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Q&A: Abdul Mahdy al-Ameedi, 4 head of Iraq's oil contracts Before turbulent election, 9 Iraq ignored key warnings

Q&A: Brig. Gen. Ali Hussein Hilal al-Mayahi, director of South Oil Police Facing months of protests at key oil sites in Basra, Mayahi details the network of government forces providing security and the challenges they have faced.

For two months this summer, Iraq’s A Basra Gas Company worker at the Nahr Bin Omar oil field takes part in the opening of a new oil sector was on edge as protesters pipeline sending gas to the national network on Jan. 12, 2017. threatened to disrupt operations at major fields in Basra, in an effort to pressure Iraq capitalizes on OPEC quota adjustment the government to provide more jobs and The Oil Ministry is unleashing latent capacity from state-run fields, and is basic services. eyeing further production increases in the next year. While most rallies were peaceful in front of government buildings and at Iraq’s production rose by over 100,000 based on data gathered monthly from each oil fields, some got tense. Protesters barrels per day (bpd) in July, following an of the country’s producing fields. shut down access roads to fields, and in OPEC meeting in which members paved the The Iraqi Oil Ministry confirmed a large multiple instances angry mobs penetrated way for production increases. increase in disclosures published in the security cordons, causing minor damage. Combined, fields under control of the August edition of OPEC’s Monthly Oil Markets Multiple protesters and security force federal government and the Kurdistan Report, claiming a total of 4.460 million bpd members were injured, and at least one region produced about 4.697 million bpd in July, up from 3.360 million bpd in each of demonstrator was killed at a field protest. in July, well above this year’s previous high- the previous nine months. Brig. Gen. Ali Hussein Hilal al-Mayahi water mark of 4.598 million bpd in May, The production increase appears to is the director of the South Oil Police, a according to an Iraq Oil Report analysis be the direct result of orders from the Oil part of the Interior Ministry’s Energy Police

see OPEC, page 2 see AL-MAYAHI, page 6

DELIERI TE FELS TAT EERIE PROSPERITY www.iraqoilreport.com Iraq capitalizes on OPEC quota adjustment

OPEC, cont’d from page 1

Ministry in Baghdad - issued on July 1, days after the most recent OPEC meeting - which instructed the Basra Oil Company (BOC) to tap into latent capacity at state-run fields, according to ministry correspondence obtained by Iraq Oil Report. “According to the oil minister’s instructions... we would like to report that we have achieved an additional 105,000 bpd of production at fields being developed through the national efforts since the end of June,” said Ihsan Ismaael, the director general of BOC, in a July 25 letter to the Oil Ministry. The Luhais, Ratawi, Nahr bin Omar, and Tuba fields had been producing a combined 143,000 bpd, Ismail wrote, but have now reached a total output of 248,000 bpd. Iraq Oil Report corroborated those and the Avana Dome of the Kirkuk field; unlock more than 200,000 bpd of capacity numbers with officials working on each those assets are now back under the control that is currently stranded. field, and with a senior BOC official who said of the state-run North Oil Company (NOC). And, if the federal government is able the state-run fields had achieved their new NOC has not been able to fully exploit to quell the protest movement in southern targets within a week of the oil minister’s July those fields because of inadequate routes Iraq, scheduled increases at other fields are 1 order. to market. The only pipeline connected to likely to come online as well - including new The overall production of federal Iraqi oil those fields is controlled by the KRG, and that initiatives to raise production from other fields rose from 4.222 million bpd in June, is currently off limits to Baghdad because of state-run fields. according to the Iraq Oil Report analysis, up political disagreements. Oil Minister Jabbar al-Luiebi announced to 4.283 million bpd in July. Bai Hassan and Avana have both come at the end of July that the state-run Dhi Qar Production would have been even online partially in recent months, reaching Oil Company (DQOC) has been allocated higher, but for protest-related disruptions a combined output of more than 70,000 $140 million to conduct a 20-well drilling which caused output to fall at the West bpd in July, according to an Iraq Oil Report program that will raise production at the Qurna 1 field, which had been producing estimate based on accounts from multiple Nassiriya field from 90,000 bpd to 200,000 over 450,000 bpd since March. It averaged industry officials in northern Iraq. Output bpd within a year. just 400,000 bpd in July. from the two fields increased further in Multiple DQOC officials said they did Iraq’s overall production also rose, August, officials said, to as much as 115,000 not expect that additional production to despite the protests, because of increases bpd. come online until 2020, however, because at fields controlled by the autonomous That production is being transported to of the additional surface facilities needed to Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), refineries in Kurdistan, under a commercial process and transport additional production. which produced a combined 414,000 bpd in agreement designed to provide fuel to areas The Subba field, also operated by DQOC, July, according to the Iraq Oil Report analysis, that are rebuilding after being occupied by is expected to add about 35,000 bpd, as soon up from 368,000 bpd in June. the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) militant as the company is able to install equipment The KRG’s production fell dramatically group. needed to treat the high salt content in the after October 2017, when the federal Iraq’s surging production in July could crude, according to multiple DQOC officials. government launched a military operation mark the beginning of a bigger increase in Production is expected to increase further to reclaim control of Kirkuk province and the coming months. after a six-well drilling plan in 2019. ♦ its oil fields. The KRG had been putting a If leaders in Baghdad and Erbil are able combined 280,000 bpd into its independent to strike a deal for NOC-produced oil to READ THE FULL STORY @ export pipeline from the Bai Hassan field flow through the KRG’s pipeline, that would www.iraqoilreport.com

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90642 GW Iraq Oil Report Ad_AW.indd 1 09/08/2018 12:07 www.iraqoilreport.com Q&A: Abdul Mahdy al-Ameedi, head of Iraq's oil contracts The Oil Ministry's contracting chief discusses prospective agreements to achieve progress in oil and gas fields awarded to foreign oil companies.

As the director general of the Oil Ministry’s Petroleum Contracts and Licensing Directorate (PCLD), Abdul Mahdy al-Ameedi is at the center of Iraq’s evolving relationship with international oil companies. The ministry is currently in the process of finalizing new contracts that were awarded just before the country’s May 12 elections - but which still need to be formally approved by the Cabinet before signing. Ameedi spoke with Iraq Oil Report about the process he is overseeing to amend previously awarded contracts and flesh out detailed final development plans for the country’s largest oil fields. Some of the previous bidding round contracts have been tweaked over the years. Where is each one now, in terms of production plateau targets, timeframe, contract length and remuneration fee? Abdul Mahdy al-Ameedi, the director general of the Oil Ministry’s Petroleum Contracts and For the four previous licensing rounds, Licensing Directorate, at a May 23 press conference following the signing of a development contract for the East Baghdad oil field with ZhenHua and the Midland Oil Company. there’s no changes so far, except for changes and amendments we made previously for So far, in Zubair, there is an agreement to The performance factor will be applied on the five contracts, which are Rumaila, Zubair, reduce the plateau from 850,000 to 750,000 a quarterly basis, only on the production that West Qurna 1, West Qurna 2 and Halfaya. bpd. In Rumaila they are discussing reducing will be agreed between our companies and No further changes, no further the plateau from 2.1 to maybe 1.8 million the contractors in the annual work program. amendments to the contracts. Except for bpd. But so far there is nothing final. The final The budget and work program is on an annual the final development plans for the second development plan was not approved yet. basis. So on the work program we will agree licensing round [projects] are the, what we So this is the situation regarding the with companies on a level of production - say call, enhanced redevelopment plan for the first round and the second round fields. it is, for example, in Rumaila, 1.5 million [bpd]. first licensing round. For the first - Rumaila, In the third round, there was nothing If the contractor will not achieve 1.5 million in Zubair, West Qurna 1 and Missan oil fields. except for Siba, in which the production each quarter, and say it is 1.4, we will reduce What are the major changes that have will be started in July, I think. the remuneration fee by the ratio of 1.4 and been agreed to in the final development You know that we have the performance 1.5 – the ratio between the actual production plans? factor. The performance factor in our to the planned approved production. The final development plan envisages previous contracts will be applied during So this is another change to the that the plateau will be reduced in some the plateau period. When the plateau contracts. And this will be applied to the of these fields. In Rumaila, in Zubair, West target is not achieved, then we will apply remaining period of term of the contract Qurna 1, Missan oil fields, and the other the performance factor to reduce the rather than during the plateau period only. fields, except for Garraf. remuneration fee. The Oil Ministry has recently In Garraf field, the plateau is always Now, when we will change the plateau renewed and expanded the agreement maintained the same, 230,000 bpd. But for the or reduce the plateau and approve the with BP for its technical study of Kirkuk other fields, the plateau is under discussion final development plan of the fields, there oil fields. What is the long-term vision with Basra Oil Company and contractors, or will be some change to the concept of the for BP’s relationship with North Oil Missan Oil Company and their contractor. performance factor. Company and its activities in Kirkuk?

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There is no long-term deal between them. in the fields, and when security will be increasing the remuneration fee - one They have signed a Letter of Intent, in January stable, Kogas will resume operations. more. These are the main things. this year, and it is for 18 months. During this In Mansuriya there is another problem: Of those, what are you willing to period of time, there should be some kind it is not the security issue but the financing accept? of discussion or negotiation between North issue of the companies constituting the Actually, it is not now, but more than one Oil Company, and the [Petroleum] Contracts contractor. TPAO, Kuwait Energy and year we told them we can accept to extend and Licensing Directorate, and BP, regarding Kogas. And we had a meeting with them, the term of the contract for the period, for a service contract for the redevelopment the three companies, and I informed the holding period, because of the force of Kirkuk oil field and some other oil fields, them to send a letter to the Ministry of Oil majeure, because of the security situation, which are Bai Hassan, Khabbaz and Jambour. expressing their position clearly, whether in the order of five years to compensate for But so far it has not been negotiated. they are interested in the project, keen to this period of instability and insecurity. For gas fields, is the Oil Ministry close continue and resume operation in the field. And we accept to make the R-factor flat, to any agreements with the operating And without any further demands, and this means that the remuneration fee companies to re-start work at Akkas or actually, they would like to amend the will be flat - will not be reduced during the Mansuriya? contract. They are requesting to the Ministry term of the contract - and to fix the ceiling You know, these two fields are in very of Oil six or seven points to be changed in of cost recovery at 60 percent rather than risky security situations. And there is a the contract. We agreed on three, and I told 50 percent. difference between the two. them we will not grant them anything more If you know that - we have two ceilings in Mansuriya is better than Akkas in terms except these three, and if they don’t like or the contract, 50 percent cost recovery and of security. Kogas is ready to resume accept we will have another position with another percentage up to 10 percent, then petroleum operations [at Akkas] when the them regarding Mansuriya. total 60, for the supplementary cost. So we security situation in Akkas is settled and What elements did they want changed? will assume the ceiling is 60 percent. ♦ stable. But the security situation in that The term of the contract, the R-factor area is not so stable so far. The Ministry of to be flat, increasing the ceiling of cost READ THE FULL STORY @ Oil requested to provide security measures recovery, reducing the state partner share, www.iraqoilreport.com

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Q&A: Brig. Gen. Ali Hussein Hilal al-Mayahi, director of South Oil Police

AL-MAYAHI, cont’d from page 1 The oil sites are mostly located near poor What has been the Oil Police strategy areas, where services are most lacking. in dealing with protesters? Directorate, responsible for securing What other security forces are When the protests started to increase, energy infrastructure in the provinces of responsible at the oil sites that have we took up positions 800 meters away from Basra, Missan, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna. seen recent protests? We have heard the entrances to oil sites, to be between He spoke with Iraq Oil Report about the that reserve forces, including Counter- those sites and the protesters. ongoing challenges posed by the protests, Terrorism Service (CTS) forces, have We do not deal with the protesters as well as the government’s broader efforts been deployed to Basra. directly, as this is the job of other security to secure an industry that provides about There are no military units inside the forces. We just stop those who attempt to 90 percent of state revenue. oil sites, but they are at the entrances of enter the oil facilities, as this is our duty. What kind of a security threat did Zubair, West Qurna 1, and West Qurna 2. And we have advanced to other positions you see in the protests at oil sites? We have dealt with the protests based on their nature. Some are a peaceful type that doesn’t seek to shut down roads that lead to the oil sites. The other type, which we’ve had to be firm with, are the saboteurs who try to take advantage of the protests. Note that some employees of Basra Oil Company and even the Oil Police elements were among the protesters at the oil sites. But the saboteurs have injured 50 security elements in our headquarters alone, when they attempted to break into it for a whole week [in mid-July]. They threw rocks and flaming bottles at our units, who managed to arrest 70 of the rioters. How are responsibilities for oil sector security divided between the Oil Police and the other security elements? The South Oil Police Department’s task is to protect the Oil Ministry’s sites: wells, Brig. Gen. Ali Hussein Hilal al-Mayahi, director of South Oil Police, in his Basra office on July 29, 2018. pipes, stations, and staff. Our job is at the gates and inside the sites, while outside of For example, West Qurna 2 was as a proactive action, in coordination with those sites is not our job but other security provided one battalion of special forces to the other security forces. forces’, such as the [field] operations hold the gate, as it was destroyed by some How much discretion is given to and police department. We have lots of protesters, and also to hold some of the commanders at each oil site, and which coordination with these formations. main roads which protesters had used to decisions have to run through you? So, bottom line is that we are in charge get close to the fields. This is in coordination A battalion commander has limited anywhere there is oil. We are responsible with Basra Operations Command. Inside authority in the case of protests, especially for protection, and we have about one the field, the Oil Police and Strike Force near the oil sites operated by international battalion of policemen in each field. provide protection. oil companies. The South Oil Police Department is There are no Counter-Terrorism Service My presence as director is necessary deployed in four provinces - Basra, Nassiriya units near oil fields in Basra. Yes, they are to support those battalions - to assign [Dhi Qar], Amara [Missan], and Muthanna present in the province as reserve forces, more forces from other battalions, or to - and those sites account for about 90 but they haven’t participated in any security coordinate with the operations command percent of Iraq’s production and exports. mission until now. to send us reinforcements.

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As a director, I can hold negotiations rest of the world is now using, such as suggested to form Oil Riot Police, which with the protesters and give them promises cameras and drones. happened - as an order was now made to to reduce the tension, whereas a battalion In terms of human resources, what we form a riot company within each battalion, commander has jurisdiction only within the have is not enough to secure all the sites, to be equipped and trained. BOC has area he is assigned to. nor can we prevent acts of vandalism like bought all the necessary equipment for a How many battalions of Oil Police are what happened to the [electricity] tower company’s size and the rest of companies there? Is it true that some units will be that was blown up near the West Qurna 2 in those battalions will be equipped merging? field. If we had better technology, we could gradually. Our department has 19 battalions. Four limit the vandalism of towers, wellheads, Do you think international oil of them in Basra, two in Amara [Missan and pipelines. companies have confidence in Iraq’s province], two in Samawa [Muthanna Another problem is not just related ability to keep them safe? province], and one in Nassiriya [Dhi Qar to protesters and saboteurs but also At Majnoon field, the Chinese company province]. We have submitted a plan to smugglers. Does South Oil Police have Anton has just came to replace Shell on the Energy Police department to merge the capacity to prevent smuggling? June 30th, and this company stopped four battalions in Basra [to form the] West Smuggling is a complicated matter working in Majnoon field, which forced us Qurna Battalion, to reach the perfect size because it requires special capabilities. to intervene, comfort them, and persuade of a battalion in terms of manpower: 750 When I was appointed as director of South them to resume their role at the field. As elements. Oil Police, I did not find a force involved in for the rest of international companies, The Oil Police exists in a directorate this matter, so I worked to create a special they already know the situations near the of the Interior Ministry, guarding company to fight smuggling. We have oil sites. facilities of the Oil Ministry, alongside chased many networks that have better Our message to all the foreign military forces organized under the capabilities than we do. We arrested tens international investment companies is that Basra Operations Command. Where do of people who are being investigated, and there is no reason to fear. No one will be your orders come from? some were submitted to the courts already. allowed to violate these companies. We exist within the command structure There are conditions that allow the We tell them that these protesters are of the Energy Police, [a directorate of smugglers to smuggle oil. Pipelines cover a for general demands, and the government the Interior Ministry] in Baghdad. But to very large area. Some pipelines go through is handling the implementation of these determine our movement, we follow orders cities. Controlling all of that is a challenge, demands. Some are demands on a personal from the Basra Operations Command. despite the constant monitoring we do. level, and we are firm and will prevent them The protests have actually improved our We have petitioned the Oil Ministry from reaching the companies. relations with Basra Operations Command to help us in monitoring tanker trucks We have also started to develop and we are in constant meetings and movements by using GPS tracking and our capabilities further. We have coordination, as it is our backbone of computers at checkpoints. confidence that these companies trust support, especially since these protests Where do smugglers sell their oil? our capabilities to protect them more began taking place outside the oil sites. The smuggled oil is sold to brick factories than their security companies. The recent What are your rules of engagement and tar factories, while the oil products are protests have corrected some of our when dealing with protesters? Are there sold to the gas stations, companies, and weaknesses, and we are in the process any situations where you are authorized factories. of making precautionary actions soon. to use force? Do you have enough resources to So we urge the investment companies No commander or official can give protect oil sites in light of the recent to improve their relations with the areas orders to open fire at the protesters, unless protests? around them and care for them by making saboteurs use weapons to break into the The last thing we were expecting is the projects according to the social benefits oil sites. Then we can use fore to defend protests to target the oil fields, since those funds, in order to increase the trust of the ourselves and the oil facility, which we are fields are the main source of revenues for people in these companies. assigned to protect. Iraq, owned by the people. If they stop, I also urge the protesters to use It seems like a big challenge to Iraq’s lifeblood will stop, too. peaceful methods, and to protect Iraq’s guard infrastructure like wellheads and These protests gained in size suddenly, fortunes. As long as the protests are pipelines that stretch over a very large but our units have done their duty and peaceful, security forces will cooperate area. Do you have enough resources to protected the oil sites despite the lack of and demands will find their way to the do the job well? enough forces. We also don’t have riot government authorities. ♦ We still use primitive methods in our job police. as Oil Police, relying on human resources I spoke personally with the prime READ THE FULL STORY @ without benefiting from technology the minister in his last visit to Basra and www.iraqoilreport.com

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Before turbulent election, Iraq ignored key warnings Iraq's election commission failed to act on detailed UN warnings about serious problems, precipitating a crisis of confidence in the country's May 12 election results.

Iraq’s electoral commission neglected UN, IHEC, and Iraqi government officials. October of 2017 and March and April of to heed a series of pre-election warnings In some cases, legitimate ballots were this year. The authenticity of the letters by the UN about serious flaws in its new improperly invalidated; in other cases, the was confirmed by both a senior UN official electronic voting systems, according to technical problems likely caused accidental and a former IHEC commissioner. official letters obtained by Iraq Oil Report. miscounts; and IHEC never fully addressed The letters from 2017 outline a rigorous The documents do not provide any UN concerns about data security. process for selecting and implementing a evidence that the results of Iraq’s May Such problems helped fuel widespread new voting system - key elements of which 12 national elections were fraudulently allegations of vote-tampering in the days IHEC does not appear to have followed. manipulated, but they do show that the after the election. The uproar resulted in The 2018 letters show the UN’s mounting Independent High Electoral Commission Parliament legislation requiring a manual concern that IHEC was lacking the capacity (IHEC) was aware of - and failed to address recount, which has complicated the already to use its selected technologies and was - technical problems that contributed to a volatile period of post-election government failing to conduct tests that would help iron crisis of confidence in the electoral process. formation. out problems ahead of election day. “UNAMI offered advice to IHEC throughout the electoral process,” said Alice Walpole, head of UNAMI, in a written response to questions from Iraq Oil Report. “That advice was followed in some but not all cases.”

Warnings ignored

The problems began in early 2017, when IHEC - under the leadership of its previous slate of commissioners - decided to adopt electronic vote-counting technology for the first time, framing it as an effort to improve the integrity of the process while speeding up the counting of votes. UNAMI’s Electoral Assistance Office soon expressed its view that technology alone could not address concerns that frequently accompany , such as lack of transparency and vulnerability to fraud. Riyadh al-Badran, the head of Iraq’s Independent Higher Election Commission, speaks during a news conference in Baghdad on May 31, 2018. When a new board of IHEC commissioners was appointed in October 2017, the UN The risks posed by IHEC’s chosen voting The elections results have now been produced an advisory letter emphasizing systems were so great, the UN warned, recounted and certified, but the crisis has that position. that they could “significantly damage the still given occasion to doubt the Writing to IHEC commissioner Muhsen credibility of the technology and undermine integrity of their elections. And it likely Hassan al-Musawi on Oct. 18, 2017, Arain public trust in the whole electoral process,” could have been avoided. said the UN was especially apprehensive according to a letter sent on Oct. 18, 2017, “When I look at the advisory [letters after observing a recent training session by the United Nations Assistance Mission from UNAMI], I see it like a crystal ball,” said held by Miru Systems, the Korean company to Iraq (UNAMI). a senior UN official. that IHEC had contracted to provide vote- Many of the technical issues raised Iraq Oil Report has obtained copies of counting machines. by the UN were left unaddressed and four such letters, authored by UNAMI’s One key problem was that the Miru created major problems on election day, principal electoral advisor, Aamir Arain, machines had a tendency to “identify and according to Iraq Oil Report interviews with which were sent to IHEC in February and stamp valid ballots as invalid,” Arain wrote

9 www.iraqoilreport.com to IHEC. Because the machines marked the IHEC commissioner said he supported that that Miru was resisting pressure from the paper ballots themselves, the UN was also proposal, but that other commissioners UN to clarify technical issues related to the concerned this flaw would end up “resulting ignored the recommendation. security of its machines. in issues during recount and audit.” “Current focus seems to be on fast “Unfortunately, the [UN] team was That problem was left unresolved, delivery of the election results, overlooking unable to provide consultation to improve according to a UN official, who said that a backup procedures,” Arain wrote in the results management program because “significant” number of ballots cast in Iraq’s October 2017. our team doesn’t have all the information national elections were improperly marked These problems went largely related to the electoral management invalid, and therefore not be counted. The unaddressed, the UN official and former system (EMS) or the electoral survey system precise number cannot be known, the IHEC official said, and caused irregularities (ESS) or the electoral data archival system official said, without a full manual recount. on election day. (EDAS) designed by Miru,” Arain wrote to Iraq conducted a manual recount For example, most polling stations IHEC on April 30, 2017. “The experience we of ballots that were subject to formal used Miru machines known as Precinct had with Miru and its lack of readiness to complaints – about 5 percent of the total Count Optical Scanners (PCOS). But in discuss technical matters in the presence votes cast. some places, where PCOS machines were the UN doesn’t indicate a good outcome “Only during the recount are we seeing malfunctioning, another Miru machine was or give the impression of credibility and the number of ballots that were determined used, known as a Central Count Optical openness.” as invalid by the machines incorrectly,” the Scanner (CCOS). Instead of investigating the encryption UN official said. “Judges have made many Many political parties alleged the issue, IHEC tried to compensate for the decisions to change invalid ballots to valid.” PCOS machines were tabulating results potential hacking vulnerabilities by having Musawi and several other former that seemed suspiciously skewed, while each polling station record its data in USB IHEC commissioners did not respond to the backup CCOS machines were yielding flash drives. That way, IHEC could check repeated requests for comment. Miru did results that generally aligned with their any data received by satellite against the not respond to requests for comment. pre-election expectations. On this basis, flash drives, according to Sayed Kakei, some claimed the PCOS machines had who was an IHEC commissioner during the Miscounting likely been hacked to produce a false, elections. Another key problem the UN reported predetermined result. In most provinces, especially in Kirkuk, in 2017 was that the Miru vote-counting In light of the concerns expressed by the Sulaimaniya, Ninewa and Anbar, the data machines had a tendency to miscount valid UN before the election, it now seems that did not match, said Kakei. In Kirkuk he ballots. such irregularities could be a product of attributed the problem to many USBs not The technology was supposed to work technical problems rather than deliberate being delivered to IHEC headquarters from by scanning paper ballots, which voters fraud - though fraud can’t be entirely ruled the province because parties suspected the marked with a special pen, and recording out. In either case, the problem raises commission would tamper with the results. images of each one. When the polls closed, legitimate doubts about the accuracy of The size of the discrepancies and software was supposed to interpret those the published results. their cause remain unknown, though the images and automatically translate the raw The extent of the potential miscounting ongoing manual recount could potentially data into election results. remains unknown. help solve the mystery. But the system did not always provide Lack of security No auditing accurate tallies, and IHEC did not have a backup plan that accounted for the kinds The UN also raised concerns about As the election approached, the UN of problems the UN was observing. what measures, if any, IHEC was taking to also expressed its alarm that IHEC had not “Current IHEC procedures stipulate that secure its data. taken basic steps to audit the integrity of its if a technical failure occurs, the re-scanning Arain’s October 2017 letter voting systems. will be conducted using a backup device, recommended that IHEC get more Miru’s refusal to disclose information which might not address the initial issue if information about the satellite system about their election system had raised it is related to technology,” Arain wrote in used to transmit voter data results to IHEC’s suspicions within the UN that the company October 2017. main computers in Baghdad, in particular knew that close scrutiny would expose To verify the accuracy of the vote- asking whether the system was encrypted. major flaws in its technology. counting machines, UNAMI suggested that These queries were never addressed, “The Koreans, for whatever reason felt IHEC decrease its reliance on technology by according one UN official and the former we were competitors - but that was [just] performing a manual recount in 20 percent IHEC commissioner. their excuse,” said the UN official. “We were of polling stations on election day, before A letter sent to the president of IHEC asking them more critical questions, which releasing any initial results. One former two weeks before the election suggests IHEC staff didn’t have the ability to ask.”

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The UN made several requests for IHEC identify different companies to perform the A full dress rehearsal could have to compel Miru to cooperate with UNAMI’s IT audit. potentially revealed problems that IT advisory, according to the UN official. “But IHEC didn’t get on board,” the UN ultimately plagued election day, the When Miru effectively rejected the offer, the official said. “They just kept slowing it down UN believed. But IHEC’s efforts were UN focused on recommending a third-party and waited so time would pass and the perfunctory at best. audit. election would come. It’s why today there was “I would say it was a simulation in name It was a recommendation that “IHEC never an audit done. The technology IHEC only,” the UN official said. It “should have systematically slowed down,” said the UN utilized was without a third-party guarantee.” included mock balloting, transmission of official. “They never did the audit.” Kakei said IHEC did end up negotiating results, and reception of these results at Kakei, the former IHEC commissioner, with one audit firm that was also on the UN’s the data center” in Baghdad. confirmed that his fellow commissioners recommended list, but by that time, at the But in reality, Miru tested parts of the had been fearful an audit would expose start of May, the commission had allotted system rather than the entire system. problems that had arisen from their and the just four days for the work to be done, a “Crucial steps were ignored,” the UN previous IHEC board’s negligence. timeframe the company could not comply official said. “It was never a full dress “Why IHEC was not able to get a contract with. rehearsal.” [with an auditor]... is because the president Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi The Iraqi Parliament received of the electoral department was afraid that confirmed in a July 4 press conference documentation of the UN’s pre-election if we negotiate or sign a contract with a third that his Cabinet had advocated for third- warnings, which ultimately helped convince party to come in and conduct an audit, and party auditors, and implied that the legislators to pass an amendment to the this audit company finds any discrepancies political independence of IHEC had been election law in June. The amended law or holes or issues with the source code and compromised. replaces the nine commissioners of IHEC with the function of the devices, then we will “We insisted on finding a [auditing] with a panel of judges and calls on them to be in big trouble,” Kakei said. company to run the tests. It is not our oversee a full manual recount. IHEC announced a tender for the audit responsibility, but we did it,” said Abadi. “We presented the UN report as on Jan. 16, 2018, according to a statement “Some political blocs encouraged IHEC not evidence against IHEC in our quest for the and a sample of bid documents for the to do so. They wanted something else, and amendment to the election law,” said Zana process found on the commission’s website. got us to where we are now. They elected Rotayi, an MP with the Komal party who Companies had until Feb. 12 to place a bid. an IHEC board through the ugly political served on the Legal Committee until July 1, But the terms of the deal were seemingly consensus process - each elected one when the Parliament’s term ended. designed to discourage qualified companies [member] for themselves, thinking they can That amended election law largely from bidding. achieve something.” survived a challenge brought by several “We told them, ‘If you use this language, The contract between IHEC and Miru is political parties in Iraq’s Supreme Court, no audit firm in the world will apply,’” said now the subject of an ongoing investigation in early July. The court narrowed the the UN official. One especially problematic by the federal Board of Supreme Audit (BSA). recount significantly, however, to include provision, the official said, stipulated that Kakei said he went to Korea to purchase only ballots that were affected by formal “the audit firm is completely responsible for 10,608 additional machines on top of the complaints. the effective operations of these machines 46,000 purchased by the previous board Rotayi said the Parliament Legal in Iraq on election day. No reputable of commissioners. Since his signature was Committee only received documentation of company can do this job.” in the annex of the initial contract, BSA the UN warnings after the election. The UN also questioned the qualifications investigators have interviewed him. But the UN official said the Parliament of the companies IHEC had identified Legal Committee was alerted well before Heads in the sand as finalists to compete for the auditing the election and also failed to take action, contract. A simulation of the election was conducted and politicians didn’t listen because they “There is no record confirming that at the end of April across Iraq’s governorates, were counting on technology to improve these four companies have ever provided but it failed to meet the expectations of confidence in the electoral process while electoral IT system audit services, including UNAMI. ignoring the steps necessary to achieve that process and source code audit – which “When we realized they don’t want to do result. UNAMI understands is the main aim of an audit, or a 20 percent manual recount [on “Political parties,” the UN official said, IHEC,”Arain wrote to IHEC. election day], or listen to advice, we said, ‘At “were looking at the technology as a Reflecting an apparent loss of confidence least let’s have a dry run, where you simulate savior.” ♦ in IHEC, the UN appealed to the Iraqi Cabinet election day and you run your machines to get involved. In response, in February and then try to transmit the results,’” the UN READ THE FULL STORY @ 2018, the Cabinet formally asked the UN to official said. www.iraqoilreport.com

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