Profiling Kernel-Level Events to Detect Ransomware
Peeler: Profiling Kernel-Level Events to Detect Ransomware Muhammad Ejaz Ahmed, Hyoungshick Kim, Seyit Camtepe, and Surya Nepal Abstract—Ransomware is a growing threat that typically proposed to fight against ransomware as follows: machine operates by either encrypting a victim’s files or locking a victim’s learning models (e.g., [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]), use of decoy computer until the victim pays a ransom. However, it is still files (e.g., [10], [11], [7]), use of a key escrow mechanism challenging to detect such malware timely with existing tradi- tional malware detection techniques. In this paper, we present (e.g., [12]) and file I/O pattern profiling (e.g., [13], [14], [15], a novel ransomware detection system, called “Peeler” (Profiling [16], [17], [9], [18], [7], [19]). kErnEl -Level Events to detect Ransomware). Peeler deviates However, these techniques have at least one of the following from signatures for individual ransomware samples and relies limitations: 1) Localised visibility: existing approaches with on common and generic characteristics of ransomware depicted limited localized visibility would struggle to detect certain type at the kernel-level. Analyzing diverse ransomware families, we observed ransomware’s inherent behavioral characteristics such of malicious activities. For example, ransomware may first as stealth operations performed before the attack, file I/O request attempt to delete Windows backup files, disable anti-malware, patterns, process spawning, and correlations among kernel-level or real-time monitoring services on the victim’s machine to events. Based on those characteristics, we develop Peeler that remain undetected before actually starting to encrypt user files. continuously monitors a target system’s kernel events and detects Techniques relying on file I/O request patterns, cryptographic ransomware attacks on the system.
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