Political Reviews

The Region in Review: International Issues and Events, 2017 nic maclellan

Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2017 volker boege, mathias chauchat, alumita durutalo, joseph daniel foukona, budi hernawan, michael leach, james stiefvater

461 The Region in Review: International Issues and Events, 2017

It was the best of times, it was the change, security, and fisheries, the worst of times. theme echoed the vision of the late Epeli Hau‘ofa by lauding the inter In 2017, Pacific collective diplomacy connections of the liquid continent reached new heights, with Island (Waddell, Naidu, and Hau‘ofa 1993). nations campaigning on the oceans, At the Forum’s opening ceremony climate change, and nuclear disar- in Apia, host Prime Minister Tui- mament through the Pacific Small laepa Sailele Malielegaoi said: “The Island Developing States (psids). Fiji Blue Pacific provides a new narrative completed its presidency of the UN for Pacific regionalism and how the General Assembly, cohosted the first Forum engages with the world. It global conference on the oceans, and will require a different way of work- took up the presidency of cop23— ing together that prioritizes The Blue the 23rd Conference of the Parties of Pacific as the core driver of Forum the UN Framework Convention on policymaking and collective action” Climate Change. (Tuilaepa 2017a). At the same time, the US adminis- Throughout 2017, Pacific gov- tration under President Donald Trump ernments promoted the Blue Pacific announced—often through tweets— agenda on the international stage. policies on climate change, nuclear Holding the presidency of the United weapons, and maritime law that Nations General Assembly (unga) rolled back the achievements of years in 2016–2017—an unprecedented of patient international diplomacy. achievement for an Island nation— With uncertainty over the post-2020 Fiji’s Ambassador Peter Thomson relationship with the European Union, used his position to raise interna- growing Chinese power, and adverse tional awareness of regional concerns. climate policies from Canberra, it was Completing his ambassadorship in a difficult year for Pacific regionalism. September, Thomson was appointed As the Pacific Community (spc) as the first UN special envoy for marked its 70th anniversary, key the ocean by UN Secretary-General regional initiatives—from ramsi to António Guterres. pacer-Plus negotiations—came to an Action around the oceans was a end. At the same time, regional orga- central regional priority. Secretary- nizations struggled with their attitude General of the Pacific Islands Forum toward independence for the remain- Dame Meg Taylor, who also serves as ing Pacific territories. Pacific Oceans commissioner, noted: The central theme of the Septem- “A healthy Pacific Ocean means a ber 2017 Forum leaders’ meeting prosperous Pacific people. The ocean was “The Blue Pacific—Our Sea of is integral to our cultures, well-being Islands.” Drawing together regional and economic growth” (Fiji Sun priorities on the oceans, climate 2017).

462 political reviews • region in review 463

In 2015, as the United Nations United States and France. The 2016 adopted seventeen new Sustainable decision to include French Polynesia Development Goals (sdgs), Pacific and New Caledonia as full members governments successfully pushed for of the Forum has raised difficult a specific goal on the oceans and seas. issues for agencies in the Council of sdg14 pledges action to “conserve Regional Organizations of the Pacific and sustainably use the oceans, seas (crop), in some of which France is and marine resources for sustainable not a member. Some fisheries officials development” (UN 2017a). have raised concern that confidential To implement sdg14, Fiji and positions on the management and Sweden cohosted the high-level UN conservation of tuna have been com- Conference on the Oceans and Seas in promised with the effective inclusion New York in June 2017. This confer- of France—through its Pacific collec- ence issued a call for action, highlight- tivities—as an ffa member (Maclellan ing action on ocean acidification, 2018). plastics, and overfishing. By the end Transform Aqorau, the former chief of the conference, 1,328 voluntary executive officer of the Parties to the commitments had been registered by Nauru Agreement (pna), expressed governments, UN bodies, nongovern- concern over France’s new influence: ment organizations, private corpo- “I know that the ffa membership rations, and others, far exceeding is deeply concerned about the impli- expectations. Pacific governments now cations of sharing the same room hope to update the UN Convention on with France in Pacific Island tuna the Law of the Sea (unclos) through discussions, and this issue was dis- talks on a new agreement on conserva- cussed at great lengths at the recent tion and sustainable use of biological Pacific Fisheries Ministers’ meeting diversity in areas beyond national in the Gold Coast. . . . there is now a jurisdictions. perception that the ffa’s position has The Oceans Conference also pro- been compromised” (Pareti 2017). vided a platform to draw attention pna held their annual officials to Pacific fisheries policy. Director meeting in April in Majuro and a min- General of the Forum Fisheries Agency isterial meeting in July in Queensland. (ffa) James Movick noted: “More pna chief executive officer Ludwig than any other UN Conference, this Kumoru said that the organization’s is one event where the Pacific nations priority remains adding value to are coming to demonstrate their global fisheries and increasing revenues for leadership of the issue on the table. Island nations. Revenue to the Islands They are coming to talk Oceans, and from the purse seine skipjack fish- the Pacific lessons and achievements ery has increased from nearly us$60 when it comes to sustainable tuna fish- million in 2010 to us$400 million in eries management” (Fiji Sun 2017). 2016 (ffa 2017a). Despite these eco- But this cooperation is compli- nomic benefits, fish stocks are under cated by the influence of Distant pressure as dwfn expand their opera- Water Fishing Nations (dwfn) and tions, although the latest report card colonial powers in the region like the on fisheries assessed that the bigeye 464 the contemporary pacific • 30:2 (2018) tuna stock is not overfished, as previ- out the world” (Bainimarama 2017). ously reported (ffa 2017b, 2). Tuvalu’s Enele Sopoaga also noted: Throughout 2017, despite head- “It is simple arrogance, meaning at winds blowing from Washington and the end of the day, it’s the money Canberra, Pacific Island nations sailed issue that is driving climate change” ahead to address the adverse effects of (Qounadovu 2017). climate change. Throughout the year, Island states Announcing an a$6 million (us$4.7 coordinated their efforts in the lead-up million) grant and key staff to the sec- to the annual global climate negotia- retariat in Suva that managed preparations. With Prime Minister Bainima- tions for cop23, Australian Senator rama absent from the Forum leaders’ Concetta Fierravanti-Wells said: “We meeting in September, Fiji’s Ambas- are at the coal face here in the Pacific sador Amena Yauvoli hosted a sidebar of dealing with issues consequent to event to discuss regional priorities for climate events” (Pacific Beat 2017). It cop23. The Pacific Climate Change was an unfortunate choice of words, Roundtable, held on 4–5 October, since many Pacific Islanders are hop- announced a center of excellence for ing that Australia will step away from Pacific climate action in Apia, at the the coal face! Secretariat of the Pacific Regional As Australian Ambassador for Environment Programme (sprep) Climate Change Patrick Suckling campus. The Pacific Climate Change visited Suva in February for bilateral Centre will serve as the Pacific Meteo- talks with the Bainimarama govern- rological Council’s primary train- ment, the Pacific Islands Climate ing and partnership provider for the Action Network (pican) issued an region. The 2017 Pre-cop Ministerial open letter challenging Australia’s Dialogue was then held in Nadi on plans for new coal mines and exports 17–18 October. (pican 2017). In May, President Hilda The culmination of all this prepara- Heine of the Republic of the Marshall tion came in November, as Fiji pre- Islands (RMI) was openly critical of sided over cop23 in Bonn, Germany— Australian climate policy in a speech the first time a Pacific Island nation in Canberra: “Now is not the time had played that role. to be debating the science, trashing Despite raising the profile of Fiji solar power, or building new coal and the Pacific, cop23 saw major set- mines. . . . I can assure you it does backs for some key regional priorities. influence the way Australia is viewed Analysts noted that “the final decision in the Pacific” (Heine 2017). on Loss and Damage is hopelessly In June, Fiji, Marshall Islands, weak” and the outcome of the climate Tuvalu, and other nations also criti- finance negotiations “were predictably cized President Trump’s decision to unremarkable” (Schalatek, Fuhr, and pull out of the Paris Agreement on Lehr 2017). Over the next year, Fiji Climate Change. Fiji Prime Minister will continue in the cop presidency, Voreqe Bainimarama called the deci- opening the way for a 2018 “Talanoa sion “deeply disappointing for the Dialogue” to feed into the 2019 cop, citizens of vulnerable nations through- “which will hopefully build enhanced political reviews • region in review 465 trust to increase ambition for both pillar of the Obama administration’s mitigation and support in the post- containment policy—the Trans-Pacific 2020 period” (Schalatek, Fuhr, and Partnership Agreement. Threatening Lehr 2017). “fire and fury” against the people of In Bonn, there was also frank dis- Korea, Trump sought support from cussion about keeping coal and other Pacific allies to pressure the Kim fossil fuels in the ground in order to Jong-un regime on nuclear prolifera- reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A tion. But a year after taking office, the new alliance of twenty nations com- Trump administration had not even mitted to moving away from burn- nominated US ambassadors to South ing coal. This “Powering Past Coal Korea or Australia, key regional allies Alliance” included Fiji, France, the in the quest to contain Kim. The US Marshall Islands, Niue, and New Zea- delegation to the 48th Pacific Islands land—but not Australia—as founding Forum was led by Susan Thornton, members (Morgan 2017). acting assistant secretary for East Asia Former President of Kiribati Anote and the Pacific. However, Thornton Tong and François Martel of the was only nominated to the US Sen- Pacific Islands Development Forum ate five days before Christmas 2017, (pidf) both signed the Lofoten delaying confirmation for this key Declaration, a high-level call to con- posting covering Asia-Pacific hotspots. strain oil, gas, and coal production. Pacific regional governance was Tong noted: “Fossil fuels will destroy also affected by the outcomes of our home. Two degrees will destroy national elections and no-confidence our home” (Feagaimaali‘i-Luamanu motions. A number of politicians 2017). Speaking in Bonn, he added: returned to office in 2017, including “If you’re going to open another coal Papua New Guinea’s Peter O’Neill, mine then you are not transitioning Tonga’s ‘Akilisi Pōhiva, Niue’s Toke [to renewables], you are lying to us” Talagi, and New Caledonia’s Philippe (sbs 2017). Germain. There were also new faces in For all of these items on the Blue leadership. In New Zealand, Labour’s Pacific agenda—oceans, fisheries, new Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern climate change, and maritime secu- replaced National Party leadership rity—the influence and appetites of under John Key and Bill English powerful partners complicated the (Ardern will become the first Forum agenda for Pacific Island governments. leader to give birth while in office, As in recent years, 2017 was marked after announcing an unexpected by jostling between international pregnancy). In Solomon Islands, players, many of whom import their former Reserve Bank Governor Rick own disputes into Pacific regional Houenipwela won power in a Novem- organizations. ber no-confidence motion, replacing This problem has particularly been Manasseh Sogavare. exacerbated by the incoherence of In 2016–2017, the regional agen- policy coming out of Washington. The cies reviewed the crop Charter. First Trump administration seeks to con- created in 2012, this charter guides tain China but abandoned a central regional institutional coordination and 466 the contemporary pacific • 30:2 (2018) collaboration in an attempt to limit Other regional agencies suffered long-running turf wars between crop internal challenges. The pidf faced members. funding problems as Fiji diverted The Forum Secretariat also under- resources to its international dip- took internal reviews, including an lomatic initiatives. The Melanesian analysis of governance and financing, Spearhead Group (msg) resolved an a review of Forum meetings, and an internal staffing dispute, after the overview “State of Pacific Regional- Vanuatu Supreme Court cleared msg ism Report 2017.” With Australia Director General Amena Yauvoli of and New Zealand providing the bulk any wrongdoing over the dispute (msg of the secretariat’s core funding, 2017). Yauvoli later faced further the task of developing a new fund- whispers as he took up a key role in ing strategy—with the independence cop23 preparations on behalf of Fiji, that implies—becomes all the more leading to lengthy absences from the important. Forum Secretary-General msg Secretariat in Port Vila. Taylor noted: “We’ve completed a At a time of changing patterns strategic framework for the Secretariat of Official Development Assistance and are very conscious that our first (oda) and climate finance, donor priority has to be people-centered funding remains a core concern. The development. We need to ensure that Organisation for Economic Co- there is not just physical security, but operation and Development (oecd) also food security and environmental officially determined that the Cook security for people in our region” Islands will graduate to developed (Maclellan 2017e). country status in late 2018, remov- Taylor also serves as chair of the ing it from the oecd Development crop, which met in Honiara in Febru- Advisory Committee list of countries ary and reaffirmed the Framework eligible for oda (oecd 2017). Other for Pacific Regionalism (fpr) as a countries also face graduation to key mechanism for policy develop- high-income status in coming years, ment. In late 2017, the Forum Secre- including Palau, Niue, Nauru, Wallis tariat reopened the process for public and Futuna, the Marshall Islands, Fiji, submissions to determine new fpr and Tonga, all of which are listed on priorities. the oecd list of upper middle income The Pacific Community (spc) Com- oda recipients. mittee of Representatives of Govern- The Trump administration also ments and Administrations met in July refused to provide a further us$2 in Nouméa, marking seventy years billion that was pledged to the Green since the regional technical agency was Climate Fund (gcf) by former US created as the South Pacific Com- President Barack Obama, even as mission. To highlight the 70th anni- Pacific leaders were already decrying versary, spc celebrated the life and the bureaucracy that limits access to achievements of seventy astounding the gcf and other funding mecha- Pacific women in the lead-up to the nisms. In frustration, Kiribati Presi- 13th Triennial Conference of Pacific dent Taneti Maamau told the unga: Women in October. “Access to climate financing, like the political reviews • region in review 467

Green Climate Fund, takes too long to damaged by policies that adversely process and disburse. We simply can- affect neighboring islands: the ongo- not afford to wait any longer. . . . With ing commitment to expanded coal the approval of Parliament, my Gov- exports at a time when Pacific government is leveraging our sovereign ernments are seeking reduced use of wealth fund as collateral for conces- fossil fuels; the expensive and unre- sional debt financing. This is a move solved warehousing of asylum seekers beyond tradition but we would rather and refugees on Manus and Nauru; take the initiative to drive our own cutbacks to Radio Australia, including aspirations and deliver to our people the January 2017 closure of shortwave than to wait on financial assistance broadcasting to isolated rural com- that may come at a moment far too munities; the abolition of AusAID as late” (Maamau 2017). an independent statutory organization; US climate vandalism has opened and the gutting of the overseas aid the way for France to step up as a program, slashed to the lowest ratio of champion of climate action in the gross national income ever recorded. Pacific. Sebastian Lecornu, secretary Strategic studies academic Joanne of state to the minister for the eco- Wallis stated that Australia’s “prepon- logical and inclusive transition in the derant material power does not neces- Emmanuel Macron administration, sarily translate into effective levers led the French delegation to the 2017 of influence, that is, effective tools of Forum leaders’ meeting. coercion, inducement or persuasion” Lecornu stressed the significance over Forum Island countries (2017, 5). of improved relations between France She argued that Australia’s “role as an and Forum member countries and alliance partner and local franchisee encouraged participation in President of the Western brand” limits its influ- Macron’s “One Planet” global climate ence, at a time of diplomatic activism summit, held in Paris in December: by Pacific states and growing activity “If the door to the Forum is open, it’s by China, Indonesia, and India (Wallis because the policies taken up by the 2017, 255). President of the Republic Emmanuel In response to this paradox of Macron, the head of State, have extensive power but declining influ- created a longing for France. This is ence, 2017 witnessed a renewed verbal because there are a number of large assertiveness from Canberra, criticiz- nations which address the issue of ing Chinese influence in domestic and climate change and global warming, regional politics. This was amplified but without as much enthusiasm, as as Prime Minister Malcolm Turn- much energy and maybe even courage bull extended collaboration with the as France” (Lecornu 2017). Trump administration over maritime Australia remains the largest aid, disputes in the South China Sea and trade, and military power in the North Korean nuclear proliferation. South Pacific, providing nearly a$1 Australia also promoted increased billion (us$780.4 million) in oda to quadrilateral coordination with the the Islands each year. But in recent United States, Japan, and India to times, the country’s standing has been contain China, even though Canberra 468 the contemporary pacific • 30:2 (2018) denies this is the objective of its 2001 Pacific Agreement on Closer strategic partnerships. Economic Relations [pacer]) was not At the 2016 Forum leaders’ meeting even mentioned in the white paper’s in Pohnpei, Prime Minister Turn- chapter on the Pacific. After nearly bull committed to a “step change” two decades of preparation and seven in Australia’s engagement with the years of negotiations, pacer-Plus Islands (Turnbull 2016). In August arrived in June with a dull thud, at a 2017, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop signing ceremony in Nuku‘alofa. outlined this change in a major speech After initially refusing to sign on Pacific policy in Suva. She pledged the treaty in Tonga, Vanuatu Prime to strengthen partnerships with Forum Minister Charlot Salwai later signed Island countries in three areas: “for at a ceremony on the fringes of the economic growth . . . for our secu- Pacific Islands Forum in September. rity . . . and to support relationships By year’s end, however, Papua New between our people” (Bishop 2017). Guinea and Fiji had refused to sign At the 2017 Forum in Apia the fol- the treaty. This decision by the largest lowing month, Turnbull announced a Island trading nations is a sign that suite of initiatives, including a Pacific there is a need for more creative initia- Labour Scheme for smaller Island tives to promote trade and investment, states and efforts to reduce the cost at a time of growing protectionist of remittances from Australia to the measures among oecd countries. Pacific. When negotiations started in 2009, This was followed in November by politicians from Australia and New the release of a major Foreign Policy Zealand stressed that pacer-Plus was White Paper, which highlights growing different from standard free trade Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific deals and would be development region and calls for enhanced engage- focused. The Office of the Chief Trade ment between Australia and the Pacific Advisor (octa) tried to highlight Islands. According to the white paper, the benefits of the treaty for Forum “The stability and economic progress Island countries (octa 2017), but of Papua New Guinea, other Pacific post-signing analysis of the deal has island countries and Timor-Leste is of highlighted the lack of ambition, the fundamental importance to Australia” failure to lock in labor market access (Australian Government 2017, 99). in the binding treaty, and the dispro- Australia’s approach to the region is portionate benefits for Australia and based on “helping to integrate Pacific New Zealand. Most commentators countries into the Australian and New were dismissive, with headlines such Zealand economies and our security as “Disappointment and Lost Oppor- institutions, [as] essential to the long- tunity” (Gay 2017) and “Not Much to term stability and economic prospects Celebrate” (Dornan 2017). of the Pacific” (Australian Govern- Former Forum Secretary-General ment 2017, 8). Sir Noel Levi, who guided the initial Even so, a central element of this drafting of the Pacific Island Coun- economic integration, the pacer-Plus tries Trade Agreement and pacer trade agreement (an outcome of the in the late 1990s, was scathing over political reviews • region in review 469 the outcome of “pacer Minus.” He the Pacific Maritime Security Program decried the lack of leadership by his over the next thirty years to provide successors for not addressing objec- nineteen replacement patrol boats tions raised by Fiji and Papua New across the Pacific. Guinea: “I question why those at the Shadow Defence Minister Richard helm of Pacific regional organizations Marles from the opposition Australian did not take heed of the seriousness Labor Party also called for increased of domestic policy and politics. . . . It engagement by Australia in the Islands was obvious that their governments in a major speech to the Lowy Insti- were not interested in any regional tute on 21 November. Marles argued agreement that, in their view, carried that the “cornerstone” for renewed the interests of Australia and New Pacific engagement “is a far more Zealand above theirs” (Levi 2017, extensive and deeper defence relation- 20). ship with those countries which have Despite pacer’s weaknesses, a defence force. . . . it would benefit Australia’s Seasonal Worker Program us to see the capability of the Pacific (swp) and New Zealand’s Recognized Island Countries’ defence forces grow” Seasonal Employer (rse) scheme (Marles 2017). This is a worrying boomed in 2017, even after public- priority for those Pacific citizens who ity over the deaths of twelve seasonal faced human rights abuses by military workers and cases of exploitation and police forces during the Bougain- by employers (Maclellan 2017f). ville war or the coups in Fiji. Expanding from horticulture into In government, Marles was an the agricultural and accommodation active supporter of French colonial- sectors, numbers to Australia jumped ism in the Pacific, viewing France as by 37 percent in 2016–2017 to 6,166 a stable democratic partner against seasonal workers. By year’s end, the Chinese influence (Maclellan 2012). World Bank had prepared a major Following the 2016 decision to extend new study with recommendations to full Forum membership to New Cale- expand the swp (World Bank 2018). donia and French Polynesia, Canberra Australian engagement with the and Paris signed a “Joint Statement region is often framed as a policy of of Enhanced Strategic Partnership strategic denial against non-Western between Australia and France” in powers. Following concerns that March, extending an existing 2012 Chinese corporation Huawei might declaration. The decision by the Turn- build an Internet cable to Solomon bull government to award a contract Islands, Turnbull intervened to block worth a$50 billion (us$39 billion) to the deal. This led to the signing of a the French corporation Naval Group bilateral security treaty between Aus- (formerly dcns) to build the next gen- tralia and Solomon Islands in August. eration of submarines for the Royal The next month, there were further Australian Navy has reinforced this bilateral memoranda of understanding global strategic engagement (Carroll on security partnerships with Tuvalu and Ell 2017). and Nauru. Australia has also com- In the past, there were few alter- mitted a$2 billion (us$1.6 billion) to natives to reliance on the anzus 470 the contemporary pacific • 30:2 (2018)

(Australia, New Zealand, and the neighbors, it should first learn from United States) allies, Japan, and the China to treat those much smaller European Union for trade, aid, and neighbors as equals and refrain from investment. Now there are a range of behaving like an arrogant overlord. new partners in the region—major The Australian government’s ‘default powers like China, India, and Indo- policy’ for all issues is to blame nesia, and smaller, agile donors from China” (Xu 2018). Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. In Sāmoa’s prime minister openly contrast to existing Western donors, criticized Fierravanti-Wells’s com- China has emphasized its identity as ments: “They are quite insulting to the a South-South development partner, leaders of the Pacific Island nations. with a common identity as a develop- To me as Chairman of the Pacific ing nation (Zhang and Lawson 2017, Leaders Forum, the comments ques- 198). tion the integrity, wisdom and intel- China stands out as the dominant ligence of the leaders of the Pacific strategic challenge for anzus in the Islands to judge what is good for our Islands region. Forum Trade Com- own people. These types of comments missioner to China David Morris said can damage the excellent relationships the Pacific governments were open to that exist between Australia and the dialogue with China because of lack Pacific Island countries, particularly of support from traditional partners: Samoa” (Samoa Observer 2018). “There’s no doubt Australia doesn’t Chinese outreach had a successful think much about its neighborhood year. In March 2017, Forum Secre- and the neighborhood knows that” tary-General Taylor led a Forum trade (Martin 2017). delegation to Beijing, Guangzhou, and This tension was highlighted in a Hainan Province, promoting invest- diplomatic spat between Beijing and ment and trade opportunities in the Canberra in January 2018. Concetta Islands. She met with China’s Minister Fierravanti-Wells, Australia’s minister for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi to discuss for international cooperation and the ongoing support for mechanisms that Pacific, made front-page headlines link the People’s Republic and the when she criticized Chinese aid proj- Islands region: the Pacific Trade and ects in the Pacific, accusing China of Invest Office in Beijing, the China-pifs “duchessing” Pacific leaders and offi- Development Cooperation Fund, and cials. Criticizing “roads to nowhere” the pif-China Scholarship Programme built by China, she said: “You’ve (pifs 2017a). got the Pacific full of these useless With three pages printed in Chinese buildings which nobody maintains, in the official handbook at the Apia which are basically white elephants” Forum leaders’ meeting, it wasn’t hard (Riordan 2018, 1). to notice China’s influence in regional In response, Chinese diplomats affairs. At the September Forum, Bei- lodged an official diplomatic com- jing provided twenty vehicles to trans- plaint. Xu Haijing, Australian corre- port the heads of government around spondent for Xinhua, polemicized: “If Apia, and there was a major seminar Australia really cares about its Pacific on Chinese trade and investment in the political reviews • region in review 471

Forum venue (with support from just Along with ministerial represen- six Forum members, Taiwan hosted tatives from Vanuatu, Sāmoa, and a dinner for its supporters away from Tonga, Fiji Prime Minister Voreqe the hotel). Bainimarama joined twenty-eight At the 19th Communist Party of other heads of government to attend China National Congress in October, the “Belt and Road Forum for Interna- President Xi Jinping announced, tional Cooperation” in Beijing in May. “China will increase assistance to After meetings between Bainimarama, other developing countries, especially President Xi, and Premier Li Keqiang, the least developed countries, and do China and Fiji signed an Economic its part to reduce the North-South and Technical Cooperation Agree- development gap” (Xi 2017). Under ment and an agreement establishing President Xi, China’s centerpiece for a China-Fiji Trade and Economic international development is the One Co-operation Commission. With Belt, One Road Initiative, potentially China now serving as Fiji’s largest the largest infrastructure program in donor, Bainimarama also agreed to history. close Fiji’s trade office in Taiwan. While the project is more focused While Australia currently stands on Central Asia, the Middle East, and aloof from the bri, other Asia-Pacific Europe, the Belt and Road Initiative nations, including New Zealand, are (bri) is also being extended to the actively involved. By year’s end, newly Pacific Islands. China analyst Nick reelected PNG Prime Minister Peter Bisley noted that the bri has four O’Neill had signed a series of infra- broad aims: “to build connectivity; structure deals with China under the develop China’s hinterlands; export bri. surplus capital and capacity; and The United Nations Development increase Chinese strategic influence. Programme (undp) is now investigat- Indeed, the Chinese government insists ing how China might finance regional that the program is not limited to the initiatives to meet sdg development already vast purview of Eurasia—any targets (undp 2017). This initiative country in the world can take part” comes as Australia, the United States, (Bisley 2017). and other traditional donors are Chinese investment and loans are reducing their funding to UN agencies facilitated through the Asian Infra- in the Pacific. structure Investment Bank, China Despite the increasing regional Exim Bank, and state-supported engagement, there are still contradic- corporations. Forum Trade Commis- tions in Beijing’s rising influence. The sioner to China David Morris said: widespread celebration of China’s “China has enormous financial capac- rapid economic growth underplays ity to support economic development. the internal contradictions of China’s It has now a private sector that is very social transformation, which involves actively looking for investment oppor- rising proletarian expectations and tunities and it has a very fast growing labor unrest; massive environmental outbound tourism market as well” and energy problems; and unresolved (rnzi 2017a). questions over Tibet, Taiwan, Hong 472 the contemporary pacific • 30:2 (2018)

Kong and Uyghur nationalism. On the Sea. Beijing also welcomes silence on 80th anniversary of its publication, sensitive topics like Tibet. Pacific aid it’s worth rereading Mao Zedong’s recipients have been noticeably quiet classic essay “On Contradiction” about Chinese domestic human rights as a reminder of the contradictions abuses. between classes and peoples in China For Forum Secretary-General (Mao 1967 [1937]). Taylor, it’s getting harder to juggle In regional think tanks and con- these sensitivities: “We’ve noticed a ferences, there is extensive debate real heightened intensity over the last over whether China’s outreach in the couple of months particularly, want- Islands is part of a strategic master- ing our countries to be clear about plan or the outcome of decisions by the One China policy, insisting that state-owned companies and private missions that are promoting trade in investors. Strategic analysts are wor- Taiwan be closed. For the Secretariat, ried that Pacific governments face we respond to the member states and significant debt burdens from Chinese six of our members recognize Taiwan, soft loans and overuse of Chinese so we have to accommodate that” labor (Lowy 2018). (Maclellan 2017b). In response, China’s Ambassador With Taiwan-aligned states like to Australia Cheng Jingye claimed: Palau now being wooed by Beijing, “China often takes into account the Taiwan must work harder to maintain debt-paying ability and solvency of the allegiance of its supporters. In recipient countries, so avoiding creat- November, incoming Taiwanese Presi- ing too high a debt burden to recipient dent Tsai Ing-wen visited the Marshall countries. . . . As the largest devel- Islands, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. oping country in the world, China Despite this diplomacy, Taiwanese has been—all along—committed to academic Kwei-Bo Huang has argued providing all possible assistance to that Taiwan’s citizens are not sup- other developing countries within the portive of the government’s expensive framework of South-South coopera- outreach to small Caribbean and tion. This is a key demonstration of Pacific states: “Most believe aid to China’s role as a responsible major Pacific nations and Taiwan’s allies is power. In providing foreign aid, the a waste. In Taiwan, unfortunately, the Chinese government always attaches South Pacific allies have often been no political strings, and fully respects portrayed as ‘poor, small, and black’ the wishes and needs of the recipient countries coveting Taiwan’s money. countries” (Cheng 2018). It is undeniable that part of Taiwan’s Like all donors, however, China effort in this region has been focusing does attach political strings, requir- on winning official recognition while ing reaffirmation of the One China under pressure from Beijing” (Huang policy. States like Vanuatu, Papua 2017). New Guinea, and (unsuccessfully) With Chinese officials monitoring Fiji have been encouraged to sup- criticism in the region, Xi Jinping’s port China’s position in international current crackdown on corruption maritime disputes in the South China has extended to the Islands. In an political reviews • region in review 473 unprecedented move, Chinese officials Minister of State for External Affairs chartered a plane to Nadi in August General V K Singh (Singh 2017). At and seventy-seven Chinese citizens the conference, India provided f$3.6 living in Fiji were deported back to million (us$1.8 million) toward the China, allegedly for involvement in Bainimarama government’s micro and telecom and online fraud. China’s small business grants program, as well official explanation for this unusual as funds for the cop23 Secretariat. extradition was questioned by the The two countries also signed a new Fiji opposition, who raised questions defense agreement, with pledges by about prostitution by Chinese nation- New Delhi to improve Fiji’s small and als overstaying in Fiji. China analyst outdated naval base. In December, the Graeme Smith noted: “One of the Indian government provided a further great ironies of these show arrests is f$1 million (us$495,000) grant to that the Chinese police were given the Fijian sugar industry to purchase more power in Fiji than they usually agricultural equipment from India. wield in China” (Smith 2017). At a time of nuclear crisis (dis- During periods of conflict and anti- cussed later in this review), South Chinese rioting a decade ago, China Korea is also seeking to expand its evacuated its citizens from Tonga, modest links to the region. In Decem- Timor-Leste, and Solomon Islands ber, newly elected President Moon aboard civilian aircraft (Smith 2012). Jae-in met with foreign ministers from Now defense analysts are concerned thirteen Pacific Island countries at his about possible future use of military presidential office, during the third aircraft for regional emergencies South Korea–Pacific Islands Forum (Connolly 2016). foreign ministers’ dialogue. China’s diplomatic profile in the Moon announced that he hoped region is raising concern in New Delhi to participate in the November 2018 as well as Canberra, Wellington, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and Tokyo. Indian Prime Minister (apec) summit to be hosted in Papua Narendra Modi visited Fiji in 2014, New Guinea. The O’Neill government and President Pranab Mukherjee is hoping that apec will strengthen visited Papua New Guinea and New economic ties between Asia and the Zealand in April 2016 (the visit to Pacific Islands, especially investment Port Moresby was a first for an Indian in Papua New Guinea. Already, Aus- head of state). Even after these state tralia and New Zealand have provided visits, India-Pacific relations have been policing and intelligence support to slow to take off, despite the creation the PNG government as Port Moresby of the Forum for India–Pacific Islands prepares for a major influx of interna- Cooperation, which held leaders’ tional delegates. summits in Suva in 2014 and Jaipur Australia and New Zealand con- in 2015. tinue to collaborate on counter-ter- Suva hosted the India–Pacific rorism and transnational crime in the Islands Sustainable Development region—work that continues despite Conference in May 2017, welcom- political tensions between the conser- ing a large delegation led by India’s vative Coalition in Canberra and the 474 the contemporary pacific • 30:2 (2018) new Ardern Labour government in toured New Zealand in May to meet Wellington. In one spat, a NZ Labour politicians, officials, and trade unions, member of Parliament was falsely while Octo Mote attended the Sep- accused of instigating a citizenship tember Forum leaders’ meeting in dispute involving Australian Deputy Apia, after lobbying in Melanesian Prime Minister Barnaby Joyce (a dual capitals. Samoan union supporters of ANZ citizen). Foreign Minister Julie the ulmwp rallied opposite the Forum Bishop foolishly attacked “treacher- venue. ous behavior” by NZ Labour, saying With action on West Papua within she “would find it very hard to build the Forum and the msg blocked by trust with those involved in allegations the larger powers, the “Group of designed to undermine the Govern- Seven” countries have been taking ment of Australia” (Belot and Dziedzic initiatives in international forums. 2017). Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Tonga, These spats, however, do not Tuvalu, Nauru, Palau, and the Mar- overcome common interests within shall Islands presented a joint state- the Forum. Michael Goldsmith has ment on West Papua to the acp noted that “the cultural gap between (African, Caribbean, and Pacific the twin white settler nations and Groups of States) Council of Min- their Pacific counterparts sometimes isters in Brussels in May. Indonesia thrust the former two into an alliance reacted sharply. In a tone unlikely to vis-à-vis the rest” (2017, 190). win friends, the Indonesian embassy Security policy remains a central in Port Vila stated: “The overwhelm- element of Pacific regionalism. Despite ing majority of Pacific countries have storm clouds brewing over self-deter- no agenda to push for the separation mination in Bougainville and New of sovereign territories of Indonesia. Caledonia, it was a relatively stable Calls to redraw the borders of Indo- year in the region. nesia by a few politicians in Vanuatu, Indonesian President Joko Widodo Solomon Islands and elsewhere, are visited West Papua in May, the fifth simply crazy and irrational talk. These visit he has made in an effort to absurdities are talks of desperate and promote Indonesian development vulnerable political leaders clinging to initiatives. This soft diplomacy has not stay in power” (rnzi 2017b). quietened the West Papuan national- Given diverse positions among ist movement, which responded with Forum members, Dame Meg Tay- protests. During the month of the lor has proposed a “softly, softly” president’s visit, police arrested nearly approach to engagement with Jakarta: two hundred people in Sentani and “The Forum as a whole is concerned seventy-seven members of the West about human rights issues, but wants Papua National Committee (knpb) in those conversations with Indonesia to Merauke. continue, recognizing that you’ve got Representatives of the United leadership in Indonesia that is much Liberation Movement for West more open about issues in Papua and Papua (ulmwp) continued to lobby West Papua” (Maclellan 2017e). In for regional action. Benny Wenda their communiqué from Apia, Forum political reviews • region in review 475 leaders recognized “the constructive tool about the ramsi years with the engagement by the Forum countries publication of a “Select Bibliography with Indonesia with respect to elec- on Solomon Islands, 2003–2017” by tions and human rights in West Papua longtime historian of Melanesia Clive and Papua and to continue a dialogue Moore (Moore 2017). in an open and constructive manner” Despite the end of ramsi, Australia (pifs 2017b). maintains an ongoing defense relation- During the year, there has been ship with Honiara through its Defence some significant progress toward more Cooperation Program. A new pack- self-governance and protection of age of law and justice support will be Indigenous rights in Rapa Nui. Chile implemented through the Department turned over administration of the of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Rapa Nui national park to a board Australian Federal Police. elected by Indigenous people. A bill to In turn, Solomon Islands has fol- severely restrict non-Indigenous immi- lowed other Pacific countries into gration to the island is under consider- UN peacekeeping. Five Royal Solo- ation by the Chilean congress. Despite mon Islands Police officers joined the this, genuine political autonomy and United Nations African Mission in the usurpation of land titles by the Darfur (unamid) for a twelve-month Chilean state are ongoing problems deployment in 2016–2017. As Prime (Gomez 2010). Minister Sogavare noted before the After fourteen years and a$2.8 UN General Assembly in September, billion (us$2.2 billion) cost to Austra- “This is Solomon Islands’ first humble lia, the Regional Assistance Mission contribution to the maintenance of to Solomon Islands (ramsi) formally world peace” (Sogavare 2017). Along- ended at the end of June. Over this side Papua New Guinea Defence Force period, 7,280 Australian Defence soldiers, police officers from Solomon Force personnel were deployed to Islands, Palau, Sāmoa, and Fiji have Solomon Islands under Operation now served in unamid. Anode, working with His Majesty’s Nuclear disarmament surged back Armed Forces from Tonga and New on to the regional and international Zealand and Papua New Guinea agenda in 2017, as US President Don- defense forces. ramsi’s Participating ald Trump and North Korean Presi- Police Force involved officers from dent Kim Jong-un traded macho barbs every Forum member country. over who had the biggest button. Kim ramsi won popular support for the threatened missile launches toward rapid demilitarization of the 1998– US military bases in Guåhan (Guam), 2003 political and social crisis and the while Trump threatened to rain “fire subsequent destruction of weapons. and fury” on the Korean people. But later “state-building” and policing Given that Pacific peoples have operations were more controversial suffered from more than 310 nuclear (Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi, and Okole tests—in Marshall Islands, French 2014). To evaluate the costs and Polynesia, Kiribati, Australia, and benefits of ramsi, citizens of Solomon Johnston Atoll—there was widespread Islands can access a valuable research anger when Trump tweeted that the 476 the contemporary pacific • 30:2 (2018)

United States “must greatly strengthen impacts,” with a report on actions to and expand its nuclear capability, be prepared for the 49th Forum in until such time as the world comes to Nauru (pifs 2017b). its senses regarding nukes” (Trump In March and July, more than 120 2016). governments met to negotiate a treaty The year 2017–2018 is the 60th to ban nuclear weapons under inter- anniversary of the United King- national law. The call for a nuclear dom’s Grapple hydrogen bomb tests, ban treaty was based on the recogni- conducted on Malden Island and tion that the humanitarian impact Christmas (Kiritimati) Island in the of nuclear weapon use is morally British Gilbert and Ellice Islands unacceptable and that these weapons colony—today part of Kiribati. British of mass destruction represent a signifi- authorities continue to resist compen- cant risk to human security. sation pleas from nuclear veterans At the March negotiations, the from Britain, Fiji, and New Zealand International Campaign to Abolish who face adverse health effects after Nuclear Weapons (ican) launched participating in Operation Grapple a report on the impact of testing in (Maclellan 2017c). the Pacific (Maclellan 2017d). ican Even with the failure of the 2014 also supported Indigenous activists RMI disarmament case in the US from French Polynesia, Marshall Federal Court and litigation in the Islands, Fiji, Japan, and Aboriginal International Court of Justice (icj), Australia to travel to New York to the cases have had an effect on nuclear lobby governments. This lobbying led policy by the weapons states. After the to significant outcomes, with a key RMI case against the United Kingdom section in the treaty obliging parties won support from half the icj bench, to assist nuclear survivors and the the British government withdrew from preamble recognizing “the dispro- compulsory icj jurisdiction on matters portionate impact of nuclear-weapon relating to nuclear disarmament in activities on indigenous peoples” (UN February 2017 (UK Government 2017b). After adoption in a 122-1-1 2017). vote, the treaty was opened for signa- In a 1 March speech on the anniver- ture on 20 September. Fiji, Kiribati, sary of the US Bravo hydrogen bomb New Zealand, Palau, Sāmoa, Tuvalu, test, RMI President Hilda Heine called and Vanuatu were among the fifty for the United States to take respon- states that signed the treaty on the first sibility for health and environmental day. Once fifty nations have ratified or impacts of past nuclear testing across acceded to the new ban treaty, it will her country (Maclellan 2017a). The enter into force. 2017 Forum communiqué required Addressing the UN General Assem- that “the Forum Secretariat coordinate bly, Forum Chair Tuilaepa said: “As assistance by crop agencies to the a signatory to this historic treaty, we Republic of the Marshall Islands in wanted to demonstrate unequivo- addressing ongoing impacts of nuclear cally our aspiration to have a world testing including human rights, envi- without nuclear weapons. The conven- ronmental contamination and health tional narrative that the possession of political reviews • region in review 477 nuclear weapons will act as deterrent References to make the world a safer place to live, is not borne out by the current reali- All websites accessed 2 March 2018. ties—otherwise the developments in Australian Government. 2017. the Korean peninsula would not have Foreign Policy White Paper. Nov. happened at all” (Tuilaepa 2017b). Canberra: Government of Australia. Aligned with US extended nuclear https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/ deterrence, the Turnbull government Bainimarama, Frank. 2017. cop23 opposed, then boycotted, the process, Presidency Deeply Disappointed with the first time ever that Australia has Trump’s Decision to Withdraw from the refused to participate in multilateral Paris Agreement. Statement by the Fijian disarmament negotiations. 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