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Saudi Arabia Country Report | Freedom on the Net 2018 Saudi Arabia Country Report | Freedom on the Net 2018 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/saudi-arabia Saudi Arabia Country Report | Freedom on the Net 2018 Internet Freedom Score 13/25 Most Free (0) Least Free (100) Obstacles to access 14/25 Limits on content 25/35 Violations of users rights 34/40 Key Developments: June 1, 2017 - May 31, 2018 An antiterrorism law introduced in November 2017 laid out lengthy prison terms for offenses linked to nonviolent political and religious speech, such as portraying the king or crown prince “in a manner that brings religion or justice in disrepute” (see Legal Environment). Authorities jailed several prominent women’s rights activists, journalists, and other government critics for their online activities. Human rights defender Mohammed al-Otaibi was given a 14-year prison sentence after he was forcibly deported to Saudi Arabia while on his way to Norway, which had granted him special travel documents (see Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities). Amid the crackdown on those who do not signal their strict allegiance to the crown prince and king, as internet users are increasingly cautious about what they post, share, or “like” online (see Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation). Introduction: Internet freedom in Saudi Arabia declined in 2018 amid an escalating intolerance for all forms of political, social, and religious dissent. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman initiated a chaotic consolidation of power over the coverage period, with dire consequences for freedom of expression and human rights more broadly. A new antiterrorism law instituted in November 2017 set out criminal penalties for, among several offenses, portraying the Saudi king or crown prince “in a manner that brings religion or justice into disrepute,” or using one’s “social status or media influence to promote terrorism.” State authorities have widely interpreted “terrorism” to encompass a variety of nonviolent political, social, and religious offenses. In addition, oversight and enforcement power for counterterrorism measures was transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Public Prosecution and the Presidency of the State Security, two newly established bodies that report directly to the king. Beginning in September 2017, authorities arrested several prominent intellectuals, academics, religious clerics, and members of the ruling family. While the reasons for the arrests have not been publicly disclosed, it was widely interpreted that the individuals were targeted for criticizing government policies, including through their social media posts. Two months later, the crown prince detained hundreds of businessmen and members of the royal family in what was described as an anticorruption drive; many were forced to come to opaque agreements as a condition of their release. In the aftermath, at least 17 individuals were hospitalized and 1 died from apparent torture at the hands of authorities.1 Online, some Saudis vocalized their support for the anticorruption measures, recommending that he tackle specific cases of suspected malfeasance. Many people have also used smartphones to spread awareness about popular concerns such as sexual harassment and women’s rights. While the internet remains the least repressive forum to air and exchange views, prominent activists and journalists perceived a shrinking space for online expression during the reporting period, resulting in a rise in self-censorship. In a graphic display of the government’s assault on free expression, Jamal Khashoggi, a prominent Saudi journalist, was forcibly disappeared in a Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. Mounting evidence strongly indicates that he was tortured and murdered by the government – and that the subsequent cover up also occurred at the direction of Saudi leaders. In his final column for the Washington Post, published after his death, Khashoggi called for free expression in the Arab World, noting that “There was a time when journalists believed the Internet would liberate information from the censorship and control associated with print media. But these governments, whose very existence relies on the control of information, have aggressively blocked the Internet.”2 In the aftermath, new revelations reported by the New York Times evidenced the government’s broad online manipulation efforts and its grooming of a Saudi Twitter employee to spy on local users.3 Obstacles to Access: Overall, infrastructure is not considered a major barrier to internet access, except in remote and sparsely populated areas, where the government has allocated funds to introduce high-speed connections. Internet penetration is highest in major cities such as Riyadh and Jeddah, as well as in the oil-rich Eastern Province. Young Saudis make up the majority of the user population throughout the country. Availability and Ease of Access Saudis have enjoyed a rapid growth in internet and communications technologies (ICTs). According to BuddeComm, an online research organization, internet penetration reached over 76 percent in 2018,4 up from 47 percent in 2011.5 Saudi Arabia is home to around 24.5 million internet users. The number of those with household fixed broadband ADSL subscriptions continued to decline, accounting for a 40 percent penetration rate in the third quarter of 2017. This corresponds to the general decline in the fixed telephony market, largely due to competition with mobile services. By contrast, 88 percent of the population used mobile broadband services in the same time period.6 In January 2018, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology demanded that mobile service providers in remote areas of the country provide local roaming services to users within two months.7 In March, the state-owned telecommunications provider Saudi Telecom Company awarded Ericsson with a contract to upgrade and expand the 4G network. This includes plans to deploy Ericsson’s 5G-ready hardware in the country, a process that began in December 2017.8 Additionally, a number of telecommunications companies have forged partnerships to achieve improved network services and infrastructure. Examples include a March 2018 cooperation agreement between Zain Saudi Arabia and Huawei.9 As part of its overall economic and social reform strategy, the government has streamlined laws to attract foreign companies, including cloud computing and technology service providers. Authorities have eased rules around foreign ownership of companies and other regulatory hurdles. In December 2017, global technology companies such as Amazon Web Services held discussions with Saudi authorities to explore potentially offering cloud services in Saudi Arabia.10 In early March 2018, the telecommunications regulator began regulating cloud computing in the country, establishing registration, disclosure, and other requirements for cloud service 1 of 6 7/2/2019, 3:28 PM Saudi Arabia Country Report | Freedom on the Net 2018 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/saudi-arabia providers.11 Mobile broadband penetration fell from 102 percent in 2015 to 76 percent at the end of 2016, with roughly 24 million mobile broadband subscriptions. Overall, the number of mobile subscriptions fell from 54 million in 2011 to 51.8 million in 2016. The decrease was due to the deportation of thousands of undocumented workers and the deactivation of their prepaid mobile accounts,12 in addition to new requirements for all mobile subscribers to register using their fingerprints in order to obtain service (see Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity). Restrictions on Connectivity Regulators and telecommunications companies have historically taken an aggressive stance against free or low-cost voice over internet protocol (VoIP) call services that potentially reduce the amount of standard mobile calls, circumvent the regulatory environment, and in some cases bypass the surveillance apparatus. Internet providers previously blocked VoIP apps including Viber,13 WhatsApp,14 and Facebook Messenger.15 In September 2017, the government announced that it had lifted a year-long ban on all VoIP call services that satisfied its regulatory requirements, including Skype and WhatsApp. This shift represented part of the government’s broader economic reforms aimed at rationalizing the business environment. This specific policy was intended to reduce operational costs for businesses and “spur digital entrepreneurship,” according to a statement by the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology.16 However, despite the announcement, several VoIP call services, including WhatsApp and FaceTime, remain blocked, and can only be accessed using a virtual private network (VPN). Saudi Arabia is connected to the internet through two country-level data service providers, the Integrated Telecom Company and Bayanat al-Oula for Network Services. The servers they utilize are split between the state- owned internet backbone and global servers. All user requests that arrive via Saudi internet service providers (ISPs) travel through these servers, making them subject to censorship at a centralized point. International internet bandwidth doubled from 1,484 Gbps in 2015 to 3,185 Gbps in 2016.17 ICT Market The two country-level service providers offer services to licensed ISPs, which in turn sell connections to dial-up and leased-line clients. Broadband and mobile phone service is provided by the three largest telecommunications companies in the Middle East: Saudi Telecom Company (STC), Mobily (owned by Etisalat in the United
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