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Nessus Plugin Family SecurityCenter 4 TENABLE NETWORK SECURITY INC., COPYRIGHT © 2012 ITS DEPT Nessus Plugin Family March 5, 2012 at 6:15pm CST [third] Confidential: The following report contains confidential information. Do not distribute, email, fax, or transfer via any electronic mechanism unless it has been approved by the recipient company's security policy. All copies and backups of this document should be saved on protected storage at all times. Do not share any of the information contained within this report with anyone unless they are authorized to view the information. Violating any of the previous instructions is grounds for termination. Nessus Plugin Family SecurityCenter 4 TENABLE NETWORK SECURITY INC., COPYRIGHT © 2012 Table of Contents Plugin Family Summary ...............................................................................................................1 AIX Local Security Checks .......................................................................................................3 Backdoors .....................................................................................................................................................4 CentOS Local Security Checks ...........................................................................................6 CGI abuses .................................................................................................................................................. 7 CGI abuses : XSS ................................................................................................................................ 9 CISCO ............................................................................................................................................................. 11 Databases .................................................................................................................................................. 13 Debian Local Security Checks ......................................................................................... 15 Default Unix Accounts ............................................................................................................... 17 Denial of Service ...............................................................................................................................19 DNS ....................................................................................................................................................................21 Fedora Local Security Checks ......................................................................................... 23 Firewalls .......................................................................................................................................................24 FreeBSD Local Security Checks .................................................................................... 26 FTP .....................................................................................................................................................................28 Gain a shell remotely .................................................................................................................. 30 Table of Contents Tenable Network Security i Nessus Plugin Family SecurityCenter 4 TENABLE NETWORK SECURITY INC., COPYRIGHT © 2012 General ..........................................................................................................................................................32 Gentoo Local Security Checks ........................................................................................ 33 HP-UX Local Security Checks ...........................................................................................35 Junos Local Security Checks ............................................................................................37 MacOS X Local Security Checks ................................................................................... 39 Mandriva Local Security Checks ................................................................................... 41 Misc. ................................................................................................................................................................. 42 Netware .........................................................................................................................................................44 N/A ......................................................................................................................................................................45 Peer-To-Peer File Sharing ...................................................................................................... 47 Policy Compliance .......................................................................................................................... 49 Port scanners ........................................................................................................................................50 Red Hat Local Security Checks ...................................................................................... 51 RPC ....................................................................................................................................................................52 SCADA ........................................................................................................................................................... 54 Service detection .............................................................................................................................. 56 Settings .........................................................................................................................................................57 Slackware Local Security Checks ................................................................................ 58 SMTP problems .................................................................................................................................. 59 Table of Contents Tenable Network Security ii Nessus Plugin Family SecurityCenter 4 TENABLE NETWORK SECURITY INC., COPYRIGHT © 2012 SNMP ...............................................................................................................................................................61 Solaris Local Security Checks ......................................................................................... 63 SuSE Local Security Checks ..............................................................................................64 Ubuntu Local Security Checks ........................................................................................ 66 VMware ESX Local Security Checks ......................................................................... 68 Web Servers ........................................................................................................................................... 70 Windows ...................................................................................................................................................... 72 Windows : Microsoft Bulletins ..........................................................................................74 Windows : User management ............................................................................................76 Table of Contents Tenable Network Security iii Nessus Plugin Family SecurityCenter 4 TENABLE NETWORK SECURITY INC., COPYRIGHT © 2012 Plugin Family Summary Plugin Family Severity Counts Family Score Total Low Med. High Crit. Windows 168870 34468 18276 1618 14574 0 General 19085 15318 13774 1447 97 0 Port scanners 14172 14172 14172 0 0 0 Service detection 9890 7619 7166 258 195 0 Windows : User management 5430 5041 4941 73 27 0 N/A 14047 5037 4004 41 992 0 Windows : Microsoft Bulletins 34624 4426 471 771 3184 0 Settings 3143 3143 3143 0 0 0 Web Servers 8732 2839 1926 332 581 0 Misc. 7413 2496 1700 321 475 0 Red Hat Local Security Checks 11848 1810 347 447 1016 0 RPC 3495 1461 990 315 156 0 DNS 5320 1168 345 465 358 0 CISCO 7351 1071 101 350 620 0 FTP 5650 1033 317 261 455 0 CGI abuses : XSS 2815 1021 173 834 14 0 CentOS Local Security Checks 6121 1009 441 0 568 0 Solaris Local Security Checks 9960 996 0 0 996 0 Backdoors 8864 983 56 66 861 0 Denial of Service 6094 969 34 470 465 0 Gain a shell remotely 6764 948 14 370 564 0 VMware ESX Local Security 7740 921 0 210 711 0 Checks Firewalls 4595 913 381 158 374 0 SuSE Local Security Checks 4381 904 485 42 377 0 Default Unix Accounts 9000 900 0 0 900 0 Peer-To-Peer File Sharing 4037 895 409 176 310 0 SNMP 3319 895 565 78 252 0 FreeBSD Local Security Checks 4512 890 479 11 400 0 SMTP problems 5170 874 196 258 420 0 Ubuntu Local Security Checks 4695 865 413 34 418 0 Databases 4422 865 399 91 375 0 Slackware Local Security Checks 5220 861 183 249 429 0 AIX Local Security Checks 8580 858 0 0 858 0 CGI abuses 4928 857 400 6 451 0 Debian Local Security Checks 4012 835 482 0 353 0 HP-UX Local Security Checks 5342 831 0 424 407 0 Plugin Family Summary Tenable Network Security 1 Nessus Plugin Family SecurityCenter 4 TENABLE NETWORK SECURITY INC., COPYRIGHT © 2012 Family Score Total Low Med. High Crit. MacOS X Local Security Checks 4776 814 219 199 396 0 Gentoo Local Security Checks 4683 777 343 0 434 0 Fedora Local Security Checks 3149 726 386 91 249 0 Mandriva Local Security Checks 3973 706 343 0 363 0 Junos Local Security Checks 2386 468 90 212 166 0 SCADA 2343 434 134 113 187 0 Netware 1780 367 21 243
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