Making the Games Preparing and Winning the London

This article was downloaded by: 10.3.98.104 On: 01 Oct 2021 Access details: subscription number Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK Handbook of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Volume One: Making the Games Vassil Girginov Preparing and Winning the London Bid Publication details https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203132517.ch3 Guy Masterman Published online on: 03 Oct 2012 How to cite :- Guy Masterman. 03 Oct 2012, Preparing and Winning the London Bid from: Handbook of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, Volume One: Making the Games Routledge Accessed on: 01 Oct 2021 https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203132517.ch3 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT Full terms and conditions of use: https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. 3 PREPARING AND WINNING THE LONDON BID Guy Masterman Winning the bid in Raffles Hotel, Singapore Introduction This chapter is concerned with how London won its bid for the 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games. The analysis draws on various documentation, texts and three interviews: Sir Craig Reedie, Chair of the British Olympic Association (BOA) and an International Olympic Committee (IOC) Executive Board member; Mike Lee, the Director of Communications and Public Affairs for the London bid; and Richard Caborn, the UK Government’s Sport Minister at the time of the bid. 29 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:08 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203132517, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203132517.ch3 Guy Masterman There is a mystique that surrounds the bid, in particular around the final presentation in Singapore to the IOC members when London was declared host. With London seemingly going into those final days in third place, certainly with the media extolling Paris as the favour- ite, the question arises as to how influential that presentation was. This chapter will look at that question but is more focused on an analysis of the extensive planning prior to that event, which enabled that presentation to be effective. How the bid developed It is important to consider where the London 2012 bid came from. Why and how London was selected and how previous bidding contributed are important questions, not only for the selection of London for the 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games, but also for the development and shape of the bid. Previous bidding London hosted its first Summer Olympic Games in 1908, having stepped in after the winning bidding city, Rome, had pulled out. London therefore did not bid for these Games. London then unsuccessfully bid for the eventually cancelled 1940 Games and successfully for the 1944 event; however, these latter Games were also then cancelled due to the ongoing Second World War. As a consequence, the first post- war Games, in 1948, were awarded to and hosted by London. London and the Greater London Council, led by Horace Cutler, did undergo a feasibility study into a west London- based and Wembley Stadium- focused 1988 Games, but this was not supported by the Government (Barker, 2003). More recently the city unsuccessfully rivalled Manchester and Birmingham for Britain’s 1992 bid. The winner, Birmingham, bid for the 1992 Games and in so doing was only the second British city to bid to host the Games. The selection of Birmingham was made by the BOA (Great Britain’s National Olympic Committee) following a Britain- wide process; at the time this selection was somewhat controversial in that London, the capital city, was not put forward. In retrospect we can see that the BOA, with the Government in support, was keen on hosting a Summer Games. Despite Birmingham’s fifth- place ranking, it was decided that a further bid should be made and thus Manchester was given the immediate opportunity for the following Olympiad. This bid also failed (fourth place), but again this failure was put aside and Manchester went again for the 2000 Games. It fared better, ranking third, but what the BOA was left with was a series of failed bids. There are two important points to make here in relation to what has since followed. First, London had clearly not been favoured in any way as a potential bid city – its campaigns to be the BOA’s nomination had been weak in comparison and it had lacked support from the Government (Reedie, 2011). Second, despite three attempts, provincial bids from England’s second and third largest cities had not been capable of winning. 1997 feasibility study These failed bids were key factors when the BOA first started sowing the seeds for a future London bid. Despite their size and prominence, an Olympic Games in any one city starts as only an early notion of an idea; in London’s case this started as early as 1993. Manchester’s second losing bid in 1993 was a significant factor in how the BOA would press forward. For Craig Reedie, the relatively new Chairman of the BOA, this was a key point at which to determine 30 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:08 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203132517, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203132517.ch3 Preparing and winning the London bid which direction the BOA should take. Reedie became an IOC member the following year and was then able to gauge critical opinion. What became apparent was that only London would be capable of winning any future bid: It became quite clear that if we were ever going to bid successfully again, it had to be with London, they [the IOC] simply wouldn’t do it with a provincial city, no matter how worthy. (Reedie, 2011) It also became clear to Reedie that a bid led by the National Olympic Committee (NOC) was critical – the BOA was Britain’s NOC. A BOA- led bid would not only be more warmly received by the IOC, it would also provide a more solid base for a future set of stakeholders to be involved in the bid, history having shown that this is not the case where there are disjointed relations (Reedie, 2011). The idea remained small at this point and there were still important questions about how London could be a host, and indeed which Olympiad would be the best one to go for. A research- underpinned feasibility exercise was required and BOA Chief Executive Simon Clegg gave that task to the goalkeeping hockey player from Britain’s 1996 Olympic hockey team, David Luckes (Lee, 2006). In 1997, Luckes set about the task of producing a report that was focused on ensuring that a winning bid could be produced, something that ultimately would not become clear until 6 July 2005. East London focus There were different options available, and an Olympic Games based in west London was on the planning table. However, it became clear that the Football Association would not support that with a new Wembley Stadium that was for anything but football, and so the most feasible option was an east London bid with a regeneration angle. A long stretch of available and mainly derelict land had been identified along the Lea Valley, but what was critical was that it would not remain available for long (Lee, 2006). In 1997, British sport wasn’t hugely successful and relationships in sport were also complicated and the Government was not that engaged; conse- quently, there was no point in submitting a bid that year and going for the 2004 Games. Athens would be too tough a competitor in any case. Similarly, the thought of taking on Beijing and bidding in 2001 for the 2008 Games appeared futile. Indeed, a 2001 bid would only have served as a trial run at best and that was considered to be a route too expensive to take (Reedie, 2011). In retrospect it is clear that when Paris bid against Beijing in 2001 they ‘got rather badly bruised by the process’ (Reedie, 2011). The BOA did not feel that it had either the time or the funding to compete or trial for these Olympiads and so it became clear that if London was to bid for an Olympiad and also take advantage of the favoured option identified in the feasibility study it would have to be for 2012. Early impacting factors There were two events that had contradictory impacts on the development of preparation towards a decision on whether to bid or not. In July 2001, London, having won and accepted its bid to stage the 2005 World Athletics Championships, withdrew on the order of Tessa Jowell, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport following late financial assessments. While avoiding a financially disastrous event was to be admired, unfortunately London instantly 31 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:08 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203132517, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203132517.ch3 Guy Masterman gained a reputation as a city that could not deliver an international sports event (Masterman, 2009). At best this would be a mantle that would need to be addressed by a bid, and at worst would be a factor standing against going ahead with a bid at all.

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