MAOISTS SURGE AHEAD the Nation Under Siege

MAOISTS SURGE AHEAD The Nation Under Siege

1 MAOISTS SURGE AHEAD - The Nation Under Siege

2 Contents

At the Threshhold - Six Questions .... 5 1. Real Objectives of Maoists’ War .... 9 Principal Targets - National Unity and Indian Army .... 10 Right of Self Determination of Nationalities .... 11 “India an Imperialist Power” .... 12 Charu Majumdar’s Thesis .... 12 2. Strengths and Capabilities .... 16 Maoists’ advance in Nepal .... 17 Strategic alliance with Jihadis .... 17 Arming the PLGA .... 19 Flow of Funds .... 22 Propaganda Blitzkrieg .... 22 3. PLGA to Peoples’ Liberation Army .... 24 Stages of Guerrilla War .... 24 Tactics of Guerrilla War .... 24 The Central Military Commission .... 26 Forces - Base, Secondary, Main .... 27 Battles - Guerrilla, Mobile, Positional .... 29 4. Brutal Killings, Genocide and Destruction of Infrastructure .... 30 Bihar .... 30 Chhattisgarh .... 33 West Bengal .... 37 Jharkhand .... 41 Maharashtra .... 42 Orissa .... 44 Andhra Pradesh .... 46 Madhya Pradesh .... 48 5. Security Forces Targeted .... 49 Bihar .... 49 Uttar Pradesh .... 51 Chhattisgarh .... 52 West Bengal .... 58 Jharkhand .... 59 Orissa .... 60 6. Public Face of CPI (Maoist) .... 63 Civil Liberties and Human Rights Platforms .... 63 Revolutionary Writers Associations .... 65 Academics and Intellectuals .... 67 Media .... 70 7. The Political Response .... 73 Unified Command .... 74 Avaoidable Debate .... 75 Political Class in Frankenstein Mode .... 76 Appendix A. Resolution on Nationality Struggles .... 82 B. Resolution against Hindu Fascism .... 83 C. Front Organizations of Maoists .... 84 D. Naxal Insurgency : Major Developments since 1967 .... 86

4 At the Threshold - Six Questions

The Maoists had ambushed and completely wiped out an entire battalion of CRPF on 6 April 2010 at Chintalnar in Chhattisgarh. Even before the nation could recover from the shock they struck again on 29 May. Their diabolic explosion on the railway track at Khemshuli in West Bengal rammed the Mumbai bound super-fast express (Gnaneswari) into a goods train crushing to death 148 innocent passengers including women and children. Over 190 injured. These were not isolated incidents. They were part of a grand strategy to use terror as a political weapon for capturing the Indian State. Two powerful naxal groups, the Peoples’ War (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) operating in non-overlapping geographical regions merged together to form CPI(Maoist). The Union Home Ministry and various intelligence agencies haven’t studied in depth the implica- tions of this merger. Firstly, naxals attained an all-India status. The arrival of new political jargon, namely, ‘Pasupati to Tirupati’, ‘Red Corridor,’ etc was but a reflection of this newly acquired stature. Secondly, an improbable had happened. Terrorist outfits, all over the world, generally split, do not unite for various reasons. Added to these developments, the Insurgency got further boost because of the rapid advance of fraternal Maoists to the central stage in neighboring Nepal almost about the same time. Ever since the merger new areas came under Maoists’ influence. A decade ago, there was hardly any presence of their activity in West Bengal. But now, thanks to Singur and Nandigram, the districts of Medinipur, Bankura and Purulia have come under their grip. By 2006, the Maoist Insurgency has pushed the cross-border terror in Kashmir to second position. Look at the following figures:

5 No.killed during 2006-2010 Maoists’ War Kashmir Insurgency Civilians 2237 661 Security Forces 1297 511 Maoists / Militants 1200 1880

The above figures should not be viewed as mere crime statistics. These were not just ordinary murders. The impact of killing a security person would be different from killing a civilian. Each fatality on the side of security forces, leads to the elevation of another militant as guerrilla because a new weapon was added to the armory.* The above table also conveys that the Peoples’ Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) is expanding rapidly. Not just that. As the Union Home Minister, Chidambaram, admitted recently, the Maoists are in the process of converting PLGA into Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA). This development implies that the Maoists are getting ready to take on the security forces, even outside their zone of influence. The Maoists claim that they have begun ‘mobile wars’ in Andhra-Orissa Border zone. Some areas are totally under Maoist control, inaccessible to the Indian State. In hundreds of villages of Malkangiri dt of Orissa only Maoists’ writ runs. The kidnapping of the Collector of Malkangiri in February 2011 amply unfolds the situation. In Abuzmarh of Chhattisgarh, the Maoists run a parallel government. They enforce conscription to strengthen guerrilla units. For over ten months in 2008-09 State withdrew itself from Lalgarh and Salboni area of West Bengal. Fifteen police stations were closed. This huge set back, in the first place, was due to the intellectual dishonesty on the part of the political leadership. The Centre and the states futilely search for the solution in development alone. Development is the primary responsibility of the Governments in all regions irrespective of the presence of Maoists. One should not be oblivious to the reality that the Maoists do not allow developmental activities in areas under their domination in order to maintain supremacy. Develop- ment at best serves as supplementary measure to insulate unaffected areas from the Maoist virus and to wean away future recruits. But it would not stem the rising tide of insurgency. The Maoists consider the State as their enemy. ‘Enemy’ is the epithet that they use in their literature and speeches against the government. As such they treat the State’s property as enemy’s property. They do not hesitate to destroy State’s or people’s assets such as railways (trains, engines, tracks, stations and communication equipment), telephones, roads, culverts, buses of public transport corporations and even schools and hostels. They do not view road as a means for development but as a facility for quick movement of enemy’s forces. They view school as a facility for stationing enemy’s troops. Look at what they have done to public properties in Chhattisgarh during the past two years.

* A Maoist document titled Post Election Situation-Our Tasks of 12 June 2009, claimed that they had killed 2000 security personnel including Central Para-military Forces, injured about 2000 and snatched away 2,500 weapons, one lakh rounds of ammunition since the PLGA was founded on 2 December 2000.

6 Public Assets Destroyed by Maoists in Chhattisgarh in 2008-9 Schools 96 Roads 71 Other Public Assets 400 (The Hindu, Editorial, 19 May 2010)

According to UNISCEF Report, the Maoists have either blasted or set on fire 300 schools in Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Orissa during 2006-09 They had destroyed Railway properties worth crores of rupees in Jharkhand, Bihar, and West Bengal besides Chhattisgarh during the past decade under one pretext or other. Their growth was dependent on creating terror. Nation’s unguarded assets constitute soft targets for Maoists’ explosions. In Andhra Pradesh, during 1980s and 1990s, they had destroyed 94 assets of railways, 300 telephone exchanges, 500 government buildings and 1500 state owned buses. In 2010 there has been a spate of such attacks in other states. In April 2010 schools were blasted in Bihar. Tatanagar bound express was fired upon in West Medinipur dt. in May 2010. During the same month, a bomb went off under a train carrying oil through Bihar: 14 freight cars caught fire. On May 19, Maoists bombed a freight train near Jhagram. In February 2010, Railways were targeted 11 times In this context the following observations of Ajai Sahni, Executive Director, Institute of Con- flict Management, New Delhi, are candid enough: “…Development cannot be a counter-insurgency strategy. It is the duty of the government to carry out developmental activities. But it is a much-longer-term programme than counter insurgency”. “People who are talking about this are basically saying that good health is a solution to disease. But when you look at India demographically and its cumulative developmental deficits, 836 million people (77 per cent of the population) are living on less than Rs.20 a day. More than half of them live on less than Rs.10. They are living on the edge of survival and are you telling me that the government has the capacity to bring this section to middle-class prosperity in 18 months?” “The model of development here is also not unidirectional. Even as it is benefiting many, it is actually harming many people. Rural distress has increased in the past decades. Why don’t you develop your areas where there is peace? In Delhi, the Maoists are recruiting students, retailers affected by the ceiling drive and multinational retail companies, people displaced or affected by SEZs, unorganized workers. If you have cancer, you have to treat it first. I cannot tell a cancer patient to go home and try to be in good health.” (Frontline, 6 November 2009) The inadequacies and poor responses felt in the political front were far more pronounced than the reverses in the security front. The Maoists and their pseudo-intellectual fellow-travelers are very clever people. They juxta- pose the failures of the system against their path of violence. They raise questions that the dumb, poor and marginalized, would like to ask the insensitive administration. The social unrest that erupted in several pockets across the country because of the Special Eco- nomic Zones and mega projects in power, steel, mining and coastal corridor sectors by the corporate houses, wasn’t the creation of Maoists. Lakhs of acres of land was forcibly taken away from the marginalized farmers and tribals to pass on to the corporate giants in the name of industrial development. Not only Nandigram (Indonesian Chemical Company Salem), Salboni (Jindal),

7 Lohandiguda(Tatas), Durli (Essar), Nagarnar and Dilimili (NMD), Raoghat, Kalinga Nagar have become synonymous with the deprivation of the livelihood of the poor. The callous approach of the governments towards these so called growth projects has opened up new avenues for the Maoists to expand. Any comprehensive strategy to defeat the Maoists in their war cannot ignore the concerns of the poor. Whatever success that the security forces might achieve in this war, need to be consolidated by policy corrections in the economic front. The Political leadership has been committing a serious blunder in another aspect as well. They look to the other way when it comes to taking on Maoists ideologically. Maoists skillfully exploit the rivalries among the political parties and groups within them. Since 1982 onwards, the opposition party in Andhra Pradesh whoever it were, unabashedly soft towards naxals. Sympathisers of naxals got elected to the Assembly alternately on TDP and Congress tickets. In the end it only strengthened the pernicious ideology. A major section of the media and journalists have been the biggest alleys of Naxals. Media reports on Maoist attacks were always biased.. They might not endorse the violence explicitly, but not a single editorial was written without riders giving respectability to the naxals. In this age of paid news, it not difficult for the Maoists to get the events published the way they want.

Six Questions People of this country raise the following six questions in the context of Maoists’ rapid advance in several states: 1. Misery and underdevelopment in rural areas might be the root cause for Maoist Insurgency. But does economic development alone wipe out this scourge from the body politic of the nation? 2. The naxal insurgency has been in existence for the past four decades. How could it survive so long? How could it survive the collapse of Leninism in Europe and the advent of market economy in Mao’s China? 3. Can a political ideology be made ineffective without a public debate? Why the Indian political class is so shy and reluctant to take on the Maoists politically? 4. Why the intellectual sections in considerable numbers, be they academics, poets, writers, artists, and film directors lean towards Maoist ideology? Why the role of state-funded institutions such as JNU in spreading this pernicious ideology was not discussed in public domain? 5. Why large sections of the media eulogize Maoists? Was it because of the influence of Western media which has been consistently anti-India? 6. Why our intelligence organizations were so apathetic vis e vis Maoist Insurgency? Was it because of lack of proper orientation and training or because of the lack of political direction? Is our intelligence apparatus free from the ideological influences of Maoists? Is it free from infiltration?

8 1

Real Objectives of Maoists’ War

* To seize power state by state * Principal Targets: National Unity and Indian Army * “India an Imperialist Power”

The CPI(Maoist) has explicitly stated in its Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution (One of the five documents adopted at the merger conference of the Peoples’ War Group and MCC in September 2004) that it wants to seize power state by state through armed struggle. They haven’t minced words:

“The unevenness of development in India indicates that it is not possible to stage a simultaneous revolution (i.e., an armed in- surrection) throughout the country and that the line of area wise seizure of power through the strategy of protracted people’s war has to be adopted basing on the relatively backward and strategic areas of the countryside. This means revolutionary war has to begin in those regions that are relatively more backward and where the social contradictions are sharp. The strength of the armed forces of the reactionaries is quite in- adequate in the vast countryside of India and the inadequacy of the transport and communication system and other infrastructure makes it inconvenient for the quick movement of the enemy forces. The people’s armed forces - the people’s army and the people’s militia, on the other hand, can advance and retreat easily, according to the needs of the struggle, in the vast countryside, that is, there is enough room for their manoeuvre in face of a big military offensive by the enemy’s armed forces.” “Thus the vastness of the countryside, 9 the inadequacy of the transport and communication system and the isolation of the remote countryside from the military centers, and above all, the inadequacy of the reactionary armed forces in comparison to the vastness of the country and the population, if all these are taken into consideration, the military strength of the reactionaries is relatively weak in the countryside compared to that in the cities, and hence from the military point of view, the vast countryside is the most advantageous for the revolutionary people’s army to strike at the enemy. Hence, we can transform the vast tracts of the countryside into red resistance areas, guerilla zones, guerrilla bases and liberated areas by making use of the favourable terrain which is abundant in some regions of the Indian countryside. Liberated areas can also be established in the plains when the domestic and international situation becomes more favourable and the people’s army becomes powerful i.e., when the revolutionary war is at a high peak.” (The Central Task of Revolution – Seizure of Political Power by Armed Force, Chapter 6) *

“Indian Army – A Paper Tiger” The ideologues of CPI(Maoist) rouse the morale of their cadres by creating false images such as “Indian Army is only a paper tiger”. They put forward a perverse logic that Indian Army’s interests are different from the interests of the people. Argues the above mentioned document:

“It should, however, be noted that the enemy is superior only from the tactical point of view. In the strategic sense, enemy’s armed forces are only paper-tigers. Their interests are diametrically opposed to the interests of the broad masses and hence cannot get any cooperation from the people. Their morale and combat capacity are quite low primarily because of their mercenary nature; and the contradiction between officers and soldiers also contributes to it considerably. Moreover, since the vast majority of them are peasants in uniform, the influence of the agrarian revolutionary war will have a deep impact on them.” And hence the Maoists theorize that it is possible to overpower the Indian Army: “However strong the enemy’s military power may be and however weak the people’s military power, by basing ourselves on the vast backward countryside-the weakest position of the enemy-and relying on the vast masses of the peasantry, eager for agrarian revolution, and creatively following the flexible strategy and tactics of guerrilla struggle and the protracted people’s war, - as a full meal is eaten up mouthful by mouthful, exactly in the same way, - by applying the best part of our army (a force few times stronger than that of the enemy) against different single parts of the enemy forces and following the policy and tactics of sudden attack and annihilation, it is absolutely possible to defeat the enemy forces and achieve victory for the people in single battles. It is thus possible to increase the people’s armed forces, attain supremacy over the ene my’s forces and defeat the enemy decisively. (The Central Task... Ibid., Chapter 6)

Principal Targets - National Unity and Indian Army One of the important strategic considerations of CPI(Maoist) was based on the assuption that dispersal of Indian Army units to meet the challenges posed by insurgency movements in various parts of the country is imperative. This was again based on the fundamental ideological plank that India is not a national at all, but a conglomeration of nationalities kept together by the Indian

* To a specific question “If you really have a pro-people agenda, why insist on keeping arms? Is your goal tribal welfare or political power?” by Tehelka, Mallojula Koteswar Rao alias Kishanji replies: “Political power. Tribal welfare is our priority, but without political power we cannot achieve anything. One cannot sustain power without an army and weapons” (Tehelka, 21 November 2009)

10 Army. It is very eloquent on this pernicious theory. What Mao formulated in 1930s, in the context of China, the CPI(Maoist) wants to adopt in case of 21st century India. They argue:

“the irreconcilable contradiction between the various nationalities and the Indian ruling classes leading to incessant armed confrontation - contributes greatly to weaken the enemy and helps the advance of the revolutionary movement.” “This circumstance arises from the fact that the unfinished democratic revolution in India has left the national question unresolved and it is the Party of the proletariat that should take up the historic task of solving this problem from a class perspective. A large part of the remote countryside, most advantageous for the establishment of red liberated areas form the geographical and military point of view, are being inhabited mainly by the discontented and agitated nationalities and tribes, who are engaged in a bitter armed confrontation with the Indian state. Hence, it becomes imperative for the enemy’s armed forces to be deployed in large numbers in ever-wider areas to contain the armed struggles waged by the various nationalities.” “Lakhs of enemy’s armed troops have been deployed since long in Kashmir and the North Eastern states alone. More and more nationalities may come into armed confrontation with the reactionary Indian state that is keeping them in a state of subjugation and oppression and denying them their right to self-determination. As a considerable part of the enemy’s armed forces will inevitably be engaged against the growing tide of struggles by the various nationalities, it will be difficult for the Indian ruling classes to mobilize all their armed forces against our revolutionary war. If our Party can lay down the correct basis to win over the nationalities and tribes through our policy of guaran- teeing self-determination for the nationalities and political autonomy for the tribes and forge a powerful united front against the common enemy (i.e. imperialism, CBB and feudalism) with these forces we can spread the flames of armed struggle to almost all the strategic regions in the country.” (The Central Task... Ibid., Chapter 6)

“Right of Self Determination of Nationalities – A Pillar of Revolution” The CPI(Maoist) considers the right of self determination of nationalities as one of the two main pillars of its revolution, the other being land problem. It did not mince words:

“Our country is a prison-house of nationalities where some nationalities are engaged in bitter struggles against the Indian state to achieve their right to self-determination.” (The Central Task... Ibid., Chapter 6)

In an exclusive resolution specially adopted on the issue, the 9th Congress of the CPI(Maoist), January 2007, says:

“India is a country of many nationalities at various phases of development. They have been struggling in different forms against the repressive and expansionist policies of the Indian ruling classes. Kashmiris and different nationalities of North-East India such as the Assamese, Nagas, Manipuris, Tripuris, etc., have been long since waging armed struggle against the Indian Government for their right to self-determination, including the right to secede from the so-called Union of India. The Indian ruling classes and their imperialist masters, particularly US imperialism, have been suppressing these struggles mercilessly. They are being crushed under the boots of the Indian Army stationed in various states of the north-east and in Kashmir. In Kashmir alone, the Indian military and paramilitary forces have murdered over 70,000 people in the last 16 years. A year ago, the Indian Army along with the Bhutanese Army killed hundreds of activists and supporters of the ULFA, Bodos and the KLO. However, even these most cruel repressive actions by the Indian Government could not stifle the voice of the struggling masses of these nationalities. They still continue to wage armed struggle and carry out 11 their attacks, striking blows at the Indian armed forces.” (see Ap pendix-A)

The resolution also hinted that the CPI(Maoist) would form a separate organization to take up the nationality issue.

“India an Imperialist Power” To attract various insurgency movements into its fold and forge a strategic alliance against the Indian nation, systematically the naxals have been unleashing vituperative propaganda depicting India as an imperialist power.

“The exploitation and control of imperialism, particularly U.S. imperialism, are not confined to the sphere of economy alone; with the help of the weapon of neo-colonialism they have established their own influence, exploitation and control over military policies through various means, such as, military “aid and co-operation”, employment of “advisers”, etc., and are strengthening their positions day by day through various kinds of military pacts. All these are going on under the various signboards of the “national defence”, the “defence of the country”, etc., etc. This army is being used not only to suppress the revolutionary movements and national liberation struggles in India but also in other countries.” “Creation of Bangladesh, forced annexation of Sikkim, interfering in the internal affairs of the neighbouring courtiers, sending army to Sri Lanka and Maldives etc. are the examples of the expansionist activities of Indian State backed by the super powers during the decade of 1970s and 80s. Today it is pursuing the policies of intervention, blackmail, meddling and subversion in the affairs of Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka etc., with the same backing of the various imperialist powers, particularly the US superpower.” (The Central Task... Ibid., Chapter 6)

Every theoretical document of naxalites emphatically says that Kashmir is not an integral part of India. Naturally that was music to the ears of Pakistan and the terrorist Laskar e Toiba. Maoists never condemn terrorist attacks such as 26/11.

Charu Majumdar’s Thesis

The ideology of Maoists was rooted in Karl Marx’s Manifesto, Lenin’s State and Revolution and Mao’s Red Book. As such the armed rebellion is an embarrass- ment to the CPI(M); the Maoists use the same flag, same symbols and the same jargon. All the founder members of the insurgency were associated with CPI(M) in the past. Charu Majumdar wrote eight articles during 1965-67, which might constitute the basic ideology of naxalism. The theme could be sum- marized as below:

12 (1) Indian economy is semi-feudal and semi-colonial. The state and ruling class represents the interests of big landlords and bureaucratic-comprador capitalists. The ruling class is a pawn in the hands of the U.S. imperialism and Soviet social imperialism. Therefore, the basic objective of any democratic revolution has to be “to over- throw the rule of feudalism, comprador-bureaucratic capitalism, the U.S. imperialism and Soviet social imperialism.” (2) There is no alternative to armed struggle. Other forms of political activity – public meetings, mass struggles for solving people’s problems - amount to revisionism. Parliamentary institutions should be discarded. (3) The conditions for waging armed struggle in India are ripe. (4) The main force of the democratic revolution emerges from the peasants and landless poor. They should be brought to the fore- front of the armed struggle. (5) The primary stage of the revolution would be annihilation of class enemies one by one. Each act of annihilation would create a base. These bases would facilitate the free movement of guerrillas, which eventually lead to the formation of liberation army. (6) The revolutionary army would liberate the rural areas one after another and ultimately encircle the towns and cities. (7) The leadership of the revolutionary movement in India would be subordinate to the Chinese Party. Charu Majumdar resorts to over simplification and trivialization to make his arguments appeal- ing. “Once inspired”, exhorts Majumdar, “with the revolutionary theory, that is, Mao Tse-tung thought, men turn into spiritual atom bombs which are more powerful than thousands of atom bombs.” He gave a call to make 1970s ‘the decade of liberation.’ Writes Majumdar: “When I say ‘make 70s the decade of liberation’, I cannot think beyond 1975. The idea of today’s armed struggle was first born in the mind of one man. That idea has now filled the minds of ten million people. If the new revolutionary consciousness, born only in 1967, can permeate the minds of ten million people in 1970, why is it impossible then for those 10 millions to rouse and mobilize the 500 million people of India in a people’s war? “ A day dreaming indeed! Charu Majumdar did not live to see for himself the fate of his predictions. Red flag did not flutter over Red Fort by 1975 as he pronounced. Luckily he was also spared from the distress of watching the crumbling of communist oligarchies in East Europe and in the USSR. He was also spared from the spectacle of Maoism giving way for market economy in China after Mao departed from the scene. His death (1972) preceded the death of Mao (1976) by four years. The naxal leadership that succeeded Charu Majumdar was clue less over the demise of communism in Europe and the long-march of China along the capitalist road. Significantly, it was a suicide committed by the system, which was assiduously built by Lenin, Stalin and Mao and vigorously defended by the Marxist intellectuals for over seven decades. Lenin’s Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The Red Flag was pulled down from Kremlin on 23 August 1991. On 29 August 1991, the Supreme Soviet outlawed the Communist Party of the 13 Soviet Union. Nevertheless it took 14 years for the PWG to realize that the adage ‘Leninist’ was a burden and no more useful.

Why the USSR collapsed? After capturing power in Russia in October 1917, Lenin took several measures to put Marxism into practice including the following: 1. Entire private property was abolished. The management of agriculture, industry, trade and commerce was taken over by the state itself. 2. All political parties were outlawed and only the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was allowed to function. 3. All class enemies were eliminated. Simultaneously, Lenin propounded a new theory that repression was still required even after the revolution. He did not explain where was the need for repression once the revolution had wiped out the class enemies. This theory, the hallmark of communist regimes of 20th century, wrought havoc with the lives of millions of people not only in the USSR but also in East Europe, China, Cambodia, Vietnam and North Korea. A new legal system was brought in and millions were forced to write their own death sentences. Millions were deported to concentration camps. None of the communist states eschewed repression as a state policy. In the party, in administration and in all other spheres, the proletariat exclusively got the oppor- tunities to usher in Socialism. These persons, after climbing the upper echelons turned despots and emerged as a new class. The phenomenon was not properly analyzed by naxals. There is no guaran- tee that tomorrow after coming to power, they too might transform into another new class.

Equality and Equal Rights Caught in a web of contradiction between ‘equality’ and ‘equal right’ the regimes could not achieve even a semblance of equality. ‘Equal right’ assumes that products (wages) would be deliv- ered according to the work performed. “But different people are not alike; one is strong, another weak; one is married another not; one has more children another less” (Lenin: State and revolution). Hence if equal right was imposed, families which have to spend more save less, and families which have to spend less save more. Consequently, over a period of time inequality would set in. Marx was aware of this contradiction. And hence he condemned “equal right” as bourgeoisie right and suggested: “In order to avoid all these defects, rights instead of being equal, must be unequal.”* A tall order indeed! Lenin was not prepared to abolish “equal right.” If implemented, a truck driver with one child must be paid less than another with two children. Also there should not be any disparity between the salaries of a truck driver and an aircraft pilot. Abolition of private property created insurmountable problems for Marxist dictatorships. The state has become new kulak. Agricultural production declined year after year. Ukraine (USSR) and Anwai (China) suffered severe famines. USSR’s dependence on food imports from capitalist countries increased year after year. There was no improvement in the living standards of common people even after a long wait of seven decades.

* This analysis was in fact the basis for: “Each according to his own ability and to each according to his own need.” 14 Marxism, although projected as humanism, finally gave way for the worst type of tyranny. The tyranny was needed, because the ruling minority i.e., the New Class, wanted to preserve its privi- leges. Secret police emerged as its unavoidable alley. The Chinese Communist Party had the additional advantage in that the Soviet experience of over three decades was before it. Unlike Lenin, who passed away within six years of the October Revolution, Mao lived longer, 26 years, to implement his revolutionary programme. Despite such distinct advantages over the USSR, the Chinese experiment too fared no better. Interestingly, Chi- nese communist leaders discarded the socialist path earlier than the Russians. Den Xiaoping, who knew Mao better than our Maoists and who participated in the Long March, stated on 16 April 1984: “Socialism does not mean poverty. Without developing the productive forces and improv- ing people’s living standards, you cannot say you are building socialism. In two decades, 1957-78, China was plunged by Left ideology and as a result, the country’s productive forces had been severely damaged.” (The Hindu, 16 April 1984). On 7 December 1984, Peking Daily editorially commented: “Marx died 101 years ago. His works were written more than 100 years ago. There have been tremendous changes since his ideas were formed. Some of his ideas are no longer suited to today’s situation, because Marx never experienced these times, nor did Engels or Lenin.” Beyond the physical neighborhood, man always possesses certain core instincts, avarice, jeal- ousy, lust, arrogance, anger etc. There is nothing in Marxism to restrict the power and play of these instincts. Marx scrupulously avoided probing into the enormously wide field of human nature, lest he had to give credence to religion or ethics. Religion or no religion, the baneful characteristics of human nature do exist. A Marxist might argue that in a classless society these urges would cease to be effective. But the pertinent question is whether these instincts would ever allow a classless society to usher in? That was exactly what had happened in the USSR and in East Europe. Wher- ever the ends justify the means baneful instincts bury ethics.

No Legitimacy What was the legitimacy of Maoist party to impose its world-view and programme on the nation? They insist that parliamentary democracy is a big hoax. They say that bourgeoisie parties buy votes and manipulate majority. Fine. But what about their party? Who have given them the mandate? There is no tangible evidence to claim that majority of people have endorsed either their philosophy or programme or their means. Maoist Party aims at establishing their hegemony under the garb of socialism without the concurrence of the people. Power without legitimacy has been their sole objective. Maoists do not spell out the details of their model, economic as well as social. They do not have a blue print. All the conceivable measures to bring in socialism were exhausted by the USSR and China. The Maoists act in secrecy because they have chosen violence as their means. Nevertheless, secrecy always widens the gap between precept and practice. Since the CPI(Maoist) Party cadres were not bound by any constitution or rule of law, they remain unaccountable for their deeds. Party leadership, view the crimes of its cadre exclusively from the point of view of partisan interests and not from the view of natural justice.

15 2

Strengths and Capabilities

* Strategic alliance with Jihadis * Arming the PLGA * Propaganda Blitzkrieg

The merger of PWG and MCC on 21 September 2004 has com- Merger of PWG and pletely changed the internal security scenario in the country. A formi- MCC dable insurgency outfit, CPI(Maoist), came into the fore threatening the democratic polity of the nation. Two naxalite affected regions, namely, Eastern U.P., Bihar, Jharkhand on one side and West Bengal, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, on the other were forged into one “Compact Revolutionary Zone” (CRZ).

21 September 2004 Merger Conference of PWG and MCC Chhattisgarh forests

16 Very significantly, the CRZ touches the coastline in north Andhra Pradesh and south Orissa. LTTE’s strategic strength was Jafna coast. The notion of CRZ has successfully created an illusion in the minds of bureaucracy and political analysts that the CPI(Maoist) concen- trates only in tribal areas of Central India. But the fact is entirely different. It is fast spreading its tentacles in almost all states. Its activities are going on in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Haryana, Delhi, Uttarakhand, Gujarat, Karnataka and Kerala as well.

The LTTE Factor The LTTE had created an international model in terrorism by raising a full-fledged army, that too in an island nation, and by waging a three-decade war. PWG’s links with LTTE dates back to Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) days of mid 1980’s. “Many LTTE innovations, such as explosive belts, vests and bras, the use of female suicide bomb- ers, and water borne suicide attacks against ships, have been copied by other terrorist groups.” (Secretary of State’s report on terrorism to the US Congress, 2006) In some areas of Bihar, the Maoists are forcing one youth from each family to join their ranks adopting the recruitment techniques of LTTE. Even though the LTTE was wiped out in 2009, its remnants who fled, are now in close contact with the Maoists and helping the latter with arms in exchange for safe haven. Government of India informed the Delhi High Court that the pro-LTTE operatives are engaged in procuring explosives, detonators, chemicals and ammunition. (The Hindu, 2 November, 2010).

Maoists’ Spectacular The Nepal Maoists rode to power in just ten years (1996-2006). Advance in Nepal Signifi cantly Prachand (Pushpa Kamal Dahal), Chief of Nepal Maoists, had learnt his first lessons in guerrilla warfare from the PWG. He spent a few months in 1994-95 in Nizamabd district of Andhra Pra- desh. In the April 2008 elections, the Maoists have got 32% vote and captured 220 seats in the 601 strong Constituent Assembly. Prachanda became Prime Minister in August 2008. It was a different matter that he stepped down in May 2009 on the issue of sacking the Army Chief. The Maoist Army in Nepal still remains intact and formidable. The spectacular advance of Maoists in Nepal is a great source of strength to CPI(Maoist) from several angles. Katmandu-Lhasa road is now easily accessible to Indian Maoists.

Strategic Alliance The illegal infiltration from Bangladesh is viewed by Maoists as a between Maoists and source of enormous strength. Bangladesh serves as a sanctuary to Jihadis Maoists as well. They are also fully exploiting the strategically situated Chicken Neck for moving freely into Nepal and Bangladesh.

17 In an interview published in The Times of India (15 May 2007), M.Laxman Rao (Ganapathi), General Secretary of CPI (Maoist), had not minced words about the alliance between Jihadis and Maoists. He says: “There is a peoples’ upsurge against globalization all over the world and Islamic upsurge is an integral part of the worldwide people’s upsurge against imperialism, imperialist globalization and war. In essence, we see the Islamic upsurge as a progressive and anti-imperialist force in the contemporary world. It is wrong to describe the struggle that is going on in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestinian territory, Kashmir, Chechnya as a struggle by Islamic fundamentalists or as a clash of civilizations.” According to West Bengal police, the Maoists have close links with the Peoples’ Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) of Manipur including in training and supplying of arms. It is believed that PREPAK members conducted training for Maoist cadres in the forests of Jharkhand in exchange for arms and ammunition. (The PREPAK was founded in 1977 with the objective of “expulsion of outsiders” from Manipur.) The ISI supplies arms to northeast insurgents and asks them to sell the same in turn to naxals at cheaper rates. Chhattisgarh police chief Viswaranjan revealed in November 2010 that Lashkar e Toiba operatives attended a meeting of naxalites some time in April or May 2010. The meeting was intended to provide weapons to Maoists. Home Ministry sources say that Shailen Sarkar, a leader of Bangladesh Com- munist Party was engaged in training naxal funded camps in Bangladesh.

On 1 July 2001, PWG and MCC of India, MCC of Nepal and Links with International some insurgent groups of Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Bangladesh formed Groups a Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia. Taking the cue from LTTE regarding the advantage of overseas support, the PWG made determined efforts to enlist the support of Indians settled abroad who have a soft corner for Maoist ideology (Political Construction – a PWG document in Telugu, March 2001, p.62). The JNU faculty has been playing a key role in this strategic arena, by making their worldwide contacts available to the Maoists. Several students of JNU, who joined Berkeley campus, University of California, formed a cell of CPI (Maoist) in the US. This cell is pro- viding the logistical support in establishing linkages between CPI (Maoist) and other International Maoist groups. The PWG is in regular contact with the following Maoist organizations of various countries: AKP (Norway), CPP (Philippines), PTB (Belgium), PCP (Peru), LPD (Germany), FACMLN (Mexico), TKP(ML) (Turkey), MLO (Senegal), JCP (Japan)

18 Arming the PLGA The Maoists say that “Enemy’s armoury is our armoury”. It was no mere boasting if one look at the Dantewada massacre of April 2010. The PLGA could fully arm one battalion with the arms looted. The aforesaid dictum implies that they would attack with inferior weapons and snatch superior arms. The disadvantage in the quality of weapons would be overcome by superior strategy and motivation. This was the main reason for frequent attacks on security forces in recent years. “During the last decade the Maoists snatched away 2,500 weapons and lakhs of rounds of ammunition.” (The Hindu, 5 De- cember 2010) Landmine was the most powerful and devastating weapon in the armoury of Maoists to ambush and take on the security forces. The first landmine went off more than two decades ago at Ambatpalli, Karimnagar dt., Andhra Pradesh, killing six BSF jawans. Most of the casualties of security forces during the past 20 years were due to landmine blasts. Each landmine blast added few more weapons to the armoury of Maoists. Landmine emerged as the major weapon because the materials required are easily available and it is easy to fabricate. Gelatin together with nitro glycerin compound is highly explosive. Gelignite or blasting gelatin is a stable substance that can be transported with relative ease when paired with a detonator cap. (Sixty-one trucks carrying explosives from Rajasthan Explosives and Chemicals Ltd. at Dholpur to a trading company at Sagar in Madhya Pradesh between April to July 2010 disappeared) The Maoists do not manufacture or import these materials: they just seize them from mining companies and civil contractors. In an interaction with Aman Sethi of The Hindu, one Ganesh an underground Maoist leader revealed: “We loot gelatin by raiding mining companies and teaches militant members how to fabricate improvised explosive devices.” He further said: “In February 2006, for instance, a company of Maoist fighters attacked the National Mineral Develop- ment Corporation depot in Hirali in Dantewada and made off with tones of gelatin-based explosives intended for the mining industry.” Another Maoist leader, Ravula Srinivas revealed in the same interview: “Once our company killed eight CISF guards, over a thousand villagers helped us carry away the explosives throughout the night.” (The Hindu, 13 June 2010) It was indisputable that the Maoists get an uninterrupted supply of AK-47 rifles, SLRs, ammunition and grenades. Possibly they get from external sources such as Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan through other insurgency outfits apart from internal sources such as BSF, CISF, Army Depots through smugglers. From the video clippings and from the police catches, it was evi- dent that their arsenal contains India made assault machine guns and

19 carbine that fire 5.62 mm, NATO ammunition of the AK 47 that fire 7.62 mm and even Israeli made sniper rifles. Not only procurement, even transportation is full of risks. Yet the way Maoists are managing this supply chain of weapons indicates the callous attitude of the security apparatus. The investigations carried after the Dantewada massacre of 6 April 2010, exposed the hollowness of the CRPF. The Hindu reports, “Ac- cording to police sources, the arms and ammunition, allegedly siphoned off from the armoury of the Central Reserve Police Forces’ 62 Battal- ion Group Centre in Rampur and Police Training College in Moradabad, were being supplied to naxalites and anti-socials through a ‘contact’ in Allahabad.” (The Hindu 1 May 2010) * There were similar allegations against the Provincial Armed Constabulary of U.P. in the past. On 29 April 2010, the Special Task Force (STF) seized 8-10 bags in Rampur from three persons containing 5000 live cartridges, 16 magazines of INSAS (Indian Small Arms Systems) and 245 kg of used cartridge shells. The raids conducted in Moradabad, Kanpur and Jhansi revealed the involvement of retired police officers and CRPF personnel in smuggling the weapons. Like other insurgents the Maoists too anticipate heavy losses of their weapons in combat operations and police raids. That is why they go in for procurement of arms eight times more than what was required. A third of their extortions are being spent on arms. A Peoples’ War documents reveal that it had acquired the capabilities to attack helicopter gun-ships in 2000 itself.

The PWG formed a technical unit in Dandakaranya in 2000 for Manufacturing Arms manufacturing shotguns, grenades, grenade launchers, magazines, clay- more mines and pipe-guns. It had also set up facilities for repairing small weapons. Hundreds of guns were repaired. (Political Construc- tion in Dandakaranya (Telugu), 4th plenum of Dandakaranya Special Zone held in September-October 2006) From this primary stage they moved on to the stage of manufacturing sophisticated weapons. They copy manufacturing technologies from Internet. They had also obtained manuals of armed forces. They had sliced plastic grenades and developed their own. This is some kind of reverse engineering. Telescopes are being attached for 51 mm mortars for greater accu- racy. Designs of rocket launchers were also recovered from Bhaskara Engineering Works, Bhopal in January 2007. More such units engaged in producing lethal hardware somewhere outside the Red Cor- ridor couldn’t be ruled out. * 2nd Battalion headquarters in Rampur was attacked by LeT in December 2007 20 In September 2006, lathe workshops and foundries manufacturing rocket shells and rocket launchers were unearthed in the suburbs of Chennai (Padi, Korattur and Mogappir). These rockets are capable of hitting targets at 300 to 800 meters.

In January 2007, the Madhya Pradesh police raided Bhaskara Engineering Works in Bhopal manufacturing arms and ammunition.

Bhaskara Engineering Works in Bhopal: Drawing of a Rocket Launcher

21 Clearly the Maoists have been anticipating that sooner or later the Indian Army would be deployed against them. These arms manufacturing programmes are clear indications in that direction. The Ple- num of Dandakaranya Special Zone (2006), refers to the urgent need for artillery capable of hitting fortifications, 200 to 300 metres away.

Maoists have their informers in media, in educational institutions, Intelligence Gathering in government offices and even in police. They also join as drivers, cooks to keep a watch on VIPs. They have prepared detailed manuals on the techniques of gathering intelligence. For instance, they knew every thing about the Jungle Warfare School at Kankar, the plans for the construction of a military airport at Mahasamund and up-gradation of Nagpur and Raipur airports to re- ceive Air Force planes. A Maoist document says: “The scanning of the entire area by satellites is almost on the verge of completion and the satellite images and the concrete topographical map of entire Maad will be ready in another month. Based on this map complete with all hamlets, forest tracks, water points, etc the police and central forces will carry out their operations.” (Post-Election Situation – Our Tasks, 12 June 2009)

Wars require enormous resources. Guerrilla wars are no exception. Unlimited Flow of Funds The funds raised by political parties were no match to the extortions of the naxalites. They impose levy on whole villages. They get on demand huge ransoms from contractors, builders, businessmen, doc- tors and those who want to sell or buy lands. As per Home Ministry sources their annual extortions exceed Rs.2,500 crores.: (Rs. Crores) Jharkhand 1,000 Andhra Pradesh 100 West Bengal 500 Maharashtra 78 Chhattisgarh 500 Orissa 57 Bihar 200 Tamil Nadu 35 (Eenadu, 15 December 2010)

Maoism survives on half-truths, lies and myths. Since the argu- Propaganda Blitzkrieg ments have to be loaded and facts have to be distorted, Maoists require a powerful propaganda machine. Apart from the astounding support that the Maoists get from the media, they maintain their own periodicals. From Abuzmud alone they publish as many as 25 magazines, some of them in tribal dialects of Koya and Gond in Hindi script. Some of these periodicals:

22 Prabhat Sangharsh Rath Midangur Peoples’ War Viyakka Jhunkar Moilgudrum Lal Pataka Vadivarapollo Pituri Bhumkal Awami Jung

A video grab from the Maoist documentary released to the press in July 2007

Apart from periodicals they also run an FM Radio in Dandakaranya. Maoists also use the latest technology and gadgets in their bid to strengthen their armed struggle. They are producing documentaries with live coverages of their ambushes and attacks on police stations. The Hindu reported in detail on one such documentary made available to the media in July 2007: “It not only shows the preparations of the PLGA fighters but also live footage of the raid on the Murkinagar police outpost in Bijapur district on April 16, 2006. During the raid, seven policemen and 10 Special Police Officers were killed, and 49 weapons, including a light machine gun and thousands of bullets were seized by the Maoists. The footage shows the ease with which the PLGA fighters mounted the attack and overran the police camp amid gunfire and the crackle of wireless sets used by them to coordinate the movement of their assault teams. Explosion of hand grenades, rapid fire from an LMG, orders being shouted (mostly in Telugu) for ad- vancing towards the camp and firing….the documentary captures every detail, just like the war movies. The documentary also dwells on the endurance and fitness modules, and weapons and combat training of the PGLA men.” “The documentary would certainly appeal to the youth. As it projects an extraordinary positive image of the Maoist rebels. It seek to drive home the message that the Maoists are in no way inferior to the security forces.” (7 July 2007) The Dantewada massacre of 62 Battalion of CRPF was vediographed and was released to the media. 23 3

PLGA to Peoples’ Liberation Army

About 2,600 naxalites died in police encounters in Andhra Pradesh Stages of Guerrilla War alone. Since 1995, the MCC and PWG have lost on an average 200 cadres every year. Among those killed were central committee members. Yet, the organization was able to move ahead with remarkable skills. There are three stages in Maoist guerrilla tactics. During the first or preparatory stage, there will be no violence at all. The militants move in villages like any other political activists, talk about burning issues and enlist the support of the students, women, and downtrodden. They take up issues related to dalits. When Kherlanji incident took place, it was the Maoists who first reacted. No violence is seen at this stage and the state perceives that there is hardly any threat. The teachers, journalists and writers with Marxist leanings would be involved at this stage. This is a stage of “non-kinetic operations”. In the second stage, a two-member squad goes into action, primarily to confuse the state. They fire at a target and run away. For a single round of ammunition expended by the guerrillas, the police use 50 rounds in response and seek more forces. The states, where there was no naxal activity at all, suddenly feel shaken. In a panic reaction these states would dump additional forces to face an evading enemy. When the additional forces arrive, guerrillas lay in wait with landmines. All this happens at the secondary stage. In the third stage the guerrillas attack police stations and other targets in full combat formations. Tamil Nadu and Karnataka have all along been assuming that they

24 were not affected by leftwing extremism. These and some other states walked into the trap of naxals. The Maoists keep a low profile in those states until they are fully ready. Now they have moved into the second stage in Orissa and Chhattisgarh. These states too were in such slumber till recently. When Andhra naxals made Koraput as their sanctuary after operations, the DIG of that area suggested action. But the then government in Orissa ignored the warning. Now the state is pay- ing the price. When a house catches fire, the neighbours instinctively take measures to protect their own houses. Such a common sense was not dis- played by the states neighboring Andhra Pradesh, where the flames have been raging for over three decades.

Tactics of Guerrilla War The Maoists are not hiding the tactics of their guerrilla war. They say: “Our revolutionary war is a new type of war-a people’s war; it must be a war in which we recognize that the enemy is strong and we are weak, that the enemy is big and we are small, and in which therefore we fully utilize the enemy’s weaknesses and our strong points and fully rely on the strength of the masses for survival, victory and expansion.” “Our PLGA should concentrate and deal heavy blows on the weak points of the enemy forces that are ready for attack against our forces with the aim of causing damage to the enemy. The tactical counteroffensive against the enemy should be carried out in the form of small and big military actions. When the concentration of the enemy forces in a given place becomes dangerous to our existence, we should temporarily retreat our guerilla forces to a strategically favourable place with the aim of carrying on the war for a long time. When the chances for enemy attack are more the guerilla squads and platoons should take the necessary precautions to remain secret and concentrate on smashing the enemy attack at the opportune moment. In this way by protecting the PLGA, the Party and the movement from enemy attacks. we should acquire the skill in conducting tactical counteroffensives.” “Not resorting to fighting when the enemy is strong but conducting attacks when the enemy is weak; dispersing the guerilla forces at one time and concentrating the forces at another time; retreating at times and destroying the enemy at other times; being ever prepared to confront the enemy anywhere-such are the methods of guerilla warfare.” “The essence of guerilla war is -when the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy camps, we harass, when the enemy tires, we attack; when the enemy retreats, we pursue.” “Seen from a strategic perspective guerilla war creates many losses and difficul- ties for the enemy. His morale will be broken and will become tired. The sum total of victories in several small battles render impotent the manpower of the enemy. The dispersed battles will develop into a more centralized war. For destroying the enemy troops on a large scale and to establish the Base Areas the guerilla warfare has to transform itself into mobile warfare.” (The Central Task of Revo- lution – Seizure of Political Power by Armed Force, Chapter 10)

Merger of PGA and The merger of Peoples Guerrilla Army (PGA) of PWG (founded PLGA in December 2000) and Peoples Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) 25 of MCC (founded in April 2003) were brought under one command with effect from 2 December 2004. The Central Military Commission (CMC) is their mobile ‘Army Headquarters.’ It looks after: - Military Training - Procurement and manufacturing arms - Fixing targets and giving directions to the PLGA - Deployment of units of PLGA in different guerrilla zones “The CMC provides the politico-military leadership to the PLGA on behalf of the Central Committee (CC). It guides the military affairs. All the Party committees from the CC to the lower levels do not form part of the PLGA. The first thing is to establish the firm leadership of the Party over the PLGA. The basic leadership system consists of the Party cells and branches in the PLGA and the collective leadership of the Party committees under which the commanders carry out individual responsibilities. PLGA carries out principally guerilla warfare. Hence there will be unified strategy and independent activities. This means that the CC and SCs/SZCs decide the general plans while the lower level commands (Regional/ Sub-zonal, Zonal/district/divisional, Area commands) draw up the correspond- ing operational plans. In the PLGA both military commanders and political com- missars are the leaders of the military units. Distinct work division exists between them. While the military commanders shoulder the responsibility of implementing the orders and instructions related to military matters the political com- missars bear the responsibility of carrying out the tasks related to political matters.” (Ibid., Chapter 10) Military training of PWG began in 1984 in Andhra Pradesh. Re- tired officers of the Indian Army and military experts of LTTE were involved. The preliminary training schedule generally is spread over 3

People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) Central Military Commission (CMC)

Regional Military Command

State Military Commission (SMS)

Sub-Zonal Military Commands (SZMC)

Divisonal Commands (DVC)

Main Force Secondary Force Basic Force Battalions LGSs/LRGSs (People’s Militia) Companies Platoons LOSs/LROs GRDs, ARDs SAT Intelligence Unit

LGS: Local Guerilla Squad; LRGS: Local Revolutionary Guerilla Squad; LOS: Local Organisation Squad; LROS: Local Revolutionary Organisation Squad; GRD: Grama Raksha Dalam; ARD: Area Raksha Dalam; SAT: Special Action Team.

26 weeks. Based on the experiences of guerrilla wars in Sri Lanka, Philip- pines and Palestine, the PWG prepared its own war manual. All details about weapons, their historical development, individual parts, functioning, firepower and range, positions to be taken while using different weapons are being taught. Every detail is explained with diagrams. The syllabus refers to four types of grenades – screaming, seizing, incendiary and gas. It also refers to grenades of German No.36 frag- mentation variety with range 10 to 20 meters, US M25 variety and German DM5 with nitro-penta explosive. Nitro-penta is deadlier than the RDX. The guerrillas engaged in an ambush are divided into four groups namely, scouting, assaulting, commanding and reserve. The positions of the groups are explained. The syllabus also includes: - How to escape if the squad was caught in an ambush - How to resist the enemy in an encounter - Different formations of platoons like single line, triple line, ar- row angle, U formation - A platoon in an encounter

Base Forces People’s militia is the base force in the structure of the PLGA. “This will be extensive numerically. Without the people’s militia it is not possible for the PLGA to develop as it is the principal recruitment source for the other two forces. Efforts should be made to arm the militia and to impart politico military training so that it becomes a militant fighting force and harass the enemy forces continuously without a let up.”

People’s Militia at village level: - Self Defense Squads (SDS) - Village Defense Squads (GRD) – Grameena Raksha Dalam - Area Defense Squads (ARD)

27 Militia

“The secondary forces operate in a specific area. The weapons of the secondary Secondary Forces forces are of relatively inferior quality compared to those of the Main forces. We have to improve them further. Although these are less in number than the base forces, they are better at fighting. They lure the enemy forces into small guerilla activities, harass and tire them and destroy the enemy forces by using guerilla tactics.” - Local Guerrilla Squads (LGS) - Special Guerrilla Squad (SGS) - Platoons and District/Division Action Teams “Though the Main Forces are relatively less in number than other forces they are better in terms of political consciousness, quality of arms and fighting skills.

PLGA

Hence it is the backbone of the PLGA. Without this force it will be difficult for the other two forces to survive.” - Action Teams - Platoon (PL) (33 guerrillas) - Company (3 platoons with 15 at Headquarters = 123 guerrillas)

28 - Battalion (5 companies with 25 at Headquarters = 640 guerrillas) The PWG adopted these formations following the pattern of guerrilla campaigns in Sri Lanka and Philippines. Intelligence agencies estimate that the main and secondary forces constitute around 3000 fighters, the number of people’s militia could be 30,000. (The Hindu, 5 December 2010)

Strength of PLGA 20,000 - According to Philip Bowring (Quoting sources from RAW): International Hereld Tribune 14,000 - 16,000, Accroding to GOC, Central Command

Types of Battles The battles are categorized as: - Guerrilla battles - Mobile battles - Full scale battles “Guerilla war by itself cannot win a revolutionary war as an all-independent form. The guerilla war will continue to develop until the guerilla army grows gradually and acquires the features of a regular army (PLA). After the development of the PLA, victory will only be possible when the enemy is destroyed by developing the guerilla warfare into mobile and positional warfare and is waged in co-ordination with them.” (Ibid., Chapter 10)

Mobile Warfare “The mobile warfare is a war, a regular army wages by concentrating its forces in a vast area with fluid battle-fronts and deployments and often changing from one place to another. It will have the mobility of attacking the enemy at his relatively vulnerable spots and withdrawing quickly and the potential for changing tactics when the conditions change.” “Fight when you can win, move away when you can’t - this is the real essence of mobile warfare.” “This mobile warfare which possesses the elementary features of regular warfare, will have the ability to annihilate the enemy forces in a big way. By thus wiping out the enemy forces on a big scale, this will serve as a key strategy to gain the upper-hand over the enemy and for transforming the war from the stage of strategic defensive to the stage of strategic stalemate or equilibrium and from the stage of strategic equilibrium to the stage of strategic counteroffensive.”

Positional Warfare “Positional warfare is a war waged face to face with the enemy, from fixed positions either to capture or to retain a territory. The positional warfare primarily depends on the theory that retaining of a territory will ultimately lead to victory. Commencing the war with guerilla warfare and then going through the forms of mobile and positional warfares will resolve the question of state power.” (Ibid., Chapter 10) According to the CPI (Maoist) Congress held in January 2007, the Insurgency is now ready to wage mobile battles.

29 4 Brutal Killings, Genocide and Destruction of Infrastructure

* Mayhem of Civilians * Assassnations of Political Leaders * Destruction of Schools, Roads, Railways, Buses, Telephone Exchanges * Blasting Factories

The Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) began its violent activities BIHAR initially in Jahanabad dt. and later spread them to Gaya, Aurangabad, Bhabhua, Rohtas, Darbhanga, Muzaffarpur, Bettia, Patna, Nalanda and Sitamarhi.

The violence of MCC took the turn of caste conflicts in the middle Brutal Caste Killings of 1980s. On 7 October 1986, in Darmia village (Jahanabad dt.) the MCC had massacred 8 Rajputs including five women. On 29 May 1987, the Yadav activists of MCC slaughtered 42 Rajputs in Baghaura

Maoist Violence in Bihar (no. killed) Year Civilians Security-men Maoists 2004 166 5 1 2005 72 24 20 2006 40 5 6 2007 45 22 2 2008 35 21 15 2009 37 25 16 2010 54 24 29 449 116 89

30 BIHAR... and Dalelchak villages in Jahanabad dt. Prakash Singh, for DGP, U.P., narrates: “The womenfolk were made to place their necks on an improvised chopping block and were beheaded with country made axes. The menfolk were either shot or had their throats slit. After the car- nage, the mob torched the Rajput houses and threw the bodies into the fire. The flames could be seen for miles around but there was no succor.” (The Naxalite movement in India, 1995. p.152) After the Baghaura and Dalelchak massacres, the State Govern- ment imposed a ban on the MCC. On 12 February 1992, the MCC massacred 37 Bhumihars at Bara village in Gaya district. Hindustan Times reports: “They called the youths and aged male persons to accompany them to a nearby place. Once they were herded together near an adjacent canal their throats were slit open one after another and the whole place bore a tell-tale testimony to the gruesome incident with patches of the blood pre- senting a devastating sight.” These violent incidents led to the formation of armed groups – senas – by Bhumihars and Rajputs. Ranbir Sena of Rajputs and Bhumihars indulged in retaliatory violence. On 1 December 1997, at Bathelakhmanpur, 61 supporters of Naxals including 33 women and 11 children were massacred by Ranbir Sena. On 18 March 1999, 35 persons were massacred by the MCC in Senari village of Jehnabad district. On 16 June 2000, the Ranbir Sena gunned down 35 people belonging to Yadava community at Mianpur village in Aurangabad district.

Elimination of Other The MCC also targeted fraternal naxal groups. In 1997, it killed Naxal Groups eight cadres of Party Unity in Palamau district (now in Jharkhand) and virtually drove away the CPI(ML)-Liberation from its strong- hold, Chatra district (now in Jharkhand), by brutally killing two of its leaders in public. On 2 August 2000, four members of MCC were killed by the CPI(ML) Liberation in Mahuagoan village, Jahanabad district. In retaliation the MCC abducted 10 activists of Liberation and killed two of them. On 19 October, it eliminated three activists of Liberation in Jahanabad district. In 2002, MCC killings took place in Bhojpur, Patna, Rohtas, Jehanabad districts. About 111 civilians and 6 police personal lost their lives against 22 casualties on MCC side. On 1 April 2003, MCC blasted the railway track in Patna-Gaya section. On 24 April 2006, Maoists ambushed the convoy of a candidate for Zilla Parishad election in Aurangabad district. Six persons including the candidate Ashok Singh lost their lives. Maoists set fire to vehicles and threw the dead bodies into the flames.

31 BIHAR...

November 2005 Landmine Blast

On 22 April 2009 they bombed a Block Development Office in Aurangabad dt. On 13 October 2009 Banni Railway Station (Lakhisarai dt.) was set on fire.

Massacre of Girijans 17 February 2010 Maoists massacred 12 girijans of Kora sect in Kasari village, Jamui dt. They entered the village at night and set fire to several houses and resorted to indis- criminate firing. Three women and a child were roasted alive. The others fell to the bullets. An- other eight seriously injured.

23 March 2010 Rajadhani Express derailed in Gaya dt.

32 CHHATTISGARH Bastar is separated from the Naxal strongholds of Andhra Pradesh, namely Karimnagar and Warangal districts by river Godavari. In fact Bastar was part of Nizam’s territory until Curzon incorporated it in British India in 1903. Forests are dense on either side of Godavari. People in Bastar, mostly tribals, speak Telugu. There was little development there since Independence. The tribals of Bastar were the most exploited in Godavari valley. It was no surprise that naxals could get a strong foothold there with little effort. In the early years of Naxal insurgency in A.P. the extremists used to cross Godavari at Mahadevpur and Kantanapalli and take shelter in Bastar. Gradually the PWG spread its network in Bijapur, Bastar, Dantewada and Kanker districts and started its violent activities. In Surguja district, adjoining Jharkhand, the MCC has spread its network.

Maoist Violence in Chhattishgarh (no. killed)

Year Civilians Security-men Maoists 2004 75 8 15 2005 121 47 32 2006 304 84 74 2007 171 196 66 2008 35 67 66 2009 87 121 137 2010 72 217 102 865 740 492

In 2002, forty six civilians and 9 police personnel lost their lives mostly in landmine explosions. The Maoists also targeted the Samri Aluminum plant of Hindalco in Sarguja dt. and Hindalco’s bauxite mines in Balarampur area. Prakash Singh writes: “They (Naxalites) opposed the worship of Lord Ganesha and Goddess Durga at some public places in parts of Bastar division and even damaged some pujamandapams. A few temples were also vandalized including a Sun temple in Kohkamera village of Narayanpur PS of Bastar district.” (The Naxalite Movement in India, p.176)

33 CHHATTISGARH...

Engine blasted : Bhansi Railway Station

Destruction of railway track

Massacre of tribals at Erraboru On 28 February 2006, twenty-seven tribals were massacred by the Maoists by exploding a landmine at Erraboru (near Kunta), in Dantewada district. They were traveling in a lorry to attend a Salwa Judum meeting. Actually only two died in the blast. The throats of the injured were cut by the Maoists in a beastly manner. They have also torched four other Lorries. Several women and children were injured.

28 February 2006 Errabore blast 27 tribals massacred

34 CHHATTISGARH... The Erraboru Salwa Judum camp was torched by the Dandakaranya Military Platoon of Maoists on 17 July 2006. Twenty-eight supporters of Salwa Judum were killed and 40 injured. Some tribals were burnt alive. Youth who attempted to flee were either shot dead or hacked to death. The Maoists also kidnapped 28 others including some women. They razed to the ground all the 120 houses built by the government for Salwa Judum activists. Before launching the attack, the naxalites laid siege to the nearby camp of the CRPF and confined three platoons to their base. Two days later they have killed six of the kidnapped tribals by torching them in most inhuman way. Those reel- ing with burns were hacked to pieces.

17 July 2006 Another Errobore blast 28 tribals killed

On 18 March 2007, Maoists assassinated BJP leader, Somaram Sodhi near Kirandole railway station. Soddhi contested twice in assembly elections from Dantewada constituency. On 5 June 2007, the Maoists triggered a landmine and blasted a vehicle carrying Electricity Board employees at Kaspi in Narayanpur dt. Three employees died in the blast. The victims were going to re- pair the three Electricity towers blasted by Maoists earlier. On 26 September 2007 the Maoists shot Tansen Kasyap, youngest son of Baliram Kasyap, BJP MP from Bastar. Baliram Kasyap’s three sons, Tansen, Dinesh and Kedar visited Dorguda village to participate in Astami Puja (Dasara). Maoists moving around as villagers, opened fire on Kasyap brothers. Tansen died on the spot. Despite the presence of a sizable CRPF and state battalions, 108 villages in 23 pachayats in Dantewada dt are inaccessible. The observations made by the District Magistrate, Reena Kangale were candid enough. She says that the tribal people are in distress and need the active support of the state. “The tribal population has a deep and in- grained sense of injustice here…They ask for food, medical care and drinking water. The definition of development needs a relook in the

35 context of Bastar. The local elites should be prevented from exploit- CHHATTISGARH... ing the tribal people.” The Planning Commission’s expert group suggested that there is a need to implement effectively protective laws such as Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006, which secures for Adivasis their rights on forest land and forest dwelling.

10 June 2008 Railway Engine derailed after the track was blasted at Kirandole, Dantewada dt.

17 May 2010 Thirty-five people – 24 tribals and 11 Special Police Officers – were killed when Maoists blew up a bus using a powerful IED. The blast took place on Dantewada-Sukhma road.

36 WEST BENGAL Naxal violence in West Bengal, though subsided by 1973, reared its head again in the tribal belt of Purulia, Bankura and West Medinipur districts by 2002. On 9 July 2005, three CPM leaders and a policeman were killed in two separate attacks in Bankura and Purulia districts. On 31 Decem- ber Rabindranath Kar, CPM leader and his wife were killed by Maoists in Purulia district.

Nandigram and Singur The Maoists became more aggressive with the flare up of Nandigram Exploited SEZ issue in November 2006. The attacks by the CPM cadre on Bhoomi Uchhed Prattorodh Committee (BUPC), the brutal firing by the North East Frontier Rifles in March 2007 paved the way for Maoist upsurge in the area. Since most of the farmers in Nandigram were Muslims the issue also took communal form and turned more aggresive. On !4 November, over a lakh of people including writers and film personalities like Mahasweta Devi, Arundhati Roy, Medha Parkar, Rituparno Ghosh, Gowtam Ghosh, Aparna Sen, Bibash Chakravarty demonstrated in Kolkata against the violence in Nandigram. In Singur, the Maoists got another opportunity to expand their base and penetrate. In February 2008, the West Bengal police arrested Himadri Sen- Roy, the Bengal State Secretary of the CPI(Maoist). On 13 April 2008, Maoists gunned down three activists of CPM who were supervising rural employment programme in Salaboni area. Honiran Murmu, a doctor working in the Laboni area, was killed along with staff nurse Bharati Majhi and driver in October 2008, after an IED went off under their car. Maoists offered no explanation for this beastly act.

Chief Minister Adivasis had been protesting against setting up of a Rs. 35,000 Buddhadev crore mega Jindal steel plant at Salboni as it would displace a large Bhattacharjee targeted number of them. The government parted away 4,500 acres forest land for the plant. Another 500 acres were acquired from private holdings. The tribals objected that the government has no right to take away the forest land which is their source of livelihood. The government’s adamant attitude led to unrest. This people’s anger provided a handle to the Maoists. Chief Minister Buddhadev Bhattacharjee and Union Minister for Steel, Ram Vilas Paswan narrowly escaped on 2 Novem- ber 2008 when a powerful IED was exploded at a place 4 km from Medinipur. The leaders were returning from Salboni after attending the foundation laying ceremony of Jindal Steel Works.

Lalgarh under Maoists’ Following the attack on the Chief Minister, the police raided sev- Control eral villages and resorted to repression. In a clash in the village Chhoto 37 Pelia, fourteen women were injured. One Woman lost her eye. This WEST BENGAL... mindless highhanded behavior of the police led to the formation of Police Santrosh Birodhi Janashadharaner Committee (PSBJC) (Peoples Committee against Police Atrocities) by the Maoists in November 2008. Trinamool Congress covertly extended its support to PSBJC. Towards the end of November 2008 the government came round the view that further confrontation with PSBJC be avoided. West Bengal police has withdrawn 15 police posts and camps from Lalgarh. This led to the complete collapse of the state administration in Lalgarh, Salboni, Jamboni, Belapahari etc. The Maoists had declared these areas as ‘liberated’ and started more raids from these bases.

Sudhir Mandal, a respected leader of traditional adivasi commu- Adivasi leader shot nity opposed to PSBJC, who organized a massive anti-Maoist rally in dead by Maoists December 2008, was shot dead. In February 2009, Maoists fired on the funeral procession of the assassinated CPI(M) leader, Nandalal Pal killing three. Five more CPI(M) supporters were killed in April 2009. Three bodies of CPM workers were found in Dharampur on 14 June. On 22 March the Maoists blasted the railway track between Midnapore and Godapiasal. On 17 June 2009 CPM activists - Abhijit Mahato, Anil Mahato and Niladhar Mahato - were executed by Maoists in the Jhargram area about 20 km from Lalgarh. Most of those killed by the Maoist death squads came from the ranks of the rural poor and tribals.

15 June 2009 In Lalgarh area CPI(M) office was torched by the Maoists and supporters of PSBJC.

On 18 June 2009 the Central forces and State police started joint Joint Operation operations in Lalgarh area to crush the Maoists Five police personnel injured in a landmine blast triggered by the Maoists at Kadasol, about 22 km from Lalgarh. The Hindu (9 June 2009) narrates the real situation: “Using the neighbouring State of Jharkhand as the base, they established a reign of terror and drove out security personnel and CPI(M) workers and sympathizers. With tribal folk as a human shield, 38 they have now sought to create “liberated zones” in the district. The offensive, timed to take advantage of the electoral debacle of the CPI(M) in the recently concluded Lok Sabha election, would not have been possible without the support of the main opposition party, the Trinamool Congress” Lalgarh police station was taken back by the security forces on 20 June 2009. It was under Maoists’ control for eight months. Ramgarh was taken back on 27 June after ten days of operation. Kantapahari, 7 km from Lalgarh, was reclaimed on 29 June. On 22 June 2009 CPI (Maoist) was banned by the Central Government. On 11 August 2009 exchange of fire between the security forces and Maoists took place in Lalgarh and Salboni. A day before Maoists killed Paritosh Mishra, a CPM leader at Dheura village, 130 km west of Kolkata. On 21 September 2009 hundreds of supporters of the Police Santrash Birodhi Janahadharaner Committee and armed Maoists laid siege to the CPIM) office in Inayatpur, about 10km from Midnapore and opened fire at the occupants of the office. Several CPI(M) cadres have been camping at the office for the past few months. They retaliated and heavy gun battle ensued. Some Marxists lost their lives. However the police denied any such retaliation by Marxists. The police want to cover up the encounter. Otherwise the issue of CPM holding guns would be exposed On 12 October 2009 Kanai Murmu of Jharkhand party was abducted and killed by Maoists in Ergada village in Paschim Medinipur dt. At Ghathera in Purilia dt. Maoists ransacked the house of a local CPI(M) leader and shot and injured a member of the village resistance committee. On 20 October one sub- inspector was gunned down and the officer –in-charge of Sankrail thana (80 km from Lalgarh) was abducted in Paschim Medinipur dt. The PS was ransacked and several fire arms, including rifles, revolvers and pistols, were looted from the armory. The officer Atindranath Datta was released on 22nd only after theWest Bengal Government released 19 tribals from custody, conceding the Maoists’ demand. On 26 October 2009 the Maoists shot dead CPM leader Pratap Nayek at Singhpur near Lalgarh. On 29 October two CPM leaders, Dilip Mahato of Midnapore Kotwali and Tapan Mandi of Binpur-Raghunathpur of West Medinipur dt were shot dead by Maoists.

Maoist Violence in West Bengal (no. killed) Year Civilians Security-men Maoists 2005 5 1 - 2006 9 7 4 2007 6 - 1 2008 19 4 1 2009 135 5 9 2010 262 34 47 436 51 62

39 On 9 November 2009 they shot dead CPM leader Jagannath WEST BENGAL... Mahato. On 26 November 2009 the Maoists shot dead a school teacher and seriously injured a non-teaching staff member at Baghmundi in Purulia dt. On 13 May 2010 they killed a CPM supporter at Pathardihi in Purulia dt. The victim Srikanta Mahato was dragged out from his home and shot dead. Next day they abducted and killed 5 CPM supporters of Chandahilla village, Bijapur block near Lalgarh. The bullet ridden bodies of the victims were thrown on State Highway, between Silda and Belpahari.

Kolkata-Mumbai Gnaneswari Express Sobataged: 148 perished

28 May 2010 Maoists have triggered an explosion on the track and derailed Mumbai bound Howrah- Gnaneswari Express near Sardhiha station in Paschim Medinipur dt. Home Ministry officially stated that 148 innocent passengers including women and children died and a large number injured. Whereabouts of 25 passengers were not known. The incident occurred at midnight 1.30 a.m. when passengers were asleep. A goods train ramed into the Express. 13 coaches jumped the track.

The Hindu editorialy comments: “Maoist groups see the death of ever-larger numbers of civilians as an acceptable part of the macabre war they have inflicted on large swathes of central and eastern India.” (29 May 2010)

40 JHARKHAND On 27 February 2004, the MCC blew up BSNL exchange at Harhargunj in Palamau dt. On 21 October they blasted a railway station in Latchar dt. On 12 November 2001 they blew up the Railway track between Karkara and Untari stations in Palamau dt. Maoist struck severest blow in Jharkhand on 4 March 2007 when they shot dead Sunil Kumar Mahato, M.P. of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, his two bodyguards and his party colleague Prabhakar Mahato. The ghastly mayhem took place at Bakuria village in East Singbhum dt. Sunil Mahato went to the village to be present at a football match as chief guest. On 7 April 2007, about 300 Maoists attacked the police at Bhasmahal coal project in Bokaro dt. killing two policemen and four civilians. They have looted weapons. 4 March 2007 The losses incurred by the railways in 2009 were heavy. They blew Sunil Kumar Mahato, up railway tracks at several places – at Jharandh in Dhanbad division, JMM, MP shot dead at Tukbhera Goan in Latchar dt. etc. They had also bombed Untan railway station in Palamau dt.

Maoist Violence in Jharkhand (no. killed)

Year Civilians Security-men Maoists 2004 128 41 20 2005 92 27 7 2006 81 43 20 2007 149 8 13 2008 74 39 50 2009 74 67 76 2010 71 27 49 669 252 235

26 June 2007 A goods train derailed after the railway track was blown near Chetar Railway Station

41 JHARKHAND...

22 April 2009 The Utari Road Railway Sta- tion in Palamau dt. was blown off.

8 November 2010 Satbahani railway station in Palamu dt., was blasted

MAHARASHTRA

Gadchiroli, Chandrapur, Bhandara and Gondia districts in Maharashtra are affected by Naxal insurgency. The PWG spread its operations from adjoining Adilibad and Karimnagar districts of Andhra Pradesh. Gondia is a major transit point of arms supplies to Naxal outfits. Gadchiroli district has large tribal population, about 40%. On 10 February 2002, the PWG killed Malu Kopa Bogami (ST), district president of Congress, Gadchiroli. On 18 September 2002 five police personnel were injured in a landmine blast at Koti, near Bhamgarh, in Gadchiroli dt. On 21 February 2003, two police personnel were killed in a

42 MAHARASHTRA... landmine blast in Chichgarh police station limits, Bhandara dt. On 29 August 2003 five police personnel were killed and two others injured in a landmine blast near Tadgaon village under Bhamargarh PS limits, Gadchiroli dt. On 4 March 2004, the naxals burnt down Mokadi railway station in Chandrapur dt.

Maoist Violence in Maharashtra (no. killed) Year Civilians Security-men Maoists 2004 9 6 2 2005 29 24 3 2006 42 3 19 2007 22 3 5 2008 2 5 7 2009 12 52 23 2010 22 15 3 138 108 62

On 22 February 2005, Maoists blasted a police vehicle under Bhamragarh PS limits killing 7 police personnel. On 30 May 2005, seven police personnel and one civilian were killed in a landmine blast on the Deori-Chichgad road in Gondia dt. The police were deployed to give protection to the officials supervising the construction of Kadvanda dam. On 16 May 2006 twelve people of a marriage party from Chhattisgarh were killed when the PWG triggered a land mine between Halewara and Petha villages in Gadchiroli dt. The victims in- cluded three women and two children. On 16 June the PWG beheaded an adivasi, Alal Lagatu Kantigal (42) branding him as police informer near Savargaon in the same district. After the ‘Unity Congress” of 2007, a separate military command was formed for Gadchiroli district as part of the Dandakaranya sub zonal committee. Weapons such as SLRs, LMGs, AK 47 rifles were brought into Gadchiroli in large quantities. All this led to the resur- gence of violence and greater causalities of security forces. On 1 February 2009 Maoists ambushed a police party at Savar village. In the fierce encounter that followed 15 policemen including one SI and 5 maoists died. One police constable and girl of 12 were gunned down by Maoists at Koppela in Sironcha taluq. On 6 April 2009 three c-60 commondos were killed at Mungur, Gadchiroli dt. On 8 October 2009 Maoists ambushed a police party at the Laheri outpost killing 18 police personnel.

43 On 26 September 2002. The PWG naxals thrashed to death an ORISSA activist of Bharatiya Janata Party in Malyamkunda village, Malkangiri dt. On 31 July 2003, the PWG killed a panchayat samiti member in the same district. During general elections, on 24 April 2004, the PWG killed an independent candidate, Daku Majhi and injured his two brothers at Muniguda forests in Rayagada dt.

Naxal attack on Udaigiri Jail, Gajapati dt.

On 12 April 2009, Maoists raided an explosives storage facility of National Aluminum Company in Koraput. Ten Central Industrial Security personnel lost their lives.They have also burnt down the Narayanpatna railway station.

23 June 2009 A Celluler tower near Kakirguma Railway Station, Koraput dt. was blasted.

44 ORISSA...

28 November 2010 5 innocent people including a child were killed when the ambulence of Gadhapur village health centre was blasted by the Maoists. (Kandhamal dt.) The ambulence was returning after admiting a pregnant women in a hospital.

24 Febuary 2011 Malkangiri Collector R.Vineel Krishna after his release from week-long Maoists’ captivity.

Maoist Violence in Orissa (no. killed)

Year Civilians Security-men Maoists 2004 4 4 0 2005 13 1 3 2006 6 4 15 2007 15 2 7 2008 24 76 32 2009 36 32 13 2010 62 21 25 160 140 95

45 Andhra Pradesh became the target of naxal attacks since 1968. ANDHRA PRADESH The following table gives a glimpse of bloodshed in A.P.

Maoist Violence in A.P. (no. killed)

Period Regime Civilians Security Naxals 1968-82 Congress 273 0 208 1983-89 TDP 338 55 250 1990-94 Congress 827 168 415 1995-03 TDP 1245 277 1424 2004-10 Congress 383 41 436 3056 541 2733

Though the Naxals had not spared any political party*, they had particularly targeted the BJP and its fraternal organizations like ABVP. Fifty two activists of thse organizations were put death during 1981- 2005. Among those who became victims were three research scholars, one State secretary, one district president and one national council member of BJP, one district secretary of RSS and one district secretary of Bharatiya Kisan Sangh. The security forces lost three IPS officers, K.S.Vyas (1993), Paradesi Naidu (1993) and C.Umeshchandra (1999) Apart from the immense loss of life, a large number had lost their limbs: about 10,000 children became orphaned (including those of Naxalites’ families). The Naxals also destroyed infrastructure, They had mindlessly

7 September 2007 Former Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh N.Janardhan Reddy, MP targeted. Landmine blast at Vakadu, near Gudur, Nellore dt. Reddy and his wife Smt. N.Rajya Lakshmi, a minister, escaped unhurt. Driver and two civilians killed.

46 blasted government buildings, railway assets, bridges, telephone ex- ANDHRA PRADESH... changes and microwave stations. They torched more than 700 buses of state owned RTC.. The value of public and private property destroyed by various naxal groups run into hundreds of crores. Most of the villagers killed by the naxals belong to weaker sections such as SC, ST and BC. The Andhra Pradesh High court constituted an Advocates’ Committee on 4 April 1997 to inquire into the extent and amplitude of threat to life and property both by extremists and police. The Committee submitted its report on 27 June 1997. Commenting on the incidents the report says “In all most all cases, be they by death, maiming or other injury or atroc- ity complained of against the extremists. The victims of Naxal violence were from the lower strata of society. Such as SCs or BCs.” At another place the report observed: “Most of the victims killed are of labour class, doing coolie work, and belonging to the lowest strata of society.” The report also reveals the depths of brutality: “In each case of death by the extremists, the victims were severely beaten in the presence of the villagers to terrorize them and then ultimately kill the victim. Each incident of murder is a saga of gruesome inhuman violence indulged in by the extremists.” The following incident mentioned in the report is self revealing: “In one case, where a couple belonging to the backward class were returning home from their fields in the evening, the extremists caught hold both of them severed the head of the husband and put it in the palms of his wife and his wife was made to parade in the village with the severed head of her husband in her palms. Even in this case no complaint was made to the police. When the police went to record the statement of the wife, she would not depose before them for fear of extremists.”

1 December 2007 Tribal leader Pantu Naik (Congress), President of Mandal Praja Parishad was shot dead while he was worshiping in a temple in Amangal, Mahabubnagar dt.

47 ANDHRA PRADESH...

10 May 2010 Somalingam, a tribal leader and Vice Chair- man (Congress), Visakhapatnam Zilla Parishad was killed by Maoists.

On 8 October 2010, Maoists also killed another tribal, Vanthala Bhaskar Rao (30), a daily wage labourer, at Surimetta of G.Madugala, Visakhapatnam dt.

The PWG has well entrenched in Balaghat, Mandla and Dindori MADHYA PRADESH districts. More security personnel were put to death in than the number of civilians by the PWG Madhya Pradesh . In Balaghat district alone 30 security personnel were gunned down by the naxals during 1991-98. During the same period 15 civilians were killed.

On 15 December 1999, Madhya Pradesh Minister for Transport, Minister Gunned Down Lakhiram Kavre (Congress) was hacked to death by the PWG in his house at Sonepuri village, Kiranpur assembly constituency, Balaghat dt. A note left at the body of the minister claimed that this was done to avenge the encounter killings of their top leaders Nalla Adi Reddy and Santosh Reddy in A.P. on 1 December 1999. This was the first instance of assassination of a minister any where in the country. In February 2000, the MCC blew up a police vehicle killing 23 police personnel including an ASP in Balaghat dt.

15 December 1999 Lakhiram Kavre, Minister (Congress) killed by PWG

48 5

Security Forces Targeted

* Ambushes * Landmine Blasts * Attacks on Police Stations * Looting of Arms

BIHAR As the Maoists climbed ascendancy in Nepal in 1996, the MCC too adopted the same tactics in Bihar. They began attacking the police, mainly to procure arms. In 1996, they attacked Tekari police station in Gaya dt., killed policemen and looted the armory. On 19 October 2000, a landmine was triggered by the MCC at Jagpura village in Patna dt., killing six police personnel. On 21 November 2000, five personnel of Bihar Military Police were killed in a landmine blast in Koirbigha Harijan Tolla, Gaya dt. On 11 August 2002, the MCC killed three police personnel and a government employee in Lobradih, Rohtas dt. On 18 March 2003, the MCC attacked a police post in Lodipur in Gaya dt. and carried away 15 rifles and huge quantity of ammunition. On 15 April 2003, they detonated a landmine in the forests of Cherki valley of Nawada district, killing 8 policemen and looted arms and ammunition. Eleven police personnel and a civilian were killed in a landmine blast on 8 September in Rohtas dt.

IPS Officer Killed There was wide spread violence in 2005. On 5 January 2005, the Maoists triggered a landmine near Bhimbandh, Munger dt., killing Superintendent of Police, K.C.Surendra Babu. IPS and six other policemen. They had looted the arms of the victims. On 22 July 2005, the Maoists killed two constables and carried away arms at Nadara in Gaya dt. On 11 August 2005, a large number of Naxals attacked

49 Chhabilapur police station in Nalanda dt., killed two policemen and BIHAR... looted arms.

The Peoples’ Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) of Maoists stormed 13 November 2005 the police lines, the district jail and the police station in Jahanabad on Jahanabad Jail Break: 13 November 2005. They had killed 5 persons and released 250 of New Tactics their comrades including the state committee member, Ajay Kanu (originally from Andhra). They had also kidnapped 20 members of Ranbir Sena and took away 16 rifles and ammunition. They exploded bombs near the residences of the district magistrate and the superintendent of police. They blew up the railway track and snapped power and telephone lines. The Jahanabad attack was certainly a turning point in the tactics of Maoists for a number of reasons. For the first time the guerilla unit also roped in large number of civilians, about 7 to 8 hundred. These tactics of involving civilians were aimed at the faster expansion of PLGA. This ‘mobile operation’ happened to be the largest of its kind since the beginning of the insurgency in 1967. Significantly this came within 14 months of the merger of the MCC and PWG. On 3 April 2006, the Maoists shot Akhileswar Prasad, DSP, Bikramganj police station, Rohtas dt. They attacked the police out- Post of Tankuppa, Gaya dt. In the encounter one ASI and one constable lost their lives. On 22 January 2007, about 50 armed Maoists attacked a police picket on Buxar-Etarhi-Dhansoi road. One jawan lost his life and two were injured. The attackers looted arms. On 8 April they attacked an RPF escort party of the Howrah-Gaya passenger between Narganjo and Ghorpara stations. In the encounter two RPF personnel were killed and three others injured. On 5 June, they attacked the 139 battalion of CRPF at Korearighat and killed two jawans. On 1 July 2007 the insurgents had attacked Rajpur and Baghaila police outposts in Rohtas dt. with petrol bombs and killed seven police personnel and two civilians. They looted 16 weapons and two wireless sets. While escaping they blew up two bridges in Karakat. On 20 December 2007, one CRPF Assistant Commander, two constables and one villager died in an encounter with Maoists in East Champaran dt. Three Maoists also were killed. On 9 February 2009, ten policemen including the SHO of Kovalkol police station in Navada dt. were killed in an ambush laid by the Maoists. On 4 April 2009 Maoists killed 5 Jawans at Khunti. On 15 April, about 200 Maoists attacked BSF camp, at Rohtasgarh (Dhansa Valley) in Rohtas dt. with rockets. On 23 June 2009 Maoists carried a daredevil attack on a police party in a court premises in Lakhisarai dt. They drove in on motor-cycles and freed Misir Besra after gunning down a policeman and hurling

50 BIHAR... bombs to scare away the people. Misir Besra was a member of the Central Control Commission and Politburo. On 22 August 2009, the insurgents ambushed a police jeep at Sonobazar in Jamui dt. Four policemen including an ASI lost their lives

3 September 2010 Body of slain havildar Lukas Tete, found in Lakhisarai in Bihar, five days after he was abducted by the Maoists along with three other policemen. (R) Wife of Lukas Tete.

UTTAR PRADESH On 20 November 2004, Naxalites blew up a police jeep in the forests of Chandauli with a landmine, killing 14 Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) and 4 police personnel. In December 2009, the Maoists beheaded an youth Shiv Prakash of Sonbhadra after branding him a police informer. Kobad Ghandy of Mumbai was arrested in Delhi on 8 November 2009. He was a member of the politburo and central committee. The Maoists abducted Francis Induvar, an inspector in Jharkhand. to ob- tain the release of Ghandy. Six days later, Francis was brutally beheaded. In 2010, Maoist activities surfaced in cities like Allahabad, Varanasi, Kanpur and Lucknow. The jungle areas of Nagwa, Chatara, Chopan and Kon in Eastern Uttar Pradesh continue to be hotbeds of Maoists. They frequently move into these areas from Bihar, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh.

51 During the 1990 assembly elections, the naxals burnt alive a pla- CHHATTISGARH toon commander and killed a sub-inspector and a jeep driver. In 1991 elections eight members of a polling party including six policemen were killed in a landmine blast triggered by naxals. In May 1991 five policemen and two others were killed in another landmine blast at Bangati in Bastar dt. In June 1992 eighteen policemen were killed in a landmine blast when their van was blown up in Gollapalli area, Dantewada dt. On 28 November 1993, ten jawans of the CRPF were killed in a landmine explosion near Narayanpur in Bastar dt. In 1998, the PWG triggered a landmine at Tarrem in Dantewada dt. killing 16 policemen. In 1999 the PWG blasted another landmine at Kiskoda in Kanker dt. killing 3 policemen. On 20 February 2000, the PWG inflicted another severe blow by blasting a truck near Narayanpur in Bastar dt., killing 22 security personnel including an Additional Superintendent of Police. On 17 Oc- tober 2000, four persons including two police personnel were killed by the PWG at Gorakhagoan, Dantewada dt. Three police personnel and a civilian were killed on 12 October 2002 in a landmine blast near Charpalli village, Dantewada dt. In 2002, 9 police personnel were gunned down mostly in landmine explosions. In 2003 thirty security personnel were killed in Dantewada, Bastar and Bijapur districts. On 29 November 2003, 7 police personnel were killed in a landmine explosion in between Guddipal and Modypal in Baster dt. In 2004, 8 police personnel were killed by the naxals. The merger of PWG and MCC in September 2004 had a devastating effect in Chhasttisgarh. The Maoists inflicted severe blows by way of gunning down as many as 47 security personnel in 2005. On 23 March 2005, 5 policemen were killed in a landmine explosion near Jhangla village, Dantewada dt. An Assistant Commander of CRPF along with five of his men was killed on 1 June 2005 when the Maoists ambushed them near Injaram in the same district. On 3 September 2005, 22 CRPF and two state police personnel were killed in a landmine explosion triggered by the Maoists near Padeda village in the same district. On 6 Febuary 2006, nine Nagaland Armed Police were killed and eight others were injured when their vehicle was blasted by a landmine at Kothacheruvu in Dantewada dt. Simultaneously the Maoists attacked Arra police station in Janpur dt. killing two personnel. They had carried away weapons and ammunition in huge quantities. On 9 February, 8 CISP were killed when the Maoists raided the NMDC store in Hirouli, Dantewada dt. On 17 April 2006, Maoists shot dead 11 police personnel after 52 CHHATTISGARH... raiding Murkinad police outpost set up to guard a near by Salwa Judum relief camp. The Bhersal base camp was attacked on 3 December. On 16 January 2007 seven policemen including two officers (As- sistant Commander of CRPF, and ASI) lost their lives when a landmine was blasted at Joora in Bastar dt. On 1 March four jawans belonging to Naga Battalion and four others were killed when the Maoists blew up a lorry near Darbhaduda in Dantewada dt. The Maoists carried away weapons including AK-47 rifles. On 28 May 2007, Maoists killed 10 policemen including a sub- inspector near Kudur in Bastar by exploding landmines.

3 September 2005 CRPF Vehicle blasted at Padeda 22 CRPF jawans killed

Ranipotili Massacre: 55 policemen killed, 15 March 2007 The Maoists struck deadly blow on the security forces on 15 March 2007. Fifty-five policemen- 15 personnel of Chhattisgarh Armed Force and 40 Special Police Officers, - tribal youth recruited and trained to protect Salwa Judum activists – were massacred at Ranipotili, Bijapur dt. Armed with grenades, petrol bombs, rocket launchers and AK-47 rifles Maoists attacked the police camp at night. Only 11 out of 79 escaped unhurt. Half the police personnel were killed in their sleep, others were shot while trying to escape from the smoke-filled premises. The Hindu narrates: “The attack, which lasted nearly two and half hours, was spearheaded by the ‘State Military Commission’ con- sisting of about 100 armed naxalites. Members of the South Bastar divisional Committee and the National park area committee of the CPI (Maoist) were reported to have participated. About 250 Maoist sympathizers mainly the militant members of the Sangams, or village-level panels, surrounded the camp before storming it. They sealed

53 the routes leading to the village by felling huge trees and slowed down CHHATTISGARH... the arrival of reinforcements.” (16 March 2007)

Ranipotili : Massacre of 55 personnel of Chhattisgarh Armed police on 15 March 2007

Massacre of 25 Security Personnel at Regadagatta, 10 July 2007 On 10 July 2007 twenty five policemen, including 17 CRPF jawans and six special police officers were killed in an ambush near Regadagatta village in Datewada dt. A CRPF Assistant Commandant was among those killed. Weapons were taken away by Maoists. Police claim that six naxals were killed in the encounter. On 29 August the Maoists had ambushed a police party of 40 and killed 12 men in the forests of Tadimetla, under Jegurugonda PS in Dantewada dt. A police inspector was among those killed. Six others were injured.

2 November 2007 Bodies of 15 policmen ambushed and killed near Pamedu, Dantewada dt.

54 CHHATTISGARH...

29 November 2007 Ten Jawans of the Second Mizoram Reserve Police Battalion were among the 13 killed in a landmine blast at Muraliguda village near Konta in Dantewada dt. The Maoists carried away sophisticated arms of the police.

On 2 November, 15 policemen of Pamedu PS fell a prey to the firing of Maoists hiding behind a rock in Bijapur dt. The police party was returning from Cherla to its headquarters. Many of them, though armed with sophisticated weapons, died without firing a single shot in retaliation. The Maoists carried away the weapons of the victims. On 12 December, the Maoists had raided Binrampur PS in Bastar dt. and killed three policemen including an ASI. On 16 December 2007, they raided Dantewada jail and facilitated the escape of 105 Maoist detenues. On 20 October 2008, twelve jawans of the CRPF were killed and six others injured in an ambush laid by Maoists near Kongupalli on the Bijapur-Bhupalapatnam highway. On 10 April 2009, the Maoists ambushed the CRPF contingent at Chinta Guppa in Dantewads dt. While the encounter was on a reinforcement team was also ambushed. An SI and 10 security personnel were killed. On 6 May 2009 at Vinjaram, Dantewada dt., 7 policeman were killed. On 11 May they triggered a landmine at Rivgoan in Kanker dt. killing 13 policemen.

12 July 2009 Thirty police personnel including Superintendent of Police, AK Choubey, were killed by Maoists at Madanawada in Rajnandgoan dt.

55 CHHATTISGARH... Deadliest attack in Dantewada dt., 6 April 2010 6 April 2010 was the blackest day in anti-Maoist operations. In fiercest attack on paramilitary forces yet, a Maoist force massacred 78 CRPF men of 62 Battalion in the Mukrana forest area close to AP border in Dantewada dt. The force was returning to base camp after a three day area domination exercise. Among those killed were Deputy Commandant of 62 Battalion, and Assistant Commandant. The ambush occurred at a place four km short of the CRPF camp at Chintalnar. A massive IED was detonated under the armored vehicle, as the troops came under heavy shelling from a raised hillock bordering the path. Troops ran to take cover behind trees, only to find that the Maoists had booby trapped the trees with anti-personnel IEDs. Jawans who stayed in the open were gunned down by Maoists with their auto- matic weapons. The police claimed that in the retaliatory firing by the CRPF, 8 Maoists lost their lives. The 62 battalion was commanded by vatern Satyawan Yadav who spent 10 years in SPG. For the first time a Union Home Minister, (P.Chidambaram) offered to quit the cabinet on the issue of a Maoist attack. Both houses of parliament paid homage to the martyrs.

6 April 2010, Chintalnar Blast : Massacre of 78 jawans of 62 Battalion of CRPF

56 CHHATTISGARH...

8 May 2010 Eight CRPF jawans of the 168 Battalion were killed when their bullet proof vehicle was blasted at Pedakodepal in Bijaput dt.

29 June 2010: Twenty-seven CRPF personnel of the 39 Battalion were killed in an ambush in Narayanpur dt. The Maoists slit the throats and hit the skulls of the injured with stones.

57 The first landmine blast by Maoists occurred in West Bengal on WEST BENGAL 16 October 2004, in which six personnel of Eastern Frontier Rifles (EFR) were killed. It took place in the Ormara forest of West Medinipur dt. On 21 September 2006, two policemen were killed and 29 injured; among them were senior police officers and photo-journalists, when a landmine exploded in the Lalgarh area of Pachim Medinipur dt. On 8 November 2009 the Maoists shot dead four jawans of East- ern Frontier Rifles at Gidhani in Lalgarh area.

15 February 2010 : The Peoples’ Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) had raided a camp of the North-East Frontier Rifles at Silda (West Medinipur dt) and massacred 24 jawans, and looted about 40 weapons.

19 May 2010 Four jawans of the CRPF and a deputy commandant were killed while another jawan was critically injured when Maoists triggered a landmine explosion at Ramgadh near Lalgarh.

58 JHARKHAND By the time the Jharkhand state was carved out from Bihar the MCC was already active in Chatra, Daltongunj, Hazaribagh, Palamu, Giridh, Dhanbad, Bokaro, Ranchi, Garhwa, Lohardaga, Gumla and Latchar districts and the PWG in East Singhbum. By 2009 the Maoist killings spread to 20 out of 24 districts of the state. Since arms were essential for raising liberation army, in Jharkhand too the Maoists concentrated on looting arms of the security forces by attacking them. In 2001 Maoist violence increased by leaps and bounds. Fifty one security personnel fell to their bullets. The most serious incident took place in Dhanbad dt. on 1 November 2001, about 150 lalkhandis (Red guerrillas) of MCC had raided the block office at Topchanchi and killed 13 jawans of State Armed Police. Another five were seriously injured. The lalkhandis carried away 14 SLRs and 3 carbines. There was widespread Maoist violence through out 2002. As many as 63 police personnel lost their lives, mostly in landmine explosions. On 27 January 2002, eleven security-men including 9 Jharkhand Armed Police personnel were killed in a landmine blast in the Chainpur police station limits. On 7 May, a landmine blast killed 15 police personnel in Mathadih village, Koderma dt. A Deputy Superinten- dent of Police and another police person were killed in a landmine explosion on 11 June, near Kalapahar, Palamau dt. On 9 October, in the same district at Kanda Ghati, a landmine took the toll of 7 police personnel. On 20 November 8 security personnel were killed in a landmine blast at Lamarnaka, Latehar dt. On 20 December 2002, fourteen policemen and four civilians were killed when MCC guerrillas ambushed a police party in Saranda forests of West Singhbum dt. In 2003, 16 police personnel were killed by MCC and PWG. For the first time there was retaliation by people and 10 Naxals lost their lives. On 14 April 2003, the MCC cadres including women had attacked a police post at Chanerapura railway station in Bokaro dt. and looted weapons. A policeman was killed and three others were injured in a landmine blast on 4 August, in Palamau dt. In 2004, Jharkhand suffered unprecedented violence in the hands of Maoists. About 41 security personnel were gunned down. On 27 April, on the eve of Lok Sabha elections, 27 policemen were killed in a landmine explosion in Baliwa village under Gua PS in West Snghbhum dt. On 23 June 2005, the Maoists attacked a police station and looted arms after killing five policemen. On 11 November, preceding the Jahanabad jail-break in Bihar, the Maoists attacked security personnel at several places in Jharkhand as well. The attack on a Home Guard Training Centre at Girdh also saw more than 300 guerrillas participat- ing in the raid that fetched the PLGA 185 rifles and huge cache of ammunition. In 2005, 27 police personnel were gunned down. Another mayhem took place on 2 December 2006. Fourteen police personnel were killed (including an SI) in a landmine blast at 59 Kanchkir in Bokaro dt. JHARKHAND... On 15 April 2009, at Latchar in Palamau dt. the Maoists triggered a landmine in which two CRPF personnel and a civilian driver were killed. Five naxals also lost their lives in retaliation. On the same day about 200 Maoists attacked with rockets a BSF camp, at Rohtasgarh in Dhansa Valley in Bihar’s Rohtas dt.

Beheading Police Officer - Srikakulam Terror Invoked The Maoists abducted Police Inspector Francis Induwar (Intelli- gence wing) on 30 September, 2009 from Hembrom in Khunti dt. demanding the release of the politburo members arrested earlier. To inflict maximum terror, the Maoists beheaded Francis Induwar. The turbo and the head were recovered near Raisa Ghati under Namkom Police Station just 12 kilometers from the state capital Ranchi. Francis Induwar

On 9 August 2001, about 250 naxals simultaneously raided the ORISSA Kalimela and Motu police stations in Malkangiri district, shot dead 6 policemen and took away a huge quantity of weapons and ammunition. On 2 December 2001, a fifty strong contingent of PWG armed with AK-47 rifles, blew up Poteru Police Out-Post (Malkangiri). Five policemen were killed and 22 injured. Two PWG commanders lost their lives in the encounter. On 11 August 2002, seven security personnel were killed and five injured in a land mine explosion by the PWG in Gunupur sub-division, Rayagada district. On 5 December 2002, eighteen police personnel of Orissa Special Police were injured in a land mine blast triggered by the PWG under a culvert near Kolnara on Rayagada- Berhampur road. On 30 July 2003 five jawans of CRPF, five state police personnel were killed and 8 others injured in a landmine blast near Vejingiwada in Malkangiri dt. On 7 February 2004, the naxals attacked in Koraput, a police station, the office of district SP, district jail and the treasury. Three CRPF jawans and one policeman of Orissa were killed. They have looted 200 weapons including SLRs, carbines and 60,000 rounds of ammunition. On 29 July 2008, the Maoists attacked CRPF jawans with granades who went to make purchases at the weekly bazaar near MV-79 police station in Malkangiri dt. One S.I was gunned down. The Maoists snatched the AK-47 rifle of the SI.

60 ORISSA...

A police station in Nayagarh dt. blasted.

On 15 Feburary 2008, the Maoists simultaneously raided several police stations in Nayagarh dt. killing 13 policemen and two civilians and looting large quantities of arms and ammunition. The naxalites first blocked all the four entry points to Nayagarh town and then attacked the arms depot at the local police training school, the district armory and the local police station, catching the security personnel off guard.

15 Feburary 2008 The gutted remains of the district armoury in Nayagarh

On 16 July 2008, the Maoists killed 20 policemen at MV-126 area in Malkangiri dt. by blasting a landmine.

61 ORISSA

On 29 June 2008, the prestigious Greyhounds suffered the worst Greyhounds Launch ever beating in the hands of Maoists due to their own negligence. A was sunk in Chitrakonda launch carrying 66 Greyhounds personnel in Chitrakonda reservoir Reservoir (Balimela dam) of Sileru River (on the border of Orissa and AP) was fired upon with AK-47 rifles from point blank range. The launch went down. 38 Greyhounds personnel lost their lives. It took ten days for the launch to be retrieved. On 16 July 2008, Maoists triggered a landmine and blasted Spe- cial Operations Group vehicle at a place 45 Km from Malkangiri district headquarters. 17 police including an inspector lost their lives. On 24 March 2009, police outpost at Padia in Malkangiri dt. was blasted. On 7 June 2009, about 100 Maoists, including women, blew up two police stations at Baipariguda and Machkhund and an outpost at Ramgiri in Koraput dt. On 18 June 2009, the Maoists had exploded a land-mine at Palur (Narayanapattana Samiti area) in Koraput dt. killing 8 policemen of Orissa State Special Force (OSSF)and the driver of the jeep.

13 November 2009 Three CRPF jawans including one sub-commandant were killed when Maoists exploded a land mine at Kalimela, 40 miles from Malkangiri

On 6 Feburary 2010, the Maoists beheaded Sukura Oram on the night of Saturday at Kumarela, Sunderghad dt. The victim was attending the marriage of his sister. On 16 May 2010, they shot dead a police constable (P.Ramachandra Rao) at a village market place at Padia under the Kalimela PS in Malkangiri dt. They blasted the Kundai PS in Nabarangpur dt. on the border with Chhattisgarh. On 4 April 2010, nine jawans of the anti- Maoist Special Opera- tions Group (SOG) were killed and eight others were injured in a landmine blast triggered by Maoists. The attack occurred at Tanginiguda on the Govindpalli ghat road, Koraput dt.

62 6

Public Face of CPI(Maoist)

* Civil Liberties and Human Rights Platforms * Revolutionary Writers Associations * Academics and Intellectuals

Cover Organizations The common perception that the CPI(Maoist) functions totally in secrecy was far from truth. Many of its front organizations (or frac- tions) function openly. These outfits provide cover to the clandestine activities and ensure the safety of underground network. They also create avenues for fresh recruitment. These outfits paved the way for the PWG and MCC to make inroads into various sections such as students, women, advocates, teachers, writers and labor. (See Appendix C)

Civil Liberties and The most powerful over ground front organisations of Maoists Human Rights have been civil liberties and human rights platforms. They go under Platforms different names in different states. Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee(APCLC), functioning since 1974, has been very effective in softening the attitude of intellectuals towards naxalism and in portraying the state as anti-people and oppressive. It is notorious for issuing guileful statements throwing the blame on the State whenever an encounter took place. When DIG Vyas, IPS, was shot by naxals in broad daylight in Hyderabad, the APCLC stated: “The murder of Mr.Vyas was unfortunate and unjus- tified, but cannot be divorced from the unlawful policy of terror being used by the government against naxalite movement, in particular the policy of wantonly murdering.” (The Hindu, 31 January 1993). Under the garb of fact-finding missions, the APCLC manufac- tures distorted or exaggerated reports on police actions. The sole purpose of these biased versions was to weaken the law and order machin- ery and depict the State as a demon.

63 These champions of human rights fully knew that witnesses would not come forward to give evidence in courts against naxals due to mortal fear of reprisals. The naxals simply eliminate or chop off the limbs of witnesses. There were several such instances. On 26 January 1980, in the presence of the Vice-Chancellor and officials of Kakatiya University, Warangal, a student naxalite pulled down the national flag and tried to torch it. Jaganmohan Reddy, an activist of ABVP stepped forward and restored the national flag. The case dragged on for two years. Jaganmohan Reddy used to go to the court to give evidence regularly. On 29 April 1982, naxals waylaid and stabbed him to death in broad daylight in Warangal. It was a strange legal spectacle in Andhra Pradesh. Several thousand naxals were arrested by the police since 1967 for crimes ranging from mass murders to looting banks and destroying public property. But only in a handful of cases the culprits were convicted. The APCLC and some other outfits such as Organization for Protection of Demo- cratic Rights (OPDR) thus, successfully paralyzed the legal system in Andhra Pradesh abusing the noble cause of civil liberties. The Hindu made the following candid observation several years ago: “While the death of a Naxalite in a police encounter gets countrywide publicity, with civil liberties activists visiting the spot to publish ‘fact finding reports’, the murders committed by Naxals hardly get any notice, ex- cept for a brief police note appearing in the local newspapers.” (17 November 1985) The CPI(M) came down heavily on the APCLC for its pro-Naxal stance. In Narahantaka Naxalism, a booklet published in 1991, the CPM says: “Some organizations donned the veils of civil rights, not only to defend the political theories based on murder, but also to protect the right to kill. Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee is one such one. Organization for Protection of Democratic Rights is another. The CLC is an all India organization. It might also have international links. Its sole objective has been to endorse either directly or indirectly the killing sprees and atrocities perpetuated by the radi- cals. It has not even once condemned the assassinations of these brutes. It never came forward to depute ‘fact finding missions’ whenever leaders of political parties or innocent persons were done to death. The pretension of these one sided and biased organizations as champions of civil rights is nothing but a crude deception. While the Naxalites have been denying the right to live and the right to hold one’s own political views by unleashing terror, these organizations are protecting them from any criticism. Their behavior as well as the statements of their leaders testify this.” “When asked by a correspondent of the Telegraph, whether he would also condemn extremist violence, the APCLC leader and leading ad- vocate Kannabhiran replied: ‘Yes, we condemn all violence. But then, it is not possible for us to condemn the violent acts of each and every

64 individual. Since there are no set rules and regulations for individual behavior, it is not possible to stop violence by them. But the government has certain code. And therefore, the State violence is much more dangerous.” “In short, they want to convey that they would be willing only to condemn encounters and not the murders by naxalites. Though he said ‘Yes, we condemn all violence’ not even once he denounced a murder committed by Naxals. By describing the naxal murders as those not guided by any pattern, they want to hide the fact that naxalite groups are liquidating their opponents according to a specific plan. By invoking certain theories, assuming the name of Peoples War, organizing armed squads, collecting clandestinely deadly weapons, they pounce on others to annihilate. To describe such bloodshed as individual acts of violence was only a tragic humor. Kannabhiran might derive some satisfaction that he was able to defend the naxalites skillfully. But people have not closed their eyes. It is the bounden duty of any government to ensure the right to live of the citizens. If at all it deviates and resorts to repression, one must denounce it. Nevertheless, the government deserves condemnation if it doesn’t take any action on narahantakas (killers of people). Law and order would flourish only if the narahantakas were caught and punished. These organizations never support such measures. Why?” (pp. 21-23) The PWG set on fire a fully packed bogie of Kakatiya Express on 9 October 1990 on the outskirts of Hyderabad. Forty-seven innocent passengers were charred to death. Another 100 injured. TLN Reddy Commission clearly established that it was the act of the PWG. The APCLC neither condemned the mayhem either in October 1990, or after the TLN Reddy Inquiry report appeared in the press in March 1993. The Peoples Union of Civil liberties has not uttered a single word of condemnation when the Maoists and their sympathizers derailed Gnaneswari Express in May 2010 in West Bengal causing the death of 148 passengers.

Revolutionary Writers The Revolutionary Writers Association (Viplava Rachayitala Association (Virasam) Sangham or Virasam) was founded in Andhra Pradesh in October 1970 under the leadership of well known Marxist poet Sri Sri (Srirangam Srinivasa Rao). A number of its members have been teachers working in educational institutions. Two anthologies of poems, Jhanjha and Diksuchi, eulogizing the Srikakulam uprising of naxals were released at the inaugural conference. The meet exhorted the writers to follow the path of armed struggle. In the manifesto rele-ased in September 1971, the Virasam had called upon the writers to transform their revolutionary pens into daggers and advocated armed revolution. Some of the titles of Virasam were very provoking: Erra pidikili (Red fist); Raktha Ganam (Troops of blood); Muttadi (The Siege).

65 Varavara Rao, came out with a book titled Uregimpu (The Proces- sion) in which he declared that those who can chop off the head of the enemy with an axe alone would become revolutionary heroes and only such persons become revolutionary poets who can prepare the people for an armed revolt. He exhorts that Virasam cannot be separated from the armed struggle of naxalites. In the issue of Pilupu (The Call, 1 October 1973), edited by one lecturer, a poem appeared under the title Nikista Tammuda (For you, my brother!). It was about snatching rifles from the police, building red army, killing class enemies and spreading red terror. The Virasam also undertook the task of indoctrination of students and unemployed youth and bringing them into the fold of naxalism. Gradually Virasam became the lifeline of PWG. Youth motivated by Virasam began to head the underground squads. In an interview to Tehelka, M.Koteswar Rao (Kishanji) acknowledged that he was inspired by writer Varavara Rao. (Tehelka, 21 November 2009) Buddhijivi Silpa Lekhan in Bihar is another one. Other states too have similar bodies working in literary fields.* Taking shelter under freedom of expression and intellectual activity writers associated with these organization spread naxal ideology. In fact they were the first to sow the seeds. Naxals step in only later to reap the harvest. Tej Singh Lodha promotes naxal ideology in Rajasthani, where as hardly there is any naxal activity in Rajasthan. Siddali Nagaiah, H.M.Panditarahya and Manohar Sardesai eugolize armed revolution in Kannada, Chandra Kakaty in Assami to attract young minds. Even in affected states, the governments do not pay any serious attention towards the activities of these so-called Maoist writers and thinkers. On the other hand these governments provide avenues to these writers to spread the pernicious ideology at the expense of state funds. For the past several years school textbooks edited by teachers with strong naxalite leanings were in use in Andhra Pradesh. The political leadership fails to understand the difference between writings of Marxists who tow the parliamentary line and Maoists who preach * Bengali Sukanta Bhattacharya Malayalam Sachitanandan Saroj Datta K.G.Sankara Pillai Dronacharya Ghosh Civic Chandran Murari Mukhopadhyaya K.Ramakrishnan Samir Rai Balachandran Chullikad Arun Sanyamat Punjabi Amarjeet Chandan Hindi Gorakh Pandey Tamil Muthu Porunan Sarveswar Dayal Saxena Agniputran Aloke Dhanva Telugu Subbarao Panigrahi (died) Kumar Vikal Charabanda Raju (died) Dhoomil Sivasagar Oriya Ravindranath Singh Pendyala Varavara Rao

66 armed revolution. The intelligence wings totally lack political under- standing in this regard.

Jana Natya Mandali Among all the front organizations of PWG in AP, Jana Natya Mandali (JNM) (JNM) was most effective and popular. It was formed in July 1973 to attract the masses towards armed revolution by staging performances like, street plays, burrakathas, ballads, folk songs, drum-beatings etc Its shows draw unprecedented crowds. One of the items performed by the JNM troupes, a ballad on ‘annihilation of class-enemies,’ used to evoke violent responses from the view- ers.

31 September 2004 Jana Natya Mandali on stage, PWG public meeting, Hyderabad

Academics and ‘Intel- It has become a fashion with some intellectuals to extol Maoists and lectuals’ their commitment and thus indirectly build respectability to the insurgency. A good number of the academics, writers, journalists, advocates, artists, civil rights champions, NGOs, IAS officers with left leanings have a soft-corner for Maoists. They do not take part in violent activities directly and hence would not attract any action from the State. Nevertheless, through their participation in seminars, writings, class- room lectures, individual conversations, newspaper columns, movies, TV talks, create respectability for the Maoist insurgency. They make recruitment easy for the CPI(Maoist). One Congress leader with communist leanings established a degree college – Jawahar Bharati – in a small town Kavali, Nellore District, Andhra Pradesh. That was around 1952, when the CPI withdrew its armed struggle. He deliberately recruited the faculty with those hav- ing Marxist leanings. During the past 50 years, it served as a cadre building institution for the CPI, CPI(M) and CPI(ML). Prestigious colleges of Delhi became centers of Naxal activity in seventies. Prakash Singh writes: “The institutions particularly affected were the St. Stephen’s College and Delhi School of Economics. The total number of Naxalites were around fifty only but they had a large

67 group of vocal and silent supporters and admirers among the student community. The girls were not to be left behind and there were small groups of Marxist-Leninists in Indraprastha College, Miranda House and Lady Sriram College. It has been said that some of them were drawn to the ideology because their boyfriends were Naxalites. Delhi University had a well identified group of students and teachers who had pronounced leftist inclinations. They openly talked of violent methods for restructuring the society and initiating reforms. Such ideas were freely debated in the associations and clubs. One such politico- cultural club known as ‘Yugantak’ particularly caught the imagination of the young for its open advocacy of revolution. It staged many plays in the campus and outside. A powerful case for revolution was made in a play called India 1969 staged in Miranda House and Tagore Hall. In what appeared to be a real life denouement of the play, the Stephenians who had acted disappeared in 1970 to work for the revolution they had talked of from the stage. About twenty students were found missing from the University campus and were repotted to have gone to West Bengal, Bihar and Assam.” ( The Naxalite Movement in India, P. 80) G.N. Saibaba, a professor in Delhi University has been an active supporter of Maoists. He is an officebearer of Revalutionary Demo- cratic Front. The JNU has been functioning as the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist School right from its inception at the expense of taxpayers’ money. Apart from defending Maoists’ philosophy through research programmes, seminars, articles, radio and television talks, they also lend a helping hand in the field activity as well by joining the so called ‘fact-finding teams.’ Apart from the JNU and Delhi University, the faculty of Univer- sity of Hyderabad and English and Foreign Languages University (EFLU), Hyderabad, are very active in promoting the philosophy of naxalism. In EFLU, students from 40 countries seek admission into various courses. This is a busy place for importing and exporting violent politics. During the tenure of Pramod Talgari as Vice-Chancellor (1998- 2003), the EFLU virtually became a haven for naxals. The entire faculty recruited during his tenure were pro-Maoists. Professors Satyanarayana and Ranjit Rajan of EFLU have been active supporters of Maoists in EFLU. Maoist students who perpetrate violence in campuses in states like Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh subsequently get admissions in JNU and continue their activities with impunity. Later they get prestigious placements in the Universities. Maoist students threw a challenge in the national capital by put- ting up posters in JNU eulogizing the Dantewada massacre of CRPF in April 2010. 68 Stratfor, a leading US think tank has cautioned: “Naxalites have formed sympathetic student groups in universities, and human-rights groups in New Delhi and other regional capitals advocating for the local tribal cause in rural eastern India. Instead of using violence, these groups stage protests to express their grievances against the state. And they underscore the naxalite ability to use both militant violence and subtle social pressure to achieve their goals. (Pioneer, 9 July 2010) Prakash Karat, General Secretary of CPI(M) came out strongly on the antics of the so called intellectuals who justify the killings of the Maoists by raising the failures of the system. “Some intellectuals and civil liberties organizations,” says Karat, “refuse to see the enormous damage being done by the Maoists by their senseless and indiscrimi- nate violence. For some of these intellectuals, it seems as if they do not want to get into the hard work and grind of building a genuine mass movement but take vicarious satisfaction in supporting such pseudo- revolutionary activities.” (Frontline, 6 April 2009) The CPI(Maoist) supports every secessionist movement in the country including the one in Kashmir. That was why the dutiful pro-Maoist elements of JNU and Delhi University organized a meeting in Delhi in November 2010 and invited JK separatist leader, Sayed Ali Gilani. Flanked by Arundhati Roy and Varavara Rao (the Maoist ideologue), the separatist leader unleashed a diatribe against India. A similar meeting was also held in the English and Foreign Languages University (EFLU), Hyderabad, in November 2010 by the pro-Maoist faculty.

Arundhati Roy’s Tirade The way pro-Maoist intellectuals commented on the massacre of CRPF in Chhattisgarh on 6 April 2010 shocked the whole nation. Without uttering a word of condemnation while addressing the Press in Kolkata on 14 April 2010, Arundhati Roy accused the Centre for waging war against the ‘poorest people’ under the pretext of fighting Maoists in the mining belt, with the purpose of creating a “good in- vestment climate.” Reacting angrily to questions why she did not condemn Maoists for the massacre of 76 CRPF jawans in Dantewada, she observed con- temptuously ‘the condemnation industry is a hollow and cynical industry where people do not care about the people killed.” “Violence of resistance could not be condoned when hundreds of Central forces cordon off tribal villages – killing and raping people with impunity.” Asked whether the blowing up of schools by the Maoists, on the pretext that the security forces could use them as camps, could be justified, Arundhati Roy replied: “Wherever there is a guerrilla warfare going on, schools are used as barracks. These schools are not functioning anyway as teachers did not attend. The Maoists however welcome the

69 teachers.” (The Hindu 14 April 2010) Again, while addressing a public meeting in Delhi on 24 April 2010 on “Indian State’s War on People and the Assault on Democratic Voices”, Arundhati Roy said: “While the death of CRPF personnel at the hands of the Maoists was saddening, one could not dismiss the alleged atrocities committed by the security personnel against tribals.” (The H indu , 25 April 2010). The meeting was organized by “Forum Against War on People” - a forum of civil society organizations, parties, individuals and social activists. Pro-Maoists are experts in float- ing platforms instantly and put up banners. This was one such one. Randhir Singh, head of the Political Science Department in Delhi University too chose not to condemn the heinous crime of Maoists. Instead he repeated the Maoists’ pet theme: “The political parties in India seem to have decided that neo-liberal capitalism is the way to proceed. The kind of development the government is practicing in tribal areas can be labeled ‘developmental terrorism.” These famed intellectuals have no word of condemnation when Gnaneswari Express was sabotaged in West Bengal by the Maoists leading to the killing of 148 innocent people.

Media’s role in building respectability to Maoists and their ideol- Media ogy is very significant. The media creates an impression, whether they meant it or not, that all encounters were deliberate murders by the police. They do not say it directly but their way of presentation of the news conveys the message. While reporting an encounter they tailor the news to depict the dead Maoist as a martyr, who died for a great cause. A media establishment loses its character once an ultra-left or pro- Maoist occupies a top position. He would not mind subverting the nation’s unity and integrity. Instances are not wanting. Today a large number of newspapers and TV channels across the country are infil- trated with pro-Maoist elements

BBC Correspondent inter- viewing a PWG leader, Chhattisgarh forests

70 The print media often publish the hit lists declared by the Maoists. They do not think that it was highly unethical to do so. They exhibit least concern for the targeted family and the amount of suffering and agony that the latter have to undergo.

M.Koteswar Rao alias Kishanji, (back to camera) member of the Politbureau, CPI (Maoist) talking to the media . Courtesy: Tehelka, 21 November 2009

One of the ways of glorification of naxals has been publishing interviews with the underground leaders. The questions were framed to suit to the naxals. There were instances of fake interviews, cooked in newspaper offices. Reputed newspapers too adopt these unethical methods to glorify the naxals. Apart from the main subject, the interviewer deliberately narrates about the hospitality, gentle manners and simple living of the underground leadership to evoke sympathy. The Hindu ’s Siddhartha Varadarajan, known for his ultra-left leanings, sent a set of written questions to the spokesperson of CPI (Maoist), Azad (Cherukuri Rajkumar) in March 2010. The answers of Azad were published prominently in the central page of the reputed daily on 14 April 2010. The timing of the publication was deliberately chosen by the daily to mollify the nation’s anger over the Dantewada massacre of 62 Battalion of CRPF by the Maoists on 6 April. The Hindu prominently published along with photographs on 13 May 2010 another interview with Maoist leaders, Ramanna and Ganesh. Aman Sethi, the interviewer, got access to the underground Maoist leaders in the Jagarguda forests of Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, on 14 April 2010. U dayam (Telugu daily, now defunct), founded by Dasari Narayan Rao, a Congress leader, and edited by ABK Prasad, served as the mouth- piece of PWG in eighties. For instance, reporting the Khanapur encounter of 3 February 1989, the daily would comment editorially: “In just one month, January, the police resorted to 15-20 encounter murders with the crease of their shirts shining.” The title of the editorial was: “Repression was the root cause for all troubles.” When the management closed the daily a few years later, its proprietor M.Subbarami Reddy (a Congress MP) was eliminated by the naxals. While reporting the death of K.Sitaramaiah, founder of PWG,

71 another Telugu daily Vartha extolled him as a great national hero (editorial, 14 April 2002). It was a camouflaged essay intended to eulogize Naxalism. Sitaramaiah, as chief of the PWG during 1978-1992, was responsible for the loss of thousands of lives and destruction of public assets worth crores of rupees. Telugu channel TV9 in its telecast on 7 April 2010 deliberately

Vaartha 14 April 2002

tried to downplay the Dantewada massacre by juxtaposing the miser- able plight of tribal areas, without expressing any remorse for the mayhem. The CNN –IBN channel too more or less put the tragic news in the same refrain. The front page caption given by a leading Telugu daily – E enadu - reporting the death of Azad was: M ao la M er unagam Tutaku B ali (Maoists’ Mountain Meru fell to the bullet). Azad’s funeral was live telecast by several channels on 4 July 2010 for over 5 hours. When R.V.Krishna, Collector of Malkangiri, Orissa, was freed on

Eenadu 3 July 2010

24 February 2011 by the Maoists after their demands were met, the media pestered him to extract words of praise for the Maoists. Media enjoys a special status in democracy. Its power is enormous. Since no government would be free from authoritarian tendency, people need a protection shield in the form of media to safeguard the true spirit of democracy. In this context two questions arise: Is not disintegration of the nation a concern for the media in the context of reporting Maoist actions? Is media bound to be neutral even towards forces that are going to deny freedom to media the moment they come to power?

72 7

The Political Response

* Unified command * Avaoidable Debate * Political Class in Frankenstein Mode

CPI (Maoist) was The Centre had at last woke up from its deep slumber and banned banned the Communist Party of India (Maoist) on 22 June 2009, terming it 22 June 2009 a terrorist organization under Section 41 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. The ban, delayed by four decades, came in only after a significant development. The Centre waited until the Maoists took control of Lalgarh in West Bengal, the citedal of Marxists. It waited until the CPI(M) government abandoned 13 police stations in Lalgarh, Salboni, Jamboni, Belapahari areas. It waited until the Maoists declared these areas as “liberated.” The Congres leadership was always scared by the Left domi- nated media and the so called Left intellectuals. It kneels and crawls before them. With the CPM now experiencing the heat, they mus- tered some courage. Despite severe beatings in the hands of Maoists, the CPM all along was against banning the naxal organizations. Wasn’t the naxal insurgency an off-shoot of CPI(M) itself, after all? Even after the fall of Lalgarh, the CPI (M) Government was reluctant to ban the CPI (Maoist). The Dantewada massacre of 6 April 2010, rattled the Centre. For the first time, a Union Home Minister offered to quit over the issue of naxal insurgency. P.Chidambaram, Union Home Minister, told the Lok Sabha on 15 April 2010 that he had tendered resignation owning moral responsibility for the horrible Dantewada tragedy. Union Home Minister talked tough. Quoting a document of Maoists, Chidambaram revealed that their intention was to trans-

73 form the Peoples’ Liberation Guerrilla Army into Peoples’ Lib- eration Army. He further told the parliament: “Let us have no illusion that they aim at seizure of political power… If Dantewada is not a wake up call, nothing will be. Whatever the failures, we must make a determined, resolute and fearless effort to combat the problem. We will overcome and our idea of freedom and liberty shall prevail.”

For the first time in four decades, the Centre realized the need for Centre proposes Unified coordination among the states and also between the Centre and States. Command On 14 July 2010, the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told the Conference of Chief Ministers of affected states, that the ramifica- tions of Left-Wing extremism called for sustained coordination between the Centre and the States, not only on the overall strategy but even on regular operational issues. “Each state has a different set of problems, administrative arrangements, strengths, and weaknesses and, therefore, there is also a need for a State specific approach… We must be and also appear to be united and one in our resolve and in execution of our strategies.” The Union Government asked Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand and West Bengal, presently worst affected by Maoist violence, to set up a United Command. It would be headed by the Chief Ministers of the four states. It will also have a retired Major General as a member. The four states were asked to appoint an Inspector General rank police officer to take care of anti-naxal operations; and appoint an IG (CRPF) as IG (operations) for that State to work in close coordination with the IG (Anti-Naxal operations) of that state. The Centre also offered the four states more helicopters, logistical support, and intelligence sharing. It also decided to establish 400 police stations in the affected districts at rupees 2 core a police station.. The Chief Ministers were told that the Planning Commission was considering a Special Development Plan for the affected districts with the focus on primary education, healthcare, drinking water and road connectivity. Despite the above mentioned initiatives, the endless confusion in the UPA, persisted. They always speak in two voices. The confusion is due to lack of clarity on the following: Development of tribal areas should not be viewed as privy to the solution. These issues need to addressed irrespective of the Maoist challenge. Even after development the challenge of insurgency might continue unless other measures were taken. But right from Prime Min- ister every one links development with Maoist problem. While releas- ing the UPA’s annual report on 1 June 2010, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said: “In dealing with Naxalism, we will pursue a policy that genuinely seeks to address developmental concerns at the

74 grassroots, while firmly enforcing the writ of the state.” While addressing the Chief Ministers’ Conference on 17 August 2009, P.Chidambaram said, “The naxalites are anti-development and have targeted the very instruments of development –school buildings, roads, telephone towers. They know that development will wean the masses away from them, especially the poor tribals. Hence these deliberate attacks on development activities.” In the next breath he has also advised the states: “We will encourage the state governments to talk to the naxalites – both individuals and local units – on condition that they give up their misconceived armed liberation struggle.”

Avoidable Debate on Confusion was confounded by raising an indiscreet debate on the Deployment of Military issue of deploying armed forces to face the Maoist challenge. Look at the following spate of statements: On 8 October 2009, A.K.Anthony the Union Defence Minister clarified that the request for the use of IAF in retaliation against naxalites would be discussed but ruled out enlarging the scope of engagements of the armed forces in dealing with the naxal issue. The Air Chief, told journalists in Ghaziabad: “We are against the armed forces being used for internal security. We are there to defend threats from across the borders. However, if the State requires our help we will…We are not attacking (naxalites) with helicopters or weapons on our aircraft.” Reiterating that the Government was ready for talks, if the outlawed organization gave up violence, Union Home Secretary, G.K.Pillai said on 8 November 2009, that the Central Paramilitary forces deployed would not open fire if they are not fired upon. He further said, “There are areas where civilian administration does not exist. Central forces will be deployed there to secure that area and then roads, schools and primary health centres will be built.” On 11 May 2010, Chidambaram ruled out the deployment of the Army and the Air Force to tackle Maoists. “We are quite clear that we cann’t use Army or the Air Force to battle the Maoists in Central India. We have had Sri Lanka dealing with the LTTE challenge in a particular way. We cannot do that in India. Ethical considerations influence choices.” The Press reported on 7 June 2010 that the Home Ministry has prepared a document, outlining various options in the face of the es- calating Maoist insurgency in Chhattisgarh and other parts of the country. The document was sent to the Defence Ministry for its views. The Army now provides training to the State and Central police forces, while the Air Force gives logistic support of transporting personnel and supplies. The emergent view within the Army is that the

75 Army should be asked to step-in only as a last resort. Also it was felt that the presence of soldiers in civilian areas could lead to a greater sense of alienation among the local population. Military is trained for conventional warfare. Without changing the strategy and tactics, mere superiority in numbers and equipment would not bring dividends. Guerrilla Army has no headquarters, no territory to defend, no vital installations to guard, no barracks, no ammunition depots. How can the Army fight such an invisible enemy? Raising a special force with specialized training is the need of the hour. Intelli- gence gathering is the key. Local recruits of this special force alone could gather the useful intelligence since they know the terrain and local languages. Greyhounds of AP could be a model in this regard.

The Maoist onslaught, which has now surpassed even the Kashmir Political Class in violence, in reality, is a threat to the State and democratic polity. Un- Frankenstein Mode fortunately the political class is not viewing it in proper perspective. Whenever the Maoists hit a target resulting in huge loss of lives, th Political leaders merely issue proforma statements of regret and advise the perpetrators to join the mainstream. This vacillating approach of political class turned out to be a boon for the Maoists. The consideration uppermost in the minds of political leaders has been that the media might brand them as anti-poor if they criticize the Maoists. Large sections of the media blatantly has been pro-Maoist. To camouglage their cowardly approach, the political leaders term it as a socio-economic problem. Certainly it was not. It was not law and problem either. It is a political challenge threatening the very foun- dations of our republic – democracy and constitution.

Very few outside Andhra Pradesh knew that it was the Congress Congress and TDP leaders who nourished the naxal elements in early 1970s. By 1969-70, in AP a formidable group eulogizing Che Guevara*, the hero of New-Left emerged in Osmania University, Hyderabad. The Group functioned under the NSUI umbrella, enjoying the patronage of Congress leaders such as K.V.Raghunath Reddy (later Governor of West Bengal) and S.Jayapal Reddy (now a cabinet minister in Manmohan Singh’s Gov- ernment at the Centre). That situation prevailed until the group shed its mask and openly aligned itself with the underground naxals in 1974. Political parties in Andhra Pradesh took different positions towards naxal violence, one while in power another while in opposition. Since 1983, the winning party, whether it was TDP or Congress, invariably took the help of PWG during elections. Interestingly, a party not supported by the PWG did not win any elections during the past 25 years in Andhra Pradesh. Congress, TDP, Telangana Rastra Samiti (TRS)

* Che Guevara of Bolivia was killed on 9 October 1967 76 have no consistent policy towards violent politics of naxals even though the naxals have not spared any party. * During his Rath Yatra in 1982, N.T.Rama Rao, president of the newly born Telugu Desam Party (TDP), had eulogized the naxals as ‘patriots’ and indirectly solicited their support in elections. The TDP came to power in 1983 with a bang ending an uninterrupted Con- gress rule of 36 years. According to one reliable estimate as many as 17 newly elected TDP MLAs had links with the PWG. During the seven- year tenure of NTR (1983-89), naxal violence took a heavy toll of life and property. About 338 civilians were killed. Attacks on police personnel had increased and 55 of them were put to death. During the same period, the PWG brought in AK-47 rifles and also introduced landmines. The NTR Government, at last, had to act. The PWG was banned in 1987. Then it was the turn of the Congress. The opposition Congress tried to woo the PWG during 1989 elections. In as many as 40 constituencies underground cadres of PWG extended their support to the Congress candidates. Congress came back to power in December 1989 and M.Chenna Reddy became the Chief Minister. The ban on PWG imposed by TDP government was lifted. Several utterances of Chenna Reddy, the Chief Minister, demoral- ized the police and gave a boost to the naxals. On 28 December 1989, while speaking in Osmania University Women’s College, Hyderabad, the Congress Chief Minister admonished the police. “I will see the end,” he warned, “if any police officer is found guilty of excesses.”

*Senior Congress and TDP Leaders Assassinated by the Naxals in A.P. Congress: K.Ranga Das Ex-MLA Mahaboobnagar dt. 12.07.1987 S.Chenna Reddy Sitting MLA Anantapur dt. 07.05.1991 T.Hayagrivachari Ex-Minister Warangal 05.12.1991 M.Subbarami Reddy Sitting M.P. Prakasam dt. 03.12.1995 K.Narayana Reddy Ex-M.P. Adilabad dt. 15.12.1998 D.Sripada Rao Ex-Speaker Karimnagar dt. 13.04.1999 C.Narsi Reddy Sitting MLA Mahaboobnagar dt. 15.08.2005

TDP: D.Venkata Rao Ex-MLA Karimnagar dt. 10.08.1990 P.Purushottam Rao Sitting MLA Adilabad dt. 15.09.1999 A.Madhava Reddy Minister RR District 07.03.2000

Also several sitting and former sarpanches, members of Mandal Praja Parishads (MPP) of both the parties were eliminated by the naxals. In 1991, P.V.Narsimha Rao roped in a naxal idealogue and APCLC activist while drafting the Congress Election Manifesto. 77 (The Hindu, 29 December 1989). On another occasion, in the presence of reporters, he taunted senior police officers: “We are trying to create law out of lawlessness, but you people are creating lawlessness out of law.” (The H indu , 8.February 1990) On 13 April 1990, the Chief Minister endorsed the functioning of people’s (praja) courts in the very presence of Chief Justice of India at a function in the premises of Andhra Pradesh High Court. (The Hindu, 14 April 1990). As soon as the ban was lifted, underground naxals came into streets, publicly brandishing AK-47 rifles. The dalams marauding with arms had become a common sight in Telangana villages. The naxal leaders used to address press conferences with guns hanging from their shoul- ders. Massive rallies were held during February-May 1990, in Hyderabad, Nizamabad, Indravelli, Bellampalli, Warangal and in several towns, the naxals brandshing guns from the rostrums. No case was booked and no one was arrested. On the other hand, Govern- ment departments like Public Works, Electricity, Public Health com- plied with the orders of PWG and made arrangements for those rallies. In several villages the officials handed over the land records to the PWG. Using this material, the PWG summoned landowners before Praja Courts and passed decrees. Chenna Reddy’s Government even constructed stupas (memorials) for the naxals killed in encounters. During the two-year (1989-91) tenure of Chenna Reddy as Chief Minister, the PWG had increased its strength manifold. During this period the insurgents had killed 400 innocent persons and 55 policemen. Chenna Reddy’s successor, N.Janardhan Reddy had to impose the ban again on PWG on 21 May 1992. It was now the turn of TDP to pamper the PWG. In the 1994 elections, the TDP gave tickets to as many as 40 candidates who had links with the PWG. After coming to power the NTR government lifted the ban on PWG on 2 June 1995. During the first year of TDP’s regime (1994-95), the naxals killed more than a hundred people and twelve police personnel. N.Chandrababu Naidu who succeeded NTR in August 1995 had to re-impose the ban on 23 July 1996. It may be recalled that Chandrababu Naidu, Chief Minister, mi- raculously escaped from an assassination attempt by the naxals on 1 October 2003. They triggered a landmine at Alipiri, Tirupati. One minister and one MLA, accompanying him were also seriously injured. This incident led to the dissolution of A.P. Assembly on 15 November 2003. During the April-May 2004 general elections, the Congress- Telangana Rashtra Samiti combine was supported by the PWG. There were direct contacts between Congress and TRS leaders on one side and PWG cadres on the other side in several constituencies.

78 As soon as the Congress government with Dr.Y.S.Rajasekhar Reddy as Chief Minister was sworn in on 13 May 2004, a soft line was adopted, probably to fulfill unwritten election promises. On 15 June 2004, “a three month halt of all police operations” against Naxals was announced. The ban on PWG and its front organizations was allowed to lapse on 22 July 2004. The cadres of PWG and Jana Shakti began to roam in villages brandshing weapons. The police were withdrawn from several villages.

Talks with Naxals in A.P. To participate in the talks with the State Government, naxal leaders, Ramakrishna (PWG State Secretary), Ganesh (North Telangana October 2004 zone secretary), Sudhakar (Andhra-Orissa border zone secretary) along with Jana Shakti leaders Amar and Riaz, came out of Nallamala forests on 11 October 2004 at Arutla village amidst great publicity and fanfare. The naxal leaders handed over their AK-47s to the olive-green clad guerrillas in full view of electronic media before boarding waiting vehicles. The entire drama was live telecast by obliging TV channels. The naxal leaders brought with them 35 guerrillas of PLGA in uniform, as if the PWG was a State by itself. The Government de- puted police officers as escort. The naxals were treated as state guests and were given VIP treatment at the Manjira State Guest House, Hyderabad. In the next few days i.e., 12-20 October 2004, the entire focus of the media was on naxal leaders. Every word uttered by them was reported. Their dress, food, and audiences – everything suddenly became important for the media. The media mounted such a propaganda blitzkrieg, that several organizations and individuals queued for an interview with them. Even a minister of state government sought an interview, which however was turned down by the PWG leaders. The PWG received as many as 700 representations in 6 days. Even before the commencement of talks, Ramakrishna made it abundantly clear in press conferences and interviews that they would not lay down arms. Armed struggle is part of their ideology and not at all an issue for discussion. They came for talks only to discuss people’s problems. The talks met the fate they deserve, but at the cost of nation’s security. The new found freedom was fully exploited by Maoists. They used the opportunity to recruit cadres in large numbers, to regroup themselves, to extort huge amounts and to procure weapons. Hundreds of rural youth were drawn into their fold to overcome the problem of depletion of numbers. The Frankenstein mindset of the congress was not confind to AP. The Congress General Secretary and former Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, Digvijay Singh often criticises the Union Home Minister.

79 The PWG officially came out in support of a separate Telangana Telangana Rastra Samiti state in 1997. Gaddar, an ardent supporter of naxals, wanted to launch a movement for separate state. But he could not move ahead, probably because of an attack on his life in April 1997. Since then the naxal cadres were waiting for an opportunity. The Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS), formed in 2001, under the leadership of K.Chandrasekhar Rao, a former minister of TDP, provided a very good passage for the militants to infiltrate and influence politics in Andhra Pradesh. Chandrasekhar Rao accurately gauged the mood of the naxals and deliberately leaned towards them for support. He succeeded in his polemics. In every election since 2001, the militants, their powerful cultural troupes, put in all their efforts to get TRS candidates elected. In the process several naxals too got elected on TRS ticket to local bodies and a few to the Assembly as well. On 13 March 2008, a year prior to the general elections, Chandrasekhar Rao, while addressing the students in the University of Hyderabad campus had said that his party would entrust certain responsibilities of the government to naxalites in an effort to resolve their problem in the separate State of Telangana. He further added that he himself would lead the talks with naxals once Telangana State was formed. (The Hindu , 14 March 2008) On 3 January 2011, the TRS, in a major move to further rope in Maoist cadres into its fold, admitted, Konapuri Ilaiah @ Sambasivudu (underground name). Sambasivudu, a top Maoist leader who rose to the position of State Secretary in 2006, ‘surrendered’ to the police in

4 January 2011 K.Chandrasekhara Rao (Left) ad- mitting Sambasivudu, a top leader of CPI (Maoist) into Telangana Rastra Samiti, Hyderabad

February 2009 just before the general elections. He was involved in several crimes including the murder of Congress MLA Narasa Reddy on 15 August 2005 in Mahaboobnagar dt. Addressing a meeting in TRS Office to mark the admission of Sambasivudu, Chandrasekhar Rao said the TRS should have no objection to toe the line of the naxalites because their struggles were aimed at fulfillment of basic needs of the poor like food and land. (The Hindu, 4 January 2011) He had 80 also observed that Maoists joining TRS is not a new thing and said that E.Rajender, leader of TRS Legislature Party was in Jana Shakti Group of naxals, Tula Uma, Chief of party’s women’s wing was active in PDSU and Jagadeeswar Reddy, a member of TRS politburo was in CPI (Maoist) Party. Sambasivudu immediately was inducted into the politburo of TRS.*

RJD Regime in Bihar The PWG in Bihar had been working as armed henchmen of the RJD. Liberation, organ of the Indian Peoples Front writes: “Its squads specialize in capturing booths for RJD and utilizing the protection provided by the RJD regime. In Patna and Jharkhand, the people are quite familiar with the slogan ‘din mein RJD, raat mein PWG.’ ((RJD by the day and PWG by the night) Prakash Singh writes: “The Maoist Communist Centre’s call for boycotting the 1995 assembly elections helped Lalu Prasad Yadav win from several constituencies in south Bihar. Lalu Yadav reportedly shared the dais with MCC leaders, several of whom were Yadavas, at quite a few places.” (The Naxalite M ovement in I ndia , p.172) During December 2009 elections in Jharkhand, JMM, had an un- derstanding with the Maoists. That was the reason for the unexpected good performance of JMM. Soon after becoming the Chief Minis- ter, Shibu Soren described the Maoists as his “brothers.”and complaind that the anti-Maoist operations were being carried out without his consent. (Frontline, 24 April 2010) However Soren later retracted his statement, obviously not out of conviction. It was no secret that several members of Parliament and Assembly sought Maoists’ help during elections in Bihar and Jharkhand.

Overtures of Trinamool Mamata Banerjee, Union Minister of Railways, was no novice when in West Bengal she demanded the withdrawal of Central forces from Maoist affected districts of West Bengal. In February 2009, she even shared a dais with Chakradhar Mahato, the leader of People’s Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA). On 9 August 2010, Mamata Banerjee addressed a huge gathering at Lalgarh, West Medinipur, the epi-centre of Maoist upsurge in West Bengal along with known Maoist sympathizers, Swami Agnivesh and Medha Patkar. The mobilization for the meeting was carried by the Maoists and PCPA. Her appeal to abjure violence by everyone including “Maoist Bandhu” was only for record.

* Sambasivudu was murdered on 27 March 2011 near Veligonda in Nalgonda dt. allegedly by a rival group involved in land settlements. 81 Appendix - A CPI (Maoist) Resolution on Nationality Struggles

India is a country of many nationalities at various ership into the existing system. They are trying to win phases of development. They have been struggling in over a section of the leadership of the struggling orga- different forms against the repressive and expansion- nizations of these nationalities and conspiring to have ist policies of the Indian ruling classes. Kashmiris and them oppose the struggling sections. However, their different nationalities of North-East India such as the ploy does not seem to succeed. The ULFA has become Assamese, Nagas, Manipuris, Tripuris, etc., have been active once again. With the Indian Government’s rejec- long since waging armed struggle against the Indian tion of the Naga proposal to form a Union of Nagaland Government for their right to self-determination, includ- or ‘Greater Nagaland,’ the talks between NSCN and ing the right to secede from the so-called Union of Government of India appear to be in dicey waters. Last India. The Indian ruling classes and their imperialist year, the people of Manipur, especially the women masters, particularly US imperialism, have been sup- waged a valiant struggle against the ‘Armed Forces pressing these struggles mercilessly. They are being (Special Powers) Act.’ The PLA too has stepped up its crushed under the boots of the Indian Army stationed attacks in Manipur. The struggle of the Kashmiri people in various states of the north-east and in Kashmir. In with the Indian forces, which has continued unabated, has generated fresh mass resentment in the wake of the Centre’s designs to hang Afzal Guru. The Kashmiri people, along with the enlightened democratic sections all over India, have raised the just demand to desist from hanging the innocent Afzal Guru. Meanwhile, the demand for separate statehood in Telengana has again gathered momentum and the Vidarbha issue too seems to be emerging. This Unity Congress – 9th Congress unequivocally supports the right of self-determination of all the oppressed nationalities, including their right to secede from the autocratic Indian state (which they were forced to join). The Congress condemns the ongoing state repression of nationality movements and vows to carry out a joint movement against the Indian ruling classes along with the people of different nationalities. According to the Kashmir alone, the Indian military and paramilitary time and circumstances, it may be necessary to form a forces have murdered over 70,000 people in the last 16 separate organization to take up the nationality issue, years. A year ago, the Indian Army along with the and we should form such organizations in accordance Bhutanese Army killed hundreds of activists and sup- with the concrete situation. This Congress asserts that porters of the ULFA, Bodos and the KLO. However, the various nationalities are independent, equal and even these most cruel repressive actions by the Indian sovereign, and that they are free to form a voluntary Government could not stifle the voice of the struggling union based on the principle of the right to self-deter- masses of these nationalities. They still continue to mination and equality. The Congress also supports the wage armed struggle and carry out their attacks, strik- just struggles of those nationalities and sub-nationali- ing blows at the Indian armed forces. ties that demand a separate state for their development. Moreover, it also reiterates its resolve to extend Of late, the Indian ruling classes have deviously be- all possible support to their just and democratic gun a phase of talks with organizations leading the struggle. nationality struggles in a bid to douse the fire of these struggles with false promises and to co-opt their lead- (9th Congress, January 2007)

82 Appendix - B CPI (Maoist) Resolution Against Hindu Fascism

The crisis of the Indian ruling classes is all round af- ment Attack Case muslims were targeted once again. fecting not only the economic sphere, but also the so- Every muslim is supposed to prove his patriotism time cial and political spheres. This is resulting in growing and again. Indian state forces are even capturing and anger and revulsion of the masses of the people against annihilating innocent muslims now and then, in the the reactionary ruling classes. They are finding it in- name of nabbing terrorists. Evidences implicating state creasingly difficult to continue their oppressive rule in and hindutva forces in ‘attacks’ are being willfully sup- the old forms. Consequently the ruling classes have pressed, as can be seen in the Afzal Guru case and the developed fascist social forces with the aim of estab- attack on RSS headquarters at Nagpur. lishing full fledged fascist rule. Through this they hope The Cong-led UPA came to power projecting itself as a not only to overcome this crisis but also establish rule secular force, but it is the Congress party itself that has with consent, and facilitate the intensification of impe- been mainly responsible for most of the communal ri- rialist exploitation. Under the Òpatriotic garbÓ of ots ever since the transfer of power. Congress party is Hindutva policies, they are meekly implementing the even more pernicious. It projects itself as a messiah of imperialist-dictated policies of liberalization- muslims, but in real practice it leaves no stone unturned privatisation-globalisation, especially after the 80’s. For to spread malicious propaganda against muslims and this they are conducting a Hindu fascist campaign, on other minorities. The anti-Sikh pogroms of 1984 were the basis of which they will try to establish open terror- one such example. In the name of equally opposing all ist forms of rule. types of fundamentalism, CPI and CPI[M] have actu- Since the early ’80s, the ruling classes have been pro- ally helped in maintaining the status-quo of domina- moting Hindu communalism, targeting religious minori- tion by the Hindu fascists. Various regional parties have ties, with the hope of uniting the Hindu majority be- made alliances with the Hindu fascists for the sake of hind themselves. The Babri Masjid demolition in 1992 votes and have become apologists for the Hindu fas- was a devious act committed with this very hope. The cists. main vehicle of the Hindu fascist onslaught has been These Hindu fascists are trying to impose a the BJP-RSS combine with its storm trooper hegemonistic Hindu culture on the various culturally organisations like the VHP, Bajarang Dal, etc. The Shiv diverse people of India. While their attacks are mainly Sena in Maharashtra too has been propped up to concentrated against muslims, they are also targeting achieve this end. The Hindu fascists are particularly Christians, especially in the tribal areas, aggressively dangerous since they have the support of the most converting tribals to Hinduism. Similarly, they also at- important arms of the state in all their activities. tack dalits. Feb 2002 was a high point when the Hindu fascist forces The Unity Congress - 9th congress of the CPI (Maoist) in their laboratory, the BJP-ruled state of Gujarat, orga- calls upon the revolutionary masses, all democratic nized the worst-ever communal genocide since 1947. forces and the oppressed religious minorities to unite Thousands of muslims were brutally killed, thousands in a struggle against the Hindu fascists. The world- burnt alive or maimed. Hundreds of muslim women were wide experience of the struggle against fascism teaches gang-raped and murdered. Muslim property was tar- that the fascists can be defeated only by militant class geted with absolute precision and destroyed by Hindu struggle in the streets, factories and in the rest of the state organized goons of VHP, RSS and Bajrang Dal in countryside. The fascists can be defeated only by iso- connivance with state armed forces. Even after four lating them from the people and smashing their organi- years, many of them have not been able to return to zational forces, and by developing and intensifying their native places because of the threat of Hindu fas- protracted peoples’ war with the aim of new democratic cists. revolution, then socialism and ultimately establishing While Gujarat was their own laboratory, similar hate communism. The CPI(Maoist) pledges to fight reso- campaigns against muslims were taken in Karnataka at lutely against each and every instance of the trampling Baba Budanagiri mazar, in Madhya Pradesh at Jhabua, on the democratic rights of the oppressed minorities in Rajasthan, in Maharashtra at Malegaon, and at vari- and others by the Hindu fascists. It pledges to do its ous other places. They use the smallest opportunity to best to defend the sections of the population targeted flare up the sentiments against muslims, like with the by the Hindu fascists. Our party is willing to unite in a singing of vande mataram. broad front with all the genuine democratic forces which would be willing to fight back the Hindu fascist offensive. The Indian state too has targeted muslims, branding them ‘terrorist’. After the 9/11 incident and the Parlia- (9th Congress, January 2007)

83 Appendix - C Front Organizations of CPI (Maoist) Andhra Pradesh: Radical Students Union (RSU) Rythu Cooli Sangam (RCS) (Agricultural Labor Organization) Radical Youth Youth League (RYL) Jana Natya Mandali Viplava Rachaitala Sangham All India Peoples Resistance Forum (AIPRF) Bihar: Buddhijeevi Silpa Lekhan (Writers association) Taktim Samskritika Abhiyan (Cultural outfit) Indrani Raktim Samskritika Parivar (Cultural outfit) Sramik Sangram Manch (Workers Struggle Front) Mazdur Kisan Mukti Morcha (Workers Peasants Liberation Front) Madhya Pradesh: Adivasi Kisan Mazdoor Sangh (Tribal Peasants and Workers Organization) Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sanghathan (Revolutionary Tribal Women Organization) Krantikari Kisan Mazdoor Sangh (Revolutionary Peasants and Workers Organization) Grama Raksha Dal (Village Defense Force) Jangal Jeevan Adhikar Bachavo Andolan Chhattisgarh Dandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Mazdoor Sangh Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sangh Adivasi Krantikari Chatra Sangh Mahila Mukti Manch Jan Shakti Sanghatan West Bengal People’s Committee Against Police Attrocities (PCAPA) Nari Izzat Banchao Committee Sangrami Sramik Mancha Chhatra Samaj Orissa Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangha Bisthapan Birodhi Janamanch Kui Labanga Sangh (Kui Youth Association) Lok Shakti Manch Nari Shakti Bahini

84 Jana Natya Mandali Kui Sanskrutika Sangathan Chasi Mulia Royat Samiti Radical Student Organisation Gujarat Krantikari Sanghatana Gujarat Working Class Union Jan Sangharsh Natya Manch Dangi Mazdoor Sabha Maowadi Satipati Sangathan Krantikari Sashashtra Andolan Adivasi Mahasabha Haryana Krantikari Mazdoor Union Disha Sanskritik Manch Mahila Mukti Morcha Jan Shiwalik Sangharsh Manch Krantikari Manch Krantikari Mazdoor Kisaan Manch Bharat Ka Pragatishil Janwadi Morch Jan Chetna Manch Others Democratic Students Union – Delhi & other Universities Revolutionary Democratic Front – All India Radical Students Union - Tamil Nadu Radical Youth League - Tamil Nadu Krantikari Lok Adhikar Sanghatan – UP, Uttarakhand Progressive Students Forum – Uttaranchal Mahila Mukti Manch - Uttaranchal Delhi General Mazdoor Front Mehnathkush Mazdoor Morcha - Delhi Viplava Janadhipathya Munnani – Kerala Jangal Adhikar Sangharsha Samiti The Campaign for Survival and Dignity Peoples United for Democratic Rights (PUDR) Association for Protection of Democratic Rights (APDR) National Alliance for Peoples’ Movement Delhi Solidarity Group All India Radical Students Force

85 Appendix - D Naxal Insurgency Major Developments xx.05.1967 Naxalbari peasants uprising under the leadership of Charu Majumdar. Some landlords were killed. 11 Women died in police firing xx.09.1967 A 12 member group led by Kanu Sanyal clandestinely reached China via Nepal and underwent training xx.10.1968 All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) was formed in Kolkata. 23.11.1968 Tellichery PS was attacked in Kerala by naxal group led by K.Narayanan and Ajitha 19.02.1969 Gottikonda Bilam (Guntur dt.) meeting. Charu Majumdar attended 22.04.1969 AICCCR was converted into CPI(Marxist- Leninist) 1969 Kanai Chatterjee and Amulya Sen started Dakhinadesh Group in Bengal and Bihar. 27.05.1969 Panchadi Krishna Murthy died in an encounter at Jalanthrakota, Srikakulam Dt. xx.10.1969 Santosh Rana started killings in Gopiballabhapur, Medinipur dt of West Bengal. 22.11.1969 Tammada Ganapathy and Subba Rao Panigrahi died in encounters at Kasibuggaand Rangampet respectively, Srikakulam dist. 10.07.1970 Vempatapu Satyanarayana and A. Kailasam died in an encounter in Srikakulam dt. xx.08.1970 Souren Bose visited China and met Chou En-lai 07.11.1971 Satyanarayan Singh formed separate CPI(ML) group in Bihar 16.07.1972 Charu Majumdar was arrested in Kolkata. He died due to asthma in Lal Bazar PS on 28.7.1972.. 1975 The Dakhinadesh Group was renamed as MCC xx.xx.1997 A.P. High Court appointed a Committee of advocates to go into the naxal problem. 00.01.1978 Kondapalli Sitaramaiah and K.G.Satya Murthy founded Peoples War Group. Central Committee was constituted with Kondapalli Sitaramaiah as General. Secretary and. Mallojula Koteswar Rao (Kishanji) as State Secretary, AP 1981 Amulya Sen died 1982 Kanai Chatterjee died 1982 Venod Misra and Nagabhushan Patnaik formed Indian Peoples’ Front. 04.01.1984 Konadapalli Sitaramaiah escaped from Osmania Hospital, Hyderabad. 1984 A Plenum was held in Tamil Nadu. Mallojula Koteswar Rao was replaced by Nalla Adi Reddy as state secretary, AP 1985 Muppala Lakhman Rao @ Ganapathy was elected as Secretary, North Telangana Guer- rilla Zone 09.04.1989 Mukkku Subba Reddy, one of the three members of COC surrendered after spending 22 years in underground. 09.10.1990 Kakatiya Express was torched at Ghattkesar, near Hyderabad. 47 passengers were burnt alive in a bogie.

86 10.06.1992 Kondapalli Sitaramaiah was expelled from PWG by Laxman Rao group. M.Laxman Rao took over as General Secretary of Central Organizing Committee. 27.01.1993 K.S.Vyas IPS, DIG was shot dead in a stadium in Hyderabad. 23.03.1993 Kondapalli Sitaramaiah surrendered to the police at his native village in Krishna dist. 27.10.1993 Puli Anjaiah, Secretary AP Committee and Member of Central Committee died in an encounter in Warangal dt. 15.11.1993 G.Paradesi Naidu IPS, SP was killed by activating a landmine in Mahaboobnagar dt. 25.03.1994 Nimmaluru Bhaskar Rao, member, Central Committee surrendered to the police xx.xx.1998 Vinod Misra died 04.09.1999 C.Umeshchandra IPS was shot dead in Hyderabad. 02.12.1999 Nalla Adi Reddy, Secretary State Committee, Y.Santosh Reddy, Member Central Committee and Seelam Naresh, Secretary, North Telengana Zone died in an encounter at Koyyuru, Karimnagar dist. 02.01.2000 Peoples Guerrilla Army (PGA) was formed 13.04.2002 Kondapalli Sitaramaih died 01.10.2003 Chief Minister N.Chandrababu Naidu’s car was blown off by a landmine at Alipiri, Tirupathi. CM and another minister survived with injuries. 12.10.2004 Talks were held between Ministers of AP Government and PWG & Jana Shakti Group. The week long talks did not yield any results. 05.01.2005 K.C.Surendrababu IPS, SP of Munger dt., Bihar was killed by a landmine-blast at Bhimbandh. 16.06.2006 Matta Ravi Kumar, Member, Central Committee died in an encounter at Eerragondapalem, Prakasam dist. 23.07.2006 Burra Chinnaiah Goud @ Madhav, State Secretary was killed in an encounterat Nekkantipenta, Prakasam dt. 27.12.2006 Wadkapur Chandramouli alias Devanna alias Naveen, member, Central Committee and Military Commission died in an encounter at Jamparlova, Visakhapatnam district. 2007 Vernon Gonsalves alias Vikram of Mumbai , member PB, was arrested. 26.07.2007 Sande Rajamouli @ Prasad, Central Committee member, Secretary Karnataka Com- mittee was killed in an encounter at Dharmavaram, Anantapur dt. 07.09.2007 N.Janardhan Reddy, former Chief Minister of A.P. Rajya Laxmi, Minister A.P. escaped unhurt in a landmine explosion at Vidyanagar, Kota, Nellore dt. 19.09.2007 Tushar Kanti Bhattacharya, top leader was arrested in Patna 17.12.2007 Mallu Raj Reddy @ Sattanna, CC member was arrested in Kochi. 02.02.2008 Lanka Papi Reddy @ Ranganna, Member of CC surrendered to the Police in Hyderabad 06.02.2008 Himadri Sen Roy, Bengal State Secretary was arrested in Kolkata 02.04.2008 Gajerla Saraiah @ Bhaskar, Member CC and member CMC was killed in an encounter at Eturunagaram, Warangal dt. 15.02.2009 Sambasivudu (Konapuri Ilaiah), State Committee Secretary surrendered to the police

87 in Hyderabad. He joined TRS in January 2011. He was murdered by factionists in March 2011. 24.05.2009 Patel Sudhakar Reddy, Member CC died in an encounter at Lavvala village in Warangal dt. He belonged to Mahaboobnagar dt. 22.06.2009 CPI(Maoist) was banned by the Centre. 24.08.2009 Amitabh Bagchi, @ Sumit @ Suman member CMC, member of the PB of CPI(Maoist) was arrested in Ranchi 21.08.2009 Kohad Gandy (of Mumbai), PB member of CPI(Maoist) was arrested in New Delhi. He was in-charge of Maharashtra, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. He was instru- mental in the formation of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties in South Asia. 26.09.2009 Chakradhar Mahato, leader of Police Santrosh Birodhi Janasadharaner Committee of Maoists (PSBJC) was arrested 08.02.2010 Bansidhar @ Chintan Da was arrested in Uttar Pradesh 12.03.2010 Sakhamuri Appa Rao, CC member died in an encounter at Nettiknda, in Prakasam dt. Solipeta Kondal Reddy @ Tech Ramana, Secretary South Telangana Committee was killed in an encounter in Tadwai mandal Ottigudem forests, Warangal dt. 23.03. 2010 Kanu Sanyal, one of the founders of Naxal Insurgency, committed suicide in his house in Hatighira village, Naxalbari West Bengal 01.07.2010 Cherukuri Rajakumar, @ Azad, spokesman of CPI (Maoist) and politburo member was killed in an encounter in Wankid mandal, Adilabad dt.