Caught in the Act: How Hedge Funds Manipulate their Equity Positions Gjergji Cici, Alexander Kempf, and Alexander Puetz* First Draft: August 2010 This Draft: August 2011 AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper CFR Working Paper No. 10-15 ABSTRACT Using 13F position valuations, we show that hedge fund advisors intentionally mismark their stock positions. We document manipulation even after eliminating issues inherent in the pricing of illiquid securities. The documented mismarking is related to hedge fund incentives. Mismarking is more pronounced for advisors that self-report to commercial hedge fund databases and increases after advisors start reporting. Significantly stronger mismarking is also documented among advisors that report more frequently to their current investors and are domiciled in offshore locations. Our analysis shows that advisors employ mismarking strategically to smooth their reported returns and push otherwise small negative returns above zero. JEL classifications: G23, G28 Keywords: Hedge Funds, Fair Value, Return Smoothing, Valuation Manipulation, Fraud * Cici is from Mason School of Business, The College of William & Mary. Email:
[email protected]. Cici is also a Research Fellow at the Centre for Financial Research (CFR), University of Cologne. Kempf is from Department of Finance and Centre for Financial Research (CFR), University of Cologne. Email:
[email protected]. Puetz is from Department of Finance and Centre for Financial Research (CFR), University of Cologne. Email:
[email protected]. The authors thank Luis Palacios and Rabih Moussawi from Wharton Research Data Services for providing them with the 13F positions valuation data. The authors thank Vikas Agarwal, Scott Gibson, Jim Hodge of Permal Asset Management, John Merrick, Harvey Westbrook, and Marco Rossi for their helpful comments.