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Richard Blundell Cbe Fba RICHARD BLUNDELL CBE FBA Curriculum Vitae (November 2013) Ricardo Professor of Economics Research Director Department of Economics, Institute for Fiscal Studies University College London, ESRC Centre for the Micro-Economic Analysis of Gower Street, Public Policy (CPP@IFS) London WC1E 6BT, UK 7 Ridgmout Street e-mail: [email protected] London WC1E 7AE Tel: 44 (0)207679 5863 Tel: 44 (0)20 7291 4820 Fax: 44 (0)207916 2775 Fax: 44 (0)20 7323 4780 Website: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctp39a/ Date of Birth: 1 May 1952 Education and Employment: 1970-1973 B.Sc. University of Bristol. (Economics with Statistics, First Class) 1973-1975 M.Sc. London School of Economics (Econometrics). 1975-1984 Lecturer in Econometrics, University of Manchester. 1984- Professor of Economics. University College London, 1988-1992 Department Chair. 2005 Ricardo Chair of Political Economy, UCL 1986- Research Director, Institute for Fiscal Studies. 1991- Director: ESRC Centre for the Micro-Economic Analysis of Public Policy, IFS. 1993 Visiting Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 1994 Ford Visiting Professor, University of California at Berkeley. 1999 Visiting Professor, University of California at Berkeley. Presidency of Professional Organizations 2004 President, European Economics Association. 2004 President, British Association (Economics). 2006 President, Econometric Society. 2010 President, Society for Labor Economics 2010-13 President, Royal Economic Society. Honorary Doctorates University of St Gallen, St Gallen, Switzerland 2003 NHH, Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway 2011 University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany 2011 Honours and Prizes Fellow of the Econometric Society 1991 Yrjö Jahnsson Prize 1995 Royal Economic Society Council 1990-1994 European Economic Association Council 1997-2001 FBA: Fellow of the British Academy 1997. Executive Council, Journal of Econometrics 1997- Econometric Society, Council 1998 -2001 Leverhulme Personal Research Professorship 1999 Frisch Prize, Econometric Society 2000 National Academy of Science NRC Panel Member 1999-2000 Member of Executive Committee of the Econometric Society 2001 Honorary Member of the American Economic Association 2001 American Academy of Arts and Science 2002 1 Honorary Fellow: Institute of Actuaries 2003 Fellow: Society of Labor Economists 2005 CBE: New Years Honors List 2006 Research Fellow, Netspar 2008 Jean-Jacques Laffont Prize, TSE . 2008 CES Prize Fellow 2010, Munich 2010 Downing Fellow, University of Melbourne 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics 2012 Carlos Lloyd Braga Chair, Minho, Portugal 2013 Distinguished Lectures Invited Lecture: Econometric Society: 6th World Meetings, Barcelona, August 1990 Invited Lecture: ESPE 4th Congress, Istanbul. Woytinsky Distinguished Lecture: University of Michigan, May 1993. Hooker Distinguished Lecture: McMaster University, April 1993. Keynote Lecture: European Association of Labor Economics, 1993. Frisch Centennial Meeting: Oslo, March 1995. Woodward Lectures: University of British Columbia, March 1997. Hannon Lecture: Australasian Meetings, July 1998. TOW Lectures: University of Iowa, April 1998. Hicks Lecture: Oxford University, February 1999. Invited Lecture: Econometric Society 8th World Meetings, Seattle, August 2000 Invited Lecture: Econometric Society Far East Meetings, Tokyo, July 2001. Keynes Lecture: British Academy, November 2001. Walras Bowley Lecture: Econometric Society, UCLA, June 2002. Theil Memorial Meeting: Amsterdam, October 2002. Tinbergen Centennial Meeting: Rotterdam, May 2003. Zeuthen Lectures: Copenhagen, November 2003. Arrow Lectures: Stanford, May 2004 Mackintosh Lectures: Queens, Canada, November 2004 Adam Smith Lecture SOLE-EALE, San Francisco, June 2005. Presidential Lecture, Econometric Society NAMES (Minnesota), ESAM, FEMES (Beijing), ESEM (Vienna), LAMES (Mexico), SAMES (Chennia). MIT Distinguished Lecturer 2006 MIT, November 2006. Lindahl Lectures Uppsala, November 2006. Al Rees Lecture SOLE, Chicago, May 2007. Dixon Lecture University of York, May 2007. Australian Conference of Economists Keynote Speaker, September 2007. Fishelson Lecture Tel Aviv, March 2008 Penn Lecture in Economics University of Pennsylvania, April 2008. JAE Lectures 2008 Madrid, June, 2008. Goethe University Public Lecture Series Frankfurt, June 2008. IIPF Invited Lecture Maastricht, August 2008. Annual Lecture in Public Economics Dottorato in Economia, Milan, September, 2008. Carlos Diaz Alejandro Lecture LAMES, November, 2008. JJ Laffont Prize Lecture Toulouse, December, 2008 Richard Stone Inaugural Annual Lecture Cambridge, March 2009 African Econometric Society Lecture Abuja, Nigeria, July 2009 JEEA-EEA Lecture AEA Meetings, Atlanta, January 2010. Lampman Memorial Lecture Wisconsin, May 2010 CEA State of the Art Lecture Quebec, June 2010 FBBVA Lecture Madrid, September 2010 Distinguished CES Prize Lecture Munich, November 2010 Sandmo Lecture Bergen, January 2011 HILDA 10th Anniversary Speaker Melbourne Institute, July 2011 Downing Lecture University of Melbourne, July 2011 CEMFI Opening Invited Lecture CEMFI, Madrid, September 2011 Murat Sertel Lecture 2011 ASSET, Evora, Portugal, October 2011 Jacquemin Lecture European Commission, Brussels, November 2011 2 RIPED Lecture UTCC, Bangkok, January, 2012 Leonid Hurwicz Lecture Inaugural Lecture, Warsaw, July 2012 Presidential Lecture, RES Royal Economic Society, April 2013. Freidman Forum Lecture Becker-Friedman Institute, Chicago, May 2013 Bank of Portugal Invited Lecture 7th Conference in Labour Markets, June 2013. SAFE Inaugural Launch Lecture CFS, Goethe Universitat, Frankfurt, September 2013. BFI Tax Policy Lecture BFI, Chicago, September, 2013. Bank of Montreal Lecture SFU, Vancouver, October 2013. Keynote Lecture ECB Consumption and Wealth Conference, October 2013. Cátedra Carlos Lloyd Braga University of Minho, November 2013. Editorial Positions Review of Economic Studies, Associate Editor (1984-1988). Journal of Econometrics, Co-Editor (1991-1997); Executive Council 1997- Journal of Human Resources, Associate Editor (1995-1997). Econometrica, Co-Editor (July 1997- 2001). Economie & Prevision, (1999- ) Journal of Public Economics, Co-Editor for TAPES Issue, (2003-2004). Fiscal Studies, Editorial Board, 1991- 2005, Editorial Executive Committee, 2005 - Australian Economic Review, Associate Editor, 2006 – Journal of Economic Literature, Editorial Board, 2004 – 2009. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Advisory Editor, 2005 - 2008. Mirrlees Review, Editor, 2006-2011. Research in Labor Economics, Editorial Advisory Board, 2011 - Annual Reviews, Editorial Board, 2011 - Scientific Advisory Positions CentER, Tilburg: Scientific Council: 2001 – ESDS Advisory Committee: 2003 - 2007 CEPR: Scientific Advisory Committee: 2003 – 2007 CERGE-EI: Scientific Advisory Committee: 2003 – 2006. EU COST Action 23 ,European Labour Market Policy Evaluation: Chair: 2003-2008. Netspar: Scientific Council: 2005 - PSE (Paris School of Economics): Scientific Council: 2005 – 2009 SIRE (Scottish Institute for Research in Economics): The International Advisory Board: 2006 – Australian Treasury Participation Modelling Project: Academic Reference Panel: 2006 Barcelona GSE (Graduate School in Economics): External Advisory Scientific Board: 2007 – Toulouse School of Economics: President, Scientific Council: 2009 – 2013. CEMFI: Board of Trustees: 2009 – CFS-SAFE: Centre of Excellence, Goethe University, Frankfurt, 2013 - External Research Panels, External Reviews and Prize Committees Research Assessment Exercise Committee, UK Universities, 2001 CentER, Tilburg: External Review Committee, 2004 UPF, Barcelona: External Review of Economics, 2005 Scottish Funding Council; Expert Review Panel for Economics Research, 2005 Helsinki University: Professorial Review Panel, 2009 Yrjö Jahnsson Prize Committee, 2009 Bocconi University: External Review Panel: 2009 Tinbergen Institute: Chair, External Review Panel: 2010 Japanese Economics Association, Nakahara Prize, Selection Committee Member, 2010 - Angelo Costa Prize, International Scientific Committee, member, 2011 - ERC Panel SH1, Panel Chair; Starter Grants: 2012. TrygFonden Foundation, Denmark, Peer Review Panel, 2012. Uppsala Chair in Labour Economics, Review Committee, 2013. ERC Panel SH1, Panel Chair; Consolidator Grant Fellowships: 2014. 3 Conference Organisation SOLE-EALE, Program Chair, 3rd World Meeting, London, 2010. Econometric Society World Meetings: Programme Committee, Tokyo 1995, Programme Chair, London 2005, LOC Chair London 2005. Econometric Society European Meetings: Programme Chairman (Econometrics) Brussels, 1992; Programme Committee, Pisa 1983; Budapest 1986; Munich 1989; Cambridge 1991; Istanbul 1996; Toulouse 1997; Lausanne 2001; Stockholm 2003. Econometric Society European Winter Meetings: Scientific Committee, 1996 - 2002. European Economics Association: Programme Committee Member: Copenhagen 1987, Venice 2002. International Institute of Public Finance, Programme Chair: Cordoba, Argentina 1998. PhD Supervision (First Advisor), by date of thesis exam. 1988: Urmila Mukherjee, 1990: Michael Devereux, 1995: Lorraine Dearden, 1995: Jumana Saleheen, 1996: Richard Dickens, 1997: Adres Gomez-Lobo, 1998: Maria Martinez-Granado, 1999: Vivian Foster, 2002: Monica Costa-Dias, 2005: Heike Harmgart, 2005: Renata Bottazzi, 2005: Elena Martínez Sanchís, 2006: Giacomo Di Giorgi, 2006: Rupert Harrison. 2007: Mario Fiorini. 2008: Matthew Wakefield 2009, Maria Casanova 2010, Andrew Shephard, 2010, Pierre Hoonhout 2011, Emma Tominey, 2010, Ben Etheridge
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