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Basic Reading on Korean Unification Study Series 12-03 Study Study Series 12-03 Basic Reading on Korean Unification Unification Basic Reading on Korean Basic Reading on Korean Unification Huh Moon Young, Cha Moon Seok, Jeong Young Tai, Jung Hyun Soo, Kang Gu Sup, Kwon Oh Kook, Kwon Young Kyong, Park Jong Chul, Son Gi Woong, Yeo In Kon Study Series 12-03 Basic Reading on Korean Unification Huh Moon Young, Cha Moon Seok, Jeong Young Tai, Jung Hyun Soo, Kang Gu Sup, Kwon Oh Kook, Kwon Young Kyong, Park Jong Chul, Son Gi Woong, Yeo In Kon Basic Reading on Korean Unification Printed December 2012 Published December 2012 Published by Korea Institute for National Unification(KINU) Publisher President, Korea Institute for National Unification Editor Center for North Korean Studies Registration number No.2-2361(April 23, 1997) Address 1307, Hancheonro(Suyudong), Gangbuk-gu, Seoul 142-728, Korea Telephone (82-2) 900-4300, (82-2) 901-2525 Fax (82-2) 901-2544 Homepage http://www.kinu.or.kr Design·Print Yeawon Creative House Co., Ltd.(82-2) 745-8090 ISBN 978-89-8479-690-4 93340 Copyright Korea Institute for National Unification, 2012 All KINU publications are available for purchase at all major bookstore in Korea. Also available at Government Printing Office Sales Center Store (82-2) 734-6818; Office (82-2) 394-0337 Basic Reading on Korean Unification Huh Moon Young (Korea Institute for National Unification) Cha Moon Seok (Institute for Unification Education) Jeong Young Tai (Korea Institute for National Unification) Jung Hyun Soo (Peace Corea) Kang Gu Sup (Korea Educational Development Institute) Kwon Oh Kook (Korea Institute for National Unification) Kwon Young Kyong (Institute for Unification Education) Park Jong Chul (Korea Institute for National Unification) Son Gi Woong (Korea Institute for National Unification) Yeo In Kon (Korea Institute for National Unification) The analyses, comments and other opinions contained in this monograph are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent []the views of the Korea Institute for National Unification. Basic Reading on Korean Unification Contents Preface ························································································ ⅸ Ⅰ. Our Vision for Unification ·················································· 1 1. The Need for Unification ····································································· 3 2. Visions and Challenges for Unification ············································· 20 Ⅱ. Unification Environment ················································· 43 1. The Past and Present in Inter-Korean Relations ······························ 45 2. The Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula ···································· 85 3. The Situation Surrounding the Korean Peninsula ·························· 120 Ⅲ. The Actual Situation in North Korea ··························· 159 1. The Current Situation ······································································· 161 2. Inter-Korean Economic Exchanges and Cooperation ······················ 193 3. Humanitarian Aid to North Korea ·················································· 225 KINU Korea Institute for National Unification Tables Table 1. The Need for Unification ······························································ 10 Table 2. Changes in Germany’s Prestige After its Unification ··················· 16 Table 3. Korea’s Mineral Deposits and Their Potential Value ··················· 17 Table 4. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea ································· 29 Table 5. The Lee Administration’s Vision for Unification through Inter-Korean Communities ····························································· 30 Table 6. OECD’s Outlook on the Unification Cost(June 18th, 2010) ······· 39 Table 7. Inter-Korean Economic Gap ·························································· 39 Table 8. The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation between North and South Korea ····················· 51 Table 9. Major Points in the June 15th North-South Joint Declaration ··· 54 Table 10. The Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Relations, Peace and Prosperity ······································································ 58 Table 11. Key Points in the National Community Unification Plan ··········· 63 Table 12. Trends in North Korea’s Unification Policies ······························· 74 Table 13. Comparison between North and South Korea’s Unification Methodologies ····································· 74 Table 14. Comparison between North and South Korea’s Unification Policies: The Models of a Unified Nation ················ 75 Table 15. Comparison between North and South Korea’s Unification Plan (From 1948 to 2011) ···································································· 76 Table 16. Comparison between North and South Korean Military Strength (as of November 2010) ································································· 87 Table 17. Comparison of North and South Korea’s views of peace ·········· 97 Table 18. Companies in Kaesong Industrial Complex by Industry ············ 98 Table 19. China-North Korea Relations ······················································· 109 Table 20. Six major national interests in China’s White Paper ················ 136 Table 21. The “Military-First” policy, the North Korean regime’s strategic and revolutionary policy for survival ························· 163 Table 22. Estimated quantity of nuclear bombs that North Korea Possess (Plutonium bombs) ······································································ 169 Table 23. The extent of North Korea’s marketization (based on a survey on 1,000 North Korean defectors) ··········· 176 Table 24. North Korea’s economic class division after 2000 ···················· 179 Table 25. Comparing North Korea’s macroeconomic conditions in 2009 and in 1990 ················································································· 187 Table 26. North Korean society under Kim Jong Il’s rule vs. under Kim Il Sung’s rule ···························································· 189 Table 27. Inter-German trades and their share ········································ 194 Table 28. Types of inter-Korean trade ························································ 200 Table 29. Classification of inter-Korean economic cooperation programs by players ···································································· 201 Table 30. The history of inter-Korean economic cooperation ··················· 202 Table 31. Changes in the inter-Korean trade value by year ··················· 207 Table 32. The structure of inter-Korean trades by year and type ··········· 210 Table 33. The development and status of general and processing trades ·································································· 213 Table 34. The Development of the Kaesong Industrial Complex Project ··········································································· 217 Table 35. The Number of Tourists at Mt. Kumgang ······························ 219 KINU Korea Institute for National Unification Table 36. Food distribution and the shortfall in North Korea ················· 231 Table 37. Comparison of major health indicators between South and North Korea ······························································· 233 Table 38. Overall aid to North Korea ························································ 239 Table 39. Humanitarian aid to North Korea by successive South Korean governments(as of late July 2011) ····················· 240 Table 40. Types of public aid to North Korea and their share (1995 to July 2011) ···································································· 242 Table 41. The status of private aid to North Korea ······························· 243 Table 42. Classification of private aid activities ········································· 245 Figures Figure 1. The process of establishing the EU ············································· 10 Figure 2. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family’s survey of middle and high school students on the need for unification (March 2011) ················································································ 14 Figure 3. The three phases of the “plans for unification towards the national community” ······························································ 30 Figure 4. A virtuous cycle of unification ···················································· 40 Figure 5. The duplicity of Inter-Korean relations ······································· 51 Figure 6. South Korea’s Official Unification Plan ······································· 62 Figure 7. Conflicts in Northeast Asia ························································ 125 Figure 8. Three major U.S. hegemonies under threat ······························ 127 Figure 9. The current status of South Korean Forces deployed in foreign countries ·········································································· 148 Figure 10. Strategies for Unification diplomacy toward the four major surrounding powers ···································································· 154 Figure 11. The structure of North Korea’s survival strategy ···················· 167 Figure 12. “Military-First” Economic Policy ················································· 174 Figure 13. North Korea’s food distribution system and ranks ·················· 237 Figure 14. The nutritional status of North Korean children ····················· 250 KINU KoreaKorea Institute Institute
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