POLITICS, PERFORMANCE, AND IDENTITY: CONNECTING THE 2001 ECONOMIC CRISIS RECOVERY AND THE IN CONTEMPORARY

By

Olivia Garcia

Undergraduate Honors Thesis submitted to the faculty of the International Studies and Dance programs

Muhlenberg College

May 7, 2020

Thesis Committee: Dr. Cathy Marie Ouellette (History/International Studies), Advisor Dr. Mohsin Hashim (Political Science/International Studies) Dr. Leticia Robles-Moreno (Theatre & Dance)

Acknowledgements

This honors thesis represents the culmination of two years of independent research on contemporary Argentina. There are many people I wish to thank who have, over the years, been a part of making this project possible. Thank you to Kelly Cannon for providing support for my research, and to the entire Trexler Library staff for assisting in the process of finding and obtaining works from all over the world. I also want to acknowledge and thank the International

Studies Department at Muhlenberg College for shaping and framing my research interests and scholarship over the past four years. To my committee members, Dr. Hashim, Dr. Ouellette, and

Dr. Robles-Moreno, I thank you for your support, in all forms, over the course of this project. I wish to extend a special thanks to Dr. Ouellette for encouraging me to start an independent study on Argentina in my junior year; if it had not been for that semester, this final and culminating thesis might never have come to fruition.

2

Table of Contents

Introduction 4

The Argentine Tango 8

Tango in Perón’s Argentina 13

The 2001 Crisis: Convertibility and the Rupture of Argentine Neoliberalism 17

The Cacerolazos 21

Who Were the Piqueteros? 22

The Tango in Crisis 25

Argentina’s Recovery: The End of Convertibility 26

The Return of the State 28

Kirchnerismo and the New Argentine State 31

The Tango as the ‘Other’ 38

The Tango’s Economic Value 39

Tango’s Renovación in Argentine Identity 43

Export v. Home Tango 45

The Solidification of Tango as Cultural Heritage 47

Conclusion 49

3

Introduction

Crises are times of change; when faced with one, the country before the crisis exits it as a different state. The changes which ensue, are, however, not always a rupture from the past, but can also be a return to, or evolution of, said past. In analyzing how a country recovers from a crisis, and how that recovery provides insight into the resulting identity of the people, various metrics of study need to be introduced. It is here where this research will connect the performative with the political.

This research focuses on the watershed moment of Argentina’s 2001 economic crisis.

This time period brings up essential questions about Argentine identity, specifically in Buenos

Aires. Known as the home of the Tango, and as the center of Argentina’s government, Buenos

Aires became the place of protest and identity shift during and after the crisis. In this study, the pulse of Argentine identity is concentrated on , the central government’s hub and the birthplace of the Tango. There are many reasons for this, however the most central being that

Tango is most commonly referenced in connection to Buenos Aires– Argentina has within it many folkloric dance styles, however Tango and its role as an identity signifier is, rightly or wrongly, concentrated in Buenos Aires and aggregated to the rest of the country. This connection between Tango, Buenos Aires, and the crisis is essential to framing my research questions. In studying the post-crisis recovery in Buenos Aires, the importance of Kirchner’s presidency is studied in connection with Tango’s reintroduction into society and the reintroduction of the state in Buenos Aires. That leads to my research question, which asks: to what extent is the renovación of the Tango, both as a commodity and as a genuine form of popular expression, a result of the 2001 economic crisis and the subsequent recovery in the city of Buenos Aires? This question connects the political and economic changes in the city and uses performance as a measure of continuity or change in the time period.

4

Studying performance is an untapped phenomenon that should be used to understand how citizens define their identity in response to political and social upheaval. Analyses of political and economic change can, at times, be confined to certain perimeters, bringing about a straight- forward and often one-sided investigation into complex crises. However, it is my understanding that the inclusion of performance, because of the ways it presents national identity, is a part of the puzzle of investigating a state in a moment of hardship. In this study, I define performance as not only art that is done with an audience in mind, but also as the acts that are done everyday which reflect the identities we chose to put on and present. Performance is both explicit and implicit– it is done both on purpose and subconsciously. The Tango is a form of performance that is done in both of those circumstances, meaning it penetrates all parts of life; it does not exist solely in Tango shows, bars, etc. That is what makes it a complicated source of analysis, and an essential one in order to understand Argentina’s recovery from the crisis. Moments of shift and change in one part of a state always influence its other parts– this can be said of shifts in politics and their consequential influence on shifts in performance and identity. Thus, to leave out such disciplines in an investigation of a crisis is to forego certain truths of the ways a crisis can into the society in which it happens: it is this lacuna that this research hopes to address.

In order to best use performance as a metric for political, economic, and social shifts after a crisis, the origins of the art form in question need to be investigated. The history of it, its evolution over the years, and the identities embedded within it require in depth investigation. An identity is something a person presents to show others who they are. There are many situations in which one does this– in their personal life, religious life, gender, etc. In this essay, the specific identity I will be analyzing is national identity. Citizens of a place who share common ties have the ability to present certain traits and truths in order to create a national identity. This identity is

5 one that goes on to represent the nation itself, and, if it becomes properly homogenized in society, it can be the only acceptable identity for a citizen to present. According to performance studies scholar Diana Taylor in her text Disappearing Acts: Spectacles of Gender and

Nationalism in Argentina’s “,” this national identity is not something that everyone in a nation inherently shares, but is the common act of putting on and stepping into the right traits in order to fit the predetermined mold of national identity decided upon by those in power.1

Defining nation-ness is the essence of what identity does and is, and is thus crucial for understanding what it means to be a part of a nation. Taylor offers that national identity is a performance– it is not something we inherently are, but a set of traits and actions that a people chose to conform to and perform in order to fit in, express loyalty, and, in some cases, blend in.2

This definition will guide my analysis, and from this point forward the word “identity” will carry with it all of the aforementioned nuances as it is mentioned.

This research studies the all-important Tango in relation to Argentine culture and identity throughout its history. Argentina has an art form that has been claimed by its government and its citizens over its history as its national art form. This paper uses secondary and primary source research to investigate Tango dance from its origins to its renovación in the 2000s. Studying

Tango and how it has defined Argentina’s national identity will provide an understanding of the role Tango has played in the crisis recovery, and it’s connection to policy changes in Argentina’s government as it strove to revert back to Argentina’s golden age after the crisis.

The Tango is used in this study to measure and interpret the identity of the Argentine people after the 2001 economic crisis, during which the country recovered from economic, political, and social turmoil. An analysis of the crisis and the recovery of the crisis will align the

1Diana Taylor, “The Theatre of Operations: Performing Nation-ness in the Public Sphere,” in Disappearing Acts: Spectacles of Gender and Nationalism in Argentina’s “Dirty War,” (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997) 91-117. 2 Ibid.

6 people’s and the government’s return to the Tango, as the government returned to populism through Nestor Kirchner, while also exploring the economic viability embedded in the Tango’s rebirth in the 2000s. In order to connect Tango with the crisis recovery, it is important to understand the economic shifts taken in the 2000s by the government after Menem’s administration. After failed attempts by the government to use neoliberal economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s to open and grow Argentina’s economy, general discontent, protesting, and looting all led to a shift in official policies. Kirchnerismo was then installed in the government, and its revert back to familiar populist political measures and Argentina-first economic policies led people to regain their trust in the government and Argentine identity. As Kirchner’s power solidified, so did Tango’s– the art form re-established itself in the city of Buenos Aires. Thus, the connection between regaining trust in their government and their identity is an important piece of

Tango’s return, and Tango’s return can provide important insight to the study of crisis recovery.

There is a plethora of research on the Tango as a metaphor for Argentine identity, and the representative nature of Tango across the centuries, however this project strives to connect the continuity of Tango’s identity to ruptures in Argentina’s political and economic reality. In addition, it attempts to make clear the connection between identity and performance, proving the importance of studying art forms in defining a national identity. Lastly, this connection provides an important metric for crisis-recovery– if an art form represents a national identity, then it’s presence in times of change and turmoil can represent the pulse of the national identity at that time.

This paper will be divided into sections: first an analysis of the origins of the Tango is done to understand its origins, its identities, and the ways it has evolved up until the 1980s. Next, the paper will dive into the 2001 crisis, analyzing the economic measures taken by Menem’s government in the 1980s and 1990s, and the failure to prevent the crisis by not just the Argentine

7 government, but by the IMF and its alignment with the Washington Consensus. The protest culture that followed will be explored in order to understand the feelings and actions of the people of the city of Buenos Aires. Next, the administrative shift to Kirchnerismo will be analyzed through the lens of Kirchner’s return to the familiar, the popular, and the Argentine in his policies. Lastly, the Tango will be re-introduced in connection with Argentina’s new policies– the connection between a population in need of work and in need of an identity will be explored with the Tango’s return. The government of Buenos Aires’ stance on the Tango, the role of Tango , and the UNESCO stamp on Tango as a piece of Argentina’s cultural heritage will connect the dance’s economic opportunities and its role as a signifier of recovery as studied through its identity. This paper will conclude with an understanding of the longevity of

Tango in Buenos Aires, while answering the question to what extent is renovación of the Tango a result of Argentina’s recovery from the crisis? This question will aggregate to address the central issue of this study, which asks of crisis and recovery studies in the social sciences to include in their metrics the importance of performance study and analysis– it is within art forms and their connection to the political and economic environment in which they exist that crises and the people they affect will be best understood.

The Argentine Tango

In order to fully understand the connection between Argentina and Tango, an in depth analysis of where the Tango came from is required. Not only does its history hold within it an understanding of the men and women who made up early Argentina, but it explains many of the values that remain incredibly important to Argentinian society today. Understanding the peaks and valleys of Tango’s popularity helps place its importance across various political, economic,

8 and social realities across time in Argentina, from which conclusions about its relevance can be interpreted and analyzed.

The only place to start is Buenos Aires, Argentina’s capital and famous port city. In her text Tango and the Political Economy of Passion, author Marta Savigliano dives into Tango's long history carefully, attempting to avoid the all-too-easy trap of generalization about the art form and its origins– it is easy, she claims, to fall into tropism and stereotyping the people who made the Tango.3 One of the more important things she notes about the Tango’s origins in the port city of Buenos Aires is that all of the different groups of people living there in the mid-

1800s had a hand in creating the dance. Men from the country, from Europe, and African slaves all made up the growing population in the city, and thus made up the population who created the dance. However, they were not credited equally in the final product. In the hybridization of

African styles, Italian traditions, and Criollo rhythms, there was conflict, and, oftentimes, exclusions. It was common for white Argentinians to caricature African rhythms as an excuse to take their movements and manipulate them within their own version of the Tango.4 It is clear that the Tango is a dance that reflected social reality from the beginning– just as blacks in Buenos

Aires were excluded from many things they built with their own hands, they were excluded eventually from dancing movements that were in some ways, their own.

There were other groups at first excluded from dancing and singing Tango: women. The

Tango is a dance for men– it has had a machismo identity since it began. Savigliano writes about this phenomena of machismo, which she defines as the loss of virility from the rules imposed by civilization. This is especially important in the 1880s, as rural men moved into the cities to find

3 Marta E. Savigliano, “Introductions,” In Tango and the Political Economy of Passion, Marta E. Savigliano, 1-30, Bolder: Westview Press, Inc., 1995. 4 Marta E. Savigliano, “Tango as a Spectacle of Sex, Race, and Class,” in Tango and the Political Economy of Passion, Marta E. Savigliano, 30-71, Bolder: Westview Press, Inc., 1995.

9 work. She writes that this loss of virility and freedom in an urban environment creates a suppressed man, who then feels the need to express his sexuality in some way– enter Tango.5

Such sexual origins of the Tango help explain the power dynamics not only in the dance but in the society around it. In addition, there is much debate about the difference between the Tango and sexuality and the Tango and sensuality– there are those who see the latter as a weakening, or even homosexualized, version of the Tango, something that usually incites fear. Men were allowed to be sexual, a trope that has continued throughout Argentina’s long history, but their sensuality and emotions were looked at as weak.6 The importance of maleness in Tango is something that has never dissipated, even as society has progressed, and in some ways has not changed in traditional Tango– this phenomena will be important in my continued analysis of the

Tango.

Defining Tango as something “sexual” frees it from being associated with queer identity, as it distinugishes that a man can be sexual, but he cannot engage in sensuality while dancing.

This is an important part of Tango’s story, as it was, from the beginning, danced between two men. In his analysis of the early Tango, Jorge Salessi, a cultural criticism scholar who focuses on

Latin American, and specifically Argentine culture, writes about a Buenos Aires not always seen, and gives voice to the many ignored stories that are deeply embedded in the art form’s origins in the port city. Because Buenos Aires was a place where people could find industrial jobs, men traveled from the countryside of Argentina to the city to find work. Men from Europe also immigrated to the country to take newly created industrial jobs in the booming city. These two groups, in combination with the African slaves who had already been bought and sold in the city,

5 Marta E. Savigliano, “Tango as a Spectacle of Sex, Race, and Class,” in Tango and the Political Economy of Passion, Marta E. Savigliano, 30-71, Bolder: Westview Press, Inc., 1995. 6 Jorge Salessi. “Medics, Crooks, and Tango Queens: The National Appropriation of a Gay Tango,” translated by Celeste Fraser Delgado, in Everynight Life: Culture and Dance in Latin/o America, edited by Celeste Fraser Delgado and José Esteban Muñoz (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997) 141-174.

10 made up the populus at the time– Buenos Aires in the 1880s had a predominantly male working- class citizenry. It was they who created the Tango, and because there were no women, many times men danced together: two men practicing and creating new steps for the Tango was quite common.7 The Tango between two men was danced not only out of practicality, but also out of desire, and, as this identity grew, it was rejected by the porteño elites, who feared the social reality happening in their city– a social reality that they saw as “dirty.”

At the time, not only was outward homosexuality danced by lower-class men, but the growth of brothels, prostitution and forbidden music all made the elites feel their “clean” city was being “infected” by this sexual impurity.8 Elites did not want the Tango associated with this impurity, and so when these elites went to Europe to show off their new dance, certain movements were changed. Dancers no longer stood as close to each other, and the music and lyrics were changed to tell more appropriate stories, or the lyrics were removed all together.

Europeans fell in love with the dance, and continued to ‘purify’ it with their own standards.

Eventually, the European-re-made Tango made its way back to Buenos Aires, and became extremely popular with the porteño population. The brothels and lower-class Tango clubs remained, but they were for the lower class, and were not the ‘true’ Tango that Buenos Aires promoted worldwide as its own creation.9 There is a clear sense that identity here is being performed, as queer-ness is being embraced by some through chosen performance and rejected by others in favor of what they felt was the “true” Argentine identity. This moment in the

Tango’s history has important roots for the conversation on what the Argentine identity is, and how the Tango is an important piece in defining that identity.

7Jorge Salessi. “Medics, Crooks, and Tango Queens: The National Appropriation of a Gay Tango,” translated by Celeste Fraser Delgado, in Everynight Life: Culture and Dance in Latin/o America, edited by Celeste Fraser Delgado and José Esteban Muñoz (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997) 141-174. 8 Ibid. 9 Carolyn Merritt, “The Cultural Preparation,” in Tango Nuevo, Carolyn Merritt (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012), 30-48.

11

The Tango’s shift to the upper class was aided by singer Carlos Gardel, arguably one of the most famous Tango performers. He, with his signature suits and polished look, transformed the Tango’s raciness into a composed and respectable art form. He straddled the between poor immigrant and refined porteño, and with that moved Tango from one class to the other with his flair and style.10 Thus, as the Tango moved from the lower class to upper class porteños, there were more rules about who could dance Tango and how they could dance. Men dancing together was no longer normal, brothels continued to be pushed out of the city, and lyrics of

Tango songs were continually purified and rewritten. All of these changes represented an important evolution in Tango– hiding its origins as it grew in popularity.11

The creation of the Tango in the 1880s was a result of the political and economic situation that existed at the time– Buenos Aires was becoming an essential hub for goods entering Argentina and the rest of , and thus the need for labor grew exponentially. In addition, as social class tension grew between poor laborers and upper class

Europeans in the city, the city became a place of duality. On the one hand, there were Tango dancers creating an intimate, popular dance and music form that was danced by men, some women, and existed in the ‘underbelly’ of Buenos Aires. All the while, Europeans were moving to Buenos Aires at the turn of the century. As the 19th century progressed, there was a distinct emphasis on wanting to modernize society, as there were in many Latin American countries.

Specifically in Argentina, there was an increased desire to whiten the country (“blanquear”), which came in the form of mass immigration in the 19th and 20th centuries from Europe.12 The

10 Alma Guillermoprieto, “And Still They Tango,” National Geographic, 204, no. 6 (Dec 2003): 34-47. 11Jorge Salessi. “Medics, Crooks, and Tango Queens: The National Appropriation of a Gay Tango,” translated by Celeste Fraser Delgado, in Everynight Life: Culture and Dance in Latin/o America, edited by Celeste Fraser Delgado and José Esteban Muñoz (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997) 141-174. 12 Carmen Alicia Ferradás, "Argentina," in Countries and Their Cultures, edited by Carol R. Ember and Melvin Ember, 77-92. Vol. 1, (New York, NY: Macmillan Reference USA, 2001). http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/CX3401700019/GVRL?u=mul_coll&sid=GVRL&xid=80f47bb9.

12 influx of Europeans and their subsequent stealing and remaking of Tango through their journeys to Europe made the dance what it is today. There is no Tango without the history of Buenos

Aires. The Tango will continue to be influenced by and influence Argentina’s political, economic and social realities across it’s history.

Tango in Perón’s Argentina

In tracing Tango's history, the next great era of the dance was in the 1940s and early 50s.

This period, dubbed the Tango ‘Golden Age,’ coincided with the Peronist era of government, during which President Juan Perón used his populist message to garner support from working class Argentinians.13 During this time, when working class laborers were given unprecedented representation by the government, Tango also rose to unprecedented popularity. What Tango represented was another form of popular rule, except rather than that rule being in the form of government, it came in the form of cultural recognition. Tango is, in its original form, a form of música popular, meaning it is a music form made directly by the people. During the 1940s, as

Perón began to give honor to people who were lower and working class, the Tango was used as a way to promote tropes that represented them and their lives. For example, it is noted that Perón honored the working class as ‘moral,’ while at the same time labeling wealth as ‘corrupt’ and

‘immoral.’ Such cultural tropes were encouraged in the Tango and in film. Many Tango songs featured the bacón or niño bueno, who represented the rich kid who acted without honor. In film, there was a constant use of the wealthy villain versus the humble hero.14 In promoting these ideas in Tango media, Peronist supporters (who were mostly working class, rural, or poor) felt

13Mike Gonzales and Marianella Yanes, “Astor Piazzola and Tango Nuevo,” in Tango: Sex and Rhythm of the City, edited by Mike Gonzales and Mianella Yanes (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2013) 151-168. 14 Karush, Matthew B, “Populism, Melodrama, and the Market: The Mass Cultural Origins of Personism,” in The New Cultural History of : Power and Identity in Mid-Twentieth-Century Argentina, edited by Matthew B. Karush and Oscar Chamosa (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010) 21-52.

13 honor in who they were, and thus saw themselves as the heart and soul of Argentina. Because of the political and economic situation in Peronist Argentina in the 1940s and 50s, the cultural presence of the Tango became incredibly important as a means of promoting a certain identity for the Peronist government, proving again the ways the political and economic state affect culture as a form of national identity.

Though Peronism was oppressive to certain sectors of the population in Argentina– indigenous groups were excluded from economic progress and ignored in populist rhetoric– his time in power in the country represented an important shift in the state in Buenos Aires.15 Social class norms were challenged, state-sponsorship became the norm, and grassroots organizations like labor unions were integrated into the political sphere. For a time, this was what defined the city of Buenos Aires, and what many citizens defined as their national identity– the people of

Buenos Aires were Peronists. Peron’s hold over the country and his paternalistic form of governance remains a turning point in Argentina; whether his populism was successful or fair matters less than his ability to capture a nation’s identity, part of which was done through popular culture and performance.

One of the most notable Tango evolutions happened during this time period as well– the

Tango Nuevo movement of the late 40s and early 50s is known as a turning point in the dance and music forms of the Tango. Dancer and composer Astor Piazzola made this new style of

Tango the cutting edge way to learn the dance. He pioneered this form that helped change the way Tango was seen– all around the world, his sexual, very new form of Tango was performed and represented an evolution in the dance and music style.16 What he essentially did was change

15 Diana Lenton, “The Malón de la Paz of 1946: Indigenous Descamisados at the Dawn of Peronism,” in The New Cultural History of Peronism: Power and Identity in Mid-Twentieth-Century Argentina, edited by Matthew B. Karush and Oscar Chamosa (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 21-52. 16Mike Gonzales and Marianella Yanes, “Astor Piazzola and Tango Nuevo,” in Tango: Sex and Rhythm of the City, Mike Gonzales and Mianella Yanes (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2013) 151-168.

14 how the Tango was taught and presented to dancers– it was not a completely new set of dance steps, but was a reorganization and deconstruction of steps that already existed. The style was also characterized by a greater emphasis on the steps themselves, rather than the emotional connection that older generations had to the dance and the music. Newer generations no longer faced the hardships their grandparents did, thus the need to grieve and express hardships through the dance subsided in the Tango Nuevo. The Tango’s evolution also helped to universalize it, making it more accessible to foreign audiences.17 Each evolution of the Tango is a way to redefine its identity, and is born from the time period in which its artists exist. The Tango was also becoming, in this Tango Nuevo movement, a bonafide dance form that was for everyone.

In her book Tango Nuevo, anthropologist Carolyn Merritt writes about the controversy of the Tango Nuevo, exploring how evolutions of the Tango represent the various populations that have danced it. She writes that many reject the notion that evolutions of the Tango are “new.” Many argue that such evolutions are proof of a living and breathing Tango that is, in essence, the same. Newer generations argue that the dance evolved because the world around them evolved– for example, in the 1940s, there was no longer a need to shut the Tango off to anyone, as the working class expanded to include more people than ever. In addition, as women were gaining further rights and power in society, the strict leader/follower-male/female binary collapsed some, representing the openness that was happening in the world surrounding the dance.18 The Tango is thus not a dance that has remained unchanged– it has evolved with the evolutions of the world around it, it exists as a living and breathing art form that cannot be tied to just one moment or identity in Argentina.

17Carolyn Merritt, “What’s so New about Tango Nuevo?,” in Tango Nuevo, Carolyn Merritt, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012) 49-81. 18Carolyn Merritt, “What’s so New about Tango Nuevo?,” in Tango Nuevo, Carolyn Merritt, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012) 49-81.

15

Some artists at the time continued to cling onto traditional Tango norms as the true way to perform the dance, a phenomena that has many implications for the dance form in contemporary performance. Is evolution a stray from tradition? Or, is it a way to present new identities as they become relevant? This argument is one that has become more pronounced as time has gone on, and tells us that identity can be pulled from the past to the present, or it can evolve based upon the world around it. This idea will return to the forefront of analysis when the

Tango returns to Buenos Aires at the end of the 20th century– the use of Tango as a political and economic good, controlled by the state, turns the Tango away from being a free and ever- changing art form, but makes it a commodity. It will be important to distinguish between what kind of Tango will be performed during those times.

This is where the Tango ends in its evolution for some time. After Perón dies in 1974 and his presidency is taken over by his wife Isabel, Argentina falls into turmoil.19 The country’s military, not agreeing with Isabel’s presidency and her inability to save the country, staged a military coup in 1976 and General Jorge Videla, along with other high level military officials, took control of the country. For nearly 10 years, Argentinians lived under violent oppression.

People were captured, held in concentration camps and political prisoners, and tortured and killed for nonexistent crimes. Anyone who was against the state– poets, writers, journalists, dancers, artists, academics, homosexuals, jews, communists, etc– were taken from their homes and tortured by state officials. The arts for the most part disappear during this time, as Tango artists who are able to escape the dictatorship move to other countries to teach their skills to foreign audiences.20 This time in Argentina’s history halted artistic expression, for fear of

19 Gonzales, Mike and Yanes, Marianella. “The Long Road Home.” In Tango: Sex and Rhythm of the City, Mike Gonzales and Mianella Yanes, 169-189. London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2013. 20 Ana C. Cara, “Entangled : Passionate Displays, Intimate Dialogues,” Journal of American Folklore, 122 (Fall 2009): 438-465.

16 persecution. It is the recovery from dictatorship and the democratization that Argentina restores that created the precursors for Tango’s eventual reentry into society.

The 2001 Crisis: Convertibility and the Rupture of Argentine Neoliberalism

The 2001 crisis came after a time of deep political strife in Argentina. Before the crisis,

Argentina’s transition to democracy should be explored as its importance in the country’s history continues today. As previously mentioned, in 1976, a military dictatorship took over the country from then president Isabel Perón, and proceeded to rule it for approximately the next 10 years. In the years following the military regime, political turmoil and global economic changes made for a difficult transition and led to an eventual burst in the stability of the Argentine economy, creating years of hardship for the people and their own definitions of who they are.

After the military abdicated its power, general elections were held and Raúl Alfonsin became the in 1983. He, a member of the UCR, the opposition party to the Peronist party of the late 90s, attempts to stabilize the country politically and economically, but fails due to lack of infrastructure and support for certain austerity measures he believed would help his economy. This, in addition to weaning foreign support for the country, led him to lose the presidency. In 1989, the Peronist party with their candidate Carlos Menem won office, with great popular support. Under Menem, the executive powers exercised over the government made the people feel distant from the administration that was meant to represent them. Menem implemented fiscal austerity in the state economy, completely overturning the existing system.

His goal was to create an Argentina that was attractive to investors, by loosening restrictions on capital movement, creating favorable interest rates and free exchange rate guarantees. In

17 addition, because of his plan to privatize industry, there would be no tax on corporate business under his economic plan for Argentina.21

All of these measures coincide with a global shift towards neoliberal economic policies.

Countries were turning towards fiscal austerity measures such as privatization of industry, reducing interest rates, opening borders to global trade, cutting back on public spending, and increasing the liquidity of assets. Because of Menem’s willingness and ability to implement these policies (through an unprecedented executive hold over the state economy), he was seen by the global stage as a great leader. The International Monetary Fund specifically treated Argentina like it’s ‘Golden Child,’ encouraging its dollarization and push towards neoliberalism by funding it’s economy through loans.22 Argentina’s compliance to the macroeconomic policies of the

Washington Consensus made the country a neoliberal success story– at first, it seemed as if these measures were working. However, the economic hardships that ensued as a result came to be known as a crisis.

The 2001 Crisis in Argentina is said to have many causes. According to Jorge Schvarzer, however, there is one cause that holds the greatest responsibility for creating the economic downturn, and that is the implementation of the 1991 . The plan, which was put into place under President Carlos Menem with the help of then Economic Minister Domingo

Cavallo, was meant to limit inflation by modifying the national economic structure. In the period between 1975 and 1991, inflation had reached very high levels in the country, and this phenomenon, in conjunction with a stagnant economy (no GDP growth, low per capita production, etc.) creating an underperforming economy. So, in order to shock the economy and help his macroeconomic austerity plans, Menem establishes a one-to-one fixed exchange rate

21Colin M. Maclachlan, “The Proceso’s Dark Shadow, Menem, and Neoliberalism,” in Argentina: What Went Wrong, Colin M. Maclachlan (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2006) 151-180. 22 International Monetary Fund, Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina, Washington D.C.: 2003

18 between the peso and the dollar. In this 2001 Convertibility Plan, it is outlined that the government will not issue new pesos except to buy foreign exchange currency and to absorb local currency when citizens want to buy dollars.23 According to the IMF’s report on Argentina, the exchange rate was meant to stabilize the economy through the establishment of a hard peg to the dollar that was nonreversible– the government’s plan was to pair the measure with other macroeconomic stabilization tools in order to create long-term stability, at least theoretically.24

Under Menem, financial hardships began to be felt more severely by Argentine citizens.

This was due to an underlying issue of weak political institutions which were unable to stop fiscal resources being used when the Argentine government had no capability to use them.

Without adjusting interest rates or altering the exchange rate, the government continued on its macroeconomic agenda, using the Convertibility Plan all too rapidly and without an exit plan or alternative to fix potential problems. In addition, because he was elected as a Peronist, meaning he had with him the connotation that he was going to save the working class and be their champion, his failure to do so left many people no longer believing that someone was going to fix their problems, which were worsening everyday. In the 1999 elections, many who voted left their votes blank to protest their distrust in the government as a whole, no matter the party. This movement, called the voto bronca, was a that there was greater than just grumbles of discontent happening in the citizenry. Although people voted, there was a feeling among citizens that they were underprotected, and thus they used their vote to tell that to their government. This act of protest was done mostly by educated elites who wanted to send a direct message to the

23Jorge Schvarzer, “The Costs of the Convertibility Plan: The Economic and Social Effects of Financial Hegemony,” in Broken Promises? The Argentine Crisis and Argentine Democracy, Edward Epstein and David Pion- Berlin, 61-76 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008) https://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=aab36fb9-85bc-45fc-8887-1ac58c0afc08%40pdc-v- sessmgr03&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=553510&db=nlebk 24 International Monetary Fund, “The IMF and Argentina, 1991-2001.” International Monetary Fund Publication Services. Washington, D.C., 2004.

19 government that they had lost faith in them. In the end FrePASO’s De la Rúa won the election.

Inheriting a 145 billion dollar debt in 1999, De la Rúa had a hard few years ahead of him politically, economically, and socially, as the situation in Argentina continued to deteriorate.25

According to the IMF report on its support for Argentina throughout the crisis, the IMF felt secure in the dollarized economy Argentina was encouraging, and felt no need to find alternatives, even as there were signs pointing towards ruin. In addition, because De La Rúa built his campaign on the promise that he would maintain convertibility, no alternative was even politically viable as he settled into his presidency.26 Thus, even when foreign debt accumulation became insurmountable, the administration continued to borrow foreign loans to maintain their debt obligations. The IMF suggested nothing to change the convertibility regime, and instead loosened regulations on the amount Argentine needed to keep in reserves in order to remain solvent in their debt repayments.27 De La Rúa’s approval ratings plummeted and there were rising feelings that Argentina’s institutions were not functioning as they should have been, no matter who the ruling party was. This discontent would lead to the ever important protests, which, as outlined in the next section, created a social environment totally consumed by hardship in the face of the crisis. This, leaving no room for other concerns, took the Tango out of the equation, pusing artists out of the country and pushing the art form out of the mainstream, making its eventual return even more important in marking Argentina’s crisis story.

25 International Monetary Fund, “The IMF and Argentina, 1991-2001.” International Monetary Fund Publication Services. Washington, D.C., 2004. 26 International Monetary Fund, “The IMF and Argentina, 1991-2001.” International Monetary Fund Publication Services. Washington, D.C., 2004. 27 International Monetary Fund, “The IMF and Argentina, 1991-2001.” International Monetary Fund Publication Services. Washington, D.C., 2004.

20

The Cacerolazos

In 2001, foreign debt reached an amount that could no longer be reversed. It became clear that economic recovery would not happen under the current policies, and there was little hope at this point for change. Foreign investors began to see the insolvency of the country, and thus left and ran the banks to take whatever reserves they could. This led eventually to the Corralito, which was when the government decided to freeze bank withdrawals of a certain amount in order to stop a countrywide bank run, which did not work: thousands took to the streets to try and withdraw their reserves from all national banks.28 It was at this moment that the crisis reached an irreversible downturn, and protests began in ways that overtook the government– December of

2001 is when the cacerolazos really began.

Because the economic state of the country deteriorated so horribly, the Argentine people had little option but to take to the streets to protest their government. The protests, called the cacerolazos, that took place in December of 2001 in Argentina, were unique in that they amassed huge numbers of people to participate in them. The protests were not only made up of organized protest groups, but the average, former middle class citizens also protested their lack of rights.29

The ultra poor, who were rarely politically active, also took action. The corralito was a huge turning point– it got people to leave their homes in a way they had not previously. The piqueteros, the men and women in organized labor unions and large working class groups, crowded the streets of Buenos Aires, holding signs that said ¡que se vayan todos!, meaning ‘that they all go,’ a slogan which defined the protest’s demands for a complete overhaul of those in

28 Gonzáles Bombal, Inés and Luzzi, Mariana. “The Costs of the Convertibility Plan: The Economic and Social Effects of Financial Hegemony.” In Broken Promises? The Argentine Crisis and Argentine Democracy, Edward Epstein and David Pion-Berlin, 111-125. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008. https://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=aab36fb9-85bc-45fc-8887-1ac58c0afc08%40pdc-v- sessmgr03&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=553510&db=nlebk 29Olga Onunch, “‘It’s the Economy, Stupid,’ or Is It? The Role of Political Crises in Mass Mobilization: The Case of Argentina in 2001,” in Argentina Since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future, edited by Cara Levey, Daniel Ozarow, and Christopher Wylde, 89-114 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan): 2014.

21 government. Another slogan seen on the street was no al F.M.I, or ‘no to the IMF,’ signaling the discontent many felt towards the IMF for their continued funding of an insolvent government.30

The IMF’s role in the crisis was controversial, as some people blamed them for it outright; protesting them was a way to place blame somewhere for all the hardships people were facing as the economy worsened.

As looting and violence reached pinnacle levels, on December 19th, 2001, De La Rúa declared a state of siege via television broadcast. Protestors reacted to this by taking over the

Plaza de Mayo the next day, and protests were broadcast across the country, prompting more people to join them. De La Rúa eventually, after attempting to work with the Peronist party, resigned, and was evacuated via helicopter from his office. In the end, approximately 20 people died from the protests, many more were injured, and the city was essentially destroyed.31 It is this phenomena that many who analyze the crisis try to understand– what drove all of these people, across gender, class, and other social cleavages to protest their governments?

Who Were the Piqueteros?

In her essay “‘It’s the Economy, Stupid’ or Is It? The Role of Political Crises in Mass

Mobilization: The Case of Argentina in 2001,” Olga Onunch writes about the driving forces behind why many citizens protested in the 2001 cacerolazos. What she discovered was that the mass mobilization of ordinary citizens in the December 2001 protests was not solely due to the discontent from economic hardships, but was because people wanted to protect their political

30Edward Epstein, “The Piquetero Movement in Buenos Aires: Political Protests by the Unemployed During the Crisis,” in Broken Promises? The Argentine Crisis and Argentine Democracy, Edward Epstein and David Pion- Berlin (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008) 78-90. https://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=aab36fb9-85bc-45fc-8887-1ac58c0afc08%40pdc-v- sessmgr03&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=553510&db=nlebk 31Olga Onunch, “‘It’s the Economy, Stupid,’ or Is It? The Role of Political Crises in Mass Mobilization: The Case of Argentina in 2001,” in Argentina Since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future, edited by Cara Levey, Daniel Ozarow, and Christopher Wylde (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014) 89-114.

22 rights. She explores why this protest differed from one made up of just activists and government opposition, and then explains the results of her interviews with ordinary citizens who joined the protest. Although there were various reasons for why people decided to participate in the protests, the overarching reason was that they felt the government, especially after Menem declared a ‘state of siege,’ was infringing upon their rights. So, in order to protect their democratic right to a responsible and responsive state, people took to the streets to protest their incompetent government.32 Thus, the fact that the worst public protests do not align with the worst moments of the economic crisis proves that people were angry with their government’s lack of responsibility and action, not with the crisis itself. It was in the moments when they felt no one was on their side that the Argentine people began to protest their government. 33

The men who organized all of these protests represented a very specific population in the

2000s in Argentina. So, who were these piqueteros? Mostly, they were groups of low income men who protested their situation through street takeovers in 2000 and 2001. In his essay on the movement, Edward Epstein notes that the piqueteros were unique, in that they mobilized the ultra poor, unemployed citizens who were always previously politically inactive. In addition, they also mobilized and included women in a traditionally male sector– the crisis was affecting all sectors, male and female dominated ones included.34 The piqueteros were also important to

Argentina’s society at the time because they were, in some ways a social movement, providing a

32Olga Onunch, “‘It’s the Economy, Stupid,’ or Is It? The Role of Political Crises in Mass Mobilization: The Case of Argentina in 2001,” in Argentina Since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future, edited by Cara Levey, Daniel Ozarow, and Christopher Wylde (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014) 89-114.. 33 Víctor A. Beker “Argentina’s Debt Crisis,” in Modern Financial Crises: Argentina, United States, and Europe, Víctor A. Beker and Beniamino Moro, Financial and Monetary Policy Studies, vol. 42. (New York City: Springer International Publishing, 2016.) 31-42. 34 Edward Epstein, “The Piquetero Movement in Buenos Aires: Political Protests by the Unemployed During the Crisis,” in Broken Promises? The Argentine Crisis and Argentine Democracy, Edward Epstein and David Pion- Berlin, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008) 78-90. https://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=aab36fb9-85bc-45fc-8887-1ac58c0afc08%40pdc-v- sessmgr03&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=553510&db=nlebk

23 sense of community and identity for those who had lost those things. As the author states, without a job, one’s identity feels lost. However, the piqueteros were able to return to many

Argentinians that sense of identity and pride in one’s contributions in the early 2000s, which helps to explain why they were so popular and their members so loyal to the cause.35 This is an important reason as to why people felt compelled to join the movement– it gave them a definition to present themselves. They were piqueteros, and that gave a mass majority of people with little to present themselves as an identity to cling to. Even if protestors did not define themselves as piqueteros, they had the identity of protesting for their rights with their fellow countrymen and, arguably, that was enough to give themselves a definition. It is this sense of community amongst Argentinians that also helps to explain why the protests had such widespread appeal– when so many people felt they lacked community, they sought it out through common discontent, and eventually found power in their identity through this solidarity.

The piqueteros will continue to be important players in contemporary Argentina, and will be crucial in the government’s recovery from the crisis. Because piqueteros represented the masses, without their support, no government would be able to make changes in the process of recovery. Their ability to protest and their hold over the city of Buenos Aires made them essential, as they continued fighting for what De La Rúa could not do– restore their faith in the

Argentine state to protect and fight for their rights. The identity the piqueteros created for the people of Buenos Aires during the crisis replaced any other– Tango dancers, and the art form itself, was overshadowed by the immediacy of the crisis. This void of identity through expression, art, and culture, was filled by the need for protest and the united front the piqueteros presented over the course of the crisis and throughout the crisis recovery. In the following section, the absence of the Tango in favor of the crisis protesting is explored further.

35 Ibid.

24

The Tango in Crisis

It should be noted here where Tango fits into the crisis story. After the dictatorship ended, many Tango dancers had returned to Buenos Aires, which will be discussed more in depth in later sections. However, although many had returned prior to the crisis to reclaim a sense of identity that had been lost to Tango during the military regime, tango dancers were unable to do so while the country’s economy fell into turmoil. Artists and dancers were put out of work, and they lost the ability to attract students and audiences to their performances as the city was overrun by protests and demonstrations.36 However, the end of the crisis, as will be explored, created favorable conditions for Tango’s revitalization in the city– Argentina would become a cheap and inviting place for tourists once the economic and political situation was solved. How it was solved is an important next step in this analysis.

It is important to mention that while the Tango disappeared during Argentina’s military dictatorship, it thrived abroad for foreign audiences. Tango Argentina, a touring Tango show made by Argentine dancers performing abroad, toured the world and brought Tango shows to foreign audiences. Created in 1983, the show premiered first in Paris. It was an international success, and toured around the world presenting Tango to the foreign market. This show, which did not come to Argentina until over 10 years after its premiere, was met with varying responses.

On the one hand, Argentinians were glad to see the art form back after a period of absence due to the dictatorship. On the other, the form of tango being danced– pre-choreographed spectacle-like movements– felt distant and curated.37 It is from this vantage point that the Tango began to become a commodity for some, and remained it’s own free, living, and evolving art form for

36 Ana C. Cara, “Entangled Tangos: Passionate Displays, Intimate Dialogues,” Journal of American Folklore, 122 (Fall 2009): 438-465. 37 Ana C. Cara, “Entangled Tangos: Passionate Displays, Intimate Dialogues,” Journal of American Folklore, 122 (Fall 2009): 438-465.

25 many others. This tension is one that will return to the forefront of the changes happening in

Buenos Aires in the early and mid-2000s.

Argentina’s Recovery: The End of Convertibility

After Argentina defaulted on approximately $132 billion dollars of debt, various people took control of the Presidential office, none of which lasted for any significant amount of time.

Following several attempts to modify the Convertibility plan and restore the circulation of public currency to improve public confidence, (a Peronist) came to the presidency after 5 men held that office in 10 days. Duhalde abandoned the fixed exchange rate in January of

2002 after the default, which started the beginning of abandoning IMF-approved tactics and moving towards executive control over the economy. The Ministry of Economy converted all bank accounts that were in dollars to peso at a set rate, angering savings holders.38 The exchange rate was made to float, and the peso further depreciated over the course of 2002. It was during this year that inflation and unemployment reached their worst, and quality of life in Argentina was drastically decreased. According to the World Bank Office for Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay report entitled “Restoring Economic Growth in Argentina,” inflation on consumer goods peaked at 41% in 2002. In addition, by June of that year, the peso price of the dollar had increased at 260%, with the exchange rate at 3.75 per dollar.39

This turn away from the IMF is important in understanding the trajectory of Argentina’s recovery from the crisis. According to their report, the IMF began discussions with authorities in the early 2000s that focused on inputting a stabilization program that would allow an elected

38 Luis Alberto Romero, “Crisis and Reconstruction, 1999-2005,” in A in the Twentieth Century, translated by James P. Brennan (University Park: The Pennsylvania Park University, 1994), 327-354. 39 International Monetary Fund, Argentina: Second Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement and Requests for Modification and Waiver of Performance Criteria—Staff Report; Staff Statement; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Argentina, Washington D.C.: 2004.

26 government to take structural reform. The reforms they were hoping to enact were to implement increased monetary control, restore the soundness of the banking system, liberalize foreign exchange restrictions, and reorganize debt so that private creditors could help restore corporate investment. In addition, the IMF called for increased negotiation with the World Bank and IDB to create social safety nets. However, as the IMF notes in their report, the Argentine government was not in agreement on implementing these measures. Many congress members worried about their constituents, many of whom were still against collaboration with the IMF, knowing that neoliberal structural adjustment programs were part of their initial problem in the crisis.40

Many Argentine citizens blamed the IMF for the hardships they were facing during the crisis, as the IMF did little to discourage the Convertibility plan and its subsequent effects. In the report they write post-crisis, it is stated “In view of the considerable risk involved, however, the decision to support Argentina in January 2001 should have been accompanied by a better anticipation of unfavorable outcomes and a clearer understanding of an exit strategy in case the chosen strategy did not work. The failure to do this, rather than the decision itself, represents the critical error in the second review.”41 Thus, it is clear that not only did the IMF support this decision by the government, they did nothing to suggest or even look into an alternative. So, the

Duhalde government needed to make changes in its relationship to the IMF in order to save the drowning Argentine economy from its dependence on outside organizations.

2002 represented a year of continued turmoil and change in Argentina: the country felt the worst effects of the crisis on its economy. Unemployment reached its highest point, inflation rose exponentially, and the government fell into disarray. Several presidents occupied office

40 International Monetary Fund, Argentina: Second Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement and Requests for Modification and Waiver of Performance Criteria—Staff Report; Staff Statement; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Argentina, Washington D.C.: 2004. 41 International Monetary Fund, “The IMF and Argentina, 1991-2001.” International Monetary Fund Publication Services. Washington, D.C., 2004, 46.

27 before Duhalde was able to centralize power, and even he only lasted for a year without a legitimate mandate.42 Until the Legislative Assembly was able to convene and assign someone to the role, many men occupied the office according to succession laws. Finally, on January 1st,

2002, Duhalde was appointed to office.43 It is understandable that from this political turmoil and instability people felt their government was not working for them but just existing to prevent complete anarchy– social programs and welfare were attempted but not fleshed out, financial institutions remained underdeveloped and powerless, and citizen action was the only way people found authority to make changes. However, this was about to change, not just in Argentina but globally– the neoliberal era had proved to be inefficient, and new ways of governing were coming to the forefront. This time period is essential to understanding how the Tango eventually returned to the forefront of the Argentine identity– with the return of the state, came the return of state control, and eventually the return of the Tango as a state commodity. The new, post-crisis

Argentine state and its ideology in the late 2000s set the stage for Tango’s eventual return.

The Return of the State

After many countries in the global south had turned away from the state as an actor in their economic policies during the 80s and 90s, the shift back towards state intervention in the

2000s is an important global phenomena to explore. In their book Reclaiming the Nation: The

Return of the National Question in Africa, Asia, and , authors Sam Moyo and Paris

Yeros write about the trends of the global south in the 2000s in regards to nationhood. From the time of the fall of the Cold War, nation-building characterized much of the developing world, as

42 Luis Alberto Romero and James P. Brennan, “Chapter 10: Crisis and Reconstruction: 1999-2005,” in A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century: Updated and Revised Edition. Updated and Revised Edition ed., (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2013) muse.jhu.edu/book/27250. 43 Ibid.

28 countries liberated themselves from colonial and post-colonial structures. With this fall, and with the victory of democracy and the ideology of the United States on the global stage, the world’s economies turned very clearly towards neoliberalism.44 The clear lean towards the so-called

Washington Consensus was used by developing nations as their only path towards modernity. In countries like Argentina, where there was a consolidated nation, it was not nation-building that needed to be done, but was state-building that returned to the forefront of their policies. The trend for modernity and development was clear in Argentina– Menem took the Washington

Consensus of neoliberal economic policy as the only viable path for Argentina’s emerging economy, and, instead of being built up, Argentina’s statehood suffered as a result.

As the authors note, Argentina’s form of statehood, which they call “partially articulated accumulation without structural reform” initially led to expansion but eventually led to a crisis, in not just Argentina, but in much of the global south.45 This form of statehood can also be understood using Francis Fukuyama’s “The Imperative of State-Building,” an essay which outlines the differences between state scope and state strength in order to challenge the traditional path to modernity as per the Washington Consensus. In the essay, Fukuyama explains state scope as the different functions and goals taken on by the government, whereas state strength is the ability of the state to plan, execute and enforce those plans.46 Argentina in the

1990s and early 2000s tried to have high strength and low scope, which led to economic failure– the policies in place took the state out of too many parts of the economy, and structural reform was never effectively developed to save the country from crisis. Argentina in particular fell

44 Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, “The Fall and Rise of the Nation Question,” in Reclaiming the Nation: The Return of the National Question in Africa, Asia and Latin America. (London: Pluto Press, 2011) https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183h0tp.4#metadata_info_tab_contents 45 Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, “The Fall and Rise of the Nation Question,” in Reclaiming the Nation: The Return of the National Question in Africa, Asia and Latin America. (London: Pluto Press, 2011) https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183h0tp.4#metadata_info_tab_contents 46Francis Fukuyama. “The Imperative of State Building,” Journal of Democracy, 15 (2004): 17-31. 10.1353/jod.2004.0026

29 victim to a system where modernization and urbanization took place, but were uncontrolled, unregulated, and relied on exporting primary commodities to finance an entire nation.

Thus, post-crisis Argentina turned away from these trends, as did many parts of the global south. They instead turned back to a populist or nationalist state system which reintroduced the role of the state into the economy, and which would hopefully restore social and economic stability in the country. In her essay “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of

Analysis in Current Research,” which is part of the 1985 text Bringing the State Back in, Theda

Skocpol outlines change in social science discourse on the importance of the state as an independent and influential actor. For so long the state was considered a means to distribute that which constituents wanted. However, after exploring the importance of state autonomy and state capacity– the state’s desire to address people’s demands versus their actual ability to do so–

Skocpol re-characterizes the state as a set of organizations and collectivities that can create and implement independently-made policy strategies. In other works, the modern state takes independent action in creating policy in economics and social change, meaning it is an actor that needs to be studied as a not just a means to an end, but as an important player in the political discourse.47 This concept of the return of the state will be important for Argentina, because as

Skocpol argues, the autonomous state can be used to reorient a nation and reorganize its political, economic, and social status quo, which is exactly what Argentina’s new administration aimed to do. As the chapter “The Fall and Rise of the Nation Question” explains, it was not that socio- political mobilizations radicalized the countries in question or made them fail, but they did shatter the country’s faith in neoliberalism, reoriented its political, social, and economic

47 Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3-44.

30 environment, and prompted change in the remainder of the 2000s decade.48 These changes will have an enormous impact on the Argentine state’s control over its commodities post-crisis– including the Tango. The following president will be essential in making that commodification possible in the post-neoliberal state.

Kirchnerismo and the New Argentine State

Néstor Kirchner was elected in May 2003 after Duhalde’s brief presidency. Kirchner ran against former leader Carlos Menem. Although Kirchner was backed by Duhalde and the

Peronist party, he was not their first choice candidate. As the election came to a head, Menem won the general elections by 24.5%, which was not enough to grant him a presidential victory.

Thus, a runoff election was held between him and the runner up, Kirchner. However, with a faltering reputation and a record that was filled with corruption, overspending, abuses of power in the executive, and his reputation as the man responsible for the crisis, Menem dropped out of the race, and Kirchner became the President with a 22.2% popular mandate.49 This start to his presidency characterized his first few years in office, and shows the distrust of most Argentines in their government– many felt no connection to either candidate and cared little about who won.

Many of the policies that Kirchner put into place in the early 2000s represent contradictions: he enacted social policy within a framework of continued transnational economic growth without assistance from the IMF or other global financial institutions. This wave of change that happens in Argentina and throughout much of Latin America is called the ‘pink tide’

48Ibid. 49 Luis Alberto Romero and James P. Brennan, “Chapter 10: Crisis and Reconstruction: 1999-2005,” in A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century: Updated and Revised Edition. Updated and Revised Edition ed., (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2013) muse.jhu.edu/book/27250.

31 of neostructuralism, but for Argentina represented the beginning of neo-developmentalism.50

From the ashes of the neoliberal crisis of 2001, a new form of development within capitalism arose especially in Argentina, where the pre-conditions of the crisis created the conditions for change. Neo-developmentalism is, as defined by Matthias Ebenau in his article “Comparative capitalisms and Latin American neo developmentalism: A critical political economy view,” an option for development that lies between the neoliberal Washington Consensus and the use of import-substitution-industrialization. The theory gives the state more purpose, while also focusing on outward competitiveness in global trade. The state was no longer to rely on structural-adjustment programs, international loans, or free-market based principles– the state would now maintain control over foreign exchange rates, interest rates, etc.51 In addition, as

Kirchner would acknowledge through his policies for state intervention in the economy,

Argentina’s export economy would create the domestic capital formation in order to fund state- sponsored development.52 Neo-developmentalism dominated the political, economic, and social spheres of the new government. This is especially important in understanding Kirchnerism and its rise in Argentina.

In Argentina’s recovery from the crisis, there was a distinct need to enact social and economic policies supported by a strong state. This is where neo-developmentalism worked: it was built on the new social movements that arose from the failure of neoliberalism, but also worked within some of the existing economic structures. The state under Kirchner wanted to

50 Féliz Mariano,“Till death do as apart?” Kirchnerism, neodevelopmentalism and the struggle for hegemony in Argentina, 2003-2015” in The Three Worlds of Social Democracy: A Global View, edited by Ingo Schmidt, (London: Pluto Press, 2016) 91-107. 51 Matthais Ebenau, “Comparative capitalism and Latin American neodevelopmentalism: A critical political economy view,” in Capital & Class 38, no. 1 (2014), 102-114. https://doi- org.muhlenberg.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0309816813512591 52 Miguel A. Rivera-Quiñones, “Macroeconomic Governance in Post-Neoliberal Argentine and the Relentless Power of TNCs: The Case of the Soy Complex,” in Argentina Since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future, edited by Cara Levey, Daniel Ozarow, and Christopher Wylde (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 67-82.

32 increase its scope– increasing its presence in it’s citizens’ lives, while keeping economic structures that worked intact. Building upon the Duhalde-created Plan de Jefes y Jefas de Hogar, or the Plan for Heads of Households, which was made to provide greater coverage for unemployed people, Kirchner continued creating plans for the unemployed population using his relation with piqueteros and labor unions. 53

A major step Kirchner took to reconcile the public's trust in its government was to include unemployment organizations in his government. In Fynn Kaese and Jonas Wolf’s article entitled “Piqueteros After the Hype: Unemployed Movements in Argentina, 2008-2015,”

Kirchner’s strategy in doing this is outlined. Kirchner openly supported and integrated unemployed groups that supported him into his government– the Federación Tierra y Vivienda,

Barrios de Pie, and Movimiento Evita had representatives in Kirchner’s administration, and were given state-funding to further their local and regional work. Kirchner used these organizations as proof of his support for the every-man, allowing the major organizations to help implement welfare programs and continue their grassroots community work with state-backed cooperatives.

Any labor organization that did not openly align with Kirchner, however, was left out of the conversation.54 Some continued their work to protest Kirchner, but by breaking up the unemployed movement and creating allies within them, Kirchner placed himself favorably in

Argentine society, and was able to create social and economic change while restoring people’s faith in the Argentine government and political system.

Traditional policies in regards to unions, which were popular in the Peronist era, were reactivated under Kirchner– the state mandated a wage increase, increased benefits, and

53 Agustín Santella, “General Strikes in 20th Century in Argentina,” in Labor Conflict and Capitalist Hegemony in Argentina, edited Agustín Santella. (Leiben: Brill, 2016), 43-74. 54 Fynn Kaese and Jonas Wolff, “Piqueteros after the Hype: Unemployed Movements in Argentina, 2008-2015,” European Review of Latin America and Caribbean Studies 102 (October 2016): 47-68.

33 increased the minimum wage. His policies, which were met by the IMF with some contempt, many reports asking about the creditor status of the IMF in the face of Kirchner’s rhetoric, made clear that Kirchner’s priority: “Our strategy to face these problems should be that of building up a serious capitalism... where monopolies and concentration are avoided... and where consumers as well as investors are protected.”55 Kirchner’s government continued to provide various plans to quite literally put money in people’s hands. By doing this, Kirchner converted the former protestors into allies to his government, which garnered him incredible support, and also invoked the power of his predecessor, Peron, to create a familiar and nostalgic administration that appealed to the heart of the Argentine populus. In this sense, Kirchner reverted back to a well- known Argentine identity (Perón), and thus was beholden to including trade unions, the working class, etc.56 This connection to grassroots movements being legitimized will be important in the analysis of Tango’s place in Kirchner’s Argentina, and will recall that which Perón did using

Tango in his own Argentina.

However, while in the short term Kirchner was creating growth and repairing the many broken relationships which had resulted from the crisis, there were contradictions embedded in his actions that were potential problems for continued growth. For example, in terms of debt restructuring and renegotiation, while this alleviated the pressure of repayment on the government, the exit from debt led to extreme currency devaluation. In addition, because

Argentina was no longer accepting IMF loans much to the chagrin of the international community, the money to fund social programs had to come from somewhere.57 This created the return of a traditional rent-based economy, which had a productive primary export sector–

55 International Monetary Fund, Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina, Washington D.C.: 2003 56 Fynn Kaese and Jonas Wolff, “Piqueteros after the Hype: Unemployed Movements in Argentina, 2008-2015,” European Review of Latin America and Caribbean Studies 102 (October 2016): 47-68. 57 Luis Alberto Romero, “A New Opportunity, 2005-2010,” in A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century, translated by James P. Brennan (University Park: The Pennsylvania Park University, 1994), 355-386.

34 mostly from agriculture– but a generally noncompetitive industrial sector. In Miguel A. Rivera-

Quiñones’ essay “Macroeconomic Governance in Post-Neoliberal Argentina and the Relentless

Power of TNCs: The Case of the Soy Complex,” the author focuses on the ways the state regained control over its macro-economic institutions and used that control to create production increases. Because primary sectors were more competitive than industrial sectors in Argentina, commodity exports were needed to finance industrial growth. This came in the form of soybeans.58

By 2010, soybeans accounted for 14% of national exports in Argentina. This growth was thanks to Kirchner’s awareness that transnational corporations that kept the agro-export industry afloat needed to have their own power separate from that which governed other economic sectors. Although Kirchner wanted an Argentina for Argentinians, he conceded power to the

TNCs’ influence on the national economy so that soybeans could be sold at competitive rates and garner revenue. Because foreign nationals owned large portions of Argentine land and were in control of these exports, and because these exports would come to fund Kirchner’s social welfare programs and the growth of other industries, the President allowed them to operate uninhibited.59

This concession to neoliberal conditions for the soybean industry proves the ways Kirchner returned Argentina to its former wealth, and his willingness to do so even if it was against his outward ideology. This idea will come back in later discussions about neoliberal cultural policies in connection with a different commodity– the Tango.

58 Miguel A. Rivera-Quiñones, “Macroeconomic Governance in Post-Neoliberal Argentine and the Relentless Power of TNCs: The Case of the Soy Complex,” in Argentina Since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future, edited by Cara Levey, Daniel Ozarow, and Christopher Wylde (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 67-82. 59 Miguel A. Rivera-Quiñones, “Macroeconomic Governance in Post-Neoliberal Argentine and the Relentless Power of TNCs: The Case of the Soy Complex,” in Argentina Since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future, edited by Cara Levey, Daniel Ozarow, and Christopher Wylde (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 67-82.

35

Having now analyzed the ways Kirchner reformed the Argentine economy and returned the power of the state to the nation, a connection to the Tango can be established. There are many reasons for Tango’s return, some of which will be explored more in depth later, however one important note to be made here is that with the return of the state, there was a return of a certain national identity. The return of pride and trust in the Argentine state connects clearly with a sense of national identity– people were no longer ashamed of their connection to the state.

Many were no longer piqueteros; they were no longer a part of a mass mobilization against their own government. In Buenos Aires, people, especially those who Kirchner supported and who supported him in return, were reconnecting to a sense of pride that had been lost; and that pride was enacted through art, through Tango. As the country recovered from its crisis, connecting the people back to their state was essential to reformulating and redefining Argentine identity, something Kirchernismo took very seriously.

Kirchner’s administration represents a clear shift in Argentina’s political alignment– in

“Conceptualizing Kirchernismo” Laclau explains that Kirchner’s populism provided citizens with a formal identification of their affiliations– Argentinians were now “the people;” a rallying cry behind which populism works to unite people and create political allegiance.60 A rallying effort such as this, as the author explains, is best suited for a population coming out of a crisis, particularly when the political institutions in place were unable to meet social demands. A populist can identify those demands and put themselves in the equation of solving them from within.61 The 2001-crisis represented the perfect pre-conditions for populism: there was a huge gap between the society at large and government representatives, and with a low mandate and

60 Enrique Peruzzotti, “Conceptualizing Kirchnerismo,” in Partecipazione e Conflitto: The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies. Italy, 2017. 61 Enrique Peruzzotti, “Conceptualizing Kirchnerismo,” in Partecipazione e Conflitto: The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies. Italy, 2017.

36 little backing, Kirchner needed support for his presidency. Thus, his strategy to create a persona that would save people was to create popular support; to do so, he chose to focus on reorienting the economy, championing human rights and ignoring foreign policy in favor of domestic politics.

Kirchner wanted to save ‘the people’ of Argentina after the crisis. However, in doing so,

Laclau argues that he never fully constructs a narrative for the enemy of the people, which never creates lasting support for him. As Argentina’s voting base became more complex post-crisis,

Kirchner’s narrow focus on short term issues became less important. In other words, now that people were being lifted out of the harsh economic situation they were in via social welfare policies, they no longer needed saving, and now had more complex demands for their government to address.62 Kirchnerism now had to establish broad, stable coalitions with diverse segments of the population, no longer relying solely on their ability to lift people out of the crisis.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, Guillermo O’Donnell’s argument in

“Conceptualizing Kirchernismo” looks at where Kirchner himself fits in the rhetoric of patriarchal personalities in Argentina’s history. The author argues that Kirchner is just another leader in the line of salvadores de la patria, which translates to the saviors of the country, who assert frontal attacks on the government and take control of the state in unprecedented ways: the first was Perón, the next was Menem, and now there is Kirchner. Although they all did so differently, each leader does obtain control over the Argentine administration and inputs their own agenda.63 Thus, Kirchnerismo is less of a populist break from the previous system and more

62 Ibid. 63 Enrique Peruzzotti, “Conceptualizing Kirchnerismo,” in Partecipazione e Conflitto: The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies. Italy, 2017.

37 of a representation of continuity in Argentina, which leads to a further questioning of the people’s reactions to him and the policies he put in place.

This discussion of Kirchner as a continuation of previously understood traditions in

Argentina connects his rise in popularity to the rise in popularity of the Tango. With Kirchner’s presidency, there was a huge sense of familiarity in his form of political leadership for the

Argentina people. Kirchner is often named in the same category of Latin American leaders with men like Fidel Castro, Hugo Chavez, and Evo Morales.64 Although those men do not share the same views on everything, and their political goals differed across their individual countries, they rose to power on the same thing– popular support. Popular support in Argentina was characterized by a return to tradition: including labor unions, creating populist rhetoric, implementing Argentina-first economic principles all created an association between Kirchner and his predecessors like Perón. This phenomena in reverting back to traditional political identities in Argentina is an important step in creating a causational link between Kirchner’s rise and the simultaneous rise of the Tango, especially as it becomes not only an evolving art form, but also a commodity for the Argentine state to buy and sell.

The Tango as the ‘Other’

The ‘One’ and ‘Other’ identity is something very familiar to the Tango, as author Maria

Savigliano writes in her text, Tango and the Political Economy of Passion. In the introductory section of her text, Savigliano introduces us to the concept of the Tango as a cultural commodity.

She represents the Tango as a part of the capitalist system that trades not just currency and political power, but that also uses identity as a commodity. She uses the Tango as an example of

64 Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, and Susan Eva Eckstein, “‘There and Back Again’: Latin American Social Movements and Reasserting the Powers of Structural Theories,” in Handbook of Social Movements across Latin America, edited by Paul Almeida and Allen Cordero Ulate, (London: Springer, 2015), 25-48.

38 an ‘exotic goods’ that is traded for, advertised for, and manipulated in the global market. This use of exoticism as an industry, she claims, comes from the ways that colonizers have created their identity (the One), and how they have sold the identity of the colonized (the Other, the

Exotic).65 This becomes an incredibly important conversation in authenticity as cultural industries grow post-2001 crisis, and as Tango comes to represent this more contemporary

“Other” commodity.

The link between the crisis and the resurgence of the Tango comes from the lack of industries available for people to work in post-crisis. In 2001, People were unemployed, left in a destroyed city, and felt undervalued and abandoned by their government. In addition, without jobs, their identity was lost– there is little to be defined as other than “poor,” and as the country attempted to rebuild its economy, an opening became clear in cultural industries that was economically viable, and also good for the national sentiment that had been destroyed over the previous 10 years. Thus, the Tango’s renovación was born, and was two pronged; it fulfilled both a cultural lacuna while also presenting people with a viable economic opportunity.

The Tango’s Economic Value

This connection between the economics of culture and its description as a valuable good is fleshed out very clearly in Morgan James Luker’s dissertation entitled “The Tango Machine:

Musical Practice and Cultural Policy in Post-Crisis Buenos Aires.” In his first chapter, Luker looks at the Tango as a national symbol in the early 20th century, and how its hegemony as

Argentina’s national art form was promoted by elites in order to prove the worth of the country

65Marta E. Savigliano, “Introductions,” in Tango and the Political Economy of Passion, Marta E. Savigliano (Bolder: Westview Press, Inc., 1995), 1-30.

39 to Europeans.66 This identity was re-explored by the people post-crisis, as citizens grappled with the relationship between culture, neoliberalism and cultural globalism. According to the author, what emerged in this relationship was the role culture could play as an expedient resource tasked with addressing social and political problems. This phenomena is what the author calls the increasing popularity of “cultural industries,” which he defines as a product or service that is based in a civilizations’ culture. These cultural industries were reconsidered within the state itself, as Argentine officials began to see them as tools through which they could promote a certain agenda or identity.67 The city Buenos Aires, both the citizens and the government of the city, reconsidered their own treatment of the Tango and began to invest in it after realizing its value– it was quickly recognized post-crisis as an untapped economic opportunity and as a way to embed a revered identity in a destroyed city. It is logical to, after seeing your city destroyed, turn to an art form that represents a time when your city was revered, and its culture recognized by elites. This helps to explain why, to a certain extent, the Tango returned to popular culture post-2001.

In order to understand how Buenos Aires changed its perspective towards these cultural industries, their total value needs to be considered. In the early 2000s, cultural policy making trends were to use these cultural industries as engines of economic development, social management, and urban renewal. Such attention to cultural policies from policymakers was new, and showed that these industries had unique potential in the post-2001 crisis world. According to

Luker, in Argentina, there was an emphasis on two things– one, promoting the Argentine culture as relevant and valuable to the world through these industries, and two, ensuring that these

66 Morgan James Luker, “On the Post-National Life of a National Genre,” in “The Tango Machine: Musical Practice and Cultural Policy in Post-Crisis Buenos Aires,” (New York: Columbia University, 2009) 1-40. 67 Ibid.

40 industries would prove to create productive economic sectors.68 In the face of such cultural industries being treated like any other economic commodity, Argentina helped to promote them to be treated uniquely among other economic sectors, as they were in place to help promote local identity, limit foreign hegemony from influencing Argentine identity, and help to promote diversity.

In his analysis, the author offers that the state must take a role in protecting this, because if it were left up to the free market, diversity would be lost and certain cultural norms would win while others would lose, due to the nuanced “One” v. “Other” global norms that have governed cultural industries for centuries– the free market would lead the “One” to win and neglect the

“Other,” which Argentia needed to avoid.69 So, cultural industries became a state-sponsored priority. This connects very clearly with the Argentine state’s turn inward in the early to mid

2000s. Economic policy favored state sponsorship over free market competition across most industries, as the administration worked to restore the relationship between the government and the people. Cultural industries represented another part of that equation– Tango and the tourism it attracted created wealth and wellbeing for Argentine citizens, and so the state began to sponsor

Tango festivals and international competitions in the city of Buenos Aires.70 This change in the state seeing the economic value of culture is important, and proves the ways in which not only are cultures and traditions important to the people from which they are made, they are also viable economic enterprises that can be used for profit.

68 Morgan James Luker, “Locating the Cultural Industries as an Object of Governmental Intervention,” in “The Tango Machine: Musical Practice and Cultural Policy in Post-Crisis Buenos Aires,” (New York: Columbia University, 2009) 44-88. 69 Ibid. 70 Morgan James Luker, “Tango as Intangible Cultural Heritage: Development, Diversity, and the Value of Music in Buenos Aires,” in Audible Empire: Music, Global Politics, Critique, edited by Tejumola Olaniyan and Ronald Radano (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 225-245.

41

Connecting Tango and the government of Buenos Aires brings up a previously mentioned connection between neoliberal economic policies in the midst of Argentina’s overall turn away from neoliberalism. Tango's connection to economic growth was connected to growth in the city of Buenos Aires. Then governor of BA Mauricio Macri was a proponent of such growth, connecting his city’s commodity of the Tango to the plains of Argentina’s commodity in soybeans. This connection is fleshed out further in “Buenos Aires, capital of tango: tourism, redevelopment and the cultural politics of neoliberal urbanism.” The article looks at how the city of Buenos Aires capitalized on tourism in the city and used neoliberal urbanism to develop the city for outsiders. The government enacted Tango Festivals like the ‘Tango World Cup,’ which attracted tango dancers from around the world. In order to accomodate for such festivals, poor residents of the city and squatters were removed from their homes, neighborhoods were

‘revitalized,’ creating Tango centers, and the city cracked down on protest in order to project cleanliness to outsiders.71 Macri was a major proponent of the power of Tango to create wealth in the city, however in doing so, he aligned Tango with the Western vision of Buenos Aires. He capitalized on the allure of what outsiders wanted tango to be and ran with it, opening the city to foreign investment, shutting down and gentrifying anything that may have opposed that goal.

This particular form of the renovación of the Tango is an important development, and connects the tangos real identity with it’s projected identity, while also exploring the economic value of both versions of Tango that are realities in the city of Buenos Aires.

These actions taken by the municipal government in Buenos Aires represent a shift in

Tango’s importance in the city of Buenos Aires. Tango became, once again, a commodity, that could be used as a form of curated identity. All the while, Tango art was being created and was

71 Miguel Kanai, “Buenos Aires, capital of tango: tourism, redevelopment and the cultural politics of neoliberal urbanism,” Urban Geography 35, no. 8 (October 2014): 1111-1117. https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2014.957112

42 evolving in the city– there were places where the Tango remained a living, breathing form.

However, these places were pushed to the background of the new Buenos Aires. The business of

Tango moved to the forefront, and those who saw Tango only as a good to be bought and sold took control of it and manipulated it. Once again, Tango becomes a product of the time in which it exists. It remains at once a genuine piece of what it means to be Argentine to many who dance and perform Tango, but it has also become a piece of what outsiders think it means to be

Argentine to everyone on the outside looking in.

Tango’s Renovación in Argentine Identity

However, while cultural industries are able to promote an industry in the traditional sense

(they can employ workers, sell products, collect revenue, etc), it is the extra-economic value they offer that would become important in the 2000s in Argentina. One of the main reasons this value was acknowledged was one: to help re-valorize the city after the crisis, and two: to prove to investors that the city was worthy of investment, particularly foreign investment. The growth of a cities’ culture accomplishes both of these goals. Much of what the city of Buenos Aires did was subsidize private companies and help them with long term growth in order to promote their economic goals and thus promote cultural industries.72 In addition, in the realm of politics, culture brings votes. In Buenos Aires specifically, after Macri’s work in implementing Tango festivals and events throughout the city, the absence of these events would have consequences for politicians running for office in the city.73 There were social aspects to this in that citizens wanted to keep up appearances, and since going to these events was seen as a middle class status

72 Morgan James Luker, “Locating the Cultural Industries as an Object of Governmental Intervention,” in “The Tango Machine: Musical Practice and Cultural Policy in Post-Crisis Buenos Aires,” (New York: Columbia University, 2009) 44-88. 73Miguel Kanai, “Buenos Aires, capital of tango: tourism, redevelopment and the cultural politics of neoliberal urbanism,” Urban Geography 35, no. 8 (October 2014): 1111-1117. https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2014.957112

43 symbol for so long, in the post crisis lack of a middle class, the ability to go to these Tango events and feel middle class mattered to many people.

However clear it is why practically the Tango returned to the cultural helm of Buenos

Aires after 2001, why did its identity resonate with people at this particular time? In many ways, the Tango has an identity that in Argentina’s history represented the ‘Golden Age.’ When the

Tango was at the forefront of the country’s cultural realm, the country was doing well in other ways too.74 At the time, in the early 2000s, the country was recovering from an economic crisis, and so to play into an identity that represents the opposite of that was attractive and provided an avenue to perform the wealth or status that many people lost after the 2001 crisis and now craved. In addition, the Tango holds in it a feeling of authenticity that citizens missed after years of protesting and feeling distant from their government. When the Argentine government was not serving them, people felt un-Argentine; in order to counter that, they turned to the most

Argentinian thing they could: the Tango. Quite simply, the Tango restored an identity– it restored a way for people to define themselves as anything other than poor, suffering, etc., and at the time that was all that mattered to the majority of the population. The ability to put on an identity that was different from the social reality surrounding them was not only attractive to citizens, but provided them with a viable outlet for change in their definitions of who they were– that is the power of the Tango’s identity in 2000s, and the power of a performative act in helping to define nation-ness at a specific time.

74 Karoline Gritzner, “Between Commodification and Emancipation: The Tango Encounter,” Dance Research, 35 no. 1 (June 2017): 49-60. https://doi.org/10.3366/drs.2017.0182

44

Export v. Home Tango

Tango was not only an important part of restoring identity for Argentinians, but was also an essential tool for defining Argentina for foreigners. An important part of the Tango boom was the increase in tourism in Argentina after the 2001 crisis, which was partly due to the devaluation of the peso– goods and services were now affordable to foreigners as the exchange rate for the dollar, , etc. were all favorable to the tourist.75 International tourists flocked to the city, looking for the real tango on their vacation. This connection between economic and political changes and subsequent tourism increases creates Tango as an essential piece of what Argentina was. Keeping the ‘true’ Tango alive was part of the reason tourists flock to Buenos Aires.

Performers in Buenos Aires in the post-crisis era began to recognize their ability to claim and control the cultural capital and economic profit of the Tango. Because of this control over the dance, foreigners seek out the ‘home Tango’ in order to claim the experience as their own– the secret of the true Tango has within it the allure that foreigners fall for in their Tango training.76

Across the world perform Tango, knowing that the ‘true Tango’ can only be found in the real milongas in Buenos Aires. So, Tango professionals keep that allure alive by selling that experience to tourists through cultivated tango imagery throughout the city. Performers created another reason for Tango’s return to Buenos Aires in the 2000s– tourists craved the place they had only heard about, but had never seen. Artists in the city jumped on that need and created exactly what tourists wanted, separate from the Tango they themselves wanted.77 Though never completely separate or distinct, the ‘home Tango v. the exported Tango’ remains a carefully

75 Morgan James Luker, “Tango as Intangible Cultural Heritage: Development, Diversity, and the Value of Music in Buenos Aires,” in Audible Empire: Music, Global Politics, Critique, edited by Tejumola Olaniyan and Ronald Radano (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 225-245. 76 Ana C. Cara, “Entangled Tangos: Passionate Displays, Intimate Dialogues,” Journal of American Folklore, 122 (Fall 2009): 438-465. 77Karoline Gritzner, “Between Commodification and Emancipation: The Tango Encounter,” Dance Research, 35 no. 1 (June 2017): 49-60. https://doi.org/10.3366/drs.2017.0182

45 cultivated distinction using images of what Tango ought to be with the audience it plans to reach in mind.

Tango abroad is still Tango, although it has its own category according to true Argentine

Tango dancers. This is important to note because as Yango was performed abroad it became something else, but when it came back to Buenos Aires, Argentinians were reminded of the real

Tango that they possess in their city. ‘Home T’ango, as Cara names it, has within it the opportunity for Argentinians to “ … identify intimately with their homeland and thus ground themselves in the local values, memories, and performative styles of home…”78 It is this distinction that created a revival of the Tango: after being away from home for so long, once it returned Buenos Aires-based performers were reminded of their connection with the art form, and thus translated that connection into an industry. With the knowledge that Tango was extremely popular abroad, Argentinians began to perform the ‘export Tango’ at home– they performed it on the street, in Tango hotels, in Tango bars, etc.79 This type of Tango was born from an awareness of the dance’s popularity abroad, and the ability of performers to distinguish between the ‘true’ Tango and the Tango images created for tourists.

In Morgan James Luker’s article, he looks at the Tango as Buenos Aires’s chief cultural industry, whose primary role was to perform the nostalgic Tango for tourists. However, within the new generation of Tango performers in the city of Buenos Aires, many have taken to reproducing the Tango to find their own identity in the música popular. This return to the music of the people helps the Tango feel relevant again, as people search for their own identities within it. In this new generation, the concept of autogestión, or collective approach, is what makes the

Tango unique to those who play its music and perform it now– there is a collective identity and

78 Ana C. Cara, “Entangled Tangos: Passionate Displays, Intimate Dialogues,” Journal of American Folklore, 122 (Fall 2009): 438-465. 79Ibid.

46 action that is promoted by its production, rather than it being dictated by the state.80 This collectivism can be seen through the modern milongas that have new rules, and are far more open to social changes that have happened in the past few decades. In connection to the situation around it, Luker writes that when the government neglected to provide people with basic rights, they took that responsibility upon themselves and formed mobilized groups to provide for each other, and when the government did not support the people’s cultural needs, they did the same thing– thus, this popular, collectively approached music came to the forefront of the art form.81

There is much to be understood in why the Tango came back when it did, but this social collectivism and need to provide for oneself what the government no longer could is certainly an explanation as to why the art form grew in the post-crisis era that does not solely rely on foreign audiences and cultivated imagery.

The Solidification of Tango in the State

In 2009, UNESCO recognized tango as ‘an intangible cultural heritage of humanity.’

This recognized Tango as an important musical and movement production that has embedded within it the cultural heritage of Buenos Aires. Tango was then able to use this label, which encouraged government supported development and conservation, as a way to encourage official support. According to a Morgan James Lukers text, “Tango as Intangible Cultural Heritage,” the

Cultural Industry of Tango was already garnering $450 million in Buenos Aires every year after the crisis, up until the 2009 UNESCO statement. This proved the essentiality of Tango in the city even before it was labeled, however, the UNESCO heritage statement solidified the Tango’s

80 Morgan James Luker, “Tango's Popular Counterpublics and the Politics of Music History,” in “The Tango Machine: Musical Practice and Cultural Policy in Post-Crisis Buenos Aires,” (New York: Columbia University, 2009) 151-201. 81 Ibid.

47 connection to Buenos Aires, while also including Tango’s diverse origins in its statement.82 This is not to say the Tango is inclusive of all stories or people, but UNESCO’s statement does trace where Tango really came from, and also reflects the ways that Tango has evolved and will continue to evolve today. In addition, it created a need for documentation of, training for, and conservation of the Tango throughout the city. This will allow for the continued evolution of the

Tango, and the continued integration of the Tango in the city, making Tango essential for the preservation and success of Buenos Aires itself.

Once Tango became a solidified piece of Buenos Aires (although for many it always had been, but now there was an ‘official’ stamp of approval), its connection to Kirchnerism becomes clearer. In previous sections, Kirchnerism was understood as the return to populism in

Argentina– President Kirchner fought to return the state to its former glory. He, using existing structures so as not to abandon what was already in place under his predecessors, turned the state into an entity that was not only autonomous, but also capable of carrying out that which it promised. He strengthened the state to re-define the Argentine state as not a place of distrust, but as an entity that represented and fought for the Argentine people. This connection, done through various domestic and foreign policy means, made the Argentine state an essential part of the recovery from the crisis. This was true not only in a traditional policy sense, but also became important in the return of the Tango. Tango’s renovación was, in many ways, a product of the state intervening and presenting export Tango throughout the city. As is clear with Macri’s policies in the city of Buenos Aires, and with Kirchner’s commitment to rebuilding the

Argentine economy, Tango’s economic value was not going to be ignored by the government.83

82 Morgan James Luker, “Tango's Popular Counterpublics and the Politics of Music History,” in “The Tango Machine: Musical Practice and Cultural Policy in Post-Crisis Buenos Aires,” (New York: Columbia University, 2009) 151-201. 83 Miguel Kanai, “Buenos Aires, capital of tango: tourism, redevelopment and the cultural politics of neoliberal urbanism,” Urban Geography 35, no. 8 (October 2014): 1111-1117. https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2014.957112

48

Using neodevelopmental policies, Tango became another industrial commodity. Tourism became a well-funded industry in Buenos Aires. Not only were Tango dancers and performers finding economic success through Tango post-crisis, but once the city inserted itself into the conversation, Tango became an overall economic industry. Creating an industry out of Tango did, however, require the commodification of the dance– as was previously mentioned, the

Tango presented through state-sponsored means was that which foreign audiences wanted to see.

Tango shows included elaborate costumes, showed off tricks and spectacular movements, and were always pre-choreographed in order to ensure consistency.84 This version of export Tango was cultivated in Buenos Aires, and, with state-sponsorship under the new neodevelopmental

Kichernist administration, in addition to a growing foreign audience after the crisis due to the cheapness of the city, created the preconditions for Tango’s renovación in the city of Buenos

Aires.

Conclusion

Tango remains relevant today, and will continue to be so as Argentina continues to evolve in its home city. However, the true Tango is not seen in the athletic, high-kicking, space- taking dances that are presented on popular media– this representation is curated, a false embodiment of a dance that has its origins in a place distant from spectacle and showmanship. In the article “And still, they Tango,” two world renowned Tango dancers in the 2000s take to the streets in early evening in the Tango barrios, wearing, respectively a short, tight, dress, and suit pants and old-time hats.85 They evoke, very clearly, a sense of nostalgia for a different Buenos

Aires. Their dance is emotionally impactful– the push and pull of their love story, the

84 Ana C. Cara, “Entangled Tangos: Passionate Displays, Intimate Dialogues,” Journal of American Folklore, 122 (Fall 2009): 438-465. 85 Alma Guillermoprieto, “And Still They Tango,” National Geographic, 204, no. 6 (Dec 2003): 34-47.

49 submissiveness of the woman and the power of the man, their quick feet and time stopping movement– it is all captivating to the audience surrounding them.86 It is, however, staged. Their dusk-danced Tango is an ode to a Buenos Aires that no longer exists, sponsored by those who travel to the city to find exactly that.

The true Buenos Aires of the 2000s has seen hardship. It has gone from economic boom in the 80s and 90s, during which the promise of democracy ignited the people, to a crisis in which everyone lost. Being Argentine was a point of anger, not a point of pride, and as the country struggled to repair itself with its state, there was little hope in the populus that change would come. When Nestor Kirchner was elected, he made it his goal to bring the Argentine state back to the forefront of the nation’s policies. He was an outward representation of that which the people craved at the time, and reminded them of a time when Argentina thrived, invoking

Perónism within the existing economic and political structures. These measures made him popular with the masses, and returned their trust in the state. That trust allowed the state into many aspects of their lives, one of which was Tango, which led to the production and commodification of the performance as an economic industry. However, isolated from that industry, Tango exists still.

Although Tango has been commodified, there is and always will be true Tango throughout Buenos Aires. Tango has been and will continue to be commodified throughout its history. It has been created, manipulated, evolved, exported, and brought home, all the while remaining not simply a tool for performance, but a performance itself. It is true that Tango has been used, but Tango exists with or without being used by those with the power to control it. It is a performative piece of Argentine identity that contains within it a spirit that tells the story of a long history of Buenos Aires. It is not a complete story, but Tango does not try to be complete. It

86Ibid.

50 does not boast or pretend to be that which it is not– that is why export Tango, which is used to falsely represent all of Argentina to the world, is an incomplete representation of all that Tango is.

Tango is a way to measure and understand Argentina. It, like all forms of performance, allows audiences to understand the current moment from its performance. The movement is intimate and close– it asks of the dancer not only vulnerability but freedom. Tango is organic, not predetermined. Tango is a conversation. It requires acute listening skills, relying on the dancer’s intuition to recognize and respond to signals of movement from their partner. Tango is improvisational. It has no underlying structure, but is rather an embodied expression of the moment. Dancers are not required to do anything more than to be there, be present, and be honest. Tango plays off of power– there is a tension between domination, subjugation that underlays the closeness and partnership of the two dancers.87 Not only are they working together, but they are working against each other, each one living in the paradox of the dance that not only exists for them in that moment, but in their lives as Argentines in the society that surrounds them– using these traits, one can use Tango performance as a way to measure identity.

As authors Juan Gabriel Mariotto and Christine S. Nielson write in their essay that connects Tango directly to its surroundings, “... characteristics of the Argentine people are revealed to us through tango, music, kinetics, lyrics, and gender relations.”88 The Tango, they argue, is a metaphor for Argentina’s cultural mindset, the reason for which, the authors claim, the population has embraced it as an undying symbol of national identity. That is not to say that

Tango is Argentina, because it is not, but that does allow for Tango to show audiences what it means to be Argentine in the current moment. It is this form of viewing Tango that makes it an

87 Juan Gabriel Mariotto and Christine S. Nielson, “The Tango Metaphor: The Essence of Argentina’s National Identity,” International Studies of Management & Organization 35, no. 4 (2005): 8-36. 88Ibid.

51 essential part of measuring Argentine identity, and why it is a crucial part of understanding the nation’s recovery from the crisis. Crisis recovery happened in the government, on the streets, in the economy, and in Tango. The impact of the crisis on Tango as a form cannot be ignored because studying it reveals so much about the country and its people after the hardships they faced. Traditional measurements of crisis recovery matter, but performance as a means to understand national identity must be included in those measurements. Adding performance analysis to this study of crisis recovery was not only important, but essential to broadening our understanding of what recovery truly means– Tango is just one example of that phenomena.

In some parts of the city, in true Tango spots, performance of the Tango continues as it always has. People gather in the early hours of the morning, sitting around grills of food, wine, and family, to watch the milongueros dance. These spots are free of tourists– they are for Tango to grow, thrive, and continue as it always has. The dances are simple and the people are normal– none of them wear elaborate costumes, none are particularly athletic, and the music is true. It is these unassuming spots that keep Tango alive.89 They cultivate the dance, and the dance moves in them as it has for generations. There is no need to present that which no longer exists– instead of trying to replicate the past, they honor it as one would a lost relative. Dancers of Tango today know Tango will not remain stagnant; it will evolve as it always has. It will be a product of the society around it. Tango will live in the city as the city at once changes and stays the same. All that is asked of the Tango dancer is that they live in the moment, that they surrender to the present, and respond to it. As evidenced by Tango’s long continuous and changing history, that is exactly what it has done. Tango is the past, yes, but more than that it is the present. With that as it’s guiding principle, true Tango in the city of Buenos Aires will not go anywhere, and will remain an essential metric to measure what it means to be Argentine at any given moment.

89 Alma Guillermoprieto, “And Still They Tango,” National Geographic, 204, no. 6 (Dec 2003): 34-47.

52

Works Cited

“Argentina Trade Balance 1962-2020.” MacroTrends, www.macrotrends.net/countries/ARG/argentina/trade-balance-deficit.

Beker, Víctor A “Argentina’s Debt Crisis.” In Modern Financial Crises: Argentina,

United States, and Europe, edited by Víctor A. Beker and Beniamino Moro, Financial and Monetary Policy Studies, vol. 42. New York City: Springer International Publishing

(2016). 31-42.

Busso, Anabella. “Neoliberal Crisis, Social Demands, and Foreign Policy in Kirchnerist

Argentina.” Contexto International, 38, no. 1 (April 2016): 95-131.

Cara, Ana C. “Entangled Tangos: Passionate Displays, Intimate Dialogues.” Journal of

American Folklore, 122 (Fall 2009): 438-465.

Damill, Mario, Frenkel, Roberto, Rapetti, Martín. “The Argentinean Debt: History,

Default and Restructuring.” Revista EconomicA 6, no. 3 (2005): 29-90.

53

Ebenau, Matthais. “Comparative capitalism and Latin American neodevelopmentalism: A critical political economy view.” In Capital & Class 38, no. 1 (2014). 102-114. https://doi-org.muhlenberg.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0309816813512591

Epstein, Edward. “The Piquetero Movement in Buenos Aires: Political Protests by the

Unemployed During the Crisis.” In Broken Promises? The Argentine Crisis and

Argentine Democracy, Edward Epstein and David Pion-Berlin, 78-90. Lanham:

Lexington Books, 2008. https://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=aab36fb9-85bc-45fc-8887-

1ac58c0afc08%40pdc-v- sessmgr03&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=553510&db= nlebk

Epstein, Edward and Pion-Berlin, David. “The Crisis of 2001 and Argentine

Democracy.” In Broken Promises? The Argentine Crisis and Argentine Democracy,

Edward Epstein and David Pion-Berlin, 9-27. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008. https://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=aab36fb9-85bc-45fc-8887-

1ac58c0afc08%40pdc-v- sessmgr03&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=553510&db= nlebk

Ferradás, Carmen Alicia. "Argentina." In Countries and Their Cultures, edited by Carol

R. Ember and Melvin Ember, Vol. 1. New York, NY: Macmillan Reference USA (2001).

77-92. http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/CX3401700019/GVRL?u=mul_coll&sid=GVRL&xi d=80f47bb9.

54

Fukuyama, Francis. “The Imperative of State Building.” Journal of Democracy, 15

(2004): 17-31. 10.1353/jod.2004.0026

Gonzáles Bombal, Inés and Luzzi, Mariana. “The Costs of the Convertibility Plan: The

Economic and Social Effects of Financial Hegemony.” In Broken Promises? The

Argentine Crisis and Argentine Democracy, Edward Epstein and David Pion-Berlin, 111-

125. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008. https://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=aab36fb9-85bc-45fc-8887-

1ac58c0afc08%40pdc-v- sessmgr03&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=553510&db= nlebk

Gonzales, Mike and Yanes, Marianella. “Astor Piazzola and Tango Nuevo.” In Tango:

Sex and Rhythm of the City, Mike Gonzales and Mianella Yanes, 151-168. London:

Reaktion Books Ltd, 2013.

Gritzner, Karoline. “Between Commodification and Emancipation: The Tango

Encounter.” Dance Research, 35 no. 1 (June 2017): 49-60. https://doi.org/10.3366/drs.2017.0182

Guillermoprieto, Alma. “And Still They Tango.” National Geographic, 204, no. 6 (Dec

2003): 34-47.

International Monetary Fund, Argentina: Second Review Under the Stand-By

Arrangement and Requests for Modification and Waiver of Performance Criteria—Staff

Report; Staff Statement; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and

Statement by the Executive Director for Argentina, Washington D.C.: 2004.

International Monetary Fund. “The IMF and Argentina, 1991-2001.” International

Monetary Fund Publication Services. Washington, D.C.: 2004.

55

International Monetary Fund. Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina. Washington D.C.:

2003

Kaese, Fynn and Wolff, Jonas. “Piqueteros after the Hype: Unemployed Movements in

Argentina, 2008-2015.” European Review of Latin America and Caribbean Studies 102

(October 2016): 47-68.

Kanai, Miguel. “Buenos Aires, capital of tango: tourism, redevelopment and the cultural politics of neoliberal urbanism.” Urban Geography 35, no. 8 (October 2014): 1111-1117. https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2014.957112

Karush, Matthew B. “Populism, Melodrama, and the Market: The Mass Cultural Origins of Personism.” In The New Cultural History of Peronism: Power and Identity in Mid-

Twentieth-Century Argentina, edited by Matthew B. Karush and Oscar Chamosa, 21-52.

Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.

Lenton, Diana. “The Malón de la Paz of 1946: Indigenous Descamisados at the Dawn of

Peronism.” In The New Cultural History of Peronism: Power and Identity in Mid-

Twentieth-Century Argentina, edited by Matthew B. Karush and Oscar Chamosa, 21-52.

Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.

Lopez-Calva, Luis F. Lustig, Nora, and Ortiz-Juarez, Eduardo. “Declining Inequality in

Latin America in the 2000s: The Cases of Argentina, , and .” World

Development, 44 (2013): 129-141. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.09.013

Luker, Morgan James. “Tango as Intangible Cultural Heritage: Development, Diversity, and the Value of Music in Buenos Aires.” In Audible Empire: Music, Global Politics,

Critique, edited by Tejumola Olaniyan and Ronald Radano, 225-245. Durham: Duke

University Press, 2016.

56

Luker, Morgan James. “The Tango Machine: Musical Practice and Cultural Policy in

Post-Crisis Buenos Aires.” New York: Columbia University, 2009.

Maclachlan, Colin M. “The Proceso’s Dark Shadow, Menem, and Neoliberalism.” In

Argentina: What Went Wrong, Colin M. Maclachlan, 151-180. Westport: Praeger

Publishers, 2006.

Mariano, Féliz. “Till death do as apart?” Kirchnerism, neodevelopmentalism and the struggle for hegemony in Argentina, 2003-2015.” In The Three Worlds of Social

Democracy: A Global View, edited by Ingo Schmidt, 91-107. London: Pluto Press, 2016.

Mariano, Féliz. “Neo-Developmentalism: Beyond Neoliberalism? Capitalist Crisis and

Argentina’s Development Since the 1990s.” Historical Materialism, 20, no. 2 (2012):

105-123.

Mariotto, Juan Gabriel and Nielson, Christine S. “The Tango Metaphor: The Essence of

Argentina’s National Identity.” International Studies of Management & Organization 35, no. 4 (2005): 8-36.

Merritt, Carolyn. Tango Nuevo. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012.

Moyo, Sam, and Yeros, Paris. “The Fall and Rise of the Nation Question.” In Reclaiming the Nation: The Return of the National Question in Africa, Asia and Latin America, edited by Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, 3-29. London: Pluto Press, 2011. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183h0tp.4#metadata_info_tab_contents

Nun, José. “The Democratic Process in Argentina.” In Broken Promises? The Argentine

Crisis and Argentine Democracy, Edward Epstein and David Pion-Berlin, 29-45.

Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008. https://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=aab36fb9-85bc-45fc-8887-

1ac58c0afc08%40pdc-v-

57 sessmgr03&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=553510&db= nlebk

Onunch, Olga. “‘It’s the Economy, Stupid,’ or Is It? The Role of Political Crises in Mass

Mobilization: The Case of Argentina in 2001.” In Argentina Since the 2001 Crisis:

Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future, edited by Cara Levey, Daniel Ozarow, and

Christopher Wylde, 89-114. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014.

Peruzzotti, Enrique. “Conceptualizing Kirchnerismo.” In Partecipazione e Conflitto: The

Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies. Italy, 2017, 48-64.

Rivera-Quiñones, Miguel A. “Macroeconomic Governance in Post-Neoliberal Argentine and the Relentless Power of TNCs: The Case of the Soy Complex.” In Argentina Since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future, edited by Cara Levey,

Daniel Ozarow, and Christopher Wylde, 67-82. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014.

Romero, Luis Alberto. A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century, translated by

James P. Brennan. University Park: The Pennsylvania Park University, 1994.

Salessi, Jorge. “Medics, Crooks, and Tango Queens: The National Appropriation of a

Gay Tango.” Translated by Celeste Fraser Delgado. In Everynight Life: Culture and

Dance in Latin/o America, edited by Celeste Fraser Delgado and José Esteban Muñoz,

141-174. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997.

Santella, Agustín. “General Strikes in 20th Century in Argentina.” In Labor Conflict and

Capitalist Hegemony in Argentina, edited by Agustín Santella, 43-74. Leiben: Brill,

2016.

Savigliano, Marta E. Tango and the Political Economy of Passion. Bolder: Westview

Press, Inc., 1995.

58

Schvarzer, Jorge. “The Costs of the Convertibility Plan: The Economic and Social Effects of Financial Hegemony.” In Broken Promises? The Argentine Crisis and Argentine

Democracy, Edward Epstein and David Pion-Berlin. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008.

61-76. https://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=aab36fb9-85bc-45fc-

8887-1ac58c0afc08%40pdc-v- sessmgr03&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=553510&db= nlebk

Skocpol, Theda. “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current

Research.” In Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich

Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, 3-44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Taylor, Diana. “The Theatre of Operations: Performing Nation-ness in the Public

Sphere.” In Disappearing Acts: Spectacles of Gender and Nationalism in Argentina’s

“Dirty War,” 91-117. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997.

Vadell, Javier A. “Kirchner’s Argentina: In Search of a New International Presence.” In

Reclaiming the Nation: The Return of the National Question in Africa, Asia and Latin

America, edited by Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, 255-274. London: Pluto Press, 2011. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183h0tp.4#metadata_info_tab_contents

Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. and Eckstein, Susan Eva. “‘There and Back Again’:

Latin American Social Movements and Reasserting the Powers of Structural Theories.”

In Handbook of Social Movements across Latin America, edited by Paul Almeida and

Allen Cordero Ulate, 25-48. London: Springer, 2015.

59