DOCSLIB.ORG

7Th Annual Risk Americas Convention - 2018

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
7Th Annual Risk Americas Convention - 2018 7th Annual Risk Americas Convention - 2018 Fraud, Cybercrime and Reputation Risk – What Organizations Can Do About It Dalit Stern, CPA, CFE Senior Director Enterprise Fraud Risk Management, TIAA New York - May 17, 2018 Agenda The intertwined landscape of fraud and cyber A vibrant marketplace changes the face of fraud Sophistication of social engineering techniques Customers Corporations The impact of cyber risk on fraud and reputation risks what to do about it Q&A 2 Disclaimer The views expressed in this presentation and in today’s discussion are the views of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of TIAA. Examples, charts and metrics are purely for illustrational purposes, and may have been modified or simplified in order to clarify a point. Neither the speaker, nor TIAA, accept responsibility for any consequence of the use of any part of the framework presented herein. 3 The Intertwined Landscape of Fraud and Cyber Assessing the risk of fraud in financial institutions: • Financial institutions continue to be subject to fraud: • In person • Remote fraud (online, interactive voice response (IVR) , paper ) • Consistent trends of money out and account maintenance fraud enabled by cyber incidents • Cyberattacks are becoming a more prominent fraud threat - designed to target: • Customer assets • Financial institution assets • Certain subsectors are more prone to cyber fraud but most see increased activity (e.g., banking, brokerage, retirement 4 insurance, investments) The Intertwined Landscape of Fraud and Cyber (cont.) Assess the sources and impact of Cyber–threats I. Sources of intentional threats: • Insiders • Nation-states • Hacktivists • Cybercriminals II. Impacts from cybersecurity breaches: • Business/operational–direct/indirect interruption from a failure of key business processes • Legal and compliance–legal action (myriad laws and regulations) • Financial • Reputation 5 The Intertwined Landscape of Fraud and Cyber (cont.) Who are these Cybercriminals? Type: Lone hackers; petty criminals; organized, professional criminals “Organized”: • Based in international locations • Full time • Collaborate and share code • Use significant resources 6 A Vibrant Fraud Marketplace 7 A Vibrant Fraud Marketplace– for Products and Services Records and data for sale–on black market websites: • U.S. credit card with track data (account number, expiration date, name and more): $12 • EU, Asia credit card with track data: $28 • Social media account: $50 • Counterfeit Social Security cards: $250 to $400 • Counterfeit driver's license: $100 to $150 • New identity plus a matching utility bill: $350 • Bank credential: $1,000 + (6% of the total dollar amount in the account) • Hacking into a website: $100 to $300 8 Source: Business Insider article; IBM and the Ponemon Institute published in 2015 A Vibrant Fraud Marketplace- for Products and Services (cont.) For sale - on black 9 Source: https://www.moneywise.co.uk/news/2018-03-21/how-much-your-data-worth-to-hackers A Vibrant Fraud Marketplace (cont.) 10 Source: https://qz.com/460482/heres-what-your-stolen-identity-goes-for-on-the-internets-black-market/ Cyber Activity Changed the Face of Fraud • Digital fraud is global • Stolen Personally Identifiable Information (PII) are widely available • Out of wallet questions are easy to obtain • Traditional attacks include new digital channels • Use of bots • Move to fast transactions will increase impact • Fraud schemes: Identity theft New account opening fraud Account takeover fraud 11 Social Engineering • Armed with PII, fraudsters attempt to access financial customers’ assets in financial institutions • Corporations implement better systems at preventing and detecting cyber and fraud • Fraudsters increasingly target consumers to get around an institution’s fraud controls • People remain a weak link and can be exploited via increasingly sophisticated social engineering techniques 12 Social Engineering Schemes Common schemes: • Phishing/Vishing/Smishing: • The use of unsolicited email, text messages, and telephone calls purportedly from a legitimate company requesting personal, financial, and/or login credentials • Spear-phishing • Who has not received phishing (e)mails?: • Winning a Lottery • Wealthy businessmen in third world countries seeking business partners • Work from home 13 • ‘Romance’ schemes Social Engineering Schemes (cont.) Purpose: many social engineering schemes are designed to: • Compel victims to act as money mule and facilitate fraud and money laundering • Defraud unwitting individuals to transfer funds Victims: • Elderly individuals • Women • Financially well-off Method: fraudster(s) develop(s) relationship over months in order to build the victim’s trust 14 Money Movement: International transfers, despite limited history of wire transfers Cyber Activity Changed the Face of Fraud (cont.) Top loss categories: 7 15 Source: FBI Internet Fraud Report 2017, by Crime Type, by Loss amount https://pdf.ic3.gov/2017_IC3Report.pdf FBI - Internet Crime Complaint Center 16 ‘Advanced’ Social Engineering - Customer, Corporate Advanced social engineering requires attaining the confidence of customers or internal employees such that they divulge pieces of information needed to proceed with a fraudulent transaction: • Involves person-to-person interaction • Multiple attempts or steps to create a valid transaction • Use of social-engineering and interactive voice response (IVR) attacks to gather data enabling account takeover, fraudulent transactions • A necessary step in ‘finalizing’ an ongoing scheme: • Obtaining One-Time-Pin (email or phone) • Obtaining specific information needed 17 Social Engineering of Call Centers Call centers may be a weaker link in organizations: • Traditional call centers that rely on live agents to look for high risk / suspicious callers • Caller ID can be easily spoofed • Limited IVR monitoring • Limitations of Knowledge Based Authentication (KBA) • Delicate balance between customer experience and stringent security “By 2020, 75% of omnichannel customer-facing organizations will sustain a targeted, cross-channel fraud attack with the contact center as the primary point of compromise.” 18 Source: GARTNER: Don't Let the Contact Center Be Your 'Achilles Heel' of Fraud Prevention, published: 02 March 2017 Social Engineering of Call Centers (cont.) • Fraud incidents are often “multi-channel” • Interactions between a criminal and a call center may not result in a financial transaction (pre-fraud): • IVR • Agent • Nature of calls • Testing stolen data in an IVR system to identify accounts • Tricking an agent into revealing customer data • Asking an agent to change contact information • Using the IVR to change the PIN number on an account • Requesting to complete a fraudulent wire transaction 19 Source: Pindrop Labs, Call Center Fraud Report 2016 The Impact on Reputation • Challenge: The critical nature of maintaining confidentiality and integrity of customer financial data in financial institutions • Challenge: Dependence of financial institutions on other financial service providers and on multiple third parties for their own operations (e.g., Target) • Challenge: PII are compromised outside the financial institutions (result of well-publicized breaches, customer malware) • Cyber/fraud incidents that are likely to harm reputation: • Loss of PII -- Regulatory violations • Business disruptions • Wrongful conduct/fraud • Customer experience – challenge and opportunity 20 The Impact on Reputation (cont.) Impact analysis: • Limited cyber incidents or insignificant fraud losses are magnified as reputation is impacted • Providers and 3rd parties impact your reputation - “multiplier” effect to the exposure • Business differentiator • Loss mitigation: business, legal, insurance implications • Customer perception and the significance of client communication: • Before incident • During incident • After incident 21 • What not to say Fraud and Cyber Incidents are Often Manifestations of the Same Attack Incidents loss reporting reflect the convergence: • Increased online activity • Increased phone activity (agent and IVR) • Increased number of fraud alerts • Increased fraud incidents • Fraud losses • Challenges include: • Consistency of taxonomy to correlate cross-channel issues as facets of same attack: • across line of business and individual reporters • business line vs. corporate functions • Subsidiaries • Manual reporting: management and governance reporting – is 22 significantly slow; when cyber-attacks occur, need to be fast What to Do about Digital Fraud – Mitigation of Cyber and Fraud Risk R L Not “a one size fits all”: I a • Limit social engineering impacting workforce: S y K • Employee training: educate and train call center, IT employees e - r • Conduct random tests on different employee groups e • Provide ongoing customer education on new cyber/ fraud risks B d and how clients can protect themselves a s • Determine approach to authentication: e C • Login requests only/ transactions, requiring enhanced d o authentication n A t • Once-and-done approach with strong two-factor (MFA) p r • Digital verification of PII p o • Implement authentication programs across all channels: R l o • Online ,Mobile, Phone, Paper s a 23 • Move to passive authentication techniques c h What to Do about Digital Fraud – Mitigation of Cyber and Fraud Risk (cont.) • Recognize and prioritize cybersecurity and fraud management • Not only a compliance issue, the business should recognize its broad impacts and manage these
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Identity Theft Literature Review
    The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: Document Title: Identity Theft Literature Review Author(s): Graeme R. Newman, Megan M. McNally Document No.: 210459 Date Received: July 2005 Award Number: 2005-TO-008 This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally- funded grant final report available electronically in addition to traditional paper copies. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. IDENTITY THEFT LITERATURE REVIEW Prepared for presentation and discussion at the National Institute of Justice Focus Group Meeting to develop a research agenda to identify the most effective avenues of research that will impact on prevention, harm reduction and enforcement January 27-28, 2005 Graeme R. Newman School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany Megan M. McNally School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Newark This project was supported by Contract #2005-TO-008 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Internet Fraud
    internet fraud Internet Fraud The term ‘internet fraud’ refers to any type of fraud scheme that uses email, web sites, chat rooms or message boards to present fraudulent solicitations to prospective victims, to conduct fraudulent transactions or to transmit the proceeds of fraud to financial institutions or to others connected with the scheme. internet fraud may include spam, scams, spyware, identity theft, phishing or internet banking fraud. spam scams Spam is a generic term used to describe The power of the internet and email electronic ‘junk mail’ or unwanted messages communication has made it all too easy sent to your email account or mobile phone. for email scams to flourish. These schemes These messages vary, but are essentially often arrive uninvited by email. Many are commercial and often annoying in their sheer related to the well documented Nigerian volume. They may try to persuade you to Scam or Lotto Scams and use similar buy a product or service, or visit a website tactics in one form or another. where you can make purchases; or they may attempt to trick you into divulging your bank More information about scams is available account or credit card details. from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) SCAMwatch More information about spam is available website (www.scamwatch.gov.au) from the Australian Communications and the Australian Securities and and Media Authority (ACMA) website Investments Commission FIDO website (www.acma.gov.au). (www.fido.gov.au). Bizsafety | www.afp.gov.au 1 internet fraud Bizsafety suggestions to prevent spyware Phishing loss from Online fraud Spyware is generally considered to be Phishing is a technique used to gain • Consideration of using a low-limit software that is secretly installed on a personal information for the purpose of separate credit card for online computer and takes things from it without identity theft.
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact of Digital Advancement in Banking Industry Marketing: the Case of Indonesia
    Proceeding Book of The 4th ICMEM 2019 and The 11th IICIES 2019, 7-9 August 2019, Bali, Indonesia ISBN: 978-623-92201-0-5 THE IMPACT OF DIGITAL ADVANCEMENT IN BANKING INDUSTRY MARKETING: THE CASE OF INDONESIA Handy Andriyas, Batara Maju Simatupang, and Kevin Bastian Sirait aFaculty of Economics, Parahyangan Catholic University bMagister Management, Post-Graduate Program, STIE Indonesia Banking School Email: [email protected] Abstract. This article investigates the impact of digital and technological advancement in the Indonesian banking industry based on the perspective of marketing. The application of technology in the marketing field enables the banks to gain a competitive advantage in introducing their product to the potential and current customers. On the other hand, these benefits are also exposing the banks' and its customer to the marketing fraud risk. To find the impact of digital and information technology (IT) utilization with the addition of marketing fraud risk, the questionnaire in this research is answered by the directors of the banks' that are classified to the Book 4 category in Indonesia. The linear regression analysis is implemented to find the relationship between the utilization of IT and marketing fraud risk to the impact of technological and digital advancement. Based on the analysis conducted in this research, it is found that the advancement of digital and technological advancement has a positive relationship with marketing fraud risk and IT utilization by the banks, and it is also found that marketing fraud risk may also increase if the banks increase their utilization on IT in regards to introducing their product to the current and potential customer.
    [Show full text]
  • Managing Your Payment Fraud Risk: Tips & Red Flags
    Treasury & Payment Solutions Information Reporting & Risk Management Managing Your Payment Fraud Risk: Tips & Red Flags No matter the type of business, the risk of fraud is always present. We are committed to providing you with support to help minimize the exposure of your BMO® bank account to fraud. This Tips & Red Flags checklist includes a number of best practices you can implement to help prevent payment fraud and protect yourself from data breaches. We strongly recommend that you review and implement the items contained in the checklist and share with other members in your organization. Need assistance? If you have any questions about the information in this checklist, please contact your BMO Representative. To report suspicious emails and websites [email protected] For BMO Online Banking for Business support 1-800-565-6444 The material in this guide provides commonly-known information about fraud trends and BMO’s observations about controls and activities. The guide is intended to provide you and your company with information and helpful tips. The guide is not exhaustive and does not constitute legal advice to you or your company. You should always seek independent legal or professional advice when implementing fraud or risk initiatives. Common fraud types and prevention tips Malware Tips & Red Flags Malware AKA malicious software 3 Download IBM Trusteer Rapport®*, a free software download Malware infiltrates your computer system and performs available on the sign in page of BMO Online Banking for Business, 1 unauthorized activities and transactions. Here are a and accessible from bmo.com. It works with existing firewall and few examples: antivirus software to provide an additional layer of security.
    [Show full text]
  • Shill Bidding in English Auctions
    Shill Bidding in English Auctions Wenli Wang Zoltan´ Hidvegi´ Andrew B. Whinston Decision and Information Analysis, Goizueta Business School, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, 30322 Center for Research on Electronic Commerce, Department of MSIS, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712 ¡ wenli [email protected] ¡ [email protected] [email protected] First version: January, 2001 Current revision: September 6, 2001 Shill bidding in English auction is the deliberate placing bids on the seller’s behalf to artificially drive up the price of his auctioned item. Shill bidding has been known to occur in auctions of high-value items like art and antiques where bidders’ valuations differ and the seller’s payoff from fraud is high. We prove that private- value English auctions with shill bidding can result in a higher expected seller profit than first and second price sealed-bid auctions. To deter shill bidding, we introduce a mechanism which makes shill bidding unprofitable. The mechanism emphasizes the role of an auctioneer who charges the seller a commission fee based on the difference between the winning bid and the seller’s reserve. Commission rates vary from market to market and are mathematically determined to guarantee the non-profitability of shill bidding. We demonstrate through examples how this mechanism works and analyze the seller’s optimal strategy. The Internet provides auctions accessible to the general pub- erature on auction theories, which currently are insufficient to lic. Anyone can easily participate in online auctions, either as guide online practices. a seller or a buyer, and the value of items sold ranges from a One of the emerging issues is shill bidding, which has become few dollars to millions.
    [Show full text]
  • Money Mule Recruitment Among University Students in Malaysia: Awareness Perspective
    PUPIL: International Journal of Teaching, Education and Learning ISSN 2457-0648 Vedamanikam & Chethiyar, 2020 Volume 4 Issue 1, pp. 19-37 Date of Publication: 25th June 2020 DOI- https://doi.org/10.20319/pijtel.2020.41.1937 This paper can be cited as: Vedamanikam, M., Chethiyar, S. D. M. (2020). Money Mule Recruitment among University Students in Malaysia: Awareness Perspective. PUPIL: International Journal of Teaching, Education and Learning, 4(1),19-37. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, PO Box 1866, Mountain View, CA 94042, USA. MONEY MULE RECRUITMENT AMONG UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN MALAYSIA: AWARENESS PERSPECTIVE Mohanamerry Vedamanikam Manager, AML Compliance, Western Union Payments (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (970512P) Level 22.03, The Gardens North Tower, Mid Valley City, Lingkaran Syed Putra, 59200 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia [email protected] Saralah Devi Mariamdaran Chethiyar Senior Lecturer, Psychology & Counselling Program, School of Applied Psychology, Social Work and Policy, College of Arts and Sciences, University Utara Malaysia, Malaysia [email protected] Abstract Money laundering is perceived as a global threat with funds sourced from illegal and fraudulent activities. Money mules are recruited by criminal networks in money laundering chain, positioned between actual criminal and the illicit funds, enabling the criminals to be anonymous and non-visible to the detection of law enforcement. Job vacancy with various positions are offered with attractive financial rewards and work flexibility and the criminal elements are hidden behind the job criteria.
    [Show full text]
  • Behind the “From” Lines: Email Fraud on a Global Scale Ten Cybercriminal Organizations Unmasked
    AGARI CYBER INTELLIGENCE DIVISION REPORT Behind the “From” Lines: Email Fraud on a Global Scale Ten Cybercriminal Organizations Unmasked © Copyright 2019 AGARI Data, Inc. Executive Summary Nigerian Scammers Target American Businesses Over the course of the past 10 months, using responsible active defense “ Since I can't send techniques, Agari captured 78 criminal email accounts, belonging to 10 criminal more money, maybe organizations, and containing 59,652 unique email messages. Agari analyzed the I'm of no use to you contents of these email accounts to investigate the tactics, targets and identities now. I certainly feel of the criminals. And now, that analysis enables stronger defensive strategies and like that could be measures. the deal here...A realtor is coming over What’s more, Agari has used this analysis to warn financial institutions about tomorrow to help accounts being used for criminal activity, and to provide evidence to law me list my house for enforcement. Agari has also warned victims, and in at least once case, quick action sale. I'm talking to an helped a company recover its money. attorney now about how to keep the One of the more interesting findings from this analysis was that while much of the collection agencies high-profile cybersecurity news of the past year has involved state sponsors like away and protect my Russia and North Korea, American businesses and individuals are far more likely to kids. All this time, I'm be targeted by Nigerian scam artists. wondering if I've heard Nigerian scam artists, traditionally associated with implausible get-rich-quick from you for the last schemes and other scams of individuals, have become more sophisticated and time.
    [Show full text]
  • Are the Auction Houses Doing All They Should Or Could to Stop Online Fraud?
    Federal Communications Law Journal Volume 52 Issue 2 Article 8 3-2000 Online Auction Fraud: Are the Auction Houses Doing All They Should or Could to Stop Online Fraud? James M. Snyder Indiana University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Communications Law Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons Recommended Citation Snyder, James M. (2000) "Online Auction Fraud: Are the Auction Houses Doing All They Should or Could to Stop Online Fraud?," Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 52 : Iss. 2 , Article 8. Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol52/iss2/8 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Federal Communications Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOTE Online Auction Fraud: Are the Auction Houses Doing All They Should or Could to Stop Online Fraud? James M. Snyder* I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 454 II. COMPLAINTS OF ONLINE AUCTION FRAUD INCREASE AS THE PERPETRATORS BECOME MORE CREATV ................................. 455 A. Statistical Evidence of the Increase in Online Auction Fraud.................................................................................... 455 B. Online Auction Fraud:How Does It Happen? ..................... 457 1. Fraud During the Bidding Process .................................. 457 2. Fraud After the Close of the Auction .............................. 458 IlL VARIOUS PARTES ARE ATrEMPTNG TO STOP ONLINE AUCTION FRAUD .......................................................................... 459 A. The Online Auction Houses' Efforts to Self-regulate...........
    [Show full text]
  • Internet Fraud
    Internet Fraud Internet Fraud is ever increasing as Fraudsters continue to find new ways of using the Internet to scam innocent consumers. Fraud over the internet is popular because of its anonymity and ease of promotion, and its lack of borders. It used to be that fraudsters required intelligence to persuade people face to face. With the increase of the internet, comes an increase of fraud - and these fraudsters no longer need to be persuasive, just persistent and patient. Fraud on the Internet includes, but is not limited to: fraudulent or fake web sites, untrustworthy websites, phishing (fishing) for personal information with fraudulent emails, Online auction frauds - buyers and sellers, increased Nigerian 419 Advance Fee Fraud, Lottery Advance Fee Scams, Business Opportunities & Work from Home Scams, International Modem Dialing and Cramming, and credit card fraud. There has been a huge increase in the types of frauds that gain personal information, which is then used or sold for the purpose of identity theft. Advance Fee Fraud, also called Fee Fraud, is any scam that in exchange for a fee: • Promises to send you money, products, or services; • Offers you the opportunity to participate in a special deal; • Asks for your assistance in removing funds from a country in political turmoil; or • Asks for your assistance to help law enforcement catch thieves. (Click here for more information.) If the fraudsters are lucky enough to scam the consumer out of cash, then that is a small bonus to compliment the personal details they have extracted from the consumer - these can include bank account and credit card details, passport numbers, social security numbers etc.
    [Show full text]
  • Online Money Laundering Operations to Take Place
    Laundering Money Online: a review of cybercriminals’ methods Jean-Loup Richet Tools and Resources for Anti-Corruption Knowledge – June, 01, 2013 - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Executive Summary Money laundering is a critical step in the cyber crime process which is experiencing some changes as hackers and their criminal colleagues continually alter and optimize payment mechanisms. Conducting quantitative research on underground laundering activity poses an inherent challenge: Bad guys and their banks don’t share information on criminal pursuits. However, by analyzing forums, we have identified two growth areas in money laundering: Online gaming—Online role playing games provide an easy way for criminals to launder money. This frequently involves the opening of numerous different accounts on various online games to move money. Micro laundering—Cyber criminals are increasingly looking at micro laundering via sites like PayPal or, interestingly, using job advertising sites, to avoid detection. Moreover, as online and mobile micro-payment are interconnected with traditional payment services, funds can now be moved to or from a variety of payment methods, increasing the difficulty to apprehend money launderers. Micro laundering makes it possible to launder a large amount of money in small amounts through thousands of electronic transactions. One growing scenario: using virtual credit cards as an alternative to prepaid mobile cards; they could be funded with a scammed bank account – with instant transaction – and used as a foundation of a PayPal account that would be laundered through a micro-laundering scheme. Laundering Money Online: a review of cybercriminals’ methods Millions of transactions take place over the internet each day, and criminal organizations are taking advantage of this fact to launder illegally acquired funds through covert, anonymous online transactions.
    [Show full text]
  • The Complete Idiot's Guide to Starting an Ebay Business, Second Edition
    Starting an eBay Business Second Edition by Barbara Weltman and Malcolm Katt A member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. Starting an eBay Business Second Edition by Barbara Weltman and Malcolm Katt A member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. This book is dedicated to all the eBay sellers, present and future, who prove that the entrepreneurial spirit is indomitable. ALPHA BOOKS Published by the Penguin Group Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014, USA Penguin Group (Canada), 90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700, Toronto, Ontario M4P 2Y3, Canada (a division of Pearson Penguin Canada Inc.) Penguin Books Ltd, 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England Penguin Ireland, 25 St. Stephen’s Green, Dublin 2, Ireland (a division of Penguin Books Ltd.) Penguin Group (Australia), 250 Camberwell Road, Camberwell, Victoria 3124, Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty. Ltd.) Penguin Books India Pvt. Ltd., 11 Community Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi—110 017, India Penguin Group (NZ), 67 Apollo Drive, Rosedale, North Shore, Auckland 1311, New Zealand (a division of Pearson New Zealand Ltd.) Penguin Books (South Africa) (Pty.) Ltd, 24 Sturdee Avenue, Rosebank, Johannesburg 2196, South Africa Penguin Books Ltd., Registered Offices: 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England Copyright © 2008 by Barbara Weltman and Malcolm Katt All rights reserved. No part of this book shall be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without written permission from the pub- lisher. No patent liability is assumed with respect to the use of the information contained herein. Although every precaution has been taken in the preparation of this book, the publisher and authors assume no responsibility for errors or omissions.
    [Show full text]
  • FINANCIAL CRIME DIGEST July 2020
    FINANCIAL CRIME DIGEST July 2020 Diligent analysis. Powering business.™ aperio-intelligence.com FINANCIAL CRIME DIGEST | JULY 2020 ISSN: 2632-8364 About Us Founded in 2014, Aperio Intelligence is a specialist, independent corporate intelligence frm, headquartered in London. Collectively our team has decades of experience in undertaking complex investigations and intelligence analysis. We speak over twenty languages in- house, including all major European languages, as well as Russian, Arabic, Farsi, Mandarin and Cantonese. We have completed more than 3,000 assignments over the last three years, involving some 150 territories. Our client base includes a broad range of leading international fnancial institutions, law frms and multinationals. Our role is to help identify and understand fnancial crime, contacts, cultivated over decades, who support us regularly integrity and reputational risks, which can arise from a lack in undertaking local enquiries on a confdential and discreet of knowledge of counterparties or local jurisdictions, basis. As a specialist provider of corporate intelligence, we enabling our clients to make better informed decisions. source information and undertake research to the highest legal and ethical standards. Our independence means we Our due diligence practice helps clients comply with anti- avoid potential conficts of interest that can affect larger bribery and corruption, anti-money laundering and other organisations. relevant fnancial crime legislation, such as sanctions compliance, or the evaluation of tax evasion or sanctions We work on a “Client First” basis, founded on a strong risks. Our services support the on-boarding, periodic or commitment to quality control, confdentiality and respect retrospective review of clients or third parties. for time constraints.
    [Show full text]