Chapter III the Turkish Intervention and Turkey's Continued Presence

Chapter III The Turkish Intervention and Turkey’s Continued Presence in the Northern Part of Cyprus

A. THE FACTS

1. The Turkish Intervention

1.1. The Coup d’Etat against President Makarios

In 1967, a military junta took power in Athens. The leader of the original EOKA, Grivas, returned to the island in 1971 and his newly founded “EOKA B” openly undermined Makarios’ authority.1 After his death in early 1974, the command of his EOKA B came into the hands of the “Athens Cyprus Office”, i.e. the General Staff of the Greek military junta and its collaborators on the island. In April 1974, Makarios issued a decree declaring the EOKA B illegal. He started to build a “reserve corps” fearing the Greek influence over his own National Guard. In a let- ter of 2 July 1974 to the Greek President, Gizikes, he demanded from Greece to withdraw the Greek officers from the Cyprus National Guard from the island.

1 Tzermias, loc. cit. (page 2, note 1), p. 416.

The Greek dictator, Ioannidis, ordered the coup against Makarios on 15 July 1974. The Cyprus National Guard, led by Greek officers, occupied the Presidential Palace. Makarios escaped, and was flown out of Cyprus by the British. The former Bishop from Paphos, Gennadios, appointed Nicos Sampson as the new President. His newly chosen ministers were well known for their enosis sympathies.2 However, they did not declare union with Greece. It appears that the primary goal of the Greek Junta was to eliminate Makarios who had severely attacked their regime.3 Nevertheless, bringing about enosis had become an option for the new government at a later stage. According to Sampson’s own confession, he was about to proclaim enosis when he had to quit as a result of the Turkish intervention.4 The coup resulted in several deaths, the exact figures of which are debated.5 The junta eliminated or detained some Greek Cypriots that were known to sup- port Makarios.6 It is disputed whether Turkish Cypriots immediately suffered after the coup.7 It seems that Sampson was cautious not to provoke a Turkish intervention at an early stage by concerted action. In any case, he was not trustwor- thy in the eyes of the Turkish Cypriot population and Turkey given the brutal role he had played during the 1963/1964 clashes.8

1.2. The Turkish reaction

1.2.1. The ﬁrst phase (20–22 July 1974) In Turkey, the Social Democrat Prime Minister Eçevit, governing in coalition with the National Salvation Party, ordered the landing of the Turkish army on 20 July 1974. The National Guard was not able to defend the island due to its involve- ment in the coup. On the same day, the UN Security Council adopted a resolu- tion9 that was primarily prepared to address the coup. Having learnt of the Turkish intervention, the Council added a new § 3 in which it demanded the immediate end to foreign military intervention that did not respect the sovereignty, indepen- dence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Nevertheless, Turkish troops seized Kyrenia on 21 July. The next day, Athens and Ankara agreed a cease-ﬁre upon a

2 Tzermias, loc. cit. (page 2, note 1), pp. 449–450. 3 L. Rühl, Der Zypernkonflikt von 1974 und der griechisch-türkische Interessenkonflikt, Europaarchiv 1975, p. 699 (701). 4 Cyprus Mail, 17 July 1975. 5 The figures vary from 100–200 up to approximately 1000 deaths. 6 Necatigil, loc. cit. (page 11, note 35), p. 91. 7 Ertekün, loc. cit. (page 6, note 19), p. 30 states that “16.000 more Turks had to aban- don 38 villages”. Official Greek Cypriot sources do not refer such massive movements; but see Papadakis, loc. cit. (page 10, note 33), pp. 73 et seq., collecting reports from eyewit- nesses about persecution and the degradation of living conditions in Limassol for Turkish Cypriots after the coup, causing their leaving to the north. 8 W. Hale/J.D. Norton, Die Türkei und die Zypern-Krise, EA 1974, p. 639 (641). 9 UNSC Resolution 353 of 20 July 1974. For an account of the discussions in the Security Council prior to adoption see Özgür, loc. cit. (page 10, note 34), pp. 89–93.