Why Were the Nineties So Good? Could It Happen Again?
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University of Wisconsin–Madison Institute for Research on Poverty Volume 22 Number 2 Focus Summer 2002 Why were the nineties so good? Income Volatility and the Implications for Food Could it happen again? 1 Assistance Programs: A Conference of IRP and the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of The right (soft) stuff: Qualitative methods Agriculture, May 2002 and the study of welfare reform 8 Income volatility and the implications for Marriage and fatherhood food assistance programs 56 Expectations about marriage among unmarried parents: The role of food stamps in stabilizing income New evidence from the Fragile Families Study 13 and consumption 62 The economic circumstances of fathers Income volatility and household consumption: with children on W-2 19 The impact of food assistance programs 63 The life circumstances of African American fathers with Short recertification periods in the U.S. Food Stamp children on W-2: An ethnographic inquiry 25 Program: Causes and consequences 64 Children’s living arrangements after divorce: Food Stamps and the elderly: Why is participation How stable is joint physical custody? 31 so low? 66 IRP Visiting Scholars, 2002 32 Gateways into the Food Stamp Program 67 Including the poor in the political community 34 WIC eligibility and participation 68 Evaluation of State TANF Programs: An IRP Confer- The correlates and consequences of welfare exit and entry: ence, April 2002 Evidence from the Three-City Study 70 TANF programs in nine states: Incentives, assistance, Measuring the well-being of the poor using income and and obligation 36 consumption 72 TANF impact evaluation strategies in nine states 41 Perspectives of researchers and federal officials: A panel session 48 ISSN: 0195–5705 Why were the nineties so good? Could it happen again? Robert M. Solow the five years 1995–2000, the U.S. economy grew faster, Robert M. Solow is Institute Professor of Economics maintained a lower unemployment rate, and experienced Emeritus at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This less inflation than in the quarter-century from 1970 to article is adapted from the Robert J. Lampman Memorial 1995 (Table 1). No serious macroeconomist that I know Lecture that he delivered in Madison in June 2001. would have thought in 1990 that the U.S. economy could go through a five-year period of rapid growth, drive the unemployment rate steadily down to 4 percent in the fifth year, and still find the inflation rate steady or falling. This The research project I sketch here had its origin in some would have been regarded as an impossibly optimistic facts about the performance of the U.S. economy. During scenario; and I would have agreed. Yet the years 1995–2000 were not quite an economic miracle, as Table 1 also shows. The decade of the 1960s Table 1 exhibited equally good performance. By the end of the Economic Performance, by Decade, 1960–2000 1960s, however, the Vietnam War was driving the U.S. 1990s economy. We now think of that period as the prelude to (second half) 1980s 1970s 1960s the inflation of the 1970s. So far, the prosperity of the 1990s does not seem to have that consequence. So we are Real GDP growth (%) 3.2 (4.0) 3.0 3.3 4.4 talking about a remarkable five years. Unemployment rate (%) 5.8 (5.0) 7.3 6.2 4.8 Inflation rate (%) 2.9 (2.4) 5.1 7.4 2.5 Two lively and interesting New York foundations—the Russell Sage Foundation and the Century Foundation— ployment.” They wondered what factors had permitted were provoked to try to understand this surprising epi- this to happen, and whether such conditions could be sode. Their interest was not purely scientific. They re- sustained as a normal outcome. Nothing could be more membered that “full employment” had once been a important for the well-being of the least advantaged part primary goal of national economic policy. In those days, of the population. Even those who are necessarily out of that meant a state of affairs in which inflation did not the labor force profit from full employment, if only be- threaten, and the measured unemployment rate was very cause governments find themselves flush with revenue close to the inevitable amount of frictional unemploy- and better able to support transfer payments relatively ment.1 painlessly. Full employment, in that sense, was expected to bring The two foundations asked Professor Alan Krueger of with it many social benefits: lower crime, better health, Princeton University and me to design and organize a improved family structure, wider access to education. research project that explored the causes and likely per- The foundations were aware that over the years, the goals manence of these changed economic relationships. The of macroeconomic policy had receded to the acceptance findings from this research have been published as a of unemployment rates much higher than the frictional volume, The Roaring Nineties: Can Full Employment Be level; the avoidance not merely of inflation but of accel- Sustained? by the Russell Sage Foundation (see box, erating inflation had become the overriding objective of p. 4). It did not occur to me until this project was well macro-policy. Now suddenly the United States had under way that it had an unusual aspect. We were trying achieved something very like the old ideal of “full em- to understand a single episode in one country. One might think that there is nothing special about that: we just have to see how it fits into some more general “covering” The Robert J. Lampman Memorial theory. But that is much too simple. Any event that is Lecture Series singled out as an “episode” is almost by definition atypi- cal or peculiar. Otherwise it would not be dignified with Established to honor Robert Lampman, professor that label. There are always exogenous events occurring, of economics and founding director and guiding and it is rarely clear how they are to be integrated into a spirit of IRP until his death in 1997, the lecture coherent story about the episode. Except very rarely, one series is organized by IRP in conjunction with the cannot intelligently compare one episode with another, University of Wisconsin–Madison’s Department because the other will have been influenced by a different of Economics. A fund has been established to collection of exogenous events and different historical support an annual lecture by a distinguished antecedents. After all, it is over two hundred years since scholar on the topics to which Lampman devoted 1789, and right now someone, somewhere, is writing his intellectual career: poverty and the distribu- another book about the causes of the French Revolution. tion of income and wealth. This memorial has been established by the Lampman family, with It was not our goal to reform macroeconomic theory, so the help of the University of Wisconsin Founda- we approached our question in the vocabulary of the tion. The series offers a special opportunity to theoretical consensus of the time: roughly speaking, the maintain and nurture interest in poverty research expectations-augmented, accelerationist Phillips curve among the academic community and members (although I, personally, have always had my doubts about of the public. The Institute extends its deep ap- that theory). This consensus view presumed the effective- preciation to the Lampman family and other do- ness of two constraints on macroeconomic performance. nors for making this opportunity possible. (For an explanation of the Phillips curve, see box, p. 3.) The 2002 Lampman Lecturer is Eugene Smolensky, Professor of Public Policy at the Uni- First, the trend growth rate of potential GDP in the United versity of California, Berkeley. Other Lampman States was widely believed to be somewhere near 2.0–2.5 Lecturers have included Sheldon Danziger, Ed- percent a year, and to be limited mainly by the slow ward M. Gramlich, and Angus Deaton. growth of productivity, at a rate of 1.0–1.5 percent a year. Of course, the economy could grow faster than that after a 2 The Phillips curve and inflation The Phillips curve is named for its originator, New Zealand economist A. W. Phillips, whose studies of unemployment and the rate of inflation in Britain between 1861 and 1957 led him to conclude that there was a predictable inverse relationship between the two. The “Phillips curve” graphically describes this observation: Whenever unemployment is low, inflation tends to be high. Whenever unemployment is high, inflation tends to be low. In the 1970s, however, higher inflation in the United States was associated with higher—not lower—unemploy- ment. The average inflation rate rose from about 2.5 percent in the 1960s to about 7 percent in the 1970s, and average unemployment from about 4.75 percent to about 6 percent, calling into question the validity of the relationship posited in the Phillips curve and raising serious issues for policymakers. If the relationship between unemployment and inflation was not predictable in the way the Phillips curve assumed, then the inflation cost of targeting a particular unemployment rate was not clearly identifiable. As Robert Solow discusses in the accompanying article, the years 1995–2000 also challenge the conventional understanding of the inflation- unemployment relationship. Inflation is considered low or high relative to the expected rate of inflation. Unemployment is considered low or high relative to the so-called “natural rate” of unemployment, a concept first presented in 1968 by Milton Friedman in his Presidential Address to the American Economic Association. In Friedman’s view, which is accepted by many macroeconomists, the “natural rate” is determined by the microeconomic structure of labor markets and household and firm decisions affecting labor supply and demand.