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The Effects of Russian Propaganda on Georgia's Diplomatic Relations

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The Effects of Russian Propaganda on Georgia's Diplomatic Relations The Effects of Russian Propaganda on Georgia’s Diplomatic Relations: 2008 Russo-Georgian War Olivia Hayward Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies October 20, 2019 1 INTRODUCTION Tensions between Russia and Georgia have existed since before the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in December 1991. These tensions finally erupted in 2008, when Russia invaded Georgia as part of a conflict involving the autonomous republic of South Ossetia, located within Georgia’s internationally recognized borders. The international community has had difficulty agreeing on who was the initial aggressor in the conflict, receiving different reports about the events of the war. After the war began, Russian propaganda surrounding the conflict was disseminated all across the globe, some being spread by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. The disinformation campaign headed by the Russian government created confusion, with some countries fully believing the Russian “facts” given to them about the war in the Caucasus. The effects of this disinformation on Georgia’s diplomatic relations with the international community has been minor regarding some countries but led to a significant loss of diplomatic ties with others as well as possible setbacks regarding its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. This paper will be testing the effects of propaganda on diplomatic relations between countries using the case of Russian propaganda against Georgia during the 2008 war. GEORGIA’S POST-SOVIET HISTORY Georgia’s relationship with the autonomous republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has been complicated, even before its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Abkhazia was an independent kingdom until 985, when it became a part of Georgia, before later regaining independence. In 1801, Georgia was absorbed into the Russian Empire and Abkhazia was annexed into Russia in 18641. In 1921, both Georgia and Abkhazia were declared Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) of the Soviet Union.2 The next year, the Soviets created the autonomous region of South Ossetia within Georgia. In 1931, Abkhazia was incorporated into Georgia as an autonomous republic by Soviet authorities.3 In 1989, Soviet peacekeepers were deployed to Georgia due to violent clashes between South Ossetians and Georgians over South Ossetian autonomy. After South Ossetia claimed to be a Soviet Democratic Republic loyal to Moscow in 1990, some Georgians began to suspect that the unrest in South Ossetia was being encouraged by the Kremlin, in preparation for a Russian military suppression in Georgia. In response, the parliament in Tbilisi dissolved the autonomous region in March of 1990.4 In spring 1991, Georgia proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union and later that year, the USSR collapsed. The same year, Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected to be the Georgian president and in 1 "Abkhazia Profile," BBC News, May 28, 2018, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18175030. 2 "2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts," CNN, April 01, 2019, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict/index.html. 3 "Abkhazia Profile," BBC News, May 28, 2018, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18175030. 4 John Kohan, "Hastening The End of the Empire," Time, January 28, 1991, Accessed August 08, 2019, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,972214,00.html. 2 January of 1991, Georgia’s National Guard entered Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, and the ensuing Georgian-Ossetian War continued throughout 1991 and 1992.5 A few months later in December of 1991, President Gamsakhurdia was the target of a military rebellion and was eventually overthrown in a violent coup d’état in 1992. The Georgian Military Council took over the government and appointed Tengiz Kitovani, one of the leaders of the rebellion, as acting-prime minister. Throughout 1992, government troops suppressed two pro-Gamsakhurdia demonstrations as well as an attempted coup, resulting in a combined 17 deaths. Eduard Shevardnadze was elected as chairman of parliament in October 1992.6 In June of 1992, South Ossetia and Georgia signed the Sochi ceasefire agreement mediated by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and established a peacekeeping organization called the Joint Control Commission for Georgian-Ossetian Conflict Resolution (JCC). The Joined Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) under the JCC in South Ossetia was made up of Russian, Ossetian, and Georgian troops. A de facto South Ossetian government was created and the conflict with South Ossetia was frozen.7 In September 1993, former President Gamsakhurdia led a rebellion against Shevardnadze’s Georgian government, which Russian troops supported towards the end of the conflict. The conflict ended when Gamsakhurdia committed suicide on December 31, 1993. The civil war ended with around 500 people killed and over 200,000 displaced. In the same period, Abkhazia declared their independence from Georgia in 1992, causing the Abkhazia-Georgian conflict in which Abkhazian secessionists rebelled against the Georgian government for independence. Despite the Abkhazian claims that their Soviet-made tanks, rockets, and other heavy weaponry were “war trophies” captured from the Georgians, there is evidence that these were supplied by the Russian army. In addition to Russia’s logistical support and provision of weaponry, there were also reports that fighters from Russia helped the Abkhaz troops torture and commit mass ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhaz territory.8 The conflict was suspended in 1994, when Georgia signed a ceasefire agreement with Abkhazia, leading to an influx of Russian peacekeepers in the region.9 Shevardnadze won the presidential election in 1995 despite an assassination attempt. He then survived a second assassination attempt in 1998, months before suppressing a military rebellion. Claims of corruption surfaced. In 1999, Abkhazia officially declared their 5 "Georgia 1991-present," Political Science, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/europerussiacentral-asia-region/georgia-1991-present/. 6 "Georgia 1991-present," Political Science, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/europerussiacentral-asia-region/georgia-1991-present/. 7 Republic of Georgia, Russian Federation, Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian - Ossetian Conflict,By Eduard A. Shevardnadze and Boris N. Yeltsin, Accessed August 8, 2019, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GE RU_920624_AgreemenOnPrinciplesOfSettlementGeorgianOssetianConflict.pdf. 8 “Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia's Role in the Conflict,” Human Rights Watch Arms Project 7, no. 7 (March 1995), https://doi.org/10.1163/2210-7975_hrd-1245-0312. 9 "2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts," CNN, April 01, 2019, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict/index.html. 3 independence, although it was not recognized by any actors in the international community.10 President Shevardnadze was elected into office for a third time in 2000, although opposition parties claimed that the legislative elections were fraudulent.11 In 2001, the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict resumed and tensions with Russia increased, due to Russian claims that Georgia was harboring Chechen rebels on its territory.12 The dark nineties in Georgia lived up to their name. Corruption and crime plagued Georgia; police officers expected bribes and often paid to get their jobs. There was no heat, running water, or electricity in hospitals and schools. Instability, poverty, and economic stagnation caused many to be frustrated with Shevardnadze’s government.13 In November of 2001, security forces raided a privately-owned anti-government television station Rustavi-2, which incited mass protests throughout the country. President Shevardnadze dismissed his government in response to the protests.14 In November of 2003, the parliament of Georgia held elections and the results were heavily in the president’s party’s favor, despite his weaning popularity. Exit polls conducted by a non-governmental organization and the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy showed that the election results were tampered with and many Georgians believed that the president was responsible. The Georgian population protested in what was deemed the “Rose Revolution.”15 The twenty-one-day non-violent revolution outside of parliament led by Mikheil Saakashvili resulted in Shevardnadze’s resignation.16 Mikheil Saakashvili was elected to the position of president of Georgia in January 2004.17 His political objectives were pro-Western; among his goals for his presidency were joining NATO and the European Union (EU). This sharp turn away from Russia and towards the West angered the Russian President Vladimir Putin, and when the two met, Putin stated that he could not trust Saakashvili, and Saakashvili accused Putin of trying to destabilize Georgia because of its Western inclinations. Tensions between the two increased when Putin asked Saakashvili to retain a senior Georgian security official who was respected in Moscow; instead, 10 "Abkhazia Profile," BBC News, May 28, 2018, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18175030. 11 "Georgia 1991-present," Political Science, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/europerussiacentral-asia-region/georgia-1991-present/.
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