DOCSLIB.ORG

Les Centres De Fusion Dans Les Pays Sélectionnés, 2013 : Document De Discussion Et Bibliographie Commentée

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Les Centres De Fusion Dans Les Pays Sélectionnés, 2013 : Document De Discussion Et Bibliographie Commentée Les centres de fusion dans les pays sélectionnés, 2013 : Document de discussion et bibliographie commentée par Elaine Koren RAPPORT DE RECHERCHE : 2015-R040 DIVISION DE LA RECHERCHE www.securitepublique.gc.ca Title [Topic/ Discussion of X/ X Guide/ Summary of X Evaluation/ Synthesis of X] Sub-title [A Literature Review/ An Les points de vue exprimés dans le présent document sont ceux de l’auteure et Annotated Bibliography/ A Meta- ne reflètent pas nécessairement le point de vue de Sécurité publique Canada. La présente étude prend appui sur les sources de données les plus récentes en date de 2013. Tout changement depuis 2013 par Author Name(s) ne s’y reflète pas. Rapport no 038 RAPPORT DE RECHERECHE : 2015-RXXX © Sa Majesté la Reine du chef du Canada, 2016 No au catalogue : PS14-26/2014E No ISBN : 978-1-100-23213-3 LES CENTRES DE FUSION DANS LES PAYS SÉLECTIONNÉS SÉCURITÉ PUBLIQUE CANADA 1 Table des matières Résumé ................................................................................................................................ 4 Principales constatations ...................................................................................................... 5 1.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 7 2.0 Méthodologie ......................................................................................................................................... 8 2.1 Questions de recherche..................................................................................................... 8 2.2 Collecte de données et définition des termes ................................................................... 8 3.0 Centres de fusion dans les pays sélectionnés ...................................................................... 9 3.1 Australie ......................................................................................................................... 10 3.2 Union européenne .......................................................................................................... 12 3.3 Nouvelle-Zélande ........................................................................................................... 16 3.4 Singapour ....................................................................................................................... 17 3.5 Centres établis au Royaume-Uni .................................................................................... 19 3.6 États-Unis .................................................................................................................................. 21 4.0 Analyse .......................................................................................................................... 26 4.1 Première question de recherche ...................................................................................... 27 4.2 Deuxième question de recherche.................................................................................... 28 4.3 Troisième question de recherche .................................................................................... 35 4.4 Centre des opérations de la sûreté maritime (COSM).................................................... 38 4.5 Éléments favorables à la connaissance du domaine maritime ....................................... 38 5.0 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 41 6.0 Acronymes ........................................................................................................................................... 43 7.0 Glossaire et termes explicatifs ............................................................................................................. 53 8.0 Bibliographie commentée .................................................................................................................... 59 8.1 Australie ......................................................................................................................... 59 8.2 Canada ............................................................................................................................ 64 8.3 Union européenne .......................................................................................................... 69 8.4 Nouvelle-Zélande ........................................................................................................... 78 8.5 Singapour ....................................................................................................................... 81 LES CENTRES DE FUSION DANS LES PAYS SÉLECTIONNÉS SÉCURITÉ PUBLIQUE CANADA 2 8.6 Centres établis au Royaume-Uni .................................................................................... 87 8.7 États-Unis ....................................................................................................................... 95 9.0 Annexes ............................................................................................................................................. 117 Annexe 1 — Bases de données et mots clés proposés pour la bibliographie commentée ........................ 117 Annexe 4 — UE : Communautés d’utilisateurs de l’environnement commun de partage des informations120 Annexe 5 — UE : Lien entre le CISE et l’EUROSUR ................................................................................. 122 Annexe 6 — UE : Vue d’ensemble des initiatives internationales en matière de sécurité maritime ........... 124 Annexe 7 — UE : Réseau européen de surveillance maritime — MARSUR ............................................. 126 Annexe 8 — N.-Z. : Rôles du National Maritime Coordination Centre (NMCC) [centre national de coordination maritime] et des organismes principaux ................................................................................ 127 Annexe 9 — Singapour : Patrouilles et exercices conjoints menés par des organisations militaires et paramilitaires en Asie ................................................................................................................................ 128 Annexe 10 — Singapour : Enjeux maritimes clés en Asie du Sud-Est ...................................................... 130 Annexe 11 — Centres établis au R.-U. : Travailler ensemble pour la paix et la sécurité ........................... 131 Annexe 12 — É.-U. : Environnement de partage de l’information (ISE) .................................................... 132 Annexe 13 — É.-U. : Structure des centres de l’initiative .......................................................................... 133 Annexe 14 — É.-U. : Liste de surveillance intégrée unique (SILO) ........................................................... 134 Annexe 15 — É.-U. : Niveaux d’engagement du FBI auprès des centres de fusion .................................. 135 Annexe 16 — É.-U. : Types de demandes de soutien locales et d’État ..................................................... 136 Annexe 17 — É.-U. : Indicateurs de rendement clés et paramètres du point de service unique ............... 138 Annexe 18 — É.-U. : Connaissance du domaine maritime ........................................................................ 139 Annexe 19 — Analyse : Comparaison globale par pays ............................................................................ 140 10.0 Notes en fin d’ouvrage ................................................................................................................... 144 LES CENTRES DE FUSION DANS LES PAYS SÉLECTIONNÉS SÉCURITÉ PUBLIQUE CANADA 3 Résumé Les menaces maritimes d’aujourd’hui vont bien au-delà du scénario de défense traditionnelle en cas de conflit entre États. Elles sont plus diversifiées, complexes, imprévisibles et indissociables que jamais. L’idée que se faisait le public de la sécurité maritime a connu un changement notable au lendemain du 11 septembre 2011, avec la menace du terrorisme international. On compte également, parmi les menaces à la sécurité maritime, une recrudescence du trafic de drogue, d’êtres humains et d’armes ainsi que l’augmentation du nombre de migrants irréguliers, comme ceux qui viennent d’Afrique et vont en Europe, ce qui a mis de l’avant le sujet de la gouvernance maritime efficace. Prévenir les attaques terroristes en mer et provenant de la mer et empêcher les terroristes de franchir les frontières maritimes comptent parmi les préoccupations majeures des gouvernements d’Europe, d’Amérique du Nord et d’Asie du Sud-Est. Ils se sont donc tournés vers les points de passage obligés du commerce maritime mondial, ce qui comprend les secteurs comme le détroit de Malacca, le canal de Suez, le détroit d’Ormuz, le détroit de Bab el-Mandeb, le canal de Panama, la baie d’Helgoland, le détroit de Gibraltar et la Manche. Il est essentiel de protéger les lignes de communication maritimes et les ports internationaux et d’assurer la sécurité de ces points de passage obligés pour le commerce maritime mondial. Bon nombre de ces défis ne sont pas exclusivement de nature militaire; si les capacités militaires et civiles ne travaillent pas en équipe, aucune des deux ne sera en mesure d’assurer une surveillance maritime appropriée. Pour préserver la sécurité maritime, il faut qu’un partenariat solide et durable s’établisse entre les autorités civiles et militaires. Les centres de fusion de l’information de la sécurité maritime ont donc été mis en place pour servir
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Course Catalog
    UNITED STATES COAST GUARD ACADEMY NEW LONDON, CONNECTICUT CATALOG OF COURSES 2014-2015 Catalog of Courses 5 201 - UNITED STATES COAST GUARD ACADEMY 2014 NEW LONDON, CT OURSES C ALOG OF AT C U. S. Coast Guard Academy Reservation of Rights his Catalog primarily reflects information regarding the Cadet Under- Tgraduate Program for the Class of 2017. The statements set forth in this catalog are for informational purposes only and may not be construed as the basis of a contract between a cadet and the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. Any conflict between this catalog and the applica- ble statutes or regulations shall be resolved by reference to language of the statute or regulation only. The Academy reserves the right to change programs of study, academic requirements, course offerings, regulations, teaching staff, Critical Dates Cal- endar, and other matters described in the catalog without prior notice, in accor- dance with established procedures. The U.S. Coast Guard Academy endeavors to maintain the accuracy of all information provided in this catalog. However, it is the responsibility of the cadets to be aware of the current regulations, cur- riculum, and graduation requirements for their class and chosen major. Human Relations Statement The United States Coast Guard Academy is an equal opportunity employer guided by applicable Federal laws and regulations. The Academy is committed to the principles of fair treatment and equal opportunity. We recruit, educate, train and employ personnel based on merit so that each individual can excel and reach his or her maximum potential without regard to gender, race, color, religion, national origin, reprisal, sexual orientation and/or where applicable, age (over 40) and/or physical or mental disability.
    [Show full text]
  • A General Model of Illicit Market Suppression A
    ALL THE SHIPS THAT NEVER SAILED: A GENERAL MODEL OF ILLICIT MARKET SUPPRESSION A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government. By David Joseph Blair, M.P.P. Washington, DC September 15, 2014 Copyright 2014 by David Joseph Blair. All Rights Reserved. The views expressed in this dissertation do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. ii ALL THE SHIPS THAT NEVER SAILED: A GENERAL MODEL OF TRANSNATIONAL ILLICIT MARKET SUPPRESSION David Joseph Blair, M.P.P. Thesis Advisor: Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D. ABSTRACT This model predicts progress in transnational illicit market suppression campaigns by comparing the relative efficiency and support of the suppression regime vis-à-vis the targeted illicit market. Focusing on competitive adaptive processes, this ‘Boxer’ model theorizes that these campaigns proceed cyclically, with the illicit market expressing itself through a clandestine business model, and the suppression regime attempting to identify and disrupt this model. Success in disruption causes the illicit network to ‘reboot’ and repeat the cycle. If the suppression network is quick enough to continually impose these ‘rebooting’ costs on the illicit network, and robust enough to endure long enough to reshape the path dependencies that underwrite the illicit market, it will prevail. Two scripts put this model into practice. The organizational script uses two variables, efficiency and support, to predict organizational evolution in response to competitive pressures.
    [Show full text]
  • The Multimission U.S. Coast Guard Ready, Aware, and Responsive – with Renewed Focus on Mission Execution
    03 The Multi-Mission 16.08.2006 7:46 Uhr Seite 96 NAVY PROFILE GORDON I. PETERSON AND SCOTT C. TRUVER1 THE MULTIMISSION U.S. COAST GUARD READY, AWARE, AND RESPONSIVE – WITH RENEWED FOCUS ON MISSION EXECUTION The U. S. Coast Guard is a unique gov- ‘SENTINELS OF THE SEA’ responsibilities over the past two centuries – ernment agency – one whose 216-year becoming what Adm. Thad W. Allen, the history continues to exert a dominant The Coast Guard originated when the U.S. service’s current Commandant, has described as Congress created the Revenue Cutter Service in a ‘clearing house’ for multiple maritime mis- influence on its character, values, and 1790 as a component of the U.S. Treasury sions. The modern Coast Guard came into being mission performance. Owing to its mil- Department. It was Secretary of the Treasury in 1915 when the U.S. Life-Saving Service was itary structure, law-enforcement author- Alexander Hamilton who first referred to the combined with the Revenue Cutter Service. The ity, and humanitarian functions, the youthful service as ‘sentinels of the sea’ for its 1930s saw the Lighthouse Service become part crew of a distinctively painted orange- law-enforcement responsibilities enforcing U.S. of the Coast Guard, and in 1942 the Bureau of striped, white-hulled Coast Guard cutter tariff laws, protecting shipping from pirates, and Marine Inspection was realigned under the Coast will not find it unusual to perform a intercepting smuggled good – including human Guard (which was placed under Department of wide variety of maritime and naval mis- contraband.
    [Show full text]
  • Coast Guard Awards CIM 1560 25D(PDF)
    Medals and Awards Manual COMDTINST M1650.25D MAY 2008 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK. Commandant 1900 Half Street, S.W. United States Coast Guard Washington, DC 20593-0001 Staff Symbol: CG-12 Phone: (202) 475-5222 COMDTINST M1650.25D 5 May 2008 COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION M1625.25D Subj: MEDALS AND AWARDS MANUAL 1. PURPOSE. This Manual publishes a revision of the Medals and Awards Manual. This Manual is applicable to all active and reserve Coast Guard members and other Service members assigned to duty within the Coast Guard. 2. ACTION. Area, district, and sector commanders, commanders of maintenance and logistics commands, Commander, Deployable Operations Group, commanding officers of headquarters units, and assistant commandants for directorates, Judge Advocate General, and special staff offices at Headquarters shall ensure that the provisions of this Manual are followed. Internet release is authorized. 3. DIRECTIVES AFFECTED. Coast Guard Medals and Awards Manual, COMDTINST M1650.25C and Coast Guard Rewards and Recognition Handbook, CG Publication 1650.37 are cancelled. 4. MAJOR CHANGES. Major changes in this revision include: clarification of Operational Distinguishing Device policy, award criteria for ribbons and medals established since the previous edition of the Manual, guidance for prior service members, clarification and expansion of administrative procedures and record retention requirements, and new and updated enclosures. 5. ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS/CONSIDERATIONS. Environmental considerations were examined in the development of this Manual and have been determined to be not applicable. 6. FORMS/REPORTS: The forms called for in this Manual are available in USCG Electronic Forms on the Standard Workstation or on the Internet: http://www.uscg.mil/forms/, CG Central at http://cgcentral.uscg.mil/, and Intranet at http://cgweb2.comdt.uscg.mil/CGFORMS/Welcome.htm.
    [Show full text]
  • Intelligence Training, Comdtinst 1500.26
    Commandant 2100 Second Street, S.W. Stop 7360 United States Coast Guard Washington, DC 20593-7360 Staff Symbol: CG-21 Phone: (202) 372-2830 Fax: (202) 372-2956 COMDTINST 1500.26 05JUL2012 COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION 1500.26 Subj: INTELLIGENCE TRAINING Ref: (a) Mandatory Use of the Training Management Tool, COMDTINST 5270.2 (series) (b) Military Personnel Data Records (PDR System), COMDTINST M1080.10 (series) (c) U. S. Coast Guard Competency Management System Manual, COMDTINST M5300.2 (series) (d) Personnel Qualification Standards for Intelligence Personnel, COMDTINST M3870.2 (series) (e) Personnel Qualification Standards for Intelligence Processors and Disseminators, COMDTINST M3870.3 (series) 1. PURPOSE. This Instruction establishes minimum training and qualification policies, procedures and requirements mandated by Commandant for all Coast Guard Intelligence coded billets and other billets located at intelligence units requiring intelligence training. 2. ACTION. All Coast Guard unit commanders, commanding officers, officers-in-charge, deputy/assistant commandants, and chiefs of headquarters staff elements shall comply with the provisions of this Instruction. Internet release is authorized. 3. DIRECTIVES AFFECTED. None. 4. DISCUSSION. This Instruction is intended to be the Intelligence workforce’s (officer, civilian and enlisted) resource for all training requirements mandated by Headquarters. However, the policies, herein, do not prevent area, district, sectors or units from specifying additional training requirements for personnel at the local level. The burden of funding a new/additional training initiative lies with the organization that mandates it. The Intelligence Master Training List (MTL), referred to within, is a living document that supports this Instruction and will be updated as new training requirements are identified and approved.
    [Show full text]
  • Listening to the RUMRUNNERS: Radio Intelligence During Prohibition This Publication Is a Product of the National Security Agency History Program
    Listening to the RUMRUNNERS: Radio Intelligence during Prohibition This publication is a product of the National Security Agency history program. It presents a historical perspective for informational and educational purposes, is the result of independent research, and does not necessarily reflect a position of NSA/CSS or any other U.S. government entity. This publication is distributed free by the National Security Agency. If you would like additional copies, please email your request to [email protected] or write to: Center for Cryptologic History National Security Agency 9800 Savage Road, Suite 6886 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6886 David Mowry served as a historian, researching and writing histories in the Cryptologic History Series. He began his Agency career as a linguist in 1957 and later (1964-1969) held positions as a linguist and cryptanalyst. From 1969 through 1981 he served in various technical and managerial positions. In the latter part of his career, he was a historian in the Center for Cryptologic History. Mr. Mowry held a BA with regional group major in Germany and Central Europe from the University of California at Berkeley. He passed away in 2005. Cover: The U.S. Coast Guard 75-ft. patrol boat CG-262 towing into San Francisco Harbor her prizes, the tug ELCISCO and barge Redwood City, seized for violation of U.S. Customs laws, in 1927. From Rum War: The U.S. Coast Guard and Prohibition. Listening to the Rumrunners: Radio Intelligence during Prohibition David P. Mowry Center for Cryptologic History Second edition 2014 A motorboat makes contact with the liquor-smuggling British schooner Katherine off the New Jersey coast, 1923.
    [Show full text]
  • The Cutter the Ewsletter of the Foundation for Coast Guard History 28 Osprey Dr
    The Cutter The ewsletter of the Foundation for Coast Guard History 28 Osprey Dr. ewsletter 28, Autumn 2009 Gales Ferry, CT 06335 Bill of Lading From the Chairman, Jim Hull, VADM USCG (ret.) The Wardroom Well, it has been three months on the job...and I am still find- Planned Giving p. 4 ing out all the “history” behind the Foundation for Coast Bennett research p. 5 Guard History. Research and documentation are key to an or- Intern report p. 6 ganization such as this; and luckily, with regard to running it, we have most of it—it’s just that it’s all spread out, and in Main Prop some cases it’s archived in people’s minds. So Gary Thomas augatuck p. 7 and I have engaged in a comprehensive effort to get it all Hudson p. 8 down on paper. We are making progress monthly, and thank Radioman in the CG p. 9 you’s go to Howie Thorsen and Fred Herzberg for “assisting” us, and to all the Regents as well. We are developing one- and 50s Aviation p. 14 five-year strategies that will be provided to the members, and Point Welcome p. 18 updated on a yearly basis. I’m not sure when the first one will hit the streets, but I will let you know in the next edition of the Speakings Cutter . CG Pilot #2 p. 25 Ancients/Queens p. 26 On a “historical” note, I performed my first official function: New Gold Ancient Albatross p. 27 attending the “roost” at Elizabeth City and presenting a copy of an aviation print on behalf of the Foundation to the new Memorials gold Ancient Albatross, symbolizing his seniority in the active Chatham Boathouse p.
    [Show full text]
  • DHS/ALL/PIA-086 DHS Counterintelligence Program Page 1
    Privacy Impact Assessment for the DHS Counterintelligence Program DHS Reference No. DHS/ALL/PIA-086 August 31, 2020 Privacy Impact Assessment DHS/ALL/PIA-086 DHS Counterintelligence Program Page 1 Abstract The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Counterintelligence (CI) Program is a Department-wide effort designed to detect, deter, and disrupt foreign intelligence threats directed at the United States. CI encompasses those activities that identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents (including transnational criminal organizations and drug trafficking organizations conducting intelligence-related activities), or international terrorist organizations or activities, collectively hereinafter referred to as foreign intelligence entities (FIE).1 DHS is conducting this Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) because the DHS CI Program requires access to, collection of, and storage of personally identifiable information (PII) associated with individuals who are either involved in, witness to, or knowledgeable of CI-related activities that are the subject of inquiry by DHS, or supporting CI activities conducted by the DHS CI Program. Overview The DHS CI Program is a coordinated Department effort to detect, deter, and disrupt foreign intelligence threats directed at the United States. Within DHS, only two Components are members of the Intelligence Community (IC): the Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), which each have different authorities under Executive Order (EO) 12333 “United States Intelligence Activities” 2 (as well as through their own statutory authorities, which are explained in more detail below).
    [Show full text]
  • Cyber Strategy Established Cyberspace As a New Operational Domain for the U.S
    UNITED STATES COAST GUARD O O O O CYBER STRATEGIC OUTLOOK AUGUST 2021 WASHINGTON, D.C. USCG CYBER STRATEGIC OUTLOOK 01 O O O O The United States Coast Guard’s Vision To Protect and Operate in Cyberspace O O O O Table of Contents I. Introduction........................................................................................................................................................4 II. U.S. Coast Guard and Cyberspace Operations...............................................................................9 III. The Marine Transportation System (MTS) in Cyberspace .................................................14 IV. Line of Effort 1: Defend and Operate the U.S. Coast Guard Enterprise Mission Platform ..................................................................................................................18 V. Line of Effort 2: Protect the Marine Transportation System...............................................23 VI. Line of Effort 3: Operate In and Through Cyberspace ..........................................................30 VII. Key Enablers ...................................................................................................................................................36 VIII. Conclusion........................................................................................................................................................42 USCG CYBER STRATEGIC OUTLOOK 1 THEof the United COMMANDANT States Coast Guard Since the early days of the Revenue Cutter Service, we have been sentinels
    [Show full text]
  • Coast Guard and Its Transition to the Department of Homeland Security
    S. HRG. 108–786 COAST GUARD AND ITS TRANSITION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, FISHERIES, AND COAST GUARD OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION FEBRUARY 12, 2003 Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation ( U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 97–272 PDF WASHINGTON : 2005 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:16 May 18, 2005 Jkt 097272 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\97272.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina CONRAD BURNS, Montana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii TRENT LOTT, Mississippi JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota GORDON SMITH, Oregon RON WYDEN, Oregon PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JEANNE BUMPUS, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel ROBERT W. CHAMBERLIN, Republican Chief Counsel KEVIN D. KAYES, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel GREGG ELIAS, Democratic General Counsel SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, FISHERIES, AND COAST GUARD OLYMPIA J.
    [Show full text]
  • Coast Guard Intelligence Foreign Language Program
    Commandant U.S Coast Guard Stop 7301 United States Coast Guard 2703 Martin Luther King JR Ave SE Washington, DC 20593-7301 Staff Symbol: CG-21 Phone: (202) 372-2700 COMDTINST M3876.1 25 JUN 2021 COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION M3876.1 Subj: COAST GUARD INTELLIGENCE FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROGRAM Ref: (a) Intelligence Community Foreign Language Capability, Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 630 (b) U.S. Coast Guard Competency Management System Manual, COMDTINST M5300.2 (series) (c) Coast Guard Pay Manual, COMDTINST M7220.29 (series) (d) Performance, Training, and Education Manual, COMDTINST M1500.10 (series) (e) Coast Guard Intelligence Manual (CGIM), COMDTINST M3800.6 (series) (f) 2018 Coast Guard Mission Needs Statement (MNS) 1. PURPOSE. This Manual establishes policy, assigns responsibilities and provides procedures, standards, and requirements for the administration of the Coast Guard Intelligence Foreign Language Program (CGIFLP). 2. ACTION. All Coast Guard unit commanders, commanding officers, officers-in-charge, deputy/assistant commandants, and chiefs of headquarters staff elements must comply with the provisions of this Manual. Internet release is authorized. 3. DIRECTIVES AFFECTED. None. DISTRIBUTION – SDL No. 170 a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z A B X X X X C X X X D E X F G H X X NON-STANDARD DISTRIBUTION: COMDTINST M3876.1 4. DISCUSSION. The 2018 Coast Guard Mission Needs Statements (MNS) codified the Coast Guard requirement for foreign language skills to communicate with foreign language speakers during operations. Reference (a) directs Intelligence Community (IC) Elements to manage their foreign language resources consistent with their respective missions, as well as designate a Senior Language Authority (SLA) to oversee their respective IC element’s foreign language capabilities and matters, and serve on the IC Foreign Language Executive Committee (FLEXCOM).
    [Show full text]
  • Union Calendar No. 894
    1 Union Calendar No. 894 115TH CONGRESS " ! REPORT 2d Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 115–1127 LEGISLATIVE AND OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 115TH CONGRESS together with ADDITIONAL VIEWS (Pursuant to House Rule XI, 1(d)) JANUARY 2, 2019.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:29 Jan 16, 2019 Jkt 034022 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6012 Sfmt 6012 E:\HR\OC\HR1127.XXX HR1127 dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with HEARING E:\Seals\Congress.#13 LEGISLATIVE AND OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 115TH CONGRESS VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:29 Jan 16, 2019 Jkt 034022 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6019 Sfmt 6019 E:\HR\OC\HR1127.XXX HR1127 dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with HEARING with DSK3GLQ082PROD on dlhill 1 Union Calendar No. 894 115TH CONGRESS " ! REPORT 2d Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 115–1127 LEGISLATIVE AND OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 115TH CONGRESS together with ADDITIONAL VIEWS (Pursuant to House Rule XI, 1(d)) JANUARY 2, 2019.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 34–022 WASHINGTON : 2019 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:29 Jan 16, 2019 Jkt 034022 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 4012 Sfmt 4012 E:\HR\OC\HR1127.XXX HR1127 dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with HEARING E:\Seals\Congress.#13 VerDate Sep 11 2014 01:29 Jan 16, 2019 Jkt 034022 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 4012 Sfmt 4012 E:\HR\OC\HR1127.XXX HR1127 dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with HEARING LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, DC, January 2, 2019.
    [Show full text]