An Essay on the First-Person Plural A
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BEING-TOGETHER: AN ESSAY ON THE FIRST-PERSON PLURAL A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy By Quentin A. Fisher, M.A. Washington, DC November 14, 2019 Copyright 2019 by Quentin A. Fisher All Rights Reserved ii BEING-TOGETHER: AN ESSAY ON THE FIRST-PERSON PLURAL Quentin A. Fisher, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Mark N. Lance, Ph.D. ABSTRACT This dissertation concerns the philosophy of the first-person. It consists of three principal philosophical studies, each concerning a set of concepts that, when taken together, form a skeletal though unified account of the first-person. The first part concerns the various uses of the first-person singular (‘I’) as well as first-person immunity to error through misidentification. The second part concerns the various uses of the first-person plural (‘we’). I argue that (i) there are several distinct uses of the first-person plural pronoun, (ii) that each of these uses can be articulated inferentially, and (iii) that one use of the first-person plural—what I call the “generic use”—is conceptually basic. In the third part, I argue that the first-person plural pronoun is, at least on some of its uses, the grammatical mark of a certain form of self-conscious understanding, and it is this kind of self-conscious understanding that underwrites the possibility of speaking a language. I end by outlining some structural relations between the various uses of the first-person singular and the first-person plural. According to the account offered here, the first-person singular and the first-person plural form a non-additive unitary structure. Correctly understood, an account of the first-person must include both the first-person singular and the first-person plural. iii The essays in this dissertation are the fruit of several longstanding conversations: with my committee, Mark Lance, Terry Pinkard, and David Bronstein; with my teachers, Bill Blattner, Yuri Corrigan, Wayne Davis, Bryce Huebner, Rebecca Kukla, Huaping Lu-Adler, Mark Murphy, Evan Riley, and Kate Withy; and with my friends, Daniel Baker, Gaurav Bagwe, Gabe Broughton, Clark Donley, Jason Farr, Rose Ryan Flynn, Jonathan Gombin, Oren Magid, Jake McNulty, Thomas Pendlebury, Kyle Scott, Ryan Simonelli, Omar Talhouk, Gerald Taylor, and Wim Vanrie. I would like to single out four philosophers for special thanks. For the past five years I have been in nearly continuous conversation with Terry Pinkard. These conversations have had a transformative effect on my conception of philosophy, and this document everywhere bears the marks of his influence. Mark Lance, my chair, made himself available at the drop of a dime anytime I had something to say or discuss this past year. He has been a relentless critic and supporter of my work, and I am very grateful for the seriousness with which he brought to this project. In my third year of graduate school I met weekly with Kate Withy to discuss Heidegger’s Being and Time. Unlike anyone I’ve met, Kate shows how reading a philosophical text can be as much an ethical activity as it is an intellectual one. Her commitment to the activity of philosophy has been a constant source of inspiration. Lastly, my gratitude to Jason Farr extends far beyond anything I can or want say here. For the past four years, hardly a day has gone by without his companionship. Much of this dissertation has been hammered out on our walks together, and his friendship has been a great joy in my life. I would like to thank Ella Taranto for her unabating enthusiasm for this project over the past year. I save my deepest gratitude for my family: my mother, Steffie; my father, Stewart; and my sister, Kameron. Questions that approach the philosophical are everywhere threatened by unintelligibility, and no experience is more familiar to me than the illusion of having meant something. Those listed above have saved me from the worst of my mistakes. Washington, DC October 2019 iv TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 1: FIRST-PERSON IMMUNITY TO ERROR THROUGH MISIDENTIFICATION ..................................................................................................... 21 CHAPTER 2: ARTICULATING THE FIRST-PERSON PLURAL ................................................... 53 CHAPTER 3: ON THE FIRST-PERSON PLURAL CHARACTER OF LINGUISTIC PRACTICE ............................................................................................................................. 82 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................ 111 REFERENCES........................................................................................................................................... 116 v LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1. FORMS OF THE FIRST-PERSON PLURAL ....................................................................... 9 TABLE 2. FORMS OF THE FIRST-PERSON SINGULAR ............................................................... 36 TABLE 3. IMMUNITY AND ITS GROUNDS ....................................................................................... 48 TABLE 4. COMPLETE FORMS OF THE FIRST-PERSON PLURAL ............................................ 75 TABLE 5. DESCRIPTIONS BY EXEMPLIFICATION ...................................................................... 85 TABLE 6. LEFT-HAND SIDE OF DESCRIPTIONS BY EXEMPLIFICATION ......................... 96 TABLE 7. ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DIATHESES .............................................................................. 100 vi Introduction Here again we see language as the existence of spirit. Language is self-consciousness existing for others. It is self-consciousness which as such is immediately present , and as this self-consciousness, it is universal. —G.W.F. Hegel 1 This dissertation (or “essay,” as I’ve called it) concerns the philosophy of the first-person. It consists of three principal philosophical studies, each concerning a set of concepts that, when taken together, form a skeletal though unified account of the first-person. The first part concerns the various uses of the first-person singular (‘I’) as well as first-person immunity to error through misidentification (hereafter, first-person IEM). The second part concerns the various uses of the first-person plural (‘we’). I argue that (i) there are several distinct uses of the first-person plural pronoun, (ii) that each of these uses can be articulated inferentially, and (iii) that one use of the first-person plural—what I call the “generic use”—is conceptually basic. In the third part, I argue that the first-person plural pronoun is, at least on some of its uses, the grammatical mark of a certain form of self-conscious understanding, 1 Hegel, G.W.F. (2018). The Phenomenology of Spirit. Edited and Translated by Terry Pinkard. Cambridge University Press, §652. 1 and it is this kind of self-conscious understanding that underwrites the possibility of speaking a language. I end by outlining some structural relations between the various uses of the first-person singular and the first-person plural. According to the account offered here, the first-person singular and the first-person plural form a non-additive unitary structure. Correctly understood, an account of the first-person must include both the first-person singular and the first-person plural. These studies cover a wide swath of conceptual space, and from the perspective of contemporary philosophy of the first-person, it is not clear that they all fit under a common heading. In this introduction, I bring out some of the substantive interrelations between these studies. They build one upon the others, and the concepts elucidated in the initial parts are then put to work and further elaborated in the subsequent parts. By showing the conceptual interrelations between the topics listed above, I hope to begin to exfoliate the term ‘the first-person’ to find a place for these topics under one heading: the first-person. 2 This essay begins where many studies of the first-person begin: the source of first-person singular immunity to error through misidentification (first-person IEM). Abstractly, some statement or assertion ϕa has the property of first-person IEM if and only if any context that constitutes this assertion as knowledge that something is ϕ constitutes as well knowledge that one oneself is ϕ. But why is first-person IEM the standard starting point for work on the first-person? It is largely accepted (and I do accept) that first-person IEM is one of the principal marks of self-consciousness. When my use of ‘I’ is immune to error through misidentification, I know myself to be in some way or another, 2 Throughout this essay I use small capitals to denote concepts. I use italics for emphasis and to denote propositions, e.g., p. I use single quotes to mention terms or sentences—though see Chapter 3 §2 for some complications regarding the use/mention distinction—and I use double-quotes for quoting sources as well as intratextual indirect speech. I also use double-quotes to introduce terms-of-art. I use minuscule xs, ys, and ϕs as variables to range over various sorts of entities at issue in propositional schemas. (Though see Chapter 2 §2.2.1 for complications concerning syncategorematic verbal nexuses.) I use