GOVERNING COALITIONS AND TENANT LEGISLATION AT THE SAN FRANCISCO BOARD OF SUPERVISORS: 2001-2016
A Thesis submitted to the faculty of San Francisco State University As In partial fulfillment of 3C? the requirements for the Degree POLI Master of Arts
In
Political Science
by
Chelsea Speyer Boilard
San Francisco, California
August 2017 Copyright by Chelsea Speyer Boilard 2017 CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL
I certify that I have read Governing Coalitions and Tenant Legislation at the San Francisco
Board of Supervisors: 2001-2016 by Chelsea Speyer Boilard, and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree Master of Arts in Political Science at San Francisco State
University.
Ron Hayduk, Dr.F.H. Associate Professor GOVERNING COALITIONS AND TENANT LEGISLATION AT THE SAN FRANCISCO BOARD OF SUPERVISORS: 2001-2016
Chelsea Speyer Boilard San Francisco, California 2017
A study exploring political power and governance through an in-depth examination of tenant legislation at the Board of Supervisors between 2001-2016, this thesis uses urban regime theory to test several hypotheses. The author articulates hypotheses about the variables that influence the Board’s responsiveness to tenant issues, specifically the number of “pro-tenant” members of the Board, the presence of an upcoming district election, and increasing rents and evictions. The study yields findings indicating a strong association between rising rents and evictions, as well as the number of “pro-tenant” members of the Board, and the number of tenant ordinances introduced and passed into law at the San Francisco Board of Supervisors .
I certify that the Abstract is a correct representation of the content of this thesis.
Date TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables...... vi
List of Figures...... vii
Introduction...... 1
Chapter 1: Literature Review ...... 7
Chapter 2: Data and Methods...... 30
Chapter 3: Analysis of Political Conditions...... 55
Chapter 4: Analysis of Economic Conditions...... 68
Chapter 5: Discussion of Findings...... 80
Appendix...... 89
References...... 113
v LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Status of Tenant Ordinances Introduced...... 43 2. Years with a “Pro-Tenant” Majority...... 52
vi LIST OF FIGURES
Figures Page
1. Tenant Ordinances Introduced & Passed 2001 -2016...... 41 2. Categories of Tenant Ordinances Introduced...... 42 3. Tenant Ordinances Heard at Committee...... 44 4. SFTU and Eviction Ordinances...... 45 5. SFTU and Condo Conversion Ordinances...... 45 6. SFTU and Rent Control Ordinances...... 46 7. “Pro-Tenant” Members and Introduction...... 57 8. Ordinances Introduced by “Pro-Tenant” Members...... 58 9. “Pro-Tenant” Board Members and Passage...... 59 10. Status of Ordinances Introduced by “Pro-Tenant” Members...... 60 11. Status of Ordinances Introduced by Non “Pro-Tenant” Members...... 61 12. Election Years & Tenant Ordinances Introduced...... 63 13. Election Years & Tenant Ordinances Passed Into Law...... 64 14. Percentage of Renters by Supervisorial District...... 65 15. Tenant Data by District & Years Electing a “Pro-Tenant” Supervisor...... 66
16. Median Rent...... 69 17. Paragon’s SF Residential Rents...... 70 18. Median Rents and Ordinances Introduced...... 71 19. Median Rent Rate of Change & Ordinances Introduced...... 72 20. Median Rents & Ordinances Passed...... 73 21. Median Rent Rate of Change & Ordinances Passed...... 74 22. Evictions 2000-2016...... 75 23. Evictions and Tenant Ordinances Introduced...... 77 24. Rate of Change in Evictions & Ordinances Introduced...... 77 25. Evictions and Tenant Ordinances Passed...... 78 26. Rate of Change in Evictions and Ordinances Passed...... 78
27. Status of Short-Term Rental Legislation...... 85
vii 1
Introduction
Limited housing stock in San Francisco and a rapidly growing population with increasingly more disposable income has led to skyrocketing rents and rising eviction rates across the city. Tenants are vulnerable in such a volatile housing market, and groups in the city have been organizing for decades for policy solutions to defend tenant rights. In addition, advocates who identify as politically progressive often see the fight to expand tenant protections as a direct response to capital and market forces that cannot be regulated through a local legislative process. Those policy efforts at City Hall have waxed and waned over the decades, depending on a range of possible conditions that increase or decrease the responsiveness of elected officials to the plight facing tenants in San Francisco. In the following pages is an exploration of why and how. San Francisco has long been a city of both great wealth and great poverty. The Gold Rush and rise of iron mining of the 19th century built incredible wealth for a small and select group of families in San Francisco, providing a foundation for the dominance of financial institutions in San Francisco and setting the context for “Wall Street of the West” (Brechin 2006). Hundreds of thousands of people have flocked to the city seeking economic opportunity since then, and there has long been a clear economic distinction between the old wealth of San Francisco and everyday working people. In cities like San Francisco, a widening income gap has led to a shrinking middle class; over ten years ago, Hartman wrote, “The city is rapidly becoming a city of have-a- lots and have-nots, with the working class and lower-middle class population being pushed out” (Harman 2002, 2). Between 1990 and 2012, the middle class as defined by the American Community Survey shrunk by 11% (SF Human Services Agency 2014). Rapidly rising rents in San Francisco have earned the city the title of most expensive rental market in the country (Zumper 2015). An online rentals listing company recently published their February 2017 top rental markets in the United States: San Francisco 2
remains #1, with a median price of $3,310 for a one bedroom and $4,500 for a 2 bedroom apartment in the city (Zumper 2017). The incredible demand has created a volatile political environment with most of the debate centering on housing—whether we have enough, what kind of housing we should be building, for what income level, and ultimately, who should be taking responsibility for the housing crisis. This tension about housing in San Francisco is a familiar one; for decades City Hall and voters have seen highly politicized fights over land use, zoning and large development projects. Since the 2000 re-emergence of district elections for the Board of Supervisors in San Francisco, there have been two big economic booms in the city as a result of the technology industry; the first, widely known as the dot-com boom and bust of the early 2000’s, drove up rent and property values particularly in the Mission District but had ripple effects across the city. And the second “tech boom”, still in process, has received national attention. Since 2010, 30% of new jobs added to the city were in the technology sector, and that doesn’t include Google or the hundreds of other Silicon Valley tech companies whose employees live in San Francisco but commute south for work. Between tech, health care, finances and hospitality, a great number of jobs are being created (over 42,000 between 2010 and 2014) but concerns have arisen from policy groups about how many of those new jobs are going to existing San Francisco residents, versus those relocating to the city for an employment opportunity (SPUR 2014). Often the public debate around the housing crisis involves a lot of finger-pointing between the so-called “progressives” and “moderates” (Metcalf 2015; McDaniel 2015; Welch 2013; Redmond 2014). These terms hold particular meaning for San Francisco’s City Hall; whereas anywhere else in the country or even the state the definition of these affixed labels may shift, in the city of Saint Francis there is a biennial battle for the political majority controlling the Board of Supervisors. Even in San Francisco, the definition of these terms depends on who one asks (Garofoli 2013). While San Francisco is a firmly Democratic town, there exist many shades of blue, as demonstrated by this divide. Frequently defined by their positions on development and business interests, 3
progressives lean to the left by opposing market-rate development and supporting higher taxes on big businesses and the wealthy, while moderates lean center-right (within the Democratic Party) and are more likely to align themselves with development and business interests. According to the San Francisco Chronicle, “These days, it’s the moderates who support the city’s rapid change, from the sharing-economy companies like Uber and Airbnb to the so-called Twitter tax break. And it’s the progressives who see the rapid change as alarming and wish the city could return to its glory days, when regular people could afford to live here” (Knight 2015). When it comes to housing, the debate narrows, most simplistically to a showdown between those who want to build 100% affordable housing (aligned with progressives) and those who want to build market rate housing (aligned with moderates). The supply- side advocates who want to build housing at all levels, including market rate, point to a decades-old alliance between progressives and NIMBYs (“Not In My Back Yard”) who opposed new development that would change the character of their neighborhoods. Together, the story goes, they were able to build a “slow-growth” movement and block new development, hence the lack of housing supply the city is experiencing today. On the other hand, affordable housing and tenant rights advocates counter that it was the creation of institutions like the Bay Area Council, SPUR and efforts to develop San Francisco as a job center in the regional economy that led to thousands of affordable housing to be demolished in the city, and that it is the greed of downtown business interests and real estate developers, in bed with moderates, that created the housing crisis. Indeed, there is passionate rhetoric coming out of both community-based affordable housing and tenant groups as well as pro-growth realtor and landlord lobby groups. And there are emerging groups, such as the San Francisco Bay Area Renters Federation (SFBARF), or the San Francisco Yimby Party, who identify with tenant interests but unlike traditional tenant advocate groups, are fiercely leading the supply-side efforts in the city to produce more housing, at any level. 4
Clearly housing development is a very complicated picture in San Francisco and beyond. Regardless of which side of the debate one identifies with, most other municipalities in the surrounding Bay Area, even as they add thousands of new jobs, are themselves refusing to build any significant numbers of new housing, affordable or otherwise. As a result, the City and County of San Francisco is left holding the bag. While the Mayor and the Board of Supervisors are often the targets of this debate, there are both financial and political restrictions on possible local interventions in the housing market, at the state and federal level, as well as the ever-increasing foreign private investment in the city’s housing market. In 2016, it’s estimated that California accounted for 15% of the nation’s foreign real estate investment; according to the Santa Clara County Association of Realtors, these out-of-country buyers are looking for a return on their investment (Pender 2016). Foreign buyers tend to spend more than U.S. residents for property, and increasingly in the Bay Area they are investing in changing neighborhoods where the property values are projected to rise (Pender 2016). In addition to foreign real estate investment, there are other challenges for the housing market. There are major, and often prohibitive, financing restrictions on affordable housing development. The state’s dissolution of the Redevelopment Agency means a significant source of funding dried up for affordable housing, leaving advocates and city officials scrambling to identify alternative financing opportunities. And the federal government has been disinvesting in public housing for decades, both in terms of development as well as upkeep for existing housing units. Largely, the city relies on private developers to either build or financially contribute to affordable housing, through inclusionary housing mandates. Without many financing options for affordable housing development, 100% affordable projects tend to be few and far between. Frustrated with a lack of affordable housing and an out-of-control rental market, affordable housing advocates have organized against large market-rate housing developments, a symbol of gentrification and luxury housing inaccessible to low and moderate income residents who are increasingly 5
leaving San Francisco in search of a lower cost of living. Equally frustrated with delayed housing development, supply-side advocates argue that more housing, at any level, would help lower the cost of housing. And the debate continues. It is not impossible, of course, for local interventions to take place to address the housing crisis, such as housing bonds, below market rate inclusionary mandates, developer fees, zoning restrictions, etc. The real debate, however, is over whether each/any of these measures address the housing crisis and who (at what income levels) benefits the most from said legislation. Finally, the efforts to advance tenant rights are not one and the same as the efforts to build affordable housing, address economic inequality, or constrain and regulate capital. Tenant advocates— and low and moderate income tenants themselves— may be effectively advancing a pro-tenant agenda in San Francisco through legislation at the Board of Supervisors, but the advances of capital through large-scale development projects, rising market-rate rents and a range of other means are forever changing the landscape of the city, including our economic and racial diversity through massive displacement. In other words, tenant advocates may be winning individual policy battles, but the broader progressive coalition is perhaps losing the war. This thesis is an attempt at both a macro and micro level explanation for San Francisco city politics between 2001 and 2016. The above context should help set the tone for the broader economic forces at play, as well as the local political landscape, but this thesis will focus more narrowly on tenant legislation in particular. Through this thesis I explore the following question: What political and economic factors increase the San Francisco Board o f Supervisors ’ responsiveness regarding tenant issues, leading to the introduction and passage o f tenant legislation? I examine three kinds of tenant legislation introduced by the Board of Supervisors over 16 years, spanning 2001-2016, in the categories of rent control ordinances, condominium conversion ordinances, and eviction protection ordinances. The study is a small-n quantitative analysis of the tenant legislation in each of those three categories introduced during the time period specified, 6
the final status of the legislation, and the political and economic factors that contributed to the end result. In Chapter 1,1 review important literature from urban and American politics that provides a theoretical framework for this thesis and present four hypotheses. Chapter 2 details some of the definitions and assumptions in my data and methods for a study of tenant legislation at the Board of Supervisors. In Chapter 3 I discuss the quantitative analysis for the political conditions included in this thesis, and chapter 4 focuses on the analysis for economic conditions relating to responsiveness. Finally, in Chapter 5 I discuss my findings, implication of those findings, and the possibility for future research. 7
Chapter 1: Literature Review
There are a number of theories with political science designed to explain urban politics and power, an arena that is continually evolving. The field of urban politics has sought to explain issues of public policy choice, responsiveness to groups, and ultimately who and what is responsible for governance in urban centers. In this section I aim to explore some of these theories and provide a foundation for this study of tenant legislation at the Board of Supervisors in San Francisco. Within urban politics, there has been at times a divide between key theories that emphasize either political or economic factors as the central reason to explain governance or policy decision-making. There have also been efforts made to develop theories that marry the two influences—or at the very least, acknowledge that it is neither simply one nor the other that can explain the responsiveness of elected officials to social issues. The thesis that follows seeks to answer a central questions: What are the conditions under which pro-tenant legislation is advanced at the Board of Supervisors? More specifically, what political and economic factors increase Supervisors’ responsiveness regarding tenant issues, leading to the introduction and passage of tenant legislation? This chapter will review several theories, including pluralism, structuralism, urban regime, and democratic responsiveness, in order to discuss their application to this study and develop a theoretical framework to explain my hypotheses.
Pluralism and Interest Groups
Robert A. Dahl, a pluralism theorist, and his formative 1961 work Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City has influenced an incredible amount of theory on urban governance and beyond. Dahl’s inquiry is clearly relevant to the present study, as he explored who held political power and influence over local policy; this 8
question and his subsequent conclusion has been significant for the development of pluralist literature. Dahl’s analysis comes from a case study of New Haven, Connecticut where he studied political decision-making and power; while he acknowledged that inequalities existed, he argued that that they were “dispersed inequalities”, and that no one group dominated local politics because all groups had relatively easy access to decision makers (1961). Dahl did discuss the plurality of “mini-elites”, referring to key interest groups and their leaders, arguing that these groups have the ability to move an agenda and influence decision-makers on policy, and that coalition-building was key. That said, Dahl and other pluralists maintain that because no one group dominates, policy is made through bargaining and compromise and is therefore relatively representative of stakeholders. Pluralism, according to John Mollenkopf, rejects the idea that “economic or social notables controlled the state in any instrumental sense” (Strom and Mollenkopf 2007,
100). Pluralists broadly contend that there are many competing groups in society, each of whom have some level of power and therefore are able to share access to resources. Dahl and other pluralist scholars have been critical of a sociological theory of a ruling elite, finding fault with analyses that pointed to institutional power structures. According to Thomas J. Anton, pluralists are predominantly focused on individuals, their self- interest and their rationality to explain community power and government responsiveness (Anton 1963, 456). A major critique of pluralism is that this theoretical framework excludes the economic and social inequalities that lead to an exclusion of non-elites from political power, in turn opening up the possibility of political unrest as those excluded fought for inclusion. The very visible civil rights battles of the 1960s shone a light on this oversight in pluralism (Strom and Mollenkopf 2007). John Mollenkopf s response to pluralist theorists draws upon a structuralist critique, whereby he argues that pluralism excludes any analysis of ongoing inequalities that exist between groups and their access to political 9
power; overall, according to Mollenkopf, pluralism is missing a “structural and economic context” that can help explain the significant influence that capital has on the political landscape for policy making (Mollenkopf 1989). E. E. Schattschneider also advanced a critique of pluralism The Semisovereign People (1975), pointing out a pro-business bias in the pressures put upon elected officials to respond to interest groups. This very critique about pluralism’s oversight with regard to inequality (economic and beyond) has allowed for innovations in this family of theory that incorporate more of a structuralist framework—namely urban regime theory, explored more in depth below, in response to the critique that Dahl left the market on the sidelines (Stone 2017, 5). While Richard DeLeon calls San Francisco a “hyperpluralist” city (1992), what he is referring to is a weak political leadership and a dispersed business elite, which in theory would allow for other interest groups to gain more political access. For the purposes of this study, pluralism cannot explain inequities between various groups and their ability to access power in the Mayor’s office or even the more accessible Board of Supervisors. Perhaps the city of St. Francis has changed too much in the 25 years since publication for his analysis to hold true—but even then, San Francisco was not above the confines of structural racism and other institutional factors that prevent all interested parties from equally sharing access to power. If San Francisco was indeed a purely pluralist city, perhaps the city’s median income would not continue to rise as low-income residents, African American residents, and children of color migrate out of the city boundaries, because those groups would be able to access the halls of power and demand responsiveness from elected officials. Indeed, if pluralism could be applied to anywhere in San Francisco, it would be at the Board of Supervisors, where district elections for the eleven members require a greater level of responsiveness to those residing in the district they represent; even then, there is disparity with regards to access to political power, particularly in districts with racial segregation and significant wealth gaps. I conclude that pluralism alone simply cannot explain how and why San Francisco elected officials 10
are responsive to particular issues, as it excludes very important factors that play a role in groups’ level of influence.
Structuralism and Economic Factors
Structuralism focuses much more deeply on an economic explanation of governance—which is a viable path forward for a study based in San Francisco, a city of great wealth and great economic inequality. Such a theory is public choice, credited to Paul Peterson from his 1981 book City Limits', for public choice theorists, boosting a city’s economic and political power is the primary motivation driving public policy. The theory is based in both federalism and market economics—that cities will compete with each other to maximize their economic growth. Cities, however, face limits on their ability to do this effectively, including of course federal budget and policy constraints, as well as the market (for example demand from investors and consumers, or a city’s credit rating). Under Peterson’s public choice theory, urban politics will revolve around economic growth, as cities will see such growth as positive for the city and all residents. Any efforts to constrain the market and limit capital is likely to derail the city’s main objective; these influences include taxes, government regulation, labor unions, or other social movement organizing. Rather, cities are more likely to sustain economic growth by subsidizing development and providing incentives to nurture new capital. A scholar of federalism, Peterson also wrote about the limits on local policy-making by federal economic policy. Peterson details three typologies within public choice theory- redistributive policies, allocative policies, and developmental policies— and he asserts that in order to be fiscally solvent and self-sufficient, cities will invest in development or growth policies. Public choice critics have claimed that his theory of economic determinism is limited and cannot explain political participation and either electoral or legislative results 11
when they do not favor the market, such as an expansion of social services or tax increase (Basolo 2006, Clingermayer & Feiock, 1995). It is argued that Peterson’s theory is refuted by examples of when growth does not benefit the city or the majority of its citizens (Logan and Molotoch 1976, Molotoch 1990). There have been efforts to use the public choice framework to explain particular housing policies—like that of homeownership as a developmental policy—with some success (Basolo 2006). But a growing body of work more aligned with pluralism challenges Peterson’s theory in finding the role of local ideology and public opinion to be a pivotal force in local policy making, rather than simply inter-city competition (Percival, Johnson & Neiman 2009). Also within the realm of economic theory but widely departing from the explanation put forth by Peterson is structuralism, a theory that “cities can no longer be taken as independent entities isolated from the larger economic and social forces that operate on them” (Strom and Mollenkopf 2007, 104). Structuralists may agree with public choice theorists on the role of private industry and capital, but that is where the similarities end. For Peterson and public choice theorists, striving for economic growth and allowing the market to function with minimal limits will benefit cities as a whole; structuralists on the other hand argue that the domination of private business and capital interests within city policy-making lead to harmful results for low-income communities and other vulnerable populations. Within structuralism, there are two primary strains of theory to explore, one being neo-Marxism and the other being urban growth machine— both exploring urban politics through a strict political economy and class framework. Neo-Marxists writing about urban politics focus on the idea that the state must favor capital and that the political system is essentially subordinate to the economic structure. They argue that under capitalism, subordination to private business interests is inevitable, and that any attempt to resist will be coopted or easily dismissed. According to Susan Fainstein, Neo-Marxists assert that “the state is structurally dependent on capital and therefore must act in its interests regardless of the intentions of public officials” (1990, 122). 12
Growth machine theory, developed by Harvey Molotoch, highlights the idea of a “rentier class” as part of ruling class domination within cities: “Coalitions of land-based elites, tied to the economic possibilities of places, drive urban politics in their quest to expand the local economy and accumulate wealth” (Jonas and Wilson 1999, 3). While the growth machine includes the rentier class such as landlords and real estate developers, it also depends on the participation of other key stakeholders who also benefit economically from urban growth and development. As indicated by its name, the growth machine is devoid of values but narrowly fixated on economic growth, operating on the backs of low-income people and people of color in urban areas; benefits to developers and the rentier class come at the expense of other public priorities or infrastructure. Unlike neo- Marxism, growth machine theory maintains that while the growth machine dominates urban municipalities, there is also almost always a “subversive thread of resistance” and that it is in fact possible for local anti-growth movements to take power (Molotoch 1976, 13). While each of these theories differ meaningfully in their analysis, the foundation for the theory is the same, in the level of importance placed upon economic factors to explain politics and power; while the approach to capital varies, none of these theories posit that groups outside of business or economic interests have any significant amount of influence on the political process. In San Francisco, a city of great wealth with a well- organized business class, structuralism as a framework for the research question at hand is a possibility—particularly growth machine theory since it highlights the role of the rentier class and land-based elites who profit from “place”. Since this thesis narrowly focuses on responsiveness to tenant issues, it is expected that landlords and to some extent real estate interests would be not only highly engaged in the legislative process but also that any decisions made would favor these parties at the expense of tenants, particularly low-income and working class tenants of color. While elements of this theory may resonate with regard to rising rents and a challenging overall climate for renters in San Francisco, in looking at the legislative process and the fact that pro-tenant legislation 13
has been passed by the Board of Supervisors, structuralism cannot solely answer the question posed in this study.
Urban Regime
A critical contribution to urban politics literature, structuralism raised the importance of recognizing economic interests in political decision-making, addressing critiques leveled at pluralists—but for some, neither pluralism nor structuralism could alone answer the questions being posed about urban politics. In an effort to develop an analysis that draws upon the strengths of theories like pluralism, public choice and growth machine, Clarence Stone explores urban regime theory in his 1989 analysis of Atlanta, seeking to create more of a “middle ground” between pluralism and structuralism (Mossberger and Stoker 2001, 812). An analysis that helps answer questions like that of the responsiveness of local elected officials, urban regime theory moved beyond the simplistic arguments that either interest groups or economic factors can explain urban governance; rather, Stone and other urban regime theorists sought to marry the two theories in a more comprehensive analysis of local politics. Grounded in a political economy viewpoint, Stone defined an urban regime as “the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions” (Stone 1989, 6). Rejecting both pluralist and structuralist assumptions that either the government is capable of governing entirely on its own or that policy is dependent solely on private business interests, Stone argued that urban regime required coalition-building and coordination order to build the “power to” accomplish particular goals, rather than wield “power over” any particular group or constituency. For Stone, urban regimes are about the creation of a governing coalition that is “empowered” to move forward an agenda; to this end, he introduced a social-production model that he argues is a step beyond the social control 14
models often found in urban politics. Drawing upon his own prior work and that of Stephen Elkin, Stone writes:
Urban regime theory takes as given a liberal political economy, one that combines two conditions. One is a set of government institutions controlled to an important degree by popularly elected officials chosen in open and competitive contests and operating within a larger context of the free expression of competing ideas and claims. Second, the economy of a liberal order is guided mainly, but not exclusively, by privately controlled investment decisions. A regime, whether national or local, is a set of arrangements by which this division of labor is bridged (Stone 1993,2).
According to Mossberger and Stoker, “Regime analysis views power as fragmented and regimes as the collaborative relationships through which local governments and private actors assemble the capacity to govern” (2001, 812). They argue that this is due to a division of labor between the state and the private market (Mossberger and Stoker 2001, Elkin 1987). Stone introduced four types: the maintenance or caretaker regime; the development regime; the middle-class progressive regime; and the lower-class opportunity expansion regime. In all of these models, he places private business front and center; as other urban regime theorists have argued, in a capitalist context where there is a separation of powers between the state and private business, collaboration becomes necessary between the two groups in order to govern. Finally, Stone asserts that under urban regime theory, these governing coalitions are not guaranteed to sustain—they require maintenance and cultivation and compromise. Here again Stone pulls upon pluralism for his theoretical framework. He argues that progressive challenges to a development regime have an uphill battle to fight since they must gain the support of a substantial number of the public, particularly those with financial resources. Progressives can’t simply dismantle the old regime, according to Stone; they must build a new one that has the resources and power to govern. 15
Recent scholarly work has also focused on the extent to which populations often on the outskirts of urban regimes— such as communities of color, low-income people, immigrants, non-profits and labor unions—are able to access power for their own agendas (Camou 2014, Jones-Correa and Wong 2015). While Stone sees a “lower class opportunity expansion regime” as unlikely to emerge, examples of bottom-up community and labor power-building for social change in Los Angeles, New York City and Detroit are pointed to as a critique to Stone’s original rigid urban regime framework. San Francisco too has many examples of efforts to build power for low-income communities and other disenfranchised populations, including many of the groups who have been involved in tenant advocacy and helped contribute to the responsiveness of the Board of Supervisors to these issues. Whether these groups have been able to build the power to govern, however, is a question very much at the heart of this thesis. Much of the literature on urban regimes has honed in on the relationship between the public and private sectors and how those relationships facilitate urban governance. H.V. Savitch and John Clayton Thomas (1991) developed four “ideal types” of regime, designed to explain various scales of arrangements between elites in the political and economic realms. The four categories are “corporatist” (strong political and business leadership), “elitist” (weak political leadership and strong business leadership), “pluralist” (strong political leadership and weak business leadership), and “hyperpluralist” (weak political and business leadership). The authors argue that across the country during the time period of publication, cities were transitioning from corporatist and elitist regimes to pluralist and hyperpluralist regimes, increasing fragmentation as more interests jockey for power, negatively impacting the ability to govern at a local level. Finally, in the almost 30 years since the publication of Stone’s Regime Politics, he and others began to explore another framework inspired by American political development scholars (Orren and Skowronek 1996, Rast 2015, Stone 2015). Rather than urban regimes, Stone and others explore a new model, the urban political order, which 16
can better explain the occurrence of political change. Urban political orders are, like urban regimes, governing arrangements but designed to capture the unique set of relationships and activities from one historical period to another. In particular, the question of what drives change from one governing coalition to the next is not answered by urban regime theory, admits Stone. But American political development scholars like Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek go even further, arguing that urban regime theory assumes “equilibrium and order as the normal state of affairs” (Rast 2015, 139). To the contrary, Orren and Skowronek (1996) reason that in fact it is “intercurrence”—disorder and conflict—particularly among institutions, that is the norm within political orders, and a primary cause of political change. Richard DeLeon (1992) also seeks to blend both pluralist and structuralist theoretical frameworks as he expands upon Stone’s work in his analysis of San Francisco between 1975 and 1991. In Left Coast City, he argues that local elected leaders, constrained by the limits of capitalism, a federal system, and an increasingly diverse populace, need to build coalitions outside of the state in order to govern—and it is through an urban regime that these leaders can transcend these limitations. DeLeon’s central question is whether or not progressivism can survive in San Francisco; he argues that the answer lies in the successful development of a progressive urban regime. While Stone describes four types of regimes, DeLeon hones in on two existing regimes in San Francisco: the first is what he calls a “progrowth regime”, and the other, is what he refers to as an “antiregime”. Here he explains the progrowth regime:
The city’s function would be to provide the physical and social means of capitalist production and accumulation within a global division of labor. The progrowth regime became the authors of the city’s vision, architect of its plans, and source of its power to get things done (DeLeon 1992, 40).
He argues that the progrowth regime in San Francisco had to be actively built, and that for many years those interest groups in support of growth and development did not 17
actually have the political power and unified coalition required to accomplish said goal. Urban renewal of the 1950s (and the anti-growth resistance it faced) helped pave the way for a progrowth regime to be constructed towards the end of that decade, which according to DeLeon was in power for a quarter of a century before a progressive coalition challenged its power and the direction of the city, which he called the antiregime. This antiregime, according to DeLeon, was effective not at building the power to get things done, but at blocking the progrowth’s regime ability to. It has been able to impose limits on the market but has not been capable of coalescing its resources to move forward a progressive agenda. DeLeon draws upon Stone’s middle-class progressive regime model in his analysis of San Francisco. He posits that progressivism in the city by the Bay is a composite of “three distinct leftist ideologies”, those being liberalism, environmentalism, and populism, represented by middle-class environmentalists, neighborhood populists, and working-class liberals. DeLeon goes on to describe San Francisco as a hyperpluralist city with no majority, and it is this argument that provides the foundation for his antiregime model. Regime theorists don’t believe a city will necessarily always have a regime—but urban regimes are created to govern effectively and to advance a particular ideological agenda. DeLeon’s critique of the antiregime is summed up in his description below:
The antiregime is a defensive system of governance designed to block and filter big business power and to protect the city’s environment, historical buildings, small businesses, neighborhood communities, and quality of life from unregulated market forces and grandiose progrowth schemes. It is a regime antithetical to large-scale development, high-rise construction, and strategic functioning as a corporate headquarters city. It is a regime that rejects money and materialism as the taproot of urban meaning. It is a regime, in short, that protects community from capital (DeLeon 11). 18
As the protection of community from capital is at the core of the urban antiregime, the antiregime’s strength is in saying “no” and placing limits on capital’s ability to cause harm to the public interest. That means that the policies, developments or ballot measures that are passed are less damaging than they might have been, had the antiregime not been in place; on the other hand, the antiregime is reactionary and stagnant, unified only in its ability to fight against capital but inhibited in its efforts to develop a positive progressive agenda and advance beyond the status quo. DeLeon published Left Coast City in 1992, and in the 25 years since, San Francisco has seen some changes— and some things have remained true to his analysis. Progressivism remains a middle-class phenomenon and as the city becomes increasingly white, so has the face of the progressive coalition, a weakness that their opponents have in recent years worked to exploit. At the time of DeLeon’s writing, the Democratic Party was not much of a force in local politics but that has changed; an endorsement from the local Democratic County Central Committee will provide a significant boost in credibility and name recognition for a candidate. The African American community has left the city in droves and the Asian community has grown considerably; for both groups their numbers closely correspond with their amount of political power at City Hall and beyond. Labor unions are still very active but the number of members who live and vote in San Francisco is shrinking, impacting their ability to flex power during elections or policy fights; and the technology sector in San Francisco is booming, contributing to an influx of more than 100,000 new residents in the city—contrary to DeLeon’s belief that, “San Francisco’s scant 46.4 miles are unlikely to accommodate many more people in the decades ahead” (DeLeon 1992, 14). Indeed, this is precisely the battle at the core of SF politics in the current moment. Using Savitch and Thomas’ four ideal regime types, DeLeon describes the state of San Francisco in the early 1990’s: “weak political leadership and a dispersed business elite” (DeLeon 1992, 135). The conditions of 2017 however vary greatly from that moment, with thanks perhaps to the political leadership of the likes of Steve Kawa, set to 19
retire this year. Kawa, the current Chief of Staff to Mayor Ed Lee, also played that role for Mayor Gavin Newsom and was groomed for the role as a top aide to Mayor Willie Brown. Upon news of his retirement, the SF Examiner reported, “Political consultant Jim Ross said in September that City Hall operated largely on relationships and that over the years Kawa has forged many of those” (Sabatini 2017). To Ross’ point, Kawa, though not alone, has been instrumental in building the “corporatist” urban regime in place today: a strong coalition of political leaders, business leaders, and more conservative labor unions (Palomino 2015, Knight and Cote 2014, Sabatini 2017, Matier & Ross 2017). DeLeon wrote, “Of all the people who make the machinery work, no one matters more than the mayor,” an absolute truth for a mayor-strong city like San Francisco (1993, 106). The Mayor appoints the vast majority of city department heads (with the exception of those elected, like the District Attorney, Public Defender, Sheriff, etc.) and appoints at least half if not the entirety of most commissions in San Francisco (ie: Planning Commission, MTA Board of Directors, Police Commission, etc.). The Mayor is not necessarily a publicly accessible figure in San Francisco; mayors, in contrast to the Board of Supervisors, are not required by the city charter to hold public meetings. The Board of Supervisors however, is a district-elected body, representing both neighborhoods and the city as a whole in their weekly public meetings where individuals can attend and make their voices heard directly to members of the Board. Since the publication of DeLeon’s Left Coast City, there has been a reemergence of a progrowth urban regime in San Francisco, seen if one gazes out over the crane- ridden skyline, or takes a look at some of the major projects moving forward under Mayors Gavin Newsom or Edwin Lee (California Pacific Medical Center, America’s Cup, Golden State Warriors, Lennar’s redevelopment in Bayview, etc.). However, when it comes to tenant-related legislation in San Francisco, the picture is less clear. In some ways, no legislation is good legislation for the rentier class like landlords and real estate interests, because that would amount to less regulation of the private housing market; but 20
we have indeed seen tenant legislation introduced and passed at the Board. Members of the Board of Supervisors, as previously noted, are more accessible to a broader group of constituents, since they are elected by districts and therefore have some place-based accountability to their constituents (whether they be tenants or landlords), as well as the fact that they hold public meetings where public comment is allowed. For this reason, I think we will see that both tenant groups and rentier groups have a significant amount of political access to the Board of Supervisors, whereas if we compared that to the Mayor’s office, we may not see the same kind of balance in accessibility equally for both groups. What Harvey Molotoch refers to as the “rentier class” commits tens of thousands of dollars every year to lobby elected officials on key issues, and they spend much more on candidate campaigns. San Francisco urban policy is influenced not only by local politicians, and the market—mostly out of the control of local politicians— but also indirectly by the groups that these local politicians may feel accountable to. While much of the housing market cannot be controlled locally, local urban policy does play a role in regulating the rental market, and there are efforts from both the rentier class and from tenant advocates to advance their policy agenda. And in San Francisco, the Board of Supervisors is ground zero. While a progrowth and corporatist urban regime is in place governing from City Hall—in particular the Mayor’s office— the antiregime that DeLeon documented in 1992 is not in power today. That is not to say that a progressive coalition does not exist, but such a coalition has had more success at the Board of Supervisors where it has been able to make inroads with regards to policy between 2001 and 2016, rather than being able to govern from the Mayor’s office. For those reasons, the Board of Supervisors has been a primary site of struggle between progrowth and slow-growth factions, perhaps even more so since the reemergence of district elections in 2000. While not a governing regime, the progressive coalition that DeLeon describes is still in place and continues to share many of the characteristics that he recognized in Left Coast City. This coalition continues to be 21
defensive rather than visionary, and lacks a strong analysis of race and class, rather its leadership tends to be middle-class and white. Progressives are fighting an increasing number of steep uphill battles against capital with their hands tied both by state and federal limitations, and a progrowth Mayor often in opposition to their goals. The coalition puts much emphasis on electing individual members of the Board of Supervisors towards a progressive majority, but the policy work that happens once they elected can be reactionary or short-sighted, and voters are sometimes disappointed by those they work to elect. The progressive coalition is struggling to build capacity while the city hemorrhages their working class base of political support; as the economic divide grows, the coalition is forced to respond to increasing crises for more communities. However, there has been deep work done to build more community-labor coalitions in recent years, and new organizations are asserting the leadership of communities of color into the progressive coalition. DeLeon’s accuracy in describing the progressive coalition’s positioning and ability to govern, 25 years after publication, was striking. What he misses however, is a more structuralist analysis. While his assessment of the progressive coalition in San Francisco rings true, he explains the lack of ability to govern by using the antiregime model by arguing that the progressive coalition is too divided, short-sighted, and reactionary to be successful. If the coalition wants to govern, DeLeon says, it must move beyond too-limited neighborhoods and too-broad regional nature of its policy fights. It must reconcile the tensions between its internal materialist and post-materialist principles. And the progressive coalition, argues DeLeon, must address the need for an economic base to support progressive goals, and identify a model for both governance and public democratic participation. All of these solutions presented by DeLeon are elements in the control of progressives, while reality reflects many factors that are simply out of their hands. Can it be possible, if not likely, that the central reason that the progressive coalition has not been able to transition from an antiregime to a functioning urban regime—not only in the 16 years included in his study, or in the 25 years since, or 22
ever— is itself capital? DeLeon acknowledges the antiregime’s goal to protect community from capital, but missing is an analysis of the obstacles that capital imposes, and the ways in which the political economy of San Francisco, that sets the conditions for urban regimes, is driven by capital. I argue that Delon’s analysis could benefit from the incorporation of a structuralist analysis, particularly growth machine theory. While many aspects of his critique hold true, excluding an analysis of the role capital plays in undermining the power-building efforts of the progressive coalition is a major oversight. Even with its limitations, DeLeon’s analysis provides a strong basis for this thesis, as it is an examination of groups attempting to influence the legislative process, and build a coalition with enough shared interest and collective power to advance a pro-tenant agenda in San Francisco.
Democratic Responsiveness
Finally, democratic responsiveness theory offers another analysis to explain the research question posed here regarding the responsiveness of San Francisco elected officials to tenant issues. Often drawing upon a pluralist foundation, a significant amount of literature within American politics looks at parties, public opinion and the responsiveness of U.S. elected officials to constituents and voters. Primary among the responsiveness literature is that of the “electoral incentive”, coined by David Mayhew (1974). Mayhew’s seminal work, Congress: The Electoral Connection, explores the motivations for the actions taken by members of Congress. He draws upon Richard Fenno’s 1973 work in highlighting three primary aims of politicians, being that of reelection, gaining influence, and accomplishing good public policy; while there are three, the priority is overwhelmingly the ability to be reelected, or elected to higher office (Mayhew 1974, 16). Mayhew and other theorists looking at the political choices of elected officials see upcoming elections and external public pressure as a primary driver of policy decisions. Mayhew makes a case that for elected officials (in this case, 23
Congress), there is universality in the goal of being reelected to office and furthering one’s political career; thus, being responsive to voters is in the self-interest of most elected officials who would like to keep their jobs. For members of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors in particular, who are elected by districts, this analysis can explain, at least in part, the level of responsiveness to tenant issues. Building upon the “electoral incentive”, more recent responsiveness literature has found a positive association between voter and constituent preferences and the policy outcomes in municipal governments (Einstein and Kogan 2016; Percival, Johnson and Nieman 2009; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014; Ybarra and Krebs 2016). Vickie Ybarra and Timothy Krebs, in their study of policy responsiveness at a local level with regards to smoke-free policies, found “support for the hypotheses concerning democratic responsiveness” (2016, 15). In particular, the authors used public opinion surveys to measure the political preferences of county residents and identified a positive association between resident preferences and policy choices, indicating that elected officials prioritized responsiveness to their constituents. Chris Tausanovitch and Christopher Warshaw also found that municipalities’ policy choices were closely aligned with the national political preferences of citizens on a liberal-conservative scale (2014). Katherine Levine Einstein and Vladimir Kogan’s study focused on redistributive spending and local fiscal policy, finding that voter preferences in particular are influential for policy decisions in local government. The authors also found that “broader competitive and intergovernmental forces constrain local responsiveness,” of interest as it relates to public choice and structuralism. Overall though they find that “cities are mindful of competitive pressures but can and often do successfully overcome external constraints to respond to the needs and wants of their constituents” (2016, 5). Their findings indicate a high level of responsiveness from local elected officials, even to the point of prioritizing the desire of voters over external economic limits; again, their findings can help explain some part of the responsiveness from local elected officials in San Francisco. 24
Also focused on fiscal policy, Zoltan L. Hajnal and Jessica Trounstine (2010) look at local spending to test responsiveness, making an assessment of local government spending based on public choice categories—redistributive, allocational, or developmental. The authors found wide variation in how cities allocate funding in each of these categories, largely influenced by local partisan politics; the more Democratic a municipality was in terms of voter preferences, the more redistributive its spending was. Ultimately, a central conclusion from the authors was that “local government budgets are a function of a complex interplay of politics, economics, institutions, and basic needs” (Hajnal and Trounstine 2010, 1154). In a Democratic bastion like San Francisco, this finding is particularly relevant, and show a significant level of responsiveness of local elected officials to voters’ priorities. Elizabeth Gerber and Daniel Hopkins found that the partisanship of mayors did have some impact on local fiscal policy, but that the considerable constraints from the state and federal governments restricted much autonomy and led to a relatively status quo budget (2011). A study from Garrick Percival, Martin Johnson and Max Neiman (2009) also builds upon a public choice model but points out that very little literature exists that explores the relationship between ideology and public policy at a local level. For their research, they relied upon a state field poll to measure the relationship between this measurement of ideology and the county-level spending across several policy categories. Similar to the findings of Hajnal and Trounstine, these authors found a positive relationship between ideology and redistributive policy, but also found that the results varied by county. “Taken as a whole,” the authors concluded, “we show that under the right political and structural conditions, there is still room for local politics to influence policy choices at the local level of government” (Percival et al. 2009, 175). While their findings were not as definitive as some of the other studies described above, they did find a level of responsiveness to constituent preferences and did conclude that politics do indeed matter. 25
Other democratic responsiveness literature found that race and ethnicity and other demographic factors were in fact an influence in the allocation of public goods, or at the very least, the perception of such. Jessica Trounstine (2015) found that municipalities segregated by race spent less funding on public goods, perhaps because those localities being more “racially polarized” are less likely to “generate policy consensus”, and therefore allocate less resources to the public (Trounstine 2015, 12). Zoltan Hajnal and Jessica Trounstine authored a study together in 2013 finding that certain groups, namely “racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, and liberals” were less satisfied with local policy outcomes and saw the local government as less responsive (Hajnal and Trounstine 2013, 56). In comparison, economically privileged, conservative, white residents were more likely to feel well represented by their local elected officials and the democratic process. While race and ethnicity is not at the center of this study, understanding that people of color and low-income people are more likely to be tenants does make this literature relevant, as this thesis examines responsiveness to overall tenant issues. And as their study look at income levels and responsiveness, this study helps provide grounding for the development of hypotheses regarding economic conditions. Journalists, political scientists and advocates have all pointed to a widening gap in the United States with regard to income, education and wealth over the past several decades (Cohen 2014). Larry Bartels has written at length about the implications of that economic inequality for our democracy and political process, given that economic inequality is linked to political inequality (2008). Bartels explores the role of economic inequality and how it can prohibit the public from having an influence in the political process. In his influential work Unequal Democracy he provides a comprehensive argument for not only the ways in which economic inequality impacts democratic politics, but that “politics also profoundly shapes economics” (Bartels 2008, 2). He argues that economic inequality has been intensifying in the United States over time, and provides a series of case studies demonstrating how this inequality impacts whose voices are heard in the political process. 26
A similar analysis comes from scholars Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page, who explore four possible families of pluralist theory to explain who has the greatest influence on policy: majoritarian electoral democracy; economic elite domination; majoritarian pluralism; and biased pluralism (2014). In terms of actors, they examine the influence of the average citizen, economic elites, mass-based interest groups, and business-oriented interest groups. They find evidence to support economic elite domination theory and biased pluralism theory, arguing that “economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence” (Gilens and Page 2014, 3). This literature focused on the intersection between economic inequality and access to political power does well to help frame a responsiveness framework for this study.
Theoretical Framework
Urban regime theory will provide a foundation for much of this thesis, including the development of hypotheses below. A theory blending pluralist and structuralist ideas, urban regime allows for the acknowledgement of a progrowth regime in San Francisco during the time period included in this study, as well as a progressive coalition that has been able to access power at the Board of Supervisors in order to advance key aspects of a tenant policy agenda. This progressive coalition includes several different stakeholder groups, such as tenant rights advocacy organizations, progressive organized labor unions, more left-leaning racial and economic justice non-profits, environmentalists, and neighborhood preservationists, who have unified around a shared ideology and particular political goals. While this coalition may not have an opening to the Mayor’s office and the progrowth regime in San Francisco, they have been able to access power through the Board of Supervisors to accomplish some of their goals, particularly in the realm of tenant legislation. 27
While largely influenced by the urban regime literature as well as biased pluralism, this thesis will be also drawing upon the above democratic responsiveness literature to test the factors that lead to a greater level of responsiveness from these district-elected representatives. A responsiveness framework will allow for an analysis of how elected representatives on the Board of Supervisors respond to key political factors like endorsements, and upcoming elections, as well as economic factors like increases in median rent and rising evictions, that could indirectly influence public opinion. In the following pages, this thesis explores what leads to greater responsiveness in local government. Specifically, what leads to greater responsiveness from the San Francisco Board of Supervisors to address tenant issues, concluding in the introduction and passage of tenant legislation? I have four hypotheses that follow, based on the literature review above; the first two are focused on political conditions, and the second two on economic conditions. The first two hypotheses are both grounded in the democratic responsiveness literature. Elections have been studied extensively in political science, yielding consistent results that point to elections being a primary driver for policy choice among elected officials. To be clear, those studies have largely been focused on the U.S. Congress where there are no term limits and thus more consistency in being able to measure reelection races as a factor in responsiveness. At a local level, with term limits, using elections as a measurement may require more nuance. Regardless, the role that elections play is an important one and will be included as a factor in this study. Directly linked to elections but a factor that has been less studied, particularly at a local level, is endorsements. Generally to win elections, a candidate needs fundraising capacity, some existing name recognition, and endorsements from groups and individuals who inspire confidence from voters. In San Francisco there are many endorsing bodies, including the following among some of the more influential: the San Francisco Democratic Party; the San Francisco Labor Council; the teacher and nurses unions; the police and firefighter unions; the Sierra Club; and major newspapers like the SF 28
Chronicle, SF Examiner, ethnic press, etc. For those voters looking for guidance on tenant issues, historically it has been the San Francisco Tenants Union. While the presence of an upcoming election is indeed an important factor for study, so are the political and policy inclinations of elected officials currently serving in office. I choose to define these inclinations through endorsements for two reasons: 1) If a candidate was endorsed by the SF Tenants Union as a “pro-tenant” candidate, that candidate was likely running on a platform that included being responsive to tenant issues; and 2) Connected to elections as a factor, if such a candidate wants to run for reelection and/or higher office, endorsements can serve as an accountability mechanism to ensure candidates, when elected, keep their campaign promises. Thus, I present my first two hypotheses relating to political conditions and responsiveness:
HI. Responsiveness to tenant issues at the SF Board o f Supervisors is associated with the number o f “pro-tenant ” endorsed members on the Board.
H2. Responsiveness to tenant issues at the SF Board o f Supervisors is associated with an upcoming district election.
The structuralism literature, as well as literature grounded in economic inequality and responsiveness like biased pluralism or Hajnal and Trounstine’s work, is also important for the development of the next two hypotheses. San Francisco, like the rest of the United States, reflects deep economic inequality; there are many poor and low- income people in the city and evictions happen every year. Additionally, San Francisco is a city where many people desire to live and since its founding the city has been a place that attracts newcomers. In more recent years, many of those newcomers have the ability to pay more in rent; that combined with increasing demand has driven up rents in the city. While poor and low-income people have often struggled with rent and evictions, an increase in these factors indicates a greater number of people being impacted, including a 29
more middle-class base. Biased pluralism and the literature on responsiveness based on demographics might privilege predict greater responsiveness to tenant issues if it negatively impacted residents with more economic privilege. Based on this theoretical grounding, I present two economic conditions hypotheses that as rents and evictions increase and impact a greater number of San Franciscans, the Board’s responsiveness to tenant issues will grow:
H3. Responsiveness to tenant issues at the SF Board o f Supervisors is associated with an increase in the annual rate o f change for median rent.
H4. Responsiveness to tenant issues at the SF Board o f Supervisors is associated with an increase in the annual rate o f change for evictions.
These hypotheses and the underlying assumptions for each are explained in more detail in the following section. 30
Chapter 2: Data and Methods
The following pages present a small-n study analyzing the following research question: What political and economic factors increase the San Francisco Board o f Supervisors ’ responsiveness regarding tenant issues, leading to the introduction and passage o f tenant legislation? This study focuses on tenant legislation (ordinances only) that have been successfully passed into law between 2001 and 2016, in three specific categories: rent control; eviction protections; and condominium conversions. For those interested in tenant rights and the political process in San Francisco, this thesis offers a developed analysis of the conditions necessary to successfully pass pro-tenant legislation at the Board of Supervisors. In order to study the responsiveness of the Board of Supervisors to tenant issues, I have identified two measurements: (1) the volume of tenant legislation introduced by the Board; and (2) the volume of tenant legislation passed into law by the Board. This study will examine the impact of two political conditions and two economic conditions on the Board’s responsiveness: (a) the number of “pro-tenant” members on the Board of Supervisors; (b) the presence of an upcoming district election; (c) an increase in the annual rate of change in evictions; and (d) an increase in the annual rate of change in median rent. For the purposes of a quantitative analysis, the San Francisco legislative process is simplified here, while in reality it can be quite complicated. Each ordinance introduced is unique, as is the political landscape at the time, and the surrounding circumstances. The following pages present a quantitative analysis of 48 tenant-related ordinances and the political and economic factors that may impact the number of ordinances introduced and passed, while also acknowledging the complex nature of the legislative process in San Francisco.
Responsiveness 31
The democratic responsiveness literature explored in detail earlier focused on the ways in which elected officials, particularly those at a local level, responded to the pressure of elections or voter or constituent preferences. Often in those studies responsiveness was measured by policy choice or fiscal allocations (ref). In this study of responsiveness regarding tenant issues, responsiveness will be defined by the introduction and passage of tenant legislation into law. There is a difference in the two measurements of responsiveness, specifically with regards to the level of leadership or risk taken. The first, introduction of tenant ordinances, will measure the responsiveness of the Board of Supervisors to tenant issues, as measured by the willingness of Board members to draft new or amend existing legislation. The second, ordinances that are passed into law, will measure the responsiveness of City Hall more broadly, since passage requires not only a majority of the Board of Supervisors, but also the Mayor who has a role in whether or not an ordinance ultimately becomes law. Additionally, while the second measurement, passage of tenant legislation into law, requires of each member of the Board a vote, the first measurement, introduction of tenant legislation, requires of the sponsor(s) a greater level of investment in the issue (for example, staff time, press attention, etc.). Both are important signifiers of the support and the responsiveness of the Board to tenant issues, but this distinction is also important to note.
Understanding Legislation at the Board of Supervisors
There are several categories of legislation introduced at the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, ranging from charter amendments, which need approval by the voters of San Francisco, to hearings on which there is no action taken except to either continue or file the hearing, once completed. This analysis is focused on ordinances, as they represent binding law being considered by the Board of Supervisors. 32
Just as Supervisors may be inclined to introduce “symbolic” legislation in anticipation of an upcoming election or other external pressures, Supervisors may be disinclined to introduce legislation that they think does not have a chance of gaining support from a majority of members on the Board. In this study, while prohibitive concerns about viability of a possible ordinance may not be visible as a factor, what will be seen is whether responsiveness to tenants takes precedence over other considerations. Of those ordinances that are introduced, many in fact do not make it through the full legislative process. There are several ways that legislation can fail at the SF Board of Supervisors. “Filed” ordinances are those that do not even make it to committee; they are filed after 6 months if they are not scheduled. This happens for a range of reasons but is often up to the primary sponsor of the ordinance. An ordinance could be filed for any of the following reasons: the city attorney issued a cautionary memo against the legislation; the sponsor assesses that the ordinance doesn’t have the votes; the issue that the ordinance is meant to address is resolved through other means; the purpose was apply political pressure and then the ordinance is no longer needed; or it “gets lost in the shuffle”, as a former Supervisor Eric Mar legislative aide told me, meaning that other priorities took precedence. “Killed” ordinances are those that are tabled indefinitely at committee, in which case after six months of inaction, it is marked as killed by the Clerk of the Board. If tabled at committee, an ordinance, with the political will of a majority of the Board, could be called from committee to the full Board for consideration and a vote—but again, a majority is necessary, and it must happen within six months. An ordinance can “fail” if it does not secure a majority vote of the full Board of Supervisors once passed out of committee, regardless of the committee recommendation. Finally, an ordinance can also fail if a majority, but not a super-majority, of the Board of Supervisors votes for it, and the Mayor chooses to veto it. It requires a simple majority (six votes) to pass legislation at the Board, but requires eight votes to supersede a mayoral veto. Without that veto- proof majority, the Board of Supervisors cannot prevent a Mayor from vetoing an 33
ordinance. If the Mayor vetoes the ordinance and the Board does not have a super majority, the ordinance is killed. Of the 48 ordinances in this study: 22 were passed and approved by the Mayor; three were passed without the Mayor’s approval; 15 were filed; seven were killed; and one is still pending committee action. By “passed into law”, I mean that the ordinance did not fail, and was not filed or killed. While the focus of this study is on the Board of Supervisors, it is necessary to include a brief statement on the role of the Mayor in San Francisco public policy. Above, I discuss the Mayor’s veto power if the Board has less than eight votes in support of a particular ordinance. The Mayor has thirty days to veto an ordinance should he please. If he takes no action (either to sign it into law or veto it) within that time frame, the ordinance becomes law without his signature, signifying a lack of support but not active opposition. My analysis is focused on the Board of Supervisors but “passage into law” does take into account the role of the Mayor of San Francisco. I do my best in the following pages to acknowledge when the Mayor plays a significant part (through veto, for instance) in the passage or failure of a particular ordinance, but it’s important that readers understand that the role of the Mayor is assumed to some extent in the language of “passage into law”. Hundreds of ordinances are introduced at the Board of Supervisors each year on a range of policy issues and city business. A brief survey of ordinances introduced at the Board in the year 2000 reveals ordinances on lawsuit settlements, historic landmark designation, special use districts, regulation of firearms, zoning maps, and regulation of massage establishments. In contrast, the number of ordinances with the word “tenant” in them introduced that year was miniscule; a mere four tenant ordinances were introduced at the Board of Supervisors that year. 34
Defining Tenant Legislation
Of course legislation having an impact on the lives of tenants may not always have the word “tenant” in them. I define “tenant legislation” as those ordinances that relate to tenants in one of the following three categories: rent control; eviction protection; and condo conversions. Specifically, I include and track ordinances included in the query results for the terms “eviction”, “rent control”, and “condominium conversion” through Legistar, the legislative database used by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors (see Appendix B). Between 2001 and 2016, there were a total of 48 tenant ordinances introduced: rent control (6); eviction protections (13); and condo conversions (29). I conducted several queries through the Legistar database to assess the terms that would yield the most relevant results, and confirmed that the results of the above search terms were indeed comprehensive. To create the definition for tenant legislation, I reached out to longtime tenant activists and organizers, as well as Board of Supervisors offices for guidance (Fieber, Marti, Mormino, Pagoulatos, Redmond, and Smooke 2016-2017). Through those discussions and my own research, I created the parameters for “tenant legislation”: ordinances introduced at the Board having to do with rent control, evictions, or condominium conversions. These three categories were chosen because they include the issues upon which tenant groups were likely to take clear positions in support or opposition, or there were substantive differences between tenant advocacy groups and landlord advocacy groups. As background for the three legislative categories chosen, the next section explains some context for rent control, condominium conversions and evictions. Rent control was enacted in San Francisco in 1979 as the emergency Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance, in an effort to stabilize rising rents and the impact on low- and moderate-income tenants. San Francisco is one of the few cities in the country that has its own rent control ordinance. Thanks to the efforts of tenant advocates, 35
rent control exists for approximately 173,000 rental units in the city, a number that is approximately 6,000 smaller than a decade ago according to the SF Rent Board (Dudnick 2015). According to a historical account published by the San Francisco Apartment Association, the combined factors responsible for the passage of this ordinance included: increasing condominium conversions in the 1970s; statewide momentum building on the passage of Prop 13 (a California property tax freeze); and far-reaching rent hikes from the Trinity property management company, impacting a more vocal middle-class renter base in the city. Additionally: “Long controlled by a generally pro-growth conservative political apparatus, despite large numbers of tenants, the switch to district elections in 1976 had much to do with the city’s inability to resist rent control. With it came no less than four progressive supervisors, including Jim Gonzales and Harry Britt, who began to forge a tenant-based coalition...” (Forbes and Sheridan 2004). Board of Supervisors members unanimously voted for the emergency rent stabilization ordinance (following a temporary rent freeze passed by 8 of the 11 Supervisors 2 months prior) and then-Mayor Dianne Feinstein signed the legislation into law. While the rent control ordinance in San Francisco still stands (and other municipalities have since, even recently, enacted their own rent control measures), any expansion of rental control is now largely governed—or limited— at the state level. In 1995 the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act was passed in Sacramento, limiting the power of local governments to strengthen rent control ordinances or impose vacancy controls. Thus, there have been some, though limited, ordinances relating to rent control in San Francisco—although politically the protection of rent control is often part of a platform in Supervisor races. Costa-Hawkins was updated in 2001 to include condominiums, as a growing trend of conversion from apartments to condos have allowed landlords to circumvent rent control laws. In San Francisco, condo conversions have been a site of conflict for tenant activists and their allies as rent controlled units can be converted to condos leading to the eviction of tenants and a reduction in rent controlled units; thus, a significant amount of 36
legislation has been introduced as a means of further regulating this particular housing stock. Very much related to tenant evictions is the Ellis Act, a state-wide ballot measure that was passed in 1985. The law allows landlords to evict tenants in order to “go out of business” and is largely seen by tenant groups as a way for landlords to circumvent rent control, convert units to condos, and sell them as “tenancy-in-common” units. While state law limits the powers of local bodies to impact law relating to tenants, San Francisco has been ground zero for much of the work to protect tenants and is seen as a model for cities across the state and country aiming to strengthen tenant rights. The three categories of rent control, condo conversions and eviction protections are closely linked and their intersections are where tenant activists see the need for stronger legislation. Therefore these three categories are the parameters used to identify relevant tenant legislation. Aside from the 48 ordinances that are the focus of this study, in Chapter 5 I will briefly discuss a fourth emerging category of tenant legislation. The short-term rentals market, often associated with the company Airbnb, are a relatively recent phenomenon and no legislation was introduced at the Board of Supervisors until 2014. Because this is a recent trend and cannot be captured in the same way as the other three legislative categories during that fifteen-year period, I am not including short-term rental ordinances in my expansive analysis but in Chapter 6 have included a brief discussion and suggestions for future analysis. There are other means by which tenant organizations and advocacy groups have been able to advance their agenda, outside of the legislative process described here, and that is through the budget process. The budget is a document that is passed by the Board of Supervisors and signed into law by the Mayor, and certainly it does include funding for tenant counseling, know-your-rights tenant workshops, and legal defense for renters. In fact, groups like SF Tenants Union and beyond have fought hard for some of these things to be included in the city budget over the years. But the process to expand funding for these kinds of services—which arguably do have a tangible impact on the lives of 37
tenants who are being threatened with a wrongful eviction, for instance—is quite different from that of introducing and passing an ordinance at the Board of Supervisors. The timeline is much longer, the Mayor has a larger role, and the steps are more complicated. For this reason I will not be including the budget process in my study, although that may be a place for further study in the future. Finally, it’s important to recognize that “tenant legislation” is not synonymous with “pro-tenant” as defined by support from the San Francisco Tenants Union. In fact, some of the ordinances included here have seen vehement opposition from SFTU. The definition used is simply to identify ordinances that are seen to have an impact on tenants. This may have an impact on the results to be explained in the next section.
Elected Power in San Francisco’s City Hall
In San Francisco, the central decision-makers (sometimes referred to as “the first face of power” in political science) are the Mayor and the Board of Supervisors, each of whom are elected by the voters of San Francisco and held to a maximum of two consecutive four-year terms. Electing the Mayor requires a citywide election, but the Board of Supervisors is currently elected not at-large but rather by district. That was not always the case; the city had always held at-large (citywide) elections for the Board of Supervisors until a proposal for district elections was passed by the voters and implemented for the first time in 1977 (SPUR 2000). A short three years later following the assassinations of Supervisor Harvey Milk and Mayor George Moscone by former Supervisor Dan White, district elections were argued to be divisive and were then repealed by a very close vote at the ballot box. From 1980 to 2000, the Board of Supervisors was again elected citywide, until in 1996, district elections were again approved by voters and implemented in the November 2000 race. Proponents for district elections claim that the model allows the city to elect leaders who will be more directly accountable to and representative of the voters and 38
residents of San Francisco based on their districts, and provides the opportunity for non business elite candidates to run, since the number of votes needed and therefore the amount of money required to reach voters is significantly less than in a citywide race. And arguably, under district elections, non-business progressive candidates have a better chance of being elected— and they have taken advantage of the opportunity . In 2000 under district elections, progressive Supervisors took the majority of the 11-member Board of Supervisors, providing resistance to the traditionally pro-growth Mayor’s office. In the years since, the political leanings of the Board have been like a pendulum, swinging back and forth between a majority of progressives or moderates. A political majority is important for Supervisors to advance legislation as well as elect a Board President who will support one side’s political agenda and make favorable assignments to Board committees. District elections tend to mark a battle between the progressive and moderate factions of City Hall for the majority vote on the Board of Supervisors. The November 2000 election marked the re-emergence of district, rather than at- large elections, and the candidates sworn into office beginning in 2001 have all been elected through that method. For this study, I honed in on the time period between 2001- 2016 as it coincides with the timeline for district elections in San Francisco and thereby provides a consistent way of measuring endorsements as well as the actions of members of a Board elected by the same model. Analyzing legislation introduced and passed between 2001 and 2016 requires a review of members of Board of Supervisors who were elected—or appointed—between 2000 and 2015. Because the Board of Supervisors is an elected eleven-member body, having consistency in the type of elections used is critical. Prior to November 2000 (with one brief exception 1977-1980), San Francisco held at- large elections for the Board of Supervisors in San Francisco; starting in 2000, district elections for the Board of Supervisors were reinstated and continue today. District elections in San Francisco take place every two years, in the fall of an even-numbered year. The Board seats up for election alternate every two years; for instance, in 2014 the even-numbered districts were up for election, and in 2016 it was the odd-numbered 39
districts. The difference between at-large elections and district elections is an important one, particularly with the number of votes required to win and the amount of financial resources needed to build name recognition and run a viable campaign. Hence, this thesis will narrowly examine this specific time period. The vast majority of the Board of Supervisors at any given time have been elected by the voters of San Francisco. However, during this time period specified, there are a handful of members of the Board who were appointed by the Mayor when a seat has been vacated, usually because the sitting Supervisor has run for and been elected to higher office. Specifically, Mayoral appointees on the Board between 2001-2016 include: Michela Alioto-Pier in 2004 representing District 2; Julie Christensen in 2015 representing District 3; Fiona Ma in 2002 representing District 4; Ed Jew in 2006 representing District 4; Carmen Chu in 2007 representing District 4; Katy Tang in 2013 representing District 4; Christina Olague in 2012 representing District 5; Sean Elsbernd in 2004 representing District 7; and Bevan Dufty in 2002 representing District 8 (Board of Supervisors, “Former Supervisors”). Most of these appointees have been part of the moderate voting blocks on the Board of Supervisors, which speaks to a more important point about political alignment between the Mayor’s office and the more progrowth moderate faction of the Board. While mayors in San Francisco do not cast votes on legislation, they do have significant influence on the political and legislative process. The administrations of Mayors Willie Brown, Gavin Newsom and Edwin Lee (the mayors serving during the specified time period) have all been very sympathetic to business and development in San Francisco—though of course, business is not a monolith and the groupings of private business interests that have benefitted from a governing coalition with the Mayor’s office have shifted over time. It’s possible that a sustained pro-growth governing coalition is due in part to common staffing throughout the three Mayoral administrations, namely Chief of Staff Steve Kawa— although that is a significant amount of power to afford any one individual (Knight and Cote, 2014). The “old money” business dealings of Willie 40
Brown do look substantively different from the “new money” coalition surrounding Ed Lee- i.e. Ron Conway, the tech lobbying group SF Citi, and the relatively recent SF Alliance on Jobs and Sustainable Growth (Williams and Hoge 2003, Lamb 2014). While tenant groups and non-profit organizations representing low and moderate income people have been able to have more access to the Board of Supervisors as a whole, the Mayor’s office and the moderate block of the Board of Supervisors are historically more sympathetic to business interests and the rentier class. The political alignment between the Mayor’s office and moderate members of the Board is well known, as is the discord between his office and progressive Supervisors. In response to the most recent 2016 district races, one of the top Mayoral staffers was quoted saying, “We will have a new board majority that seeks to work with the mayor, not just against him,” (Green 2016). This political landscape should be considered as the Mayor’s role in the legislative process is discussed.
Tenant Ordinances Introduced and Passed at the SF Board of Supervisors
There are hundreds of ordinances introduced and passed each year at the Board of Supervisors, as acknowledged previously, but only a handful introduced that relate specifically to tenants in the categories of rent control, evictions, and condominium conversions. Between the beginning of 2001 and the end of 2016, there were a total of 48 tenant ordinances introduced; that is an average of three each year. Figure 1 shows the volume of tenant ordinances both introduced and passed into law for each year between 2001 and 2016. 41
Figure 1: Tenant Ordinances Introduced & Passed at the SF Board of Supervisors 2001-2016
* Tenant Ordinances Introduced Tenant Ordinances Passed Into Law
Data Source: San Francisco Board of Supervisors (see Appendix)
As shown in Figure 2 below, this study examines three categories of tenant legislation. Between 2001 and 2016, out of a total of 48 tenant ordinances introduced, six were under the category of rent control, thirteen were eviction protection ordinances, and the majority, twenty-nine, were ordinances relating to condominium conversions. 42
Figure 2: Categories of Tenant Ordinances Introduced
■ Rent Control
m Evictions
Condo Conversions
Data Source: San Francisco Board of Supervisors (see Appendix)
With regards to the status of the 48 tenant ordinances introduced at the Board of Supervisors between 2001 and 2016, just over half (25) were passed into law. The majority of those (22) were passed by the Board and signed into law by the Mayor; only three were passed by the Board without the Mayor’s approval, and either the Mayor returned the legislation unsigned (which becomes law if not vetoed within 30 days) or the Mayor vetoed but could not overturn the vote of the Board’s veto-proof majority. The remaining 23 ordinances were either killed or filed during that sixteen year period, with the exception of one ordinance still pending action at the Board as of the writing of this paper. In totality, 15 tenant ordinances were filed, and seven were killed. Table 1 below shows the status of tenant legislation; specifically, for each of the three categories of legislation in this study, the table shows the number of ordinances that were passed with the Mayor’s approval, passed without the Mayor’s approval, filed, killed, or still pending. 43
Table 1: Status of Tenant Ordinances Introduced
Total Rent Eviction Condominium Ordinances Control Protections Conversions by Status
Passed with Mayor's Approval 2 7 13 22 Passed without Mayor's approval 0 0 3 3 Filed 4 3 8 15 Killed 0 2 5 7 Still Pending 0 1 0 1 Total Ordinances by Category 6 13 29 48 Data Source: San Francisco Board of Supervisors (see Appendix)
“Symbolic” Legislation and the Role of the San Francisco Tenants Union in the Legislative Process
Earlier, I presented a definition of tenant ordinances as having an impact on tenants through one of the three following categories: evictions; rent control; and condominium conversions. Of particular note is the point that these ordinances may or may not have been supported by the San Francisco Tenants Union or other tenant advocacy groups. In fact, they may not have been either supported or opposed by anyone publicly, as defined by testimony at public comment. The following data in Figure 3 is presented to distinguish these “symbolic” measures, with zero public support either in favor or against, to present some context for the numbers of ordinances passed above. 44
Figure 3: Tenant Ordinances Heard at Committee
EVICTIONS CONDO CONVERSIONS RENT CONTROL
8® Total m No Public Comment Approved Approved by full Board unanimously
Data Source: San Francisco Board of Supervisors (see Appendix)
The chart above shows tenant ordinances that made it to committee and were heard publically, by category. There is a close relationship between those “symbolic” ordinances for which there was no public comment neither in support nor opposition. Figure 1 also shows data about which of those “symbolic” ordinances passed into law, and of those, how many were unanimous. It is of note that there was a lack of interest from anyone in the public to contribute to the public discourse, either in support or in opposition—which is not common for tenant issues in San Francisco’s City Hall. This data shows that these “symbolic” measures are largely administrative (though not exclusively). For instance, in 2015, Supervisor Breed introduced an ordinance that would conform the Subdivision Code to be in alignment with the Below Market Rate Condominium Conversion Program. Supervisor McGoldrick twice introduced ordinances to extend the condominium conversion lottery, once in 2006 and again in 2008. All of these examples were unanimous votes. These administrative and/or symbolic ordinances may not have seen any public comment because they did not have a tangible impact on the lives of tenants, evidenced by the SF Tenants Union along with other tenant groups and the rest of the public choosing not to participate or attempt to influence the outcome. The SF Tenants Union did however, like other members of the public, take positions on many tenant ordinances introduced. Figures 4, 5 and 6 show their participation thanks to documentation from the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors.
FIGURE 4: SFTU AND EVICTION ORDINANCES
Support 20%
No Position
Took a Position (but minutes did not indicate) 30%
Data Source: San Francisco Tenants Union; San Francisco Board of Supervisors (see Appendix)
FIGURE 5: SFTU AND CONDO CONVERSION ORDINANCES Support
not indicate) 36%
Data Source: San Francisco Tenants Union; San Francisco Board of Supervisors (see Appendix) 46
FIGURE 6: SFTU AND RENT CONTROL ORDINANCES
No Position I 25%
Data Source: San Francisco Tenants Union; San Francisco Board of Supervisors (see Appendix)
Unfortunately, over the years the Board of Supervisors Clerk’s office has not been consistent in the way that clerks take minutes or document speakers at public comment. That means that for two of the categories (evictions and condominium conversions), there are a significant amount of ordinances that showed the SF Tenants Union speaking at public comment, but the minutes do not differentiate speakers by support or opposition. For many of these hearings, the list of speakers will include groups like: a) the San Francisco Tenants Union, Housing Rights Committee, Chinatown Community Development Center, Causa Justa/Just Cause, Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Senior Disability Action, Coalition of Community Housing Organizations, Mission SRO Collaborative, etc.; and b) San Francisco Apartment Association, Small Property Owners of San Francisco, San Francisco Association of Realtors, Residential Builders Association, etc. The difference between the a) groups and the b) groups are that they are often on different sides of legislation at the Board of Supervisors; unfortunately the notes from some of these hearings do not indicate a position from any of the speakers listed. For the third category, rent control, 75% of the ordinances heard at committee are 47
missing minutes from the legislative database altogether and therefore it’s impossible to know who spoke at all. Of the SF Tenants Union positions that are documented, they took no position almost half of the time (with the exception of the rent control category, where we only have one documented example). This data supports the importance of understanding that the definition of “tenant legislation” comes with its challenges—namely that it does not differentiate between administrative or symbolic ordinances, and those that make a substantive difference in the lives of tenants (for either better or worse). While I hoped to include in this study the impact of SF Tenant Union support on the outcome of tenant ordinances, the inconsistent data does not allow for the completion that analysis in a way that would yield accurate results.
Political Factor: “Pro-Tenant” Endorsements
The following sections will describe the methodology behind the four political and economic factors analyzed in this study, beginning with the number of “pro-tenant” members on the Board of Supervisors. In this thesis, “pro-tenant” is defined by a positive endorsement from the San Francisco Tenants Union (see Appendix A). There are many influential groups that make endorsements consistently in district races, like the San Francisco Democratic Party, the San Francisco Labor Council, the SF chapter of the Sierra Club, individual unions, business interests, and neighborhood or community groups, but for this thesis, the focus was on organizations that consistently endorsed Supervisorial candidates between 2000 and 2015 based on tenant issues. Many tenant groups are non-profit 501 (c)3 organizations, which by law cannot take positions on or use organizational resources to support candidates for office (although they can for ballot measures, and many do). SF Tenants Union is the most prominent tenant group that has the ability to make endorsements in candidate races because unlike many non-profit organizations, they are an organization with 501(c)4 tax status granting them that power. 48
While there are other pro-tenant endorsing organizations that have emerged over the years, none have consistently made endorsements in every district race during the time period 2000-2015. Other groups have either formed after 2000 or dissolved sometime during that fifteen year period. The endorsement of individual tenant activists are not included because individual endorsements are too often colored by personal relationships, and there is likely not the kind of group vetting process employed by formal organizations with a membership base. The definition of “pro-tenant” is now being contested by the arrival of new pro development tenant groups like SF Bay Area Renters Federation (SF BARF), the YIMBY party, and GrowSF; all of these groups say that they also represent tenants, largely more recent arrivals, but differ from existing tenant groups on their positions on market rate development, among other issues. Interestingly, the timing of the arrival of these pro-development tenant groups coincide with the emergence of short-term rental legislation at the Board of Supervisors, signaling at the very least, a dramatically shifting landscape for housing, tenants and land use in San Francisco beginning in 2014. Finally, a note on tenant demographics and the political landscape. Tenants and property owners are by no means homogenous groups in terms of San Francisco economics. There are tenants who are making six-figure salaries and small property owners who are working class, only renting out an in-law unit in their single-family home. Not all tenants, including those in rent controlled units, are low-income. And while non-profit tenant groups adamantly advocate on behalf of the most vulnerable—low- income elders and families, immigrants and the disabled—it is tenants as a whole, regardless of economic status, who benefit from tenant protections. Because of these complexities, being “pro-tenant”, even for groups like the SF Tenants Union, does not necessarily equate to economic and racial justice. Certainly low- income people and people of color are more likely to be tenants than homeowners (Joint Center for Housing Studies 2013). But for extremely low-income people, particularly African Americans and other people of color in San Francisco, tenant advocacy groups 49
have not historically represented people in public housing, Section 8 housing, or Single Residency Occupancy hotels. Notwithstanding this tension, SF Tenants Union remains the primary political force for tenants in San Francisco. For all of the reasons above, I focus on the San Francisco Tenants Union endorsements to identify “pro-tenant” members of the Board, for reasons best articulated by the organization itself:
San Francisco Tenants Union is also the only tenant rights advocacy organization for San Francisco renters which can endorse or withhold endorsements for politicians who pass laws that affect tenants. Legislation is the most powerful tool to advocate for tenants, and as a 501(c)(4), the SFTU is not restricted in advocating for or against legislators. The SFTU organizes tenants to pressure the politicians on legislation (SFTU website).
SFTU was founded in 1971 and for over 40 years, the mostly volunteer-run organization has prioritized both tenant counseling and tenant organizing. As explained above, SFTU not only endorses Board of Supervisors candidates in district races but also monitors tenant-related legislation at the Board of Supervisors and is active in trying to influence the outcome of such legislation. There were efforts made to include other “pro-tenant” endorsing bodies, such as the San Francisco Bay Guardian, a well-known progressive and “pro-tenant” publication that recently went out of print. There are many factors that political groups, individuals and publications consider in their endorsements, including candidate stances on priority issues, viability and the broader political landscape. However as an example, while the Bay Guardian consistently took “pro-tenant” positions as a publication, the paper also was invested in other issues like clean power and public transportation. Whatever factors influenced the SFBG endorsements between 2000 and 2015, it is clear that their considerations may have had a broader reach than simply whether candidates support a “pro-tenant” agenda. For that reason, “pro-tenant” will be defined solely as having received an endorsement from the San Francisco Tenants Union. 50
Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) was passed by San Francisco voters in November 2002, and implemented for the first time in November 2004. RCV eliminated the need for a run-off election, as it allowed voters to specify their first, second and third choices on the same ballot. It also allowed political groups and individuals to make endorsements reflecting that new option. I include as an endorsement from SF Tenants Union any ranking—meaning that if they endorsed another candidate as their #1 choice but the winning candidate was their #2 choice, I have not made a distinction and it will still be reflected here as an endorsement. There is only one example of this; in 2006, the Tenants Union endorsed Marie Harrison in District 10 as their #1 candidate, with incumbent Sophie Maxwell as their #2 choice. As expected, Supervisor Maxwell was re-elected. Because an endorsement at any level indicates an expression of confidence that a particular candidate will support the organization’s policy priorities, any level of endorsement will be treated as equal. Prior to 2004 though, there were still run-off elections in San Francisco if no candidate met the 50% +1 threshold, meaning that the top two vote-getters would face each other in a run-off election. In 2000, there were four district races that required a run off: Districts 7, 8, 10 and 11. And in 2002, there were two races requiring a run-off election: Districts 4 and 8. For the purposes of endorsement tracking, I have included any endorsements made by the SF Tenants Union during a run-off election in my overall endorsement tracking.
Political Factor: Election Years
The democratic responsiveness literature suggests that elections are a primary motivator for elected officials with regards to policy choice, and thus the second hypothesis examined in this study measures the relationship between Board of Supervisor responsiveness to tenant issues and the presence of an upcoming election. 51
In the analysis when discussing upcoming elections, the language “the year leading up to” the next election will be used to refer to the year of an election, since district races almost without exception take place in November. This stretch of time is relevant because it is when candidates running for district elections are actively running campaigns and the positions that they take if currently elected, are closely scrutinized. There are a few challenges to be named here with using upcoming elections as a political factor. Because Supervisors are elected to four-year terms, district races alternate every two years, between five seats (the even-numbered districts) or six seats (the odd- numbered districts) being up for election. That essentially means that only approximately half of the Board will feel the political pressure associated with an upcoming election. Additionally, because of term limits, uncontested re-elections or the individual ambitions of Supervisors to seek higher office, it’s difficulty to identify consistency even among only odd-numbered Supervisorial district elections, as well as among only even- numbered ones. Despite those challenges perhaps unique to San Francisco, decades of literature show that election years are influential in the responsiveness of elected officials. For that reason, elections years are included as a political factor in this thesis to measure the level of influence of this factor on responsiveness from the Board of Supervisors to tenant issues.
Economic Factors: Evictions and Median Rents
Ultimately this analysis seeks to understand the extent to which key political and economic factors influence the responsiveness of the Board of Supervisors to tenants, by introduction or passage of tenant ordinances. This section will address the two economic factors considered in this study, those being an increase in the annual rate of evictions, and an increase in the median rent rate of change. The Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board, known as the SF Rent Board, was created through emergency legislation by the Board of Supervisors in 52
response to a housing crisis at the time. The Rent Board was created "in order to safeguard tenants from excessive rent increases and, at the same time, to assure landlords fair and adequate rents consistent with Federal Anti-Inflation Guidelines". From the website of the Rent Board:
The Ordinance applies to approximately 170,000 rental units in the city and, among other things, places limits on the amount of rent increases which can be charged by the landlord and on the reasons for evicting a tenant. The Rent Board is a special fund department, completely funded through the collection of rental unit fees and has no general fund contributions in its budget (SF Rent Board, 2008).
The Rent Board releases an annual eviction notice report, and it is this data that will be used for analysis. Historically the release of the report is sent to the Mayor and the Board of Supervisors, and the press has often covered the newly released numbers and whether there has been an increase or decrease. Tenant groups use those numbers in their advocacy and organizing campaigns to strengthen tenant policy as well as funding for tenant counseling and other services. An increase in the number of evictions in San Francisco, if publicized by the press and used by tenant groups, could create pressure on Supervisors to increase their responsiveness to tenant issues. The report covers both the total number of evictions as well as the over 15 possible causes for eviction; this study’s analysis will include only the total number of evictions. Median rent is a more difficult factor to quantify because no public entity (local, state, federal) currently directly collects comprehensive data for tracking (that could come with a rental unit registry for instance). Instead, the city is either dependent on the industry to release numbers, or reliant upon the U.S. Census and American Community Survey, neither of which are ideal sources. Many real estate industry sources, not surprisingly, lack of truly scientific data to rely upon. Both Paragon Real Estate and the San Francisco Apartment Association are collecting median rents for open units— ie: listing prices—or a group like the Apartment Association may supplement with data regarding rents for current tenants through 53
surveying their approximately 2000 members. With the evolution of technology and more information readily available on the World Wide Web, more sources have emerged, but unfortunately many of these more recent sources do not have data available for the entire time period included in this study. For the reasons enumerated above, the primary source for San Francisco median rent in this analysis is the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD does not track median rents, but because it subsidizes rents for low-income people in the private rental market through its Section 8 program, it does annually conduct an assessment of “fair market rents”. From HUD’s website:
Fair Market Rents (FMRs) are primarily used to determine payment standard amounts for the Housing Choice Voucher program, to determine initial renewal rents for some expiring project-based Section 8 contracts, to determine initial rents for housing assistance payment (HAP) contracts in the Moderate Rehabilitation Single Room Occupancy program (Mod Rehab), and to serve as a rent ceiling in the HOME rental assistance program. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) annually estimates FMRs for 530 metropolitan areas and 2,045 nonmetropolitan county FMR areas. By law the final FMRs for use in any fiscal year must be published and available for use at the start of that fiscal year, on October 1.
HUD goes to great lengths to provide documentation of its methodology for Fair Market Rents, which includes compiling data from the most recent American Community Survey as well as local survey data, which none of the other sources provided. For these reasons, this study will be using data from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to examine the relationship of the rate of change in annual median rent to the responsiveness of the Board of Supervisors on tenant issues. 54
Lag Effect
One consideration to note before discussion of empirical research is that of a lag effect. For many of the political and economic factors discussed, there is the possibility that the data does not reflect real-time impact. For instance, a lag effect may be present in determining the relationship between the public release of median rent data and whether members of the Board of Supervisors introduce legislation on tenant issues. Even the development of HUD’s Fair Market Rents likely includes a lag effect, since the department is developing FMRs based in part on a survey of current rents and it takes time for that analysis to translate into publicly release FMRs for the next year. I will point to a possible lag effect in some of the analysis below, as it becomes relevant. 55
Chapter 3: Analysis of Political Conditions
The focus of this thesis is to examine the relationship of key political and economic factors on the responsiveness of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors to tenant issues. This chapter will discuss an analysis of political conditions, and the next chapter will discuss economic conditions. In this chapter I analyze the impact of the number of “pro-tenant” Supervisors on the responsiveness of the Board as a whole, as well as the impact of upcoming district elections on the responsiveness of the Board. Again, responsiveness will be measured by the volume of tenant ordinances both introduced and passed into law. The findings for the first hypothesis (HI) are mixed, showing that the number of “pro-tenant” members of the Board of Supervisors does have an impact on responsiveness with regards to the introduction of tenant legislation. However, there is not evidence that such a relationship exists for the passage of tenant legislation. I found the second hypothesis (H2) to be null, with no evidence that an upcoming district election leads to greater responsiveness either in the introduction or passage of tenant ordinances.
HI. Does the Number of “Pro-Tenant” Supervisors Impact Board Responsiveness?
Only six of the sixteen years included in the study had a “pro-tenant” majority on the Board of Supervisors; according to my hypotheses about the numbers of “pro-tenant” Supervisors, these years would have seen a greater level of responsiveness to tenant issues. Table 2 shows the years with a “pro-tenant” majority on the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, defined as an endorsement by the San Francisco Tenants Union. 56
Table 2: Years with a “Pro-Tenant” Majority
Board Members "Pro-Tenant" Endorsed by SF Majority? Tenants Union 2001 6 Y 2002 6 Y 2003 6 Y 2004 6 Y 2005 4 2006 4 2007 5 2008 5 2009 6 Y 2010 6 Y 2011 5 2012 5 2013 5 2014 5 2015 4 2016 5 Data Source: San Francisco Tenants Union (see Appendix)
In all of the years the number of “pro-tenant” Supervisors on the Board varied within a very small range, never dipping below four, and not once rising above a six-member majority. A clear association exists between there being a majority of “pro-tenant” members of the Board of Supervisors and an increase in the number of tenant ordinances being introduced, indicating a greater level of responsiveness. As shown in Figure 7 below, the volume of ordinances being introduced grew from 2001-2003, and again in 2010, during those periods that there was a majority. But it does not appear that there is a close relationship between the two factors. Even the lag effect, introduced in the previous 57
chapter, cannot explain the trends. The two years with the most tenant ordinances introduced—2003 and 2014— were under a “pro-tenant” majority and a “pro-tenant” minority. Those six years when four or more tenant ordinances were introduced were mostly not under a majority of “pro-tenant” Supervisors; only two of the six years fell under that category (2002 and 2003).
Figure 7: "Pro-Tenant" Board Members & Introduction of Tenant Ordinances
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Board Members Endorsed by SF Tenants Union Tenant Ordinances Introduced
Data Source: San Francisco Tenants Union; San Francisco Board of Supervisors (see Appendix)
Figure 7 does not show a strong association between the number of “pro-tenant” Board members and the number of tenant ordinances introduced. While SF Tenants Union endorsements are designed to uphold a standard of tenant-friendly candidates, like any political endorsements they are based on many factors including relationships and assumptions. Of note in particular, the San Francisco Tenants Union did not always initially endorse candidates who they later supported in a reelection campaign, perhaps once they had a track record. Specifically this was true for two Board members: Sophie 58
Maxwell in District 10, who was not endorsed by SF Tenants Union either in 2000 or 2002 but she did receive their support in 2006; and David Campos in District 9, who was not endorsed in 2008 but received their support in 2012 (as well as for his 2014 Assembly race against David Chiu, who was endorsed by SFTU in both of his Supervisor races). This dynamic likely has an impact on the results above. I conducted a supplemental analysis of the number of tenant ordinances introduced by “pro-tenant” Supervisors. Figure 8 shows both the numbers of ordinances introduced by “pro-tenant” members of the Board, as well as total tenant ordinances introduced by category.
______Figure 8: Ordinances Introduced by "Pro-Tenant" Members
Data Source: San Francisco Tenants Union; San Francisco Board of Supervisors (see Appendix)
Over 60% of tenant ordinances (30 of the total 48) introduced during this time period fell within the above parameters, confirming that while there may not be a close association between a majority “pro-tenant” Board of Supervisors and the number of tenant ordinances introduced, it is indeed more likely that “pro-tenant” Supervisors will introduce and act as primary sponsors for tenant ordinances. A total of 62.5% of tenant ordinances were introduced by Supervisors who had been endorsed by the San Francisco 59
Tenants Union, showing a positive relationship between “pro-tenant” Supervisors and the introduction of tenant ordinances and an indication that individual “pro-tenant” Supervisors are more responsive to tenant issues than those not endorsed by SFTU. These findings provide clear evidence in support of the HI hypothesis, specifically as it relates to the introduction of tenant legislation. Figure 9 below explores the association between the number of “pro-tenant” Supervisors and the passage of tenant legislation. In looking at the data, it is difficult to identify a positive association between either a majority of “pro-tenant” Supervisors or the raw number of “pro-tenant” Supervisors, and the passage of tenant ordinances. In fact, the two years with the highest number of ordinances passed into law (three in 2006 and four in 2015) also coincided with being among the years with the lowest number of “pro-tenant” Supervisors. There does not appear to be evidence that more “pro-tenant” Supervisors on the Board leads to greater responsiveness when it comes to passage of tenant legislation, which again, includes the Mayor’s explicit or tacit approval.
Figure 9: "Pro-Tenant" Board Members & Passage of Tenant Ordinances
7
6
5
4
3
2 1 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
-Board Members Endorsed by SF Tenants Union Tenant Ordinances Passed Into Law
Data Source: San Francisco Tenants Union; San Francisco Board of Supervisors (see Appendix) 60
The two figures below examine the status of tenant ordinances introduced by “pro-tenant” Supervisors, and separately by Supervisors who were not “pro-tenant”. Figures 10 and 11 show a contrast between the final status of tenant ordinances introduced by “pro-tenant” versus non “pro-tenant” members of the Board, and whether they were passed with the Mayor’s approval, passed without the Mayor’s approval, filed, killed or still pending.
FIGURE 10: STATUS OF ORDINANCES INTRODUCED BY "PRO-TENANT" SUPERVISORS
I Passed with Mayor's Approval ■ Passed without Mayor's approval * Filed H Killed H Pending
Killed 13%
Passed with Mayor's Approval 44%
Passed without Mayor’s approval 10%
Data Source: San Francisco Tenants Union; San Francisco Board of Supervisors (see Appendix) 61
FIGURE 11: STATUS OF ORDINANCES INTRODUCED BY NON "PRO-TENANT SUPERVISORS"
■ Passed with Mayor's Approval ■ Passed without Mayor's approval M Filed M Killed » Pending
Killed 17%
Passed with Mayor’s Approval 50%
Passed without Mayor's approval
Data Source: San Francisco Tenants Union; San Francisco Board of Supervisors (see Appendix)
Notably, those non-endorsed Supervisors have a higher rate of passage through not only a Board majority vote but also approval from the Mayor (50%), while pro-tenant Supervisors saw only a 44% Mayoral approval rate. Pro-tenant Supervisors did see a higher approval rate overall though on tenant ordinances they introduced, as an additional 10% of ordinance introduced were approved despite the Mayor’s lack of support. Legislation from both “pro-tenant” and non-endorsed Supervisors saw a comparable rate of ordinances being filed, which again, could be due to a range of circumstances described in the previous chapter; “pro-tenant” Supervisors had less ordinances filed (30% of their total) than non-endorsed Supervisors (33% of their total). And they both experienced similar rates of legislation being killed, as non-endorsed Supervisors had 17% of their ordinances killed in comparison to “pro-tenant” Supervisors’ 13%. Non-endorsed Supervisors had no instances of passage without the Mayor’s support; the Mayor actively signed into law every one of their ordinances. Additionally, 62
this group did not experience one Mayoral veto. The combination of these two indicators point to much greater policy alignment between non-endorsed Supervisors and the Mayor’s office, in comparison with “pro-tenant” Supervisors who more frequently experienced conflict with the Mayor’s office over tenant policy. Not only did the “pro tenant” Supervisors pass into law three ordinances despite a lack of approval from the Mayor, but half of their killed ordinances were done so through a Mayoral veto. There is evidence that individual SFTU-endorsed Supervisors are more responsive to tenant issues by introduction of tenant ordinances. However, there is confirmation of an association between the number of “pro-tenant” Supervisors and a greater level of responsiveness to those issues from the Board as measured by passage of ordinances into law. This is at least in part due to the role of the Mayor in the legislative process. For the HI hypothesis, the results are mixed, finding support for one measurement of responsiveness but not the other.
H2. Does an Upcoming District Election Impact Board Responsiveness?
In this section is an analysis of the relationship between upcoming election years and responsiveness of the Board of Supervisors to tenant issues, beginning with the introduction of tenant ordinances and ending with the passage of ordinances into law. If political pressure is indeed a motivator, or at the very least a perceived responsiveness to tenant issues is an aim for members of the Board, then we should see an increase in the number of tenant ordinances introduced in a year that will see a Board of Supervisors district contest in November of said year. Figure 12 below shows that, of the eight district races included in the analysis, half of them (four) saw an increase in the number of tenant ordinances introduced. There is one instance in which the number of tenant ordinances introduced stayed flat, and three years in which the number of ordinances decreased from the year prior. 63
Figure 12: Election Years & Tenant Ordinances Introduced
I: V E N ODD L' VI; N ODD EVEN ODD EVEN ODD
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Data Source: San Francisco Board of Supervisors (see Appendix)
Examining data by district shows that for even-numbered districts, the number of tenant ordinances introduced increased during three of the four years leading up to an election, and in the fourth year, the number remained flat with neither an increase nor decrease. For odd-numbered districts, the number of ordinances introduced decreased during three of the four years, and only increased once. Based this data, there is no evidence of an association between upcoming district elections and the number of tenant ordinance introduced. The same conclusion can be drawn from examining the relationship between upcoming district election years and the number of tenant ordinances actually passed into law. As shown by Figure 13, there are three instances of the year prior to a campaign dipping to zero ordinances passed, and while 2006 saw a spike, the same year of an approaching even-numbered district election, this increase did not become a trend in other election years. In fact, the data show very inconsistent results, even when separating even-numbered district elections and odd-numbered district elections. Thus, there is not a 64
clear positive association between the two factors, leading to a conclusion that impending elections do not increase responsiveness among members of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors or City Hall, either through the introduction or the passage of tenant ordinances.
Figure 13: Upcoming Election Years & Tenant Ordinances Passed Into Law
f V! N EVEN f VI N
2007
Data Source: SF Department of Elections; SF Board of Supervisors
An important aspect of the analysis for election years’ impact on the responsiveness of the Board of Supervisors, is how heavily renter-occupied each district is. This is relevant because for those districts that are predominantly owner-occupied, Supervisors may be less likely to be responsive to tenant issues. In Figure 14 below, I present data on the estimated percentage of renters for each Supervisorial district, compiled from the San Francisco Department of Elections and the U.S. Census 2011- 2015 American Community Survey. 65
Figure 14: Percentage of Renters, by Supervisorial District
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Data Source: San Francisco Department of Elections; U.S. Census, 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates (see Appendix)
Not only is it possible that Supervisors in districts with a lower percentage of renters will be less responsive to tenant issues, but it’s also possible that those districts are less likely to elect a “pro-tenant” Supervisor to begin with. In an effort to further understand how district tenant demographics may influence the responsiveness of Supervisors, Figure 15 juxtaposes the percentage of renter-occupied housing in a Supervisorial District, with the number of years a district has elected a “pro-tenant” Supervisor. There is a clear association between the two factors in Districts 1, 3 and 6 where districts that had a high percentage of renters (65% or higher) were also the three districts that had elected a “pro-tenant” Supervisor each of the sixteen years included in the study. The association is sustained by data from District 4 and 7, two of the three districts that had never elected a “pro-tenant” Supervisor, both of which have a majority of owner-occupied units rather than majority renter. And Districts 9 and 10 are both somewhere in the middle, with renter rates between 50-60% and having elected a “pro tenant” Supervisor during some of the years included in the study. The outliers in this trend are District 2, with a high level of renters but having never elected a “pro-tenant” 66
Supervisor, District 5 with a high level of renters but only occasionally electing a “pro tenant” Supervisor, District 8 with approximately 60% renters but never having elected a “pro-tenant” Supervisor, and District 11 with a low level of renters but having had a “pro tenant” Supervisor during the majority of the years studied.
Figure 15: Tenant Data by Supervisiorial District, Compared to Number of Years Electing a "Pro- Tenant" Supervisor
Years Electing a "Pro-Tenant" Supervisor — — % Renters
Data Source: San Francisco Board of Supervisors; San Francisco Department of Elections; U.S. Census, 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
This data is relevant because it provides insight into the level of electoral pressure that may be placed upon a Supervisorial candidate running for reelection in an upcoming district race—which is the political condition being considered here. The analysis above leads to the conclusion that those in Districts 2, 4, 7, 8 and perhaps 11 are perhaps less inclined to be responsive to tenant issues based on either a low percentage of renters or a history of not electing “pro-tenant” Supervisors. Therefore there is no evidence for the second hypothesis examining an association between upcoming district elections and the number of tenant ordinances introduced or passed into law; H2 is found to be null. There is evidence, however, that the patterns of the percentage of renters in a district and the 67
likelihood of electing a “pro-tenant” Supervisor, and such Supervisors’ responsiveness to tenant issues, are closely linked. 68
Chapter 4: Analysis of Economic Conditions
The last chapter discussed an analysis of political conditions and whether the number of “pro-tenant” Supervisors and upcoming district elections had an impact on the level of responsiveness from the San Francisco Board of Supervisors. This chapter focuses on economic conditions. Specifically, the question to be answered here is: Will a rate of change in evictions and median rents in San Francisco increase responsiveness from the Board of Supervisors, as measured by the volume of tenant ordinances both introduced and passed into law? The findings show strong evidence for both hypotheses H3 and H4, and a positive association between both median rents and evictions and the level of responsiveness from the Board of Supervisors to tenant issues. The literature about economic inequality and the relationship to access to political power has provided an important foundation for this discussion, as well as literature documenting the historical context for San Francisco. According to the SF Apartment Association, some of the impetus for the creation of rent control in the late 1970s was an escalating housing crisis impacting not only low income residents but increasingly a middle income renter population. If rising rents and rising eviction rates impact a greater number of people and income levels, those factors could contribute to greater responsiveness from the Board of Supervisors.
H3. Does an Increase in the Annual Median Rents Impact Board Responsiveness?
Median rents are often driving the discussion about tenant legislation, concerns about evictions, and more broadly the city’s housing crisis. Figure 16 below shows annual trends in median rent; for the purposes of this study, I have averaged all sizes of units (studios, 1 bedrooms, 2+ bedrooms, etc.) so that only one price for median rent is included. As noted earlier in the section on lag effect, these are Fair Market Rents (FMRs) released by HUD for the purpose of determining housing subsidies for the 69
coming year. As a result, the 2017 Fair Market Rents was released in October of 2016, determined by data collected earlier that year. Because the 2017 FMRs are based on 2016 data, for the purpose of the charts below I have reflected the median rent to correlate with the year in which the data was collected. For instance, the large increase (33.5%) reflected for 2016 in the chart below, comes from the HUD 2017 FMRs.
Figure 16: San Francisco Median Rents
3500 |---— w 3000
[ 2500 O ,4 , ©...... A:> 2000 i ' 0 ' ^....-4 | 1500 1r
1000
I : 500 : | 0 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Data Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
There is likely a lag effect reflected in this data, even adjusting for the timing of data collection, since the methodology of HUD to develop the Fair Market Rents requires the most recent American Community Survey as well as a community survey. For instance, this data points to a significant rental spike in 2017, but by many accounts that spike took place in 2015 (Elsen 2015). Median rent spiked in San Francisco during what was referred to as the “dot-com boom” and subsequent bust of the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, but again, by most accounts the bust led to many tech workers leaving San Francisco and rents beginning to stabilize if not drop beginning in 2001. That, however, is not shown in the chart above. Therefore, a lag effect is something to be considered in this analysis. 70
Below is Figure 17, from Paragon Real Estate, an industry source whose methods are not well documented and as explained previously, should not be a primary data source for exact year-to-year median rent numbers. Even so, their data is included below for comparison, particularly because the trends of dips and growth in residential rent in San Francisco are consistent, although the lag effect is visible in the comparison of the two charts.
Figure 17: Paragon Real Estate Group’s SF Residential Rents
San Francisco Residential Rents Weighted Average Asking Rent, Q1 Data Points, 1994 - Present SBlOSSi01 $3,620
$3,500
$3,000
$2,500 Dotcom peak -> t 2012 recovery
$2,000 t 2008 financial markets crash $1,500 t* Dotcom bubble pops
$1,000 ^ ^ ^ ^ # \^ SVVVVVVVA
1M quarter data points except, as noted, for last reading per RealFaets LLC, for buildings with at { ffii P A R A G N least 90 units. Q1 2017 estimated using ZiltowRent Index data. Data from sources deemed reliable cstatc but may contain errors and subject to revision All numbers are approximate.
Source: Paragon Real Estate
In examining the relationship between annual median rent and the number of tenant ordinances introduced year-to-year, Figure 18 below shows some impact of median rent on responsiveness from individual members of the Board. During the first tech bubble (often referred to as the “dot-com boom” of the late 1990’s which burst in 2001), rents soared in San Francisco, having a drastic impact on the housing market for renters in the city. The number of tenant ordinances also increased during this time, likely 71
in response to the public outrage about the cost of rent in the city, which came hand in hand with evictions—another variable to be discussed shortly. As the dot-com bust stabilized and rents decreased, the number of tenant ordinances declined.
Figure 18: SF Median Rents & Tenant Ordinances Introduced
2500 6
2000 5
4 1500 3 1000 2 500 1 0 0 2000 20012002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 20112012 2013 2014 2015 2016
- i- S F Median Rent «^#^Tenant Ordinances Introduced
Data Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; SF Board of Supervisors
While the cost of median rent gradually increased, the number of tenant ordinances gradually decreased, dropping to zero in 2012—but spiking in the next two years. There is an increase in both factors between 2000 and 2003, and a decrease in both from 2003- 2004. There was consistency in both median rents and the number of ordinances introduced from 2005-2006; and while it looks like spiking on chart, from 2007-2010, the number of ordinances fluctuated very little, staying in the 2-3 range each year while median rents showed minimal growth. Although the association between median rent and tenant ordinances introduced is not precise, there is a positive relationship between the two factors, indicating responsiveness from individual Supervisors to tenant issues. Examining the trends further requires honing in not only on the raw numbers of annual median rent but the rate change year to year, shown in Figure 19. 72
Figure 19: Median Rent Rate of Change & Tenant Ordinances Introduced
40.00% ------— — - - — — ...... 6
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
- 10.00%
-20.00%
— Percentage Change — ^Tenant Ordinances Introduced
Data Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; SF Board of Supervisors
The trends between median rent percentage change and the number of ordinances introduced are clear, although it appears that there is a lag effect present; the dip in rents in 2002-2003 is seen in the decrease of ordinance introduced 2003-2004, although an increase on both fronts was seen in 2004-2005, leveling out the following year. The period of 2007-2011 appeared relatively stable for both factors, and both median rents and tenant ordinances introduced saw a decline in 2012 and subsequent increase in 2013. There is a clear association between median rents and the number of tenant ordinances introduced at the Board of Supervisors, indicating that rents have an impact on the responsiveness of Board members and finding evidence in support of hypothesis H3. Median rent is an-oft discussed issue in the press and increasingly more so with the rise of more informal press, like blogs and social media, which do have some influence on public discourse. It is likely that Supervisors will experience more public pressure to respond to tenant issues as median rents increase; perhaps that is in part driving this association. As for the relationship between median rent and the number of tenant ordinances actually passed into law, the trend continues as above. The rate of change for median 73
rents shows a much stronger association with passage into law, than the raw numbers of rent increases or decreases. Figure 20 shows that the highest point of tenant legislation being approved is in 2015, which perhaps could reflect many years of rising rents and therefore lag time, but the year with the second highest number of ordinances passed is actually at the end of a steady decline in median rent. The two time periods when there exists a possible positive association are the change from 2002-2003, and from 2012- 2015, when we see both an increase in annual median rent and an increase in the number of ordinances approved into law.
Figure 20: SF Median Rents & Tenant Ordinances Passed into Law
2500 4.5
2000
1500
1000
500 0 Cv* Y’0' tSo f ^ ^ T r r T ^ f T T.cv’ T T T -cv* T rv'
Median Rent «-**j*-»Tenant Ordinances Passed Into Law
Data Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; SF Board of Supervisors
Figure 21 examines the year-to-year rate of change in San Francisco median rents, and the relationship with tenant ordinances passed into law. There is a much clearer association here, although a lag effect may be present as well. 74
Figure 21: Median Rents Rate of Change & Tenant Ordinances Passed Into Law
40.00% — — ------— 4.5 4 30.00% 3.5 20.00% JL ...... — — / ¥/ 3 2.5 10.00% /VA ____ 2 0 .°0% \ / X / 1.5
-10.00% $ & ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 4 ^ 1 ’• 0.5
-20.00% 0
—•—Percentage Change Tenant Ordinances Passed Into Law
Data Source: U.S. Department o f Housing and Urban Development; SF Board of Supervisors
The change in rents from 2002-2003 matches the trend in tenant legislation passed the following year, and that consistent pattern is seen in the dip in ordinances passed 2011 - 2012 matching the dip in rents the following year, and the increases in ordinances and then rents in 2014-2015. There is a strong association between the changes in median rent and the responsiveness of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors to tenant issues, and that association is much more evident when looking at the rate change in rents rather than only examining the total median rent. The data above shows evidence in support of hypothesis H3, that responsiveness increases as median rent increases, both for introduction and passage of tenant ordinances.
H4. Does an Increase in the Rate of Evictions Impact Board Responsiveness?
As shown in Figure 22 below, San Francisco evictions as documented by the SF Rent Board are beginning to match the unprecedented numbers seen in the housing crisis created by the first dot-com boom of the mid- to late-1990’s. With hundreds of small start-ups receiving an influx of capital, thousands of young and ambitious technology 75
entrepreneurs flooded the Bay Area, many of them paid by their fledging companies in stock options rather than cash. A five-year dot-com boom ensued in the city, driving up rents astronomically, fueling unforeseen residential housing speculation, and leading to the spike in evictions documented below.
Figure 22: San Francisco Evictions 2000-2016
2014-2015
2012-2013
2010-2011
2003-2004
2000-2001
3000
Data Source: SF Rent and Arbitration Board
These evictions from the SF Rent Board are those that have been reported by the landlord. Not all landlords report an eviction, and many tenants don’t know their rights about how to contest an eviction, leading to certain underreporting; that said, this is the most accurate data available. 76
Below is an analysis of the relationship between annual evictions and the responsiveness of individual Supervisors through introduction of tenant ordinances (Figure 23), followed by the relationship between the annual eviction rate of change and responsiveness (Figure 24). In Figure 23, while the line documenting tenant ordinances introduced at the Board is appears more irregular, there is a clear association between the two factors when comparing the overall trending increases and decreases. As with median rents, examining the rate of change for annual evictions helps illuminate the relationship between the two factors as we seek to understand the impact of evictions on the responsiveness of members of the Board of Supervisors; as shown in Figure 24, there exists a strong association between a rate of change in evictions and the number of tenant ordinances introduced.
Figure 23: Evictions & Tenant Ordinances Introduced
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
«■— »# 0f Evictions mmmmm'Tenant Ordinances Introduced
Data Source: SF Rent and Arbitration Board; SF Board of Supervisors 77
Figure 24: Rate of Change in Evictions & Tenant Ordinances Introduced
6 30.00%
»«#^Tenant Ordinances Introduced «*<#*•*% change
Data Source: SF Rent and Arbitration Board; SF Board of Supervisors
As seen in Figure 24, there is a relationship between the two factors documented in corresponding increases or decreases in 2006-2007, 2007-2008, 2008-2009, and 2009- 2010. The matching trend continues in 2011-2012, 2012-2013, and 2014-2015. While not a perfect match for each year, there are clear indications that point to a positive association between the two factors, showing that eviction rates do indeed have an impact on the responsiveness of the Board of Supervisors to tenant issues in San Francisco, as measured by the introduction of tenant ordinances. Therefore, the data points to findings in support of hypothesis H4 on the first measurement of responsiveness. The second measurement of responsiveness focuses on annual evictions and rate of change as it relates to tenant ordinances passed by the Board of Supervisors and approved, either explicitly or tacitly by the Mayor. While again difficult to see explicit connections with the raw data of evictions in Figure 25, Figure 26 illuminates the positive association between the rate of change in evictions, and the volume of ordinances passed into law. As seen in Figures 25 and 26, in 2001-2002, 2005-2006, 2006-2007, 2008-2009, 2009-2010, 2011-2012, and 2012-2013 there are clear patterns in the increasing or 78
decreasing evictions and ordinances passed, showing an association between annual evictions, in particular the rate of change, and the number of tenant ordinances passed into law by the Board and the Mayor.
Figure 25: Evictions & Tenant Ordinances Passed Into Law
3000
| 2500
2000
1500
I 1000
| 500 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
-# of Evictions «~^Tenant Ordinances Passed Into Law
Data Source: SF Rent Board; SF Board of Supervisors
Figure 26: Rate of Change in Evictions & Tenant Ordinances Passed Into Law
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
-10.00%
-20.00%
-30.00% 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
^#^Tenant Ordinances Passed Into Law change
Data Source: SF Rent Board; SF Board of Supervisors 79
Figure 26 shows that sharp increases in the rate of evictions put pressure on elected officials to address tenant issues (and decreases relieve that pressure). I conclude that the rate of change in evictions ultimately has an effect on responsiveness through both the introduction of tenant legislation and the passage of such tenant legislation into law at the Board of Supervisors in San Francisco, finding strong support for hypothesis H4. One of the challenges of this study is not being able to document how these factors (not only evictions, but also median rents, and even endorsements and upcoming elections) are used strategically in the advocacy of tenant groups like SFTU and others; I anticipate that the use of rent and eviction data may play a role in the level of responsiveness and perhaps is an area for further study in the future. 80
Chapter 5: Discussion of Findings
This thesis sought to explore what increased the responsiveness of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors to tenant issues. Drawing upon the literature, there were four hypothesis developed, to test the relationship between key political and economic factors, and responsiveness of the Board. As explained in the previous analysis chapter, the findings yielded strong associations between both economic factors and responsiveness, showing strong evidence that the annual rate of change for both evictions and median rents had an impact on the level of responsiveness from the San Francisco Board of Supervisors. However, in the analysis of political conditions in chapter three, the findings led to one null hypothesis with no evidence of an association between upcoming district elections and responsiveness, and one hypothesis with mixed results, regarding the association between the number of “pro-tenant” members on the Board of Supervisors and responsiveness to tenant issues from that body. My analysis found that there was an association between the number of “pro-tenant” Supervisors and the introduction of tenant ordinances, but not the passage of such ordinances into law. The economic conditions, for both the change in median rents and the change in evictions, were clearly connected to responsiveness of the Board. As explained in the literature review, these hypotheses were grounded in the idea that an increase in rents and evictions would mean that a greater number of San Francisco residents were being impacted, and thus would grow the responsiveness of the Board of Supervisors to address these issues. Indeed there was evidence of a strong association between rising rents and evictions and an increase in responsiveness through the introduction and passage of tenant legislation. For future study and building upon the inquiry regarding the role of the Tenants Union, another route of qualitative research might be the extent to which the San Francisco Tenants Union actively uses the data on rents and evictions in their advocacy. It may be that it is these factors in combination with the advocacy from tenant groups that 81
lead to greater responsiveness from Supervisors to tenant issues, rather than either of these two data points entirely on their own. Ultimately, there was no demonstrated impact of an upcoming district election on the Board of Supervisors as a whole. What was present was the pressure that individual members of the Board may have felt as a result of an upcoming election, but the impact was limited to few individual members of the Board and not the full body, and did not therefore lead to an increase in the number of tenant ordinances introduced. This is likely for several reasons. First, not all members are elected by majority-tenant districts; for those Supervisors representing majority owner-occupied units, the need to be seen as responsive to tenant issues is less important than for others. Second, significance should be assigned to whether a Supervisor is termed out of office, running for higher office, running for reelection unopposed or facing a contest in their reelection campaign—and given the scope of this study, those factors were not captured quantitatively, making an assessment difficult. A deeper analysis of the impact of elections for local policy making, tenant-related or otherwise, is perhaps an area for further study, as literature on this topic is often not at a municipal level. Because there was so little variation between the numbers of “pro-tenant” members on the Board of Supervisors (ranging between four and six), my focus was on looking at the years that “pro-tenant” Supervisors were a majority. As referenced earlier, district races are often seen as a fight to decide whether the progressives or moderates have a majority on the Board—the assumption being that with a majority comes more power and the ability to advance either side’s policy agenda. Certainly a challenge with the definition of “pro-tenant”, as mentioned previously, is that it relies on a single endorsing body to define, for the purposes of this study, whether a Supervisor will be an ally to tenants with regards to legislation at the Board. And there are at least two examples of Supervisors who were not endorsed by the San Francisco Tenants Union in their first term but were in their second, leading to a question about whether those two, in 82
particular, should have been counted as “pro-tenant” for the entirety of their service (they were not in this study). While the number of “pro-tenant” Supervisors, perhaps in part due to the definition, did not have a clear impact on the number of tenant ordinances passed into law at the Board, there was a connection between the number of “pro-tenant” members and the number of tenant ordinances introduced. An even stronger connection, however, was between an individual “pro-tenant” Supervisor, and the likelihood that they would introduce tenant legislation. The majority (over 60%) of tenant ordinances introduced were done so by “pro-tenant” Supervisors, indicating a greater level of responsiveness to tenant issues than for members of the Board not endorsed by SFTU. This points to the importance of endorsements in elections—although an area for further study would be to understand how the SF Tenants Union is managing the relationship with Supervisors they’ve endorsed, in contrast to those they did not endorse. Understanding that dynamic, or what community organizers sometimes call “inside-outside” strategy, may help provide further insight about the level of responsiveness from endorsed and non-endorsed members of the Board. Briefly, I’d like to discuss some of the politics that come into play during the legislative process. Non “pro-tenant” Supervisors are slightly more likely to have their legislation killed at the Board by their “pro-tenant” colleagues. That said, the Mayor has a significant role in the ultimate passage of a legislation, particularly if there are policy differences on the Board and no one side is able to secure eight or more votes of the eleven-member body. The findings show that the Mayor is more likely to support tenant ordinances from Supervisors who were not endorsed by the San Francisco Tenants Union; in fact, the Mayor has never vetoed an ordinance from a non-endorsed Supervisor and rather has approved into law every single ordinance introduced by non-endorsed Supervisors. On the other hand, legislation introduced by “pro-tenant” Supervisors is often approved by the Mayor (but less frequently than their non-endorsed colleagues), occasionally passed without the Mayor’s signature, and occasionally vetoed. The 83
Mayor’s role in the passage of tenant legislation confirms my argument that the Mayor’s office is less aligned with the “pro-tenant” and “progressive” wing of the Board, and more aligned with the rentier interests that seek to oppose more stringent tenant protections. Finally, a small-n study on local tenant legislation has been shown to be difficult for statistical analysis. It is a challenge to conduct quantitative research on the legislative process in general—although not impossible and the literature yields many examples at the federal level. However, to examine a narrow policy area like tenant legislation at the municipal level may require a qualitative study in the future. The reality is that the legislative process is deeply complex and there are many factors that may influence the outcome of any particular legislation that are difficult to control for in a small-n study. Future qualitative study could, for instance, look more deeply at case studies for further analysis of how these political and economic conditions influence responsiveness, by providing insight into the kinds of considerations that Supervisors face when deciding how to weigh in on tenant legislation. Related to further potential qualitative inquiry is the issue of “symbolic” legislation. A challenge to differentiate from more substantive legislation without bias, it does appear that there could be a meaningful difference between ordinances that make small or inconsequential changes versus those that take on significant policy shifts. I mentioned that the presence of public comment may be a way to differentiate between the two categories, but again, this is possibly an area for future study. An emerging policy area within tenant legislation is that of short-term rentals, an issue that the Board of Supervisors, the Mayor and even the City Attorney have struggled to regulate. I briefly here spend some time on this as area for future research on responsiveness from the Board of Supervisors. 84
A Look at Short-Term Rentals
Much like the phenomenon of Tenancy In Common units and condominium conversions, short-term rentals are an emerging sub-market in San Francisco (and globally) that tenant advocates see as a threat to renters and to rent-controlled housing stock in San Francisco. Short-term rentals as an industry have been developing for some time through small-scale companies like Vacation Rental By Owner (VRBO), which was later bought by HomeAway, Inc. While HomeAway and some of its affiliates have actually existed for much longer, it was Airbnb’s entrance on the scene that caused an uproar in San Francisco. Founded in San Francisco in 2008, Airbnb now boasts over 3 million properties worldwide. The company was initially a platform for strangers to find an air mattress to sleep on, but less than ten years later Airbnb can boast a $25 billion company worth. The issue of short-term rentals is hotly debated in San Francisco, pitting the parents of college kids with an extra room against those who want to regulate the speculative landlords transforming entire rent-controlled buildings into short-term rental hotels. Tenant advocates worry that the City is not doing enough to regulate this relatively new industry, both to protect tenants and to prevent precious rental stock being taken off of the market, especially affordable rent-controlled units. While the short-term rentals market was growing, the Board of Supervisors did not introduce any legislation with regards to regulation until 2014. Between 2014 and 2016, members of the Board introduced a total of 13 ordinances. Eight of those were introduced by “pro-tenant” members of the Board, two were introduced by non-SFTU endorsed Board members, and three were introduced by either the Mayor (both times co sponsored by Supervisor Farrell, a non “pro-tenant” member) or in one instance, the City Administrator. 85
Figure 27: Status of Short-Term Legislation 2014-2016
» Passed with Mayor’s Approval
? Passed without Mayor's approval
Filed Killed 23% Killed
Still Pending
Filed 23%
Data Source: SF Board of Supervisors
Almost half of the ordinances introduced did not pass and were either killed or filed (46%). Less than 40% of short-term ordinances passed into law, mostly with the Mayor’s approval. The time period in which short-term rental legislation was introduced at the Board of Supervisors also saw three district elections, one for even-numbered seats in 2014, a special election that included District 3 in 2015, and another for odd-numbered seats in 2016. As there has been no evidence of the impact of elections on the body as a whole, I will not spend much time on this factor. However, in light of the majority of short-term rental ordinances coming from “pro-tenant” Supervisors, I should note that the SF Tenants Union endorsed five of the eleven elected Supervisors during those district races. In the years that short-term rentals ordinances were introduced at the Board of Supervisors, San Francisco saw a steady rise in evictions (12.5% in 2014, 7.2% in 2015, and 12.1% in 2016). Annual median rent also increased during this time, spiking 86
significantly in 2016 (5.4% in 2014, 8.2% in 2015, 33.5% in 2016). There is again a strong association between these economic factors and the responsiveness of the Board to this issue. The one legislation that was vetoed by the Mayor in 2016 was called “one of the most stringent restrictions on short-term rentals in the country” by the SF Chronicle (Green, 2016). This legislation came partly in response to ongoing legal battles with Airbnb over the company’s refusal to share the contact information for a new city registry that aims to regulate listings according to city law. On May 1 of this year, Airbnb and HomeWay, Inc. finally agreed to a settlement with the City Attorney’s office to ensure that scofflaw landlords abide by San Francisco’s regulations. The settlement was seen as victory not only for the city but also for tenant advocates who have long been critical of the company for allowing the platform to be used for housing speculation. Even with this recent significant legal settlement, short-term rentals are certain to continue to be an evolving and complex issue and it’s doubtful that the city has seen the last of legislative attempts to address this sub-market. As the corporate “sharing economy” continues to grow in the areas of housing, transportation and more, this should be an area of future study to monitor the conditions under which San Francisco pushes for increased regulation.
Conclusion
In sum, the ability for a pro-tenant agenda to be advanced through a responsive Board of Supervisors is reliant on political conditions like endorsements and electing tenant-friendly Supervisors, as well as economic factors that lead to a greater sense of urgency for tenants in San Francisco (increasing rents and evictions). While a “pro tenant” majority does not inevitably lead to more ordinances passing into law, it does have an impact as most tenant legislation comes from “pro-tenant” Supervisors. And 87
ultimately, not having a majority on the Board does have an impact on the passage of legislation, as does not have a veto-proof majority. An active progrowth urban regime in San Francisco may lead to less responsiveness from City Hall to tenant issues. The Mayor, at the helm of this regime, is less likely to align him/herself with the “pro-tenant” members of the Board of Supervisors and less likely to be responsive to tenant issues. The progressive coalition— while not actively an antiregime but still primarily working to protect community from capital—has not been able to develop a governing coalition but sections of the progressive base have successfully made headway on key policy issues through the Board of Supervisors, a body much more responsive to the public. Primary of course, is a tenant agenda. In the end, without a governing coalition willing to prioritize the economic needs and interests of low-income and working class people, coupled with an uphill battle against capital, a tenants rights agenda is the intervention of some parts of the progressive coalition to protect these communities from the harm done by capital. Ultimately, the findings in this thesis indicate that it is possible for a progressive coalition, like the one supporting a tenant agenda in San Francisco, to secure policy priorities from elected officials, but there are key conditions that make it more or less likely that such a coalition will be successful. At a local level, elections are most important in determining who is elected, and endorsements play a part, not only to support the election of a particular candidate but also to hold that candidate to key policy priorities. However, upcoming elections at a local level do not appear to have an influence on an elected body as a whole, particularly when not all seats are simultaneously on the ballot. Most compelling, perhaps, is that economic factors like rising rents and evictions are influential when it comes to responsiveness, perhaps because it means economic strive is extending beyond a traditional poor and low-income population and impacting a greater number of residents, including those with more economic means. This analysis is in alignment with biased pluralism and some of the structuralism literature, and speaks to the presence of economic and structural factors that 88
prevent responsiveness from elected officials to the concerns of constituents with less privilege. While each of these hypotheses for which I found evidence through this study have been shown to have an impact on responsiveness, the reality is that it is more likely to be a combination of these conditions that increase responsiveness. Progressive coalitions can build the power to achieve responsiveness and advance their policy goals, but they are constrained by external economic factors. How all of these political and economic conditions work together to increase responsiveness, and how they are used by advocacy groups (an additional condition), is an important question for future study. 89
Appendix: Data Sources
A. San Francisco Tenants Union (SFTU) Endorsements for Sitting Board of Supervisors Members
The information regarding SFTU endorsements came directly from the organization itself, as this was not available through any other source. I worked with Jennifer Fieber, SFTU’s Political Campaign Director, to compile the data and organize it by year. Please note that this data marks the years served, not the election year (for instance, elections that happen in November 2000 lead to a January 2001 inauguration). The shaded boxes demarcate years that a Supervisor served in office who was not elected but rather appointed by the Mayor. “BOS D l” refers to the Board of Supervisors, District 1. All 11 districts are represented below. Under the column heading “DA- SFTU support?” there will be an X if the Tenants Union endorsed the victorious candidate in that district race. D1- SFTU D1- SFTU D1- SFTU BOS D1 support? BOS D2 support? BOS D3 support? Jake Gavin McGoldrick Newsom Aaron Peskin Jake Gavin Newsom McGoldrick Newsom Term 1 Aaron Peskin Jake Gavin McGoldrick Newsom Aaron Peskin Jake McGoldrick Mi chela Newsom Peskin McGoldrick Term 1 X Alioto-Pier Term 2 Aaron Peskin Term 1 X Jake Mi chela McGoldrick Alioto-Pier Aaron Peskin Jake Mi chela Alioto-Pier McGoldrick Alioto-Pier Term 1 Aaron Peskin Jake Mi chela McGoldrick Alioto-Pier Aaron Peskin Jake McGoldrick Mi chela Peskin McGoldrick Term 2 X Alioto-Pier Aaron Peskin Term 2 X Eric Mar Mi chela David Chiu Mi chela Alioto-Pier Eric Mar Alioto-Pier Term 2 David Chiu Mark Eric Mar Farrell David Chiu Mark Chiu Eric Mar Mar Term 1 X Farrell David Chiu Term 1 X Mark Eric Mar Farrell David Chiu Mark Farrell Term Eric Mar Farrell 1 David Chiu X Mark Julie Chiu Eric Mar Farrell Christensen Term 2 Mark Farrell Term Peskin Eric Mar Mar T erm 2 X Farrell2 Aaron Peskin Term 1 X D1- SFTU D1- SFTU D1- SFTU BOS D4 support? BOS D5 support? BOS D6 support? Matt Lei and Yee Gonzalez Chris Daly Matt Daly Lei and Yee Yee Term 1 Gonzalez Chris Daly Term 1 X Matt Fiona Ma Gonzalez Chris Daly Matt Gonzalez Fiona Ma Gonzalez Term 1 X Chris Daly Ross Fiona Ma Mirkarimi Chris Daly Ross Daly Fiona Ma Ma Term 1 Mirkarimi Chris Daly Term 2 X Ross Ed Jew Mirkarimi Chris Daly Ross Mirkarimi Carmen Chu Jew Term 1 Mirkarimi Term 1 Chris Daly Carmen Chu Ross Chris Daly Ross Daly Carmen Chu Chu T erm 1 Mirkarimi Chris Daly Term 3 X Ross Carmen Chu Mirkarimi X Jane Kim Christina Mirkarimi Carmen Chu □agueTerm 2 Jane Kim London Katy Tang Chu Term 2 Breed Jane Kim Tang Term London Kim Katy Tang 1 Breed Jane Kim Term 1 X London Katy Tang Breed Jane Kim Tang Term London Breed Kim Katy T ang 2 BreedTerm 1 Jane Kim Term 2 X 92
D1- SFTU D1- SFTU D1- SFTU BOS D7 support? BOS Df support? BOS D9 support?
Tony Hall Mark Leno Tom Ammiano Leno Tony Hall Mark Leno Term 1 Tom Ammiano
Tony Hall Bevan Dufty Tom Ammiano Ammiano Tony Hall Hall Term 1 Bevan Dufty Tom Ammiano Term 1 X
Sean Elsbernd Bevan Dufty Tom Ammiano Dufty Sean Elsbernd Bevan Dufly Term 1 Tom Ammiano
Sean Elsbernd Bevan Dufty Tom Ammiano Elsbernd Ammiano Sean Elsbernd Term 1 Bevan Dufty Tom Ammiano Term 2 X Sean Elsbernd Bevan Dufty David Campos Dufty Sean Elsbernd Bevan Dufty Term 2 David Campos
Sean Elsbernd Scott Wiener David Campos Elsbernd Campos Sean Elsbernd Term 2 Scott Wiener David Campos Term 1
Norman Yee Scott Wiener David Campos Wiener Norman Yee Scott Wiener Term 1 David Campos
Norman Yee Scott Wiener David Campos Wiener Campos Norman Yee Yee Term 1 Scott Wiener Term 2 David Campos Term 2 X D1- SFTU D1- SFTU BOS D10 support? BOS D11 support?
Sophie Maxwell Gerardo Sandoval Maxwell Sophie Maxwell Term 1 Gerardo Sandoval
Sophie Maxwell Gerardo Sandoval Sandoval Sophie Maxwell Gerardo Sandoval Term 1 X
Sophie Maxwell Gerardo Sandoval Maxwell Sophie Maxwell Term 2 Gerardo Sandoval
Sophie Maxwell Gerardo Sandoval Sandoval Sophie Maxwell Gerardo Sandoval Term 2 Sophie Maxwell John Avalos Maxwell Sophie Maxwell Term 3 X John Avalos
Mali a Cohen John Avalos Avalos Mali a Cohen John Avalos Term 1 X
Mali a Cohen John Avalos Cohen Mali a Cohen Term 1 John Avalos
Mali a Cohen John Avalos Cohen Avalos Mali a Cohen Term 2 John Avalos Term 2 X 94
B. The number of Board of Supervisors members, by year, endorsed by the San Francisco Tenants Union:
Board Members Endorsed by SF Tenants Union 2001 6 2002 6 2003 6 2004 6 2005 4 2006 4 2007 5 2008 5 2009 6 2010 6 2011 5 2012 5 2013 5 2014 5 2015 4 2016 5
C. Tracking Tenant Legislation
For each category of tenant legislation (rent control, condominium conversions, evictions, and short-term rentals), a spreadsheet was used to document key information. Column headings were as follows: File Number; Name of Legislation; Title of Legislation; Type of Legislation; Sponsor(s); Primary Sponsor Endorsed by SFTU?; Date of Introduction; Action Taken at Committee; Committee Members and Vote Count; 95
Public Testimony in Support; Public Testimony in Opposition; Action Taken at Full Board; Vote Count; Mayor’s Action; Status; Date of Final Action. This record-keeping allowed a visual analysis of tenant ordinances introduced across each category.
D. Tenant Ordinances Introduced and Passed Into Law Tenant ordinances introduced and passed into law in three categories: rent control; condominium conversions; and eviction protections. Note: The category of short-term rentals is not included in these numbers. Tenant Ordinances Tenant Ordinances Introduced Passed Into Law 2001 3 2 2002 4 0 2003 5 2 2004 3 0 2005 4 2 2006 4 3 2007 2 2 2008 3 2 2009 2 1 2010 3 1 2011 2 1 2012 0 0 2013 2 1 2014 5 3 2015 4 4 2016 2 1 Total 48 25 E. Status of Tenant Ordinances Introduced, by category:
Rent Condo Control Evictions Conversions Passed with Mayor's Approval 2 7 13 Passed without Mayor's approval 0 0 3 Filed 4 3 8 Killed 0 2 5 Still Pending 0 1 0 97
F. Status of All Tenant Ordinances Introduced: Introduced by Non Introduced by “Pro- “Pro-Tenant” Tenant” Supervisor Supervisor Passed with Mayor's Approval 13 9 Passed without Mayor's approval 3 0 Filed 9 6 Killed 4 3 Pending 1 0 30 18
G. Number of tenant ordinances introduced by “pro-tenant” members of the Board of Supervisors: Ordinances Total Introduced by Ordinances "Pro-Tenant" Introduced Board Members Rent Control 6 5 Condominium Conversions 29 17 Evictions 13 8 Total 48 30 98
H. Tenant Data by District
Using data from the American Community Survey 2011-2015 5-Year Estimates, I divided all of the census tracts in San Francisco by Supervisorial district. This is not an exact representation of Supervisorial districts since the boundaries of census tracts often overlap districts—but census tracts were assigned to the district that the majority of its land fell in.
District 1 Census Renter Owner Tract Occupied Occupied Total 479.02 770 721 1491 479.01 1,102 1,537 2,639 9802 45 25 70 478.02 999 561 1560 427 1,605 779 2,384 478.01 910 708 1,618 426.01 1,394 375 1,769 477.01 1,135 717 1,852 477.02 892 685 1,577 426.02 995 437 1,432 476 1,524 673 2,197 402 1,753 711 2,464 452 1,917 1,011 2,928 451 1,439 726 2,165 156 1,104 328 1,432 157 1,922 710 2,632 Total 19506 30210 District 2 Census Tract Renter Occupied Owner Occupied Total 428 229 691 920 133 996 925 1,921 154 2,048 826 2,874 127 1,662 443 2,105 128 1,699 734 2,433 132 1,356 1,067 2,423 134 1,429 650 2,079 135 1,307 299 1,606 131.02 1,330 338 1,668 151 1,145 355 1,500 131.01 2,017 457 2,474 130 1,898 637 2,535 126.01 1,286 217 1,503 129.02 1,534 550 2,084 129.01 1,095 378 1,473 126.02 1,335 377 1,712 102 1,789 826 2,615 Total 24155 33925 District 3 Census Owner Tract Renter Occupied Occupied Total 101 1,703 346 2,049 103 1,523 507 2,030 109 2,124 665 2,789 110 2,144 473 2,617 111 2,641 395 3,036 120 2,504 65 2,569 104 1,762 795 2,557 107 2,226 200 2,426 106 1,636 236 1,872 113 1,336 181 1,517 112 1,273 545 1,818 108 2,092 432 2,524 119.01 1,150 359 1,509 119.02 1,736 101 1,837 121 2,035 120 2,155 117 981 43 1,024 118 690 9 699 611 1,952 84 2,036 105 1,211 371 1,582 Total 32,719 38,646 District 4 Renter Census Tract Occupied Owner Occupied Total 352.01 738 1,224 1,962 352.02 1,193 599 1,792 351 1,220 1,678 2,898 327 818 1,585 2,403 326.02 987 673 1,660 326.01 1,079 708 1,787 328.02 493 949 1,442 328.01 601 791 1,392 329.02 356 989 1,345 329.01 561 1,240 1,801 353 812 1,777 2,589 354 1,074 1,401 2,475 330 1,140 1,549 2,689 Total 11072 26,235 District 5 Census Owner Tract Renter Occupied Occupied Total 165 1,799 614 2,413 166 1,925 502 2,427 171.02 1,151 561 1,712 301.01 1,503 593 2,096 302.02 1,650 459 2,109 302.01 1,455 462 1,917 171.01 1,155 659 1,814 107 2,226 200 2,426 164 1,561 326 1,887 158.02 1,286 256 1,542 158.01 1,257 446 1,703 155 1,997 269 2,266 153 658 307 965 152 1,890 601 2,491 159 1,673 476 2,149 161 2,488 179 2,667 163 1,582 401 1,983 168.02 1,272 323 1,595 162 1,481 166 1,647 Total 30,009 37,809 District 6 Census Renter Owner Tract Occupied Occupied Total 160 1,166 473 1,639 122.02 1,579 37 1,616 122.01 2,821 110 2,931 124.02 2,050 202 2,252 124.01 2,548 0 2,548 123.02 1,787 9 1,796 123.01 1,291 9 1,300 125.02 2,209 20 2,229 176.01 3,676 431 4,107 202 2,597 529 3,126 201 2,313 597 2,910 177 640 116 756 228.01 1,137 802 1,939 178.02 1,692 464 2,156 178.01 1,830 418 2,248 180 729 613 1,342 615 4,448 2,729 7,177 607 3,270 1,524 4,794 Total 37,783 46,866 District 7 Census Tract Renter Occupied Owner Occupied Total 331 216 1,276 1,492 332.01 638 0 638 332.04 1,565 0 1,565 332.03 1,525 0 1,525 604 853 155 1,008 309 268 2,040 2,308 310 320 992 1,312 311 920 1,542 2,462 308 425 1,727 2,152 307 477 2,141 2,618 306 134 751 885 304 428 1,536 1,964 303.02 315 1,133 1,448 303.01 1,021 1,355 2,376 301.02 1,147 1,046 2,193 305 268 740 1,008 Total 10520 26,954 District 8 Census Tract Renter Occupied Owner Occupied Total 170 929 1,142 2,071 169 1,210 390 1,600 168.01 1,343 296 1,639 202 2,597 529 3,126 207 2,090 666 2,756 206 1,529 1,049 2,578 205 860 530 1,390 204.01 770 897 1,667 204.02 2,007 618 2,625 212 652 754 1,406 211 1,047 832 1,879 210 1,651 557 2,208 214 774 891 1,665 215 1,443 1,137 2,580 216 807 1,317 2,124 217 624 1,219 1,843 218 778 1,090 1,868 Total 21111 35,025 District 9 Census Owner Tract Renter Occupied Occupied Total 208 2,249 414 2,663 228.01 1,137 802 1,939 228.03 1,058 552 1,610 209 1,573 250 1,823 229.01 1,088 346 1,434 229.02 449 345 794 229.03 655 478 1,133 252 804 1,351 2,155 251 358 982 1,340 254.01 678 566 1,244 254.02 316 823 1,139 254.03 751 782 1,533 257.01 408 1,002 1,410 256 438 1,188 1,626 253 1,113 673 1,786 Total 13,075 23,629 District 10 Renter Owner Census Tract Occupied Occupied Total 607 3,270 1,524 4,794 227.04 774 817 1,591 227.02 652 359 1,011 614 1,356 1,154 2,510 228.02 473 166 639 226 436 432 868 9809 131 17 148 230.01 416 919 1,335 230.03 269 922 1,191 612 701 465 1,166 231.02 1,027 520 1,547 231.03 977 62 1,039 232 528 721 1,249 233 315 590 905 234 505 382 887 9806 61 103 164 610 611 934 1,545 257.02 568 581 1,149 259 432 1,046 1,478 258 288 344 632 264.02 374 816 1,190 264.01 339 723 1,062 264.03 458 583 1,041 264.04 335 350 685 9805.01 191 83 274 605.02 759 202 961 Total 16,246 31,061 District 11 Census Tract Renter Occupied Owner Occupied Total 313.01 272 1,040 1,312 313.02 633 1,272 1,905 314 650 1,172 1,822 312.01 754 1,137 1,891 312.02 298 587 885 262 641 1,339 1,980 261 893 1,107 2,000 255 729 2,005 2,734 263.03 509 735 1,244 263.02 588 933 1,521 263.01 599 778 1,377 260.04 560 680 1,240 260.03 506 892 1,398 260.02 238 746 984 260.01 697 809 1,506 256 438 1,188 1,626 Total 9005 25,425
Renter- Total % District Occupied Renters 1 19,506 30,210 65% 2 24,155 33,925 71% 3 32,719 38,646 85% 4 11,072 26,235 42% 5 30,009 37,809 79% 6 37,783 46,866 81% 7 10,520 26,954 39% 8 21,111 35,025 60% 9 13,075 23,629 55% 10 16,246 31,061 52% 11 9,005 25,425 35% citywide 225,201 355,785 63% 109
I. Ordinances Supported/Opposed by the San Francisco Tenants Union:
As I documented earlier, the legislative database for the Board of Supervisors called Legistar, while robust, had missing minutes making the tracking of this data difficult. Took a Position (but No minutes did No Minutes Support Oppose not indicate) Position Available Total Evictions 2 3 5 10 Condo Conversions 2 2 8 10 22 Rent Control 1 3 4
J. Number of Tenant Ordinances Heard at Committee:
The chart below outlines ordinances heard at committee, how many of those received no public comment either for or against, and of those ordinances heard at committee, their approval status at the full board. The intention of this data is to capture those ordinances that are considered “consensus” ordinances and are essentially non-controversial. Total Ordinances Heard at No Public Approved Committee Comment Approved? unanimously? Evictions 10 3 2 2 Condo Conversions 22 8 6 4 Rent Control 4 1 1 1 110
K. Data on Annual Evictions from the San Francisco Rent Board annual reports:
Number of Evictions By Year Rate of change 2001 2675 1.012874 1.30% 2002 2101 0.785421 -21.45% 2003 1643 0.782009 -21.80% 2004 1587 0.965916 -3.40% 2005 1446 0.911153 -8.88% 2006 1621 1.121024 12.10% 2007 1476 0.910549 -8.95% 2008 1665 1.128049 12.80% 2009 1430 0.858859 -14.11% 2010 1269 0.887413 -11.26% 2011 1370 1.07959 7.96% 2012 1395 1.018248 1.82% 2013 1757 1.259498 25.95% 2014 1977 1.125213 12.52% 2015 2120 1.072332 7.23% 2016 2376 1.120755 12.08% Ill
L. Data on Annual Median Rent, from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s “Fair Market Rents”:
Percentage Median Rent Change 2016 3220 33.52% 2015 2412 8.24% 2014 2228 5.42% 2013 2113 8.97% 2012 1939 -2.01% 2011 1979 3.93% 2010 1904 4.15% 2009 1829 6.15% 2008 1723 4.15% 2007 1654 2.64% 2006 1611 0.98% 2005 1596 -0.20% 2004 1599 -13.81% 2003 1855 -8.49% 2002 2027 11.05% 2001 1826 19.74% 2000 1525 7.14% M. Status of Short-Term Rental Legislation:
Short Term Rental Legislation Passed with Mayor's Approval 3 Passed without Mayor's approval 2 Filed 3 Killed 3 Still Pending 2 TOTAL 13 113
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