cuban nationalism “Agencia de Rap Cubano”, which in the early and spin the messages to spread revolutionary days generally produced more commercialized xxxix ideals. Since race is such a prominent factor in or salsa-infused rap artists. Ariel Fernandez, rap, the state could take critiques of a color- one of Cuba’s biggest rap promoters and blind society and market them as an image intermediary between rappers and the state, of Cuba as a mixed race nation with African said that in the mid- to late-1990s, “the discs roots. e state had previously been known

11 RAP Y REVOLUCIÓN: AFROCUBANISMO AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY CUBA | ANITA ROJAS CARROLL to use Afro-Cubanism as a way of promoting to exercise greater censorship through national cohesion during times of crisis, institutionalization. Since the Ministry of despite the long-standing idea that race was Culture and the Agencia de Rap directly irrelevant. “In post-revolutionary Cuba, race support the rap festivals, this means that the has served the additional purpose of being a artistic process can be hindered by political formidable ideological weapon against the control. Rappers are very aware of the increase United States and a source of domestic and of control the state has over music as this international political support.” Since the music is integrated into ocial institutions. Special Period increased racial disparities and Osmel Francis Turned, a rapper in Cubanos led to some cynicism about the revolution’s de La Red (Cubans of the Network), does not ability to help Afro-Cubans, the state used approve of state control and the lack of rapper’s these pronunciations of blackness to construct autonomy. “Rappers can’t wait for the state to an image of national union and to regain resolve their problems, because tomorrow I popularity worldwide and nationwide.xlii might say something that bothers the state and ere has even been a change in ideology then I’ll have to forget being a rapper, because which has led some Cuban ocials to commend they’re going to tell me I can’t do it.”xliii rap for showing the existence of discrimination Many rappers complain about not being in Cuba. Cuba’s Minister of Culture said, able to appear on radio programs until they get “We are supporting this movement because rid of o ensive language or dissenting political the vision of rap profoundly reects our lyrics. Rappers try to take some initiative in contradictions, the problems of our society, the maintaining their autonomy by releasing their theme of racial discrimination, and it strongly own CDs or leaking their music online. Today, highlights the drama of marginalized barrios.” artists are trying to maintain their close ties e 21st century has paved the way for more with international rappers and agents so they institutional support for underground rap, can gain control over their own businesses including state-supported concerts and and futures. e success and exposure of rap festivals. Yet, this means the government gets groups is almost entirely dependent on their to choose who can perform, who gets radio relationships with ocial institutions, a fact time, and who gets to release CDs produced by that many artists feel negates the original their agency. In 2004, Anonimo Consejo and purpose of rap as a creative and free expression other rappers complained that discrimination, of their generation. Rappers and young Afro- marginalization and limited resources were Cubans denitely appreciate the prominence just as bad as they had been years before. Cuban rap has reached through state help, but e government rap agency, instead of they generally look at state sponsorship with looking to give rappers autonomy, wants to suspicion and reluctance. Ariel Fernandez is create a dependent relationship. e rappers worried that rappers will lose the autonomy have to appeal to the state for funding and they have been ghting so hard for, saying permission to produce work. erefore, it “Cuban rap will lose its essence the day it may also be a possibility that part of the doesn’t criticize anything.”xliv state “embracing” rap was a political move

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LA HABANA / NILI BLANCK

is individual photograph within the La Habana series depicts one of the most caricature images associated with Cuba: vintage cars. A Havana series would be incomplete without a 1950s car.

13 THE TRIALS OF THE WRETCHED | RHONDA KHALIFEH THE TRIALS OF THE WRETCHED RHONDA KHALIFEH

On Sunday, May 1, 2011, Osama bin for the sake of justice, despite their emotional Laden, the head of al Qaeda, the extremist inclinations. e doubts and questions they group responsible for the fall of the Twin raised regarding the mechanisms used to Towers and the deaths of thousands of achieve justice are not new to modern times. innocent civilians both on American soil and ey are the same questions that have been abroad, was captured and killed by U.S. armed posed time and time again by society’s critical forces. In the aermath of this monumental thinkers since the Nuremberg Trials in the event, U.S. President Barack Obama made the aermath of World War II. following remarks: e Nuremberg Trials were an attempt to set an internationally agreed-upon precedent As a country, we will never tolerate our in order to ensure that the tragedies of World security being threatened, nor stand idly War II would never be repeated. Despite this by when our people have been killed. We will be relentless in defense of our attempt, the years to come would still be dotted citizens and our friends and allies. We with men, such as Saddam Hussein and Osama will be true to the values that make bin Laden, who would pose a threat to the us who we are. And on nights like this status of humanity and international peace. It one, we can say to those families who seems then that the trials that followed World have lost loved ones to al Qaeda’s terror: War II were not fully successful in leaving a justice has been done. i long-lasting legacy. For it remains true that Americans across the country rejoiced at when faced with atrocities of monstrous the death of the man behind the most horric proportions and horric intent, the standard attack on American soil since the bombing of for the process of passing judgment on those Pearl Harbor. Yet despite the wave of jubilation responsible remains ambiguous. that swept across the country, some remained Although there are countless diculties somber and skeptical upon receiving the news that result from the trying of those individuals of this perceived victory. who are horrically unjust, it remains an It is not that these individuals were imperative that a standard of justice is sympathetic towards bin Laden - on the maintained that transcends any preconceived contrary, they had been stubbornly insistent notions of the defendant. e signicance of that justice be delivered and that bin Laden this position can be summarized powerfully face the consequences of the atrocities he and by the words of the late Supreme Court Justice his followers had committed. However, they Robert H. Jackson in his opening of the remained critical of the situation and loyal to Nuremberg Trials when he said, their values upon hearing of bin Laden’s death

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e former high station of these Eichmann trial was the last of the postwar trials, defendants, the notoriety of their acts, yet the rst, and only, trial to take place in the and the adaptability of their conduct newly formed Jewish state of Israel.iv e fact to provoke retaliation make it hard to distinguish between the demand for a that Eichmann was tried in a Jewish state oen just and measured retribution, and the leads to the misconception that the central role unthinking cry for vengeance…It is our the Jewish people played in the trial was what task, so far as humanly possible, to draw distinguished Eichmann’s trial from other ii the line between the two. postwar trials. While it is true that no other Nuremberg defendant was judged by a Jewish To undertake the trials of the unjust with judge and prosecuted by an entirely Jewish the highest standards of justice is both a prosecution team, the trial in this aspect was testimony to the wrongness of the defendant’s not so di erent from the other postwar trials actions and a rearmation of the purest, most held in formerly Nazi-occupied territories in ideal conception of justice. It is not necessarily which Nazi war criminals were tried in the the case that the defendant is worthy of such location of their crimes by the people against high standards of judicial processes, but it is whom their crimes had been committed.v critical that these standards are maintained While the localized judicial process would so that humanity’s concept of justice remains surely lead to conicting feelings between untainted. “professional duties and national emotion”vi In order to begin the process of assessing on the part of those involved in the process, those convicted of crimes against humanity one must take note that this internal conict aer World War II and the methods of justice must have also existed in the other localized taken against them, one must look back postwar trials, such as those that took place in to the trials that immediately followed the Poland or the Czech Republic.vii war. e Eichmann Trial in particular raises e third, and certainly most concerning, numerous questions that are still applicable aspect of the Eichmann trial that made the to modern standards of judicial processes. trial di erent from others of its kind was the Adolf Eichmann, a German Nazi leader process by which Eichmann was brought to involved with the expulsion, relocation to Israel in order to be tried. Hannah Arendt, one concentration camps, and murder of millions of the most prominent intellectuals of modern of Jews (as well as others who were also times, describes this problematic aspect of the declared enemies of Nazi Germany) managed trial: to escape the clutches of his victors for more than twenty years before he was forced to face Hence, the Eichmann trial di ered from the consequences of his actions. What makes the Successor trials only in one respect – his trial particularly interesting is the nature of the defendant had not been duly arrested the proceedings and that it di ered in several and extradited to Israel; on the contrary a clear violation of international law had aspects from the trials that preceded it.iii been committed in order to bring him e rst and most basic aspects to be taken to justice…In this instance, Israel had into account in regards to the Eichmann trial indeed violated the territorial principle, are the location and timing of the trial. e whose great signicance lies in the fact

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that the earth is inhabited by many the possibility of punishment can be peoples and that these peoples are ruled explored. Arendt explains the grounds on by many di erent laws, so that every which legal punishment is administered: extension of one territory’s law beyond Consider the question of legal the borders and limitations of its validity punishment, punishment that is usually will bring it into immediate conict with justied on one of the following grounds: the law of another territory. viii the need of society to be protected against crime, the improvement of the e moral debate that ensued due to the criminal, the deterring force of the warning example for potential criminals, kidnapping of Eichmann from his hideaway and, nally, retributive justice.xi in Argentina in order to bring him to justice makes the Eichmann trial the classic example While these grounds are certainly of the contradictory actions that oen result applicable for crimes that occur under from the attempt to bring civilization’s worst “normal” circumstances, it is dicult to see criminals to justice. As the nal postwar how they could be applicable in regards to trial, the Eichmann trial adds a somewhat criminals of war or individuals who have uncomfortable undertone to the legacy the committed crimes against humanity. It is Nuremberg trials and other postwar trials unclear what is truly achieved when a criminal attempted to leave behind. Furthermore, the of war is punished. e fact of the matter is trial unintentionally le behind the precedent that the circumstances under which crimes of violating international law in order to bring against humanity occur are so specic, and the an individual to justice. crimes themselves so twisted in their intent, e premises under which the Eichmann that punishing the individual responsible trial was conducted, in addition to the rhetoric neither prevents nor encourages the repetition used by both the accused and the accuser, of the act. However, society’s sense of morality naturally lead to the examination of the would now allow these criminals to go purpose of holding a criminal trial and the unpunished.xii e problem with trying and circumstances under which legal punishment punishing those who have committed crimes is necessary and appropriate. First of all, a against humanity is that the conditions under trial must be founded solely on the pursuit ix which such crimes occur break “all customary of justice. Any other motives, emotional standards and hence are unprecedented in the inclinations, or nationalistic loyalties must be sense that they are not foreseen in the general pushed aside in order for the trial to be loyal to rules, not even as exceptions from such rules.” the notion of justice. e main business of law xiii In the face of such unimaginable acts, one is is to “weigh the charges brought against the lead to question whether it is the very human accused, to render judgment, and to mete out x conception of justice that is incomplete, or if due punishment.” To allow alternate motives mankind is unable to maintain this conception to enter the scene of the courthouse would fully. deter the trial from reaching a just verdict that In addition, the Eichmann trial, along is in accordance with the rules of the law. with the other postwar trials, provoke explorations of the very notion of “crimes Once a verdict has been reached,

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against humanity.” e phrase was relatively process used to achieve a so-called notion new at the time of these trials, and it was of justice is very much in question. It is only coined in the aermath of the horric possible to draw comparisons between some atrocities that occurred during World War II. of the troubles faced during the Nuremberg By World War II, the methods and instruments Trials and the recent cases of crimes against used in battle had become so highly developed humanity. Overall, however, both men were that the previous notion of “criminal warfare” dealt with using a manipulated version of the was deemed insucient at the start. Instead, rhetoric developed by the Nuremberg Trials criminal warfare was ambiguously understood in a manner that made a sham of the legacy as an act of aggression that was “outside le behind by the Nuremberg Trials. e all military necessities, where a deliberate credibility, appropriateness, and perceived inhumane purpose could be demonstrated.”xiv success of the actions taken by the United However, this denition was not found to States government against these men draws adequately summarize the magnitude of the great skepticism from intellectuals across the crimes committed during this war, and thus country and globe. a second denition, “crime against humanity,” e rst of these two men to be held was also adopted. e Nuremberg Tribunal accountable for his actions by the United took this second denition to be far worse States government was Saddam Hussein. It than the rst, for it represented what the is interesting to note the extremely intimate French prosecutor François de Menthon called relationship that existed between Saddam “crimes against the human status.”xv In fact, Hussein and the United States Government only those defendants who were convicted of throughout the majority of Saddam’s reign crimes against humanity were sentenced to as dictator of Iraq. Little known to most death.xvi Americans, Saddam was scouted by the CIA Having examined the nuisances that in his early years to assassinate the Iraqi resulted from the prosecution of men who Prime Minister at the time, due to the latter’s had committed crimes that were previously sympathetic stance towards communism. unheard of in the modern judicial system, xvii While Saddam himself was a classless one can examine similarly controversial and “thug” with little credentials, he possessed dicult cases of crimes against humanity that promising anti-communist attitudes and have equally tested the judicial system and the with the mentorship and support of the CIA, limitations of the modern day conception of he rose to become the “President” of Iraq. justice. Over the last een years, the United xviii In the decade that followed, he continued States of America has accused two di erent to receive decisive support from the United men of committing crimes against humanity. States and several other Western European ese men, Osama bin Laden and Saddam countries even while carrying out the worst of Hussein, were dealt with using methods that his atrocities. the United States government wholeheartedly It was only when Saddam overstepped claimed were appropriate measures of justice. his “boundaries” and attempted an attack on And while there is little dispute over the Kuwait that was not part of the American actual crimes these men were accused of, the and European agenda that these countries

17 THE TRIALS OF THE WRETCHED | RHONDA KHALIFEH suddenly opened their eyes to the horric women, and children were detained, crimes Saddam was committing both within of whom an unspecied number were Iraq and outside its borders.xix From that point tortured. Aer a year of detention in Baghdad, approximately 400 detainees onward, the relationship between Saddam were transferred to internal exile in a and Western nations, in particular the United remote part of southern Iraq. Another States, continued to rapidly deteriorate. On 148 male detainees were referred to March 19, 2003, George W. Bush launched trial before the Revolutionary Court, the invasion of Iraq, also known as the Second are recorded as having been convicted and sentenced to death in 1984 aer a Gulf War, due to Iraq’s alleged possession of summary trial (the number who actually xx weapons of mass destruction, though the stood trial is disputed), and most of existence of these weapons remains debatable them were executed in 1985. Large to this day. swathes of agricultural land and some homes in Dujail were conscated by the While the U.S. army continued to search xxiii for weapons in their occupation of Iraq, the government and bulldozed. U.S. forces took it upon themselves to force the now-criminal tyrant Saddam Hussein to In late 2006, Saddam was found guilty of face justice. On December 14, 2003, almost the murder of 148 Shiite men in the town of nine months aer the start of the war, Saddam Dujail, in addition to the massacre of 50,000 Hussein was successfully captured by U.S. – 100,000 Kurds in northern Iraq. He was xxi sentenced to death by hanging and executed armed forces. e United States acted quickly xxiv to set up an interim Iraqi government and the on December 30, 2006. Iraqi High Tribunal, both of which would play e Bush administration hailed this trial xxii as a victory for foreign policy and the “rule a role in the trial of Saddam Hussein. xxv e opening of Saddam’s trial occurred of the law.” Since it cannot be denied that on October 19, 2005, over two years aer the Saddam was a ercely unjust leader who had start of the war. is rst case would concern committed the worst types of atrocities against the atrocities Saddam, with the aid of various his own people, it is according to the most Ba’ath party members, committed against basic principles of justice that he be tried for Dujail, a town in Iraq’s central Salahaddin his “crimes against humanity.” However, to call province. Human Rights Watch gives the the trial itself a victory for the “rule of the law” following summary of the crimes Saddam is a gross fallacy. ere was very little regarding committed in Dujail: the trial that was conducted according to the international standards of fair trials, not to On July 8, 1982, there was an assassination mention American standards. e deciencies attempt against then-President Saddam of Saddam’s trial make the Eichmann trial look Hussein during a visit to Dujail. e like a model for just judicial processes. prosecution at the trial of Saddam First there was the unavoidable (as in Hussein and his co-defendants claimed the Nuremberg trials), yet no less problematic that, soon aer the assassination attempt and in retaliation for it, Dujail was the issue of Saddam’s trial occurring in a court xxvi object of a “widespread and systematic largely facilitated by his accusers. e attack” in which nearly 800 men, United States was not only the prosecutor in

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the trial, but also the occupying force in Iraq. his whereabouts, the American armed According to the provisions set up in the forces had him surrounded and immediately fourth Geneva Convention, this is in clear assassinated. In the process of assassination violation of international humanitarian law. there was virtually no attempt to follow even xxvii Second, in order for a trial to be fair “the the most basic principles of justice.xxxi e fact accusers and the accused must be subject to that American forces violated international the same standards.”xxviii is was far from law by invading Pakistani territory in order the case in Saddam’s trial. Aside from being to reach bin Laden is not astonishing given denied adequate time to prepare for the case, the precedent set by the Eichmann Trial, but. the defense lawyers and witnesses were under it is preposterous that a criminal, regardless extremely high risk. ree of the defense of the magnitude of their atrocities, would be lawyers were mysteriously killed and the killed without trial and that this act should be defense witnesses that were willing to talk were perceived as the execution of justice. beaten, threatened, and even arrested by order e modern day conception of justice of the court in order to silence them.xxix ird, is in grave danger. ese two recent cases if the trial of Saddam was intended to truly to of individuals convicted of crimes against be an attempt to achieve justice the trial would humanity prove this to be true. e have brought as witnesses all of those who signicance of these two cases should not be gave support for Saddam during his reign. overlooked or dismissed. Saddam’s trial held Among those who would have to stand would by the Iraqi High Tribunal is the rst trial be representatives from the Russian, French, since the Nuremberg Trials in which an entire German, British, and American governments. government was held accountable for its gross xxx ese factors are among some of the many human rights violations.xxxii Osama bin Laden’s that prove Saddam’s trial to be anything but a assassination, while di ering in its procedure just and lawful procedure. and outcome, brought to the table once again e second man convicted of crimes the precedent of breaking international law in against humanity was the leader of al- order to reach the accused. As Human Rights Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, responsible for the Watch stated in their assessment of Saddam’s September 11th attacks that resulted in the fall trial, “ at stake is not only justice for hundreds of the twin towers and the deaths of thousands. of thousands of victims, but, as in Nuremberg, e decade-long search for this man, involving the historical record itself.xxxiii e steps taken America’s longest ongoing war to date, was against these men to achieve some form of nally brought to an end when he was captured justice failed because, while they may have by U.S. armed forces and intelligence ocers. appeased the human desire for vengeance, they His trial did not drag on for over a year as failed to truthfully document the atrocities Saddam’s trial had, because bin Laden received and crimes conducted by these individuals so no trial, no chance to speak in his defense, that history could stand testimony for their and no sentence. Instead, upon discovering occurrence.

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THE 96 YEAR-OLD AND HIS LOVELY WIFE / DANIELLE GRANT

Beijing, China 2012

20 JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS | VOLUME 8 | FALL 2013 REHABILITATING CHILD SOLDIERS ALLEVIATING VIOLATIONS OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS ALIX COHEN

I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS who is part of any regular or irregular armed force or group, regardless of their function. An estimated 300,000 child soldiers are is includes males and females, and those actively being used in armed conicts in at who join voluntarily as well as those who are least 30 countries around the world, according forcibly recruited.iii While most child soldiers to both Amnesty International and UNICEF, are between 13 and 18 years of age, there has but the actual gure may be higher.i In these been a trend towards recruiting even younger conicts, children as young as 7 are being used children, with boys and girls as young as 7 to perform a wide variety of roles, working as years old being recruited in countries such ghters, bodyguards, cooks, domestic laborers, as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In spies, recruiters, and sex slaves.ii is large- northern Uganda, the average child soldier is scale use of child soldiers has severe health now younger than 13, and in a recent survey consequences for the children themselves as of six Asian countries, the average age of well as for their communities, and presents recruitment was 13, with one third of these many grave human rights concerns. Close children being under the age of 12 at the time examination of these health and human of recruitment.iv rights issues will reveal the importance of Due to the length of many conicts, the the larger problem, and analyzing previously obscuring of civilian and military targets, used disarmament, demobilization, and and the proliferation of small arms, the use reintegration (DDR) programs such as those of children in armed conict has increased used in Sierra Leone will help elucidate how in recent decades.v Youth are not only used as to best overcome it. Furthermore, analyzing combatants by governments but also by non- the contexts in which children are used as state actors. e current prevalence of the use soldiers in addition to formerly implemented of child soldiers is evident in the large number DDR methods will help answer the imperative of countries where children have recently been question: how can children be protected from exploited as soldiers.vi From 2001 to 2004, becoming child soldiers across the globe, 27 countries and territories in Africa, the despite the prevalence of conict and war? Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, In order to examine the problems were cited as utilizing child soldiers. Although resulting from the use of child soldiers, it media coverage has predominantly publicized is important to establish how this term is the use of child soldiers in Sub-Saharan African understood. “Child soldier” is internationally countries, child soldiers have also been used in dened as any person under 18 years of age

21 REHABILITATING CHILD SOLDIERS: ALLEVIATING VIOLATIONS OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS | ALIX COHEN countries such as Colombia, Nepal, Burma, Sri “State Parties shall take all feasible measures Lanka, Afghanistan, and Iraq. to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do II. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS not take a direct part in hostilities” (Article 1). Despite cultural and regional disparities It stipulates that state parties shall ensure that between these nations, the use of child soldiers children under 18 years are not “compulsorily is a violation of the children’s human rights, recruited into their armed forces,” (Article 2) and raises the minimum age for voluntary according to several international documents. x e International Convention on the Rights recruitment to age 18 (Article 3). In addition, of the Child, which was ratied in 1989 the Geneva Conventions of 1949 state: and entered into force in September 1990, “children shall be the object of special respect states that “State Parties shall take all feasible and shall be protected against any form of indecent assault…” (Additional Protocol I, measures to ensure that persons who have xi not attained the age of 15 years do not take a Article 77) direct part in hostilities.”vii Article 38 further One can interpret the International species that “State Parties shall refrain from Convention on the Rights of the Child recruiting any person who has not attained according to “three P’s: provision, protection, the age of 15 years into their armed forces… and participation.” Provision signies “the [and] in recruiting among those persons who right to get one’s basic needs fullled,” with have attained the age of 15 years but who have “basic needs” including, but not limited to, not attained the age of 18 years, State Parties food, health care, education, recreation and shall endeavor to give priority to those who play. Protection signies “the right to be are oldest.”viii While these provisions clearly shielded from harmful acts or practices,” such show that the use of child soldiers under as commercial or sexual exploitation, physical age 15 is a violation of international human or mental abuse, or engagement in warfare. Participation includes “the right to be heard rights, they unfortunately do not ban the use xii of child soldiers between ages 15 and 18. is on decisions a ecting one’s own life.” Forcing may be because many societies, particularly in children to serve as soldiers violates all three developing countries, dene childhood and of these P’s, for if any child under age 18 is adulthood in terms of labor and social roles, being exploited as a soldier, he or she is not meaning that people become adults when they receiving education, recreation or play, is at do adult work. And in many societies, doing high risk of sexual exploitation, is indubitably “adult work” at age 15 is the norm.ix Article 38 facing physical and mental abuse, is engaged in includes no direct ban on the use of soldiers warfare, and has not been heard on a decision at this age, but a later addition, the Optional which signicantly a ects his or her life. us, Protocol on the Involvement of Children in using child soldiers violates each of the core Armed Conict, rectied this omission. human rights identied in the Convention on e Optional Protocol on the Involvement the Rights of the Child. of Children in Armed Conict, which entered Furthermore, the UN Convention on into force in February 2002, declares that the Rights of the Child aims to “ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and

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development of the child.”xiii Child development are at greater risk of injury and disability from is a complex process, a ected by socialization, the hardships common to military life, such as cultural values, traditions, gender, ethnicity, poor diet, insanitary conditions, inadequate emotions, and participation in community life. health care, and the rigors of harsh training Spending key developmental years in armed routines and excessive punishments, including conict, stripped from families, schools, torture. Sexual abuse of both male and female and communities, has signicant e ects on child soldiers is oen reported, enhancing child development, particularly on identity the risk of sexually transmitted diseases such construction.xiv “e world child soldiers as HIV/AIDS, and pregnancy for girls. is face is one where the social and cultural puts girls at risk of additional health threats, environment of family and community has particularly if the pregnancy is terminated been destroyed or severely disrupted; where or the baby is delivered in unsafe, unsanitary their physical and emotional well-being has conditions.xvi been a ected; where their opportunities for Mental health consequences that result education and vocational or skills training, from being a child soldier include Post and ultimately their chances for employment, Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), anxiety, are limited...”xv us, they are deprived of the and depression. A study by the Journal of the aspects of childhood that are necessary for American Medical Association comparing healthy development, an additional, critical the mental health of former child soldiers violation of their human rights. and children who had never been conscripted revealed that all participants who had been III. HEALTH CONSEQUENCES child soldiers had experienced at least one Moreover, being a child soldier type of trauma. Former soldier status was has various detrimental physical and signicantly associated with depression, decreased condence, and PTSD, particularly psychological consequences. Physically, xvii children’s inexperience and frequent lack of for girls. In addition to trauma, other training results in high casualty and death psychological consequences result from rates in combat. Children are commonly given the distancing of child soldiers from their particularly dangerous assignments, such as communities. For example, in Sierra Leone, ghting on the front lines or laying or detecting some children were forced to kill a member of landmines, oen resulting in amputation or their own family or village, “thereby severing even death. Many who are injured during ties of trust between them and their primary combat are le to die from their wounds or support systems, the family and community… leaving searing memories and emotional, are shot. ose who do not cooperate, are xviii too weak to keep up, try to escape, or avoid psychological, and social scars.” is type recruitment may also be executed. In addition, of psychological issue causes serious problems child soldiers oen die from starvation during the reintegration of former child or preventable diseases contracted in the soldiers into society, as well as serious health unhygienic conditions in which they live. consequences for the larger community. Because their bodies are still developing, they Because families and local communities are integral to DDR programs, this lack of trust

23 REHABILITATING CHILD SOLDIERS: ALLEVIATING VIOLATIONS OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS | ALIX COHEN creates roadblocks to reconciliation and their families, are also particularly vulnerable community acceptance of former soldiers. to military recruitment because without the protection of their parents, there is no one IV. ROOT CAUSES OF CHILDREN BECOMING SOLDIERS to send them to safety. ey are physically In order to understand how to e ectively less able to resist forced recruitment, and demobilize, reintegrate, and prevent child more susceptible to peer pressure from the soldiers from being used in the future, it is military without families to guide them. Many important to rst examine the situations in separated children have lost their parents due which children most oen become soldiers. to conict or terminal illnesses (such as HIV/ For in order to reconcile these human AIDS). Lack of guidance and community can lead a child to seek a replacement family rights abuses and address these grave health xx concerns, the factors initially causing the within the military. problem must be addressed. While reasons While successful DDR programs can that children become soldiers depend largely disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate child on context, varying per situation, country soldiers back into their communities, and conict, a UN study (e Child Soldiers interventions cannot be e ective without Research Project) has identied several addressing these adverse scenarios that cause general trends of which children are most children to become soldiers in the rst place. likely to become child soldiers. is study In order to e ectively prevent children from on the impact of armed conict on children being exploited as soldiers in the future, factors examined 24 countries, and determined that such as education, employment opportunities, three groups of youth are at the highest risk: and economic security must be addressed. For the poor and disadvantaged, the inhabitants of without education, the army may remain the conict zones, and separated children.xix only available option for a child to earn money e poor and disadvantaged are at and contribute to his or her family’s income. higher risk of forced recruitment because us, education and vocational training must government recruiters oen target those they be a priority in rehabilitating and reintegrating see as a threat, such as potential recruits to an child soldiers in order to ensure that they do armed opposition group. Impoverished youth not become combatants again. Moreover, are oen deprived of their education, so they for former child soldiers, “education is more are also more likely to volunteer to join armed than a route to employment…It is also the groups, seeing these groups as a “route out system within which the children’s lives can of destitution.” Many inhabitants of conict be normalized, and they can be helped to overcome their experiences and develop an zones have lost their parents due to violence, so xxi the children become the largest wage earners identity separate from that of the soldier.” for their families. If these youth are poor and V. DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION have been deprived of education, joining armed forces may be the only way for them As important as they are, education and to support their families. Moreover, separated economic opportunity are only part of the children, or youth who are not living with e orts needed to rehabilitate former child

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soldiers. Coordinated e orts are required to regional, and international government address issues including mental health, child agencies. Without proper coordination, this protection, and primary health care as well. can create an ine ective mess. In Angola, lack In order to best achieve these necessities for of planning led to a DDR program sta ed by former child soldiers, UNICEF identies people who did not have adequate language three overlapping phases of “turning a child skills. Military commanders were then allowed soldier back into a child”: 1) disarmament to serve as interpreters for the children, and demobilization, or physically taking enabling them to manipulate registration data the child out of a military environment, 2) to serve re-recruitment purposes, and hinder physical and psychological rehabilitation, the children’s recovery processes. E ective and 3) reintegration with families and the demobilization also requires emphasis on community.xxiii community building and should reect an While these stages of demilitarizing analysis of local circumstances. Policies should former soldiers are implemented di erently be coherent and program strategies should be depending on situation and context, several clear on how to separate child soldiers from guidelines have been developed based on the military and how to encourage processes historical lessons that non-governmental of family reunication and community organizations (NGOs) and government acceptance, which are crucial for reintegration. agencies should follow. In respect to xxiv disarmament and demobilization, all child e demobilization program implemented soldiers should be included in peace accords in Sierra Leone presents an excellent case and demobilization processes. For instance, study, for there has been an e ective, integrated UN peacemaking missions in Angola and response to the mass-scale use of child soldiers Mozambique tried to limit their mandate and in the region since a ceasere was declared in budget to only soldiers aged 15 and older, 2001.xxv Prior to this ceasere, civil war had excluding all younger child soldiers. is is consumed the country since 1991, when an ine ective because it denies demobilization armed group called the Revolutionary United services to the youngest of child soldiers, Front (RUF) invaded eastern Sierra Leone leaving them without much-needed assistance. from Liberia demanding an end to government Other faulty peace accords have included ex- corruption and claiming to be bringing peace. combatants only, which excludes soldiers who Instead, however, the RUF controlled diamond fullled non-ghting duties, such as girls who elds and regularly abducted large numbers were recruited for sexual exploitation. is is of boys and girls during attacks, forcing them problematic because all soldiers are in great to provide labor and sex and to participate need of demobilization, regardless of their in combat. About half of their forces were function. children, and opposition militias, including Successful demobilization programs the civil defense forces (CDF) and the Armed also require e ective planning, allocation Forces Revolutionary Council, used child of resources, and coordination. In many soldiers as well. Ultimately, an estimated DDR programs, e orts are made by national 10,000 child soldiers participated in this war. and international NGOs as well as by local, xxvi

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e demobilization of child soldiers took their children to return home because of the place during various stages of the war, with atrocities they were forced to commit, such UNICEF and other NGOs negotiating the as killing family members or neighbors.xxviii release of children and assisting with family It provided a place for the youth to go until and community reintegration whenever their families were ready to accept them, and possible. To e ectively disarm the child played a key role in rehabilitation by preparing soldiers, the NGOs physically separated them children to re-enter civilian life. from their commanders and adult members of their armed group to break the links of VI. REINTEGRATION control. Aer this separation, children who Aer demobilization and rehabilitation, were still in contact with their families were e ective reintegration requires being reunited able to return directly home. Most, however, with family members and an inclusive had lost contact with their families and community environment. While programs were taken to an Interim Care Center (ICC) like the ICCs can only make limited, short- managed by one of the child protection NGOs. term contributions, families and communities ICCs became the primary centers for nding are the primary agents in the development of surviving family members and helping the children. ey have a better understanding of youth begin to transition back into civilian their children, of why they became soldiers, life. ey provided an important transition and of what programs and/or policies will for children, during which they would regain work best in their communities than any a sense of normal life by participating in external worker can.xxix Reintegration also activities such as chores, classes, play, artwork, requires psychosocial approaches: because singing and learning culturally appropriate child soldiers are deprived of normal cultural behavior. e length of stay in an ICC was and moral values while in the military and limited to six weeks, to prevent children when separated from their families and from becoming accustomed to institutional communities, reintegration must emphasize life and to expedite family reunication and forming trusting relationships with adults. It community reintegration. ose who could must incorporate family-based environments, not be reunited with family aer six weeks in which normal cultural behavior can be were placed in foster care (while the search for taught. Moreover, e ective reintegration their family continued), or placed in a living oen must incorporate traditional healing situation with a small group, depending on xxvii methods. In some places, such as Liberia, their age. there are traditional healing methods such as is shows great planning, because the “cleansing” ceremonies that are important for ICCs eciently tackled several issues at community forgiveness. All ocials assisting once: they gave the children a safe place to with reintegration, despite their personal go, where health services and a community beliefs, must respect these methods of healing. were available, while giving the sta time to Lastly, reintegration must address the initial locate their families. is program strategy causes of the child solider problem, so the also shows analysis of the local situation, in problem does not resurface in the future.xxx which many families did not initially want

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e Sierra Leone DDR programs further and future economic success.xxxiiii highlight how these reintegration methods can be put into action. Ultimately, 98% of the VII. LESSONS FROM SIERRA LEONE children demobilized in Sierra Leone were While these aspects of the DDR reunited with one or both parents or with program in Sierra Leone underscore the relatives, but this success was not achieved general guidelines for demobilization and easily. In order to overcome the families’ initial reintegration processes in all post-war unwillingness to accept their children, child situations, there are several issues with Sierra protection sta pursued various outreach Leone’s programs that present lessons to learn. strategies to encourage families to welcome For instance, there was a lack of emphasis their children back home. For instance, they on physical and psychological rehabilitation, worked towards community sensitization both of which are necessary in order for the by discussing the situation of former child children to move forward. UN peacekeeping soldiers with traditional leaders (i.e. local strategy changed from a Demobilization, chiefs), stressing that they had been abducted Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) and forced by adults to commit the atrocities xxxi approach in 2001 in Sierra Leone to a they did. ey also coordinated with local Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration communities to use traditional cleansing and Rehabilitation (DDRR) approach in ceremonies or other healing rituals. ese Liberia in 2003.xxxiv Greater emphasis on ceremonies have been proven to increase health and psychological wellbeing is critically community acceptance of the children, as needed in order to ensure the children’s future well as to help the children feel acceptable xxxii progress. Although health care was provided themselves. while the Sierra Leonean youth were in ICCs, Reintegration programs must also respect severe health issues cannot be resolved in the “local culture and the ecological context” six weeks. Better access to health services they are conducted in, meaning that “any was needed once children returned to their intervention must attend to building local families.xxxv capacity, and if the intervention is run by an Increased focus on psychological care, outside humanitarian aid organization, they while in the ICCs and aer returning to must anticipate the reality of a day when their communities, is also needed. Mental they will no longer be present.” Accordingly, health programs still were not included in the social workers in charge of the DDR the updated DDRR plan in Liberia, but UN program in Sierra Leone focused largely sta and NGOs are starting to recognize the on strengthening parents’ and caregivers’ need for formalized psychological support. ability to help returned children adjust to is addition to rehabilitation programs life in their community and resume normal could create more e ective, longer-lasting social roles. Training teachers and working impacts on former child soldiers, as long as with communities to re-establish sustainable the psychological treatment is tailored to schools is also crucial to reintegration and, as local customs and does not impose Western previously noted, to providing former child psychological theory on non-Western soldiers with an opportunity for development

27 REHABILITATING CHILD SOLDIERS: ALLEVIATING VIOLATIONS OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS | ALIX COHEN societies.xxxvi situation, as well as the “important social, Perhaps the most important lesson learned cultural and personal inuences that lead from Sierra Leone is that collaboration and children to participate in armed conicts.” Yet ongoing communication between the actors they must also aim to protect children’s rights, participating in the DDR process is key to including health, security, and safety, before success. Moreover, analysis of the situation they aim to preserve their culture.xxxviii is crucial to planning, and rather than “prescribe specic child protection actions to IX. PREVENTION a community, it is best to raise questions for its e most e ective way for the international members to consider, [such as] What can we community to reduce the number of children do to help children who have been abducted in combat is by preventing them from joining and involved in ghting to assist them settle armed forces to begin with.xxxix Reintegration back into the community? What can we do to xxxvii programs must simultaneously be preventative protect our children in a time of crisis?” strategies, in order to protect other children from becoming child soldiers and to prevent VIII. UNIVERSALISM V. CULTURAL RELATIVISM former child soldiers from becoming soldiers ere is much debate about DDR programs again. In addition to being implemented in between proponents of the universalism of post-conict states with DDR programs, children’s rights and proponents of the cultural preventative measures should be taken relativity of childhood and children’s rights. worldwide. ese measures include political While the former believe that “childhood pressure from the international community, constitutes a coherent group or a state dened local communities recognizing the role they by identical needs and desires, regardless of can play in protecting children, and advocacy. class, ethnic, or racial di erences,” the latter e international community can help sees childhood as a “social construction, [with] prevent the use of child soldiers by putting its meaning negotiated between di erent political pressure on governments and non- individuals and groups, oen with conicting government forces to recognize international interests.” Supporters of the universal-rights standards such as the International Convention argument contend that children the world over on the Rights of the Child and the Optional have the same needs, and therefore the same Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the support and protection mechanisms should be Involvement of Children in Armed Conict. applied to children worldwide. Advocates of ey should further encourage governments the cultural relativism debate, however, argue to adopt national legislation banning voluntary for better assessment of local conditions and and compulsory recruitment of children below dynamics that dene and shape the experience 18 years and enforcing proper recruitment of the child soldier. Both sides of the debate procedures. If ocials do not abide by such bring up important points, all of which must laws, countries should indict and try those be considered when creating e ective DDR responsible for illegally recruiting children, programs. ese programs must take into to show that there are legal consequences for account the details of the specic conict such actions.xl International pressure can also

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inuence governments through measures the radio and through other media. e such as the Child Soldier Prevention Act of constitutional assembly and elections there 2007. is bill, sponsored by Senators Richard also provided an opportunity for children to Durbin (D-IL) and Sam Brownback (R-KS) participate in the political process. It has also and signed into U.S. law in January 2009,xli been found in Nepal that the involvement puts limits on U.S. military assistance to of children in politics, such as through governments that support the recruitment or dialogue with policymakers, helps increase use of children in government armed forces child protection and build local institutions or government-allied armed groups.xlii is concerned with protecting children’s rights.xliv bill represents an example of how external, Furthermore, other advocacy methods can inuential governments such as the U.S. can also be used to help prevention. For instance, decrease the military incentives of utilizing raising awareness about what children’s rights child soldiers, and can help diminish child are protected according to international exploitation worldwide. legal doctrines can be benecial, as well as When international doctrines preventing informing people about what community the use of child soldiers, such as the Convention services are available to them. For example, on the Rights of the Child, are created, in Sudan, a humanitarian principles project community involvement is key in translating called Operation Lifeline Sudan Southern such laws into practical interventions that Sector (OLS) e ectively spread awareness address the needs of children through dialogue, about children’s rights on a large scale. Leaets partnership, and advocacy. Community actors, were disseminated throughout churches, such as social workers on the ground, local schools, health centers, and military barracks NGOs, and small government organizations, explaining humanitarian principles and are needed to implement such conventions children’s rights. OLS also conducted training at the grassroots level. Without this link workshops, attended by over 7,000 people, from international law to individual people, to make families aware of the prohibition such documents cannot be e ective. e against recruiting children below 15 years of international community should also support age and to inform people on how to decrease community e orts to prevent recruitment. abductions from schools. e media can also Such programs, moreover, should focus on be used to help spread awareness, and local assistance to children that are at the highest and international reporting mechanisms can risk of recruitment: those in conict zones, help engage political and military ocials and those separated from their families, or other community leaders in redressing cases of child marginalized groups (i.e. street children, recruitment.xlv certain minorities, or refugees/internally While these human rights doctrines, displaced youth).xliii community e orts, and advocacy methods ese prevention programs are most are benecial in preventing the use of child e ective when they include children’s voices. soldiers, large-scale, systematic changes are In Nepal, for example, the media organization needed in order to most e ectively prevent Search for Common Ground is helping to their use. Improved access to education, facilitate children’s voices being heard on including secondary education and vocational

29 REHABILITATING CHILD SOLDIERS: ALLEVIATING VIOLATIONS OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS | ALIX COHEN training for all children is crucial in order to child soldier problem currently occurring create opportunities for youth outside of the in about 30 countries, and preventative military.xlvi Moreover, the use of child soldiers measures can help protect additional children stems directly from the prevalence of war. from being exploited as soldiers. Not only erefore, conict prevention must be taken do these e orts help alleviate the su ering of seriously in order to prevent the destruction of child soldiers, but investments in youth are children and adults as well. Conict prevention investments in the future for entire societies. methods include analysis of the roots of conict, “When war-a ected youth receive the services the establishment of early warning and crisis they need coupled with opportunities to management, improvements in government pursue productive lives,” they will inevitably and justice systems, and alternative methods contribute to the economic and political of resolving or transforming conict. ese security of their communities.xlvii is could include mediation by third parties, problem- potentially restructure distraught societies, solving dialogues, and unocial diplomacy.xlvii making desperately needed structural changes Although actively pursuing conict a future reality. If health and human rights prevention measures can be useful in abuses of child soldiers are reconciled and the preventing the use of child soldiers, the initial causes of this problem are remedied, global presence of conict and war today children can be educated, skillfully trained, and is undeniable. us, it is imperative that better equipped to create peaceful tomorrows. proactive e orts are made to protect children Future children could potentially be spared from becoming soldiers in this war-ridden of this devastation, and grow up in more world. DDR programs can help remedy the peaceful, stable, and prosperous societies.

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ECUADORIAN MASKS / QUITO, ECUADOR is photo is of an old man sitting at the doorway of his mask shop. I enjoyed the old man’s face contrasting the hanging masks. e signicance it held to me was the simple facade many people put on when really they’re selling their faces. ought it was quite interesting and thought provoking.

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JAPANESE GAMBLERS / SHINJUKU, JAPAN ese are rows of gambling addicts xated on their machines. I found it shocking. I saturated the colors to represent a media saturated, hyper-stimulated environment.

JAPANESE HEALTH OBSESSION / TOKYO, JAPAN I was shocked the see countless individuals adorned in medicale masks from the fear of contracting illness and hypersensitivity to the pollution within Tokyo.

JAPAN’S OLDEST WALL / SHINJUKU, JAPAN I found this asymmetrical, hand built wall to be beautiful in its imperfections. It was a wall built to guard a temple in Shinjuku.

PHOTOS BY DIANE KANG

32 JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS | VOLUME 8 | FALL 2013 EDUARDITO GABRIELA GARCIA

Papa, sing to me I saw his face once, Papa until the ngerprint of Uruguayan diaspora you inhaled on the deck and has pressed itself into me xed your gaze on the pine and has tattooed its tender ache the smoke spirals lied from your worn lips Eduardito was whistling with you let’s make believe we live in the same spheres His legs came rst even though your constellations of creases then a branchy, bounding body draw breath from some distant greenness and dark, clandestine eyes in a hue I’ve never dared touch Hush, Papa, let me lend an ear to his erce murmur. will you cut my meat for me I’ll listen for the unbearable into traces of Abuela’s tales? gleam of you yearning for each other let’s lean back now, wait for the bite to sink together we’ll exist as slanted lines do you know how much I yearn for you? can I get you a toothpick? let’s say “aren’t we lucky?” I’ll play the game, croon grateful melodies but you’re singing to a plate, and I am singing to you no one has to know

call me little ower, hijita, gordita, Gabrielita in crunchy Spanish, seasoned with tabasco

I’ll call you Eduardito that’s your name, isn’t it? that’s the body you used to wear you said he liked cigarettes

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A ROYAL WEDDING / ANITA ROJAS CARROLL

On the way to the Hagia Sophia, I saw these children dressed up for some sort of holiday festivity and asked if I could take their photo. I saw a lot of children dressed like this, but never found out why. Istanbul, Turkey 2013.

34 JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS | VOLUME 8 | FALL 2013 CIVIL SOCIETY OCCUPIES THE RIO+20 EARTH SUMMIT MIKE SAMDEL

In June 2012, Brazil hosted more than large segments of the earth uninhabitable if 190 heads of state and high-level ministers nothing was done to reduce emissions.ii How — including U.S. Secretary of State Hillary could a global growth-oriented capitalist Clinton, Russian President Vladimir Putin system and a global environmental crisis be and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao — for the reconciled? United Nations Conference on Sustainable e inclusion of civil society — an appeal Development, popularly referred to as Rio+20.i to conceptions of global citizenship and In addition to governmental representatives, democratic deliberation — was one part of the conference also included over 40,000 an incomplete answer. e adoption of a set participants from civil society — which, by the of Rio Principles for sustainable development U.N.’s classication, encompasses indigenous framed in terms of human rights was another. leaders, students, climate scientists and the iii CEOs of multinational corporations. e creation of processes for the e formal inclusion of large numbers of negotiation of climate change and biodiversity civil society groups at the original 1992 Rio loss were a way for member states to appear de Janeiro Earth Summit was unprecedented as if they were doing something to solve the and helped make the summit a historically problem while actually avoiding the most signicant event. is year, however, these politically tricky issues. ese processes groups publicly denounced Rio+20’s failure to have failed — in Kyoto, Japan, Copenhagen, deliver meaningful results. Denmark, and Durban, South Africa — to In 1992, the Cold War had just ended generate meaningful outcomes. Meanwhile, and democratic-capitalist “one-worldism” the interrelated economic, environmental and was being proclaimed as the “end of history.” political crises have all become more severe.iv Yet there were serious reasons for pause. Many had high hopes that a 20-year Shortly before the summit, world leaders had follow-up to the Earth Summit might be an just barely managed to agree to stop using opportunity to redesign the architecture of chemicals that were tearing an enormous multilateral talks, a chance for world leaders hole in the ozone layer (the hole is still there, to take a step back and address basic systemic but it is no larger now than it was then), and problems in a holistic manner. Radical had nally begun to realize that greenhouse transformation was unlikely, but perhaps some gases were causing a worldwide increase in important reforms could be made to hold o temperature and had the potential to make irreversible damage to people and planet while

35 CIVIL SOCIETY OCCUPIES THE RIO+20 EARTH SUMMIT | MIKE SAMDEL at the same time focusing media attention on negotiations, Rio would be a tremendous the big picture problems of our time. is was waste of what U.N. Secretary General Ban certainly the viewpoint of many civil society Ki-Moon had called a “once in a generation groups when the lead-up to Rio began, and opportunity.” these groups made a point of coming to the e 50-page document contains almost table with many good ideas in mind.v no actual commitments. It gives lip service However, most of the more than 40,000 to the idea of building a “green economy” civil society representatives at the summit but contains no commitments to ceasing the found themselves following the preparatory massive handouts oen given to polluters.x talks with increasing frustration. ey It acknowledges the need for stronger watched as negotiators bracketed and deleted environmental governance and increased any and all proposals that might have foreign aid, but commits no funding for challenged the global status quo. ey fought, either. It even fails to openly acknowledge sometimes successfully, to retain human our dangerous encroachment on planetary rights language, but they knew that ambitious boundaries, the critical tipping points beyond proposals for things like the establishment of which science warns that our most basic an international nancial transaction tax or a ecological life support systems may fail us world environmental court were not going to completely.xi be politically feasible.vi In response to the text, civil society Some groups had set their sights on groups issued press releases and made smaller but still signicant victories, such as speeches condemning the document for the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies or the its lack of ambition in the face of clear and creation of a World Environment Organization present dangers. ey tried to use the media on equal footing with bodies like the World to put pressure on heads of state to reopen Health Organization.vii,viii Others just prepared negotiations and add some substance to an to take a defensive stance. Most groups arrived otherwise empty document. alongside mid-level government negotiators, a At the conference’s opening plenary, full week before the heads of state. Days were representatives of youth organizations spent frantically trying to track developments, condemned the document as unacceptable lobby delegations, and report back to and asked, “are you here to save face or to constituencies at home. save us?”xi,xii e enormous caucus of NGOs en, two days before the conference took an even more aggressive stand, publicly was scheduled to begin, it was decided that requesting that the phrase “in full participation negotiations would take place behind closed with civil society” be removed from the doors. No media. No civil society. A negotiated document’s preamble.xiv Heads of state clapped text was released the next morning, and it was politely at the end of each statement and then, far worse than anyone could have imagined. as if these interventions had never happened, e document, entitled “e Future We took turns congratulating themselves on what Want,” suggests that an international race they had supposedly achieved. to the bottom had taken place.ix It was clear By the second day of the three-day that unless high-level ocials reopened the conference, it had become clear that none

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of the leaders present were willing to reopen was a great deal of discussion about how the the negotiations. e remainder of Rio+20 group could be most accountable to those who would just be more photo opportunities and could not be present inside the walls of the hollow speeches, and the civil society groups fortied conference center. Was there anything would be reduced to set dressing in a spectacle le to do in terms of playing the inside game? designed to portray the likeness of meaningful e consensus process seemed to be action where none had occurred. moving painfully slowly, but about two hours At around 1 P.M. on that second day, into the plenary, a decision was reached. ose activists from the Canadian Youth Climate present felt they had done all they could inside Coalition held a satirical press conference in the conference center. Rather than continue to the walkway immediately outside the plenary legitimize a failed summit, they would walk hall.xv Posing as corporate executives, they out, leave their badges and join the people’s distributed copies of a document entitled “e summit on the other side of town.xvii Future We Bought” to the crowd that formed e walkout, like so many of the recent around them and celebrated how Rio+20 had protests around the world, was largely, gone forward without actually doing anything although certainly not entirely, made up of to regulate corporate behavior. It was pretty young people. e group numbered several good political theater, but what came next was hundred and included representatives from even more interesting. women’s organizations and indigenous Copies of the mock-document were communities, as well as the sta from major ceremonially ripped up and onlookers were international NGOs including Friends of the asked to sit down on the oor and to join Earth,xviii Ibon Internationalxix and 350.org.vii in a “People’s Plenary.”xvi A young woman As the policy experts, students and veteran began facilitating and explaining consensus negotiation-trackers marched out of the decision-making. Various participants took complex, they were inundated with cameras. turns voicing their frustrations with the U.N. U.N. sta and government ocials looked process and its outcome, their words echoed on in awe and embarrassed smiles as the by the human microphone. Were it not for the group chanted for “rights, justice, equity, the business casual attire and the U.N. ID badges, Earth’s integrity” before switching to the more it could have been a scene straight out of the straightforward “Walk out — don’t sell out.” Occupy Wall Street protests in Zuccotti Park. e protests got the attention of e plenary grew as journalists, civil the international press,xx but, perhaps society representatives and members of unsurprisingly, there was no reopening of government delegations from around the negotiations. Discontent with the political world stopped to see what all the commotion process at Rio was largely reported alongside was about. Some stood around the edges while praise for the individual commitments made others committed to sit down and stay a while. by some states and corporations which do next Security was powerless to remove such a large to nothing in terms of challenging the political group of people. Eventually, the conversation status quo or reconciling the fundamental shied from an airing of frustration with the structural tensions between economy and document to a plan for collective action. ere ecology that necessitated the rst earth

37 CIVIL SOCIETY OCCUPIES THE RIO+20 EARTH SUMMIT | MIKE SAMDEL summit 20 years ago.xxi also e ective so far as it represented a clear In the wake of all of this there are a great and coherent rejection of governmental self- many questions that need to be asked. Have the congratulation. nations of the world really become so beholden Yet, the question remains of where to to the short-term interests of nancial markets go next. Social movements and civil society and campaign donors that they are willing to organizations are not likely to get very far by waste a historic opportunity to literally save the only committing romantic acts of desperation world? If so, are we simply doomed to live on over and over again. Moving from passion to a dying planet? Can states be forced to become real commitment and impact means doing the responsive to a broader base of interests and hard work of building and growing the kinds protect the global commons? of independent and resilient institutions and Further, one might also ask: What does it networks that can o er new ways of doing mean when those groups which are supposed things while also leveraging power against the to be working inside the political system on forces that actively uphold a status quo with behalf of broad constituencies feel that they bleak implications for the future. is may be have no other option but to turn to the tactics alien territory for civil society groups that have of an Occupy protest? traditionally operated with narrow reformist For those who had devoted months, if not missions and stable funding. However, aer years, to trying to move the U.N. process from Rio, they may have no choice but to reect the inside, the decision to occupy and to walk deeply on their own methods and take a step out was as desperate as it was romantic. It was into the unknown.

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CUBANISMO / ANITA ROJAS CARROLL

Havana, Cuba 2012

39 STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE: BETWEEN TERROR AND COUNTERTERROR | NICHOLAS GLASTONBURY STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE: BETWEEN TERROR AND COUNTERTERROR NICHOLAS GLASTONBURY

Modern notions of the nation-state are However, claims of national sovereignty have predicated on the responsibility of the state stymied the ecacy of such laws and have to control and limit violence in domestic thereby oen put domestic conicts in a realm and everyday life. Borne of omas Hobbes’ beyond accountability until aer the fact, as in Leviathan and the fundamentals of social the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. contract theory, the state exists to preclude ese multifaceted and complex the possibility of warre, or a war of all against developments raise questions about certain all. is has been the dominant discourse paradoxes of the nation-state, governance, up until very recently in history. e rise of and conict; they further call for a signicant authoritarian military regimes in the Southern reexamination of the shape and role of Cone in the mid-20th century, in addition to violence and conict in what is imagined to be the advent of globalization, internationalism, a democratic society. Is it defensible for states and Realpolitik, however, have completely to limit the rights of the people in the name of recast the way in which the nation-state is preserving national security, even when those perceived and perceives itself. Furthermore, limitations allow violence on the part of the with the purported proliferation of terror state? Where does a state’s mandate for violence across the globe, a politics of fear has made end? What are the lines between terror, a its way into all facets of the contemporary morally reprehensible and condemnable act discourse of the state. against a free nation, and counterterror, the Terrorism has similarly instigated the rise state’s responsibility to protect its citizens from of counterterrorism—a eld dating back to the violence? Are there ways in which these two early 1970s and involving an approach focused seemingly conicting societal facts can be on combating the enemy—as well as the rise reconciled with one another? of counterinsurgency, a eld which emerged is paper aims to provide a historical mostly in the 1950s and places its focus more understanding of state-sanctioned terror, distinctly on population-centered, grassroots violence, and oppression, from the perspectives initiatives for ideological dominance.1 of the regime and of the people living under With the expansion of international law, the regime, thereby attempting to understand more energy is being focused on maintaining the commonalities and basic traits of these a certain level of peace, freedom, and justice regimes. ereaer, it will examine current in international society, a human rights domestic conicts in context and examine norm known as the responsibility to protect. the possibility of these states’ devolutions into

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regimes of terror, followed by an attempt to countries.4 e United States, in its vigorous delineate, in the terms of Norbert Lechner, attempts to undermine the Soviet Union and between criminality (the legitimate use of to eradicate communism, quietly impaired state force in domestic contexts) and violence the leist movements and poured money (the illegitimate use of state force in domestic and matériel into the military and its allies. contexts).2 General Videla, during his presidency, once Although state-sponsored violence and said “A terrorist is not just someone with a gun terror can be seen across the globe and in a or a bomb but also someone who spreads ideas variety of cultural and historical contexts, that are contrary to Western civilization.”5 some of the most relevant examples of state e problem of state terror in Latin America, terror are found in Latin America. e then, is as much a problem of the military dictatorial reign of Augusto Pinochet in Chile, establishment and its professionalization as it the de facto presidency of Jorge Rafael Videla is an indictment of American foreign policy during the Dirty War in Argentina, and the and Realpolitik. In fact, military leaders orchestration of Operation Condor across the in the Southern Cone would eventually go Southern Cone all serve to highlight the depth on to proclaim “the intrinsic weakness and and comprehensive nature of the politics decadence of democracy,” an ironic criticism, of fear and state-sanctioned violence in the given that the United States, a self-proclaimed region. ough each Southern Cone country beacon of democracy, managed to wholly had a di erent experience with the rise to undermine and demonize democracy in the power of, and suppression by, authoritarian Southern Cone countries.6 military regimes, there are nonetheless some ere have been numerous regimes details that provide a general sense of these outside of Latin America that have engaged in regimes’ teleologies and a narrative arc of their the same tactics of terror throughout history. histories. While we could examine a number of states, First of all, each of the Southern Cone one that serves as an interesting foil is Turkey, countries—including Brazil, Argentina, whose history is fraught with the same kinds of Chile, Uruguay and Peru—witnessed an disappearances, military coups, and silenced enlargement of its military and police forces narratives as those of the Latin American in the mid-twentieth century, accomplished regimes. e collective violence committed through the defeat of leist guerrilla armies against the Armenian people between 1915 attempting to bring about social revolution. and 1917 in the process of nation-building In Brazil, for example, aer the 1964 and arranging the soon-to-be Turkish coup, the legal restrictions on the military Republic, for example, and the subsequent establishment were whittled away, while in denial by Turkey of the reality of those events, Uruguay and Argentina, the military had has set a precedent not only for a historical claimed full autonomy for themselves even silencing of memories of atrocity but also for before usurping the civilian governments.3 the legitimization of military interventions Furthermore, the polarization of the Cold War into civil matters.7 Like the Southern Cone managed to play a role in the strengthening of countries, Turkey was also the site of several the conservative facets of political life in these Cold War proxy conicts that managed to

41 STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE: BETWEEN TERROR AND COUNTERTERROR | NICHOLAS GLASTONBURY empower conservative movements, and by and continues to be promulgated by a state extension, the military.8 Since 1960, there increasingly centralizing its power structures. have been three military coups in Turkey, ough the last of the Southern Cone totaling more than six of the ninety years dictatorial regimes had been removed from that have passed since the establishment of power by 1990, and transitions to democracy the Turkish Republic. In addition, Turkey had nally occurred, the orchestrators of has a signicant population of Kurds, with the military juntas oen lived in impunity, whom the government has had a contentious continuing to benet from the injustices relationship since the establishment of they committed, and even, in some cases, the Republic, and indeed, several cases of remaining in positions of power, as with disappearance (of Kurds as well as Turks) have General Pinochet. In the mid-to-late 1990s, been taken to the European Court of Human though, Spanish attempts to capture General Rights.9,10 According to anthropologist Carole Pinochet and bring him to justice spurred Nagengast, “more than a quarter of a million similar attempts across the Southern Cone, Kurds and Turks in Turkey have been beaten particularly in Chile and Argentina, to challenge or tortured by the military, police, and prison impunity and bring to justice those who had guards since 1980.”11 ese events have been orchestrated national and transnational terror accompanied in large part by erce silence on and disappearances.14 Despite the best e orts the part of the Turkish state. of human rights groups and legal advocates e current regime of Turkey, though not to convict General Pinochet, he died before a military regime, has become very concerned any convictions could be made: the vestiges with national security and the preservation of the old regime’s judiciary and legislative of national ideals, which has resulted in corruption demonstrating the pervasive and the arrests and disappearances of scholars, continuing nature of the culture of fear in the activists, politicians, journalists, and students. Southern Cone countries.15 Interestingly enough, a large number of these In both Latin America and Turkey, arrests have been predicated on a purported although much of the work of suppressing conspiracy to orchestrate a coup, ironic given opposition groups has been categorized by that these actions are congruent with those the regimes as necessary for the protection typically taken by a regime installed by a of national values, the cultures of fear coup to legitimize and empower itself.12 Other perpetuated by the authoritarian regimes are arrests have been for purported alignment crippling to society at large. Fear is established, and association with anti-government groups disseminated, and tightly controlled by the and activities, whether they be leist groups, state through the establishment of stringent newspapers, political groups, or Kurdish moral, social, and cultural norms, and any groups.13 ere may be a fear that the events sort of diversion, or “transgression,” from of the Arab Spring could be repeated in those norms is categorically labeled as other, Turkey, and this fear may be breeding a desire something to fear and oppose.16 Particularly to undermine potential unrest by whatever in Latin America, where pluralism did not means possible. Nonetheless, in contemporary develop into a collective order in the same Turkey, the same culture of fear has been way that it did in North America, social and

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cultural di erences in society tended to rapidly line of thought that can trouble the principle devolve into patterns of factionalization and of the universal right to life canonized in splintering of social groups.17 e normative almost every body of international law, and it indoctrination committed by the military can pave the way for further leniency in the juntas further streamlined this process of government’s responsibility to protect. Indeed, devolution and social disintegration. this same opportunistic approach to legalism is Despite the denial of ocial involvement deployed by authoritarian regimes that believe in disappearances, murders, and other acts of in the exceptionalism and the righteousness of oppression, all of these actions were “intended their causes and ideas. to humiliate, demoralize, and terrify a broad According to E. V. Walter, “every state has population beyond the particular persons the necessary conditions for terrorism,” which detained for punishment.”18 rough the include a group of individuals—a government, inculcation of such large-scale humiliation, a military, or some form of regime—“equipped guilt, and fear, these regimes intended to with the instruments of violence,” and a discourage political participation, and even group of people who would be subject to this social activity, that might be perceived violence—a population under that regime, as subversive, thereby further adding to or some segment of that population.21 Given the disintegration and destruction of any Hobbes’ notion that the state should be the possibility of pluralism. is violence, ultimate monopolizer of violence in a free though very physical, is also highly symbolic: society, it is axiomatic that these conditions according to Nagengast, “[this] symbolic cannot be destroyed without the eradication violence is important in the structuring and of the notions of liberal statehood that loom ordering of relations of domination and over Western discourse. However, there subordination . . . state regimes everywhere must also be conditions under which the justify their own violence as a reaction to the violence of the state is allowable. In much the (symbolic) violence implicit in opposition same way that Lechner delineates between itself.”19 Indeed, the goal of state violence is not criminality and violence, Hobbes delineates to inict pain, but rather to create categories of between punishment and hostility as the two people who deserve to be punished.20 forms in which state violence may manifest ere is a remarkable dearth of literature itself: punishment has certain limitations on the subject of this delineation between and is intended to inculcate obedience to legitimate and illegitimate uses of violence, collectively agreed-upon law and norms but the issue of the use of violence by states established by virtue of the social contract in cases of terror is highly controversial. Some and social relationships, whereas hostility is scholars who assert principles of pragmatism only allowable against enemies or subjects and relativism oen pose the question of who have, by the act of rebellion, forgone their proportionality, typically by describing a status as subjects.22 Continuing with this line ticking-time-bomb scenario. Is it better for of thought, Walter concludes that one morally reprehensible individual to die, or for a thousand civilians to die? While the for violence to qualify as legal answer may seem clear, this is a dangerous punishment, it must be imposed by

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duly constituted public authority for challenge to delineating punishment and an act within its jurisdiction that is hostility in this model. Western countries publicly judged to violate a legal rule that trumpet themselves as the bearers of promulgated before the act took place . . . [and] it must be inicted with the rights and freedom to the world will decry intention or the reasonable probability torture, terror, and illegitimate violence while that it will strengthen the disposition to simultaneously asserting that it is sometimes obey the laws. (E. V. Walter, “Violence necessary to resort to extrajudicial and ad hoc and the Process of Terror,” American mechanisms for the sake of their own national Sociological Review 29.2 [1964]: 256.) security. e United States is a ne example of such a contradiction, and indeed, since erefore, if a state party issues 9/11, has been engaged in this exact mode of punishment outside of the framework of this justication, which is also visible in the above model, it is violating not only the law but also quote from José Martínez de Hoz as well as in its end of the social contract. the behaviors and speech of other Southern However, this understanding of Cone politicians, the most infamous and punishment and hostility does not address outspoken of whom was General Pinochet. certain elements that may play a role in erefore, our understandings of the shaping of state regimes engaging in delineating legitimate and illegitimate unsanctioned violence. For example, what if deployments of violence have been obfuscated, the law itself is unjust? What if the state has if only because states are sometimes unwilling a popular mandate, and these laws are even to make that legal delineation themselves. To democratically written? And even if we are be sure, the strongest remedies to this would able to identify a state’s deployment of violence be to not only strengthen domestic laws using as illegitimate, what then? e noncompulsory democratic methods, but also to empower nature of international law problematizes international law and the bodies that enforce attempts to hold regimes accountable for them to have more ecacy in holding states their actions. Furthermore, many states, accountable to these norms. Additionally, rather than shy away from or feel guilt over economic and human development may engaging in illegitimate violence, revel in it. also provide some remedy to the issues of For example, the Argentinian Minister of the terrorism and also of robust domestic legal Economy during the time of General Videla’s systems. “State failure signies a return to dictatorship, José Martínez de Hoz, once said the conditions of the state of nature” dened in an interview that “we have used the same by Hobbes as warre; therefore, according to drastic measures against the terrorists that eresa Reinold, the proliferation of failed they have used.”23 e leaders of the Southern states is what is most responsible for the Cone regimes were not afraid to shy away problem of irregular warfare and hence, from proclaiming their goals of eradicating terrorism.25 But what exactly is a failed state? subversion from their respective nations.24 ough no standardized denition exists in e sense of exceptionalism propagated international law or at any international bodies through state responses to terror, and the such as the United Nations, failed states can be subsequent justications thereof, is a further typied by the following basic characteristics:

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“ey are unable or unwilling to protect their foment the resolve of such terror groups citizens from violence and perhaps even and protract the conict. Paul Wilkinson, destruction. ey regard themselves as beyond in discussing the violence of autocratic and the reach of domestic or international law…. colonial regimes and the violence of resistance [And] they su er from a serious ‘democratic and insurgency, describes the two as having decit’ that deprives their formal democratic a “symbiotic relationship” in which the institutions of real substance.”26 is can oen actions of each serve to galvanize the other be traced back to infrastructural decits— into conict.28 e use of counterterrorism shabby systems of national education, the and even counterinsurgency strategies, while remnants of colonial and post-colonial power they may seem e ective in more short-term structures, poor healthcare, a lack of food, contexts, actually continues to problematize economic exploitation, and more. However, and challenge the containment and eventual as Noam Chomsky notes, failed states are not reduction of terror groups in a holistic and a priori weak states; in fact, “Nazi Germany exhaustive manner. Oen, in pursuing these and Stalinist Russia were hardly weak, but techniques, a state becomes the monster it is by reasonable standards they merit the ghting, as exemplied by José Martínez de designation ‘failed state’ as fully as any in Hoz’s aforementioned exaltation of extralegal h i s t or y.” 27 e problem, then, is just as much violence in Argentina as a mirror of the one of systemic failure as it is an alignment techniques used by terrorists against the state. of state bodies—whether intentionally or It is a pipe dream to imagine that the unintentionally—with arbiters of violence; solution to the blurred borders between that is, it is the co-opting of the state and its illegitimate and legitimate violence is to do structures as an instrument of terror. away with conict altogether. e most realistic Since 9/11, the eradication of terror as a solution, while still somewhat idealistic, is for political goal has completely dominated the states to institute a series of legal and political discourse of international relations. However, limits on the scope of military and police rather than ghting a “war on terror,” the more forces, to reform the democratic institutions pragmatic approach (and certainly one that is already in place, and to facilitate the human more aligned with Western norms of human and economic development that will preclude rights) is to engage in developing failed states the urgency to radicalize. e inhibition of at a grassroots level, and, more importantly, this kind of asymmetric conict will only be to refrain from violent combat with terror possible when governments stop perpetuating groups, because such combat is likely to it.

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PHOTO BY HANNAH COHEN

Berthoud Pass, Colorado

46 JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS | VOLUME 8 | FALL 2013 CROSS CLASS OPPOSITION TO HUSNI MUBARAK JULIAN PHILLIPS

INTRODUCTION Islamic dress—negatively a ected women most directly. Mubarak also alienated the growing Sharif Arafa’s short lm, “Retention,” number of Egyptians involved in Islamic- depicts a cross-section of Egyptian society inspired social and political organizations responding to the uprising of January 25, with his support of Islamophobic Israeli and 2011. e lm’s six symbolic characters—a American policies. Mubarak’s inability to police ocer, a middle-class youth, a capitalist satisfy this array of interest groups—the poor, entrepreneur, a print journalist, a history workers, ‘plugged-in’ youth, intelligentsia, teacher, and a young Islamist—have very capitalists, the military, women, and di erent backgrounds and political beliefs. Islamists—created a perfect storm of dissent However, with the exception of the policeman, that forced his resignation in February 2011. the men universally support the overthrow of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak.1 Arafa’s THE POOR lm illustrates the degree to which opposition to Mubarak was spread across social groups e bottom class of Mubarak’s Egypt—the and classes. Egypt’s urban and rural poor roughly 40% of the population who subsisted blamed Mubarak for rising living costs and on less than two dollars a day—included both cuts to social programs. Egyptian workers also farmers and urbanites. Both segments of experienced rising costs and stagnant wages this population grew and su ered increasing during the Mubarak years. From the late nancial hardship as a result of Mubarak-era 1990s, nancially stable urban youth formed population growth and social welfare policy. online and activist communities to oppose For farmers, the Mubarak years brought police brutality and Mubarak’s foreign policy. both a growing shortage of land and water and e urban intelligentsia shared these political decreasing prot margins. Many farmers had concerns and further opposed censorship in received land grants under former President print media and stagnant government salaries. Gamal Nasser’s land reform program, but Mubarak’s removal of protective tari s and such plots were too small to support families support of foreign investors threatened that had oen grown tenfold since the initial Egypt’s moneyed capitalist entrepreneurs and allocation.2 Farmers’ attempts to expand their military ocers. Many of Mubarak’s policies— holdings were stymied by the expansion of cities including removal of food subsidies, tolerance and factories onto arable land and by the 600% of police harassment, and crackdowns on average increase in rents in the 1990s.3 Some

47 CROSS CLASS OPPOSITION TO HUSNI MUBARAK | JULIAN PHILLIPS farmers also experienced water shortages due increase, and, in fact, further impoverished to the increasing diversion of the Nile for desert many already poor urban families.13 is trend reclamation projects.4 Furthermore, Mubarak’s pushed many members of the urban poor removal of tari barriers to food importation into activism and contributed to a protest by and cuts to agricultural subsidies decreased workers in the Aswan tourism sector and the the protability of small-scale agriculture.5 participation of poor Cairenes in the January Even with access to land and water, most small 25 uprising.14 farmers came to depend on secondary sources of income such as brickmaking or tourist (ORGANIZED) LABOR 6 work. Farmers reacted to the nancial trials Egypt’s industrial working class grew of the Mubarak years in two major ways: many into a signicant demographic and political villages organized protests against government 7 force during the Mubarak era. e early agricultural policy, and one million small 1990s brought a wave of foreign-funded farmers immigrated to major cities where they 8 industrialization—notably in textiles, joined the ranks of the urban poor. piece-manufactured consumer goods, and e urban poor—city dwellers without construction.15 ese new industries drew sucient stable income—were impoverished their workers from two sources: the urban by Mubarak-era infrastructure and and rural poor (including many women), and subsidy policies. Due to overcrowding and Egyptians who had worked in the Persian Gulf demand-induced rent spikes in established countries until the 1991 Gulf War and a wave neighborhoods, many poor urbanites built of citizen employment programs in Saudi makeshi settlements on the outskirts of 16 9 Arabia and Qatar. Although manufacturing Cairo and other cities. Because Mubarak jobs were initially steadier and more protable had not signicantly expanded Cairo’s than farming and urban day labor, industrial infrastructure since the early 1980s, these wages failed to keep pace with ballooning new neighborhoods did not receive consistent 10 ination and living expenses. (e stagnation running water or electricity. Poor urbanites of wages may have been a result of the inux also have diculty obtaining food due to the of foreign-manufactured goods into Egypt withdrawal of subsidies put in place by Nasser following Mubarak’s 1991 abolishment of and his successor, Anwar as-Sadat. In the tari barriers. In order to compete with early 1990s, Mubarak cut the national budget cheap foreign goods in the domestic market, for subsidies from 5.2% of total spending to Egyptian factories were forced to keep the 1.5%. Of the limited subsidies that remained, prices of their products articially low— only 17% directly aided the bottom h of 11 precluding expensive wage increases.) Between the population. Together with rising global cost-of-living increases and Mubarak’s cuts to food prices, rent increases and the withdrawal subsidies and social services, many workers of subsidies produced a 75% increase in the began to su er increasing nancial hardship cost of living for Egyptians during the last 12 in the 2000s. In response, many factory two decades of Mubarak’s rule. Further cuts workers began to form unions and organize made by Mubarak to social services in the protests during the latter years of Mubarak’s early 2000s failed to help the poor weather this

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reign. In 2004, an anti-regime group called organizing, as do un- and self-employed “Workers for Change” emerged during the recent college graduates.19 During the 1990s, Kifaya movement (“Kifaya”—Arabic for 15-20% of Egypt’s high school and college “enough”—was the unocial name of the graduates were unemployed.20 is group Egyptian Movement for Change).17 In 2008, a of graduates (most of whom continued textile workers’ strike in al-Mahalla al-Kubra to live with their families in urban areas) provoked nationwide solidarity strikes and gained cheap access to the Internet due to protests. is “6 April Movement” spurred a profusion of cyber cafés in the latter part the 2008 formation of an independent public of the decade.21 Other Egyptian college sector union and hundreds of industrial graduates became self-employed “micro- strikes and sit-ins in 2009 and 2010. e post- entrepreneurs”—supporting themselves by 2008 burst of labor activism culminated in the running small businesses such as cyber cafés, 2011 formation of a nationwide trade union call centers, gymnasiums, laundromats, piece- federation.18 Mubarak’s economic policies, manufacturing workshops, and microbus therefore, provoked both growth and dissent transit agencies.22 Unlike poor day laborers, in the industrial working class. micro-entrepreneurs usually have sucient income and leisure time to join Internet social ‘PLUGGED-IN’ YOUTH networks. Al-Face online communities also e spread of the Internet in the late 1990s include well-o young professionals (such heralded the formation of a new social class in as Google executive Wael Ghunim, civil Egypt: ‘plugged-in,’ or computer-savvy, youth. engineer Ahmad Mahar, and banker Walid is group encompasses nancially stable high Rashid). ese users tend to log onto the school and university students, unemployed Internet outside of regular working hours, and self-employed recent graduates, and young and oen from outside Egypt. Common urban professionals. Signicantly, the “Al- Internet use patterns form the strongest link Face Generation” (to borrow anthropologist between Egyptian students, graduates, and Linda Hererra’s term) coalesced around online professionals. opposition to particular Mubarak policies— Crucially, all three subgroups of the Al- notably the planned succession of Gamal Face Generation are generally united in their Mubarak, Husni’s younger son, and police opposition to two particular Mubarak policies: brutality—and, therefore, has played a major hereditary succession and police brutality. e role in anti-regime organizing since 2000. cross-class anti-succession movement erupted e Al-Face Generation encompasses in 2004 with a wave of Kifaya protests against three distinct groups of young people: the grooming of Gamal Mubarak for the students, un- and self-employed graduates, presidency. Signicantly, the Kifaya movement and young professionals. Egyptian college spurred thousands of young Egyptians to students (who primarily come from urban begin political blogs—which simultaneously areas and nancially stable families) use the protested Mubarak’s policies and provided a signicant space for online community Internet for leisure activities, socializing, 23 artistic production, shopping, and political building. In the last years of the Mubarak regime, members of the Al-Face Generation

49 CROSS CLASS OPPOSITION TO HUSNI MUBARAK | JULIAN PHILLIPS spearheaded a major movement against police to Mubarak. Egypt’s judges repeatedly brutality—which claimed 167 lives between passed rulings contradictory to Mubarak’s 2003 and 2007. During the campaign, bloggers wishes—causing the president to send like Wael Abbas (“Egyptian Awareness”) and some high-prole cases to more compliant Wael Ghunim (“We are All Khalid Said”) spread military courts.26 Journalists reported on news about police abuse to online readers and government corruption and police abuses— traditional media outlets (Ibid and Hererra). provoking a crackdown on print journalism Identication between members of the Al-Face in the mid-1990s.27 Writer Sunallah Ibrahim Generation and Khalid Said—an anti-regime dramatically refused to accept a national blogger and “micro-entrepreneur”—provided “Arab Novel Award” in a 2003 protest against crucial fuel to the movement.24 e Kifaya the regime’s “illegitimacy.” Artist Ahmad movement and the campaign against police Basiuni presented a veiled critique of the brutality illustrate the extent to which political failures of the Mubarak regime to the Venice activism shaped the Al-Face Generation into a Biennale with a performance titled “30 Days of largely unied and anti-Mubarak class. Running in Place.”28 Such acts demonstrate a widespread opposition to Mubarak among the THE INTELLIGENTSIA intelligentsia. Egypt’s traditional intelligentsia— Crucially, such agitation unied the various composed of doctors, lawyers, judges, sectors of the intelligentsia. is trend began teachers, professors, writers, artists, in the 1990s. In the early part of the decade, journalists, engineers, and civil servants— secular and pious lawyers began to collaborate on police brutality lawsuits—closing a has been largely opposed to many of Husni 29 Mubarak’s policies. ese groups largely share signicant schism in the legal community. labor and Al-Face concerns about stagnant e spread of the Internet in the late 1990s salaries, police brutality, and succession. provoked the formation of online political- Further, the intelligentsia as a whole opposes legal anti-regime groups. Such organizations distinctively included lawyers, litigants, and regime censorship and other retrogressive 30 cultural policies. Like the Al-Face Generation, judges together. A middle-aged doctor the intelligentsia was increasingly involved in coordinated the 2004 Kifaya movement, which included signicant participation by Egypt’s online and street activism during the last years 31 of Mubarak’s reign. “Judges’ Club.” In 2008, Egyptian doctors and teachers held a joint strike in protest of Educated and nancially stable Egyptians 32 protested various aspects of the Mubarak wage stagnation. ese joint actions molded regime in the 1990s and 2000s. In the early disparate professional groups into a more 1980s, Mubarak had permitted a proliferation unied sociopolitical class. of independent media and professional In addition to fostering a growing unity administrations—both of which had been among the intelligentsia, such protests bridged suppressed under Sadat.25 In the following class distinctions between elite intellectuals, decades, many sectors and members of this young online activists, and labor organizers. resurgent intelligentsia stood in opposition Professional journalists began to collaborate with Al-Face bloggers in the late 1990s and

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early 2000s—recruiting anonymity-protected Tawq are representative of the wealthy bloggers to release condential or censored capitalist class that was signicantly enriched information.33 Kifaya mobilized doctors and by Mubarak’s early free-market reforms. judges alongside workers and young people. However, Mubarak’s later encouragement e 2008 textile workers strike in al-Mahalla of foreign investment in Egypt threatened the al-Kubra provoked civil servants to form prot margins of these businessmen—turning independent unions in 2008 and 2010.34 Such the hugely powerful National Capitalist class cross-class movements e ectively infused the into political opponents of the President. In intelligentsia with the political consciousness 1991, Mubarak lied tari barriers that had of the emerging Al-Face Generation. deterred foreign companies from importing manufactured goods and foodstu s into NATIONAL CAPITALISTS Egypt.39 Consequently, industries that Egypt’s elite class of wealthy depended on domestic markets (e.g. food and businessmen—which controls 40% of the consumer goods) lost some of their prots country’s wealth—beneted immensely to foreign companies. Beginning in the early from Mubarak’s privatization policies.35 2000s, the Mubarak administration began However, these “National Capitalists” opposed to sell signicant amounts of public land to Mubarak’s support for foreign investment, companies from China, Russia, and the Persian which threatened their privileged access to Gulf region for development. e establishment Egyptian resources and markets. of industrial parks, telecommunications Well-connected businessmen like Nagib infrastructure, and vacation resorts by foreign Sawiris, Husam Badrawi, and Tarak Tawq investors threatened the market share of gained signicant wealth from Mubarak’s Egyptian companies like Orascom, which had previously held near-monopolies over these privatization of government services in the late 40 1980s and early 1990s.36 Sawiris’ Orascom— industries. National Capitalists, therefore, the largest private company in Egypt—gained largely opposed the planned succession of control of parts of Egypt’s transportation Gamal Mubarak (who was largely blamed for infrastructure (railroads and highways), Egypt’s support of foreign investment), and communication sector (cellular telephone eventually endorsed the 2011 overthrow of service) and energy sector (wind farms). Husni Mubarak. Additionally, Sawiris received privileged THE MILITARY access to undeveloped public land on which to develop protable vacation resorts, hotels, and Husni Mubarak entered politics by way gated communities. Badrawi took advantage of of his Air Force service, and the military cuts to Egypt’s public health insurance system was generally supportive of the President in to form the nation’s largest private healthcare the early 1980s.41 Over the past two decades, provider.37 e regime granted Tarak Tawq however, certain sectors of the armed forces cheap government land, water, and credit in have come to oppose particular Mubarak the late 1980s to establish a protable factory policies. By 2011, Mubarak retained the farm north of Cairo.38 Sawiris, Badrawi, and support of the Air Force and the Presidential

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Guard, but was increasingly unpopular Forces to repeat the same demand. erefore, among young foot soldiers, the Mukhabarat a mixture of civilian and military concerns intelligence services, and top generals. turned crucial sectors of the Egyptian military Particular Mubarak policies became against the Mubarak regime. unpopular in particular sectors of the Armed Forces during the 1990s and 2000s. Younger MUSLIMS soldiers and ocers largely originate from Many Muslim Egyptians opposed three Egypt’s poor or from the Al-Face Generation— particular Mubarak policies on a religious and signicantly share these classes’ anger at basis. Firstly, the regime’s crackdown on cost-of-living increases and police brutality. 42 radical Islamic fundamentalism threatened e Mukhabarat (which has a close Muslims’ freedom to observe and propagate relationship with the U.S. Army and the CIA) their religious practices. Secondly, Mubarak’s came to prioritize Egypt’s long-term stability collaboration with Israel and the United States above the continuation of the increasingly ostensibly aided those countries’ Islamophobic unpopular regime. In 2011, the Mukhabarat policies. Finally, Islamic charitable attempted to calm disruptive anti-Mubarak organizations contrasted favorably with protests by collaborating in the president’s Mubarak’s gutted state assistance programs— removal. In the early days of the uprising, the underscoring the failings of the regime. department chief Umar Suliman lled the us, by the end of Mubarak’s tenure, many vacant post of Vice President—symbolically Egyptian Muslims opposed the president for relieving Mubarak of some executive power. such religious reasons, in addition to holding At the end of the revolt, the Mukhabarat class-based grievances. endorsed the president’s abdication. e Mubarak’s crackdown on fundamentalist military’s top generals also came to oppose Islam came in two waves: the rst came in the Mubarak—in large part because they share early 1990s (in the wake of the assassination common economic interests with the of Anwar as-Sadat), and the second in 1995 National Capitalist class. As Egypt has not (in response to a series of terrorist attacks and engaged in any substantial military activity assassinations). During the rst wave, Mubarak since 1973, the generals spend the majority arrested a number of vocal fundamentalists, of their time engaged in business (primarily banned several radical Muslim publications, the development of commercial, residential, and instituted a secular dress code at public and vacation facilities on military-controlled 44 43 universities. In the second wave, the regime land). e Mubarak regime’s sale of public arrested a number of conservative Muslim land to foreign companies for development in leaders (including 15 members of the Muslim the 1990s and 2000s threatened the generals’ Brotherhood), placed a number of radical market share of these sectors. Finally, all mosques under direct government control, sectors of the military depend on American and diverted valuable alms payments from aid, and are therefore extremely responsive to Islamic charities to the state.45 Although these the desires of the U.S. government. U.S. calls for measures targeted radical fundamentalist Mubarak’s resignation in February 2011 likely Islam most directly, many Egyptians— encouraged many members of the Armed

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including the #Jan25 protest singer Rami [W]ith the withdrawal of the state Dungawan—interpreted the policy as from the provision of social goods and generally anti-Islamic. In his song “Against services, and the insecurity in the face of arbitrary police harassment and the Government,” Dungawan charged, “they humiliation, individuals were thrown [the Mubarak regime] target your faith.” For more and more on any possible security Dungawan and others, the campaign against net… especially the provision of social fundamentalism represented an assault on free goods and services by these religious 47 Muslim religious practice. associations. Many Egyptians viewed Mubarak’s Zubaida’s phrasing highlights the collaboration with the United States and Israel relationship between the dependence on as contrary to pan-Islamic solidarity. Religious religious charity and anti-regime sentiment. opposition to the regime’s foreign policy had Many poor Egyptians did not freely choose to four peaks: one in 1991 (at the time of the rst join Islamic organizations; rather, they were Persian Gulf War), in 2001 (at the time of the “thrown” into such organizations because Israeli crackdown on the al-Aqsa Intifada), in the government failed to provide the basic 2003 (at the time of the U.S. invasion of Iraq), social services they needed. Because they and in 2008 (at the time of the Israeli-Egyptian had experienced the failings of the regime blockade and the Israeli bombing of the Gaza rsthand, members of Islamic organizations Strip). It is possible to dene each of these were more likely to be critical of Mubarak than military campaigns as anti-Islamic for two Egyptians who did not depend on the fraying reasons. Firstly, the vast majority of casualties state safety net—making Islamic charities in each of these conicts were Muslims. probable hotbeds of dissent. Such regime- Secondly, the U.S. and Israel justied their critical religious charities—alongside criticism actions on largely Islamophobic grounds— of Islamophobic domestic and foreign policy— producing an upsurge of anti-Muslim melded Islam and anti-regime sentiment. sentiment in the Judeo-Christian world. e apparent anti-Islamism of the four campaigns WOMEN spurred religious-inspired organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood to lead street protests Some aspects of the Mubarak regime— against Mubarak’s complacency or support.46 including cost-of-living increases, restrictions Such protests melded anti-regime and Islamist on Islamic dress, tolerance of police sentiments. harassment, and a failure to pass feminist For many Egyptians, Islamic charitable legislation—a ected women on a gender- organizations contrasted positively with— specic basis. Consequently, women of all and underscored the failings of—state social classes held gender-based grievances social services. In the early 1990s, many alongside class opposition to Mubarak policy. poor Egyptians began to depend on Islamic Some aspects of the Mubarak regime organizations for food, healthcare, and other negatively a ected particular classes of social services that the state had previously women. Mubarak’s social service cuts forced provided. Sami Zubaida describes the shi: many married women to work in order to support their families.48 For women

53 CROSS CLASS OPPOSITION TO HUSNI MUBARAK | JULIAN PHILLIPS responsible for domestic work and childcare rapes an unveiled female college student. (a major responsibility in a nation with a high e lm both depicts a realistic narrative birthrate), a time-consuming job represented a and presents a transparent metaphor for major burden. Although wealthier women did Mubarak’s abuse of Egypt (symbolized by the not su er nancial hardship under Mubarak, police chief and the student, respectively). his regime oversaw the disappointing failure Besides implementing secular dress codes of “Suzanne’s Laws.” ese liberalizing policies and dangerously empowering policemen, would have granted women no-fault divorce, the regime failed to enact a comprehensive legal custody of their sons until age 15, program against state harassment.53 e and electoral quotas—but were overturned harassment epidemic, cuts to social services, by the courts.49 As the public face of the and an inability to secure feminist legislation regime, Mubarak would likely have been held all provided women with gender-specic partially responsible for the collapse of the reasons to oppose Mubarak. reforms—threatening his popularity among disproportionately socially liberal wealthy CONCLUSION: ORGANIZING ACROSS CLASS LINES women. Over the thirty years of the Mubarak On the other hand, social spending cuts and regime, Egyptians developed myriad sector- the failure to pass feminist legislation tarred specic grievances. Crucially, however, the Mubarak for particular classes of women, the January 25 movement was able to mobilize regime’s tolerance of sexual harassment— dissidents from all sectors of society into which a ects over 80% of Egyptian women— 50 a single mass movement. Members of the harmed women in general. Two particular Al-Face Generation like Asma Mahfuz state policies aided would-be harassers. initiated the rst major protests in Tahrir Firstly, the 1990s ban on Islamic dress on Square—which included signicant numbers university campuses increased the risk of of Egyptian women.54 Many members of sexual harassment for Egyptian women. the Egyptian intelligentsia also joined the Headscarves and veils provide a measure of movement in its early days, including a privacy to women on crowded streets—and, 51 coalition of lawyers from the American therefore, serve as a deterrent to harassment. University in Cairo. Although initially For women, the secularizing dress code both reticent, the Muslim Brotherhood eventually increased the risk of harassment and revealed threw the signicant power of political Islam the regime’s lack of awareness of the epidemic behind the uprising.55 e military gave tacit of sexual harassment. Secondly, Mubarak’s endorsement to the movement when it refused policemen were generally permitted to extract to use deadly force against protestors and bribes and torture prisoners with impunity— protected some civilians against attacks by an extraordinary amount of power for low- 56 52 pro-regime thugs. Nagib Sawiris and other level state employees. Many ocers used National Capitalists formed a “Committee of this authority to sexually harass women—a Wise Men” to advise the uprising.57 Workers in phenomenon illustrated by Yusuf Shahin’s Lower Egypt and the Suez Canal zone struck 2007 lm Haya Fawda (It’s Chaos). In Shahin’s in a show of solidarity with the protestors.58 narrative, a corrupt police chief harasses and

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Whereas the Kifaya and April 6 movements among all Egyptians. e apparent numerical involved collaboration between activists in superiority of dissidents motivated powerful a few di erent social groups, the January 25 and reluctant parties like the United States, uprising mobilized vocal representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood, and organized every major group of Egyptians. e diversity labor to endorse the protests—nally forcing of the protestors—more than their number— Mubarak’s resignation. In reality, it is not was critical to the success of the uprising. entirely clear whether or not a clear majority Altogether, only eight percent of Egypt’s adult of Egyptians endorsed the overthrow of Husni population participated in anti-Mubarak Mubarak. However, the cross-class nature of protests.59 However, observers conated the protests gave #Jan25 more legitimacy and cross-sector participation in protests with thus greater political strength than any other numerical majority support for the uprising force in Egypt, including Mubarak’s regime.

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INDIA BOYS / HUNTER BAKER

is photo is a production still from the documentary Liing Dreams, which tells the story of an orphanage in Northern India. Hardiwar, India.

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On November 9, the New York Times What has resulted is the creation of a luxury ‘Travel’ section published the article, “A industry meant to serve those with the means Chocolate Tour of the Caribbean.” e article, to indulge, the same people who have been written by Baz Dreisinger, which described a indulging for centuries in the sweetness of the journey of indulgence and luxury, hopping Caribbean. between three Caribbean islands in search of In his article “Ital Chic: Rastafari, the best chocolate in the world. is burgeoning Resistance, and the Politics of Consumption sector of the tourism industry, indicative of a in Jamaica,” Rivke Ja e describes the rise of larger trend, bears profound and conicting eco-chic, writing, “Sustainable development implications for the Caribbean. Chocolate through radical societal change has lost tourism is a prime example of eco-chic, the ground, becoming decreasingly popular. trend in selective consumption that privileges Achieving environmentally friendly societies local, natural, and sustainable production as a and combating global poverty through ‘green’ form of environmental activism. Dreisinger, lifestyles and ‘ethical consumption’ has proven using words like “artisanal,” “small-batch,” to be a much more attractive proposition. “untouched,” “tree-to-shop,” and “fair-trade,” Green consumerism now places consumption demonstrates the ethic of eco-chic - the at the heart of the solution.”ii ere are valorization of certain kinds of production multiple factors that qualify chocolate tourism and consumption characterized by ethical as eco-chic: the cocoa must be grown by small, and environmentally sustainable practices local, sustainable farm co-operatives and hand (eco), as well as an appreciation for the harvested by traditional methods. e benets highest quality ingredients and materials, for both the workers and the environment are authentic inspiration, and luxury (chic).i e framed as secondary benets of this process, article also reveals the paradox of eco-chic, which is ultimately aimed at creating higher in that it oen assumes the superiority of one quality, better tasting chocolate. Passages from denition of “local” over another, which has the New York Times article validate this claim. global implications, and it ties the alleviation e author discusses the tour chronologically, of poverty to the exclusive consumption writing, “e journey began in a very un- of the elite. In the Caribbean, an industry eco setting: the glinting Hyatt Regency in traditionally based on mass production for Port of Spain, a bustling Caribbean capital export now prides itself on its small scale, its with some of the region’s liveliest night life.”iii locally-rooted production, and its exclusivity. ere is a value judgment placed on a certain

57 BITTERSWEET: CHOCOLATE TOURISM IN THE CARIBBEAN | MAGGIE CARTER kind of tourism, the kind the author is forced over 300 years. You will learn how important to take part in before beginning her tour, Cacao has been to Bri Bri Culture. Cacao which is marked by modern luxury and fast- is used in healing practices, spiritual and paced pleasure. She juxtaposes this with the purication ceremonies and has aided in their rst day of her journey, driving out of Port economic survival.”vii Hotel Chocolat in St. of Spain to the countryside where, “green Lucia o ers multiple “experiences,” including erupted everywhere: rolling hills, quaint plant the “Tree to Bar Experience,” where guests shops, iguanas scurrying across the road.”iv get to participate in every stage of chocolate Describing her rst experience tasting this making beginning with harvesting the cocoa, chocolate, she writes: and the “Engaged Ethics Island Growers Tour,” described as, “A wonderful opportunity to “I smelled the bar. I admired its style: experience the diverse farming of some of a cocoa pod was imprinted on the our island growers who supply us with some chocolate. I felt its cool temperature. I broke it in half — ‘it should break cleanly, of the best cocoa beans for our chocolate with a proper sound,’ Ms Jurawan said. and who maintain the principles and pledges Finally, I tasted; the fruity, spicy sensation of our Engaged Ethics Programme.”viii is made me momentarily understand why popular tour that Dreisinger participated in the Mayans, considered inventors of o ers guests the opportunity to be reassured chocolate, were said to sacrice humans in the ethics of their consumption. Dreisinger in exchange for a good cocoa crop. is was to-die-for chocolate.”v describes meeting a farmer on this tour who told her, “aer growing cocoa for four decades, ix It is clear from the article that chocolate he could nally make a fair wage.” tourism is an experience. It is not just about Undoubtedly, some of the values eating the chocolate; otherwise, people associated with eco-chic, and chocolate would mail order it, a service many of these tourism specically, are positive ones chocolate makers o er. Rather, it is about a for society: environmental preservation, unique and exclusive setting, distinct from economic growth that does not exploit the resort style vacationing. Dreisinger writes poor, and appreciation for di erent cultures. of her tour: “It carried me beyond umbrella- However, these values are complicated by studded beaches to far-ung elds, untouched some contradictions within eco-chic that, island landscapes and a local culture with at least in the case of chocolate tourism, re- a legacy well worth witnessing.”vi It is also entrench the colonial relationship of power. about interacting with the cocoa growers Chocolate tourism in the Caribbean prots and the chocolate makers, and the exclusive from its position as an exclusive industry in opportunity to experience culture. Tourism which the fruits of Caribbean land and labor sites o er chocolate-making demonstrations are meant solely for a global elite market while conducted by the Bri Bri tribe of Costa Rica: promoting itself as local and egalitarian. Ja e “In this tour, you will see a demonstration of writes, “In various sociogeographical spaces, the Bri Bri tradition of making chocolate that one nds localism, environmentalism, and has been passed on through the generations for ethics tied—oen paradoxically—to globalized identities, consumption, and elite lifestyles.” x

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e juxtaposition of localism and globalism developed world, a history well documented is stark in the case of chocolate tourism. As by Sydney Mintz in his book, Sweetness and previously discussed, the industry valorizes Power. localism and small-scale production, one of its e artisanal Caribbean chocolate selling points. However, as a form of tourism, industry, the “Champagne of cocoa,” reveals it is distinctly global by nature. It functions and functions because of vast, geographically- because there is an inux of foreigners seeking rooted inequalities.xv Aer going on the leisure and adventure in the Caribbean islands, Engaged Ethics Island Tour, guests return a non-reciprocal relationship between the to their “luxe pods,” at the Hotel Chocolat, servers and the served that has deep colonial “where even the magnicently minimalist roots. Additionally, although the industry décor (rich mahogany oors, ivory-colored promotes itself as being benecial for the bathroom with open-air shower) evokes the nations of the Caribbean, it is largely foreign- essence of chocolate.”xvi One gets to experience owned or foreign-backed. For example, the the traditional, the rustic, and the local, Caribbean Fine Cocoa Forum is a “European while enjoying the comforts of the modern, Union-nanced networking vehicle working the grand, and the global. e author so to bolster production and exports in nine obtusely writes, “Interestingly, most locals countries.”xi Further, many of the farms and seem to prefer Hershey’s and Cadbury to hotels discussed in the article are owned by these homegrown, primarily dark-chocolate foreigners who immigrated to the Caribbean, creations.”xvii e author nds it “interesting” rather than locals. Finally, the industry has a that the largely poor Caribbean population wide global reach, assuring that this chocolate chooses not to spend their shamefully low can be available even to those who do not wages on chocolates, “which range from venture to the islands: the British-owned $20 to $35 for a box, in specialty shops and “Rabot Estate marquee includes the hotel, an supermarkets across the island.”xviii e eco- internationally available chocolate label (Rabot chic values embedded in chocolate tourism Estate), a restaurant chain (Boucanxii, in St. disguise the fact that it is just as much a class- Lucia, soon to be introduced to New York City striated system as all Caribbean tourism. It is and London), chocolate cafes in London and also incredibly revealing and problematic that Stockholm and the new Roast & Conch shop, the locals can a ord globally sourced mass- which brings small-batch chocolate making to produced chocolate, a product of industrialism London.”xiii For many chocolate makers in the and modernity, and yet chocolate produced by Caribbean, the next logical step aer becoming traditional Caribbean methods of chocolate successful in the chocolate tourism industry making, with cocoa from their own lands, is is to expand globally. e author writes, “the reserved for the elite of the developed world. Caribbean cocoa industry, which has roots is phenomenon is well summed-up by Ja e, in colonial times, is being revitalized.”xiv e who writes of eco-chic, “local, natural, and problem lies in the fact that its revitalization artisanal goods are refashioned in terms of is uncomfortably reminiscent of the colonial aesthetics and price to allow the gentrication model, which turned Caribbean crops into of a back-to-basics, place-based nostalgia.”xix luxuries only available for the elite of the Dreisinger points out of the growing ne

59 BITTERSWEET: CHOCOLATE TOURISM IN THE CARIBBEAN | MAGGIE CARTER chocolate industry in the Caribbean, “is is not be exceptions but should be legislated excellent news economically: with free trade globally, are employed to legitimize the having all but destroyed the islands’ banana exploitative relationships between developed and sugar industries, fair-trade farming and developing that this industry is indicative initiatives are a welcome boon.”xx Undoubtedly, of. Dreisinger writes, “Suddenly I was struck there are some benets to the growth of this by the fact that I could be in Trinidad, or St. industry: not only does it bring income to Lucia, or many other Caribbean islands — all Caribbean nations, but many of the farms of them pinning hopes on this singular crop that participate are cooperatives that treat whose history weaves a storied connection and pay their workers much more ethically between disparate lands. And this I now than large-scale farms in the Caribbean. know: it’s a sweet, sweet connection, indeed.”xxi Further, the small-scale farming methods e connection—rooted in inequality and are more environmentally sustainable and dependency—is not a sweet one; it is bitter, have a smaller impact on the landscape of the just like the cocoa bean, until it is masked Caribbean. However, it is highly problematic with sugar and milk and luxurious golden that these unique elements, which should wrappers, hiding its true nature.

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MYANNMAR / DANIELLE GRANT

62 JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS | VOLUME 8 | FALL 2013 KASHMIR AND OPPOSING NATIONALISMS BEN KELLERMAN

For many Westerners, the name “Kashmir” Indian ruler. At the moment India gained its conjures up images of cross-border disputes independence, the region was occupied by between India and Pakistan. Indeed, nuclear a Muslim majority but governed by a Hindu threats between the countries heightened in ruler, Hari Singh. is, along with its proximity the late 1990s and the early years of the 21st to Pakistan, made the state’s ocial status Century, attracting international intervention particularly contentious aer the Partition and rousing the media’s attention towards of 1947. Despite Hari Singh’s “ambitions of India’s northernmost state, technically named Kashmir being an independent state,” the Jammu and Kashmir. Periods of insurgency threat of attacks from Pakistan forced him to and extensive counter-insurgency measures accede to India in return for military support.1 taken by the Indian military have also e initial agreement that gave most of the garnered publicity; however, a driving force territory to India stated that later on, the of conicts in the region is oen overlooked: accession could be reversed with the “consent Kashmiri nationalism, driven by the people’s of the [Kashmiri] people.”2 However, the struggle for independence and political Indian government later determined that a autonomy. Multiple ruling governments in referendum by the people was not warranted, India have evidently seen this as a political leaving the state of Jammu and Kashmir under threat, leading them to ignore or stie Indian control. e northwest region of the Kashmiri nationalist movements; moreover, disputed territory was eventually granted to multiple administrations have misconstrued Pakistan, and the northeast to China. the resistance as part of a Pakistani agenda in Despite the statement of Jawaharlal order to bolster their own projects of Indian Nehru, India’s rst Prime Minister, that “the nationalism. question of accession in any disputed territory e dispute over Kashmir is rooted or state must be decided in accordance with in the British colonial administration’s [the] wishes of [the] people,” the government mismanagement of its own departure from demonstrated its strong preference for an India. Under British rule, the region, known Indian Kashmir not long aer independence.3 as Kashmir and Jammu, was one of roughly By 1957, the government had managed to 600 princely states in colonial India; these ensure that the Instrument of Accession was were territorial enclaves that enjoyed relative ratied by the people of Jammu and Kashmir, sovereignty under the direct rule of an in part by prohibiting separatist parties

63 KASHMIR AND OPPOSING NATIONALISMS | BEN KELLERMAN from participating in elections. ese claims reiterates the predominance of Kashmir’s to the region were linked to components symbolic importance for India over more of the nationalist project that the Indian practical claims to the territory and any forms National Congress was pursuing at the time of ownership that would lend agency to its - particularly economic development and the people. ideology of a cohesive, secular nation. e Indian National Congress’s initial e state of Jammu and Kashmir is motivation to assert its jurisdiction over noted for its “rich natural resources in forests Kashmir was also linked to the secular and water.”4 is made the state useful in doctrines of Nehruvian nationalism. Conicts developing India’s infrastructure in the image in Kashmir derive largely from the state’s of a heavily industrialized, self-sucient complicated religious demographics - each nation. Indeed, control over Kashmir provided of its three regions is occupied by a di erent the government with extensive access to cheap religious majority; in rough terms, the timber, which would be used mainly to expand Kashmir Valley is 76 percent Muslim, Jammu India’s railways, which were an expression is 82 percent Hindu, and Ladakh is 90 percent of the nation’s literal unity and its aggregate Buddhist.7 India and Pakistan’s justications productive potential. for control of the former princely state arose e region’s water is a persistent point of from its Hindu leadership and its Muslim contention between India and Pakistan. India majority population, respectively. e history continues to divert the Indus River in order of religious fragmentation made Kashmir to generate power, leading Pakistan to claim an appropriate testing ground for Indian that “600,000 people will su er by getting less secularism. If the Congress clung to control water for irrigation.”5 ough this is very much over the region, it could “demonstrate that a modern issue, water diversion is rooted in the province could thrive in a secular state.”8 the history of the ever-shiing forms of Indian e stability of Kashmir would have made a nationalism. e construction of massive particularly strong case for a unifying secular dams in order to generate hydroelectric rule given the region’s complex religious power was a key component of the industrial identications. However, any justications nationalist project under Prime Minister regarding the merits of a secular Kashmir were Nehru, who “considered dams to be the very later nullied with the emergence of Hindu symbol of India’s collective growth.”6 us, nationalism in the region. e government’s resource exploitation in Jammu and Kashmir attempt to use Kashmir as an instrument for began not only as an economic exploit, but a secular agenda demonstrates one of the also as a projection of Nehruvian nationalism. ways in which it glossed over the will of the Such enormous government investment in population, which encompassed an array of the energy sector has served greater national regional and religious identities, in the name purposes, but has come at the expense of of a nationalist ideal. Kashmir’s own welfare; though it has fought to Furthermore, interventions by the national maintain control over the region, the national government in later periods of insurgency show government has made few investments in that it placed less importance on secularism per developing industry within the state. is se as it did on Indian control over the region.

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In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Jammu In cases like these, inuential right-wing and Kashmir Liberation Front (JFLF) engaged Hindu parties were exceedingly inuential in in militant protest with a secular agenda of galvanizing domestic support for policies that creating an independent Kashmir. e JKLF tightened India’s hold on Kashmir. hearkened back to the region’s pre-1947 Hindu nationalism and the anti-Muslim sovereignty and coalesced around “Kashmiri actions that it inspired were easy to discern nationalism, which foregrounds kashmiriyat before the 1996 elections. e combination or Kashmiri-ness.”9 Due to the movement’s of Jammu and Kashmir’s Muslim majority separatist motives Pakistan withdrew its and the state’s long history of insurgency support and the Indian state went as far as to made it a tting target for the BJP’s scathing execute or imprison most of its leadership. rhetoric. According to the party, the people Such assertions of national authority have of Kashmir, along with Pakistan, “embodied consistently undermined Kashmir’s self- India’s external ‘Muslim threat’” which had determination. Indian aggression has oen “clear political reverberations in domestic been directed at Kashmiri secessionists rather communal politics.”11 is followed the logic than at groups that aspire to defect to Pakistan; of electoral politics, with the BJP seeking this indicates that the crux of India’s struggle to rally the Hindu base around its cause is to maintain dominion over the people of before the upcoming elections. Inciting fear Kashmir and any traces of Kashmiri identity, of a threatening ‘other’ emphasized that the rather than its relations with Pakistan. Kashmiri demographic did not align with e expression of Hindu nationalism that India’s touted Hindu majority. According to rose to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s, Angana Chatterji, the “Kashmiri Muslim,” namely with the right-wing Bharatiya Janata in particular, continues to be “execrated as Party (BJP), directly opposed the tenets of ‘violent’ and as an ‘enemy,’ with allegiance to Nehru’s secular agenda. Nonetheless, like an entity other than India”; the government the secular parties, Hindu nationalists used frames this “other” as someone who “can never Jammu and Kashmir as a means to promote be fully trusted and must be assimilated into their own political platform and to dene the norm to become [an] obedient national- Indian national identity as being essentially subject.”12 Given Kashmir’s contested status and primarily Hindu. e BJP exploited between India and Pakistan, excluding conicts with Pakistan in particular to Kashmiri Muslims in such a way frames them assert this form of identity politics, which as an extension of Pakistan and incorporates justied India’s increasing militarization in them into bilateral, as opposed to separatist, Kashmir. Indeed, rhetoric about pacifying antagonism. insurgency in Kashmir was a consistent part is fear mongering took place in the of campaign strategies for right-wing Hindus, context of South Asia’s nuclearization. as demonstrated before the Indian general Tensions grew when India tested its rst election in 1996 when the BJP promised to nuclear devices in 1998, with Pakistan augment “defense expenditure and [to take] following soon aer, and these tensions a more aggressive posture towards militant provided a convenient pretext for the BJP-led insurgencies…in Jammu and Kashmir.”10 government to conate insurgency in Kashmir

65 KASHMIR AND OPPOSING NATIONALISMS | BEN KELLERMAN with national security threats. Pakistan’s clear had clear religious undertones, the ocial nuclear capacity became an opportune way rhetoric had the e ect of discounting any to frame the conict as Muslim aggression non-religious motives for dissent in Kashmir. towards Indian Hinduism. In addition, joining ese motives arose from treatment by the the international nuclear club had been “a BJP and other Indian governments who have long-held symbol of Hindu pride.” e BJP enforced a “systematic and conscious policy took virtually all credit for India’s nuclear of undermining democratic institutions and program, despite the years of development federal autonomy provisions in the region” that preceded armament and statements about in an e ort to make Kashmir’s sovereignty an nuclearization that date back to Nehru.13 impossibility.16 e nuclear tests were an unmistakable is created a complex dynamic in which statement of Indian nationalism. e widely the national government subjugated and publicized events caused a patriotic surge, criminalized the people of the region, but still which meant that to publicly oppose the events exercised its ardent claims over the territory. In “was to risk being labeled as ‘antinational.’”1 the context of Hindu nationalism, India losing Even though the menace of Pakistan was its grip on Kashmir would signal the defeat promulgated in part as a political project, of this majoritarian form of Indian identity; security threats from Pakistan were indeed at the same time, acknowledging the stability legitimate and imminent for Indians; the of a Muslim majority state within India stando ended only aer extensive bloodshed would undermine Hindu claims to national on both sides and international intervention. identity. us, the BJP’s stance on Jammu and Nevertheless, these security threats came Kashmir stood in stark contrast to the secular fraught with nationalist sentiments about nationalism of the past. Where the secular boosting India’s status as a global power, which government strove to prove that di erent thrived on the criminalization of Kashmiri religious identities could coexist under the Muslims. e widespread public support Indian banner, right-wing Hinduism may for India’s reactions to the perceived nuclear have beneted from the region’s instability to threats, which resulted in increased violence advance a singular identity. in Kashmir, serves as an example of how one India’s enormous military presence in particular form of nationalism ignored the Kashmir makes its motives in the region will of other demographics within India. contestable. State and media institutions appear e September 11 attacks on the United to have concealed Kashmiri nationalism and States allowed for further justications by desire for self-determination as a driving force right-wing Hindu parties to conate Kashmiri of conicts, instead emphasizing struggles insurgency with purely Islamic motives. between Pakistan and India. In the early 1990s, Aer the attacks, India’s home minister for instance, the government termed Kashmiri banned the Students’ Islamic Movement of separatist riots “Pakistan’s ‘proxy war,’” as a India under the pretense that it had links to form of rationalizing the “draconian measures Kashmiri insurgent members of Al-Qaeda it used to quell the rebellion,” which included and other pan-Islamic groups. ough a curfews and unprovoked shootings.17 More number of militant acts in the region have recently, the Indian government has been

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accused of continuing to oppress Kashmiri states, Kashmir brings to light remnants of society on shaky grounds. e number of colonialism. In other words, the conict troops that occupy India’s share of the region, reects an impasse “in the space between the at around 671,000, is greatly disproportionate ‘former colony’ and the ‘not-yet nation,’” in a to ocial estimates of the militant population, government that has consistently asserted its which amounts to only around 1,000.18 legitimacy as a modern nation-state.21 Still, A ‘People’s Tribunal,’ which is administered the Kashmiri people’s widespread desire for in part by Angana Chatterji, has been set up to secession also undermines the strength of shed light on the military’s actions in Kashmir. the unitary nation. is explains, in part, why Unaccounted-for killings paint an ominous the military has suppressed demands for self- picture. In one example of allegedly “fake” determination so furtively, as it must project encounters between the military and supposed the image of a nation with control over its insurgents, only one out of 47 casualties was own territory, one that has evolved from the found to be a militant.19 Moreover, instances of turmoil of the past. rape and other forms of violence perpetrated However, not all violent conicts can be by the military appear to be widespread. Such shrouded, and the extremely public nuclear covert attacks targeting civil society bring to confrontations with Pakistan are a great the fore a number of questions regarding the example. e open criminalization of Pakistan government’s true motives in Kashmir. di ers from that of Kashmiri society because Mainstream views among the international Pakistan is a clearly sovereign, internationally community would state that “it is in India’s recognized ‘other’ in relation to India. In fact, interest to bring the insurgency in Kashmir to friction with Pakistan can help boost India’s a close and to settle its dispute with Pakistan as own modernized legitimacy, as it allows the quickly as possible,” given that strife threatens “economic, military, and political disparities India’s security and its legitimacy.20 If Indian between India and Pakistan [to become] leaders do prefer peace in the region, this increasingly stark.”22 In this way, Indian leaders could also be driven by nationalist motives may nd that they highlight their nation’s in the current period of globalization. India’s progressiveness and international dominance attempts to rise to international prominence by placing it in direct contrast to Pakistan. in both economic and political arenas are Jammu and Kashmir has been a well documented, and can be seen through consistent arena for Indian declarations its continued appeals to become a permanent of its own nationhood. Di erent styles of member of the United Nations Security nationalist politics, including Nehru-inspired Council (UNSC). Much of the current secularism, right-wing Hinduism and nationalist sentiment therefore comes along globalized denitions of Indian identity have with assertions that India is a modern, global each employed Kashmir to serve their own nation. ends. is has come at immense costs for the Conicts in Kashmir undoubtedly hinder people of Kashmir, resulting in immeasurable India’s image of modernity. Given that disputes bloodshed, roughly 300,000 internally over the territory are rooted in the 1947 displaced Kashmiri Pandits and little capacity Partition and the tensions around princely for self-governance. Motivations behind

67 KASHMIR AND OPPOSING NATIONALISMS | BEN KELLERMAN insurgency in Kashmir are oen blurry, either because they are multifaceted or convoluted by the national government. Any lasting peace in the region requires a greater degree of transparency so that the true motives and actions of combatants on both sides can be discerned.

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TAIPEI GAY PARADE / TAIPEI, TAIWAN

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A BUTCHER IN SHANGHAI / SHANGHAI, CHINA

THE DESTRUCTION; CHINA: WHERE THE HOUSING BUBLE HAS YET TO CRASH / SHANGHAI, CHINA

PHOTOS BY DANIELLE GRANT

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MYANNMAR / DANIELLE GRANT 71 JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS | VOLUME 8 | FALL 2013 EDITION STAFF BIOS

ANITA ROJAS CARROLL / NEW YORK, NY NYU Gallatin School of Individualized Study, BA, May 2014 Identity and Narrative in Latin America Minor in Spanish MATTHEW BERENBAUM / NEW YORK, NY NYU Gallatin School of Individualized Study, BA, May 2013 e Aesthetics of Science, e Logic of Dance MAGGIE CARTER / DALLAS, TX NYU Gallatin School of Individualized Study, BA, May 2013 Anthropology of Latin America DECLAN GALVIN / WARREN, MAINE NYU Gallatin School of Individualized Study, MA Candidate African Politics NYU Africa House Fellow and a Gallatin Global Human Rights Fellow Declan plans to matrculate into a PhD program in 2014. ALEXANDRA HANSEN / BOLINGBROOK, ILLINOIS NYU Gallatin School of Individualized Study, BA, May 2016 Anthropology and eatre HENRY TOPPER / FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA NYU Gallatin School of Individualized Study, BA, May 2015 Capitalism and Democracy ELISA YI / FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA NYU Gallatin School of Individualized Study, BA, May 2014 International Relations and New Media Minor in Web Programming and Applications

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RAP Y REVOLUCIÓN: AFROCUBANISMO AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY CUBA

i Fernandes, Sujatha. Close to the Edge: In Search of the Global Hip Hop Generation., p.5 ii Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. 231-233. iii Basu, Dipannita, and Sidney J. Lemelle. The Vinyl Ain’t Final: Hip Hop and the Globalization of Black Popular Culture. London: Pluto, 2006. 223-226. iv Fernandes, Sujatha. Close to the Edge: In Search of the Global Hip Hop Generation. 245-246. v Fernandes, Sujatha. Close to the Edge: In Search of the Global Hip Hop Generation.225-227. vi Whiteley, Sheila, Andy Bennett, and Stan Hawkins. Music, Space and Place: Popular Music and Cultural Identity. 178-179. vii Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 233-235. viii Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 134. ix Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 186. x i Whiteley, Sheila, Andy Bennett, and Stan Hawkins. Music, Space and Place: Popular Music and Cultural Identity. 277. xi Basu, Dipannita, and Sidney J. Lemelle. The Vinyl Ain’t Final: Hip Hop and the Globalization of Black Popular Culture. London: Pluto, 2006. 165. xii Fernandes, Sujatha. Close to the Edge: In Search of the Global Hip Hop Generation. 213. xiii Basu, Dipannita, and Sidney J. Lemelle. The Vinyl Ain’t Final: Hip Hop and the Globalization of Black Popular Culture. London: Pluto, 2006. 321. xiv Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 145. xv Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 145. xvi Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 227. xvii Basu, Dipannita, and Sidney J. Lemelle. The Vinyl Ain’t Final: Hip Hop and the Globalization of Black Popular Culture. London: Pluto, 2006. 88. xviii Whiteley, Sheila, Andy Bennett, and Stan Hawkins. Music, Space and Place: Popular Music and Cultural Identity. 162. xix Fernandes, Sujatha. Close to the Edge: In Search of the Global Hip Hop Generation. 99. xx Fernandes, Sujatha. Close to the Edge: In Search of the Global Hip Hop Generation.178. xxi Fernandes, Sujatha. Close to the Edge: In Search of the Global Hip Hop Generation.222. xxii Fernandes, Sujatha. Close to the Edge: In Search of the Global Hip Hop Generation.223. xxiii Basu, Dipannita, and Sidney J. Lemelle. The Vinyl Ain’t Final: Hip Hop and the Globalization of Black Popular Culture. London: Pluto, 2006. 313. xxiv Basu, Dipannita, and Sidney J. Lemelle. The Vinyl Ain’t Final: Hip Hop and the Globalization of Black Popular Culture. London: Pluto, 2006. 321. xxv Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 130.

73 JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS | VOLUME 8 | FALL 2013 EDITION xxvi Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 131. xxvii Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 132. xxviii Whiteley, Sheila, Andy Bennett, and Stan Hawkins. Music, Space and Place: Popular Music and Cultural Identity. 275. xxix Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 140. xxx Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 127. xxxi Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 140. xxxii Fernandes, Sujatha. Close to the Edge: In Search of the Global Hip Hop Generation. 146. xxxiii Fernandes, Sujatha. Close to the Edge: In Search of the Global Hip Hop Generation. 15. xxxiv Fernandes, Sujatha. Close to the Edge: In Search of the Global Hip Hop Generation. 16. xxxv Whiteley, Sheila, Andy Bennett, and Stan Hawkins. Music, Space and Place: Popular Music and Cultural Identity. 207. xxxvi Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 18. xxxvii Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 18. xxxviii Fernandes, Sujatha. Close to the Edge: In Search of the Global Hip Hop Generation. 154. xxxix Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 114. xl Fernandes, Sujatha. Close to the Edge: In Search of the Global Hip Hop Generation.115. xliFernandes, Sujatha. Close to the Edge: In Search of the Global Hip Hop Generation.119. xlii Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 16. 122. xliii Basu, Dipannita, and Sidney J. Lemelle. The Vinyl Ain’t Final: Hip Hop and the Globalization of Black Popular Culture. London: Pluto, 2006. 188. xliv Fernandes, Sujatha. Cuba Represent!: Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 16. 122.

THE TRIALS OF THE WRETCHED i President Barack Obama. “Osama bin Laden Dead.” May 11, 2011. Accessed December 17, 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead. ii Robert H. Jackson. “Opening Statement Nuremberg Trials, 1945.” PBS Primary Sources. November 21, 1945. Accessed December 17, 2011. http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/ personality/sources_document12.html. iii Hannah Arendt. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. (New York: Penguin Books, 2006.) 234-240. iv Ibid. 259. v Ibid. vi Ibid. vii Ibid. viii Ibid. 263. ix Ibid. 253.

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x Ibid. xi Hannah Arendt. Responsibility and Judgment. (New York: Schocken Books, 2003.) 25. xii Ibid. 25. xiii Ibid. 26. xiv Hannah Arendt. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. 257. xv Ibid. xvi Ibid. xvii Gregory Elich. “Selective Justice and the Trial of Saddam Hussein.” November 9, 2006. xviii Accessed December 17, 2011. http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=3761. xviii Ibid. xix Curtis Doebbler. “e Saddam Hussein Verdict: An Abuse of Justice.” e Jurist. November 6, 2006. Accessed December 17, 2011. http://jurist.org/forum/2006/11/saddam-hussein-verdict- abuse-of.php. xx Faiz Shakir. “A Timeline of the Iraq War.” ink Progress. March 17, 2006. Accessed December 17, 2011. http://thinkprogress.org/report/iraq-timeline/. xxi Ibid. xxii Curtis Doebbler. xxiii Human Rights Watch. “Judging Dujail.” Iraq. November 2006. xxiv Faiz Shakir. xxv Gregory Elich. xxvi Curtis Doebbler. xxvii Ibid. xxviii Noam Chomsky. “What a Fair Trial Would Entail.” e Toronto Star. January 25, 2004. Accessed December 17, 2011. http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20040125.htm. xxix Curtis Doebbler. xxx Noam Chomsky. “On the Occupation of Iraq, the Trial of Saddam, and the US Election.” e Guardian. March 16, 2004. Accessed on December 17, 2011. http://www.chomsky.info/ interviews/20040316.htm. xxxi Noam Chomsky. “My Reaction to Osama bin Laden’s Death.” Guernica. May 16, 2011. Accessed December 17, 2011. http://www.guernicamag.com/blog/2652/noam_chomsky_my_reaction_to_ os/. xxxii Human Rights Watch. 5. xxxiii Human Rights Watch. 6.

REHABILITATING CHILD SOLDIERS: ALLEVIATING VIOLATIONS OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS

i Verhey, Beth. “Child Soldiers: Preventing, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating.” Africa Region Working Paper Series, World Bank Post-Conict Unit. No. 23 (November 2001): 1-31. Print. ii Wessells, Michael. Child Soldiers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006. Print. p. 8 iii Verhey, p. 27 iv Wessells, p. 7-8 v Verhey, p. 1 vi Wessells, p. 10-11 vii United Nations General Assembly. International Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 38. 20 November 1989. viii International Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 38 ix Wessells, p. 5 x United Nations General Assembly. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the

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Involvement of Children in Armed Conict. 25 May 2000. xi United Nations General Assembly. Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I, Article 77. 12 August 1949. xii Hammarberg, omas. “e UN Convention on the Rights of the Child – and How to Make It Wor k .” Human Rights Quarterly 12 (1990): 97-105. Print. p. 100 xiii International Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 6 xiv Verhey, p. 15 xv Bracken, Patrick J. and Celia Petty. Rethinking the Trauma of War. New York: Free Association Books Ltd, 1998. Print. p. 70 xvi Bracken, p 67-68 xvii “Comparison of Mental Health Between Former Child Soldiers and Children Never Conscripted by Armed Groups in Nepal.” Journal of the American Medical Association 300.6 (August 2008): 691-701. Print. xviii Wessells, Michael. “Psychosocial Issues in Reintegrating Child Soldiers.” Cornell International Law Journal 37 (2004): 513-525. Print. xix Bracken, p. 62 xx Bracken, p. 62-65 xxi Bracken, p. 72-73 xxii Betancourt, eresa Stichick. “Child Soldiers: Reintegration, Pathways to Recovery, and Reections from he Field.” Journal of Developmental & Behavioral Pediatrics 29.2 (April 2008): 138- 141. Print. xxiii Young, Aaron. “Preventing, Demobilizing, Rehabilitating, and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in African Conicts.” e Journal of International Policy Solutions 7 (2007): 19-24. Print. p. 20 xxiv Verhey, p. 12-13 (is endnote applies to the two paragraphs before where the endnote is marked.) xxv Williamson, John. “e disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers: social and psychological transformation in Sierra Leone.” Intervention, War Trauma Foundation 4.3 (2006): 185-205. Print. p. 185 xxvi Wessells, p. 13 xxvii Williamson, p. 185-189 xxviii Williamson, p. 189-198 xxix Verhey, p. 15-16 xxx Verhey, p. 18-21 xxxi Bracken, p. 62 xxxii Verhey, p. 17 xxxiii Williamson, p. 189-198 xxxiv Medeiros, Emilie. “Integrating Mental Health into Post-conict Rehabilitation: e Case of xxxv Sierra Leonean and Liberian ‘Child Soldiers’.” Journal of Health Psychology 12.3 (2007): 498-504. Print. p. 501 xxxvi Williamson, p. 199 xxxvii Medeiros, p. 501 xxxviii Williamson, p. 200-201 xxxix Rivard, Lysanne. “Child Soldiers and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs: e Universalism of Children’s Rights vs. Cultural Relativism Debate.” e Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (August 23, 2010): 1-15. Print. p. 1 xl Rivard, p. 10 xli Bracken, p. 73-74 xlii “e Child Soldiers Prevention Act.” World Vision: Building a Better World For Children. WorldVision.org. Web. 9 May 2011.

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childprotection-conict-bill> xliii “Child Soldiers.” Amnesty International USA. Amnesty International USA, 2011. Web. 16 April 2011. . xliv Bracken, p. 74 xlv Singer, Merrill and G. Derrick Hodge. e War Machine and Global Health. Lanham: AltaMira Press, 2010. Print. p. 109 xlvi Verhey, p. 3-4 xlvii Bracken, p. 74 xlviii Wessells, 240-241 xlix Betancourt, p. 141

CIVIL SOCIETY OCCUPIES THE RIO+20 EARTH SUMMIT

i Rio+20 - United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development. United Nations. . ii History of climate change science. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. . iii Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. United Nations Environment Programme. . iv Planet Under Pressure. . v Challenge Papers. Global Transition 2012. . vi Everything you need to know. Robin Hood Tax. . vii 350.org. <350.org>. viii WHO. World Health Organization. . ix e Future We Want. United Nations. . x $1 Trillion in Global Fossil Fuel Subsidies & the Urgent Need for Transparency. e Price of Oil. . xi Planetary Boundaries. Stockholm Resilience Centre. . xii Representative of the Children and Youth major group, Opening of the Conference, 1st Plenary Meeting, Rio+20. UN WebTV. . xiii Brittany Trilford, Opening of the Conference, 1st Plenary Meeting, Rio+20. UN WebTV. . xiv Representative of the Non-Governmental Organizations major group, Opening of the Conference, 1st Plenary Meeting, Rio+20. UN WebTV. . xv Ourclimate.ca - Home of the CYCC CYDD. . xvi Opening the People’s Plenary at Rio+20. YouTube.com. . xvii Building the People’s Summit Rio+20. Rio+20 Portal. . xviii Home. Friends of the Earth. .

77 JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS | VOLUME 8 | FALL 2013 EDITION xix IBON International Home Page! IBON International. . xx Rio+20 protestors perform ‘ritual rip-up’ of negotiated text. e Guardian. . xxi Commitments. Cloud of Commitments. .

STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE: BETWEEN TERROR AND COUNTERTERROR

1 David Kilcullen, e Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), xv 2 Norbert Lechner, “Some People Die of Fear: Fear as a Political Problem,” in Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America, ed. Juan E. Corradi, et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 27. 3 Patricia Weiss Fagen, “Repression and State Security,” in Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America, ed. Juan E. Corradi, et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 41. 4 Ibid., 43. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid., 44. 7 Fatma M. Göçek, “Deciphering Denial: Modernity, e Turkish State, and the 1915 Collective Violence Against the Armenians,” Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies at NYU, Richard Ettinghausen Library, October 17, 2011. 8 Ibid. 9 Timurtaş v Turkey, 2000-VI Eur Ct HR 221 (2000). 10 Ertak v Turkey, Eur Ct HR 193 (2000). 11 Carole Nagengast, “Violence, Terror, and the Crisis of the State,” Annual Review of Anthropology 23 (1994): 119. 12 Bawer Çakır, “Ergenekon’u Bilmiyorum, Buraların Yabancısıyım,” Bianet, October 21, 2008. http:// bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/110353-ergenekonu-bilmiyorum-buralarin-yabancisiyim 13 Zeki Günal, “Bir annenin çığlığı,” Radikal, December 12, 2011. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal. aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1072289&CategoryID=77 14 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, e Pinochet Eect (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). 15 Ibid. 16 Lechner, “Some People Die of Fear: Fear as a Political Problem,” 27. 17 Ibid., 28. 18 Fagen, “Repression and State Security,” 62-3. 19 Nagengast, “Violence, Terror, and the Crisis of the State,” 111. 20 Ibid., 122. 21 E. V. Walter, “Violence and the Process of Terror,” American Sociological Review 29.2 (1964): 257. 22 Ibid., 255-6. 23 Fagen, “Repression and State Security,” 46. 24 Ibid., 39. 25 eresa Reinold, “State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11,” e American Journal of International Law 105.2 (2011): 249. 26 Noam Chomsky, “Superpower and failed states,” Khaleej Times, April 5, 2006. 27 Ibid.

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28 Paul Wilkinson, “Can a State Be Terrorist?” International Aairs (Royal Institute of National Aairs) 57.3 (1981): 467.

CROSS CLASS OPPOSITION TO HUSNI MUBARAK

i “Retention” dir. Sherif Arafa, in Eighteen Days (Egypt, 2011) ii “e Role of Rising Food Prices in Egypt’s Revolution,” PBS Newshour (30 November 2011), Accessed online at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec11/egyptfood_11-30.html. iii Arthur Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt: the Formation of a Nation State (Boulder: Westview Books, 2004), 193; “e Role of Rising Food Prices” iv “e Role of Rising Food Prices” v Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 145; “e Role of Rising Food Prices” vi Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 192; Tarek Osman, Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 200 vii Mona El-Ghobashy, “e Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution,” Middle East Report 258 (Spring 2011), accessed online at http://www.merip.org/mer/mer258/praxis-egyptian-revolution. viii “e Role of Rising Food Prices” ix Osman, Egypt on the Brink, 200 x Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 189 xi Osman, Egypt on the Brink, 259 xii Osman, Egypt on the Brink, 131 xiii Osman, Egypt on the Brink, 130 xiv Mona El-Ghobashy, “e Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution”; Paul Amar, “Why Egypt’s Progressives Win,” Jadaliyya (8 February 2011), accessed online at http://www.jadaliyya.com/ pages/index/586/why-egypts-progressives-win xv Amar, “Why Egypt’s Progressives Win” xvi Amar, “Why Egypt’s Progressives Win”; Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 194 xvii Osman, Egypt on the Brink, 141 xviii Paul Amar, “Why Mubarak is Out,” Jadaliyya (1 February 2011), accessed online at http://www. jadaliyya.com/pages/index/516/why-mubarak-is-out- xix Linda Herrera, “Egypt’s Revolution 2.0: the Facebook Factor,” Jadaliyya (12 February 2011), accessed online at http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/612/egypts-revolution-2.0_the-facebook- factor xx Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 193 xxi Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 194 xxii Amar, “Why Egypt’s Progressives Win” xxiii Charles Hirschkind, “From the Blogosphere to the Street: the Role of Social Media in the Egyptian Uprising,” Jadaliyya (9 February 2011), accessed online at http://www.jadaliyya.com/ pages/index/599/from-the-blogosphere-to-the-street_the-role-of-soc xxiv Amar, “Why Egypt’s Progressives Win”; Herrera, “Egypt’s Revolution 2.0” xxv Osman, Egypt on the Brink, 166 xxvi Mervat Hatem, “Gender and Revolution in Egypt,” Middle East Report 261 (Winter 2011), accessed online at http://www.merip.org/mer/mer261/gender-revolution-egypt; Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 192 xxvii Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 142 xxviii Ursula Lindsey, “e Cultural Revolution,” Foreign Policy (4 August 2011), accessed online at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/04/the_cultural_revolution xxix Asef Bayat, “Egypt, and the Post-Islamist Middle East,” Jadaliyya (10 February 2011), accessed

79 JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS | VOLUME 8 | FALL 2013 EDITION online at http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/603/egypt-and-the-post-islamist-middle-east xxx Amar, “Why Mubarak is Out” xxxi Osman, Egypt on the Brink, 137 xxxii Osman, Egypt on the Brink, 131 xxxiii Hirsschkind, “From the Blogosphere to the Street” xxxiv Amar, “Why Mubarak is Out” xxxv Osman, Egypt on the Brink, 115 xxxvi Osman, Egypt on the Brink, 129 xxxvii Amar, “Why Egypt’s Progressives Win” xxxviii “e Role of Rising Food Prices” xxxix Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 145 xl Osman, Egypt on the Brink, 242 xli Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 186 xlii Bassam Haddad, “English Translation of Interview with Hossam El-Hamalawy on the Role of Labor/Unions in the Egyptian Revolution,” Jadaliyya (30 April 2011), accessed online at http:// www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1387/english-translation-of-interview-with-hossam-el-ha xliii Amar, “Why Mubarak is Out” xliv Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 187 xlv Osman, Egypt on the Brink, 199; “Muslim Brotherhood—in Pictures,” e Guardian (8 February 2011), accessed online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/gallery/2011/feb/08/egypt-muslim- brotherhood-in-pictures xlvi Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 148; “Muslim Brotherhood—in Pictures” xlvii Sami Zubaida, “e ‘Arab Spring’ in Historical Perspective,” Open Democracy: Free inking for the World (21 October 2011), accessed online at http://www.opendemocracy.net/sami-zubaida/ arab-spring-in-historical-perspective xlviii Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt, 198 xlix Hatem, “Gender and Revolution in Egypt” l Noha Radwan, “How Egyptian Women Took Back the Street Between Two Black Fridays: A First Person Account.” Jadaliyya (20 February 2011), accessed online at http://www.jadaliyya.com/ pages/index/694/how-egyptian-women-took-back-the-street-between-tw li Osman, Egypt on the Brink, 242 lii Amar, “Why Egypt’s Progressives Win” liii Haya Fawda [It’s Chaos] dir. Youssef Chahine (MISR International Films, 2007) liv Naber, “Imperial Feminism, Islamophobia, and the Egyptian Revolution,” lv Bayat, “Egypt, and the Post-Islamist Middle East” lvi Radwan, “How Egyptian Women Took Back the Street” lvii Amar, “Why Egypt’s Progressives Win” lviii Haddad, “English Translation of Interview with Hossam El-Hamalawy” lix Kurt Anderson, “e Protestor,” Time (14 December 2011), accessed online at http://www.time. com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2101745_2102132_2102373,00.html

BITTERSWEET: CHOCOLATE TOURISM IN THE CARIBBEAN i Baz Dreisinger, “A Chocolate Tour of the Caribbean,” New York Times, November 9, 2012. Accessed November 12, 2012, http://travel.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/travel/a-chocolate-tour-of- the-caribbean.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. ii Rivek Ja e, “Ital Chic: Rastafari, Resistance, and the Politics of Consumption in Jamaica,” Small Axe 14:1 (March 2010), 31. iii Dreisinger, “A Chocolate Tour of the Caribbean.” 80 JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS | VOLUME 8 | FALL 2013

iv Dreisinger, “A Chocolate Tour of the Caribbean.” v Dreisinger, “A Chocolate Tour of the Caribbean.” vi Dreisinger, “A Chocolate Tour of the Caribbean.” vii “Bri Bri Indigenous Reserve Tour,” Willi’s Costa Rica Tours, accessed November 12, 2012, http:// www.willies-costarica-tours.com/en/cocoa-house-tour.html. viii “Tours,” Hotel Chocolat, accessed November 12, 2012, http://www.thehotelchocolat.com/tours. html. ix Dreisinger, “A Chocolate Tour of the Caribbean.” x Ja e, “Ital Chic,” 31. xi Dreisinger, “A Chocolate Tour of the Caribbean.” xii Boutique Boucan Hotel & Restaurant Saint Lucia, accessed November 12, 2012, http://www. hotelchocolat.com/uk/boucan. xiii Dreisinger, “A Chocolate Tour of the Caribbean.” xiv Dreisinger, “A Chocolate Tour of the Caribbean.” xv Dreisinger, “A Chocolate Tour of the Caribbean.” xvi Dreisinger, “A Chocolate Tour of the Caribbean.” xvii Dreisinger, “A Chocolate Tour of the Caribbean.” xviii Dreisinger, “A Chocolate Tour of the Caribbean.” xix Ja e, “Ital Chic,” 31. xx Dreisinger, “A Chocolate Tour of the Caribbean.” xxi Dreisinger, “A Chocolate Tour of the Caribbean.”

KASHMIR AND OPPOSING NATIONALISMS

1 Nivedita Menon and Aditya Nigam, Power and Contestation: India since 1989 (Halifax, N.S.: Fernwood Pub., 2007). 152. 2 P.A. Sebastian, “Kashmir behind the Propaganda Curtain,” Economic and Political Weekly, 1996: 320. 3 Arundhati Roy, “Nehru on Kashmir,” November 29, 2010, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/ roy291110.html. 4 Nivedita Menon and Aditya Nigam, Power and Contestation: India since 1989 (Halifax, N.S.: Fernwood Pub., 2007). 154. 5 e Economist, South Asia’s Water: Unquenchable irst, November 19, 2011, http://www. economist.com/node/21538687. 6 Economic Policies of Jawaharlal Nehru, 2009, http://www.mapsondia.com/personalities/nehru/ economic-policies.html. 7 Siddhartha Prakash, “Political Economy of Kashmir since 1947,” Economic and Political Weekly, 2000: 2052. 8 Sumit Ganguly, “Will Kashmir Stop India’s Rise?,” Foreign Aairs 85, no. 4 (2006): 46. 9 Nivedita Menon and Aditya Nigam, Power and Contestation: India since 1989 (Halifax, N.S.: Fernwood Pub., 2007). 157. 10 Sanjay Ruparelia, “Rethinking Institutional eories of Political Moderation: e Case of Hindu Nationalism in India, 1996-2004,” Comparative Politics, 2006: 321. 11 Ibid., 327. 12 Angana P. Chatterji, Ritty A. Lukose and Ania Loomba, “Witnessing as Feminist Intervention in India-administered Kashmir,” South Asian Feminisms. 238. 13 Sanjay Ruparelia, “Rethinking Institutional eories of Political Moderation: e Case of Hindu Nationalism in India, 1996-2004,” Comparative Politics, 2006: 326.

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ENDLESS SUMMER / KENDALL HILL

Maui, Hawaii

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The articles that appear in the NYU Gallatin Journal of Global Affairs (JGA) represent the views of a wide-ranging group of students and scholars. They in no way reflect the views of NYU, the Gallatin School of Individualized Study or the JGA. While all reasonable precautions have been taken by the authors and editors to ensure the quality of work, the JGA makes no representations or warranties as to the accuracy or completeness of material within. While we may not agree with all of the observations and diagnoses of our writers, we support their pursuit of serious university-level academic research and the fruits it yields. We hope that the thoughts and arguments found in this journal serve as a stimulus for further debate and discussion.

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