The Markets of Pyongyang by John Everard UK Ambassador to the DPRK (2006-2008) in 2006–08 Pyongyang Had Two Kinds of Markets

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The Markets of Pyongyang by John Everard UK Ambassador to the DPRK (2006-2008) in 2006–08 Pyongyang Had Two Kinds of Markets January 2011 • Volume 6 • Number 1 The Markets of Pyongyang by John Everard UK Ambassador to the DPRK (2006-2008) In 2006–08 Pyongyang had two kinds of markets. The first 2006, nothing had prepared him for the variety of goods avail- were “official” markets that had started out many years earli- able, or the noise and color, of Pyongyang’s markets. These stood er as farmers markets selling only food but have since grown out as oases of vibrant life amid the general drabness of the city, into officially sanctioned permanent structures selling also and he quickly became fascinated by what they showed of the a wide variety of nonfood items. The second were the unof- changes in the DPRK. For this was a time of change. Amid the ficial and unregulated markets—colloquially known as “frog tensions caused by the July 2006 missile test and the October markets”1 because the traders would jump up like frogs and 2006 nuclear test and amid World Food Program warnings of run off with their wares at the first sign of trouble2—which food insecurity outside the capital, smart coffee houses, spas, continued to sell mostly food. The markets reintroduced into and even a hamburger restaurant were opening in downtown DPRK society habits of trading and an independence from Pyongyang for the benefit of those few North Koreans with state supplies, which the regime had spent decades trying cash to burn; and the offspring of the elite were starting to wear to eliminate. They acted too as centers of foreign-currency bright Western-style T-shirts. The markets fascinated the author trading and of information exchange. Markets were hard hit too because they did not fit with what the DPRK purported to by the regime’s November 2009 attempts to rein them in, be. These developments were a living indictment of the regime’s but by late 2010 the official markets had largely recovered, economic and political failure. although the frog markets had not. Except on a few points of detail, the author does not seek to There is no place for these markets in the DPRK’s ideol- challenge existing literature on North Korea’s markets but ogy, and their continued existence presents the DPRK to complement it with accounts of what Pyongyang markets government with a political challenge. The frog markets looked like on the ground. He does not argue that the markets in particular were acts of mass disobedience. Moreover, of Pyongyang were more or less significant indicators of change the markets already seem to act as foci for the exchange of than markets elsewhere in the DPRK—these were simply the news and ideas, a role that is likely to grow if the regime only markets he was able to visit regularly.3 stumbles. The survival of the markets in the face of deter- mined regime attempts to curtail them testifies both to their The Markets of Pyongyang in 2006–2008 resilience and to the difficulties the regime now faces in enforcing its ideology. Description of Markets This paper is based mainly on the author’s own experiences Although observers at the time of the economic measures in of the markets of Pyongyang, which he visited often during 2002 reported simple, open-air gatherings of traders, by 2006 the nearly two and a half years he spent as the UK Ambas- Pyongyang markets were substantial structures, each usually sador to the DPRK from February 2006 to July 2008. with a brick wall surround and an arched gateway. The outside walls were between two and three meters high (too high to look Introduction over without climbing) and colored the same dull dun, or some- times lime-washed white, as many other suburban buildings in Although the author had read extensively about the DPRK, Pyongyang. This meant that from the outside the market walls including its markets, before taking up his posting there in were difficult to distinguish from those of any other building Ambassador Everard’s paper is the fortieth in KEI’s Academic Paper Series. As part of this program, KEI commissions and distributes 10 papers per year on original subjects of current interest to over 3,000 Korea watchers, government of- ficials, think tank experts, and scholars around the United States and the world. A public discussion at KEI with the author gen- erally follows in conjunction with distribution. At the end of the year, these papers are compiled and published in On Korea. Vol- ume 4 of On Korea will be published in February 2011. For more information, please visit www.keia.org/paper_series.php. and that it was easy to walk past them without realizing that author once needed to replace an obscure camera battery. In a a market lay within. local market he was directed to a “battery-selling comrade,” an elderly lady who smilingly produced an entire clip of the bat- Inside, the walls were lined with permanent and carefully teries in question (which even worked!). But the author never constructed booths. In some of these there were permanent saw either radios or bicycles for sale (both are items the regime concrete tables on which traders would set out their wares, seeks to restrict).11 All transactions in the markets seemed to be while in others the traders would set up trestle-table stalls, conducted in DPRK won—the author never saw anybody paying often covered with cloths. The markets had concrete floors. for goods in foreign currency, and his own occasional attempts In some, the entire trading space was roofed while in others to do so were rebuffed. only the booths were sheltered, leaving a central area open to the sky. Most (perhaps all) had lavatories.4 The majority Even during periods of economic difficulty, the markets seemed of markets were single story, although Tongil Market had an to keep supplied. From time to time, one product or another upper story that housed some offices and, from time to time, (meat seemed particularly vulnerable) would disappear but a currency exchange booth. The size of the markets varied, would often reappear the next day or a couple of days later—and but some seemed to house several hundred traders. such events were sufficiently infrequent as to cause gossip. There have been suggestions that Tongil Market is a showpiece that is Pyongyang market traders were all women. The author kept especially well supplied, but the author saw a comparable was told by North Koreans that this was because men were variety and quality of items for sale in other markets. banned from trading as the regime considered that they should be involved in more productive work.5 On 1 Decem- Numbers and History ber 2007 the regime sought to ban women below 50 years of age6 from working in markets, but this decree held sway for It was unclear how many markets there were in Pyongyang in less than a month before it was widely ignored, and women 2006–08. With the exceptions of Tongil Market and Central of all ages again appeared behind the stalls. Stalls were usu- District Market, which stand proudly in their own clearly marked ally well staffed, with the women almost jostling shoulder to white buildings with blue roofs, they were not visible from the shoulder for space behind the counters. Hygienic conditions street and were often concealed behind residential blocks. (It is were basic.7 Meat was often simply hung on hooks, even unclear why two markets were built in visible locations and all in the summer heat, and the smell of the fish section of the the others hidden.) Often they could only be located by follow- markets could be overpowering. There was little attempt to ing the streams of people who came in and out of them. But in keep flies off food. Eggs were sold 10 at a time, tied together areas with which the author was familiar, there seemed to be at in an intricate twine weave that both protected them and least one official market in eachguyok (district) of Pyongyang. made them easier to carry. As there are 19 guyok, this seems likely to have been a mini- mum number for the official markets of the city, and there may These markets are sometimes termed “farmers markets,” have been many more. In 2006–08 an unofficial frog market but by 2006 this term was misleading. Although the markets sprawled out from every official market known to the author. seem to have begun as selling points only for foodstuffs, the 1 There seemed to be perhaps another one or two frog markets, of July 2002 economic measures permitted “general markets,”8 varying sizes, in the same guyok. This suggests that there were and by 2006 these were selling a great variety of consumer several times more unofficial markets than official ones. goods. These included domestic wares (particularly cheap plastic household items such as plates and mugs), stationery Pyongyang has probably had markets since at least the early items (including pens, pencils, ink, and exercise books), 1980s.12 These proliferated in the famine of the 1990s but were clothing of many varieties ranging from cheap shirts, skirts, at that time still fairly modest affairs located on the outskirts of and trousers through elaborate dresses and including modest the city.13 The regime’s decision to give markets official status beachwear, and electrical goods including flashlights and in the economic measures of 1 July 200214 led to the creation lightbulbs (the author once saw an electric organ for sale).9 of official markets that were well established by the time the The great majority of nonfood items seemed to have been author arrived in Pyongyang in February 2006.
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