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Internet Voting in Australian Electoral Systems

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Internet Voting in Australian Electoral Systems Internet voting in Australian election systems 10September2013 Contents List of Acronyms and Abbreviations used......................................................................... 5 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 7 Aims........................................................................................................................... 7 Time horizon .............................................................................................................. 8 Technical issues relating to the security of the internet ............................................. 8 Costing and planning ............................................................................................... 10 Outline ..................................................................................................................... 11 Key observations ..................................................................................................... 11 2. Definition and distinctive features of internet voting ................................................ 13 Definition and main models of “internet voting” ....................................................... 13 Distinctive features of internet voting....................................................................... 14 3. Historical background .............................................................................................. 19 The evolution of Australia’s voting processes.......................................................... 19 Previous Australasian experience with electronic voting ......................................... 20 Significant previous analysis of the issue of internet voting..................................... 24 International experience .......................................................................................... 32 4. The electoral environment in Australasia................................................................. 33 AEC environmental scan ......................................................................................... 34 Population mobility, including overseas................................................................... 35 Changing nature of the printing industry and postal services .................................. 36 The nature of campaigning ...................................................................................... 37 The rise of the internet............................................................................................. 39 Increased commercially-available internet voting for private and fee-for-service (FFS) elections and other ballots ....................................................................................... 42 Public attitudes to, and trust in, internet voting, the election process and EMBs..... 43 Attitudes to risk ........................................................................................................ 44 Diversity of electoral processes in a federal system................................................ 45 Page 1Internet voting in Australian election systems 5. Rights and obligations............................................................................................. 46 Constitutional law..................................................................................................... 46 Instruments and documents elaborating principles relevant to internet voting ........ 46 The secret ballot, and free expression of the electors’ will, without fear or intimidation............................................................................................................... 47 Transparency........................................................................................................... 53 Universal and non-discriminatory access ................................................................ 55 Conflicts between principles .................................................................................... 55 6. Potential motivations for the introduction of internet voting ..................................... 55 Provision of better service to individual voters......................................................... 56 Enhancements to the overall electoral process ....................................................... 59 Realisation of efficiencies in the administration of elections.................................... 63 7. Issues regarding internet voting............................................................................... 64 Issues relating to the social context and character of elections............................... 65 Issues relating to the protection of the integrity of the voting process, and trust ..... 66 Secrecy of the ballot, and voting in a protected environment .................................. 68 Transparency........................................................................................................... 68 Timing of voting, and the campaign......................................................................... 69 Challenge of ballot structure and devices................................................................ 69 Registering for internet voting, and voter identification............................................ 69 Witnessing ............................................................................................................... 70 Cost issues .............................................................................................................. 70 8. Concluding observations......................................................................................... 71 Appendix A - Consideration of electronic or internet voting by federal parliamentary committees .............................................................................................................. 74 The 1998 Federal Election - Report of the Inquiry into the conduct of the 1998 Federal Election and matters related thereto - JSCEM - June 2000 ....................... 74 The 2001 Federal Election - Report of the Inquiry into the conduct of the 2001 Federal Election, and matters related thereto - JSCEM - June 2003 ...................... 74 The 2004 Federal Election - Report of the Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2004 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto - JSCEM - September 2005........... 75 Page 2Internet voting in Australian election systems Report on the 2007 federal election electronic voting trials - Interim report of the inquiry into the conduct of the 2007 election and matters related thereto - JSCEM - March 2009.............................................................................................................. 75 Report on the conduct of the 2007 federal election and matters related thereto - JSCEM - June 2009................................................................................................. 75 Australia’s Overseas Representation - Punching below our weight -Inquiry of the Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee - Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade - October 2012 ......................................................................... 76 Cancer of the bush or salvation for our cities? Fly-in, fly-out and drive-in, drive-out workforce practices in Regional Australia - Inquiry into the use of ‘fly-in, fly-out’ (FIFO) workforce practices in regional Australia - House of Representatives Standing Committee on Regional Australia -February 2013................................................... 76 Appendix B - State and Territory Legislation .................................................................. 77 General .................................................................................................................... 77 New South Wales .................................................................................................... 77 Victoria..................................................................................................................... 77 Queensland ............................................................................................................. 77 Western Australia .................................................................................................... 77 South Australia ........................................................................................................ 78 Tasmania ................................................................................................................. 78 Australian Capital Territory ...................................................................................... 78 Northern Territory .................................................................................................... 78 New Zealand............................................................................................................ 79 Appendix C - Current positions of ECANZ members in relation to internet voting.......... 80 Commonwealth........................................................................................................ 80 New South Wales .................................................................................................... 80 Victoria..................................................................................................................... 80 Queensland ............................................................................................................. 80 Western Australia ...................................................................................................
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