Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa's Shores

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Laying transoceanic cables on Africa’s shores: a Neo-gramscian study

Derbe, S.T.

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Download date:25 Sep 2021 Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s Shores A Neo-Gramscian Study

Samuel Teshale Derbe

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s Shores A Neo-Gramscian Study

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op gezag van de Rector Magnificus Prof. Dr. D.C. van den Boom ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties ingestelde commissie, in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel op donderdag 4 november 2010, te 10:00 uur

door

Samuel Teshale Derbe geboren te Ambo, Ethiopië

Promotiecommissie

Promotor: Prof.Dr. C.J. Hamelink Co-promotor: Prof. Dr. G. C. A. Junne

Overige leden: Prof. Dr. L. F. M. Besselink Prof. Dr. A.J. Dietz Dr. J. Hoffmann Dr. H.S. Gebre Selassie Dr. A. A. M. Schrauwen

Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid

Acknowledgment

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my promoters, Professor Cees Hamelink and Professor Gerd Junne. I am very lucky for having such knowledgeable and compassionate mentors.

I am heavily indebted to Leonard and Alison for their generosity and constant friendship.

I thank Haile Selassie for making this PhD project a reality.

Meles Habte, Genet Baraki, Kim Bierhoff, and my colleagues at the Amsterdam School of Communication also deserve a special mention for their kind assistance.

Finally, I am grateful to my wife, Abeba, and my children, Yonathan and Ruhama. Their love and sacrifice sustained me during my sojourn in the Netherlands.

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

Table of Contents Abbreviations and acronyms...... v

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Literature Review...... 3 Research on ICAIS...... 3 Politics of global communication...... 10 Africa and the politics of global communication...... 12

Research Questions...... 15 Research Methods...... 15 Organisation of the Chapters...... 16

CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 19

Neo-Gramscian Theory of Political Economy...... 19 Methodology: Historic blocs, hegemony and civil society.... 22 Strands of Gramscian thought...... 24

Technology and Social Change...... 26 Mapping a Neo-Gramscian Route for the Study of the Global Information Society...... 29 A shift to postmodern cultural studies...... 29 Hegemony, ideology and commercialisation of the Internet... 32

CHAPTER TWO: THE BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL BACKBONE PROVISION ...... 34

Technical Description...... 34 Providers of Connectivity...... 37 Historical Development of Internet Backbones...... 43 Charging Arrangements...... 46 Peering arrangements...... 46 Transit arrangements...... 48

Nature of the Contractual Agreements...... 49

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

Business Strategies of IBPs and Downstream ISPs...... 52 ICAIS, Regulation, and the Economics of the Internet...... 55

CHAPTER THREE: IDEATIONAL CONSTITUENTS OF THE GLOBAL INFORMATION ORDER ...... 58

Information Society...... 58 A global information society?...... 62 Information society and the digital divide...... 65

Communication Society...... 69 New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO)/New International Information Order (NIIO)...... 69 The Post-NWICO vision for world communication...... 74 Developing countries in the Post-NWICO phase...... 76

CHAPTER FOUR: INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE GLOBAL INFORMATION ORDER ...... 79

The ITU and the Global Information Order...... 79 Origins of the ITU development mandate...... 80 ITU in a changing business environment...... 86 The accounting rate system and ICAIS...... 90

The World Summit on Information Society: Debating the Global Information Order...... 93 The profile of UN summits...... 93 The agenda of WSIS...... 94 Civil society and the WSIS...... 100

CHAPTER FIVE: LINKING AFRICA TO THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY ...... 107

Ownership of Telecommunications Assets in Africa...... 107 The Politics of Telecommunications Reform in Africa...... 115 Stakeholders of the global information superhighway...... 120 SAT 3/WASC/SAFE...... 121 EASSy, open access, and compromises...... 127

iii

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

CHAPTER SIX: INFORMATION SOCIETY WITHIN A RESTRUCTURED AFRICA ...... 135

Africa’s Information Society Initiative...... 135 NEPAD, African Development and E-strategies...... 139 Genesis of NEPAD...... 139 Foreign and local engagement with NEPAD...... 144 Framing NEPAD...... 148

CONCLUSION ...... 159 References...... 174 Summary...... 207 Samenvatting...... 215

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

Abbreviations and acronyms Afrispa-African Internet Service Providers Association APC-Association for Progressive Communications APRM-African Peer Review Mechanism CODESRIA-Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa DFID-Department for International Development Dot Force- Digital Opportunity Task Force EASSy-Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System GEAR - Growth, Employment and Redistribution GISPA-Ghana Internet Service Providers Association ICANN-Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ICT-Information and Communications Technology IDRC-International Development Research Centre IICD-International Institution for Communication and Research IMF-International Monetary Fund IPDC-International Programme for the Development of Communication ITU-D- International Telecommunications Union- Telecommunications Development Sector ITU-International Telecommunications Union ITU-T-International Telecommunications Union- Telecommunications Standardization Bureau LAN-Local Area Network MAE-Metropolitan Area Exchange NAP-Network Access Point NEPAD-New Partnership for Africa‘s Development NIIO-New International Information Order NSFNET-National Science Foundation Network NWICO-New World Information and Communication Order Panaftel -Pan African Telecommunications Network

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

POP-Point of Presence PTO-Public Telecommunications Operator PTT-Postal Telegraph and Telephone SADC-Southern African Development Community SAT 3/WASC/SAFE - Third South Atlantic /West Africa Submarine Cable/South Africa-Far East SEA-ME-WE4 -South East Asia-Middle East- Western Europe 4 TWN-Third World Network TNC/ MNC-Transnational Corporation/ Multinational Corporation UNECA-United Nations Economic Commission for Africa UNESCO-United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization USAID-Unites States Agency for International Development USNSF-United States National Science Foundation WIPO-World Intellectual Property Organization WSIS-World Summit on Information Society

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

Introduction

This dissertation explores the material interests, ideas, and institutions shaping Africa‘s integration into the global information economy. Among the plethora of issues arising in the context of this integration, International Charging Arrangements for Internet Services (ICAIS) are chosen as the entry point into this study.

International Charging Arrangements for Internet Services are agreements between Internet service Providers to settle costs for carrying each other‘s traffic. The dominant players in these settlement arrangements are Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs). These are the largest Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in terms of number of customers, geographical coverage, web content, and ownership of high-speed fibre networks. IBPs, most of which are U.S. and European transnational corporations, thus, command vital resources for worldwide Internet connectivity.

Since the 1990s, the charging arrangements for Internet connection have been identified as one of the key issues of the digital divide. The ICAIS dispute between Asia-Pacific ISPs and U.S. Internet Backbone Providers was submitted to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Study group 3 in 1998. The complainants alleged that they were obliged to pay the full cost of transmission links to U.S. Internet exchange points even though the transmission links were used to carry the traffic coming from the US. In other words, the charging arrangements grant U.S customers a free ride. In order to rectify this unfair trade practice, the complainant ISPs demanded that U.S. backbone providers be charged a fee for the Internet traffic they send to Asia-Pacific destinations.

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

The cost of interconnection has been compounded for Africa because the continent depended on satellite technology to connect to U.S. Internet exchange points. Apart from being more expensive than fibre optic technology for high volume traffic, these satellite links were leased from foreign companies. As a result, African ISPs paid the full amount not only for the incoming and outgoing traffic but also for the leased satellite link (Bell, 2002). Thus, African policy makers had to address the twin challenges of construction of transoceanic fibre optic cables and settlement of costs for traffic exchange.

The Halfway Proposition, submitted to the New Partnership for Africa‘s Development (NEPAD) Ministerial Meeting in 2002, was the first proposal to address these challenges. According to this proposal, African states had better not litigate the ICAIS issue at the ITU. If the cost of Internet traffic exchange is to be reduced, these states must encourage their ISPs to devise techniques of aggregation of traffic. The monopoly telecoms operating in many African states have to be dismantled, and privatisation and liberalisation measures have to be introduced. The other half of the solution involved donor assistance to finance the construction of submarine fibre optic cables. These same measures were later endorsed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and NEPAD in their policies and projects to address the connectivity problem.

While ICTs can be used to address mass poverty and underdevelopment, current ICAIS and information society policies of African regional organisations, instead, reflect the hegemonic ideas of a transnational capitalist bloc and its node in Africa.

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

The following review of the literature on the subject aims to situate the theoretical and methodological approach adopted in this study.

Literature Review

The Literature review is divided into three sub-sections. The first sub-section reviews prior research on ICAIS. The second sub-section summarises the broader literature on the politics of global communication within which the ICAIS research is situated. The third sub-section assesses the literature on international Internet connection, digital divide and information society with specific reference to Africa.

Research on ICAIS

For developing countries or non-US ISPs, international Internet connection has two cost components. The first one is the cost of physical capacity to link with exchange points or Network Access Points (NAPs) in the U.S. The other cost relates to purchase of transit access from IBPs to deliver or receive traffic within the US or via the US in a third country. In U.S-Africa routes, both these services are usually purchased in bundles from a few providers (Antelope Consulting, 2001, pp.21-22).

The first complainant on ICAIS was Telstra, a telco in which the Australian government had a 50% share. The gist of the complaint was that Telstra was compelled to pay the cost for the physical links that are used by U.S.IBPs to forward their traffic to Asia-Pacific destinations. Hence, the remedy sought by the complainants was a financial settlement by 3

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

U.S.IBPs in proportion to the volume of traffic they send over the transmission links.

The Australian government initially submitted the complaint to the Telecommunications Meeting of Ministers of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1998. An ICAIS task force was set up to investigate the matter (APEC, 2000, Annex A). On the basis of the findings of the task force, APEC members, in their meeting in Cancun, Mexico in 2000, recommended that governments play a role to restore fair competition where there are dominant players in the market of Internet interconnection. The following were also suggested as the relevant considerations for ICAIS in bilateral commercial contracts: (a) the use by each party of the interconnected network resources, (b) the end-to-end costs of international transport link capacity, and (c) the contribution of each network to the communication (APEC, 2000, Annex B).

The Australian government also submitted its complaint to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The ITU World Telecommunications Standardization Assembly (WTSA) passed recommendation ITU-T D.50, 2000, as amended in 2004. The recommendation stated that bilateral negotiations between Internet service providers should consider the following elements: traffic flow, number of routes, geographical coverage and cost of international transmission. USA and Greece did not adopt this recommendation. China also objected because it preferred charging arrangements based on traffic flow only.

The ITU-T D.50, 2008, which is now in force, introduced an additional consideration, namely: ―the possible application of network externalities‖. This addition was based on another ITU recommendation, ITU-T.D .156. The latter recommendation 4

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores was based on a study conducted to identify the impact of network expansion in developing countries on revenues received by developed country telcos. The finding was that the addition of new users of telephone in the developing countries results in the increase in the value of networks of developed countries. Hence, ITU recommended that telecommunication companies in the developed countries pay a premium to developing country telcos in proportion to the positive externality. This premium was a payment on top of the regular charges for telephone calls. It must be noted that ITU recommendations are not legally binding. They neither impose mandatory rules on the ISPs and IBPs entering into charging arrangements nor subject these arrangements to a regulatory scrutiny.

The overriding issue in the ICAIS literature has been whether the charging arrangements were a result of monopoly pricing by American IBPs. Savage, Frieden and Denton (1999, 2000a, 2000b), who were assigned by APEC to study the ICAIS dispute, answered the question in the negative. The Internet backbone market is generally competitive, and there are no barriers to entry. The IBPs do not have any monopoly over provision of capacity. The high cost of Internet interconnectivity in the region is attributable to other factors, mainly the lack of competition in the domestic telecommunication sector. Besides, the ISPs in the region had not designed business models to avoid routing intra-regional traffic via US. They did not also utilise available technologies to reduce the amount of traffic routed via the long haul transmission links (Savage, Frieden & Denton, 1999, 2000a, 2000b).

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) explained the cause of the dispute in very technical 5

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores terms. It asserted that ICAIS are a result of the shift in the ―financial midpoint for traffic exchange from the oceans (as in the case of cables) and geostationary orbit (as in the case of satellites) to Internet exchange points‖ (1998, p.36). In other words, telecommunication links between US and other countries used to be jointly owned by the respective national providers. ITU regulations were put in place to make sure that each party paid for its half of the circuit. Now, according to the OECD, charging arrangements deal with costs for carrying traffic from NAPs to U.S.IP addresses, and the NAPs are located in the US.

Besides, the OECD pointed out that the cost sharing mechanism based on traffic proposed by the complainant countries also affects European interests. European telcos have invested in the U.S. backbone market. As a result, they would prefer to maintain the current arrangements.

Antelope Consulting (2001) specifically dealt with the issue of whether the major variable determining access to Internet in developing countries was the high cost of interconnection. Based on case studies conducted in Zambia, Nepal, India and Brazil, this study concluded that international connection is a significant cost component for end users. According to Antelope, these costs do not reflect ―exploitative behaviour by companies from the developed countries, either in international leased circuit market or in the global interconnectivity market‖ (p, 25). However, it noted that the existing ICAIS lack transparency and a procedure to address grievances.

To sum, all the above studies on the ICAIS dispute recommended speeding up liberalisation of the infrastructure market to address the problem. The industry, they conjectured, 6

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores will devise its own solution if it is allowed to operate in a competitive, rather than a regulated, market. Adoption of cost saving technology and rationalisation of usage of bandwidth were also the other measures recommended to ISPs from developing countries (Kende, 2000; WiK, 2002).

Roseman (2003a, 2003b) applied a realist-mercantilist theoretical framework to interpret the ICAIS dispute as a conflict between the national interests of EU/US and developing countries. The fact that the company that initiated the ICAIS complaint, Telstra (Australia), later withdrew its claim, according to Roseman, validates this argument. In other words, the developing countries involved in this dispute seek a return to the old accounting rate system of the ITU. In the previous accounting rate system, the country that originated a telephone call paid the country that terminated the call. As more calls originated from developed countries than from developing countries, the latter received substantial transfer of revenue for terminating these calls. In contrast, ICAIS required developing countries to pay for Internet traffic that originated from USA and Europe. The new arrangement, therefore, ensures cash transfer from the developing to the developed countries.

Roseman concluded that market liberalisation and adoption of cost-saving technology are not sufficient to solve the issue of ICAIS. A more useful measure would be application of antitrust laws against the IBPs of the developed countries. Nevertheless, this measure can be implemented only if the US, as a ―benevolent hegemon‖, is willing to extend its assistance to those countries affected by the new settlement arrangements.

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

Therefore, while the literature summarised above framed ICAIS in terms of behaviour of firms, Roseman analysed the issue from the point of view of the national interests of the countries involved. In conclusion, national interest being ultimately dependent on the balance of coercive or material power in the world, the solution to the problem of ICAIS lies in the benevolence of the powerful countries.

African ISPs also complained about the ICAIS. According to Bell (2002), if a Kenyan ISP sends traffic to the US, then it has to pay 100% of the transmission link to the US NAPs. The Kenyan ISP also pays for the transmission link when an e- mail or another electronic content is carried by a US IBP to a Kenyan destination. Besides, as many business and intergovernmental organizations in Africa had their websites in US or Europe in search of a reliable connectivity, the problem was exacerbated (Bell, 2002).

Bell commented that Internet backbone providers have no reason to agree to a cost sharing arrangement. He put the response of the latter as follows: ―if you (AISP) [African Internet Service Providers] want service, you have to come to me, if you don‘t want to come to me-that is fine, I am not paying to come to you‖ (2002, p.3).He, therefore, advised against joining the ICAIS controversy at the ITU.

The alternative strategy proposed by Bell stressed the need for a strategic leadership by the private sector and donors to solve the continent‘s connectivity problems. Accordingly, the African Internet Service Providers Association (Afrispa), in collaboration with transnational companies was to set up national exchange points in all countries across the continent. Then, national ISPs would establish a consortium, Pan-African Virtual Exchange Inc. 8

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

(PAVIX Inc) that will aggregate the traffic originating from the various national ISPs. By aggregating intra-Africa traffic at regional exchange points, African ISPs would avoid the cost of transmission of intra-Africa traffic via U.S. exchange points. African ISPs would also be able to take advantage of the higher volume of the aggregated traffic and negotiate a better price with IBPs.

The Halfway Proposition sought to insert African ISPs into a position where they can appropriate a slice of the annual payment the continent pays to U.S. IBPs. However, in order for the private sector to play its role of a business intermediary, the physical infrastructure had to be put in place. This requires large investment that African governments cannot finance. Hence, the role of donors in providing the necessary financial resources is the other key part of the strategy.

African governments, on the other hand, were urged to withdraw from the market and introduce liberalisation and deregulation policies so that the private sector can develop innovative business solutions to the issue of ICAIS. The Halfway Proposition is not, therefore, just a strategy to address the issues of ICAIS. It is also a political agenda to change the respective power and role of the state, local and foreign capital as well as donors in connection with bridging the digital divide in Africa. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, this political agenda was at the root of the conflicts surrounding ownership of essential telecommunication facilities such as fibre optic cables in Africa.

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

Politics of global communication

The specific issue of ICAIS can also be situated within the broad literature on the study of international communications. There are two schools of thought on how Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) should be approached within the framework of international communications.

Rosenau (2002) argued that though there is a digital divide, it is fast closing down mainly because of the decline in the cost of production of ICTs. The emergence of new technologies allows developing countries to leapfrog from traditional to current state of the art communication modes and processes. An example of such leapfrogging is the growing number of users of mobile phones in developing countries. The other benefit of extensive use of ICTs, according to Rosenau, is that developing countries can collaborate with a wide spectrum of global actors and networks to challenge the existing world order.

Singh (2002) further pointed out that after the failure of import substitution and other socialist experimentation of the 1960s and 1970s, what has emerged now is a ―neoliberal developing world‖. It is not, thus, a tenable claim that third world countries compromised away their future to global multinational corporations. The agreement they concluded to liberalise the telecommunication sector under the framework of the WTO agreements is in line with their domestic policies. The current official discourse on information and communication technology in Africa tallies with the view of these authors (See Hegazy, 2004; UNECA, 1996).

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

The other school of thought on international communications attempts to address a different set of questions. Do information technologies empower all? Are the poor and the marginalised in the developing world making use of the new information technologies? Are information technologies neutral?

Hamelink (1994) expounded that the politics of world communication has but enhanced the growing power of global corporate media to the detriment of individual and collective rights to communicate. Technology and media have largely served the interests of powerful corporations to advertise their products, to coordinate their global businesses, and to shape the attitude of international actors toward the global market. On the other hand, the views and concerns of a large section of the population of the world have not found outlet. This, in turn, has resulted in inadequate information and understanding about pressing issues such as war, famine, environmental crisis, etc.

Hamelink, thus, proposed a human rights approach to reframe the issues of international communication. In particular, positive and enforceable rights to education, culture, communication and knowledge have to be promoted in order to empower the disadvantaged. He further recommended that the direction of governance of world communication should be redefined. Governance structures must enable civil society actors and the ordinary people to influence decisions that affect the majority of people in the world. This calls for such institutions such as world parliaments and community media organizations (Hamelink, 1997; Golding & Harris, 1997; O‘Siochru, 2004b; Padovani, 2005; Sussman, 1997).

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

Africa and the politics of global communication

The Halfway Proposition and related research on the ―digital divide‖ identify the market as a mechanism to attain welfare and development. Competition among ICT enterprises is expected to bring price of products and services to an affordable level. Thus, foreign investment is singled out as the key factor in facilitating a competitive market (UNECA, 1996; Nulens, 2002).

There are important exceptions to this dominant view, however. Ya ‗u (2004) characterised the information society initiative as a platform for penetration of the market of Africa under the banner of globalisation. With the help of ICTs, multinational corporations have acquired a new capability to expand their activities. Consequently, they have been keen to link their manufacturing activities in Africa with their financial sources. WTO rules have also made health, education, and knowledge tradable commodities that the poor countries now buy from these global corporations.

According to Ya‘u, the direct consequence of this trend is that ICTs will not be part of a social provision in Africa. As a result, the majority of the people will not have the opportunity to use technology and improve their life. In order to reverse this trend, Ya‘u recommends that developing countries should create a bloc in international organisations and push for a development and democratisation agenda.

Similarly, Alden (2003) has argued that information society discourse shelves off Africa‘s call for aid and debt reduction. In contrast, it advances the corporate interests of the G8 countries. He attributes this asymmetry to lack of democratic representation of developing countries in such 12

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores clubs like the G8. Therefore, a more representative decision making process at an international level is recommended to address the issue of digital divide.

These works provide a useful insight into the stakes involved in adopting information society policies in Africa. However, the inquiry should be broad enough to include the complex structural, instrumental, and discursive power of transnational capital. In addition, the role of African governments in the international organisations mentioned above has to be problematised.

Nulens and van Audenhove (1999) have also critically analysed the whole range of issues pertaining to the claim that new ICTs will enable Africa to leapfrog into an advanced stage of growth. They pointed out that such a technologically deterministic view assumes that information will be almost free in the information society. However, the profit motive supported by liberalisation and privatisation is not likely to result in access to information for those with low income. Nulens and Van Audenhove, thus, suggested that African governments should challenge Western ideology in a unified voice and push forward alternative strategies in the interests of Africa. However, they also underlined that this is unrealistic in the present context because Africa is marginalised and has little leverage at the international level.

While Nulens and Van Audenhove have developed useful criticism on the discourse of digital divide, the state- centric framework of their analysis limits the dimension of the issues under consideration. African actors are depicted as victims of the asymmetry of power in the global political economy. This conceals the class interests of African elites 13

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores in maintaining the existing world order. Their characterisation of the continent as a monolithic bloc also conceals from view the internal contradictions within African states. Moreover, it limits the possibility of conceptualising resistance to the status quo from within Africa.

This dissertation applies a Neo-Gramscian theory of political economy to explain Africa‘s attempt to integrate into the global information economy. In this framework, a global economic order is conceived as a constellation of material capabilities (natural resources, technology, equipment, and wealth), ideas that make a social discourse possible and institutions. This structure conditions but does not mechanically cause the actors‘ behaviours, experiences, and expectations (Cox, 1983, 1987).When there is a fit between these components, then we have a hegemonic structure where the power relation among actors is primarily based on consent.

As will be elaborated in the subsequent chapters, the prevailing global structure has pitted social actors against each other along class, gender, racial and ethnic configurations depending on local circumstances. Research based on a Neo-Gramscian theory attempts to explain how order and legitimacy is maintained in such a divided world. In a hegemonic structure, the role of ideas in constituting power relationships is critical. Thus, intellectuals, entrepreneurs and government functionaries exercise hegemony through an ideational structure that enables their agency and constrains that of their opponents.

The counterhegemonic forces constitute radical civil society actors, victims of exploitation along gender, class, ethnic, etc lines and, in general, the poor and marginalised populace. A counterhegemonic movement starts by developing a 14

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores new vision for an alternative world order around which the subaltern can rally and challenge the hegemonic structure. For both hegemony and counter hegemony to materialise, the role of organic intellectuals i.e. those who generate ideas that organise the system or movement, is vital.

Research Questions

The literature on ICAIS has mainly focussed on the business dispute among the Internet backbone and service providers. This dissertation situates this dispute and the position taken by African regional institutions on the issue within the broader theoretical framework sketched above. Hence, the research questions are:  Is the common position of African regional organisations with regard to ICAIS in particular, and the information society initiative, in general, shaped by a hegemonic relationship between local and transnational social forces?  If so, what are the specific components of the global structure that upholds this relationship?  Are there local and transnational counterhegemonic social forces that can transform the global structure? If so, what are their visions and strategies?

Research Methods

The various works cited in the literature review have applied qualitative research methods to the analysis and

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores explanation of the historical, social and political issues. Similar methods are used in this dissertation. The concepts derived from the Neo-Gramscian theory of political economy merely provide guidance and reference in approaching the specific characters of the global and African context relevant to the research questions.

The research is designed along the operational decisions made at the initial stage. The ITU, the WSIS and NEPAD are the organisations that this study closely observed. The selection is made based on availability of data as well as degree of relevance to the research questions.

All empirical data are collected using the same tools: archival and documentary sources (typical documents being position papers) including diplomatic submissions, video and audio recordings of speech delivered in international conferences. The research uniformly relies on a systematic analysis of contents of treaties, conventions, and regulations in addition to related secondary data. The result of this systematic analysis is finally presented as a synthesis, not merely interpretive but also explanatory of the social reality under study.

Organisation of the Chapters

The first chapter introduces the assumptions, origins, and variants of Gramscian theory. The concepts of hegemony, historic blocs, and civil society have been used with varying connotations in previous Neo-Gramscian studies, leading to different routes of empirical inquiry. This chapter, therefore, clarifies these variations of application and situates the study within a particular strand of Neo-Gramscian

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores theory. It also spells out the assumptions this study makes about the relationship between technology and social change.

Chapters two, three, and four depict the frame of action for the various social forces involved in shaping the political and economic components of the prevailing global information order. The patterns of production and distribution of Internet connectivity are highlighted in chapter two. In chapter three, the major ideas developed to constitute the global information order, information society and communication society, are discussed. Chapter four examines the function of international organisations as sites of (counter) hegemonic political engagement.

Chapters five and six analyse the reciprocal relationship between the global structure and African regional political and economic initiatives.

Finally, an alternative account of the current information for development policy and discourse in Africa is presented. The major finding is that African business and political players were co-actors in shaping this global hegemonic structure. Nonetheless, Africa remains a weak node as the ruling classes lack the material capability to exercise cooption and trasformismo vis-a-vis the popular masses. The conclusion also highlights the limits of possibility for a counterhegemonic resistance under the current global structure.

The findings of this dissertation have implications for the theoretical framework of Neo-Gramscian international political economy and critical international communications studies. It is argued that a blanket disavowal of hegemonic politics in the periphery omits some subtle differences in 17

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores national politics. Hegemony has gradients and some forms of political engagement in African countries approximate to a hegemonic politics by degrees. Finally, by applying the Gramscian concept of civil society to analyse recent developments in the politics of international communication, this study contributes to the further articulation of counterhegmonic praxis.

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

Chapter One: Theoretical Framework

The purpose of this chapter is to lay down the theoretical framework adopted for the study of the subject matter of this dissertation. The first section highlights the ontological and epistemological assumptions of Neo-Gramscian theory of international political economy. In the next section, the theories on the relationship between technology and social change are explicated. Finally, the specific strand of Neo-Gramscian theory used in this study shall be explained.

Neo-Gramscian Theory of Political Economy

Neo-Gramscian theory of political economy was first formulated by Cox as a critique of the existing theoretical traditions in the field of international relations (1981, 1983, 1996). Subsequent works based on this theory have further elaborated Cox‘s interlocution rather than the original works of Gramsci himself (Bieler & Morton, 2004). According to Worth (2008), therefore, Neo-Gramscian theory is more Coxian than Gramscian in that sense.

Theories of (neo) realism and liberal pluralism, it is contended, have an essentialist and ahistorical view of the world. Neo-liberalism postulates that human beings are essentially power maximizers, while realism assumes that states are driven by national interest. An analysis premised on these abstract assumptions is likely to have a problem- solving concern. In other words, its findings can only be useful to maintain the system (Cox, 1981). Neo-Gramscian theorists distinguish their approach from some strands of (neo) Marxist approaches as well. The latter

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores are rejected for setting down an objective law of history in which progressive social change mechanically follows from economic development (Cox, 1981, p.89).

Neo-Gramscian theory aspires to introduce a comprehensive ontological, epistemological and methodological critique of these theories. Ontologically, Neo- Gramscian theorists placed social forces or classes as the major protagonists in the international arena. According to Overbeek (2004), the national-international dichotomy that is essential to international relations should be rethought in terms of the dynamics of social relations. Social forces or classes, therefore, primarily shape the form of the state and inter- state relations. The specific question, then, becomes how the relation of production that is the basis of social power in one state is extended into the world arena.

The state, in this theoretical formulation, comprises the official apparatus such as the government, military and political parties as well as civil society such as church, education and media. Where civil society is penetrated and dominated by the ideology of a certain group or class, the state‘s goal and function (raison d’état) will be conditioned by that ideology and interest. Equally, new social forces can articulate an alternative ideology in the realm of civil society in order to precipitate another raison d’état. This insight is used to conceptualise a ‗global civil society‘ where counterhegemonic forces may be mobilised to challenge intergovernmental organisations (Cox, 1999).

Neo-Gramscian theory attempts to avoid both structural determinism and voluntarism by placing equal emphasis on the changing nature of structure and the limits of possibility of change at a given historical point. In other words, in order 20

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores to explain both stability and change, the historicity of a given frame of action has to be demarcated. Thus, structure is understood as persistent social practice that constrains and puts pressure on agency, rather than mechanically determining its action. The relationship between structure and agency is dialectical (Gill, 1993, pp.23-25).

Epistemologically, Neo-Gramscian theory rejects classical positivism, which is predicated on a subject-object duality. Theory is for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation, or social class, of dominance or subordination... (Cox, 1981, p.87).

Gill further asserted that theory has some strategic goal in favour of a certain interest or worldview. Therefore, when a theory claims neutrality or self-imposed restraint to ―describe‖ the world accurately, its underlying ideology has to be unmasked. Mainstream economics theory is cited as an example. It claims to limit itself to the description and enumeration, with the help of mathematical tools, of the ―natural‖ behaviour of consumers, demand, supply, price, etc. Such an approach, therefore, implicitly accepts and endorses the normative premise of the underlying relations of power.

Yet, theory should go beyond mere expression of perspective. It is desirable for a theory to be reflexive. It has to clarify its own assumptions and origins. Still, the initial perspective is always contained in the theory. This formulation of subject-object identity leads Neo-Gramscian IR to include theory itself as part of the problematic to be studied.

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

Methodology: Historic blocs, hegemony and civil society

The major feature of Neo-Gramscian theory is that it offers a historicist reading of materialism. It takes class struggle as a ―heuristic model for the understanding of structural change‖, mediated by ideology (Cox, 1996, pp.57- 58). Class, in the historical materialist strand of neo- Gramscian theory, is a historical, rather than a static analytical category. It is used to explain exploitation that arises from the production process. Likewise, class consciousness arises from the particular historical context (Cox, 1981, pp.138, 143).

The Gramscian methodological constructs that have been deployed for such a historicist interpretation of specific international relations issues are mainly hegemony, historic bloc, and civil society. Cox (1983) applied the concept of historic blocs to capture the dialectical relationship between economic structure and the political superstructure in different eras of world history. Where these cohere in a reciprocal relationship, then we have a hegemonic historic bloc. Hegemony is about the constitutive role of ideology and culture in maintaining social orders at state and world level (Cox, 1981; Murphy, 1998; Ritzer, 1983; Rupert, 1998).

The foremost revision to the study of international relations suggested by Gramscian approaches is that coercive power is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to establish dominance. In a hegemonic relationship, the dominant and subordinate social actors are engaged in an ―educational‖ or ―opinion moulding‖ process. The primary focus of the struggle for power is ―intellectual and moral leadership‖ (Bieler & Morton, 2004).

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

The origin, content and future trend of such a historical bloc is what Neo-Gramscian studies attempt to explain. The major contributions within this theoretical framework have expounded the processes by which social forces created within particular states forge alliances with kindred classes in other states. Van der Pijl (1998) traced the emergence of liberal internationalism, state monopoly capitalism, corporate capitalism and neo-liberalism over three centuries to such a process. His thesis was that these forms of capitalism became the foundation of state in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Later, the fractions of capital that played the role of a steward in these states were also able to establish the hegemony of the national political economic configuration at a world level.

Likewise, Gill (1990) depicted the hegemonic leadership of the Trilateral Commission in constructing a neo-liberal world order. The Trilateral Commission was an elite organisation comprising owners and managers of TNCs, national and international financial authorities, politicians and civil servants in most developed and developing countries.

With regard to the North-South issues of international relations, the concept of ―passive revolution‖, rather than hegemony, has been more useful. This refers to a situation where the ruling class are unable to integrate the masses under a comprehensive order based on consent and coercion. As a result, the state in the periphery merely absorbs only some aspects of the model that is hegemonic at a global level. Passive revolution takes the form of either Caesarism, or trasformismo. The former refers to a balance between forces promoting and opposing the social change maintained by sheer personal power of the leader. Trasformismo refers to domestication or cooption of potentially radical ideas and subaltern groups or leaders (Cox, 1981; Morton, 2007). 23

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

Strands of Gramscian thought

Neo-Gramscian theory has also its own schisms with far reaching implications for the foundational claims stated above. Germain and Kenny (1998) drew attention to the ambiguities of the Coxian formulation of hegemony in which structure and superstructure are combined. This observation led to a revision of Cox‘s proposition that idealism and economism can both be maintained in the same framework without privileging one over the other.

There are three different views about this particular proposition (Macartney, 2008). The first one rejected the possibility of congruence between hegemonic ideas and material forces as a disguised endorsement of liberal pluralism or idealist accounts of historical change. According to this position, ideas must be treated as mere epiphenomena that actors can instrumentally manipulate, while the determining factor is the economic structure.

The second position interprets Cox‘s historic structure composed of ideas, material capabilities and institutions as eclectic but grounded on historical idealism or subjectivity. It is maintained here that subjectivity ―is necessary to give complete form and substance to material structures‖ (Germain, 2007, p.129). This post-Marxist historical materialism treats class as just one ―myth‖ that may or may not be the foundation of the material structure. The point of departure in this approach is the particular form of consciousness at a given time.

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

In direct opposition to the above, the third position interprets Cox‘s formulation as a Marxist historical materialism in which hegemony is presented as class dominance. Nevertheless, unlike the first position, which regards ideas as epiphenomena, this one treats them as constitutive of the material structure (Morton, 2006; Bieler & Morton, 2008).

Hall elaborated this position as follows: It is possible to hold both the proposition that material interest helps to structure ideas and the proposition that position in the social structure has the tendency to influence the direction of social thought, without also arguing that material factors unequivocally determine ideology or that class position represents a guarantee that a class will have the appropriate forms of consciousness (Cited in Rupert, 1998, p.430).

In other words, in a historical materialist approach, class positions are necessary but not sufficient for the analysis of any ideological formation. Ideologies can be transformed through discursive practices or political construction. As aptly summarised by Rupert, ―social relations of production may be understood as having some determining effects in the first instance, rather than the last‖ (1998, p.431). This dissertation similarly takes into account that economic structure sets important limits, but the political and economic superstructure has a degree of autonomy. The implications of this proposition for the study of global information society shall be highlighted in the third section of this chapter.

As the specific issue under discussion in this dissertation relates to ICTs, it is in order first to clarify the relationship between technology and society. The following section deals with the definition of technology and the contending views as to its explanatory value for social change.

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Technology and Social Change

Technology can have different meanings depending on the level of analysis. At the lowest level, it can refer to physical artifacts, such as the personal computer, the telephone, etc. But, at a higher level, technology refers to the context and knowledge that accompany use and development of such artifacts (Flew, 2002, pp.36-37; Sussman, 1997, p.19).In this study, we understand technology to refer broadly to ―the knowledge that underlies the artifacts and the way they can be used in society‖(Harvey cited in Castells, 2000b, pp.28-29; Herrera, 2003, p.575).

The role of technology in social change has been analysed in the literature in terms of technological versus social determinism. For the former, technology is driven by the logic of scientific progress, or by its own autonomous logic. It is, a ―prime mover‖ or ―independent variable‖ that is uncaused by social factors but with a determinate impact upon society (Mackenzie, 1984). Technological determinism has been quite dominant in one or another form especially in connection with the new information and communication technologies. It is marked by the predominant role it assigns to ICTs in increasing personal freedom, empowering consumers, strengthening democracy, bridging global inequalities, etc. A subtler version is that technologies are neutral and it is up to human beings to shape their design and use (Chandler, 1995).

The critics of technological determinism argue that it is a perspective based on a conception of technology as an exogenous factor to the social system. Besides, technological determinism allegedly downplays negative stories such as job

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores loss and income disparity, invasion of privacy, etc that also accompany its use (Sussman, 1997; Flew, 2003; Herrera, 2003). For instance, the various initiatives to bridge the ―digital gap‖ such as African Information Society Initiative (AISI) of 1996 posit that information and knowledge ensure better provision of such human needs as health and education. Yet, the intellectual and managerial skills needed for their use and development are, unfortunately, in the hands of a few transnational corporations (Hamelink, 1997, 1999).

The opposite pole in this debate is social determinism. It insists that technology is entirely determined by social and political factors and its effects are created by human interest and creativity. Social determinists emphasise that the development of particular technologies is determined by the social necessities of particular commercial or powerful groups. Some even argue that where the technology contains a potential to be used to challenge the dominant pattern of social relations, a ―law of suppression of radical potential‖ operates to stop or reverse its development (Winston cited in Flew, 2003, p.57).

The Political Economy tradition has generally underscored the ―social construction of technology‖. It spells out the political role played by owners and managers of large-scale corporations, the state and other players in the use and deployment of technology. Technology is regarded as a ―form of capital‖ used in production processes to coordinate and control labour, or to cheapen labour power by employing unskilled and docile workers. In short, it is an instrument of profit maximisation and of class power in capitalism. Likewise, the recent emergence of digital technology is causally linked to changes in methods, instruments, and scales

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores of production in capitalism (Sussman, 1997, pp.8-9; McChesney, 1998, p.7; Simpson, 2004).

It is, indeed, the case that the general course and effects of information and communication technologies take place based on the profit logic of capitalism. Nonetheless, even amidst the overarching interest and control by powerful political and economic interests, technology has also been applied for non-profits ends. Though not to be exaggerated out of proportion, the particular flexibility of the digital technologies must be mentioned in this respect. A case in point is the use of Internet for mass protests, for rural communication, for alternative media services, community health programmes, etc. However, redefining the potential use of communication technologies for non-commercial purposes requires social struggle, since the dominant forces in the world work toward its utilisation for pursuit of profit (Dawson & Foster, 1998; Golding, 1998).

Castells summarised the technology-society complex as follows: Technology does not determine society. Nor does society script the course of technological change since many factors, including individual inventiveness and entrepreneurialism, intervene in the process of scientific discovery, technological innovation, and social applications, so that the final outcome depends on a complex pattern of interaction(2000b,p.5).

In this study, therefore, we will regard the effects of technology as posing constraints and offering opportunities to actors. Technology can help social actors to achieve their pre-existing goals (that the prior material environment had made impossible) where it is shaped and produced in a manner conducive to their purpose and interest. It can also impose constraints on them where it is produced and shaped in a manner opposed to their purpose.

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

Thus, when technical features of a particular technology are discussed in the subsequent chapters, it is to demonstrate: "who uses it, who controls it, what it is used for, how it fits into the power structure, how widely it is distributed‖ (Finnegan cited in Chandler, 1995, Theoretical Stances, para.6; Hamelink, 1997, 1999; O‗Sochuru, 2003; Padovani, 2005). The Neo-Gramscian framework adopted in this study focuses on the dialectical relationship between techno- economic structure and the conscious action of human agency in directing change and development.

Mapping a Neo-Gramscian Route for the Study of the Global Information Society

The question of the relative primacy of ideas or social being seems to be central to the different paradigms in the field of international communication. Two different routes were indicated by previous Neo-Gramscian approaches to international communication research. The first route followed a culturalist (postmodern) interpretation of Gramsci for the study of international communication. The second route outlined a materialist and modernist appropriation of the Neo- Gramscian IR methodology.

A shift to postmodern cultural studies

Park (1998) identified the concept of the base- superstructure relationship as the source of the two distinct approaches to mass media studies, namely: political economy and cultural studies. The political economy approach takes media as concrete forms of industrial infrastructure. It

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores describes cultural domination in terms of the monopoly of production by global media giants.

According to Park, the political economy approach was pervasive in the three dominant development paradigms, namely: modernisation, dependency, and postdependency. The common emphasis of all these has been the economic disparity between the rich and the poor countries in the world. The literature on cultural imperialism is about economic domination of western media industries as the main, if not the sole, determinant of cultural dependency. This argument, therefore, assumes that audiences are passive recipients of cultural products and, consequently, totally at the mercy of global media producers.

The cultural studies approach, on the other hand, questions whether cultural objects or media ―texts‖ are effective in imposing the ideology of the ruling class. This shifts the focus of research to the process of construction of meaning by the audience. Then, it appears that multinational mass media companies do not have control over the construction of the text by audiences. Media products can be construed in a manner not intended by the producers of the content. Park recommends postmodern concepts such as simulation, signification, and decentring the subject to elaborate the cultural studies approach to international communication1.

1 Signification or the social practice of meaning making is supposed to replace transmission, which was the major concern of political economic approaches, according to Park. Hence, media outputs are regarded as ―texts‖ whose meaning is produced both by the writers and the readers. ―Simulation‖ is also a view opposed to ―representation‖ which, supposedly, was the hallmark of traditional communication approaches. Representation refers to equivalence between the sign and the real while such lack of equivalence is normally regarded as false representation. Simulation, however, implies 30

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

Gramsci‘s contribution to such a research approach is understood to be his elaboration of ideas or the superstructure as an independent variable, not derived from but shaping the economic infrastructure. In particular, his concept of hegemony can be deployed to expound ―multivocality‖ or susceptibility to multiple meanings of all kinds of cultural communication. Hence, by shifting the research focus to how media content is construed by audiences, Park argues, an emancipatory politics for creation of alternative realities, meanings, and identities can be advanced.

Park‘s reading of the literature exaggerates the dichotomy between an economistic and idealistic reading of international communication. A definition of political economy of communication necessarily addresses the relationship between the two as a more complex interface: First, it addresses the nature of the relationship of media and communication systems to the broader structure of society. In other words, it examines how media (and communication) systems and content reinforce, challenge, or influence existing class and social relations. Second, the political economy of communication looks specifically at how ownership, support mechanisms (e.g. advertising), and government policies influence media behaviour and content (McChesney, 1998, p.3).

Thus, political economy and cultural studies of international communication would regard production and reception of texts as their respective points of departure,

that the sign and the real are one and the same. Signs produce the real. In short, reality is not given and then represented afterwards; it is created (simulated) by signs in the first place. Decentering the subject refers to the rejection of a metanarrative based on class, gender etc. Instead, research should focus on exposing local differences that are concealed or suppressed by universal categories. Decentering aims to deny these categories their privileged central status in institutional discourse.

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores not destination. A historical materialist approach can incorporate both material and ideational aspects.

More importantly, the underlying assumption of this culturalist reading of Gramsci is that culture or ideology is an independent variable. Laclau and Mouffe‘s (1985) poststructuralist political strategy, based on the concept of ―radical democracy‖ attempted effectively to politicise social and cultural forces to replace the depoliticised labour movement.

In present-day society, where dominant groups have diverse interconnections with subordinate groups, the forms of domination should differ from the forms of domination based on economic relations... From the perspective of hegemony, the multinational media industry is only one of the cultural forces vying for cultural hegemony in developing countries (Park, 1998, pp.89-91).

This argument introduces a shift away from a historical materialist direction that takes economic relationship as its entry point for analysis. Its insistence on ―a decentred subject‖ clearly calls for a research question and methodology more germane to a ―post-modernist‖ strand of Gramscian theory.

Hegemony, ideology and commercialisation of the Internet

Simpson (2004), on the other hand, applied the concept of hegemony differently to explain the recent transformation of Internet as a tool for commercial exploitation. He argued that the recent development of the Internet as ―a lightly regulated marketplace‖ is more a result of consensus and hegemony spearheaded by leading industrial states, infrastructure owners, service providers and users.

The Internet, Simpson pointed out, was a technology largely used only by few experts and specialists before its transformation into a medium to provide and exchange multiple products. Once the potential of the technology to create 32

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores networks across the world was realised, capitalist forces in collaboration with governments introduced structural changes to shape the operation of the Internet for business. The commercialisation of the Internet, however, gained a hegemonic character through political agency of these actors at international institutions like the WTO, WIPO, and ICANN.

While adopting the general outlines of Simpson‘s approach, this study attempts to further elaborate the political economic context. The relationship and differences between systemic and non-systemic conflicts in relation to Internet governance issues is also given additional emphasis.

In analysing the (non)hegemonic nature of the prevailing historical structure, I critically engage with Bieler and Morton‘s nuanced elaboration of hegemony as class dominance, with ideas not as epiphenomenon but as integral to the material structure. This specific approach is especially suited to explicate the relationship between material production and the discourse of information society. It is equally germane to assess the real significance of international organisations in amalgamating material capabilities and ideas that constitute the hegemonic structure.

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Chapter Two: The Business of International Backbone Provision

This chapter highlights the existing patterns of international backbone production and exchange relations. The key aspects examined at some length are the allocation of resources for Internet connectivity, the nature of inter- capital alliances and conflicts, and the role of economic discourse in shaping the industry and the market.

Technical Description

From a technical point of view, the Internet is made up of computers and cables. Tim Berners Lee of CERN, who is credited with inventing the World Wide Web said: ―... The Web could not be without the Net. The Web made the Net useful because people are really interested in information...and don't really want to have to know about computers and cables" (Quoted in Cave and Mason, 2001, p. 6). In this section, however, we will briefly look into the technical features of the Internet for that is necessary to understand the relationships built around its ownership and consumption.

In order to be on the net, a corporate or private end user links its Local Area Network (LAN) i.e. a group of computers connected to one another, to a local ISP at a Point of Presence (POP). The ISP usually leases a physical link from a carrier to enable its customers to reach the POP (Kariyawasam, 2001). Generally, the traffic generated by the end user does not terminate on the network of his/her local ISP. It has to be forwarded to a chain of other networks until 34

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores it reaches its final destination, which could be on the opposite side of the globe. Here is where routers, Network Access Points(NAPs) and Backbones play the major technical role in moving Internet Protocol(IP) packets(basic transfer units) from one node to another.

A router is a key device in establishing connectivity. It is a special type of computer that is usually located at the boundary between two logical or physical sub networks. The router performs the function of forwarding packets from one network to another. It exchanges information with other routers to determine the optimal path or route for packets. The router "advertises" routes (paths to a block of network addresses) to other routers to direct the exchange of traffic between the two networks (Huston, 1999a, 1999b).

Routes for Internet traffic are determined in advance by configuring routing tables. The preparation of the routing table takes into account such factors as path length (hop count), latency, and available bandwidth. Ideally, a router maintains an entry for every router on the entire Internet in its routing tables. However, in reality, routers maintain a limited set of routing information. Entering routes in the routing table an ISP is not only a technical issue. It is also a business decision. IP packets of no economic interest to the ISP are assigned a default route to reach other networks. Default routes are not necessarily efficient (Gorman & Malecki, 2000, p.16).

Routing policies and routing advertisements are, therefore, key indicators of the nature of the relationship between different ISPs. Routing policies have two main elements: preferred routes and filtered routes. The former indicates which routes are more preferred if multiple routes 35

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores to the same destination are available. Routes may be preferred because of performance considerations such as delay and loss of packets. The more important element is the filtering policy. A filtering policy imposes constraints o traffic from and to neighbouring ISPs. Provision of a path to the packets coming from other networks is based on the filtering policy of each network. Hence, charging arrangements are about setting filtering policies applicable to the ISPs involved in a transaction.

A set of routers under the administrative control of a single organisation is called an Autonomous System (AS). Thus, for the network specialist, the Internet is simply composed of a great many ASes. Each backbone provider or ISP is an Autonomous System in network terms. ASes are identified by numbers assigned by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). The millions of individual IP addresses are, therefore, identified and organised under ASes (Gorman & Malecki, 2000, p.116)2.

In technical terms, therefore, the Internet is a series of:  Individual end user or several end users connected by LAN ,  Individual LANs or Several LANs connected to a local ISP,  Local ISPs connected to a network of a large national ISP (national backbone),  Networks of large national ISPs or backbones connected to the network of an international ISP (International backbone),and

2 See www.fixedorbit.com for more details. 36

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 The interconnection of international backbones3.

These networks have to build up links between them so that end users belonging to different networks can communicate with each other. To enable such interconnection, interfaces are established at Network Access Points (NAPs) and/or at private interconnection points. NAPs are simply collocation sites where a number of ISPs exchange their traffic. A NAP shall have, at least, a housing space for each member ISP to install its transmission equipments, and a technician to facilitate the transmission of traffic from one ISP to the other. A private interconnection point, on the other hand, is a traffic exchange site set up by two networks for exchanging only bilateral traffic (WiK, 2002).

Providers of Connectivity

Four types of players are involved in Internet interconnection transactions. These are end users, content or portal providers (such as Yahoo, Amazon, etc), Internet Service Providers, and Internet Backbone Providers (Badasyan & Chakrabarti, 2003, p.7, Prüfer & Jahn, 2007, p.145).

There are two phases of universal connectivity. The first is linking the end user (households or companies) to a local Internet Service provider. Here, the ISP provides initial access to the public Internet (Cave & Mason, 2001; Foros, Kind

3 However, a local ISP may bypass a national ISP and directly connect to an international ISP. Likewise, a national ISP may bypass a continental ISP and directly connect to an international ISP. In short, the hierarchy is not binding for interconnection (WiK, 2002).

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& Sørgard, 2005). The second phase refers to the relationship that exists among the various ISPs to transport the IP packet from the sender's end to the receiver's end of the Internet. This is an interconnection relationship among companies engaged in network services. ICAIS refers to the latter phase of connectivity.

According to network economics, the demand and supply relationship in the network industry is caused by network externalities/effects. Network externalities arise when the benefits of a product to an individual consumer increase with the increase in the number of other consumers. A very good example is a telephone network. When more and more people subscribe to a telephone network, then the opportunity to communicate increases for those already subscribed to the network4.

Consequently, given a choice between two alternative ISPs, consumers will prefer the network with the largest number of users. This demand side behaviour is the reason why ISPs are in competition to capture the network effect. Each network devises a strategy to bring as many IP addresses as possible under its control. In order to provide universal connectivity to its own customers, it must also enable them to

4 The value of a network is N (N-1) (known as Metcalfe‘s Law). In other words, the value of a network (i.e. the benefit each consumer gets when another consumer joins the network) is about a square of the total number of its members. Besides, with the increase in the size of a network, content providers will come up with more services to take advantage of the large number of users. For example, when a large number of users buy hardware, there will be more production of software compatible with the hardware, thus making the hardware even more useful to its users. This is the indirect benefit of a growing network size (Cave & Mason, 2001, p.3; Kende, 2000).

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores have access to all other IP addresses in the world. The wealth and power of International Backbone Providers is, therefore, a function of the number of IP addresses they administer. The network with the largest number of users is likely to be more powerful because other networks seek to connect to it for their own survival.

The international backbone market is dominated by a few global telcos that control the vast majority of the Internet routing table5. By November 1997, four U.S. IBPS (UUNet, MCI,

5 The following table indicates the hierarchical nature of the Internet industry on the basis of routing information.

Autonomous Customer Customer Rank system Number ISP’s name and country cone /24s cone ASes

1 1239 Sprint / US 5,678,904 1,686

2 701 UUNET Technologies Inc. /US 5,331,183 2,652

3 3356 Level 3 Communications/US 5,181,012 1,422

4 7018 AT&T WorldNet Services/ US 5,004,744 2,075

5 1219 TeliaNet Global Networks/ SE 4,859,250 479

6 3549 Global Crossing/US 4,587,493 960

7 3561 Savvis/ US 4,562,760 509

8 174 Cogent Communications/ US 4,498,773 1,712

9 2914 NTT America Inc/ US 4,393,195 531

10 209 Qwest /US 4,181,917 1,269

Source: Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA)(2006) http://www.caida.org/home/ AS links: BGP RIBs from Route Views (rv2) (RIB means Routing Information Base or a table of routes in a given Border Gateway Protocol. This information was collected by a University of Oregon project called Route Views). The table presents ranking of Autonomous Systems (AS) by customer size inferred from BGP (Border Gateway Protocol-a protocol that is used to route IP packets from one AS to another) tables. 39

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BBN and Sprint) transmitted about 80% of total Internet traffic, while the other ISPs transmitted only about 20% of the total traffic (Cave & Mason, 2001,p.29). Due to the sheer size of their customers, a large amount of traffic can move within the network of IBPs. As a result, while IBPS have little need for interconnecting with another network, it is mandatory for downstream ISPs to be connected to them. Otherwise, as Cukier put it, "they are effectively not on the net" (1999, p.14).

The companies listed above also own the world's major satellite or fibre optic cable transmission link. UUNET, for example, owns more than 20,000 kilometres of long haul, submarine networks traversing the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, connecting North America with China, South East Asia, Middle East and Western Europe (See http://www.verizonbusiness.com).

Level 3 Communications Inc. has also rolled out about 47,000-mile long route. Its customer base includes top-level telecommunication companies, carriers, ISPs, cable and wireless service providers. Large health care institutions, medical laboratories and insurance companies transmit health data of their clients through these routes. Similarly, major U.S. academic and research institutions are customers of this company for a real time interchange of scientific and research information (www.level3.com ).

Columns four and five indicate the customer base of each network. /24 prefixes are the most unique or aggregated IP addresses in a given network. They, more or less, represent the number of terminals or devices linked to the Internet and, therefore, serve to estimate the number of users. The number of Autonomous systems mentioned in the last column, more or less, represents the total number of organizations or ISPs that are customers of the corresponding IBP.

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The concentration of routing tables under U.S. IBPs dictates the rolling out of transmission links. Europe and South East Asia have invested more on their link with the U.S. NAPs than for intra-continental link6. Consequently, US-bound transmission link is cheaper and speedier and the ISPs on both sides of the Atlantic and the Pacific have a commercial incentive to maintain this status quo. That is why Cukier (1999) refers to this situation as American ―Bandwidth Colonialism‖.

It has been argued by some observers that the unique nature of IP technology will necessarily lead to the disappearance of "bandwidth colonialism". The feature that distinguishes the Internet most sharply from traditional telecommunications is its layered nature. Hence, the physical layer where the electrical signals move i.e. Ethernet, fibre optic, etc can be separated from the other layers of application. As a result of this "opportunity for vertical disintegration", a robust market for a separate infrastructure provision has emerged. This market provides from short-term spot sale for bandwidth up to long term leased lines or bulk transport such as a 10-year lease for transoceanic fibre optic cable (WIK, 2002; Savage et al., 1999).

However, it needs to be underlined that demand for content is the principal factor in determining the decision to roll out transoceanic links. About 80% of Internet traffic is

6 A previous study by Telegeography had put the maximum link between any two countries in Europe around 450 Mbs, while the link with the US was over 3.5 Gbs. In Asia, the ratio was 155 Mbs to 2Gbs against intra- continental bandwidth provision (Cukier, 1999).

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores caused by browsing and file transfer, most of which is from U.S. hosts (Hibbard, de Ridder, Baker & Frieden, 2004, p.10).

One of the trends noted by industry analysts is vertical integration of conduit and content providers e.g. AT&T and Media One, and Vivendi and Seagram (Lanzi and Marzo, 2005). Such type of vertical integration offers a number of advantages to the parties involved. Some of these advantages are accessing monopoly contents of the content providers, broadening the network effects of the carrier/content provider and profiting from the complementary nature of the content and carriage service demands of customers. For instance, according to a study conducted by Rubinfeld and Singer (2001), AOL was motivated to merge with Time Warner to take advantage of the broadband infrastructure of the latter for its content brand.

With regard to the ICAIS dispute, the issue of the matter is that U.S. IBPs should share the cost of the transmission link. The availability of cheap physical infrastructure for purchase at alternative markets is not relevant to this issue. Nonetheless, the conclusion about the emergence of a separate robust physical infrastructure market is an unqualified generalisation based on the specific case of the Atlantic link. Geographically specific studies have indicated that there is ―a rather thin provision to South Asia and Africa‖ (Antelope Consulting, 2001, p.10).In these areas, there is little opportunity to buy unbundled physical infrastructure from competitive providers. Even more importantly, cheaper bandwidth is not cheap enough for the majority in the developing countries and, thus, the question remains whether market solutions can address the problem of universal connectivity.

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In order to understand the current asymmetrical relationship between IBPs and ISPs, it is necessary to look at the history of the networks. The next section, therefore, attempts to answer the following questions: How did this configuration of forces arise? How did IBPs acquire such vast material capabilities?

Historical Development of Internet Backbones

The early Internet had a single backbone network- the NSFNET (the National Science Foundation Network), which was heir to the Advanced Research Project Agency, a U.S. governmental organ. The Internet, then, was made up of just three tiers of networks, namely: campus LANs, regional networks and the NSFNET. Traffic within the LAN was maintained in the network itself while outbound traffic was simply "defaulted" to the regional network, which had knowledge of all the LANs belonging to it. The regional networks were able to route traffic between their hosts, and all other traffic to the NSFNET. The NSFNET controlled all the routing information on the Internet and the long haul transport. In consequence, the architecture of the Internet emerged as strictly hierarchical, with the backbone commanding essential function for connectivity (Marble, 1998).

Merit Network, Inc, IBM and MCI were contracted by the U.S government to operate the network. The other commercial backbone operators at the time, PSINet, UUNET, and CerfNet, were not allowed to use the NSFNET. An Acceptable Use Policy signed between NSFNET and its operators limited the uses of the Internet for administrative and educational purposes only (Hussain, 2003).

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. multinational corporations were intensifying their global production and marketing activities. This made international telecommunications an important tool for organising global business. These corporations, therefore, pushed for deregulation of the traditional telecommunication market in order to obtain cheaper prices (Rioux, 2005; Jahn & Prüfer, 2005). The decision of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) to transfer the Internet backbone to commercial entities in 1995 was a response to this demand. Since then, the Internet emerged as a network of proprietary networks owned and operated by commercial entities (Gorman & Malecki, 2000).

The NSF, on leaving the stage to the commercial players, set minimum rules. It designated NAPs where they would exchange traffic among themselves7. The details of interconnection criteria were totally left to the commercial entities. As a result, the backbone market remains free of telecommunications regulations to this day (Giovanetti, 2005; Wik, 2002, pp.16-17).

Peering was the only type of arrangement in use among the commercial Internet providers during the early period. There was no payment for traffic exchange. With the dramatic increase in Internet applications and the number of users in the 1990s, the NAPs began to be congested. The original players also found out that they were not equal participants in the growing Internet market. Subsequently, the bigger ISPs decided to avoid the NAPs and to establish bilateral interconnection with only those that generate equivalent

7 Accordingly, in 1994, four NAPs were built in four U.S. cities to be operated by PacBell, Bellcore, Ameritech, Sprintlink and Metropolitan Fibre System (Hussain, 2003). 44

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores traffic and own extensive transmission infrastructure. Consequently, public interconnection at NAPs for the smaller ISPs and private bilateral interconnection for the bigger players emerged as two distinct modalities of interconnection (Baake & Wichmann, 1999).

Another important feature of the history of Internet backbone industry is the recurrence of mergers and acquisitions that continually changed the profile of the players, if not the rule of the game. The MCI acquired 12 companies while six were taken over by Cogent Communications from 1997 until 2004 (Giovanetti, 2005). One company, WorldCom, made more than 70 acquisitions in the 1990s only (Rioux, 2005, p.8)8.

The widely shared opinion among economists is that this trend will continue (Chan-Olmsted & Jamison, 2001; Giovanetti, 2005; Noam, 2006; Crémer, Rey & Tirole, 2000; Prüfer & Jahn, 2007). Noam contended that volatility and cyclicality would be inherent features of the telecommunication industry. After assessing the various policy measures adopted by governments in Europe and North America, he concluded: The [final] policy option is to let the telecom industry stabilize itself through concentration. And this seems to have happened implicitly, by government accepting mergers that would not have been approved earlier. Such a policy spells out a departure from the regulatory philosophy of the past 25 years, which was based on an active creation and promotion of a competitive market structure (2006, P, 281).

8 Verizon Inc, likewise, describes itself as a company built on a series of takeovers. In 1998, it acquired UUNET, one of the oldest and now the second largest backbone provider. In the same year; it had acquired CompuServe, another well-known ICT corporation. It acquired MCI in 2006. Similarly, Level 3 Communications was able to aggrandize its share of the market by acquiring Genuity in 2003. 45

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

This has been an accurate prediction until now. It is yet to be seen whether the recent global crisis will affect this trend.

To sum up, the Internet is not a network uniformly laid out globally but one that radiates mainly from the United States. The dedication of more bandwidth to connect to the U.S. hubs reinforces this hierarchical structure. The Internet architecture, the institutions, standards, and protocols bear the stamp of the U.S. government. In the first place, the timing to privatise the Internet backbone provision was a strategic decision. The U.S. Federal Communications Commission also refrained from regulating these firms afterwards. As a result, U.S. IBPs control a sizable share of the market and influence worldwide Internet connectivity and usage through their business practices.

Charging Arrangements

The disparity in bargaining power between global Internet backbone providers and other ISPs mainly emanates from the disparity in material resources and institutional backup discussed above. ICAIS merely reflect this asymmetry in the two types of contractual relationship, Peering and Transit, currently used in the industry.

Peering arrangements

Peering is a business relationship in which two ISPs agree to exchange traffic reciprocally. The traffic must originate from each other or their downstream customers, not from a third ISP. Hence, the parties to a peering agreement have no obligation to pass each other's traffic to the rest of 46

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores the Internet. This marks the distinction between peering and transit (Frieden, 1998).

Peering, also known as "settlement- free‖ or "sender keeps all", does not involve any payment9. The two networks only make sure that they incur the same costs (mainly for equipment and transmission capacity) and derive roughly equal benefits from the interconnection (Wik, 2002, pp.47-48; Hussain, 2003).

Peering is the only type of business relationship among the largest backbone providers. Small ISPs also peer among each other (‖secondary peering‖). There is also a possibility of large and small ISPs agreeing to peer. In that case, the smaller ISP will have access to a limited number of IP addresses of the larger ISP. In return, the latter will obtain access to either the whole or an agreed portion of the small ISP's customer base (Kariyawasam, 2001, pp.39-40).

Peering can be private or public. In a private peering, the two parties exchange reciprocal traffic at a location agreed between them. This has become the dominant form of peering among IBPs10. Public peering occurs at Network Access Points (NAPs) or Metropolitan Area Exchanges (MAEs). NAPs or MAEs are collocation/traffic exchange points administered by a third party, which could be a business enterprise or a non-

9 There is also a rare type of peering called paid peering. In the case of paid peering, the parties do not have the obligation to terminate traffic originating from a third party ISP. The smaller ISP in a paid peering arrangement pays for traffic that it receives from and sends to the IBP or larger ISP (Jahn & Prüfer, 2005). 10 80% of Internet traffic was exchanged at private peering points already in 1999 (WiK, 2002, p.50).

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores profit organisation. Alternatively, the interconnecting ISPs may set up a committee to operate the Internet exchange point.

One incentive for peering is improvement of quality of service. As IP packets do not necessarily follow a geographical path, even traffic destined to a neighbouring country may be routed through the US. This results in latency i.e. delay in data transfer and response. Hence, by agreeing for a private interconnection at their borders, ISPs can reduce latency and better respond to the demand of their customers that use interactive activities like visual or audio communications. In addition, by getting access to the customers of each other, they will enhance the value of their networks. By transferring a certain amount of traffic load to this new interconnection route, the ISPs will also ease the traffic on their main lines. In peering, thus, both profit maximisation and cost reduction are achieved at once (Baake & Wichmann, 1999; Norton, 2001).

Transit arrangements

Transit is the business relationship in which an IBP or ISP routes the traffic originating from a customer ISP to the rest of the Internet. If the transit provider is an IBP, then it will send the traffic to its destination in the network of one of its peers. If it is not an IBP, it may in turn buy a transit service from a bigger ISP (Norton, 2001, p.2; Kende, 1999, p.5; Wik, 2002, pp.56-61).

The customer ISPs pay to the transit provider for incoming and outgoing traffic. The transit provider does not pay anything to the customer ISPs. This remains to be the rule though some large customers may negotiate specific details.

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The justification for this asymmetrical relationship is that the request for content by the downstream customers of the small ISP networks is the cause of congestion. Therefore, IBPs have to invest on infrastructure expansion in order to deliver the large amount of traffic from content hosts to end users of the small ISPs. However, due to the confidentiality of actual transit agreements, it is not possible to determine whether a specific transit pricing is based on cost of initial investment or congestion (Wik, 2002).

Transit is the principal type of interconnection arrangement for the majority of ISPs in the world seeking universal connectivity. Global Internet connectivity operates in a hierarchy in which a handful of such IBPs are at the top of the food chain while the lower part of the pyramid is populated by a large number of ISPs.

Nature of the Contractual Agreements

The most outstanding feature of peering and transit contracts is the non-disclosure clause. As a result, third parties do not precisely know the terms of such contracts. Economists and even regulators have, therefore, to use indirect and unsatisfactory methods to assess the actual price and terms of trade. For example, what is publicly known about transit price is just that it could be based on either traffic volume or capacity of the link11.

11 Antelope Consulting recommended the following terms as useful for transit contracts: parameters for latency and packet loss, indemnity for such loss caused by one of the parties, liability for illegal content, and the use of caching(2001,pp.47-48).However, the inclusion of such terms depends on the bargaining power of the parties. 49

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

Some IBPs have made their peering policies publicly available12. It must be noted, however, that peering policies are not legally binding documents but indicative of the content of the contractual agreement that would be signed subsequently (Antelope Consulting, 2001; WiK, 2002; Savage et al., 2000a, 2000b).

Peering policies usually deal with three criteria. The first criterion refers to the resources for interconnection that the parties must bring to the peering relationship. These can be further divided into geographic scope, traffic volume and ratio, backbone capacity and routing. IBPs require a potential peer to have a geographical coverage matching their own network. Most of the IBPs also specify the volume and ratio of traffic to be exchanged on their links. The potential peer has also to announce in advance the number of routes or paths that it makes available to the other party. Backbone capacity is still another test. The peering policies state the types of fibre optic cables to be used for the long haul interconnection between the networks involved.

The second criterion refers to operational capabilities. These relate to establishment of network operation centres and provision of maintenance and repair services. IBPs require their peers to maintain a network-operating centre available at all times. They expect the operating centre to report problems within a short time. The network of the potential peer must also be redundant, i.e. a failure at one node should not affect general traffic because of the multiple connections a node already has to the entire network.

12 E.g. UUNET at www.verizonbusiness.com/UUnet/peering , Abovenet Communications at www.above.net/peering/, and AT&T at http://www.corp.att.com/peering/) 50

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

The third criterion covers the peering process itself, and includes two obligations. One is the obligation to sign a non-disclosure agreement or clause. UUNET, for example, requires a non-disclosure agreement separately and prior to an interconnection agreement. The other crucial point is that former transit customers of the IBP or of the potential peer are not eligible for peering agreements (D‘Ignazio & Giovannetti, 2006a, 2006b)13.

Obviously, very few ISPs qualify for peering with the IBPs. In particular, ISPs from developing countries cannot meet the requirement for high capacity links at geographically widespread interconnection points in America. The majority have to settle for a transit arrangement. For such ISPs, this also involves negotiation of transit price, establishing nodes in the US and securing transmission links.

Furthermore, IBPs have developed a host of strategies to reinforce their dominance of the market. The following section describes the strategies adopted by both IBPs and ISPs to enhance their respective positions.

13 The peering policy of Abovenet Communications states: "IP transit customers are not eligible for peering" (Art.1.1.4) AT &T also states in its policy: "A network (ASN) that is a customer of an AT&T US network for any dedicated IP services may not simultaneously be a settlement-free peer of that same network‖.

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Business Strategies of IBPs and Downstream ISPs

Quality degradation has been the most notorious strategy that led regulators to consider intervention into the IBP market. Crémer, Rey and Tirole (2000) have elaborated the economic model for strategic quality degradation in the backbone market. An IBP may degrade the quality of interconnection with other IBPs or smaller ISPs to force customers of the latter to switch to it in search of a better quality service. The resulting growth in size also enables the same provider to offer more network benefits to its own customers, further providing an incentive to degrade quality of interconnection with the remaining backbone competitors.

The EU Commission, in its decision on the merger case of WorldCom /MCI, identified selective degradation of interconnection with private peers as the most likely danger to be expected from the merged company. It noted that such degradation would take the form of decreasing bandwidth capacity at peering points or refusing to increase the bandwidth capacity when requested by peers. By applying this tactic, the dominant IBP can raise the cost of its competitors and override the market (Buccirossi, Bravo & Siciliani, 2005).

Another strategy is a foreclosure by an IBP or upstream ISP, which has merged with a downstream ISP. In such cases, the IBP or upstream ISP has an incentive to foreclose competitors of its downstream division by denying them access to its essential facilities or by price discrimination. As a result, the competitors to the integrated downstream ISP will face additional cost that will push them out of the market (Ordover et al cited in D‘ignazio & Giovanetti, 2006a, 2006b).

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

Apart from these strategies, smaller ISPs have complained about other predatory tactics by upstream ISPs or IBPs. Some have alleged that they were forced to sign contractual terms prohibiting them from competing in certain service or geographical markets. Some IBPs have also made access to their trunks conditional on an ISP‘s buying certain other services (Antelope Consulting, 2001).

New Generation Networks (NGN) technology has also made product differentiation a major strategy for the big IBPs. With this technology, providers can differentiate IP packets by their content (e.g. email, voice, and video).They can then offer an end-to-end dedicated path or session, like in the old telecommunications system, for selected Internet services. In short, a new market for premium services can be easily provided using NGN technology (Wik, 2008).

NGN technology, therefore, makes it possible to determine peering or transit arrangements based on type of traffic. Peering will likely be available only to those ISPs that have made the additional investment to transport the premium services. Small ISPs can buy transit from a series of ISPs and create one dedicated path for transmission of real time traffic. This, however, depends on the transit charges they can negotiate with all the ISPs along that path. In the past, transit was negotiated only with the neighbouring IBP that guaranteed delivery of the traffic to its destination. The projected scenarios for peering and transit will likely strengthen the market power of IBPs (Dodd, Jung, Mitchell, Paterson & Reynolds, 2009).

Downstream/customer ISPs have also devised their own strategies to react to price increases or discrimination and targeted quality degradation. Multihoming i.e. entering into 53

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores transit contract with more than one transit provider is considered a feasible strategy to improve the bargaining position of a downstream ISP. Multihoming helps to maintain an uninterrupted service to the ISP‘s customers in case the routes of one upstream ISP or IBP fail for some reason. A multihomed ISP can choose from the various upstream routes the one that has less latency and delay at a specific time.

Nevertheless, there are practical reasons why multihoming may not be a viable strategy for small ISPs (Crémer, Rey, and Tirole, 2000). Firstly, multihoming does not necessarily protect an ISP from quality degradation by a dominant IBP unless the alternative IBP or ISP can deliver the traffic without peering with the offending IBP. Secondly, multihoming involves large technological costs due to the use of a sophisticated routing protocol that requires highly qualified staff. Besides, sending and receiving traffic via another trunk implies the use of the existing trunk at less than full capacity. That entails a loss of returns to scale.

The other available manoeuvre is secondary peering. One of the arguments forwarded in the Halfway Proposition is that African ISPs should be able to enhance regional peering arrangements to reduce dependence on U.S. IBPs. However, the efficacy of this strategy is severely limited for African ISPs as most of the traffic is simply outbound in search of content produced elsewhere.

ISPs in developing countries are also advised to resort to technological solutions to reduce reliance on long haul backbone transmission (OECD, 1998; Savage, Frieden & Denton, 2000b; Kende, 2000). These usually refer to caching and mirroring. A cache is a server owned by a downstream ISP that is programmed to store web content frequently requested by its 54

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores customers. When customers request the web content again, the stored (cached) content is provided to them. The advantage of this technology is that it reduces delay and long distance traffic costs.

In the case of a mirroring service, the content provider and the ISP enter into an agreement to make the complete content accessible from the content provider ISP's remote servers. IBPs do not encourage mirrors, as they are mechanisms to reduce reliance on their services (WiK, 2002, pp, 62-63).

Due to the set of challenges mentioned above, ISPs have solicited regulatory intervention by regional organisations such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and the ITU. In the next section, we will examine why IBPs and government officials in the developed countries resisted regulation of the backbone market.

ICAIS, Regulation, and the Economics of the Internet

The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) insisted that the backbone industry is competitive from the start. In the absence of entry barriers, regulatory measures would only stifle innovation and the growth of the budding industry. In recognition of the role of regulatory abstention in the development of the Internet, the 1996 Act states that ―[t] he Internet... [has] flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation‖ (Kende, 2000, p. 15).

Thus, any price regulation or imposition of a cost sharing formula based on traffic flow or other criteria would only introduce the "legacy international telecommunications regulation" that was designed for national monopoly markets. Kende (2000) further indicated that regions of the world where

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores the market is liberalised offer better prices for long haul transmission.

Giovannetti and Ristuccia, on the other hand, have differentiated the debate surrounding the ICAIS issue from the "economics, price-based, perspective (2005, p.274, Italics in the original)‖. Similarly, Tan, Chiang and Mookerjee (2006) categorised the ICAIS debate as a political one. The following quotation succinctly summarises the economic perspective reflected in the majority of the studies: Even though most markets suffer from imperfections, they typically operate more effectively than they would if they were regulated more closely. The main problem for authorities in seeking to improve on existing market outcomes is that although we know markets do not operate perfectly, except for encouraging more competition it is usually not possible to know what we can do to improve their performance-the authorities rarely have the necessary information about what is going wrong and why. In a majority of actual markets, enough of the advantageous features of market-based competition are retained that regulatory intervention is unable to improve on the efficiency of the overall outcome (Wik, 2002, p.100)

Therefore, when the ICAIS dispute is treated with the help of the assumptions, methodology and value preferences of Internet economics, it leads to a set of standard answers:  Developing countries have to liberalise their telecommunications market and remove local access monopolies. D‘Ignazio and Giovanetti (2006a) mention that many of these countries are members of the WTO, but they have not ratified the specific instruments that require providing market access to foreign firms (p.59).  Technological solutions such as caching, mirroring, etc.  A wait and see approach. Savage et al suggest that as the bandwidth market has

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grown up, prices will fall in the future and make the ICAIS issue less relevant.  Developing countries should collect evidence to show market failure and seek legal/ regulatory measure from the WTO or the European Commission.

However, even if the charging arrangements are modified by a regulatory intervention as requested by the complainants, the allocation of resources will still be guided by the laws of demand and supply, the efficiency criterion and, in general, the market system. The issues arising in connection with the emergence of New Generation Networks (NGN) illustrate this basic point. Product differentiation may lead to network providers targeting only those that demand and can pay for real time services. As provision of real time services involves cost of additional investment, which has to be recovered from the high-end services, ordinary services such as e-mail will likely be routed on a less robust path.

The economic or cost based perspective, therefore, implies a specific political perspective about the relationship between the state and the economy. The WiK study mentions that the same problems of Internet traffic could be reframed as issues of individual right (e.g. privacy), or of distributive justice (e.g. universal service or merit goods). The following chapter traces the political contestations to frame ICAIS and similar other issues of relevance for ICT use and distribution.

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Chapter Three: Ideational Constituents of the Global Information Order

The previous chapter sketched the prevailing material structure within which the specific issue of ICAIS arose. This chapter focuses on the ideational structure. The key component of this structure is the notion of information society. The idea of the communication society, on the other hand, attempts to construct an alternative structure. Both have their own histories in framing the actions of global players.

Information Society

In this section, we will highlight the academic and policy discourses on the information society. Duff (2000) identified three different theses that have provided the theoretical backdrop for the notion of information society (computerized society, wired society or telematics society).These are the information sector, information flows and information technology versions.

The information sector version

This thesis is associated with Machlup and Porat. Machlup (1962) collected and analysed statistical data on U.S. economy to observe the major economic trends in the 1950s. His first finding was that expenditure for "production of knowledge", i.e. education, training, research and development (R&D), communication media, information machines and services accounted for a substantial percentage of the GNP. Secondly, white-collar labour in the U.S. had increased while blue- collar labour had decreased by significant margins, thus 58

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores changing the nature of the national workforce and occupational structure. Porat (1977) provided additional and up-to-date statistical data to confirm Machlup's findings. Porat included workers, machineries, goods and services used to process, manipulate and transmit data in what he called ―information activities‖. He found that such activities accounted for 46% of U.S. GDP as well as 53 % of income from labour14. The general conclusion of these studies was that the US had already become an information society.

The information flows version

The Japanese version of the information society draws on an information flow census that was carried out in 1975. The census measured the amount of information transmitted via all kinds of media irrespective of its value. The finding was that information consumed by Japan had increased by such a substantial margin that Japan could be considered the most informationalised society next to the US. The Japanese

14 Duff, Webster and Kumar, have extensively examined the various formulations of the information society with the view to establishing their validity and explanatory potential. Webster(2002), for example, challenged the thesis put forward by Machlup and Porat as one that derived qualitative conclusions from a quantitative premise. Changes in the proportion of workforce or amount of information activities do not evidence a break with the previous system or a social transformation. In fact, according to Webster, it is the continuity of past social, political, or economic life that is more accentuated in the present era. Likewise, other scholars concluded that increasing inequality, commodification of life, invasion of privacy, atomization of society, environmental degradation, antagonistic relationship between the actors involved in the production process will continue to plague the world with or without information society (Kumar,1995; Tremblay, 1995; Garnham, 2000).

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Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, which conducted the census, also recommended greater use of electronic media to further expand the information society.

The information technology version

This version focussed on the changes brought about by the convergence of computing and telecommunications. The thesis is that information technology has brought about a new cost structure (i.e. costs of capital, labour as well as its own cost of production) and a new organisational and management method. Hence, the significant change is not the arrival of new techniques but the emergence of a new "socio-technical system".

According to this version, apart from the physical device, a diverse set of skills, organisation units, and beliefs about the uses of the devices characterize the information society. Warschauer (2003) cited the production structure of Dell Company to illustrate this point. The company uses information and communication technology to gather and process information about its customer base, its production process and supply chain. Dell also sells its products to consumers on the Internet. Dell‘s build-to-order system also functions based on information provided to it by corporate customers on its website. The company almost totally depends on outsourced manufacturers whose activity is also coordinated based on information gathered using ICT (pp.17- 18).

Bell theorised the changes that took place in the 1960s as a qualitative transformation of the US into a Post- Industrial society (later called information society). He

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores described these changes as part of a broad historic transformation in the magnitude of the agrarian and industrial revolutions of the past. In pre-industrial societies-still the condition of most of the world today-the labour force is engaged overwhelmingly in the extractive industries: mining, fishing, forestry, agriculture. Life is primarily a game against nature...Industrial societies are goods-producing societies. Life is a game against fabricated nature. The world has become technical and rationalized. ...A Post-Industrial society is based on services. Hence, it is a game between persons. What counts is not raw muscle power, or energy, but information (Quoted in Porat, 1978, p.72, emphasis omitted).

Castells (2000a, 2000b), who prefers the term "Network society", also emphasised that the changes accompanying the introduction of ICTs represent not only a new technological paradigm but also ―a new economy". In this new economy, firms, countries or regions have to process and manage information to achieve productivity15. What distinguishes the present epoch, according to this view, is that information technology has made information processing a "source of life and social action" (2000a, p.10)16.

15 The new global, informational and networked economy, according to Castells, has transformed work and employment, culture, politics, conception of time and space, and the organisation of the state. Work has become more flexible with more people employed on a part time, temporary, self-employed basis. Culture is also disseminated through diverse media outlet. Though there are still oligopolies, the cultural exchange is more interactive and inclusive due to the opportunities created by the Internet and other ICTs (2000a, pp.14-15). 16 Castells' definition of ICTs includes genetic engineering (2000b, p.29). In addition, Castells portrays the network as a social reality which is greater and less than the capitalist system. He expounded that it is the capitalist system that determines the operation of the network at present. But the network, as a social organization, was there before capitalism. Now with ICTs making it the only form of social organization around, it will be there even if capitalism is superseded by another mode of production (2000b, p.502).

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A global information society?

The information society vision subsided for decades after its early emergence in the 1970s and re-emerged in the 1990s with greater vigour and broader scope. This time around, governments began to consider the potential of the new technological paradigm in a more systematic fashion.

In 1993, the U.S. introduced the "National Information Infrastructure Programme-Agenda for Action" (NII)), while the Japanese Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications issued its ―Reforms towards the Intellectual Creative Society of the 21st Century‖. In the same year, the European Commission published "Growth, Competitiveness and Employment: The challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century‖, which was later followed by other reports. In the following year, the Bangemann report- "Europe and the Global Information society" appeared. Other countries such as Brazil and Ireland soon caught up with the new policy trend followed by the United Nations and related international organisations (Martin, 2005).

The U.S. National Information Infrastructure (NII) (1993) was the first national policy that was later widely emulated elsewhere. The NII had the objective of boosting economic growth and a "steadily- increasing standard of living for all Americans" by expanding information related industries.The primary responsibility of the government was providing incentives such as reduction of tax burdens, speeding up of procurement services, protection of intellectual property rights, and combating security threats. The private sector assumed a central role in producing information/content and constructing facilities for its transmission. The document

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores also proposed a Private Sector Advisory Council to facilitate its participation in national policymaking process.

Provision of universal service through affordable and easy access to ICTs was the other goal of the NII. The NII revised the earlier universal service scheme that had largely relied on government provision of telephone and similar services .The new approach envisaged universal service as a function of free competition.

The emerging information infrastructure was primarily valued for its potential to create "unprecedented opportunities" for the U.S. information industries. Thus, the NII recommended the following specific measures to help trade and investment by US corporations:

 Negotiating with other countries for removal of export restrictions against U.S. telecommunications services,  Eliminating trade barriers through participation in international standard making bodies, and  Review and amendment of international and U.S. trade regulation. A specific example mentioned in the document is the "excessive charges for completing [telephone] calls from the United States‖ (Item V.8).

The Bangemann Report also urged the European Union to emulate the U.S. and actively participate in the new information economy.

The first countries to enter the information society will reap the greatest rewards. They will set the agenda for all who must follow...

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... [C]ompetitive suppliers of networks and services from outside Europe are increasingly active in our markets. They are convinced, as we must be that if Europe arrives late, our suppliers of technologies and services will lack the commercial muscle to win a share of the enormous global opportunities which lie ahead. Our companies will migrate to more attractive locations to do business. Our export markets will evaporate. We have to prove them wrong.

In this sector, the private investment will be the driving force...The market will drive, it will decide winners and losers... (Commission of the European Communities, 1994).

The specific recommendation of the report was for Europe to design a trade strategy that capitalises on its comparative advantage such as its linguistic plurality. European governments were advised to facilitate competition, open up the market, secure interconnection and interoperability among telecommunication providers, and adjust tariff.

The subsequent report by a High Level Group of Experts (HLGE) in 1996, however, questioned the excessively pro- market, technophilic, and narrow focus of the Bangemann report. In particular, two aspects of the Bangemann report- the information society concept itself and the market fundamentalism underlying it-were singled out as problematic. The information society idea, it was pointed out, focused too much on production of information to stimulate the economy. It did not refer to the generation of knowledge.

The Bangemann report was also criticised for its representation of technology and the market as exogenous factors to which European actors should merely adapt. The HLGE was of the view that the use of technology is dependent on social conditions shaped by social actors. Thus, the concept of flexible use was introduced to reflect that ICTs could consciously be utilised to advance broad policy goals.

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The HLGE suggested that digital literacy must enable employability of people, protection of natural resources, social cohesion, and communication. The report also recommended creation of mechanisms for protection of labour, which has become flexible and feminised due to the introduction of ICTs. More importantly, the issue of social inclusion or increased participation of "less favoured groups" into economic activity was proposed as the major agenda of the information society. Those left out by the market, it was suggested, have to be accommodated by public institutions.

Simultaneously, the report also underscored that ―regulation policy must fully reflect the new international agenda formed by the emerging global information infrastructure‖ (Commission of the European Communities, 1996, p.15).

The HLGE reflected most of the scepticism expressed in academic debates about the information society. Its final recommendations, however, seem to display a tension between the declared goals of social inclusion and capitalist market expansion. The globalisation of ICT production and exchange was structured by neo-liberal tenets laid down mainly by the US. Consequently, such policies as protection of labour were incompatible with these tenets. The HLGE, thus, called for a "global level playing field" so that the European Union will not be disadvantaged by its tradition of social welfare.

Information society and the digital divide

According to some observers of the evolution of the information society discourse, developing countries were not envisaged as participants until the 1990s (Martin, 2005).

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Nonetheless, this observation is only partly correct. The information society vision had already assigned a role to the developing world since its early inception. Porat had elaborated this in his ―Global Implications of the Information Society" (Porat, 1978).

Based on the findings of his empirical study on the U.S. economy, Porat indicated the significance of global expansion of information industries. ... projections of the US labor force reveal that the growth of the information work force has slowed dramatically. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, between 1970 and 1980 the information sector will grow at a net rate of 0.04 percent-not much faster than the overall U.S. labor force....The prospects for new growth for the information economy can come from only two sources of demand: domestic and foreign.

...Internal pressures to export information goods and services have already resulted in aggressive marketing by U.S multinationals-both in the developed countries (including the Soviet Bloc) and the less developed nations"(Porat, 1978, pp.74-75).

Obviously, the decline of the U.S. economy is the problem this study aims to address. Porat, however, found common interests between the U.S. foreign trade policy and the development needs of the poor countries, however. Where computers and communication are used for economic modernization (i.e., in support of industrialization), the US is clearly committed to encouraging such development. The quality of life is at stake, and dovetails with a fixture of U.S. foreign aid policy-raising the developing nation's standard of living (Porat, 1978, pp.74-75)17.

Porat‘s policy recommendation is, therefore, interesting for it bluntly reminds us of the origin of the information

17 However, as it will be discussed in the next section, objections were raised by academics and some third world countries against the U.S. "cultural imperialism". Porat contended that U.S. cultural exports were desired in these countries and it would be contrary to the human right principle of freedom of expression/information to disrupt the international transactions.

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores society, the material interests underpinning it and how its vision of economic growth is embedded in the so-called ―digital divide‖.

The role of developing countries in the new information and communication order was spelt out in the G8 Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society of 2000. The charter defined the digital divide as lack of access to information and communication networks in some countries or localities. The solution, according to the G8, is primarily ―fostering market conditions conducive to the provision of affordable communications services", and secondarily, extending "complementary means‖, such as financial assistance.

The G8 also underlined that developing countries should ―take ownership‖ of the process through the adoption of ―coherent national strategies‖. Such strategies must aim to:  build an IT friendly, pro-competitive policy and regulatory environment,  exploit IT in pursuit of development goals and social cohesion,  develop expansion of IT skills, and  encourage community initiatives and indigenous entrepreneurships (p.4).

The Okinawa Charter, with full array of its vision, programmes, and resources, formalised the modality of incorporation of the developing world. The key message was that the poor countries have to open up their economy to foreign investment. The Digital Opportunity Task Force (Dot Force) that was established under its auspices also facilitated increased participation by the private sector. The Private sector, already conscious of its role in building a sustainable business environment for its own prosperity as well as 67

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that of others, will need to explore the specific ways of achieving this in the context of development goals and ensure that responsible best practice is consistently maintained(G8 DOT Force, 2001,p.6).

The latter phases of this project of introduction of ICTs in the developing world have simply focussed on gathering ―best practices‖ and establishing them as benchmarks. In 2001, therefore, it was reported: "ICTs [are] already being used highly effectively to directly address development goals‖ (Accenture, Markle Foundation & UNDP, 2001, p.5). Examples from Gambia, Chile, Bangladesh, etc were cited to show that the digital divide initiatives are already creating a ―development dynamic‖18.

Thus, the concerns and interests of global ICT production are now linked with the aspirations of the developing countries to achieve a better standard of living. Trade, aid, and investment relationships in the field of ICT between the North and the South were reconstructed around the theme of enhancement of global movement of goods and services. Governments in the South made a commitment to create an enabling environment through protection of intellectual property rights, ensuring security and encouraging consumption of information products.

The notions of information society and the digital divide serve to provide a political legitimacy to the current global

18 There are also other views about the digital divide. For instance, its focus on access to ICT infrastructure and equipments has been criticized. Instead, capacity building and resource usage have been identified as more essential to bridge the divide. Warschauer (2003), in his critique of the U.S. national digital divide initiatives insisted that the focus should be on developing digital literacy so that people will be empowered to use ICTs for their own developmental needs.

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores information order. However, there are also efforts to critically engage these notions and to construct an alternative vision. The concept of a communication society attempts to map out an alternative ideational structure for ICT production and distribution in the world.

Communication Society

International communication issues have been a subject of intense ideological struggle especially since the 1970s. This section highlights the continuity and change in the approaches and issues of this ideational struggle over the past half century.

New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO)/New International Information Order (NIIO)

In the 1950s and 1960s, the decolonisation process in Asia, Africa, and Latin America brought about a change in international relations. The liberated states became active members of international organisations such as the UN and its specialised organs. However, it was soon realised that despite decolonisation, the oppressive and inequitable relationships established during the colonial era were still prevalent.

In the sphere of information and news exchange between the North and the South, similar asymmetry of power existed. Hence, developing countries initiated a political process to challenge the existing information order and proposed a New

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International Information Order (or later the New World Information and Communication Order) to replace it19.

In academic discourse, the backwardness of the third world was initially explained by the modernisation paradigm. Accordingly, the cause of backwardness of the third world should be sought in its own makeup or its political and economic traditions and cultures. Thus, third world countries have to slowly acquire Western mode of political and economic organisation. Hence, the role of mass media in injecting modern values and cultural attitudes in these traditional societies was the central theme of communication studies (Carlsson, 2003).

In contrast, the dependency paradigm attributed the underdevelopment of the South to the structures of imperialism and colonialism. It underlined that the structures of world

19 The NIIO is related to the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The latter could be regarded as a set of specific demands made at the UN and embodied in various official documents, mainly Resolution 3201(S-VI). The political demands made by the third world countries included equality, sovereignty, and participation in international decision-making processes. The economic demands included regulation and supervision of transnational corporations, improvement of the terms of trade between primary and manufactured goods, access to Northern markets, transfer of technology on equitable terms, reform of financial structures, and autonomous use of foreign aid. Amin (1995, p.9) depicted these demands as ―authentic liberalism‖, rather than as a break from the capitalist order. Even then, almost all of these demands were rejected by the developed countries. The NIEO can also be regarded as a debate about theoretical issues concerning the international economic structure. For instance, the participants in the debate challenged the validity of comparative advantage as a concept to understand relationships between the North and the South (Cox, 1979, pp.257-302; Addo, 1984).

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores trade and investment simply perpetuated the predatory grasp of western capitalism on third world countries. Third world economies, according to this line of argument, have to delink from the global capitalist cycle. In other words, they must have their own autonomous system, not subordinate to the needs of capitalist production in the North (Amin, 1995; Cox, 1979). This development paradigm largely provided the undercurrent of thought for a new international information order.

The Non-Aligned Movement, which was by no means a homogenous group in terms of ideology or political-economic systems, articulated most of the ideas of the ‗new international information order‘. The non-aligned moment called for safeguarding national cultures and identity, correcting imbalances in flow of information, and control over transnational information and communication corporations (Carlsson, 2003, p.11).

The broad themes of the NIIO are categorised under the ―the four D‘s‖:  Democratisation: The flow of news was understood to be ―one- way‖, i.e. from North to South. Hence, it is imperative to democratise world communication process in order to enable equal participation by third world nations and people.  Decolonisation: Western media had a free rein to trump the cultural identity, interests, aspirations, and values of third world nations. If these countries are to resist cultural imperialism by advancing their own culture, then resources have to put at their disposal.

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 Demonopolisation: The major producers and distributors of cultural goods and technology were transnational corporations that wielded immense economic power. Third world nations insisted that they should supervise and regulate the activities of transnational corporations.  Development: The idea of development underlined autonomy, equitable distribution of communication resources and empowerment of the marginalised. Though this formulation decidedly rejected modernisation as a paradigm, its key component was that the rich countries should extend development assistance to the poor countries (Nordenstreng cited in Carlsson, 2003, pp. 12-14).

The Non-Aligned Movement countries were able to get a declaration passed by the UNESCO in 1978. The UNESCO Declaration on the Role of Media in Strengthening Peace stipulated the principles of free flow and balanced dissemination of information, and the right to reply to news information disseminated by global media corporations. However, these principles were controversial because the Western representatives considered them too inimical to free flow of information, whereas the Third World countries found them too hortatory (Mansell and Nordenstreng, 2007, p.22; Hamelink, 1997).

In order to break this stalemate, the UNESCO Secretary General later set up an international commission, led by Sean MacBride, to study the problem. The result was a book-length report with detailed analysis of the history of communication, 72

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores the problems and concern of the time, the institutional framework for decision making and about 82 recommendations (International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, 1980).

The criticism against the MacBride report ranged from its lack of theory to its failure to make considered practical proposals (Golding and Harris, 1997, Carlsson, 2003, pp.17- 18). Perhaps the following comment by co-authors of the report aptly describes the nature of the document: The report is not always organic in the development of the different topics it touches upon, lacking on occasion a fully systematic and coherent style. As such, it is more a negotiated document than an academic presentation (Marquez and Somavia in International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, 1980, p 281).

Yet, the report of the MacBride Commission is the official document defining NWICO, and approved by a unanimous vote at the 21st session of the UNESCO General Conference held in Belgrade in 1980. The principles it enshrined included inter alia:  Elimination of imbalances and inequalities,  Elimination of the negative effects of certain monopolies, public or private, and excessive concentration,  Free flow and better balanced dissemination,  Plurality of sources and information, and  Respect for each people‘s cultural identity and for the right of each nation to inform the world about its interests, its aspirations and its social and cultural values (Italics added)20.

20 Article 14 of the resolution, which the above text cited, clearly indicates the negotiation efforts to shape the language of the final text. For example, it was argued that not all but only certain monopolies have 73

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However, the report did not result in any political or legal instrument. The NWICO was characterised as an attempt to muzzle the free press. The U.S. and UK withdrew from UNESCO. Eventually, the NWICO proposals were not implemented21. Yet, the ideas elaborated by the MacBride report have remained relevant to debates in international communications.

The Post-NWICO vision for world communication

The MacBride Roundtable of 1989, a forum by journalists, academics, and activists carried on the concerns raised in the NWICO debate. Several transnational activist networks joined this core group. The central normative concept articulated by this movement is the ―right to communicate‖ or ―communication rights‖.

This idea of communication focussed on a different aspect of freedom of expression. The latter simply guarantees the right of a person who has access to resources and technology to freely exercise his/her right. Thus, an emphasis on freedom negative effects on international communication. It was also held that not only private but also public monopolies, ostensibly the state media in the Socialist bloc, played a negative role in world communication. In other words, corporate dominance of communication and state repression of freedom of expression were equally condemned. The phrase "better balanced‖ was inserted to imply that the existing information exchange was not totally unbalanced (Carlsson, 2003, p.22). 21 The brief account of NWICO given in this text does not cover the geo-political conflicts in the background of the debate. The oil crisis of the 1970s and the role played by OPEC countries in challenging the dominance of the rich countries, as well as the cold war rivalry between the East and the West strongly influenced the NWICO debate (see Hamelink, 1997; Mansell & Nordenstreng, 2006; Carlsson, 2003 for an extended analysis of the geopolitical context). 74

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores of expression tends to reinforce the already existing material imbalance in the flow of information. A two-sided communication, on the other hand, is based on empowerment of all individuals and groups to respond and criticise. This can only be achieved in a political and economic structure that extends communication resources and capabilities to the economically, socially, and culturally disadvantaged (O'Siochru, 2004, p.210).

Hamelink has pointed out that the existing Human rights regime provides only for dissemination, consultation and registration, while omitting conversation or communication (2003, p.155). As a result, it confounds communication with information. It also omits the right to share the benefits of technological development and to make technological choice (Hamelink, 2003; O'Siochru, 2005). To address these issues, the individual and collective right to communicate, including the right to information, protection of culture, and participation has to be the defining principle of the international communication order (Hamelink, 2004; O‘Siochru, 2004a)22.

This necessitates a new political vision for a communication society whose foundational principles are:  knowledge as a public domain or a common good;  democratic control of media and communication resources i.e. public and community ownership, and

22 O'Siochru has distinguished the right to communicate from "communication rights". Hence, for the latter, the emphasis is "on realising the existing communication rights...‖, while the former focuses on establishing ―a new right under international law‖ (2005, p.19). 75

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 use of communication resources for social and human needs i.e. to eradicate poverty, to promote peace, human rights and culture.

In the Post-NWICO era, intergovernmental institutions did not hold the prominent role as instruments for realising an alternative vision for communication. Hence, the strategy for political mobilisation relies on popular support through an international social movement. According to O‘Siochru, civil society has to capitalise on its shared destiny and continue its struggle at new arenas such as the World Social Forum (2004b, p.220).This has not, however, led to an uncritical acceptance of civil society either since civil society actors are not necessarily democratic, representative, or accountable (Hamelink, 2004, p.289).

Developing countries in the Post-NWICO phase

The responses of the ―third world‖ to the Post-NWICO political vision are variegated. Musa (1997) contended that the struggle against Western media domination was waged under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie. This group did not intend to bring fundamental change to the existing class hierarchy within the third world. Consequently, the whole movement focused on the one-way flow of content or cultural imperialism and the suppression of indigenous culture.

A more balanced assessment, according to Musa, should also highlight the unequal access to resources within the periphery and the compradorisation of the national bourgeoisie by virtue of its ownership of the national media. More specifically, since NWICO, the media in third world countries such as Nigeria, Mexico, Egypt, and Brazil, has relatively

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores developed. Nevertheless, the majority of people in these countries do not have access to communication resources. Therefore, transformation of class relations is a necessary condition for a real democratisation of communication in the periphery.

In contrast, Antonio Pasquali, former Assistant Director General of UNESCO and head of its communications sector, observed: Is it realistic to expect the downtrodden but still combatant South and the goodwill-driven NGOs...to progress even inches in their fight for a more democratic Internet governance, when we know that the North Americans control 13 of the most important Internet search engines, the Cisco quasi-monopoly of commuting,70 percent of the electronic directory that operates under the code Ipv4, all their messenger espionage systems (Echelon, submarines and others), and the platform of 95 percent of intra-European and intra-Asian connections?(2005, p.294).

This assessment singles out the overemphasis of the NWICO movement on declarations of principles and ideals rather than on concrete strategies and tactics. The alternative strategy suggested by Pasquali is to fight the battle in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. This, in turn, requires reframing the problems of the developing countries in the language of protectionism and dumping, regulation of monopolies, etc.

Similarly, Kiyindou (2004) argued that the ―the noble intention of integrating the global South into the information society‖ is compromised due to lack of follow up of the commitment to provide aid. Thus, it is possible, through partnership between donors and African states, to introduce a serious ICT for development policy with built in follow up mechanisms.

Kiyindou‘s argument reiterated the official view of the Group of 77, as declared in its Havana Programme of Action, 77

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2000. The latter called for international development assistance based on the ―spirit of partnership‖. In particular, the Group of 77 appealed for ―TRIPs agreements relating to the transfer of technology [to] work to the mutual advantage‖ of the producers and users.

Thus, there is a close alignment between official policy in developing countries and the information society notion propagated by international organisations such as the ITU, World Bank and G8. Developing countries are now competing among each other to attract TNCs. The information society policies of regional organisations in Africa, such as NEPAD and UNECA, clearly reflect the prescriptions of the G8. Consequently, social development agendas such as the communication society have scarcely found any room in policy discourse in Africa.

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Chapter Four: Institutionalisation of the Global Information Order

This chapter attempts to explain the role of international organisations in coordinating the material and discursive power of the dominant social forces in the global information order. The ITU and the WSIS are selected for analysis in this chapter due to their relevance for ICAIS.

The first section deals with ITU‘s transformation in terms of objective, organisational model and membership following the changes in the pattern of production of ICT. The ITU tackled the ICAIS dispute was as part of its new mission of supporting liberalisation and deregulation of the international telecommunications market.

The second section discusses the articulation of the information society and communication society visions and strategies at the World Summit on Information Society.

The ITU and the Global Information Order

The first sub-section highlights the original mandate of the ITU and how it accommodated the concerns of its developing country members. The second sub-section traces the changes in political philosophy and organisational mission introduced in the 1980s and 1990s. The third sub-section elaborates the change in ITU‘s telecommunication settlement rates and its impact on ICAIS.

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Origins of the ITU development mandate

The ITU has regulatory, distributive, and developmental functions. In particular, it is responsible for standardisation of telecommunications services and equipment, allocation of radio spectrum and orbital slots, setting tariff rates for international telecommunications services, and development assistance to third world countries (ITU, 2005; Cowhey and Aronson, 1991).

Members of the ITU include states and private operating agencies. The former are represented in the highest organ of the ITU, the Plenipotentiary Conference, which is held every four years. Recognised Private Operating Agencies (RPOAs) i.e. operators endorsed by their respective governments, were allowed to have a non-voting membership since 1976. These bodies together with International Standard Organisations (ISOs), which were brought on board since 1989, play a central role in the standard making process of the ITU. The conference draws up the Union's general policies, strategic and financial plans, and elects the senior management team (ITU, 2005).

The members of the ITU embraced two central values. Firstly, they viewed telecommunications activities as services provided by single designated national operators. The only exceptions were the US, UK and Japan which had multiple providers of telecommunications services. ITU's role was to facilitate cooperation between these designated Post, Telephone, and Telegraph (PTTs) providers for the exchange of international telecommunications traffic. The idea of joint ownership of telecommunications facilities between the

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores national monopolies justified this cooperation (Rutkowski, 1991, p.292).

Secondly, telecommunications services were agreed to be public services, not tradable items. The ITU, unlike the GATT or WTO, did not aim to provide a multilateral framework of a global telecommunication market. There was no direct relationship between users in the originating country and the telecommunications operator in the destination country. Besides, each national operator had sovereign right to regulate its local telecommunications services (Woodrow, 1991).

The ITU incorporated a development assistance role to respond to the needs of its developing country members. In the 1970s, the North-South conflict occupied the organisation like the other UN specialised agencies. The developing country members demanded abolition of inequities in international tariffs, access to radio frequency spectrum and geostationary satellite orbit, and transfer of technology, equipment, and systems (Segal, 1983, p.330)

The Nairobi Plenipotentiary Conference of 1982 entertained the North-South conflict in the ITU. At the time this conference, the movement for the New International Economic Order (NIEO) was an international agenda. The cause of disagreement in the ITU related to access to funds for technical assistance to the developing countries. The ITU's major source of funds for its development activities was the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). As multilateral aid was declining and UNDP financing was insufficient, many developing countries requested for diversion of the regular budget of the ITU to fund technical assistance. The developed

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores country members, on the other hand, insisted that aid should be provided only through the UNDP.

As a compromise, the Conference participants agreed to establish a special voluntary programme for technical cooperation that would solicit finance and other forms of assistance. In addition, an International Commission for Worldwide Telecommunications Development, commonly known as the Maitland Commission, was set up to identify mechanisms of resource transfer to the poor countries (Näslund, 1983).

The Conference resolution to establish this commission referred to the MacBride report. The latter was also based on a similar study to address the communication imbalances between the North and the South. One of the measures recommended by MacBride report was the establishment of an International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC). This organ was later established under UNESCO. However, funding problems faced by the IPDC led to its failure to address the needs of developing countries (Carlsson, 2003, p.25).

The Maitland Commission also made a number of specific recommendations to address the problem of "financing the development of telecommunications" in the third world. One of the observations made by the commission was that opening up the telecommunications equipment market on a competitive basis would ensure access to technology. The finding of the Commission about this market was that it had excess capacity while, at the same time, developing countries had a lot of unmet demand for telecommunications. In view of this, the Commission surmised that developing countries have a strong bargaining position and that they can demand open tendering, international bid on prices and repayment terms (The 82

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Independent Commission for Worldwide Telecommunications Development, 1984, p.57).

Apart from the market solution, the Maitland Commission explored such mechanisms like a revolving fund and Telecommunications Investment Trust to finance development in the third world23. However, the most practical source of fund for modernisation of third world telecommunications was the cash receipt from international calls. Third world telecommunications agencies derived their revenue mainly from termination of long distance calls from developed countries. Generally, there is more incoming call from developed countries to developing countries than vice versa. This traffic imbalance worked to the advantage of developing countries24.

The accounting rate system implements the principle of joint ownership of facilities by member states by allocating the cost of provision of this service among the carriers involved in a transaction. The accounting rate is a bilaterally negotiated rate for average cost per minute of a

23 A Centre for Telecommunications Development was set up by the ITU as recommended by the Maitland Commission. The function of the centre was to consult developing countries on matters of organization, planning, maintenance, tariff policy, etc. The centre, which came into existence in 1987, was financed by the private sector and the World Bank (Cowhey & Aronson, 1991, p.309). As its budget was inadequate, however, the centre could provide only a limited consultancy service. 24 Accounting for international telecommunications between and among countries was carried out within an international framework of standards known as Recommendations, developed and approved by members of the ITU. The specific body entrusted with this task was the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), now known as the Telecommunications Standardization Sector (ITU-T) (Stern & Kelly, 1997, pp 3-4). 83

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores call between countries A and B. It is usually stated in U.S. dollars or Special Drawing Rights per minute of traffic (Thuswaldner, 2000). Afterwards, the originating carrier shall share the revenue it acquired from the caller in its jurisdiction with the destination carrier. In other words, the latter shall be reimbursed by the call-originating carrier for the cost of termination. The amount of this reimbursement is fixed in a separate rate known as the settlement rate.

In principle, the settlement rate is 50/50.Though there are a variety of settlement methods, the equal sharing of the accounting revenue is the most commonly used one. Accordingly, if the accounting rate between A and B is $1.00 per minute, then one pays to the other $0.50 per minute to deliver each call to its destination. Therefore, if more calls have been terminated in a country than originating in it, the telephone company of that country receives a net settlement. Consequently, the direction of the traffic determines which operator has to pay the settlement (Minges, Kelly & Staple, 1996, p. 16).

Developing countries have been beneficiaries of the accounting rate system. For example, Ethiopia had 60% of its telecommunications revenue derived from international calls, most of it from net settlement payments. However, the largest recipients of the benefit were still countries like Mexico, Canada, Japan, China, India and South Korea. Sub- Saharan Africa received only 2% of the total in 1996/7. Socio- political factors like immigration, population size, proximity with trading partners also influence volume of traffic, and hence receipt of settlement payments (Deane, 1998, pp.6-7).

In spite of this limitation, for the poorest countries, the revenue derived from the settlement payment is the single 84

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores most important source of finance. Firstly, many developing countries do not have access to credit, or if they receive credit, it is at a high interest rate. Hence, the foreign exchange earnings from the accounting rate system are even irreplaceable. Secondly, the cost of equipment and lease of cable and satellite system demand upfront payment for which these countries lack the financial resources. Thirdly, least developed countries cannot afford to open direct telephone links with many countries. Thus, they have to pay for transit. As a result, the cost of telephone call from these countries is higher than from developed countries. More importantly, providing access to people living in the rural areas is expensive in these countries, as it requires huge infrastructure investment (Deane, 1998, p.10). The Maitland Commission recommended creation of a special fund for accumulation of a fixed part of the receipt from the net settlement. Thus, the ITU would be able to make disbursement for telecommunications development projects from this fund.

The development mandate of the ITU was revamped following the transformation of the telecommunication industry in the 1990s. A case in point is the freezing of the ITU initiative to introduce subsidy scheme for infrastructure construction in developing countries25.

25 The value of a network increases for previous customers when new customers join a network. Thus, as per the request of developing country members of ITU, a study was conducted to determine the positive externalities accruing to developed country networks due to new customers in developing countries joining their national networks. According to a study conducted by Neu (2004), a 1% increase in fixed and mobile subscription in a developing country leads to a 0.66% increase in calls from and to USA. In the new telecommunication environment, subsidies from developed countries to finance infrastructure construction in developing countries could be justified on such grounds only. The externality premium paid by the rich telcos is conditional. It should a) be used exclusively 85

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In the discussion of this initiative at the ITU, the principal participants were Vodafone, MCI, FCC, and KDDI (Neu, 2003). The main objection raised by these transnational corporations was that this subsidisation scheme entails additional burdens on their clients26. Hence, 22 developed country members rejected the final recommendation.

The next sub-section discusses the nature and scope of the changes in the ITU and the implications of these changes to developing countries. It also explains how these changes affected the approach adopted to address the issue of ICAIS.

ITU in a changing business environment

International telecommunications as a non-tradable service run by national monopolies faced a challenge in the momentum of international trade liberalisation in the 1980s. At the 1986 Punta del Este multilateral round of trade negotiations, a step was taken to incorporate these components into the existing GATT regime (Drake & Noam, 1997).The push came from large corporations such as American Express, Citicorp and Reuters, which are major telecommunications user groups in developed countries. These transnational corporations had opened up branches and subsidiaries or sales outlets in far-flung areas in search of cheap labour, tax for extending networks and awareness campaigns and b) have a positive effect on the number of customers (ITU-T Study Group 3,2008(a)). 26 The ITU has made it clear that ―Membership to ITU-T is a means to actively take part in the Sector‘s standardization work and thus secure an influence of a company's business goals and policies on the development of standards within its business sphere‖ (http://www.itu.int/en/ITU- T/membership/Pages/why.aspx ) .

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores haven and profit repatriation. This meant that their telecommunications fees constituted a significant portion of their cost of production. As a result, telecommunications, both as a service sector and a mode of delivery for other services, became key issue of trade liberalisation negotiations led by the US27 (Woodrow, 1991).

The ITU, as the organisation responsible for regulation of international telecommunications, had to handle these changes. Most member states and monopoly telecommunications providers in the ITU were initially cautious and concerned about this takeover of the mandate of the organisation by trade officials. Besides, though ITU had also some members with competitive service providers, it never had a drive to promote progressive liberalisation of international telecommunications.

In addition to the organisational philosophy of the ITU, its voting procedure also allowed active participation by developing countries. The equal vote system gave full rights to each member, at least formally. However, the preponderance of developing countries in ITU has a limited significance since the organisation relied on financial support from the developed countries. Yet, developing countries could exercise their voting rights to block some decisions (Woodrow, 1991; Rutkowski, 1991).

At the World Administration of Telegraph and Telephone Conference of 1988 in Melbourne, the ITU's long held view about the nature of telecommunications services was challenged from within its membership. The Conference attempted to

27 This is comparable to the process that led to the privatization of the U.S. backbone network discussed in chapter 2. 87

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores include the new telecommunications services known as leased line and value added services. The USA and the UK argued that such incorporation would subject the providers of these new services to regulation against the current trend of free competition. Developing countries and European PTTs demanded that these activities must be included in the ambit of the ITU regulations as part of international telecommunications services. Eventually, a special arrangement to allow for exceptions to these new services was introduced (Woodrow, 1991).

The next step in coming to terms with the WTO regime was taken at the Nice Plenipotentiary Conference of 1989. The Conference set up a High Level Committee to study the reform needs of the ITU. The dominant concern behind this study was that ITU's role would be increasingly marginal due to the changes happening in global telecommunications. The entry of new global carriers that could provide an end-to-end telecommunications service touched the core of the ITU. Thus, members had to take a stand on how the ITU should accommodate private, competitive international carriers (Codding, 1991).

The question itself anticipated far reaching changes of the ITU and its relationship with the emerging global telecommunications industry. Savage (1991) drew a parallel with the adjustments made in the Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisations (CTO). In the 1990s, this organisation had already been administering telecommunications development programmes for 40 years. The report of the Maitland Commission commended the CTO as a model for telecommunications development assistance, particularly for its preferential tariff scheme. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, the telecommunications carriers of some of the CTO members were privatised and ready for competition. These 88

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores carriers were, therefore, unwilling to continue their treaty obligations to provide preferential treatment to any other carrier. They rejected the relevance of the CTO and its ‗altruistic‘ development projects. Obviously, in order to compete in the liberalised market effectively, they had to seek profitable commercial arrangements.

In a similar vein, the High Level Committee concluded that if the ITU is to remain a relevant institution in the changing telecommunications world, it has to serve the interests of privatised operators. Otherwise, these will increasingly rely on other flexible regional or bilateral arrangements, and thus effectively marginalise the Union. One mechanism suggested to avoid this scenario was to maximise the participation of private industry and RPOAs standardisation activity of the union. In short, the ITU decided to move away from the "old guard of state owned PTTs" (Savage, 1991, p.370).

The new secretary General of the ITU, Tarjanne (1999) outlined the basic changes brought about by the ―new governance of telecommunications‖. According to Tarjanne, in the ancien regime, international end-to-end service was provided by connecting the half-circuits of one national carrier with that of another. With the recent change in technology and market structure, however, a carrier from one country can build or lease its own circuits in another country and provide the same end-to-end service by itself. Hence, there will be no need of joint ownership, compensation and bilateral settlement agreement, which were the foundation elements of the old telecommunications order of the ITU.

Tarjanne also expounded the impact of this "revolution" on third world telecommunications development. The chronic 89

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores lack of capital the poor countries have suffered will be addressed by introduction of foreign investment. Besides, the accounting rate system has "outlived its usefulness‖. Thus, it shall be replaced by a new cost-based arrangement. In this regard, the WTO will set down the rules for entry of new operators and service providers into previously closed markets. The commitment to liberalise in the context of the WTO will have an impact on the revenue system of the national monopolies. However, according to Tarjanne, "undoubtedly there will be winners and losers"(p.57).

As regards the organisation and role of the ITU, the anticipated changes were significant. Firstly, the ITU shall provide a forum for adapting the revenue-sharing mechanism in line with the new ownership structure of telecommunications. Tarjanne cited the task of study Group 3 in reforming the existing bilateral accounting rate agreements as a case in point.

Secondly, the ITU would work to incorporate developing countries into the new international telecommunications order. We are conscious that many of the ITU's 188 Member States are not members of the WTO. Many developing countries -including those who did not take part in the negotiations on basic telecommunications- need to be convinced that the benefits that trade in telecommunications can bring will actually materialize for them, and the measures to protect their national interest will be effective. The ITU Development Sector has a role to play in providing this information and in helping governments to use the process of progressive liberalization under the GATS to strengthen telecommunications reforms in their countries...Marketplace ideology which sees commercial trade and other general schemes as a replacement for the old regime has much to commend it, and has produced spectacular results in many countries in a very short period of time (Tarjanne, 1999, pp.60-61).

The accounting rate system and ICAIS

The ITU Study Group 3, which is responsible for developing recommendations for tariff and accounting rate 90

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores agreements between telecommunications operators, became a subject of criticism in the 1990s28.

The U.S. government put pressure for reduction of the absolute level of the accounting rate i.e. the calculation of cost of termination of calls by destination countries. The U.S. Federal Commission for Communication alleged that since the accounting rate was high above cost, U.S. net settlement payment was exorbitant. The OECD also affirmed that the traffic imbalance between developing and developed countries has cost the latter exorbitant sums of money in the form of settlement payment (Walker, 1996). Consequently, the U.S. Federal Commission for Communication took a unilateral measure to fix the ceilings of accounting rates that U.S. telecommunications operators should negotiate with their foreign counterparts (Cave & Waverman, 1999)29.

28 A series of articles in early 1990 in the Financial Times accused this organ as "an anti-competitive cartel of the 'old order' of PTTs and international monopoly carriers". The newspaper alleged that this body orchestrated a '10 billion a year rip off‘ through its instruments that enable international telecommunications providers to garner substantial profit (Cited in Savage, 1991, p.366; Woodrow, 1991, p.333). 29 This unilateral measure has, however, been criticized for different reasons. Tarjanne deplored the unilateralism of the act as a flagrant violation of the multilateralism of the new international telecommunications order. Walker (1996), on the other hand, underlined that the crux of the matter is not reduction of the absolute level of the accounting rate. It is the division of the revenue from the accounting rate which is the commercial bone of contention. The unilateral measure has still embraced the 50:50 divisions. Hence, it merely introduces a reduction of the absolute amount to be shared. If a cost-based accounting rate is to be followed, third world countries would not be worse off because of the higher cost of termination of international calls in these countries. If such cost is higher, then these countries are entitled to a bigger share of the revenue. Thuswaldner (2000), in contrast, concluded that the equal sharing of revenues between carriers with disparate costs is detrimental to 91

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The ITU Study Group responded by carrying out a series of revision of the accounting rate system to "better reflect the new telecommunications environment‖. A member of the WTO secretariat participated as an observer in the meetings of the Study Group. The recommended procedures for remunerating the destination carrier included a cost-orientated, asymmetric settlement rate. However, any bilaterally negotiated commercial arrangement was approved. The Study Group also proposed transitional arrangements to help developing countries graduate to a cost-orientated remuneration system (ITU-T Study Group 3,2000a).

It was against this background that the Study Group was called on to make a recommendation on the ICAIS issue upon complaints made by some Asia-Pacific countries. The Study Group recognised that when two providers set up an Internet circuit, they have a choice between peering /sender- keeps- all or an asymmetrical system whereby the traffic-initiating provider pays the full-circuit cost. As mentioned earlier in this paper, Recommendation D.50, 2008 leaves the final determination of remuneration to the bargaining power of the providers.

The ITU suggested that a world summit on information society be convened to debate all issues related to the new media30. The UN endorsed this recommendation and assigned the

the high cost carrier due to the non-disclosure of the cost of termination of calls. In the absence of a means of knowing such cost, a resort to the 50:50 sharing rule might be better for the high cost carriers. 30 UNESCO was also interested in organizing a WSIS kind of conference. O'Siochru cites informal reports that the ITU refused to "share the summit" with UNESCO. According to O‘Siochru, UNESCO might have treated 92

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ITU to take a "leading managerial role" in preparation of the summit. The purpose of the Summit was to develop a common vision among governments, international organisations and civil society actors on the direction of the ―information society‖ (http://www.itu.int/itu-wsis/).

The World Summit on Information Society: Debating the Global Information Order

The first sub-section assesses the processes and outputs of UN summits with the view to demonstrating the political significance of the WSIS. The second sub-section summarises the issues discussed in the WSIS and how the ICAIS issue was framed during the debate. The last sub-section evaluates the participation of civil society during this summit.

The profile of UN summits

A world summit is a UN institution, which takes the form of a conference on global issues held on a non-routine basis. The UN had held at least one summit per year since the 1992 Earth Summit of Rio de Janeiro. These summits covered such issues as human rights, housing, food, racism, etc.

UN summits have a similar organisational format. The official world summit is preceded by a long preparatory process. Thus, prior to the summit, the ITU conducted Preparatory Committee Meetings (Prepcoms I, II, and III) and regional meetings. The input for the final documents of the summit is gathered in these meetings. The summit itself is the issues of culture and communication in a more favourable way .Civil society would also have more leverage (2004b, p.212). 93

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores attended by high-level delegates who ceremoniously ratify these documents within the few days of the conference (Klein, 2004).

Summits are attended by thousands of delegates. The UN being an intergovernmental organisation, state plenipotentiaries take the centre stage at summits, flanked by civil society and private sector participants. Each country has only one vote. Hence, both developing and developed countries have a formal status of equality. Civil society organisations usually attend the summit process itself and hold parallel conferences on a separate agenda (Clark, Friedman & Hochstetler, 1998)

The WSIS had, however, some different features from the other UN summits. Firstly, it was held in two phases, in Geneva and Tunis in 2003 and 2005 respectively. Secondly, the WSIS devised mechanisms to formalise the participation of civil society. The Civil Society Bureau was a kind of self- governance mechanism to allow civil society organisations to organise their own agenda, choose their own representatives and set guidelines for their participation.

Nevertheless, the limit of the Summit form of institution has also clear implications for the outcomes of the process. Summits have a defined outcome in the form of two documents, namely: a declaration of principles and a plan of action (Klein, 2004, p.5).

The agenda of WSIS

The participants of the Geneva phase of the Summit identified two clusters of issues for further elaboration,

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores namely: Internet governance and the financing of ICT for development. The UN Secretary General set up working groups to study and forward recommendations on these issues.

Internet governance

The Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) was assigned to develop a working definition of Internet governance, identify the public policy issues for discussion, and develop a common understanding of the expected roles of the various stakeholders.

Internet governance was defined as the process of development and application of principles, norms, rules, procedure, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet. The definition also envisaged a multisatakeholder governance approach in which governments, civil society and private sector will have their respective roles in the process. Then, the WGIG specified the issues that needed to be addressed by this governance arrangement. In fact, the bulk of the activity of the working group related to identifying and framing the relevant public policy issues for the WSIS31.The issue of allocation of critical resources such

31 The key public policy areas were agreed to be: 1. Issues relating to infrastructure: management of the domain name, IP addresses, root server system, technical standards, peering and interconnection, etc. 2. Issues relating to the use of the Internet: spam, cyber crime, etc. 3. Issues adjacent to the Internet but with much wider impact: intellectual property rights, and international trade. But these are issues, which the working group, identified as already within the ambit of existing international organizations. 4. Issues related to the use of Internet for development such as capacity building in developing countries. 95

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores as the root server and domain names was the most controversial which, according to Gurumurthy and Singh (2005), even eclipsed other equally important issues32. Some authors also suggested that the original mission of the WSIS was to put that issue to rest (Klein, 2004).

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is an organisation subject to U.S. domestic law and government supervision, and responsible for administration, allocation and coordination of IP addresses, domain names, and root server systems. Due to the history of the Internet, the Domain Name System, for example, was under the U.S. Department of Defence, until it was later transferred to this private organisation. A number of participants of the WSIS were of the view that this entity is not truly multilateral, accountable, and transparent. The ITU had also an interest in appropriating some of the powers of this organisation and combining the administration of the new logical infrastructures with the physical one traditionally under its regulation (Afonso, 2005, Klein, 2004).

The U.S. and business groups represented in the WSIS were in favour of the status quo. The official position of the U.S. was clear and unequivocal.

Specific recommendations were also made in respect of each public policy issue identified above. These recommendations evaluated the existing organizations dealing with each of the public issues against the abovementioned criteria. The working group forwarded different alternative models of governance mechanisms based on the criteria of transparency, accountability, multilateralism, and coordination. 32 The root server keeps a database of Top-Level Domain Names. These are .com, .org, .edu, etc. Without such domain names, users of the Internet would be forced to remember IP addresses, which are a series of numbers, to communicate with each other. 96

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The United States remains open to discussing with all stakeholders ways to improve the technical efficiency as well as the transparency and openness of existing governance structures. However, it is important that the global community recognize that the existing structures have worked effectively to make the Internet the highly robust and geographically diverse medium that it is today. The security and stability of the Internet must be maintained (USA, 2005).

The challengers of the status quo rejoined that this argument unduly focuses on technical efficiency and problem- solving capacity of ICANN, rather than on representation and democratic decision-making. However, it is clear that controlling ICANN, and through it, the critical Internet resources, is consequential. The usual example mentioned to highlight this problem is the country code top level domain ―.iq", the Iraq domain, which has been in the hands of a private company outside of the country (Afonso, 2005, p.5).

The European Union was also against the unilateral control of the core resources by the US (Gurumurty & Singh, 2005). The EU representatives stated that the current ICANN regime is commendable for the public private partnership it embodied. However, it should include the participation of more governments (European Union, 2005).

On the other hand, the issue of ICAIS was raised by developing countries as a major problem that should be addressed by the WSIS. In its comments on the report of the WGIG, the African group insisted that the issue of interconnection costs should be at the top of the agenda. The report of the working group framed the issue as one of "uneven distribution of cost" resulting from "absence of an appropriate and effective global Internet Governance mechanism to resolve the issue"(WGIG, 2005, P.4).

The recommended measures included:

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 examination of alternative solutions such as establishment of regional backbones, and local and regional access points,  multistakeholder participation in resolving the issue in various international organisations,  donor programmes to fund establishment of exchange points and local content in developing countries ,and  continuation of the work on ICAIS at ITU and other organisations (WGIG, 2005, p.16).

Therefore, the issue of ICAIS did not receive any novel response at the WSIS. While representatives of the developed countries emphasised technological fixes and market solutions, the developing countries called for enhanced donor support.

Financing ICT for development and ICAIS

The other contentious issue, which was assigned to a task force for further study, was the question of financing, deployment, and use of ICT in the poor countries of the world. The initiative to address this issue came from African representatives. President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal proposed a scheme for transfer of resources from the North to the South in order to bridge the "digital divide". This transfer was to be made under what was later called "digital solidarity agenda". The proposal was to secure financial resources for ICT projects primarily from taxes levied on sales of computers, software, and network equipment and the use of international communications. Donations were also solicited from governments and financial institutions (www.dsf-fsn.org).

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

This proposal was opposed by the US, EU, Japan and the business community while a large number of developing countries supported it. The developed countries insisted that financing should be sought within the existing mechanisms. Moreover, it maintained that the solution to the problem of the digital divide lies in the countries themselves. They have to open up their market through privatisation, competition, and liberalisation.

Nevertheless, the Digital Solidarity Fund (DSF) was established as a legal foundation in Switzerland in March 2005, with a dominant membership of municipalities from different parts of the world. Its major source of fund has been the 1% voluntary contribution from the contract value of sale of ICT goods and services by corporations. Then, these corporations are granted a logo and a permission to advertise their philanthropic deeds. This voluntary contribution from a supplier's profit margin is finally invested in community projects. The Fund is administered by a coalition of governments, private sector, civil society, and international organisations (www.dsf-fsn.org).

The Task Force for Financing Mechanisms (TFFM) underscored the decline in recent years of official aid to the third world and the inadequacy of government budget. On the other hand, it emphasised the renewed reliance on private capital, mainly from foreign investment. In its recommendation to address the financing issue, it suggested that all sorts of mechanisms be used, including the old and the new ones such as the Digital Solidarity Fund (TFFM, 2004, p.13).

As a political document, the WSIS official declaration of principles and plan of action alluded to principles of Universal Human Rights, the Millennium Development Goals, and 99

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores inclusion of small island countries, the disabled and the young generation. Still, resources for social and developmental goals are to be obtained from private investment or charity. The summit in general emphasised the following policy measures to bridge the digital divide:  the creation of enabling environment i.e. conducive private investment and ownership regime,  multistakeholderism i.e. public-private partnership in which the private sector plays a key role, and  capacity building with an emphasis on cultivation of a mass of consumers for ICT goods and services (Gurumurthy & Singh, 2005; Hamelink, 2004; Mansell & Nordenstreng, 2006).

Civil society and the WSIS

Though world summits promise to facilitate participation by different groups, WSIS goes further in its declared aims to involve civil society actors on co-equal terms with governments and private sector representatives. There was an attempt to make the WSIS a model for the multistakeholder approach (Padovani & Tuzzi, 2004).Accordingly, the Executive Secretariat of the WSIS created a Civil Society Division, which was entrusted with the task of facilitating the full participation of civil society. The rules of procedure of the Summit allowed the accredited non-governmental organisations, civil society and business members to sit as observers at meetings and make oral statements when invited by the presiding officer of the body concerned. The Civil Society Division, in consultation with governments, was responsible

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores for determining which civil society organisation should participate and in what order (Banks, 2005; Cammaerts & Carpentier, 2005).

After the Geneva phase of the summit in 2003, civil society participants drew their own declarations, and specific recommendations in respect of the various issues discussed during the summit. The Civil Society Declaration, entitled "Shaping Information Societies for Human Needs", attempted to challenge as well as to constructively engage with the official WSIS discourse. The following are the major elements of the declaration.

 The unitary information society concept must be replaced by the concept of information and communication societies. This was to emphasise the importance of communication as a basic need .Besides, it sought to draw attention to the diverse visions and approaches to the problem facing the world.  The primacy of public services and protection of the public domain must be promoted. In particular, private ownership of intellectual property and infrastructure was singled out as detrimental to the development of information and communication societies. ICTs should not be treated merely as private resources and commodities. Community use and ownership must be encouraged as well.  The idea of enabling environment, which in the official WSIS version emphasised the

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primacy of the market, must be substituted by a focus on empowerment of citizens.  The idea of technological neutrality must be rejected and a participatory approach in designing and provision of technology must be adopted.

Despite this statement of common opposition, there are some areas of convergence between the official and civil society declarations. The civil society declaration does not fully represent a coherent set of principles either. The following section also highlights the differences within civil society representatives themselves along a North-South fault line.

With respect to the specific issues of ICAIS, the declaration had little to add. In order to address the lack of efficient African backbone network, which is the reason behind the exorbitant cost of traffic and access, it suggested a reinforcement of the current efforts to build infrastructure. An example of such an effort cited in the declaration is construction of Internet exchange points. The principles to guide expansion of infrastructure were also stated as equality, partnership, fair competition, and regulation at local and global level.

The civil society declaration also endorsed the Digital Solidarity Fund on condition that it is properly managed to extend public services to underserved areas. It added its own proposal for a Community Media Fund by a donor-civil society partnership to construct community information and communication initiatives.

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The WSIS had important implications for the theoretical and practical analysis of the role of civil society in the democratisation of global governance. Various questions have been raised about identity of civil society, the institutional framework for participation in global governance, and existential problems for radical actors.

Identity of civil society

Civil Society at the WSIS identified itself as follows: Organizations-including movements, networks and other entities-which are autonomous from the State, are not intergovernmental or do not represent the private sector, and which in principle, are non-profit- making, act locally, nationally and internationally, in defense and promotion of social, economic and cultural interests, defense of human rights, promotion of development objectives and for mutual benefit(Banks,2005).

Banks (2005) later reported that, notwithstanding this assumption about civil society, there were also civil society organisations that supported the existing intellectual property regime. Some civil society groups promoted the agenda of their government. Some civil society members regarded even the apparently universal value of human rights as a ―sectoral issue‖, not to have priority in the final text of the WSIS declaration (Marzouki & Joergensen, 2004).

Chakravartty (2007) also alleged that most civil society organisations from the North promoted the interests of the developed countries on many issues. The first was the issue of freedom of expression. This, however, focussed on condemnation of states such as China, Singapore, Tunisia and Pakistan. Civil society also collaborated with EU to push for democratisation of ICANN. On the other hand, this ―partnership‖ in negotiation did not work on the issues of intellectual property rights and financing access to

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores resources. In general, civil society prioritised the right to information while relegating redistributive issues to a secondary status.

Civil society organisations from the North, according to Chakravartty, owe their view of state/civil-society relationship to their history and local political environment. The Tocquevillian form of voluntary associational groups advancing the public interest can flourish only in a stable and democratic state, not in the political and economic environment prevailing in most developing countries. Civil society in the global South, therefore, cannot stand against the state. It must support the state as the only actor that can press for ―meaningful redistributive policies in the transnational governance arena‖ (p, 311).

Chakravartty makes a valid point about the dangers of the marginalisation of the state due to neo-liberal prescriptions by NGOs and international organisations. The Structural Adjustment Programme of the 1980s and the consequent erosion of public service and social welfare have illustrated this point. However, it is also necessary to pierce the corporate veil of the state and problematise its ideology of development. Her argument assumes existence of a developmental state that is beyond class partisanship.

Secondly, by drawing a sharp contrast between capitalist states of the North and developmental states of the South, her analysis obscures the reciprocal relationship between global capital and peripheral actors.

Moreover, third world countries, with or without developmental orientation, have not been able to influence decisions in international institutions for lack of 104

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores geopolitical and economic capabilities. Hence, the suggestion to rely on these states to resist global neo-liberal forces does not draw any lesson from the NWICO and similar previous initiatives.

The institutional framework of participation

Civil society representatives at the WSIS had to deal with the problems of effective and meaningful participation33. The multistakeholder approach to global governance posed two types of challenges to civil society actors. One is the superficiality of participation, or in the words of Cammaerts and Carpentier (2005), ―the unbearable lightness of full participation‖. On the other extreme, there is the danger of domestication (Calabrese, 2004b).

The obstacles for full participation of civil society arise because the decision makers in this intergovernmental processes are states (Banks, 2005). Hence, civil society actors not accredited by their own government cannot participate. Secondly, private sector organisations like the World Economic Forum and the International Chamber of Commerce were categorised as civil society actors. The civil society forum provided by the UN required ―partnership‖ with these groups. Due to this characteristic problem of participation, it has been suggested that representation in these

33 The factors militating against effective participation mainly arose from the reluctance by some state members of the WSIS to involve some civil society actors. The accreditation process was used to exclude, for example, Reporters without Borders-a media NGO, for exposing suppression of free press by some states (Banks, 2005; Cogburn, 2004; Cammaerts & Carpentier, 2005).

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores international institutions has limited value. Civil society should also establish alternative forums for a more vigorous participation (Calabrese, 2004b; Sader, 2002; Cammaerts & Carpentier, 2005).

While some civil society advocates point at the rough terrain of the international institution for their poor participation, others have applied the same criticism to civil society‘s internal workings. Chakravartty denounced the dominant civil society organisations from the North for ―centralization and bureaucratization of civil society within the WSIS‖ (2007, p.301). Likewise, Schmidt (2004) claimed that the very definition of civil society excluded grassroots organisations in Africa. In their place, professional NGOs, which are part of the aid community, were represented.

Existential problems of civil society

The scarcity of material resources to make sustained political participation in global forums has been an enduring problem for civil society actors, especially for those organisations from the developing countries. Cogburn (2004) observed that the principal form of interaction among global civil society participants was email exchange. Hence, the digital divide itself was a major obstacle preventing NGOs in the South from taking part in global platforms and transnational networks.

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Chapter Five: Linking Africa to the Global Information Superhighway

The restructuring of the telecommunications sector has changed the profile of the players in the industry as well as the rules of the game at a global level. This chapter attempts to explain how the political economy of backbone connectivity in Africa has also reflected these changes.

The first and second sections highlight the political and economic ramifications of telecommunications reform in Africa since the 1980s.The last two sections examine the policy debates surrounding specific Internet backbone construction projects.

Ownership of Telecommunications Assets in Africa

Telecommunications infrastructure and networks in Africa are largely a colonial legacy. The colonial powers used the technology to exploit the resources of the continent and to administer their subjects. As a result, the telecommunications industry was mostly unresponsive to the economic needs of the bulk of the population. The most widely cited example is that Kinshasa and Brazzaville, capital cities of the two Congos, which faced each other across the Congo River, did not have a direct communication line. Phone calls between the two cities had to be routed via France and Belgium (Ganywa & Tshilombo, 1999, p.125). The penetration of phone lines, the ratio of mainline to population, quality of service, finance and human resources have also been extremely inadequate for the communication needs of the population. 107

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In post independence Africa, the shape and purpose of telecommunications reflected the social character of the states. The major users of telecommunications services have been the government, urban elites, and foreign companies. Most of the infrastructure is found in urban centres. The government bureaucracy, one of the biggest users of telecommunications services, usually has massive arrears of payment (McCormick, 2005)34.

In line with the old PTT model, most telecommunications operators in Africa were state monopolies. All tariffs, investment, pricing, and other decisions were made by the relevant Ministry (Wilson III & Wong, 2003). There have always been powerful interests around these state monopolies and their considerable surpluses. The largest revenue for the telecommunication operators came from hefty bills paid by a few large business customers. Despite the rhetoric of universal service, telecommunication revenues were mostly used to service the few important customers or to finance other government expenditures. The relatively well-paid telecommunications workers had a vested interest in the status quo, while the political rulers had to indulge the telecommunications workforce to avoid strikes and sabotage

34 This urban bias has been explained from different theoretical angles. According to Ake (1996), the divide between the urban and rural parts of Africa was due to the class interests of the petit-bourgeoisie which inherited colonial privileges. For Mamdani (1996), the colonial empire created a ‗bifurcated‘ state in which the urban centre stood for citizenship and modernity whereas the countryside was left for tribal despotism and agrarian production. On the other hand, those scholars who draw on Weberian analysis of modernization characterize the postcolonial state as patrimonial and clientilist in which state power is a personal property used to maintain patronage (Harsch, 1993). 108

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(Azam, Dia & N‘Guessan, 2002; Noll & Shirley, 2001; Noam, 1999).

African PTOs are among the most profitable telephone companies in the world. According to Wilson III, an African telco‘s average revenue per main line is 1.7 times higher than in the rest of the world. He described the African telecommunications market as ―the world‘s poorest but fastest- growing market‖ (Wilson III, 1996). Perhaps a good illustration of this is Somalia‘s telecommunications sector. In a country without a central government, corporate law, investment promotion (much less investment climate), there are nine private operators providing fixed mobile telecommunications service to major cities and towns (World Bank, 2005, p.12).

The introduction of new telecommunications technologies opened up a new profit base. On the one hand, the new technologies, mainly Internet telephony, were used to bypass the monopoly telecommunications infrastructure and place calls abroad. It, thus, became possible to siphon the state‘s major source of revenue. On the other hand, the opportunities for providing new information services with the help of ICTs encouraged well-informed businesses to exploit the unexplored markets of Africa. Small, private enterprises can now provide telecommunications and value added services with lower sunk cost compared to what the incumbent incurs for its basic operation35. Therefore, a fast growing market for services such

35 A new mobile network is about ten times cheaper to roll out than a fixed network in African countries (Curwen & Whalley, 2008, p.356).This is partly due to the high cost structure of fixed networks in Africa, presumably caused by their own inefficiency. Partly, it is due to the nature of the technology in that it does not require extensive construction on the ground. 109

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores as cell phones, paging, and data services raised the stake of the interested parties (Afullo, 2000).

Many African governments were relatively willing to allow entry of private mobile operators into their market. Apart from the mobile providers, a plethora of dependent enterprises such as kiosks, booths, telecentres, airtime resellers, handset repair shops, battery re-chargers and vendors of scratch cards have also emerged36.

Beyond telecommunications, private sector activities in computers, software, system design, etc also seem to be gaining ground in Africa. Many global corporations such as Apple, IBM, and Oracle are active in the continent. IBM, which is the major player in the African computer market, estimated in 1996 that its personal computer products alone are growing at 80 to 100 percent annually. As usual, the targeted customers are governments, financial service markets, and major multinational companies like Coca-Cola and Chevron. The banking sector in Africa has also enthusiastically embarked on the automation of its activities with the help of these global network providers (Wilson III, 1996).

36 According to Africa and Middle East Telecom Market(2009),mobile telephony is a highly concentrated market, now controlled by MTN and Vodacom(south Africa), France Telecom(France) ORASCOM(Egypt),Celtel(a subsidiary of Zain)(Kuwait), and Millicom(Luxembourg). Most of the key players in the mobile market have engaged in a series of takeovers. Etislalat (United Arab Emirates) acquired half of Atlantique Telecom (Cote d‘ivoire) in 2005, and 66% of the third mobile licence in Egypt in 2006. The same company had earlier acquired, through a consortium, 75% of Nitel /M-Tel in Nigeria but later withdrew .It also expressed its interest to acquire licences or stakes in Libya and Algeria. MTC (Kuwait) has also acquired 61% of Sudan‘s Mobitel (Curwen & Whalley, 2008, pp.349, 360-361).

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South African businesses have particularly been active in all telecommunications and computer businesses in the continent. By 2000 i.e. only six years since that country joined the African community, about a third of its export was destined to the continent. Nigeria, Kenya, Algeria, Senegal and Gabon have been recipients of South African investment in the areas of telecommunications, energy and the exploration of mineral resources and construction of infrastructure (Akinboade & Lalthapersad-Pillay, 2005).

South African based telecommunications giants, Vodacom and MTN, have been able to build one of the world‘s largest telephone networks, mainly by buying shares in incumbent African telcos. They have dominated the supply of transcontinental connectivity infrastructures including regional mobile backbone, routing the continental traffic, franchising with global multinational companies such as IBM, EDS (an information services company), publishing and multimedia production. South African firms are also major providers of Internet based education and Cable TV service in Africa, now replacing Europe and the US as a market for higher education and skills training (Wilson III, 1996).

The factors that led to this rapid expansion of trade and investment into the rest of Africa are:  new opportunities in Africa, especially in non-traditional activities such as information technology and telecommunications, franchising, advertising, property development etc.,  the view that so many South African products are tailor-made for Africa,

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 regional integration especially in Southern Africa (Akinboade and Lalthapersad-Pillay, 2005).

The special attractiveness of African countries for off- shoring and outsourcing needs of global corporations has been promoted by e-readiness or ICT investment surveys carried out by the World Bank (Hewitt Associates, 2006). South Africa, Mauritius, Botswana, Egypt and Ghana are promoted as candidates to compete globally with countries like India, Philippines, Ireland and the Czech Republic in the so-called information technology enabled services. Such services mainly include call centres, customer contact, finance and accounting, website development and hosting, etc. These countries are suitable for this type of business activities because they have a culturally westernised and relatively cheap labour force.

The lack of ICT artifacts in Africa, which is the theme of the digital divide, should be closely examined . In the 1995 Global Information Conference in Brussels, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa stated, ―there are more telephone lines in Manhattan than in all of Sub-Saharan Africa‖. This striking comparison has now been corrected by the World Bank itself, which, in one of its reports, noted, ―Unless New Yorkers and their commuter friends have 12 phones each, Africa now has as many more telephones than Manhattan‖ (World Bank, 2005, p.1).

On the other hand, this focus on introducing more ICT goods and services does not seem to be concerned with the fact that the available technological wealth is unequally distributed. Internet users in Africa are rich males, who speak English or another Western language and live in the cities. Most Points of Presence (POPs) are located in urban 112

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores centres while rural areas are seldom covered by the Internet. Most active institutional usage of the Internet is accounted for by NGOs, Universities, and private companies (De Roy, 1997; Polikanov & Abramova, 2003).

Expansion of mobile lines in Africa has been cited as an example of the success of the information society vision. Indeed, since mobile telecommunication requires by far less investment than the fixed line, telecommunication companies have the incentive to operate in the relatively new African markets. As a result, the penetration of mobile phones significantly exceeds that of the fixed line in most African countries. Yet, a recent survey of 54 African states indicated that by 2005 only five countries had a large subscriber base i.e. above 10 million (South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Nigeria). Twelve African countries had from one up to five million subscribers (Kenya, Tunisia, Sudan, Angola, Cameroon, Cote D‘ivoire, Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, DR Congo and Uganda) (Curwen & Whalley, 2008). All the rest have hardly caught up with the much advertised mobile revolution yet.

The magnitude of the affordability problem can be deduced from the multifarious incentives and innovative business techniques adopted by the mobile providers in Africa to encourage uptake. The first major incentive focuses on prepaid subscription, which accounts for 94% of mobile subscription in Africa. Providers have allowed airtime charging for as low as 0.40 USD. Celtel in Burkina Faso has introduced a service for users to freely transfer their airtime to their acquaintances in as low denomination as 0.40 cents. Some providers have created ―flash calls‖ to enable users to freely make signals to others or to text them so that the latter will call back (Gray, Minges & Muylkens, 2008, p.4).

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The other effort made by mobile companies relates to introduction of cheap handsets because this is the most important entry barrier in Africa. The handsets must not only be cheap but also enable long talk and stand-by time since electricity is scarce in Africa (Gray, Minges & Muylkens, 2008).

Despite all these attempts, still the prognosis for business is not bright. According to a recent market survey: The mobile market in the region however faces a number of hurdles, such as low per capita income and lower living standards, in sustaining the rapid growth that has been achieved in recent years. Orascom is one operator that appears to be actively limiting its focus on key countries of operation, and then shifting further investment to some of the emerging markets in the Middle East and Asia, rather than pushing further expansion in Africa. For example, it has increased its stake in its subsidiary in Iraq where the per capita income and living standards are much higher, compared to Africa, and hence there is greater scope for expansion.

In terms of mobile value-added services, the region is currently at a nascent stage. In general, the demand for value-added services in the region is expected to be low due to low levels of penetration, low literacy levels and low per capita income, causing operators to limit their investments in the development of anything but the most basic value-added services. However, some of the developed markets, such as South Africa, Morocco, Mauritius and Nigeria, will continue to prove an exception to this rule. Across most of Africa, SMS is likely to be the only non-voice value-added service to gain mass market popularity in the immediate future (Africa and Middle East Telecom Week, 2009).

Roycroft and Anantho (2003) had also outlined in an earlier survey of 54 African states that there is a ―dual digital divide‖ within Africa. The first is the age-old lack of basic telephone networks, which makes Internet connectivity itself impossible. In relation to this type of digital divide, the authors suggest that one has to justify why Internet connection should be given priority over other needs. Even then, they argued, Internet connection should be provided through community centres, rather than through individual subscription.

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The second type of digital divide relates to the absence or shortage of Internet subscription even by those sections of users who already have access to telephone. Telecommunications liberalisation and privatisation policies respond more to the needs of those who have effective demand for new ICT services. Such demand is based on one‘s prior advantage in income, language ability, and basic telephone access.

In the next section, therefore, we will examine how these divides were addressed in the telecommunication reforms that have been introduced in Africa (Mutula, 2003; Mercer, 2005; Fuchs & Horak, 2006).

The Politics of Telecommunications Reform in Africa

Prior to the 1990s, the problem of telecommunications in Africa was framed in terms of lack of development. The ITU recommended improvement of management, introduction of appropriate technology, and pooling common resources through regional organisations such as the Pan African Telecommunications Network (Panaftel). In short, there was generally no pressure for a change of ownership of telecommunications infrastructure (Wilson III & Wong, 2003).

The 1990s, however, was marked by the transformation of the global telecommunications environment. Thus, the central issue became private and foreign participation in ownership and management. Therefore, the proponents of the telecommunications reform agenda had ―to tear down ... a barricade of outdated regulations and governmental fears of the political consequences of liberalisation‖ (Wilson III, 1996, p.22). The direct consequence for African telecommunication sector was abolition of state monopolies and

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores the privileges associated with them. Subsequently, a host of mechanisms including programmes of policy assistance, institution building, projects, international and regional conferences, consultancy, and dissemination of information were used to influence government policy. Some international actors engaged African governments in policy dialogues in multilateral and bilateral forums while others focused on training, policy reform, and promotional programmes.

One important such initiative, funded by USAID, was the Regional Telecommunications Restructuring Programme (RTRP) whose objective was to assist the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to overhaul its telecommunications regime. As government owned PTOs were dominant in the fixed network sector in the region, the RTTP introduced model policy and legislative framework for liberalisation and privatisation. The framework was later incorporated in national policies by Lesotho, Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe (Goulden & Msimang, 2005). It appears that Southern Africa started integration into the global telecommunications market early on, spurred by the entry of South Africa into the SADC in 1994.

The USAID Leland Initiative was another such initiative aimed at fostering local ISP industry by introducing affordable international gateway and enabling policy environment. African countries that applied to join this initiative had to pledge ―[A] process and timeline for qualifying and licensing private sector ISPs‖ .The initiative also assists indigenous ISPs to acquire marketing and business plan development skills (http://www.usaid.gov/leland/).

The World Bank‘s Information for Development (InfoDev) programme, which is widely regarded as the repository of 116

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores knowledge in the field of ICT for development, also provides policy guidance and best practice tools for both donor and developing country policy makers. The programme was allegedly created because various pilot projects and initiatives in the field of ICT were unsustainable and unscalable due to lack of factual data about developing countries. To remedy this situation, the programme runs several projects in Africa ranging from analysing business process outsourcing opportunities to designing telecommunications regulation policies (www.infodev.org/).

ITU‘s Development Bureau has been active in providing information and technical expertise on third world markets to tackle pre-investment studies, training, management and legal challenges37. Recently the ITU has been involved mainly through its Worldtel Company. This strictly for-profit corporation is wholly owned by global corporations, in which the ITU has a ―golden share‖ and is represented in the board of directors. Worldtel has invested in Zimbabwe and Egypt to provide voice, data, and Internet services. Thus, while decades ago ITU‘s focus was on stepping up financial aid and legitimising the accounting rate system, now it is engaged in buying equity in incumbent telcos in developing countries (http://www.itu.int/osg/sg/speeches/2001/03worldtel.html).

More importantly, the change in the African telecommunications structure resonates with a change in the composition of the social forces in the individual African countries. With the debt crisis of the 1980s and the

37 This is one of the three bureaus under the Secretary-General of the ITU and headed by an elected director. It is responsible for ICT for Development. Its specific tasks include provision of technical advice, supervision of ITU development projects, programmes or sector works and publication of relevant data (http://www.itu.int/net/ITU-D/index.aspx ). 117

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores subsequent introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme, the post-colonial state was subjected to strong criticisms from all quarters. The World Bank asserted that one of the major causes for the economic breakdown of Africa was the ‗rent-seeking‘ activities of the state, as manifested by privileged access to monopoly sectors, inefficiency, patronage, and corruption. A ―market fix‖ was, therefore, promoted as the solution to the ills of the ―patrimonial‖ state. This, in turn, prepared a new ground for political mobilisation (Cited in Harsch, 1993, p.41).

A study conducted by Noll and Shirley (2001) on telecommunications reforms in six African countries found that poor telecommunications sector conditions are not sufficient to introduce reforms. It is only when such conditions are combined with a change in the governing political coalition that reforms materialise. Coalitions representing new constituent base have usually been behind most of the telecom reforms. Such forces also enhance the implementation capacity of the government.

In Ghana, according to Noll and Shirley, the Rawlings administration had its constituent base in rural areas and among businesses. Businesses had already reported that they could not compete in global markets due to the poor telecommunications condition in the country. For example, Coca-Cola Corporation cited this reason for not locating its regional operations in the country. The urban workers, on the other hand, stood to lose from the job cuts that would accompany the change. Therefore, in order to carry out the reform, the government had to suppress this opposition through legislation that curbed union strikes. In Malawi, the government that replaced the former dictator did not have a

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores strong enough political base to implement the changes that it set out to introduce.

In Senegal, on the other hand, the social forces involved on the opposite sides of the political process of telecommunications sector reform were able to successfully push their interests (Azam, Dia & N‘guessan, 2002). When the decision to privatise Sonatel, the incumbent telco, was proposed, workers union and consumers associations formed a common front to oppose the reform. The former were concerned with the potential job cuts, while the latter were keen on preventing price hikes.

On the side of the state‘s privatisation process was the GRCC (Groupe de reflexion sur la competitvite et la croissance), a think tank that was able to galvanise the support of intellectuals and business leaders. This group created a debating forum for independent experts and representatives of various civil society organisations in order to disseminate the idea of privatisation and liberalisation of the telecommunications sector. Eventually, a compromise was reached to give a 10% share in the new privatised corporation to the trade unions and to limit the level of reduction of workforce. The government was, therefore, able to avoid the strikes and consequent disruption of services to the urban clientele and foreign companies.

In 1998, the ITU reported that 62% of its African members had taken the first step in liberalisation i.e. separating the postal and telecommunications services. At least half of African states permitted competition in non-basic services. About nine countries had already sold part of the equity stake of the incumbent to foreign companies. An increasing number of African countries have submitted to the WTO discipline. Seven 119

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African countries have already signed the Telecommunications Agreement of 1997(Afullo, 2000).

Yet, while the push for privatisation and deregulation has already changed the ownership structure of telecommunications in Africa, the emerging business elites insisted that there is still too much of the old monopoly system inhibiting the continent from joining the global information society. These political differences were later played out in connection with the construction of transoceanic cables linking Africa with the rest of the world.

Stakeholders of the global information superhighway

Several projects have been proposed to connect African countries with the global information superhighway. The best known of these was the Africa One project that was initiated by AT&T (USA) in 1994. The plan was to encircle Africa with undersea fibre optic cable. However, AT & T was not willing to raise the whole fund by itself. It solicited financial contributions from the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and various U.S. government agencies. Nevertheless, as the investment return was not assured, the project did not materialise. Another project, Fibre Optic Link Across the Globe (FLAG) was also proposed to connect Africa with Britain and Japan via Egypt (Malcalm, 2006).

In this section, we will focus on the cable projects that have been at the centre of policy debate in recent years. These are the Third South Atlantic /West Africa Submarine Cable/South Africa-Far East (SAT 3/WASC/SAFE) and the East Africa Submarine cable system (EASSy).

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SAT 3/WASC/SAFE

The SAT 3/WASC/SAFE project was the first intercontinental undersea fibre optic cable to connect Africa with Europe and Asia. This transcontinental cable consists of two segments. The SAT 3/WASC segment extends from Portugal to South Africa, with nine landing points in African countries, while the SAFE segment stretches from South Africa to Malaysia. There is also a possibility of linking numerous landlocked countries of Africa through terrestrial backhaul connection38.

The SAT 3/WASC/SAFE network is organised as a consortium co-owned by thirty-six companies. Ten of the members of the consortium are African telcos, which were able to secure loans from global financial institutions such as the European Investment Bank. The major shareholders, however, include leading global telecommunications operators such as AT& T (USA), Cable & Wireless (UK), MCI World (USA), Sprint (USA), KPN (The Netherlands), Deutsche Telekom (Germany), Communications Global BT (UK), etc. These global telcos contributed the majority of the total investment39.

38This cable network project was initiated and coordinated by Telkom South Africa and designed, built and installed by Tyco Telecommunications, a U.S. company jointly with Alcatel of France (http://www.safe- sat3.co.za/). 39 However, the amount of contribution by individual members of the consortium is concealed by non-disclosure clauses of the contract. Therefore, most of the allegations made about the finances of this project are based on secondary data and analysis of market trends (Jagun, 2008a, 2008b).

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The SAT 3/WASC/SAFE project describes its business undertaking with a poignant historical allusion. It recollects how Vasco da Gama unlocked the secret routes of Africa. Thus, following the trail of Da Gama, this fibre optic project aims to connect Africa to the international market. This romantic story of West meets East, however, omits that the most important item of trade in Da Gama‘s route included African slaves and the sequel to that mercantile adventure was the legacy of colonialism. The civilising mission rhetoric also reappears in the guise of ―bridging the digital divide‖: This project will help bridge the digital divide between Africa and the developed nations and all the role-players will enjoy the access to knowledge brought about by the information revolution that has already had such a dramatic impact in the West, Europe, and the Far East. It will bring the people of Africa the fast, efficient and affordable communications they need for sustained development and progress (http://www.safe-sat3.co.za ).

Nevertheless, it is the Consortium or ―closed shareholders club‖ model of ownership of this cable network that has occupied the attention of policy makers and aspiring businesses in Africa and elsewhere. In this model of ownership, each member pays a share of the upfront cost of construction of the cable as well as all other operational and maintenance costs for the lifespan of the project. In return, the consortium members determine the rules of allocation of capacity of the cable and the price of sale or lease of capacity to non-members (Jagun, 2008a).

A consortium authorises the investment party, usually an incumbent telco, to administer the landing station of the cable, and to sell or lease capacity. Other licensed operators may be allowed to buy an indefeasible right of use for long term, or lease the capacity for a shorter term. In both cases, non-members pay a higher price and their access to the cable is subject to the right of first refusal by the consortium

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores owners. In short, the cable is fully controlled by the owners/members of the consortium (Jensen, 2007).

The most active opposition to the SAT 3/WASC consortium owners came from organised Internet service providers (ISPs), especially in those countries where a strong business relation with global companies is already established. Ghana, for instance, has been identified by the World Bank as a potential destination for outsourcing/off-shoring businesses. There are also a significant number of corporate customers in that country demanding better access to the Internet. A competitive supply market has also emerged, comprising about 163 ISPs already in 2004. There are around 700 cyber cafes in Accra only, with the nation‘s total exceeding 1200 (Hewitt Associates, 2006, p.39).

The incumbent Ghana Telecom had enjoyed the monopoly over international connectivity due to its membership to the SAT 3/WASC/SAFE consortium. Corporate customers as well as access providers, such as mobile operators and ISPs complained about predatory behaviour by the incumbent. The Ghana Internet Service Providers Association (GISPA) was finally able to successfully negotiate a reduced price. Yet, non-members of GISPA still buy capacity at a higher rate.

Similar complaints were also made against the incumbent in Nigeria and South Africa. In the former, the second national operator, Globacom, decided to build its own fibre optic cable linking Nigeria with England. In South Africa, the private mobile operators also took similar measures (Jensen, 2007).

One of the controversial aspects of the consortium was that it allows African telcos to sell transmission capacity to 123

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores their own subsidiary ISPs as well as to other competing ISPs. This places the incumbent telco in a position to undercut the private enterprises by cross subsidising its own ISP services. The Open Access model, on the other hand, stipulates that the incumbent should act as a carrier‘s carrier or a wholesaler of international bandwidth, and not as a retailer. Under the Open Access Model of ownership, new service providers gain profit from retail and value added services, while the incumbent recoups its investment from sale of bandwidth to these retailers.

In addition, ISPs demand that there should be as many infrastructure providers as possible competing with each other, even if infrastructure provision is a large-scale investment. According to Afrispa, ―[i]t is almost certainly better to ―over provide‖ rather than leave control of the infrastructure resources in the hands of a single entity whether publicly or privately owned‖ (Spintrack AB,2005,p.18).

Mobile telephone operators are currently overtaking the incumbent fixed line operators in terms of market value, number of subscribers and ownership of terrestrial backbone lines. Yet, in many African countries, mobile operators have not been able to access international and regional connectivity grids due to the monopoly of the gateway by national incumbents. With the help of an Open Access Policy, however, such providers will be able to link their extensive national backbones with the landing sites of transcontinental fibre optic cables.

Celtel, which is one of the oligopolies in Sub-Saharan Africa mobile market, has recently merged its networks in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania to extend its dominance in regional connectivity. Thus, mobile operators can also link their 124

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores networks and jointly dominate the regional connectivity market even more firmly. Industry analysts note that if an Open Access Policy is widely adopted, mobile operators will deploy their backbone assets to provide a wide range of ICT services. Consequently, they will be in a position to push both fixed line incumbents and ISPs out of the market (Engvall & Hesselmark, 2007).

The African Internet Service Providers Association (Afrispa) coordinates the campaign of local ISPs on a continental level. The Halfway Proposition that was put forward by this body was a notable intervention in the Pan- African policymaking process. This proposal is already recognised as Africa‘s position in the ICAIS debate. Afrispa has also been able to implement this proposal by launching a regional Internet exchange point for West Africa (http://www.afrispa.org/).

Afrispa also lobbied for a more comprehensive policy change in the telecommunication sector. A World Bank sponsored study, entitled, ―Open Access Models: Options for Improving Backbone Access in Developing Countries‖ (Spintrack AB, 2005), co- authored by the executive secretary of the Afrispa. This study provided the baseline for subsequent policy debates. The study specifically identified the consortium model of ownership of the SAT 3/WASC/SAFE cable as a legacy of the pre- liberalisation era.

The Open Access Policy activists in Africa have also collaborated with international actors outside the continent to influence the policy making process. Donors have been urged to persuade African governments through policy dialogue, provision of research assistance and risk underwriting for

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores international backbone investment .If these measures are not sufficient, then more coercive measures should be considered. Any donor support of infrastructure, in particular for the large international projects (but also for cross-border and other national backbones) must be conditional on Open Access Principles, with non- discriminatory access for anyone in different layers (SpinTrack AB, 2005, p.27).

Understandably, the national monopoly telcos have not accepted the Open Access proposal. In South Africa, Telkom was pressured to open up the landing point to the SAT 3/WASC/SAFE cable that is under its control. Telkom argued that its monopoly must be guarded so that it can extend service to underserved areas. It also contended that the Open Access principle should be deferred at least temporarily for the sake of protection of national assets such as cable landing stations. The South African government representative reminded the open access camp on the inauguration of the SAT 3/WASC/SAFE cable that: [O]ne of the major benefits of this project is that it will be owned, controlled and maintained by the individual operators. This means that revenue generated by the African operators will remain in Africa - which is critical to the economic development of the continent as a whole (www.safe-sat3.co.za).

Moreover, any interference with the consortium arrangement itself may amount to interfering in the market. This is so especially because the privatisation of the incumbent telcos usually involved granting an exclusivity right to the strategic investor. For instance, Telkom South Africa was granted an exclusivity right to protect its value until the end of the five-year contractual period. In fact, Thintana Communications (itself owned by Telkom Malaysia and SBC of USA) was induced to buy equity in Telkom by a grant of exclusivity right (Jensen, 2007; Engvall & Hesselmark, 2007)40.

40 The role played by SBC in influencing the South African Telecommunications Policy is well documented by Horowtiz and Currie (2007). 126

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When a new backbone project, called Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System (EASSy) was initiated in 2002, the same issue of ownership cropped up again. This time, however, some state actors and intergovernmental bodies also promoted the Open Access principle.

EASSy, open access, and compromises

The EASSy, whose construction has been completed in 2010, runs 10,000 kilometres from Mtunzini (South Africa) to Port Sudan. The outermost landing points of the cable will be connected to other fibre optic cables for onward connectivity with Europe or other destinations. Landing points are set up at Maputo (Mozambique), Toliary (Madagascar), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Mombassa (Kenya), Mogadishu (Somalia), Djibouti (Republic of Djibouti) and Comoros. The EASSy project underlined that the change in the telecommunications structure in Africa, following the massive deregulation and liberalisation measures, makes the provision of cable infrastructure a viable option.

According to the official record of the Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System (EASSy), the project was conceived at the first East African Business Summit convened in 2002. The participants of this meeting, businesspersons from Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, declared in their Business Manifesto that linking East Africa to the global information highway is crucial to stimulate its economic growth. The new undersea cable project was to be owned by telecommunications operators

This company has relinquished its share in Telkom in 2009 (http://www.telkom.co.za/about_us/shareholding.html)

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Mozambique and Zambia (www.eassy.org).

The African telcos that initiated the EASSy project first adopted a consortium model in line with the SAT 3/WASC/SAFE cable. Consequently, the Open Access supporters regrouped to campaign against the proposed consortium arrangement. The project was delayed for years due to acrimonious conflicts between the various interested parties.

With regard to the EASSy, civil society organisations took the lead in advocating an open access model. The Association for Progressive Communication (APC), which was the most important civil society representative at the WSIS, organised most of the advocacy activities41. The APC set up a campaign website and published a series of research findings to expose the problems of the SAT 3/WASC/SAFE consortium model (www.fiberforafrica.org, http://www.apc.org ). More significantly, it was able to provide leadership to a gamut of like-minded national civil society associations in Africa. These associations demanded the following measures to be taken into consideration in African ICT policies42:

41 According to Mueller et al (2007, p.288), the APC dominated the participation of civil society members at the WSIS in terms of issue coverage and scope of network. 42 Statement issued at ―Civil Society Workshop on Open Access to ICT Infrastructure in Africa‖ organized by APC in Rwanda in October 2007. The participants in this workshop, convened by the APC, were civil society delegates, academicians, consumer interest groups, researchers etc. Large networks such as the African Internet Service Providers Association, Collaboration for ICT Policy in Eastern and Southern Africa, Open Society Institute for West Africa also took part in this effort (http://www.apc.org/en/news/openaccess/africa/statement-participants-civil- society-workshop-open ).

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 a new corporate governance in which all stakeholders are represented,  universal access to be more demand driven, rather than determined by supply,  greater protection and empowerment of consumers,  increased participation by civil society in all policy making activities, and  harmonisation of policy regulation and laws at regional levels to avoid the bottleneck created by recalcitrant national operators.

In order to boost civil society activism in Africa on matters related to the digital divide, the APC assisted a number of fledgling national civil society groups by providing expertise, training, access to foreign fund and networking with international NGOs. The APC has also attempted to influence the rule of engagement between civil society actors and government bureaucracy in African countries. One of its latest and ambitious projects, called CICEWA, expressly aims to ―identify the political obstacles to extending affordable access to ICT infrastructure in Africa and to advocate for their removal‖ (www.apc.org ).

The APC is not the only organisation actively advocating the introduction of a liberalised fibre optic market in Africa. The Open Society Institute (OSI), with the support of the International Development Research Council (Canada), attempted to file a lawsuit against Telkom South Africa for violation of the Open Access principle. The World Bank, UbuntuNet Alliance (a group of higher education institutions in Southern Africa), and the East African Community (EAC) are

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores engaged in various advocacy and policy advisory roles (Jensen, 2007; www.balancingact.com ; www.cipesa.org ).

The New Partnership for Africa‘s Development (NEPAD) later assumed the leadership to revise the EASSy cable project. NEPAD first carried out a series of studies on alternative infrastructure development models in Africa. These studies simply affirmed the earlier proposals by the World Bank on financing mechanisms for undersea cable projects in Africa. The NEPAD e-commission stated that any provider should have access to the backbone network on non-discriminatory terms. Besides, the infrastructure provider should not compete with its customers (service providers).

NEPAD proposed a new cable ownership model, called a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), as a viable alternative. The SPV was to be licensed in each member country to conduct the wholesale business and distribute the proceeds to its shareholders. Other service providers and telecommunications operators would consequently be able to compete with the retail branch of the incumbent telcos on a level playing field. The objective of the SPV was to remove the incumbent telcos from deriving profits from sale of fibre capacity to ISPs and mobile operators. NEPAD also stated that the SPV will ―give preferential access to education and the needy sectors‖ (Jensen, 2007, p.14). In return for joining this arrangement, NEPAD offered the incumbent telcos to use its good will to secure loan for the project.

A meeting of Development Finance Institutions, NGOs, policy makers and regulators was convened in 2006 to set up an Intergovernmental Working Committee (I-GWC). This organ was charged with the responsibility of formulating details of the

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SPV mechanism. Its main challenge was, however, persuading the EASSy members to join the SPV (Jensen, 2007)43.

The first plan of NEPAD was to have two SPVs: one for the submarine cable and the other for the terrestrial one. However, as the EASSy was already ahead in implementation of its consortium model, a Hybrid SPV was suggested as a compromise solution. Thus, the EASSy was to be composed of a consortium and an SPV. The NEPAD e- Commission, however, insisted that all African operators in the EASSy should join the SPV component. Only foreign investors could continue as consortium owners. The SPV was also to hold the majority share in the cable project and operate on the basis of Open Access Principles(Jensen, 2007, pp.14-19).

NEPAD‘s attempt to incorporate the EASSY project came close to success with the signing in 2006 of the Protocol on Policy and Regulatory Framework for NEPAD ICT Broadband Infrastructure for Eastern and Southern Africa, otherwise called the Kigali Protocol. ICT policy advisors, regional regulatory associations, civil society, and NGOs such as the Open Source Institute for South Africa (OSISA) and APC, development-funding institutions such as World Bank, European Investment Bank, etc supported this protocol. The objective of this legal instrument was to supplant the consortium model in Eastern and Southern Africa by imposing an obligation on its signatories to pull out of the EASSy project.

43 In the proposal of NEPAD for an SPV to take over the EASSy consortium, it was recommended that ―only African companies be in the SPVs‖ (Jensen, 2007, p.18). Obviously, this would enable South African transnational corporations to control the telecommunication market in the continent.

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The supporters of the Open Access model also lobbied finance institutions to suspend the soft loans that many of the state owned operators desperately needed to be on board the EASSy (Jensen, 2006, p.8). The EASSy members, thus, made some concessions. One of the concessions was that all telecommunications operator will be allowed to sign the memorandum of understanding if they have a gateway licence under the law of the member countries. It has to be noted that this excludes ISPs because they do not operate international gateways (Jagun, 2008a).

In spite of the dialogue -cum- pressure44, the EASSy project has been able to secure the necessary fund for the construction of the cable. Nevertheless, the profile of investors has changed. There are now two classes of investors in EASSy: consortium members and SPV members. The result could be called a hybrid SPV model. The consortium members include ten African telcos, three of which are South African private operators (NeoTel, Vodacom and MTN International). The Non- African operators include Communications Global Networks Services (UK), Saudi Telecom Company(Saudi Arabia), Bharti Airtel (India), Etisalat (UAE) and France Telecom.

The second category of African telcos invested in the cable through West Indian Ocean Cable Company (WIOCC), an SPV incorporated in Mauritius. The loan for this SPV was secured from the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Development Bank of France (AFD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), Germany's

44 Telkom South Africa was perhaps the consortium member that was pressured most to accept the Open Access model. The South African government even threatened to refuse a landing point to the EASSy cable. South Africa has many telecommunication providers, some of which are the largest in the continent. Besides, most of the Internet traffic of Africa originates from it (Jensen, 2007). 132

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores development bank (KfW) and International Finance Corporation (IFC). The proposal submitted to the Board of Directors of the International Finance Corporation, the investment wing of the World Bank, makes open access policy the condition for loan eligibility. Whether and how this requirement will be implemented by the Board of Directors and the loan recipients is yet to be seen45.

The biggest challenge for the NEPAD approach was that it requires a substantive policy upheaval in order to remove entrenched gateway monopolies. The incumbent telcos are not willing to give away the profits to be derived from such monopoly to the new foreign and local players. The EASSy, therefore, still insists that its SPV members are allowed to sell capacity to any entity according to their national laws. It remains to be seen how Open Access condition imposed by the creditors will be implemented (http://www.eassy.org/ investors.html).

Business and civil society groups that rallied behind NEPAD had, on the other hand, to explain why development finance institutions failed to impose a strict implementation of Open Access Principles. According to Jensen (2007), the lead consultant to the NEPAD e-commission, this is firstly because they regarded infrastructure provision more as an income generator than as a public good. Secondly, they are not used to financing multilateral government institutions.

45 Jagun (2008) mentions that the World Bank offered to cover 50% of the funding required to complete the project on condition that the consortium members adopt open access policy. But the EASSy consortium members summarily rejected this offer.

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A more realistic explanation is offered by Jagun (2008b) who pointed out that such financial institutions focus on obtaining a timely return on their investment. In that regard, the EASSy consortium is a suitable project. The accumulation drive of the global companies and their local partners in the construction as well as post-construction business associated with the cable are the real issue at stake. The rural poor and the marginalised sections of the society, referred to as ―public‖, in a nominal list of stakeholders are nowhere represented either in the business strategy or in the power matrix.

At present, there are a number of fibre optic cable projects in Africa46. These cable projects are competing among each other to take the ―first mover‖ advantage. It is yet to be seen whether this intense activity leads to a ―capacity glut‖ previously encountered in USA and Europe following the initial bubble (Prüfer & Jahn, 2007).

46 SEACOM cable has already gone live since 2009,connecting Southern and Eastern African countries to Europe and Asia .It has landing points in Mtunzini (South Africa),Maputo(Mozambique), Toliary (Comoros),Dar Es Salam(Tanzania),Mombasa( Kenya),Djibouti (Djibouti),and Zafarana (Egypt). It has onward connectivity to France and India. SEACOM is a privately owned cable project. TEAMS, another submarine cable, connects Kenya with United Arab Emirates. It was completed in 2009. Kenyan companies hold 85% share, of which 42.5% is held by the Kenyan incumbent telco. The other cables under construction are WACS, MainOne, Glo1, and ACE. MainOne is a privately owned project, while the others are consortiums in which African incumbents and foreign telcos are joint owners (http://manypossibilities.net/african- undersea-cables/). 134

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Chapter Six: Information Society within a Restructured Africa

This chapter examines the relationship between African and global capitalist firms and think tanks in shaping Africa‘s development ideology.

The first section assesses the African Information Society Initiative (AISI), which was prepared under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). The AISI was a blueprint for national policies designed to bridge the digital divide. Various NGOs, local and foreign and governmental actors and international organisations were active participants in the process of designing AISI. It is argued that the AISI represents a conscious agency of reproduction of the global ideational and material structure in Africa.

Currently, the New Partnership for Africa‘s Development (NEPAD) is in charge of the information society policy of Africa. The second sub-section, therefore, investigates NEPAD using the Neo-Gramscian concepts of hegemony and counterhegemony.

Africa’s Information Society Initiative

The majority of digital divide initiatives are designed, undertaken and supported by the international development practitioners, such as the Canadian IDRC (International Development Research Centre), the Dutch IICD(International Institution for Communication and Development), and the UK

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DFID (Department for International Development), ITU, USAID (United States Agency for International Development)47 .

Africa was represented by South Africa in the G-7 ministerial meeting of 1995 in which the agenda for global information society was set by the US. In the same year, a conference entitled ―African Regional Symposium on Telematics for Development‖ was organised by the UNECA, UNESCO, ITU and IDRC. The participants from Africa included ICT consumer organisations, ISPs and regulators, whereas external participants included IT specialists and representatives of bilateral, regional and international organisations. This conference reviewed existing initiatives in Africa. It was then agreed that there is a need to devise national strategies and policies ―emphasizing market-oriented approaches and opportunities for partnership between user groups, telecommunications operators and public authorities‖ (http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Padis/telematics.html).

One of the participants of the conference summed up the agenda for policy reform as follows: The real challenge is not technical or financial, but organizational and political. While there are no technological barriers to rapid expansion of Internet service in Africa, there are many in the sphere of obsolete regulatory frameworks that result in constricting barriers to information access and knowledge expansion. (http://www.unitednationonline.org/eca_resources/Major_ECA_Websites/p adis/telemat/africa03.htm).

Therefore, the conference participants decided to lobby the Organisation of African Union and the G15 Heads of State meetings to address the issue of information society in

47 According to Zongo (2001), ―there are so many international development agencies in ICT related projects and activities towards Africa that it may not be possible to go through a full list of them in [a] short overview paper‖ (p.20). 136

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Africa. It was also underlined that more stakeholders have to be involved to shape the information society policy of Africa. (http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Padis/telmatcs_comunik.html)

The telematics conference was a watershed event because it marked the beginning of the information society policy in Africa. It was followed by the UNECA Conference of Ministers responsible for social development and planning in 1995, which passed a resolution, entitled ―Building Africa‘s Information Highway‖. A High-Level Working Group was appointed to draft an umbrella policy that will streamline the various Internet initiatives in Africa in a definite direction (http://www.uneca.org/aisi/).

The High-Level Working Group, composed of 11 ICT experts, came up with ―African Information Society Initiative (AISI): An Action Framework to Build Africa's Information and Communication Infrastructure" in 1996. The premise of the framework was that information technologies are tools that enable low capital investment and efficient exploitation of Africa‘s vast information resources. The objective of the framework is to guide African leaders to take advantage of this technological revolution by opening up their market to global ICT providers. Hence, mirroring the information society agenda set forth earlier by various global organisations, the AISI recommended:  inclusion of the private sector and NGOs in the national policy making process,  strong protection for intellectual property,  free flow of information within African countries and to/from the rest of the world,

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 liberalisation of national telecommunications and public broadcasting services, and  creation of enabling environment for investment through policy and legislation.

The AISI was endorsed by the Summit of Heads of States of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at the 64th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers meeting held in Yaoundé, Cameroon in July 1996. It was subsequently approved by influential international organisations such as the G8 (http://www.uneca.org/aisi/).

The ECA took up the task of coordinating and guiding the implementation of the AISI based on this blueprint. The E- readiness reports prepared by the ECA provided an update on the investment realities in African countries. It also made investment scans to indicate the business opportunities available in Africa (See Scan-ICT at http://www.uneca.org/aisi/). The ECA also coordinated the preparation of a common African position at the WSIS. In general, it played a central role in formulating Africa‘s position with respect to the ICAIS and other global information society issues.

In 2002, African leaders introduced another high profile development blueprint, NEPAD. Hence, NEPAD‘s e-commission for Africa took over the assignment ―to federate all the ICT initiatives of the continent and mobilise resources for funding of the major African projects‖ (http://www.uneca.org/aisi/ Bamako2002/.

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NEPAD, African Development and E-strategies

The first sub-section deals with the origin of NEPAD, its vision and strategies. The second sub-section assesses political response to NEPAD from regional and international political actors. The third sub-section provides an interpretation of the role and function of NEPAD from a Neo- Gramscian perspective.

Genesis of NEPAD

A number of political and economic programmes have been proposed to end the cycle of poverty and conflict in Africa. The Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, Africa‘s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery of 1986, the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio- Economic Recovery and Transformation of 1989 are only a few of these policy proposals. NEPAD is yet another such initiative that aims to address the continent‘s economic, political and social problems (Adedeji, 2002).

The NEPAD initiative was derived from two recovery plans for Africa drawn up by Presidents Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. The first, called the Omega Plan for Africa, stressed that the major causes of disparity in productivity and living standards between developed and developing countries emanate from the difference in their respective level of infrastructure. Hence, if the gaps in physical infrastructure, education, health and agriculture are bridged, Africa will have the capacity to participate in global production and trade. The practical problem that needs to be addressed is, therefore, securing finance for infrastructure construction. The Omega plan insisted that

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Africa should not rely on foreign aid or debt to finance its infrastructure projects. Instead, the resources should be drawn from creation of special drawing rights for Africa, borrowing from African national treasuries, foreign direct investment, etc (http:// www.nepad.org.ng /PDF/About% 20Nepad /planOmega.pdf).

The Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme (MAP) was the plan contributed by Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. The MAP was more far-reaching and comprehensive, and it has been almost entirely incorporated into the final NEPAD document. NEPAD attributes the impoverishment of the continent to its colonial legacy, especially to the exploitation of raw materials for the production of value added products in the West. Subversion of traditional values, institutions and structures for imperial ends, and the heritage of a ―weak capitalist class and weak...accumulation process‖ are the major features of this legacy. The poor rate of accumulation in the post-colonial period coupled with a dysfunctional and corrupt leadership is the single most important obstacle to Africa‘s economic recovery (OAU, 2001).

NEPAD declared its ―vision and firm conviction" to be the eradication of poverty in Africa and abolition of the development chasm between the continent and the international community. The specific goals to be attained in the medium term include achievement of an economic growth of 7% per annum in the next 15 years and attainment of the UN Millennium Development Goals. The latter include reduction of the proportion of people living under extreme poverty , infant and maternal mortality, and increasing student enrolment, provision of basic health services, etc (Para.1).

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The strategy for economic growth advocated by NEPAD focuses on increasing and diversifying African exports and enhancing its competitiveness. The marginalisation of Africa from the world market is considered the manifestation of its poverty. While globalisation has increased the cost of Africa‘s ability to compete, we hold that the advantages of an effectively managed integration present the best prospects for future economic prosperity and poverty reduction (Para.28).

The mobility of capital across the globe enables governments and private entrepreneurs to secure financial resources from global markets. To sum up, the globalization process offers Africa greater opportunity for real injection of private funding and risk taking, creation of new markets and harnessing of increased economic capacity (Paras. 29-32).

However, according to NEPAD, there are still two major obstacles to end the marginalisation of Africa. Firstly, the developed countries have taken advantage of the marginalised sections of the world due to the absence of fair and just rules to regulate global integration of economies. NEPAD insisted, however, that the call for a fair global rule of business is not only a moral but also an economic imperative. In the words of the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, A small minority of the world creates much of current wealth. That wealth cannot continue to grow indefinitely so long as it continues to be based on a narrow circle. The base of the wealth creation has to be expanded to include the rest of the world for it to be sustained. In the absence of such an expansive process, it is only a matter of time before the economies of the developed world stagnate with all the dire consequences of such a phenomenon…Africa‘s development is thus a necessary means of preventing ultimate stagnation in the developed world.

...NEPAD is thus based on the recognition of the fact that Africa‘s development is vital to the realization of the direct material interest not only of Africans but also of the rest of the world (Quoted in Abraham, 2003, pp.19-20).

The other obstacle is the failure by African governments to introduce good governance. NEPAD, thus, vouched to create a market friendly environment in Africa through its peace,

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores security, democracy and political governance initiatives. The African leaders behind NEPAD have assured their partners that ―the numbers of democratically elected leaders are on the increase‖ in the continent and, hence, the positive outcome of this latest initiative is guaranteed (para.42). However, market assessment reports released by Western economic institutes in the same year NEPAD came to existence seemed to negate this assurance. For example, according to the Report of the Economic Freedom of the World in 2003, except for six African countries (Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, Mauritius and Tanzania), the rest have unacceptable legal structures and weak protection of property rights. Similarly, the corruption index places most of African countries among the worst offenders. Only fourteen countries have managed to put in place enough discipline on their fiscal regime through spending cuts, reduction of stabilisation funds, and accelerated privatisation (cited in Loots, 2003).

The African Peer Review Mechanism was created to lock in the political commitment of each African country. This is a voluntary mechanism by which member states undertake periodic review of the policies and practices of one another and exert peer pressure on the laggards. The review aims to ultimately ensure that the political and economic processes in the African countries conform to best practice guidelines stipulated by their ―development partners‖. By 2008, 29 African states had already gone through the Peer Review Mechanism (http://www.nepad.org/aprm/; Loots, 2003, p.4).

NEPAD requested foreign financial aid ―to bridge existing gaps between Africa and the developed countries so as to improve the continent‘s international competitiveness and enable it to participate in the globalisation process‖ (Para.95). A large capital inflow, 64 billion USD every year, 142

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores was sought by NEPAD to carry out its plans and programmes. The partners for development are, thus, expected to provide debt cancellation, aid and other financing mechanisms in the short run. However, NEPAD relies on expected private capital flows to harness the wealth of Africa and achieve its objectives (Para.144).

The role of ICTs in the integration of Africa into the global economy is given a special focus in the NEPAD strategy. The current economic revolution has, in part, been made possible by advances in information and communications technology (ICT), which have reduced the cost of and increased the speed of communications across the globe, abolishing pre-existing barriers of time and space, and affecting all areas of social and economic life. It has made possible the integration of national systems of production and finance, and is reflected in an exponential growth in the scale of cross-border flows of goods, services and capital (Para.29).

The benefits expected from utilisation of ICTs range from enhancing opportunities for global trade, investment and finance to creation of a common regional market and even an African Union (Paras.104-108). The small size of African markets is singled out as the major obstacle to attract foreign direct investment. Thus, by rolling out regional Internet connectivity, NEPAD aims to link these markets the global economy.

The e-Africa commission of NEPAD was established early in 2001 with funding from donors such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank, UK, Japanese, Swiss development agencies as well as the governments of South Africa and Egypt. This organ is responsible for ICT initiatives. The commission, operating in alliance with regional organisations such as Southern Africa Development Cooperation (SADC), shapes policy and regulatory framework to facilitate telecommunications reform and e-readiness. The fibre optic cable project discussed in the previous chapter, thus, was one of the tasks

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores the Commission set out to accomplish. The plan was to coordinate all the fibre optic cables into a ring so that every African country will be connected to the information superhighway (http://www.eafricacommission.org/).

Foreign and local engagement with NEPAD

The NEPAD development blueprint has received favourable response from donors and Western governments. More importantly, the G8 encouraged all partnership agreements to be undertaken via the organs created under NEPAD (Abraham, 2003).

In contrast, NEPAD has been a subject of serious criticism by a number of African scholars, civil society groups and social movements (Bond, 2005a). The first criticism relates to the elite driven, top-down process of its inception. NEPAD was initiated by the heads of states of Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria and Senegal and later submitted to the G8 for an approval. Questions as to the source and scope of its authority have not been answered yet (Tandon, 2002, p.10; Maxwell & Christiansen, 2002; Adedeji, 2002; Matthews, 2004; Mbaku, 2004).

According to Chabal (2002), the very nature of post- colonial politics in Africa militates against any democratic process. Neo-patrimonialism and clientilism still define African politics. Despite the presence of a modern institutional facade, power is still exercised through informal patron-client relationship between the ruling elites and their support base. Chabal cites the civil service system as an example of just another link for the patrimonial chain between patrons and clients. Similarly, elections do not have

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores the role of establishing accountability but factional mobilisation, since the principles of legitimacy are still traditional. Hence, without fundamentally changing the neo- patrimonial politics of Africa, it is impossible to have initiatives like NEPAD through a participatory process.

The second theme of criticism is NEPAD‘s development paradigm, which is understood to be neo-liberalism. Some scholars have pointed out that NEPAD‘s reliance on foreign aid leads to a reproduction of colonial/dependency relationships (Adedeji, 2002). Others have contended that, as experiences of other countries such as Argentina indicate, foreign direct investment (FDI) is a risky means to build Africa‘s economy (Tandon, 2002, p.21). Tandon, thus, recommends that African governments open their doors to FDI selectively, and not as a matter of general policy. In particular, the provision of social services such as electricity, education, health, etc must not be put in the investment basket. The obligation to provide basic needs of the people must be placed outside the vagaries of the market and squarely shouldered by African governments.

The cooperation paradigm, or partnership, is also criticised for perpetuating the inequality between donors and recipients (Maxwell & Christiansen, 2002; Matthews, 2004). According to Adedeji (2002), the subtle semantic and conceptual shift from ―cooperation‖ or ―compact‖ to ―partnership‖ since the end of the cold war has culminated NEPAD. This shift reflects the change in the character of international relations since the Yaoundé I cooperation agreement between the then European Economic Community and Africa in the 1960s. Each successive agreement has reduced the autonomy of recipients over aid resources by introducing stringent conditionality. Adedeji argued that with the 145

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores introduction of ―partnership‖, the liberal international principle of interdependence is no more in the service of Africa. Consequently, it would be naive to expect the partnership advocated by NEPAD to signify anything other than submission of Africa to a neo-liberal discipline.

Finally, academics and civil society groups have articulated alternative visions for Africa. Adedeji advocated a revival of the principles which guided the liberation struggle in Africa, namely: self-reliance, self-sustainment, the democratisation of the development process, and a fair and just distribution of the fruit of economic progress. Self- reliance, which is the core element of this vision, emphasises import substitution and internal articulation of the economy (Adedeji, 2002, p.7).

Similarly, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and Third World Network evaluated NEPAD in their meeting in Accra, Ghana in 2002. The common position was that current African economic problems emanate from the international economic order with its division of labour reinforcing ―domestic weaknesses deriving from socio-economic and political structures‖. Thus, the policy measures that are urgently required for the recovery of Africa were pointed out as follows:  stabilisation of commodity prices,  reform of the international financial system, the World Bank and the IMF,  an end to IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes,  fundamental changes to the existing agreements of the WTO regime, as well as reversal of the attempts to expand the scope

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of this regime to new areas including investment, competition and government procurement, and  debt cancellation.

Likewise, a number of radical African social movements, trade unions, youth and women organisations, and religious, academic, etc groups, convened in Durban, South Africa in 2002 to denounce NEPAD. The Civil Society Indaba of South Africa, for instance, specifically addressed each segment of NEPAD‘s neo-liberal policies including private ownership of infrastructure, commercial agriculture, debt rescheduling, etc. They concluded that all these measures are detrimental to food security, employment, and environmental protection in Africa. The African Civil Society Declaration that came out of this meeting articulated an alternative vision for Africa based on the principles of Human Rights, Self-Reliance, Pan- Africanism, and a ―developmental participatory state‖ (Bond,2005a,pp.32-35).

Unlike the civil society groups that have been promoting the neo-liberal principles enshrined in NEPAD, the radical civil society elements opposed to it remain hardly visible. The first problem faced by radical civil society groups is lack of resources to disseminate information, or to carry out advocacy and lobbying activities. For instance, about 650 activists attended the 2004 Africa Social Forum, which met in Lusaka, Zambia. Most of the delegates were from neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia. Members from other parts of the continent were unable to participate due to material constraints. Besides, organisations, which were putting up resistance against their governments on issues of privatisation and environmental degradation, were prevented from attending this conference (Bond, 2005b). 147

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In Africa, as elsewhere, there are divisions among civil society actors as to the stance to be taken against the state and international financial institutions. Some civil society actors prefer a critical engagement with both, while others call for mass action and civil disobedience. This divergence in commitment is usually presented as a lack of unity leading to the inability to design an all-Africa social forum. However, such evaluation of civil society actors seems to be based on an erroneous theoretical presupposition that civil society represents a homogenous and autonomous entity. Rather, the African Civil Society Declaration points the way towards a resistance bloc that not only opposes the neoliberal path of NEPAD but also offers an alternative vision.

Framing NEPAD

While there is no dearth of criticism of NEPAD, there are relatively few attempts to explain why it came about in the first place. Adedeji (2002, p.11) characterised the partnership logic of NEPAD as ―a childlike naivety among African leaders and policy makers‖ in expecting a relationship with donors based on equality. Tandon (2002, p.25), on the other hand, commented that the ―road to hell is often paved with good intentions‖. For these authors, NEPAD arises from a noble concern to end the spiral of poverty and conflict that is plaguing Africa. It is only the means that it chose which is inappropriate to the reality of the continent. According to these scholars, NEPAD should simply adopt a ―strategy of self- reliance‖48.

48 Both Adedeji and Tandon emphasised the distinction between insertion into the global accumulation system as advocated by NEPAD and controlled integration into the global economy. The suggested path is an 148

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Tsheola (2002), on the other hand, associated the birth of NEPAD to the role of South Africa in mediating globalisation in the continent. He traced the shift to neo- liberalism in South Africa to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy of 1996. GEAR was committed to relaxation of exchange controls, reduction of tariff on imports and privatisation of public assets. These policy changes affirmed the primary role of capital in the post- Apartheid recovery of South Africa49.

auto-centred integration in which African countries do not merely adjust to the system but shape and influence it to their own advantage. Amin stressed the political goals of integration as follows: Here we have to look at the challenge of regionalism in another way: that the bourgeoisie-at the global level or the compradors at various levels in Africa and elsewhere-look at the problem of regionalism in terms of common markets and we should be very critical of this view. It is presented as follows: that if even the Europeans with strong national economies need to unite by building a common market, we should do the same. In fact, they have different problems and they have to go beyond a common market even from the European left point of view (1997, p.8). 49 The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) stated that the wage of blue collar workers went down by 7% and number of jobs by 171,000 only a year after the introduction of this new policy. At the same time, the reduction of public expenditure and the push for a slim state has eclipsed the redistributive goals of the post-Apartheid recovery programme (Vavi, 1997). Tsheola also observed that despite the sound macroeconomic fundamentals set down by GEAR, foreign investment did not materialise. In fact, there was more capital flight from the country, aided by the relaxation of foreign exchange control prescribed by the new policy. The result of this capital outflow was the state expenditure deficit leading to labour strikes and stoppage. In short, GEAR ensured foreign interests at the expense of domestic ones.

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South Africa‘s geographical association with Africa, which is deemed a zone of danger for free enterprise, was identified as the cause for the lack of FDI. Therefore, GEAR was later transposed to NEPAD through the active leadership of Thabo Mbeki. According to Tsheola, in spite of the rhetoric of ―African recovery‖, NEPAD is but a means to attract more FDI to South Africa itself.

South African economic think tanks and experts have indeed positively evaluated the NEPAD initiative as a vehicle for national economic objectives. The President of the Economic Society of South Africa spelt out the strategic advantages of corporate expansion of South Africa into the rest of the continent (Loots, 2005). Firstly, the profitability of investment in Africa is, on average, higher than in other regions of the world. Secondly, the perception of foreign investors about the continent follows a blanket approach, which tends to lump all of Africa as a single destination. South Africa and China are becoming major investors in the continent partly because they do not share this perception. Therefore, the adoption of ―good policies within a stable institutional framework‖ such as NEPAD is an indispensable prerequisite to attract FDI to Africa50.

Akinboade and Lalthapersad-Pillay (2005,) provided a detailed account of the ―possible pay-offs‖ of the NEPAD policy framework for South African economic interest. Accordingly, African countries need the expertise, investment

50 Loots (2003) also extensively analysed the function and role of the African Peer Review Mechanism in providing such stable institutional framework. Applying concepts from the New Institutional Economics (NIE), she outlined the role of institutions such as the Peer Review Mechanism in reducing uncertainty, promoting efficiency and, therefore, facilitating good economic performance. 150

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores and concrete business opportunities offered by South Africa ―to kick start their development process‖. Economic contact with South Africa ―provides an opportunity to procure internationally traded goods and services at reasonable cost from an African country‖ (pp.5-6).

More importantly, South Africa offers one of the largest and most deregulated financial industries with sophisticated banking and insurance markets. The South African stock exchange market is an important source of equity financing. Moreover, South African enterprises have the expertise and the capacity to construct and maintain transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructure in other African countries.

Similarly, what South Africa can get from the rest of Africa is stated as follows: During the apartheid years cultural, political and economic sanctions were imposed against South Africa. As South Africa embraced democracy, these sanctions were lifted. This opened up the possibility of corporate expansion of dominant South African firms into the rest of Africa as a means of maintaining economic viability and acquiring more competitive strength in a globalizing world. Also expanding into other parts of Africa could minimize the impact of policy changes that are introduced under democracy on South African business interests, and should facilitate the closer integration with Africa of an otherwise previously isolated country(p. 256).

Amin (2006), on the other hand, situated the NEPAD initiative and the role of African actors within a broader critique of global capitalist developments. His major proposition is that various models of worldwide capital accumulation rest on social alliances in the centre and periphery. Accordingly, the colonial, post-colonial and the current ―globalization‖ phases have depended on different types of comprador classes in Africa.

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The social blocs in Africa that engaged in the liberation struggle and then in the NIEO were ―national populist‖ pitted against the imperial ambitions of transnational capital. The hegemonic ideas that cemented this bloc included economic modernisation through industrialisation, internal articulation of the economy, and creation of internal demand for growth. According to Amin, these were the foundation for the economic and social transformation of the third world from the 1950s up to the 1970s51.

However, the dominance of neo-liberal blocs in the North and the material limitations in the South later brought about the reconfiguration of comprador classes in Africa. The debt burden and the discontinuation of the growth and industrialisation policies finally eroded national populism. It could be asked why the governments of the countries of the South have subscribed to all of these commandments drafted in the imperialist centres. The response, in general terms, is that we should look to the social hegemonic blocs mentioned above that make possible the reproduction of asymmetric globalization. There is a new comprador class in the countries of the periphery that actually derives its existence from the new model of globalized liberalism. This comprador class participates in the new government arrangements that followed the erosion of the national populist models inspired by Bandung (Amin, 2006, p.4).

Taylor (2002) has also applied the insights of Neo- Gramscian theory for his argument that NEPAD has been the instrument of externally-oriented fraction of capital within

51 Amin distinguished a national populist bloc from a national socialist one. The former could be useful in combating colonial and neo- colonial impositions from abroad. Besides, it could play a role in defining an autonomous development path for Africa. Ultimately, however, the emergence of a national socialist bloc is a necessary condition to delink from a capitalist world system. De-linkage is not synonymous with autarchy. It refers to what Amin calls auto-centred integration with the international economy.

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores key African states, mainly: South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria. These are confronted by inward-looking fractions who rallied around a nationalist project of de-linkage from the world capitalist system. However, the new global structure has provided favourable opportunities for the externally oriented fraction to prevail in such regional initiatives as NEPAD.

These explanations have some merits when analysed on the basis of the facts and analysis presented in the previous chapters of this dissertation. The framing of NEPAD as a mere extension of South Africa‘s national interest into the rest of the continent appears to be the most extensively documented and evidenced of all the different arguments. Lesufi (2004,) emphasised this argument by pointing out that the presentation of NEPAD as a collective instrument of African leaders conceals ―the inequalities among the African states and thus the real possibilities of reproducing relations of domination and exploitation among them‖ (pp.813-814). Bond (2006) also underlined the thesis that South Africa is deploying its ―comparative advantage‖ in the industrial sector in order to play a semi-imperialist role over other African countries.

Such analysis overemphasises the role of national interest and disregards the integral role played by transnational alliance of interests52. The agency of other actors in Africa in charting out a neo-liberal path of development is, therefore, underestimated.

52 The Sunday Times, reporting on the July 2003 African Union meeting in Maputo, stated that Mbeki was viewed by other African leaders as ―too powerful, and they privately accuse him of wanting to impose his will on others. In the corridors they call him the George Bush of Africa, leading the most powerful nation in the neighbourhood and using his financial and military muscle to further his own agenda‖ (Cited in Bond, 2006, p.112). 153

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It may be instructive to note the evolution of the Open Access Policy initiative as the key policy instrument to integrate Africa into the global economy. This initiative was, from the start, incubated by Internet service providers in Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria in particular, and in other African countries, in general, through their continental ISP association. The Halfway Proposition and Open Access policy for Africa were the contributions of this association or its members. These were only later actively supported and even funded by the South African political and corporate elite53.However, the advocacy and policy proposals had already influenced donors and international financial organisations well before the involvement of the South African government.

Taylor‘s assessment of NEPAD seems to be closer to the factual evidence offered in the previous chapters of this dissertation. However, his dichotomy of the present political actors into external oriented and inward looking ones is not fully tenable. It may be appropriate to characterise the difference between the proponents of NEPAD and some civil society actors and academics who espoused import substitution and self-reliance .Otherwise, the Open Access versus Consortium dispute as well as the resistance by African governments to privatisation and liberalisation of national telcos did not display any inward looking political or policy stance. NEPAD‘s emphasis on African ownership of the fibre optic cable is, thus, specific to proprietary rights over the assets such as fibre optic cables and landing stations. It does not aim to reorient the patterns of trade and investment between Africa and foreign capital.

53 The South African government contributed 3 million Rand to NEPAD e-Africa commission to supplement its budget for one year (Jensen, 2007, p.20). 154

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South Africa is indeed the major economic force in Africa but not the only one. Egypt and Nigeria seek bigger markets for further accumulation. Egypt is one of those African countries with indigenous Pan-African operators with a stake in the global and regional information society policy. MSI and Orascom, Sudanese and Egyptian private telcos respectively, have more than fourteen licences in other African countries in 2000 (Gebreab, 2002, p. 9). These corporations have also been well represented by their state bureaucrats in the NEPAD blueprint. Egypt, it is to be recalled, was one of the countries that financed the e-Africa Commission.

South Africa, Senegal and Nigeria, have a relatively visible preponderance of elites that are part of an emerging transnational bloc comprised of executives and affiliates of global corporations, consumerist elites, state bureaucrats as well as politicians and professionals promoting neo-liberal policies. The considerable political and discursive power mobilised to shape African information society by NGOs, ISP associations, new ICT enterprises is a manifestation of a transnational class alliance. Likewise, the dispute around the Open Access versus Consortium models is a conflict between class fractions, rather than between national interests. ISPs, mobile providers, ICT entrepreneurs, NGOs, etc, irrespective of national origin, were supportive of a liberalised infrastructure provision whereas incumbent telcos were in favour of a monopoly provision.

Neo-Gramscian studies seem to have neglected the probability of such class alliance in African social formations. According to Cox, no dominant class has been able to establish hegemony in the peripheral regions nor is the economy developed as in the hegemonic core. In other words, in 155

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores the peripheral regions, the state is Hobbesian, where civil society is undeveloped, and the ruling class is the state class. Therefore, elites in these regions are not able to articulate hegemonic ideas that have a social basis and internal logic. Thus, political change in such circumstances amounts to superimposition of global capital accumulation over the old internal power structure (Van der Pijl, 1998).Major ideological and political shifts in Africa ranging from the promotion of the New International Economic Order of the 1970s to the democratisation movement of the 1980s were, thus, summarily explained as a passive revolution. The ruling class in Africa is ―too weak to establish hegemony in the sense of an ideological bond between itself and the masses‖ (Abrahamsen, 1997, p.149).

However, the political processes discussed in this dissertation suggest that hegemonic politics has also its place in Africa, albeit to a limited extent. Likewise, NEPAD‘s neo-liberal agenda was opposed by a coalition of radical civil society actors at regional platforms. Such opposition is a prototype of a counterhegemonic exercise against the moral and political legitimacy of the NEPAD programme. Civil society groups have been able to forward ideas reflective of African reality and antagonistic to the hegemony of neo-liberalism. Hence, there are some empirical indications that a blanket characterisation of African regional and national politics as a mere ―transition or conveyor belt‖ of external changes may be unwarranted54. Rather, concepts such as passive revolution and hegemony are ideal types whose application in practical contexts may reveal nuances and variations.

54 Though Amin has noted that national populists had a hegemony in the 1950s and 1960s, he does not ascribe such hegemony to the new ―comprador classes‖ active in NEPAD. 156

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In South Africa, GEAR has generally been regarded as a broad social contract, including civil society, political parties, and grassroots movements, both radical and moderate, under the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC). As a hegemonic exercise, GEAR attempts to establish its legitimacy by invoking black empowerment in the post-Apartheid period (Adler & Webster, 1995; Bond & Mayekiso, 1996). Such empowerment generally took the form of ownership and control of state enterprises by black entrepreneurs. For example, a black middle class group owned equity in Telkom (Engdahl & Hauki, 2001, Horowtiz & Curry, 2007).

However, this idea of black empowerment has also been contested. Labour representatives such as the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) have asserted that creation of black or African bourgeoisie merely introduces a class conflict between (black) capital and (black) labour. Thus, empowerment is progressive only when it is people centred and addresses such issues as poverty, urban renewal and gender balance (Labour Resource and Research Institute, 2001).

A political contestation of comparable degree also took place in Senegal, as described in the previous chapter, where telecommunications reforms accompanied the restructuring of the state. The employees of the monopoly telco retained their privilege by becoming shareholders in the new private company. Nevertheless, a consensus was reached after a complex state- civil society engagement in which traditional authority figures (marabouts) were also involved along with the urban

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores middle class55. Certainly, the political forces pitted against each other had little ideological difference than in South Africa. Even then, this kind of compromise politics occurred to a lesser degree in countries like Ghana where privatisation and liberalisation were carried out after demobilisation of opposition groups (Noll &Shirley, 2001, p.47).

At the other end of the spectrum are countries like Ethiopia and Algeria, whose leaders have been the spokespersons of NEPAD to the outside world. Here the state is a ―tyranny of cousins‖ and politics is synonymous with armed struggle or urban riots. In Algeria, telecommunication reform was carried out in disregard of opposition by labour unions and political parties (Um, 2004). In Ethiopia, telecommunication reforms have been muted until the recent push by international organisations to kick-start the country‘s accession to the WTO Agreement. These are, indeed, good examples of passive revolution where a new form of capitalist accumulation is introduced without altering the existing social divisions whether based on tradition, ethnicity, or class. Telecommunication reforms or introduction of information society policies in such social formations are means to access foreign debt or aid that will ensure the continuity of the existing system.

55 These are leaders of Muslim Brotherhoods in Senegal with strong following. They have been able to influence the votes of their followers and negotiate with political candidates for the presidency (Azam et al., 2002).

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Conclusion

ICAIS and telecommunications reforms as a strategy of capital accumulation

The transformation of the telecommunications sector since the 1980s, from national to global, from public service to trade, and from regulation to deregulation has enabled capital accumulation at a planetary level. The reorganisation of production of telecommunication services at a global level, thus, led to a shift of market power to the new dominant economic unit - the privately owned global telco.

Competition among the global telcos in the restructured telecommunications sector has focussed on routing most or, if possible, all of the Internet traffic within one‘s private network. This in turn necessitated control of as much physical and logical communication resources as possible. The series of mergers and takeovers that led to the emergence of even fewer global telcos as oligopolies and conglomerates was a result of such necessity.

Furthermore, by expanding into the periphery through equity purchases or contractual arrangements, these global telcos are pushing out the few national incumbents, relics of the old ITU-based system. In this capitalist competition for inputs and markets, the national incumbents, who command a narrow resource and profit base, are severely constrained by the new global production and exchange structure. Some ISPs have, therefore, joined the global telcos as ―strategic investors‖ in order to tap into their global networks. Others have resorted to cost-saving technologies to minimise their vulnerability.

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International Charging Arrangements for Internet Services (ICAIS) are instruments for the exercise of bargaining power by the global oligopolies or conglomerates against smaller competitors. These confidential arrangements establish the network link speed, network congestion, and price available to ISPs and users all over the world. U.S and European regulatory institutions have so far refrained from regulating these arrangements between the global telcos and smaller ISPs.

The imperative of the accumulation strategy is such that even the current imbalance in bargaining power may change to further strengthen the global telcos. Major international backbone providers have claimed that bandwidth, routing tables and IP addresses are scarce resources, presently available to users all over the world due to the huge investment made by them. They may, therefore, shift resources to production of services that are valued by those users who can pay for them. The new market segment, called New Generation Networks, targets the demand for real time services by multinational corporations and consumers in developed countries. In short, by introducing product differentiation and price discrimination in the market, the global telcos can impose an even more aggressive strategy of accumulation of capital through ICAIS.

The contours of hegemony

The power of the global telcos to determine the allocation of resources arises from their ownership of the means of production. Conceptualising this class power merely as a contractual arrangement between individual parties is itself a form of consciousness about power relationships. In examining inter-capital relations as those manifested in 160

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ICAIS, therefore, the role of ideas and consciousness, as an integral component of the global structure must be explicated.

The Information Society idea accords a broad political and ideological legitimacy for the dominant class forces in the global information structure. In the promotional and academic literature, information society represented progressive values such as openness, freedom and innovation. The emphasis on the market as the arbiter of ICT development and usage also refers to these values. Thus, private ownership of infrastructure and willingness to pay for access are now the worldwide organising principles of production and exchange of network services.

In relation to Africa, the essence of hegemony has been in establishing particular interests of global capitalist accumulation as compatible with the aspirations of ordinary people for development and better life. The information society, significantly coupled with the digital divide, equated expansion of foreign capital into the less developed economies as a way of development, leapfrogging or catching up with the advanced societies. At the same time, the embedment of these ideas as the global common sense constrains the full articulation of alternative forms of production and distribution of ICT services such as those premised on free and open source or public goods provision.

The hegemonic fit between the material interests of dominant class forces and collective images of development or human progress is achieved through an active agency. This dissertation has extensively documented how national and international think tanks, policy consultants and informal organisations such as the G8 as well as formal inter-state organisations such as the ITU were central in the process of 161

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores constructing a hegemonic order. Organic intellectuals played a key role in this hegemonic exercise. Consequently, third world political engagement is no more based on the antagonistic division between the North and the South. Instead, technological determinism and neo-liberal ideas pervade current policy discourse in developing countries as well.

More importantly, international organisations have been instrumental in cooption of opposition to the dominant information society construct. The ungainly universal access policy has diluted the urgency and intensity of the need to address the communication demands of the disadvantaged. It posits that universal service is not achievable in the poor countries because of the sheer size of the have-nots and the logic of scarcity of resources. Therefore, despite the magnitude of the communications needs of the majority of people in the world, the responses are in the form of isolated projects for low cost infrastructure such as Internet radio, telecentres, etc.56 Unfortunately, philanthropic activities and isolated pilot projects can address only just so much of global inequality.

Hence, while bridging the digital divide in effect amounts to greater access by urban elites and high-income groups to new technology; it perpetuates the exclusion of the popular classes as long as it does not address the income divide. In fact, to the degree that digital divide and universal access policies do not affect the underlying development or class divide, they mainly serve to contain

56 See the reports of the ITU-D Focus Group 7 at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/univ_access/ for an updated list of projects by ITU and NGOs.

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores potentially counterhegemonic ideas and make them consistent with the hegemonic order.

Nevertheless, hegemony is not a static apparatus of power but a dynamic and contested process. A hegemonic order cannot avoid but manage tensions (intra-class) and contradictions (inter-class). The disputes between the U.S. and EU Internet Backbone providers and their Asia-Pacific clients and the resistance of African monopoly telcos to telecommunication reforms, analysed in this dissertation, are instances of such tensions.

The ICAIS dispute is an attempt to reverse or moderate the flow of payment from the national and regional ISPs and telcos to the global IBPs by enlisting the support of regulatory bodies. The basic complaint in the ICAIS controversy is that the contractual arrangements unduly grant a larger profit to the latter. The ICAIS dispute does not challenge the basis of the inequitable global social order. Emphasis must be laid on the fact that both parties i.e. the U.S. Internet Backbone Providers and Internet service providers from Asia pacific countries, have subscribed to the market system in which there are bound to be losers and winners.

Framing the ICAIS dispute as a North-South conflict also captures only the final stage of the controversy at its best and, at its worst, it conceals that all the contenders share the same capital accumulation interest. Concerns about ICAIS were initially raised by Telstra of Australia. Then, the same concern was taken by Chinese telcos and other Asian ISPs. Besides, sides could be switched easily, as in the case of Australia, when the complainant acquires enough market power to effectively play the game as it is. 163

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Likewise, the tension between African monopoly telcos and international and regional actors regarding restructuring of the telecommunication industry is rooted in inter-capital rivalry. The emerging ICT entrepreneurs and global telcos insisted that African incumbent telcos should abdicate their means of accumulation. The new information society notion prescribed that African states should only facilitate the accumulation of capital by private enterprises. However, the state class was reluctant to give up its privileged position. This remains to be the subtext of ongoing conflicts with respect to telecommunication reform and ownership of fibre optic cables in Africa.

It must finally be underlined that this tension between African incumbents and global telcos was not addressed by persuasive or diplomatic power only. Less subtle or sometimes plain coercive state and corporate power has also been exercised to push the changes dictated by the new model of capital accumulation. Thus, when the accounting rate system was overhauled unilaterally by the US, it deprived African governments of their major source of revenue. The introduction of ―subversive‖ technologies such as IP telephony, call back techniques also represented sheer technological power that adversely affected their monopoly status.

Internal articulation of hegemony

Inasmuch as Africa‘s position on ICAIS and the information society was shaped within the structural limit set by the global economy and governance, NEPAD explains the role of African political agency in relation to this global structure.

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By its own declaration, NEPAD is a project to legitimise accumulation of surplus by an African capitalist class. It is an internal articulation of the hegemonic concepts of competitiveness, free enterprise, and open economy as strategic orientation for ―African Renaissance‖. The ―strategic partnership‖ with global corporations and donors, which is promoted as the way to end Africa‘s ―marginalization‖, is also part of this articulation.

The information society initiative steered by NEPAD claims to fight mass illiteracy, infant mortality, abject poverty, etc. Yet, the introduction of ICT products and services through profit driven ICT production and distribution will respond to the interests of a few emerging ICT entrepreneurs such as mobile providers, ISPs, franchises, etc. For instance, the benefits expected from the controversial transoceanic cable projects are off- shored and outsourced jobs for technical professionals. As a Kenyan scholar pointed out: What will flow through the fiber optics? Already, we have a well- educated workforce. What is missing is the infrastructure and, of course the supply of jobs to be outsourced. We cannot assume that jobs will just come because the cables are in place. .. If we can leverage on this communication link, we can turn into Silicon Valley, the same way Indians turned Bangalore into mini-silicon valley (Iraki, 2009).

Nevertheless, much as NEPAD represents the active agency of a new social bloc to mobilise actors around a neo-liberal ideology in Africa, both subjective and objective factors seem to militate against its success. Firstly, if it has to be accepted as an ideological consensus, it must engage a wide spectrum of social forces through various institutions. Yet, while a few affiliated NGOs have supported its goals and

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores activities, NEPAD has not become a broad rallying force in Africa57.

As a hegemonic exercise striving to accommodate popular forces, NEPAD seems to be even more significantly debilitated by the preponderant material power relations underlying the global structure. A considerable social conflict in Africa has been engendered by past colonial and neo-colonial policies such as the Structural Adjustment Programme. NEPAD‘s vision for African recovery also privileges economic efficiency and capital accumulation at the expense of social equity and satisfaction of basic human needs. This only aggravates the existing social divides in the continent.

The urgent need to engineer some form of internal political cohesion, therefore, explains the ―partnership‖ premise of NEPAD. NEPAD requires external financial aid to offset radical opposition through material concessions. The ―innovative solutions‖ such as construction of tele-centres in rural areas are attempts to provide such a concession without any substantial change in the income or class structure. Yet, even such solutions could not succeed due to ―donor fatigue‖. Therefore, this objective reality severely constrains the capacity of NEPAD or any other similar elitist project to co- opt antagonistic social forces.

Paths of Counterhegemony

From a Neo-Gramscian perspective the abiding challenges of establishing an alternative political economic structure

57 Presently, NEPAD has merged with the African Union and the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee. It is accountable to the AU assembly. 166

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores are: a) Raising a counterhegemonic consciousness around a universal ideology that speaks to the situation of those unrepresented and disadvantaged, and b) mobilising social action to construct an alternative political economic structure. Hence, the ―communication society‖ movement as well as the organised popular forces which are striving to construct an alternative vision in Africa and elsewhere have to address these challenges.

As more and more spheres of human life such as culture and the natural environment are subjected to capitalist production, opposition to it straddles class, gender and identity formations. Thus, there is a strategic necessity to overcome the fragmentation of actors. This, in turn, has entailed questions as to the relative relevance and primacy of class as a defining element of the counterhegemonic consciousness.

As Neo-Gramscian theory contains Marxist and Post-Marxist strands, the answers to this question have also displayed wide ideological differences. One of the responses to this question has been that a hegemonic consciousness must transcend class consciousness by incorporating other identity-based movements into a vision of society based on one of the fundamental classes (Cox, 1999).

The other response is that the relationship between race, gender, etc based identities in a counterhegemonic bloc should not be understood in terms of instrumental compromise. It is a process through which all the social forces that share anti- capitalist values are equally engaged in an educational relationship. As a result, all subjects will be transformed into a new type of political community or historic bloc. No one pre-constituted social group will be permanently 167

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores institutionalised. Historical materialism itself is a ―situated knowledge‖, which, in a post-hegemonic era, must be superseded by other forms of knowledge (Rupert, 2005).

At the other end of this debate, we find the view that class is constitutive of capitalism while the other forms of identity are not (Wood, 1990). According to Wagar (1995), no other identity-based struggles are anti-systemic. It is possible to imagine capitalism without racial, national or gender oppressions, but not without class oppression. Therefore, such progressive social movements must be regarded as pro-systemic in the final analysis, a ―slender and wobbly reed‖, with which a radical movement for a socialist world system must be ―at all odds little inclined to collaborate‖.

The communication society movement displays the potentials and challenges of a broad counterhegmonic alliance. This movement was able to mobilise different types of groups and identity- based actors against the encroachment of capitalism into the sphere of communication. Yet, there are lingering doubts as to whether human rights will be a broad enough umbrella to bring the disparate identities under a common vision. Another resistance attempt frequently discussed in the Neo-Gramscian literature, the Zapatista movement, displayed the double-edged nature of broad based counterhegemonic movements. The movement was able to mobilise ethnic (indigenous) groups along with trade unions, workers‘ cooperatives, and social movements. On the other hand, such alliance was also marred by ethnic infighting among peasants (Rupert, 2002, Morton, 2007). Hence, Wagar‘s conclusion captures only one side of the problem.

This dissertation has elaborated the class nature of the genesis and dynamics of the global hegemonic order. It 168

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores concludes that it is possible and imperative to galvanise different identity groups around a core class force. Once the class basis of the vision of the struggle is established, the tactical and strategic choices as to the counterhegemonic alliances should be left to the actors‘ appreciation of the immediate context. Such choices will necessarily depend on the spur of the historical moment in the course of the counterhegemonic engagement.

Contributions to further research and practice

1. The approach adopted in this study, while avoiding the problem of treating Africa as a country, rather than as a continent with multiplicity of social configurations, still retains the possibility to analyse the shared position of African states in the current global capitalist structure. African political-economic issues have customarily been characterised as merely derivative of the world capitalist system. This is succinctly summarised by Van de Walle: African governments are highly dependent on external public finance and cannot afford to disagree vocally with donors and their policy prescriptions. They agree to reform programs to gain access to the external cash needed for crisis management; they may actually implement parts of the reform program, but often remain unconvinced by the intellectual logic behind these programs(2001, p.57).

Applying this theoretical framework to her study of telecommunication reform in Kenya, Kerrets-Makau (2006) concluded that foreign prescriptions, whether structural adjustment programme or telecommunication reform, are accepted by the ruling elites only to gain financial and other resources. These resources are then channelled into the domestic patron-client relationship. The result of this was the second claim, namely: that a co-dependency was created between IFIs and African leaders, in which a ‗culture of approval‘ based on a paper process, was institutionalised... [T]he telecom sector in part does suggest that international negotiation between the Kenyan Government and IFIs provided both entities with the means for self-preservation, but did not accomplish the outward

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goals of either entity. Unfortunately, the losers on the whole are the Kenyan people who continue to suffer at the hands of Kenyan leaders reluctant to introduce reforms. .. It is thus both ironic and tragic that IFIs and African leaders over the years have failed to execute their one true mandate: supporting and assisting African societies in reforms (pp.259-261, Emphasis in the original).

By situating both the international financial institutions and African states within a complex structure composed of material, ideational and institutional elements, this dissertation contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the reciprocity between these actors. Thus, what emerges is a complex tapestry of class alliance as well as competition for power and profit between the international and national actors. This relationship is partly consensual and partly coercive.

Moreover, the hard determinism of the abovementioned approach leaves no room for structural transformation. Thus, by analysing the direction of the counterhegemonic resistance to the prevalent structure, this dissertation also indicates ways of conceptualising possibilities of change.

2. The findings of this dissertation show that Neo- Gramscian studies have still to engage in analysis of local political projects in addition to their focus on hegemonic politics in major international institutions. The analysis of the NEPAD project in this dissertation shows that political practices below the general level of ―World Order‖ are also important in explaining the nature of the global structure.

More importantly, a cautious application of Neo-Gramscian categories of hegemony or passive revolution as ideal types, which approximate the social reality in various degrees, leads to an empirically nuanced conclusion about Africa. Further research in the specific form of elite and popular class

170

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores interaction with the global structure has to start not from an over-determined premise but from closer observation of state- civil society relationship below the regional- institutional level. Passive revolution should not provide a blanket explanation for political changes in Africa. Some national social formations have shown more of a hegemonic politics than others. Dominant social forces in these formations have also been active participants in the construction of a global structure. South Africa, Senegal and Ghana, in a descending order, are examples. The state of play of hegemonic politics in individual African states needs to be further studied.

3. Critical international communication studies that historicise the global information society have developed concepts and strategies for a transformative praxis. The idea of Communication Society and the shift of emphasis from intergovernmental politics to a broader involvement of civil society are the most important contributions in this regard. By synthesising these works with Neo-Gramscian theory, this study contributes to analysis of current and future direction for social movements on issues of communication.

Formation of civil society at a local, national, and regional level has to be rethought in terms of the potential for establishment of a global counterhegemonic resistance. In Africa, where the existential problem is acute, some African scholars call for an alignment of civil society with existing government policy, while others have made a rather negative assessment of the role of civil society altogether. For instance, Allen, after a critical review of the budding literature on the subject concluded: Apart from the grant-seeking NGOs and the academic, it is proponents of the ‗liberal project‘ who need civil society: western governments, their associated agencies, multinationals, and IFIs [International Financial Institutions]. Africanists can dispense with it... (Allen, 1997, p.337). 171

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Instead of such summary execution of civil society, this dissertation argues that research should focus on redefining the concept within a different framework. I have elsewhere indicated a possible route for such research by developing ―models‖ of Gramscian civil society in Africa58.

Current literature based on Neo-Gramscian theory locates transformative civil society in Africa in peasant resistance in the form of withdrawal from the ―national economy‖ and the state structure (Cox, 1999). The research conducted by Cheru (1989) on the history of resistance by peasant communities against the Structural Adjustment Programme is the key contribution to this approach. Cheru‘s finding was that the conscious withdrawal of peasants into their own self-help communities and informal economy has reduced the importance and presence of the state. Hence, communal practices in the form of a deliberate shift from export to subsistence production and illegal use of government owned land for grazing and irrigation are depicted as counterhegemonic resistance appropriate to the regional context.

This formulation of civil society leaves much to be desired. Firstly, it draws a rather stark distinction between the state and peasant communities. In African political systems, kinship, ethnic, and similar ties link the state actors with such communities. Secondly, the social anatomy of these communities has to be problematised. Are they based on equality or hierarchy? Thirdly, the potential for formation

58 The Global-local Nexus of Civil Society Actors in Africa. Paper presented at the 12TH Annual Conference of The Israeli Centre for Third Sector Research, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Dead Sea, Israel, 18th TO 19th March 2009.

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores of a historic bloc between these community actors and other social forces is left unaddressed.

The argument for another model of praxis in which all types of subaltern groups organise around an ideological platform, therefore, focuses on engagement with the state by radical actors, not on withdrawal from it. This, which I called the Bond-Mayekiso model, draws from the experience of South African community based organisations in confronting the neo-liberal policies of the post-Apartheid era. The key strategy of this model is instilling social agency and consciousness into the existing community based organisations in both rural and urban settings. The common issues that bring them together such as the diminution of public provision of health and education could be geared towards a demand for a more development-oriented state and for establishment of non- profit, community based institutions.

This approach to civil society has the additional merit of highlighting the role of ideas in shaping political resistance. It also helps to examine the interface, if any, between grassroots social movements and global counterhegemonic praxis.

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Summary

Until recently, African countries depended on leased satellite links to connect to Internet exchange points in the US. However, satellite connectivity was more expensive than fibre optic technology for high volume traffic. Besides, the charging arrangements for the exchange of traffic between local ISPs and global backbone providers stipulated that the former must pay for both outgoing and incoming traffic. Thus, in order to integrate Africa into the global information economy more effectively, its policy makers had to address two major challenges, namely: construction of transoceanic fibre optic cables and negotiating more favourable charging arrangements.

Some member countries of the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC) initiated a regulatory review of International Charging Arrangements for Internet Services (ICAIS) by the International Telecommunication union. The Halfway Proposition, a policy proposal by the African Internet Service Providers Association (AfrISPA), on the other hand, identified privatisation and liberalisation as the key instruments to address the challenges mentioned above. In a competitive domestic market, private ICT entrepreneurs will find technological solutions to reduce the volume of outgoing traffic, and hence the cost of connectivity for the continent. As to the financial resources required for construction of fibre optic cables, however, it called for donor assistance. The combination of market liberalisation and donor support became the accepted formula in later information society policy and programmes designed by African regional organisations. 207

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The questions pursued in this research are why and how such a policy path was taken and its implications for Africa‘s quest for development. The relevant literature offers two different types of explanation. The first one attributes the problem to imperialist domination and super power politics in international organisations. The other explanation is that adoption of a neo-liberal ICT policy in Africa reflects an enlightened choice. In other words, African ICT policymakers have realised that foreign investment and market mechanisms are effective instruments to achieve economic and social transformation.

This study adopts a Neo-Gramscian theoretical framework to offer an alternative account. According to this framework, political and economic actors operate within a global structure composed of material capabilities (natural resources, technology, equipment, and wealth), ideas and institutions. The capacity of such a structure to enable or constrain social and political agency depends on the fit between these components. Ideas, in particular, play a significant role in cementing the political and economic components of the global structure. They are crucial for emergence of a hegemonic global structure in which the leaders are able to rule by persuasion, rather than mere coercion. Hence, the concept of hegemony emphasises the active role of organic intellectuals in providing moral and intellectual leadership to stabilise a given world order.

Accordingly, chapters two, three, and four elaborate the material, ideational and institutional components of the prevailing global information order that are relevant 208

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores to the subject matter of this research. Chapter Two highlights the patterns of production and distribution of Internet connectivity. In the Internet connectivity industry, competitors aim at controlling as many Internet addresses as possible within their network. A series of mergers and takeovers in the backbone industry have resulted in very few conglomerates controlling key nodes in the global network. Smaller Internet service providers cannot afford to bypass these nodes if they desire to remain on the global network. Besides, public regulatory bodies in the developed countries have refrained from regulating the industry.

Chapter three traces the major ideas shaping the trajectory of the global information order, namely: information society and communication society. Some academic scholars such as Daniel Bell, Fritz Machlup and Marc Porat championed an optimistic idea of information society in which ICTs are the instruments of social and cultural progress. Nevertheless, regional and global organisations have defined information society in terms of foreign investment and free trade in ICT goods and services. To counteract this prevalent view, some civil society activists and critical scholars have outlined an alternative idea, Communication society. Communication society centres on the right to education, cultural expression, and equitable distribution of technological resources, knowledge and skills.

Chapter four examines the function of international organisations as sites of political engagement between social forces and ideas vying for hegemony. In particular, it explicates the role of ITU and the WSIS in

209

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Chapters five and six analyse the reciprocal relationship between the global structure outlined above and African political and economic agency. Since the 1980s, privatisation and liberalisation have become the conditio sine qua non of the global economy. In Africa, however, the state classes resisted this change. The proposal to construct fibre optic cables to connect Africa to the rest of the world came amid a clash between social forces allied and opposed to the new global structure. The new ICT entrepreneurs, private mobile providers and some civil society actors aimed at dismantling the monopoly grip of incumbent telcos over essential facilities. Political players with a stake in the status quo, on the other hand, sought to control fibre optic cables and landing stations ―in order to implement development programmes and strategies‖. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) provided the platform for the lobbying efforts of both camps.

The major finding of this research is that African business and political elites were co-actors in shaping a hegemonic global information society order. NGOs, ISPs, and emerging telecommunication providers have advocated an open access model at regional and international forums. This model prescribes that incumbent telcos should provide only wholesale bandwidth to private ISPs while the latter take charge of the whole gamut of ICT service provision to end users . This arrangement would certainly change the configuration of actors in the telecommunication sector in Africa. 210

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However, a highly differentiated level of agency was visible among various African actors in this political exercise. The first impetus to shape the modalities of rolling out regional fibre optic cables came from Internet service providers in Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria through the continental ISP association. South African political and corporate elites later provided active support to this motion.

South African and Egyptian corporations have a strong presence in many African countries. Egyptian private telco, Orascom, has, for instance, operations and subsidiaries in many other African countries. These corporations are also well- represented by their state bureaucrats in the process of designing the NEPAD policy programmes. South Africa, Senegal and Nigeria have a preponderance of elites that are part of an emerging transnational bloc comprised of executives and affiliates of global corporations, consumerist elites, state bureaucrats as well as politicians and professionals. More importantly, within their specific national context, these social forces have the capability to provide some form of intellectual leadership, or a hegemonic project.

Leaders of countries like Ethiopia and Algeria, who have been the spokespersons of NEPAD to the outside world, stand on the other end of the spectrum. In Algeria, telecommunication reform was carried out in disregard of opposition by labour unions and political parties. In Ethiopia, such reforms are largely a result of the push by donors to kick-start the country‘s accession to the WTO Agreement. These are, indeed, good examples of passive revolution by which a new form of 211

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores capitalist accumulation is introduced into a political system without altering the existing social divisions based on tradition, ethnicity, or class.

The major conclusions of the study are the following. The ICAIS dispute between small ISPs and global conglomerates was a result of capitalist rivalry for resources and markets. Characterisation of this dispute as a North-South confrontation conceals the interests and commitment to market based notions of information society shared between the actors on both sides of the dispute.

Global Internet Backbone Providers have derived their class power from their ownership of means of production, namely: physical and logical infrastructure. The notion of Information Society, at least as propagated by international and African organisations and policy think tanks, presents this class power as a mere contractual relationship between ISPs. In such a relationship, ability to pay is the criterion for access to the resources controlled by global corporations. The efficacy of hegemony is such that this ―common sense‖ guides ICT policies and practice. Consequently, alternative political and economic initiatives based on other ideas and principles are constrained by this prevalent structure.

The Communication Society vision that espouses human rights values has shown its potency as a rallying point for a counterhegemonic resistance against the information society notion. On the other hand, there are also doubts as to its possibility to transcend gender, identity, third-wordlist, post-colonial etc axes of 212

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores counterhegemonic engagement. Thus, the possibility of construction of a counterhegemonic order depends on the ability of a core class force to galvanise these disparate civil society actors under a common vision.

This study underlines that internal articulation of hegemony by the ruling elites in Africa through the neo- liberal development paradigm of NEPAD is unlikely to succeed. As the record of NEPAD itself indicates, these elites have not managed to provide legitimate intellectual leadership. In fact, NEPAD faced strong opposition from civil society actors in Africa. It is generally recognised as a sequel of the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s that resulted in social and economic crisis in the continent. Secondly, these elites do not have the necessary material resources to provide concessions to social forces that oppose their hegemonic project. Even the implementation of NEPAD‘s plans to construct regional fibre optic cables for Eastern Africa or to introduce e-school initiatives is dependent on the willingness of foreign ―partners‖ to provide the required financial means.

The contributions of this study to the existing research on African integration into the global economy are threefold. Firstly, it charts out a research approach that broadens the unit of analysis by combining global and local as well as political and economic processes. Secondly, in addition to explaining the provenance of the current global structure, it indicates the possibilities and limits for its transformation. Thirdly, it redirects the quest for civil society in Africa to an inquiry into social agency and consciousness among existing community based organisations in both rural and urban settings. 213

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

Therefore, civil society in Africa is about the transformation of issue-based political engagement by such local actors into a broader vision and discourse for development-oriented state and for establishment of non- profit, community based institutions. This approach also outlines the potential for a counterhegemonic alliance between grassroots social movements and global civil society actors.

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Samenvatting

Kabels van overzee aan Afrika’s kusten: een neo-Gramsciaans onderzoek

Afrikaanse landen waren tot voor kort afhankelijk van geleasede satellietverbindingen die contact maakten met Amerikaanse Internet exchange points. Er deden zich twee moeilijkheden voor. Ten eerste waren voor omvangrijk verkeer satellietverbindingen duurder dan glasvezeltechnologie. Ten tweede waren de verrekeningsarrangementen voor gegevensverkeer tussen Afrikaanse ISPs en de bedrijven die toegang bieden tot de centrale netwerk infrastructuur (the global backbone) zodanig dat eerst genoemden moesten betalen voor zowel uitgaand en inkomend verkeer. Om Afrika te kunnen verbinden met het globale netwerk, stonden Afrikaanse beleidsmakers daarom voor twee uitdagingen, namelijk het aanleggen van overzeese glasvezelkabels en het uitonderhandelen van betere voorwaarden voor de afrekening van het gegevensverkeer.

Terwijl lidstaten van de Asia-Pacific Economic Community de lange weg van juridische procedures insloegen om een herziening van de International Charging Arrangements for Internet Services (ICAIS) te bewerkstelligen, werd in de zogenoemde Halfway Proposition – het ‗tussenvoorstel‘ dat door de African Internet Service Providers Association (AfrISPA) werd voorbereid – een andere benadering voor Afrika gekozen. Het ‗tussenvoorstel‘ concentreerde zich op een ander samenstel van economische en technologische maatregelen om de uitdagingen te benaderen. Het benadrukte dat

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores privatisering en liberalisering moesten worden doorgevoerd om de opkomst van Afrikaanse private ICT ondernemers te stimuleren. Ook werd voorgesteld dat deze ondernemers technologische oplossingen zouden toepassen om de omvang van het uitgaande verkeer te beperken, en daarmee de kosten van internationale connectiviteit voor Afrika. Voor de voor de aanleg van glasvezelkabels benodigde financiële middelen deed het tussenvoorstel een oproep tot donorhulp. Deze technische en economische maatregelen werden later opgenomen in het informatiemaatschappij beleid en programma‘s van Afrikaanse organisaties als United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) en de New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).

In de voorliggende studie wordt de vraag gesteld waarom en hoe dit beleidspad gekozen werd, en wat daarvan de implicaties zijn voor Afrika‘s zoektocht naar ontwikkeling. De relevante literatuur biedt hiervoor twee verschillende verklaringen. De eerste schrijft dergelijke beleidskeuzes toe aan de imperialistische overheersing en grootmachtspolitiek binnen internationale organisaties. De andere verklaring suggereert dat het aannemen van een neo-liberale benadering in ICT beleid in Afrika gevolg is van een rationele keuze. Met andere woorden, Afrikaanse ICT beleidsmakers hebben zich gerealiseerd dat buitenlandse investeringen en marktmechanismen effectieve instrumenten van economische en sociale verandering zijn.

Dit onderzoek neemt een neo-Gramsciaans theoretisch kader tot uitgangspunt voor een alternatieve verklaring. In dit kader opereren Afrikaanse politieke en economische actoren binnen een structuur van globalisering, een structuur waarvan samenstellende delen bestaan uit 216

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores materiële capaciteit (natuurlijke hulpbronnen, technologie, gereedschappen en welvaart), ideeën en instituties. Of deze structuur het handelingsvermogen (agency) van deze actoren faciliteert of beperkt hangt af van de aansluiting (fit) tussen deze samenstellende delen. Vooral ideeën spelen een belangrijke rol in het samenbinden van politieke en economische componenten van de globale structuur. In een dergelijke hegemoniale globale structuur zijn leiders in staat om te regeren door overreding eerder dan door pure dwang. Aldus benadrukt het concept van hegemonie de actieve rol van ‗organieke‘ intellectuelen bij het stabiliseren van een gegeven wereldorde.

Hoofdstukken twee, drie en vier staan nader stil bij de specifieke materiële, ideationele en institutionele componenten van de dominante globale informatieorde die relevant zijn voor het onderhavige onderzoeksonderwerp.

De productie- en distributiepatronen van internet connectiviteit staan centraal in hoofdstuk twee. De concurrentie in de internet connectiviteitsindustrie wordt gekenmerkt door het verwerven van controle over een zo groot mogelijk aantal internet adressen binnen een bepaald corporate network. De veelvuldige fusies en overnames de afgelopen decennia in de bedrijvigheid op gebied van de centrale netwerk-infrastructuur (backbone industry), hebben geresulteerd in een zeer beperkt aantal conglomeraten die controle hebben over de sleutelknooppunten binnen het globale netwerk. Kleine internet service providers (ISP‘s) kunnen het zich niet veroorloven om buiten deze knooppunten heen te werken als ze toegang tot het globale net willen behouden. Regeringen in ontwikkelingslanden hebben daarnaast 217

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores nagelaten om bedrijfsstrategieën en de verrekeningsarrangementen van de transnationale bedrijven aan regels te onderwerpen.

In hoofdstuk drie worden de belangrijkste ideeën besproken die het ontwikkelingspad van de globale informatieorde vorm gaven, namelijk dat van de ‗informatiemaatschappij‘ en van de ‗communicatiemaatschappij‘. Een aantal academici zoals Daniel Bell, Fritz Machlup en Marc Porat omarmden de optimistische idee van de ‗informatiemaatschappij‘ waarbij zij innovatie en het gebruik van ICT zagen als de voorboden van een nieuw tijdperk van maatschappelijke en culturele vooruitgang. In de beleidsdocumenten van zulke instellingen als de G8, Wereldbank en de Internationale Telecommunicatie Unie, werd deze optimistische visie omgezet in een informatie maatschappij die in de sleutel staat van buitenlandse investeringen en vrijhandel in ICT goederen en diensten. Een aantal activisten van maatschappelijke bewegingen, civil society, en kritische wetenschappers hebben daarentegen de idee naar voren gebracht van de ‗communicatiemaatschappij‘ als alternatieve structuur die gebaseerd is op eerbiediging van het recht op onderwijs, culturele uitingen, en een eerlijke verdeling van technologische hulpbronnen, kennis en kunde.

In hoofdstuk vier wordt de functie onderzocht van internationale organisaties als plaatsen van politieke engagement en confrontatie tussen de zojuist geschetste maatschappelijke krachten en ideeën die streven naar hegemonie. In het bijzonder wordt de rol van de ITU en WSIS bij het samenbrengen van de materiële en ideationele

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores krachten in het transnationale kapitalistische krachtenveld onder de aandacht gebracht.

De hoofdstukken vijf en zes analyseren de wederzijdse verhoudingen tussen de hierboven aangeduide globale structuur en het Afrikaanse politieke en economische handelingsvermogen. Sinds de jaren ‘80, is privatisering en liberalisering de conditio sine qua non van de globale economie. In Afrika veroorzaakte dit een conflict tussen de staatsklassen en de opkomende ICT entrepreneurs. De aanleg van glasvezelkabels om de ‗digitale kloof‘ tussen Afrika en de rest van de wereld te overbruggen, was een van de tonelen waarop dit conflict zich afspeelde. De nieuwe ICT entrepreneurs, de aanbieders van private mobiele telefonie en actoren van maatschappelijke bewegingen waren erop gebrand de monopolistische greep van de dominante telecombedrijven op essentiële faciliteiten te ontmantelen. Daartegenover insisteerden de politieke spelers met gevestigde belangen bij de status quo erop dat glasvezelkabels en landingstations onder de controle dienden te blijven van de Afrikaanse regeringen om hun beleidsprogramma‘s en nationale ontwikkelingsstrategieën ten uitvoer te kunnen brengen. Beide groepen spelers presenteerden met kracht hun agenda‘s bij de United Nations Economic Commission for Africa en de New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).

De belangrijkste bevinding in deze studie is dat Afrikaanse ondernemingen en politieke spelers samenwerkten bij het vormgeven van een globale hegemoniale informatiemaatschappij. Het open access model was het centrale beleidsinstrument dat door locale en globale NGO‘s, ISPs en opkomende telecom-providers werd 219

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores gebruikt om op beslissende wijze de doeleinden en modaliteiten vorm te geven van het verbinden van Afrika met de globale informatie snelweg via overzeese glasvezelkabels. Dit model schrijft voor dat de verantwoordelijke telecombedrijven zich moeten beperken tot het verschaffen van een grootschalige bandbreedte aan private ISPs, terwijl deze zich zouden moeten belasten met het de kernactiviteit van ICT dienstverlening aan eindgebruikers. Kortom, het open access model was uiteindelijk een strategie om de maatschappelijke machtsconfiguratie, of in Gramsciaanse terminologie het ‗historisch blok‘, in de verschillende Afrikaanse nationale politieke ordes te veranderen.

Dit onderzoek komt echter ook tot de bevinding dat er een hoge mate van differentiatie zichtbaar was in het niveau van handelingscapaciteit (agency) tussen de verschillende Afrikaanse actoren in deze politieke kwestie.

Het eerste initiatief om de modaliteiten van het uitrollen van glasvezelkabels te bepalen kwam van verschaffers van internetdiensten uit Kenya, Ghana en Nigeria, door middel van de African Internet Service Providers Association (AISP). Aan dit initiatief werd later actieve steun verleend door de Zuid-Afrikaanse zaken- en bedrijfselite.

Zuid-Afrikaanse en Egyptische ondernemingen hebben een sterke presentie in veel Afrikaanse landen. MSI en Orascom, achtereenvolgens een private Soedanese en Egyptische telecom-ondernemingen, hadden in 2000 meer dan 14 vergunningen in andere Afrikaanse landen. Deze 220

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores ondernemingen werden ook goed vertegenwoordigd door hun statelijke bureaucraten bij het tot stand brengen van een neo-liberaal ‗ICT voor ontwikkeling‘ blauwdruk via het NEPAD netwerk. Zuid-Afrika, Senegal en Nigeria hebben een vrij gewichtige presentie van hun elites die deel uitmaken van een zich ontwikkelend transnationaal blok dat bestaat uit de business executives en dochtermaatschappijen van op globale schaal opererende bedrijven, consumentistische elites, overheidsbureaucraten, politici en professionals. Belangrijker, binnen hun specifieke nationale context hebben deze maatschappelijke krachten het vermogen een eensluidend politieke en economische doeleinden te propageren, met andere woorden een hegemoniaal project.

De leiders van landen als Ethiopië en Algerije, die de woordvoerders waren van NEPAD tegenover de buitenwereld, staan aan het ander einde van het spectrum. Hun binnenlandse politiek wordt gedomineerd door een ‗tirannie van neven‘, waarin politiek gelijk staat aan gewapende strijd of stedelijke relletjes. In Algerije werd de telecomhervorming uitgevoerd met volstrekt voorbijgaan aan vakbonden en politieke partijen. In Ethiopië werd een hervorming van de telecomsector tegengehouden tot de recente druk van internationale organisaties om de toetreding van het land tot de WTO krachtig aan te zwengelen. Dit zijn zeker goede voorbeelden van een passieve revolutie waarbij een nieuwe vorm van kapitalistische accumulatie werd ingevoerd zonder dat bestaande scheidslijnen, ongeacht of die nu van traditionele, etnische of klasse aard zijn, werden gewijzigd.

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De belangrijkste bevindingen in deze studie zijn de volgende. Het ICAIS geschil dat door kleine ISPS in de Aziatisch-Pacifische regio werd geïnitieerd om hun bargaining power tegenover globaal opererende telecom conglomeraties te versterken, moet worden begrepen als een kapitalistische rivaliteit over toegang tot hulpbronnen en markten. De karakterisering van dit geschil als een conflict tussen ontwikkelde en ontwikkelingsland verbergt de belangen en verpanding aan marktgerelateerde noties van de ‗informatiemaatschappij‘ die door beide partijen bij het dispuut worden gedeeld.

De globale Internet Backbone Providers ontlenen hun klassemacht aan de eigendom van de productiemiddelen, namelijk de fysieke en logische infrastructuur. De notie van ‗informatiemaatschappij‘, althans zoals die gepropageerd wordt door internationale en Afrikaanse organisaties en beleidsfora, doet het voorkomen alsof deze klassemacht pure contractuele relaties tussen ISPs zijn, en maakt betalingsbereidheid het criterium om toegang te verkrijgen tot de bronnen die door globaal opererende bedrijven worden gecontroleerd. De bereidheid te betalen is het criterium voor toegang tot de bronnen die deze globaal opererende bedrijven onder hun controle hebben. De effectiviteit van de hegemonie is zodanig dat het huidige denken in Afrika en andere ontwikkelingslanden deze notie omarmd heeft als de vanzelfsprekende, common sense manier om Afrika‘s voortdurende zoektocht naar sociale, culturele en economische ontwikkeling te benaderen.

Het gezichtspunt van een communicatiemaatschappij die gebaseerd is op de waarden van mensenrechten blijft 222

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores het momenteel beschikbare verzamelpunt voor contra- hegemoniaal verzet tegen de heersende globale orde. Het succes van dit verzet hangt af van een bewuste contra- hegemoniale praxis die de versnipperde krachten van de civil society die zich baseren op kwesties van gender, identiteit, milieu en dergelijke, weet te bundelen. In dit onderzoek wordt gesuggereerd dat , net zoals de heersende orde van de informatie maatschappij wordt geschraagd door een transnationaal kapitalistisch blok, een dergelijke contra-hegemoniaal blok een daar tegenover staande klassemacht moet zijn.

Meer in het bijzonder met betrekking tot de articulatie van hegemonie van de regerende elites door middel van het neo-liberale ontwikkelingsparadigma van NEPAD, wordt geconcludeerd dat deze benadering gedoemd is te mislukken, en wel om twee redenen. De record van NEPAD geeft aan dat deze elites er niet in geslaagd zijn een geloofwaardig en effectief intellectueel leiderschap voor te brengen. Integendeel, NEPAD stuit op grote weerstand bij de civil society actoren in Afrika. In het algemeen wordt dit gezien als een gevolg van de structurele aanpassingsprogramma‘s van de jaren ‘80, die grote sociale en economische crises veroorzaakten op het continent.

Op de tweede plaats beschikken de regerende elites niet over de noodzakelijke materiële hulpbronnen om concessies te doen aan maatschappelijke krachten die tegenstander zijn hun hegemoniaal project. Zelfs de implementatie van NEPAD‘s belangrijkste activiteiten zoals de aanleg van een regionaal glasvezelkabelnetwerk voor Oost-Afrika of de invoering van e-school initiatieven zijn afhankelijk van de bereidheid van 223

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores buitenlandse ‗partners‘ om de benodigde financiën te verschaffen.

Dit onderzoek levert drie bijdragen aan het bestaande onderzoek over de Afrikaanse integratie in de globale economie. Ten eerste verbreedt deze studie het onderzoeksobject door zowel de locale als globale politieke en economische processen met elkaar te combineren. Ten tweede verschaft het niet alleen een kritiek van de huidige globale en Afrikaanse politieke ordes, maar wordt ook aangegeven wat de mogelijkheden en grenzen zijn voor hun verandering. Ten derde introduceert het, op basis van neo-Gramsciaanse theorie, een specifiek concept van civil society in Afrika op locaal en regionaal niveau. De quest for civil society in Afrika wordt aldus verschoven in de richting van het kweken van maatschappelijk handeilngsvermogen (agenycy) en bewustzijn onder bestaande gemeenschapsorganisaties in zowel rurale als stedelijke contexten. Het politieke engagement van zulke actoren met kwesties als de afname van openbare gezondheids- en onderwijsdiensten kunnen worden geherformuleerd tot een bredere visie en een breder discours voor een ontwikkelingsgerichte staten en voor het vestigen van op de gemeenschap gebaseerde instellingen zonder winstoogmerk. Deze benadering schetst ook het potentieel voor een contra-hegemoniale bondgenootschap tussen sociale basisbewegingen en globale civil society actoren.

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