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Is Social Projection Based on Simulation Or Theory? Why New Methods Are Needed for Differentiating

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Is Social Projection Based on Simulation Or Theory? Why New Methods Are Needed for Differentiating New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 328–335 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect New Ideas in Psychology journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/newideapsych Is social projection based on simulation or theory? Why new methods are needed for differentiating Claudia Bazinger 1, Anton Kühberger* University of Salzburg, Department of Psychology, Hellbrunnerstr. 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria abstract Keywords: The literature on social cognition reports many instances of a phenomenon titled ‘social Social predictions projection’ or ‘egocentric bias’. These terms indicate egocentric predictions, i.e., an over- Simulation theory reliance on the self when predicting the cognition, emotion, or behavior of other people. Theory theory The classic method to diagnose egocentric prediction is to establish high correlations Social projection between our own and other people’s cognition, emotion, or behavior. We argue that this method is incorrect because there is a different way to come to a correlation between own and predicted states, namely, through the use of theoretical knowledge. Thus, the use of correlational measures is not sufficient to identify the source of social predictions. Based on the distinction between simulation theory and theory theory, we propose the following alternative methods for inferring prediction strategies: independent vs. juxtaposed predictions, the use of ‘hot’ mental processes, and the use of participants’ self-reports. Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction a similar question for the topic of other minds: How do we come to know about the mental states that exist in other How do we come to know about the mental states people? We will discuss the merits of a distinction between (e.g., beliefs, or desires) that are existing in ourselves? One simulation theory and theory theory for understanding and influential philosophical view suggests that we know about predicting the behavior of other people. Specifically, we will our own current mental states through introspection. Des- show that this distinction can be used in research on social cartes argued that we are in doubt about everything except cognition in order to better explain the bases of under- what is happening in our own mind. This view came under standing and predicting other minds. attack by Ryle (1949) and Wittgenstein (1958), who Imagine the following experiment: You ask people to proposed a radically different view. These philosophers rate T-shirts of different colors on a scale from 1 to 10 maintained that there is nothing like beliefs or desires in the according to their liking. Then you ask them to make mind and that mental terms refer to dispositions to behave predictions for another person, using the same scale. How in certain ways rather than to internal mental states. Simi- can people accomplish this task? They can either project larly, Sellars (1956) argued against introspection and their own judgment onto others, i.e., they use their own proposed, as an alternative, that lay people have a theory of opinion as a basis for the prediction (the strategy of using mind that posits mental states. The present paper deals with ‘self as proxy’), or they can base their predictions on folk psychological theories about other people (e.g., what colors are popular among people in general). Consider the result * þ þ Corresponding author. Tel.: 43 662 8044 5112; fax: 43 662 8044 of the hypothetical experiment to be a mean correlation of 5126. r ¼þ0.40 between own and predicted liking. What does E-mail addresses: [email protected] (C. Bazinger), anton. [email protected] (A. Kühberger). this result mean? Did participants make their predictions 1 Tel.: þ43 662 8044 5167; fax: þ43 662 8044 5126. using a theory or the self as proxy? 0732-118X/$ – see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2012.01.002 C. Bazinger, A. Kühberger / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 328–335 329 Inspection of the literature shows a clear tendency to could use specific knowledge about a good friend, or interpret such findings as indicating social projection, i.e., knowledge about how other people in general would react. using the self as a proxy. The logic for this interpretation is These two polesdprojection and theorydcontrast in the that social projection will result in a correlation between amount to which the self is involved: High in the case of own and predicted preference. Although true in general, projection, not necessarily in the case of a theory. In this interpretation faces two problems: First, the use of philosophy of mind, these two concepts are known as a theory can also lead to significant correlations, if that simulation theory (Gordon, 1986; Heal, 1986) and theory theory happens to produce a prediction similar to one’s theory (Churchland, 1981; Fodor, 1987). Even though own judgment. Second, social projection is tested against concepts related to simulation and theory are used in social the null hypothesis of no correlation; a proper test of social psychology (Ames, 2004a, 2004b; Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, projection should be against a correlation of 1, however, & Gilovich, 2004), we argue that current theorizing does given that complete social projection implies a perfect not adequately distinguish between theory and simulation. correlation. We argue that correlations by themselves do Before we go into detail about the methodological prob- not show that predictions are based on the self, i.e., they do lems, we will introduce simulation theory and theory not show social projection. Instead of relying on correla- theory. tions, alternative methods are needed to determine whether people use the self or theoretical knowledge for predictions. 3. Simulation theory and theory theory 2. Predicting others Simulation theory was introduced by philosophers (Gordon, 1986; Heal, 1986) as an explanation for our ability Predicting other people’s behavior is one of the essential to understand and predict other people. It holds that we requirements of our daily lives. Knowing what other people use ourselves as a model for understanding and predicting think or feel and what they therefore might do, makes our other people, in a process that does not require any social lives easier and allows us to maneuver smoothly knowledge about the mental makeup of other people. through the world that we share with others. Although we Simulation theory claims that the same sequence of mental are generally successful in our predictions of others (which processes that can be found in another person also takes is evident since we are not constantly surprised by the place in us, triggered by the imagined situation. This behavior of people around us), sometimes predictions go replication of mental processes (Heal, 1986) is the core wrong. One particular error that is attributed to people is assumption of simulation theory. Perner and Brandl (2009, the tendency to find others more similar to themselves p. 438) distinguish three stages of simulation: than they actually are (e.g., Dawes, 1989; Gilovich, Jennings, & Jennings, 1983). People tend to believe that other people (i) Identification: We pretend to be in the other person’s will act, think and feel as they do. This assumption is true situation. on a very basic level, since we are all human, hardwired in (ii) Replication: Our own mental processes work in the a similar way, and, unless suffering from a severe mental same way as those of the other person. disorder, our way of thinking and feeling is therefore (iii) Interpretation: The mental states that were involved in similar. However, it is certainly not wise to over-apply this the replication stage are extracted and are projected idea. The erroneous assumption that we can automatically onto the other person. derive other people’s experience from our own experience has been discussed by philosophers (e.g., Gregory, 2004). Simulation is a simple method for using the self as a tool Turing reminded us that, although we may perceive for predicting other people, and it has been shown that it is someone as human and therefore similar to ourselves, he used as a strategy for predictions (Kühberger, Kogler, Hug, could also be a computer trying to deceive us (as explicated & Mösl, 2006; Perner & Kühberger, 2003). in the famous ‘Turing Test’). The basic philosophical issue of The counterpart to the simulation view is theory theory the idea of likeness notwithstanding, social psychology has (Churchland, 1981; Fodor, 1987), which states that we also collected evidence of overgeneralization. Indeed, possess folk psychological theories about mental processes. people are psychologically different in many aspectsdour Other people’s behavior is accordingly explained and pre- opinions, beliefs, ideals, morals, and preferences need not dicted by ascribing beliefs, desires and other mental states be the same. At times, people realize this and do not to them. Explanation and prediction of other people’s assume that other people will behave similarly to them- behavior exploit an internally represented knowledge selves (e.g., Johnson, 1987; Karniol, Eylon, & Rish, 1997). structure of human behavior, i.e., a ‘folk psychology’ (Stich However, research has documented many instances of & Nichols, 1992). Folk psychology, in its broadest sense, over-application of similarity (e.g., the false consensus contains information about how the human mind works effect; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). This phenomenon is and how that makes people act in different situations. We called ‘social projection’, where the basis for predicting possess concepts about different mental states, their rela- others (a social task) is our own judgment projected onto tionships among each other and about the relationship othersda strategy that can be described as using oneself as between mental states and behavior (e.g., that people act to proxy. However, there is a real alternative to projection: satisfy their desires according to their beliefs; Apperly, The use of purely theoretical information that can also be 2008).
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