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LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES FROM
1948-1978: EXPLORING THE SALIENCE OF DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University
By
Michael Ty Snarr, B.A., M.A.
afc a|c a|e sfe afc
The Ohio State University
1995
Dissertation Committee: Approved by
Charles F. Hermann
Margaret G. Hermann
Felipe Aguero tdviser Joe D. Hagan Department of Political Science UMI Number: 9534068
Copyright 1995 by Snarrr Michael Ty All rights reserved.
UMI Microform 9534068 Copyright 1995, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by Michael Ty Snarr 1995 To My Parents
ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Charles F. Hermann, the
chair of my committee, for his willingness to assist me through every step of this
project. I feel fortunate to have had the opportunity to study under him and receive the
benefits of his scholarly insights. I would also like to thank the other members of my
committee. Dr. Margaret G. Hermann was extremely supportive through her many
constructive suggestions and her warm personality. She made the process a great deal
less impersonal. Thanks to Dr. Felipe Agiiero for his insights on Latin America. Dr.
Joe D. Hagan of West Virginia University was incredibly helpful throughout this entire project. His expertise on Third World foreign policy was quite helpful and his enthusiasm for the project was a great motivator.
Thanks also go to Jan Bosold whose efficiency and sense of humor were of
great help to me.
The Mershon Center and the Ohio Geographic Alliance provided valuable
financial support throughout my years in graduate school. Randy Smith deserves a
special thank you for understanding the demands of a doctoral program.
David Kimball, Michael Barr, and Chris Chapman of The Ohio State
University's Polimetrics Lab offered technical assistance for this project. In particular,
David deserves special thanks for the many afternoons in which he patiently assisted me through the laborious process of calculating United Nations voting.
Kenneth Coleman, William Furlong, Jeanne Hey, Jeffrey Lantis, Harold
Molineu, and Bruce Moon all deserve thanks for their comments on various sections of this project.
The dissertation is dedicated to my parents. My mother deserves a great deal of thanks for, among other things, her willingness to proof-reading what must have seemed like never-ending political science jargon. My father was instrumental in fostering my interest in Latin America and I could always count on his continued support. He also read the entire text and offered editorial suggestions.
Special thanks goes to my loving wife, Melissa, who suffered the most throughout this project—yet showed remarkable patience. I never could have finished this project if not for her steadfast financial and spiritual support. But most important of all was her enduring friendship. Furthermore, she blessed me with our wonderful daughter, Madison Grace, who brought a great amount of joy into my life during die final stages of this project. VITA
July 4, 1963 ...... Born - Denver, Colorado
1986 ...... B.A., Wilmington College, Wilmington, OH
1988 ...... M.A., Ohio University, Athens, OH
PUBLICATIONS
Snarr, Michael T. 1991. "Needs and Obstacles to Strengthening Geography as Perceived by Ohio Educators." Ohio Council for the Social Studies Review27 (Spring): 26-31.
Snarr, Michael T. and D. Neil Snarr 1990. "Nicaragua's Foreign Relations with Countries Other Than the United States," In Sandinista Nicaragua: Part 2: Economy, Politics and Foreign Policy, pp. 133-52. Ann Arbor, MI: Pierian Press.
FIELD OF STUDY
Major Field: Political Science
v TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... iii
VITA ...... v
LIST OF T A B L E S ...... xix
CHAPTER PAGE
I. LITERATURE REVIEW AND C R IT IQ U E ...... 1
Introduction ...... 1 The Compliance and Consensus A pproaches ...... 5 Anti-core Approaches ...... 13 Summary and A lternativ e ...... 17
II. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AS AN ALTERNATIVE...... 22
Introduction ...... 22 Justification for a Development Strategy ...... 23 Identifying a Development Strategy A p p ro a c h ...... 31 Hypotheses ...... 41 Outline of Dissertation ...... 42 S u m m ary...... 44
III. TESTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN P O L IC Y ...... 48
Introduction ...... 48 Operationalization and Coding of the Independent V a ria b le ...... 48 Sources for Data C ollection ...... 54 Combining Multiple Indicators ...... 55 Confidence M easures ...... 57 Caretaker and Short-Term Regim es ...... 58 CHAPTER PAGE
The Dependent Variable ...... 63 Methodology ...... 66
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS...... 70
Introduction ...... 70 R e s u lts ...... 71 Development Strategy and United Nations Voting...... 71 Development Strategy and CO PD A B ...... 77 Comparing UN and COPDAB D ata ...... 83 Analysis ...... 87 Development Strategy and United Nations Voting ...... 89 Development Strategy and C O PD A B ...... 97 Comparing UN and COPDAB D ata ...... 104
V. CONVENTIONAL DEVELOPMENT CASE STUDIES...... 110
Introduction ...... 110 Ruiz Cortines of Mexico ...... 118 Internal Variables ...... 120 External V ariables ...... 120 Operational/Conceptual ...... 135 C onclusion ...... 141 Kubitschek of Brazil ...... 145 Internal Variables ...... 147 External V ariables ...... 152 Operational/Conceptual ...... 153 C onclusion ...... 161
VI. MODERATE REFORM CASE STUDIES...... 164
Figueres of Costa Rica ...... 165 Internal Variables ...... 166 External V ariables ...... 173 Operational/Conceptual ...... 177 C onclusion ...... 180 Torrijos of Panam a ...... 181 Internal Variables ...... 182 External V ariables ...... 187
vii CHAPTER PAGE
Operational/Conceptual ...... 190 C onclusion ...... 194
VII. RADICAL REFORM CASE STUDIES...... 196
Goulart of B ra z il ...... 196 Internal Variables ...... 197 External Variables ...... 207 Operational/Conceptual ...... 210 C onclusion ...... 215 Allende of C h i le ...... 218 Internal V ariables ...... 219 External V ariables ...... 224 Operational/Conceptual ...... 227 Conclusion ...... 232
VIII. CASE STUDY: CONCLUSIONS...... 234
The Link Between Development Strategy and Latin American Foreign Policy ...... 238 Qualifications to Development S tra te g y ...... 238 Development Strategy as a Conceptual Tool ...... 245 Future R e se a rc h ...... 252
APPENDICES...... 256
A. Coding Summary ...... 256
B. Regime Coding Sheet ...... 257
C. Sources Consulted for Classifying Regimes (by Country) ...... 258
D. UN Annual Voting Session Dates and Number of Nonunanimous Votes ...... 284
BIBLIOGRAPHY 285 LIST OF TABLES
TABLE PAGE
1. Shortcomings in the competing approaches to dependent state foreign p o l ic y ...... 18
2. Preferences and the three approaches to dependent state foreign policy . . . 20
3. List of Regimes by Country and Dates in Office ...... 59
4. List of Regimes by Development Strategy and Dates in Office ...... 61
5. Relationship Between Development Strategy and Support for US in UN Voting for All R eg im es ...... 73
6. Relationship Between Development Strategy and Support for US in UN Voting for Regimes Classified with High and Medium Confidence . . . 74
7. Relationship Between Development Strategy and Support for US in UN Voting for Regimes Classified with High C onfiden ce ...... 75
8. Correlation Means for each Development Strategy T y p e ...... 76
9. Relationship Between Development Strategy and COPDAB 1 Conflict Behavior Data for All Regim es ...... 79
10. Relationship Between Development Strategy and COPDAB 1 Conflict Behavior Data for Regimes with High and Medium Coding Confidence. . . 80
11. Relationship Between Development Strategy and COPDAB 1 Conflict Behavior Data for Regimes with High Coding C onfidence ...... 81
12. COPDAB Correlation Means for each Development Strategy T y p e ...... 82 TABLE PAGE
13. Summary of Correlation Coefficients between Development Strategy and UN Voting and Development Strategy and COPDAB ...... 82
14. UN and COPDAB Z -S c o re s ...... 84
15. Regime Voting Agreement in the United Nations with the United States. . .8 9
16. Regime COPDAB Cooperation Level with the United States ...... 97
17. Net Change in Regime Z-scores from UN to COPDAB ...... 104
18. Regimes Selected for Case S tu d ie s ...... 113
19. Summary of Findings for Conventional Case Studies ...... 163
20. Summary of Findings for Moderate Reform Case Studies ...... 195
21. Summary of Findings for Radical Reform Case Studies ...... 233
22. Summary of Findings for Selected Case Studies ...... 240
23. Preferences and the Approaches to Dependent State Foreign Policy . . . 246
x CHAPTER I
Introduction: Literature Review and Critique
Introduction
Attention to North-South relations has increased in recent years with the breakdown of the bipolar system and the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, the importance of ties between North and South is increasing as the North looks to the
South as a trading partners and global environmental problems are coming to the center of world politics. This scenario is especially true with relations between the United
States and Latin America. Yet the scholarly community's understanding of foreign policy-making in the South lags behind these important changes. If a greater understanding of these and other global issues is to be attained, then a better comprehension of the determinants of foreign policy in the developing world is needed.
While it is noted above that scholarly research lags behind important developments, several scholars have recently made important contributions to this area of study. These essays are notable for drawing attention to the importance of domestic factors, and/or highlighting the complexity of foreign policymaking. For instance, in one of the earliest works on Third World foreign policy Good (1962, 3) drew attention to the inherent instability within new states and the subsequent effect on foreign policy.
He stresses the importance of domestic factors such as state-building and how the governments of new states are confronted with the challenge of guiding an incoherent nation. Although he notes that other factors may influence the foreign policy of new states, he emphasizes that due to their centrality domestic factors can not be ignored.
While focusing on Arab foreign policy, Dessouki and Korany (1984, 5-7) reject single variable explanations of foreign policy. For instance, they argue against the
"great man theory," that explains foreign policy as the result of the idiosycracies of the leader. They also reject other Third World foreign policy explanations such as the
"great powers approach." Their approach stresses the importance of East-West confrontation and ignores the domestic forces within the developing country.
As an alternative, Dessouki and Korany (1984, 7) challenge those studying
Third World foreign policy to develop a more complex view of Third World foreign policy that integrates multiple factors. Although not diminishing the importance of the international system, Dessouki and Korany note the importance of domestic politics:
"...the foreign policy process cannot be separated from the domestic social structure or domestic political process. To understand a country's foreign policy, we have to open the 'black box' of Third World society."
In his widely recognized analysis of Indonesian foreign policy, Weinstein
(1976) focuses on the "dilemma of dependence." This concept refers to the dilemma that decision-makers in the Third World face when attempting to achieve economic and political development. The dilemma revolves around how Third World countries can interact with the outside world without relinquishing their sovereignty. "The dilemma is painful precisely because Indonesia is an underdeveloped country: the economic and political deficiencies that make cooperation with the outside world appear indispensable also make it seem dangerous" (1976, 20).
Thus for Weinstein (1972, 366), the interplay among three factors are central to understanding Third World foreign policy: independence, development, and political competition. While independence and development are central to the dilemma of dependence discussed above, political competition is a result of the ensuing political alliances. The alliances rely to a great extent on how development and independence are defined. For instance, Sukarno's anti-Western foreign policy resulted in different domestic political competition than Suharto's pro-West foreign policy. The former was much more nationalistic and patriotic in comparison to Suharto's. Echoing the assertions of Dessouki and Korany and Weinstein, Robert Roth stein (1977, 62) also recognizes the complexity of Third World foreign policy. He argues that leaders in these countries face a "double burden" in that they must consider the influences of a volatile domestic situation as well as a highly complex international system.
In addition to the list of sophisticated analyses discussed above,1 it should also be stated that a large number of single country studies on foreign policy of Third World countries exists. The latter consists of one-time studies of a single country or region.
Unfortunately, both sets of studies generally suffer from two shortcomings. First, despite their importance, the vast majority of these studies do not represent a coherent literature. In other words, the studies do not tend to build upon each other. Second,
1 Other authors that could be added to this list of sophisticated analysis of Third World foreign policy include Shaw (1985) and David (1991). very few of the studies are rigorously tested. As a result, a laundry list of variables, which are believed to be important, have been generated, but have not been empirically tested. As a result of these two shortcomings, this research has not led to the accumulation of knowledge.
There is, however, one exception to this trend, A group of authors studying dependent state foreign policy, led by Neil Richardson, Charles Kegley, and Bruce
Moon, have to a great extent overcome this trend. The following study is primarily concerned in addressing this body of literature that has evolved over the past two decades. Its beginnings can be found in the early 1970s with correlational studies between US foreign aid and trade, and United Nations General Assembly voting. It has continued through the 1980s and into the 1990s taking the form of three alternative approaches.
The remainder of this chapter will summarize the evolution of this body of literature on dependent state foreign policy and call attention to the lack of attention to anti-core (anti-US) foreign policy. The final section will consist of a discussion of the goals of this dissertation, that is, exploring the ability of development strategy to explain Latin American foreign policy behavior toward the United States, identify qualifications to this approach, and a generate a tool to reconcile the other three approaches.2
2 It should be noted here that this research is directed toward foreign policy patterns of dependent countries, not individual decisions. The Compliance and Consensus Approaches
The origin of the literature on foreign policy compliance is relatively recent and in turn its scope is limited. Scholars began by looking at puzzles such as how foreign aid or trade patterns are correlated to United Nations voting. This is the question that
Eugene Wittkopf (1973) addresses in one of the earliest studies on foreign policy compliance. In his study, Wittkopf is interested in the covariation between the US and the twelve Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries' aid, and the recipients' voting behavior in the United Nations' General
Assembly. He examines General Assembly voting during the 1963 and 1966 sessions and US aid from 1962-1964 and 1965-1967. He also examines the covariation of Soviet aid and General Assembly voting by Soviet bloc countries.
Wittkopf (1973, 878) discovers that the only significant relationships between aid and votes is an inverse relationship. This examination of a small number of relationships, does not confirm his expected hypothesis that aid and voting would be linked. Even when a more complex methodology is introduced, using relative measures of aid and voting, a clear pattern is not disclosed.3
3 The "relative allocation" of foreign aid from donor i to recipient j is calculated by subtracting the expected allocation of foreign aid from i to j from the actual allocation of foreign aid from i to j, and dividing by the expected allocation of foreign aid from i to j (1973, 874). The "relative agreement1' between UN members i and j are calculated by subtracting the expected number of roll calls on which a randomly selected pair of Assembly members, for all roll calls on which members i and j are both present and voting, agree,” from the actual number of times members i and j agree across a set of roll calls, and divide by the number of times they agree (1973, 875). Another important work, and one of the earliest publications to use the term
"compliance" was done by Neil Richardson in 1976. Richardson (1976, 1098) directly addresses the question of foreign policy compliance: "Are there patterns to the asymmetrical influence exercised by dominant nations?" He adds a new twist to the literature by introducing an "economic explanation of international political submissiveness in a hierarchical world" (1976, 1098). Richardson is interested in confirming the proposition that countries dependent on the United States are characterized by a greater degree of voting agreement with the United States. He utilizes international trade theory as a basis for postulating that developing countries with a significant trade relationship with a dominant country will engage in politically compliant behavior. In addition to "export dependence" (nations whose trade is dominated by a single, dominant partner), Richardson (1976, 1099-1101) adds commodity concentration, recipient concentration, and economic development.
It is discovered that dependent nations vote virtually the same as non-dependent countries on non-Cold War4 ("Other") issues. Furthermore, he finds that dependencies comply significantly more often than do non-dependent countries on Cold War votes. It should be mentioned, however, that the dependencies comply less on Cold War votes than on Other issues. These results are somewhat mixed. In an effort to explain this,
Richardson (1976, 1106) explains that the remaining, non-dependent states, "depart from the US on Cold War votes significantly more than do dependencies."
4 Cold War votes are defined here as those on which the United States and the Soviet Union disagree. 7
In 1980, Richardson co-authored an article with Charles Kegley on the same topic. The authors engage in a more complex analysis by borrowing Keohane and
Nye’s (1977) concepts of "sensitivity" and "vulnerability" dependence. Richardson and
Kegley (1980, 192-3) are primarily concerned with vulnerability dependence, which refers to long-run costs that a dependent country would incur despite attempts to reduce its dependent position. In their study, they select a set of countries which have been asymmetrically dependent on US trade for twenty-four years . It is their belief that this trade vulnerability will have an effect on the dependent countries' foreign policies.
More specifically they hypothesize that: "Among dependencies there is a positive association between the extent of export dependence and the level of Cold War voting agreement with the United States," and that "A dependency's Cold War voting agreement with the United States directly covaries with its level of export dependence upon the United States."
The results do not confirm these hypothesis and the authors are left puzzled.
Richardson and Kegley (1980, 219) conclude by stating that there existed "a positive relationship between trade vulnerability and foreign policy compliance for much of the period since 1950." Furthermore, they assert that either UN cold war issues have declined in salience to the United States since the end of the 1960s or that United States has lost its ability to turn asymmetric trade situations into foreign policy compliance.
Soon after the Richardson and Kegley article appeared, Adrienne Armstrong
(1981) published an article entitled "The Political Consequences of Economic
Dependence." She defines economic dependence as asymmetrical economic reliance. In 8 addition to trade dependence, she adds military aid, economic aid, and trade importance. As indicators of compliance, Armstrong utilizes three measures, two of which use UN roll call votes, and one using Azar and Sloan’s Dimensions of
Interaction. The results from this study demonstrate that military aid and the importance of the United States as a trade partner are primary predictors in accounting for political compliance. In addition, there was a significant relationship between the importance of the issue and the costs of compliance to the dependent state.
Surprisingly, this was not the case for economic aid. In fact, economic aid had a negative effect on political compliance. With regard to the Soviet Union, the findings were inconclusive.
In sum, the compliance literature has not attained impressive results. Despite experimenting with several types of dependent relations, significant results have eluded these researchers (DeRouen and Mintz 1991; Menkhaus and Kegley 1988; Snarr 1992).
This prompted the development of a competing approach introduced by Bruce Moon in
1983.
Prior to his article, the literature had approached political compliance from a bargaining perspective. From this view, military assistance, and US aid and/or trade dominance is utilized as a bargaining tool and levels of US assistance will reflect levels of dependent country political compliance. In other words, the asymmetrical power advantage of the United States can be translated into a method of forcing concessions from weaker states. Moon rejects this power politics-based approach and adopts one which is based on Galtung's (1971) theory of structural imperialism. This approach emphasizes the affinity between elites in the core and periphery to describe the
relationship between the dominant and dependent state. He argues that at the center of the relationship is not power, but rather shared values. Dependent state foreign policy
will agree with that of the United States not because of short-term bargaining, but because of "consensus" on the issues. Moon's approach therefore is more closely associated to dependency theory, in contrast to the compliance approaches' reliance on a bargaining perspective. In the words of Moon (1983, 321):
Basically, the incorporation of a national elite into an internationalized bourgeoisie produces decisionmakers who, owing not only to the economic interests they share with American elites through economic transactions but also to their shared values and perspectives, produce policy virtually indistinguishable from that which would be generated by American elites. Thus, external effects on foreign policy, though strong, are indirect and involve the penetration of the society and economy as well as the political system.
Moon is therefore suggesting that political agreement will occur, but for different
reasons than the bargaining theorists suggest. At the center of the relationship is not power, but rather shared values.
His results lead to the following conclusion: "Much as expected by the dependency model, it appears that the greater the percentage of a nation's foreign policy transactions and interactions accounted for by the United States, the greater the similarity of the foreign policy behavior of the two states" (Moon 1983, 327). But as he acknowledges, this agreement does not necessarily mean that influence or distortion is present. In order to determine this, one must first have some knowledge of the regimes preferences. 10
In a subsequent longitudinal study, Moon (1985) tests the relationship between aid-giving, which is deemed as reward behavior, and compliance behavior, which is measured by UN voting. Thirty-five nations are examined during the period from 1946 through 1975. The conclusions of this article, while tentative, cast further doubts on the compliance approach and gives some credence to his consensus approach. In particular, he finds evidence pointing to the salience of domestic variables, such as regimes.
Given the lack of conclusive results of earlier compliance studies, Menkhaus and Kegley (1988) attempt to modify the earlier bargaining model by offering a modified version of it. While they do not alter the basic conceptions of bargaining theory, they do argue that a "dominant state-centric" model does not accurately capture reality. In the "dominant state-centric" model, which has been utilized by the literature surveyed above, the focus is on a single dominant country and its dependencies.
Menkhaus and Kegley argue that in reality a dependent country is generally dependent on several dominant countries. This alternative model is referred to as the "dependent state-centric" model.
The authors use this new model in an attempt to obtain a greater understanding of the relative salience of various types of dependence. In their article they engage in a case study of Somalia, which they assert is dependent on Saudi Arabia, Italy, the
United States, and the Soviet Union. Their findings are used to counter the claims of
Moon's earlier study. "The evidence...suggests, in contrast to Moon's thesis, that among alternative forms of economic dependence, relatively speaking, export trade 11 dependence is the most potent predictor of changes in Somalia's foreign policy orientation (Menkhaus and Kegley 988, 340).
While more research is needed on some aspects of the compliance and consensus literature (e.g., Menkhaus and Kegley's "dependent state-centric" model), neither approach offers convincing empirical evidence. In addition to their lack of attention to anti-core foreign policy there are several other shortcomings worth mentioning.
This survey demonstrates that the literature falls short of establishing any clear relationship between aid or trade dependence, and political compliance. None of the above studies find significant evidence to support their theories, and the few findings that offer some evidence often contradict the findings of the other studies. In addition, the bargaining literature can be criticized for not investigating the concept of distortion, in which how the regime would vote without US influence is estimated and compared with its actual voting behavior. While Moon (1983) attempted such an analysis, he admits this was a less than satisfactory attempt. Therefore, the remaining studies are ignoring the possibility that the dependent states are voting with United States due to shared interests. For instance, on the topic of Cold War votes, several of the studies result in conclusions that the US dependencies comply with Cold War votes quite consistently. Yet they do not consider that many of these dependencies in Latin
America were adamantly opposed to communism, especially during the 1950s and
1960s after Castro came to power, and that they vote in agreement with the United
States, not out of compliance, but due to a common fear of communism. 12
Another weakness of this literature is that much of the data examined draws on data from the 1950s and 1960s. Only Menkhaus and Kegley examine political compliance since 1975, and they focus only on the case of a single country and do not question whether dominant state influence is responsible for their UN voting behavior.
Hence, there are no aggregate investigations of the relationship between economic dependence and political compliance after the mid-1970s. This is a problem because a close examination of voting agreement levels reveals a significant decrease in agreement after the early to mid-1970s. This significant drop in agreement levels makes the unquestioned assumption of compliance by dependencies problematic.
A third criticism is that few of the studies engage in effective longitudinal studies. Although Richardson and Kegley attempt such a study from 1950-1973, it is flawed. The problem with their study is that they do not account for the changing agenda in the United Nations. This oversight ignores two problems. On the one hand,
"due to the procedural dynamics of the UN sessions themselves, some sessions are dominated by near-unanimous roll call votes on resolutions which produce little serious opposition while during other sessions only relatively close votes are conducted in the roll call mode" (Moon 1983, 324). In addition, the actual agenda of each session can vary to an extent that greatly complicates comparison across sessions. In an attempt to remedy this situation, Moon's longitudinal study calculated the deviation of each nation 13 from the mean of its subgroup.5 Unfortunately, his results are inconclusive, he only examines aid, and his study does not extend beyond 1975.
These shortcomings in the literature lead to two interrelated problems. First, because these studies often use relative voting measures and they do not conduct post-
1945 longitudinal studies or include near-unanimous votes, their overall agreement levels with the United States are masked. The studies discussed above are misleading because they project an image of high agreement levels between the United States and the dependent countries. If absolute agreement levels are actually lower than these studies portray, one must question the degree to which compliant or consensual relationships exists.
This does not mean that these studies should be discarded, since both offer valuable insights. Both approaches describe Latin American foreign policy phenomena that do occur. Yet they are incapable of determining when compliance will occur and when consensus will occur. Furthermore, too much foreign policy behavior is left unexplained (i.e., anti-core behavior). The next section discusses a recent reaction to these approaches that is directed at the latter of these shortcomings.
Anti-core Approaches
The two approaches discussed above converge in their implicit assumption that dependent state foreign policy behavior will coincide with the interests of the dominant
5 A subgroup was decided by an earlier study of Moon which identified coherent voting groups. In this case Latin America was one such voting group or bloc. 14 state, but they disagree on the specific reasons for this behavior. They also focus their attention, although indirectly in Moon's case, on external variables. For US-Latin
American relations this implies that Latin American foreign policy will agree or comply with that of the United States. This, however, fails to explain instances in which the
Latin American foreign policy deviates from that of the United States. "Both compliance and consensus fail to account for instances in which dependent leaders implement foreign policy opposite to core preferences" (Hey 1994, 245).
The ability to explain dependent state foreign policy that does not coincide with core preferences is becoming increasingly important as the former become more independent of the United States (Menkhaus and Kegley 1988, 318; Snarr 1992).
Whereas, during the early part of the Cold War period, it is believed that the foreign policies' of these countries generally coincided with the wishes of the United States, this is no longer true. A prime example is the Central American peace plan engineered by Oscar Arias of Costa Rica. This peace plan directly contradicted the wishes of the
Reagan administration and caused a great deal of acrimony between this administration and the Central American republics. Assuming this literature is accurate, it is important to investigate the causes of this increasing potential for conflict.
While examples such as this may have become more frequent in the last two decades, theoretical explanations of this behavior have not kept pace. Since the more popular theories of developing country and Latin American foreign policy behavior tend to focus on data prior to this period, their models emphasize external explanations that focus on behavior that coincides with that of the United States. Given the 15 increasing independence of Latin American countries, more attention needs to be given to foreign policy that does not coincide with that of the United States, Only in the past few years have serious attempts been made to account for anti-US behavior.
This is perhaps the single greatest shortcoming of this literature. And while it may help us in explaining pro-core foreign policy, it is of little use for explaining anti core foreign policy. When one considers that such behavior is not an uncommon phenomena (Hagan 1989; Hey 1994; Hey and Kuzma 1993), especially after the beginning of the 1970s, it becomes evident that a gap in the literature exists. For instance, Hagan notes that even the most "pro-US" developing countries vote against the United States a majority of the time in the United Nations General Assembly (1989,
515 fh.).6 Thus, there exists a need to incorporate domestic explanations in an effort to understanding the anti-core behavior of dependent states. Recent attempts to address this point are discussed below.
One such attempt to examine anti-core foreign policy behavior can be found in a case study on Jamaican foreign policy by Biddle and Stephens (1989). They were interested in the radical transformation of foreign policy that has taken place in this country, in which the Manley regime and its anti-US foreign policy replaced, and was later replaced by, a pro-US regime. Here was a country heavily dependent on the
United States, yet able to radically alter its foreign policy as new governments came to power. As a result of their investigation, they argue that:
6 See also Moon (1985, 306). 16
(1) it is possible for dependent states successfully to carry out policies directed against at least some of the interests of core countries and TNCs, given a strong enough coalition of domestic classes and sufficient state capacity; and (2) in some cases, it is even possible for political elites in democratic polities in the Third World successfully to carry out policies against both TNC and domestic bourgeois preferences, given sufficient organization and mobilization of the lower classes and sufficient state capacity (414).
Biddle and Stephens explain this anti-core behavior as a result of the social strains placed on a society by the dependent development model, resulting in dissatisfaction among the masses. This social unrest can then provide an opportunity for internal social movements to acquire influence and/or policymakers to alter their development policies. Thus, Biddle and Stephens have taken an important step in addressing the gap in dependent state foreign policy by including in their analysis, domestic influences, anti-core foreign policy, and a role in foreign policymaking for not only the pro-core elites, but also the frequently anti-core elites and subordinate classes.
More recently, Hey (1994) has elaborated upon the dependent development approach. She focuses on the anti-core foreign policy of dependent states, or what she refers to as counterdependence.7 In her examination of Ecuadoran case studies, she finds that the counterdependent foreign policy option may be more prevalent among
Latin American policymakers than the compliance and consensus literature imply.
Nevertheless, Hey does not argue that counterdependence should in any way replace
7 Anti-core foreign policy (or counterdependence) are actions by dependent countries which contradict the wishes of the core. Richardson (1981, 90) has referred to this as "defiance." compliance or consensus. Instead, she stresses that all three approaches have something to contribute to the understanding of dependent state foreign policy. Among her recommendations for future studies is a call for addressing the question of under what conditions each of these approaches is most useful. This is due to a belief that all three approaches have something to offer in different situations. Her findings also point to the need for further investigation of the impact of policymakers' ideological orientations (Hey 1994, 259).
In sum, this recent literature has advanced the debate on dependent state foreign policy by forcing it to consider anti-core foreign policy behavior. Before discussing how this dissertation will attempt to build upon this progress, one other weakness in the literature necessitates discussion.
Summary and Alternative
The shortcomings discussed thus far are summarized in Table 1. None of the three competing approaches can explain all three foreign policy behavior patterns.*
8 It should be mentioned that a "Somewhat" or a "No" does not necessarily denote a shortcoming. Instead, the approach may simply be unconcerned with this aspect or choose not to highlight it in that specific study. 18 TABLE 1 Shortcomings in the Competing Approaches to Dependent State Foreign Policy
Counter- Compliance Consensus Dependence
Pro-Core Yes Yes No Anti-Core No No Yes
The table shows that the compliance and consensus literature are best prepared to explain pro-core foreign policy behavior of dependent states, but not anti-core.
Counterdependence, on the other hand, offers an explanation for anti-core foreign policy behavior, but is not designed to explain pro-core behavior.
Given these shortcomings, what is needed is an alternative approach that will provide a framework for explaining pro-core as well as anti-core dependent state foreign policy. The alternative proposed here is designed to fulfill these requirements.
In order to address these weaknesses, it is proposed here that it is necessary to explore the ideological preferences of the policymakers (or regime), and the resulting impact upon foreign policy behavior.9 For if a distinction is to be made between consensus, compliance, and counterdependence, the initial preferences of the regime must be determined. This will emphasize internal rather than external variables. As mentioned above, this is a task that has been mentioned in the literature, but has not
9 By foreign policy preferences, I mean the foreign policy that would be chosen under conditions void of external or internal constraints. The question of whose preferences will be discussed in Chapter 2. been undertaken. Recently, several studies, in addition to Hey's article mentioned above, have highlighted this gap by stressing the importance of examining the ideological preferences of regimes. For instance, in a recent article that examines US attempts under Reagan to link foreign aid to the foreign policy behavior of its recipients, Kegley and Hook (1991, 311) stressed the need to consider the "interests, values, and perceptions" of dependent states. Similarly, Hagan (1987, 362) asserts that in order to further our knowledge of foreign policy, "we must know something about the initial preferences of the regime leadership." Based on these weaknesses in the literature and suggestions by other scholars for advancing it, this research project will attempt to develop the concept of regime preferences.
This dissertation will therefore attempt to provide several important contributions to the literature on dependent state foreign policy. First, it will incorporate the concept of preferences into this body of literature by offering a means of assessing a regime's preferences. As noted above, this is a much needed step in furthering our analysis of dependent state foreign policy. Second, following the introduction of this approach for incorporating preferences, it will be empirically tested. The test will consist of both statistical and case study analysis of patterns of
Latin American foreign policy behavior.
Furthermore, if this alternative approach proves to be useful, then it will offer a basis for distinguishing between the three approaches discussed above. While it is referred to as an alternative, because it introduces another way to view dependent state foreign policy—i.e., a domestic-based explanation which centers around the ideological 20 preferences of the regime—it also serves to generate a tool for distinguishing between the other three approaches. It will accomplish this by offering a method, based on these preferences, for determining which of the three approaches, or in this case outcomes, to expect. Since the purpose of this dissertation is not to displace or disprove any of the existing approaches, this is a valuable contribution. Table 2 demonstrates how these three can be distinguished based on the regimes preferences.
TABLE 2 Preferences and the Approaches to Dependent State Foreign Policy
Pro-US Foreign Policy Anti-US Foreign Policy
US-Dependent Slate Agreement CONSENSUS DOMESTIC COERCION Preferences
US-Dependent State Elite COMPLIANCE COUNTERDEPENDENCE Disagreement
Ideally, if the preferences of the dependent state and the United States are in agreement, then the expected outcome will be consensus. If the preferences of these two actors are in disagreement and their foreign policies diverge, then counterdependence has occurred. If the preferences diverge and foreign policy agreement follows, then compliance has taken place.10 Since compliance is the result of an intervening variable (external pressure by the United States in this case), this
10 If the intervening influence is cause by a foreign actor, such as the United States, then this is the compliance advocated with Richardson, Kegley and others. However, if the preferences agree, but foreign policy diverges due to domestic variables external to the regime, then this is a different type of compliance that has not been discussed in the literature. 21 alternative approach will only be able to indicate whether to expect consensus or counterdependence. It will take additional research, some of which will be performed in this project, to be better educated regarding when to expect compliance.
Therefore, the alternative introduced in this research project incorporates the consensus literature's notion that shared values exist between the core and periphery, but expands it to include situations in which elite preferences are not in agreement. It builds upon the counterdependence literature by specifying the conditions under which to expect both pro- and anti-core behavior. Finally, this alternative does not displace the compliance literature, but rather, helps indicate when compliance occurs by examining preferences.
While it is not realistic to expect this alternative conception to end the debate on dependent state foreign policy, this proposal represents a step towards synthesizing the literature and addressing some of its weaknesses. While the author is perfectly aware that this study does not include all pertinent factors involved in foreign policy decision making, it is hoped that future research will build upon this study.
In Chapter Two, a means of assessing the preferences of Latin American regimes will be introduced and developed. CHAPTER H
Development Strategy as an Alternative
Introduction
In Chapter One several shortcomings in the literature on Third World and Latin
American foreign policy were discussed. The purpose of this chapter is to present an alternative explanation-based on regime preferences--to Latin American foreign policy that is intended to overcome these shortcomings. This alternative is not expected to replace the aforementioned approaches to studying the external behavior of this region, but rather introduce another way of viewing dependent state foreign policy which, in turn, will assist in determining the conditions under which the three approaches can be expected to occur.
In order to incorporate the preferences of regimes into this literature, the concept of development strategy will be introduced. Development strategy will be utilized to estimate the preferences of these countries. In other words, a country's, or more specifically, a regime's preferences will be represented by its choice of development strategy.
This chapter will discuss the theoretical justification for pursuing a development strategy approach as an alternative, identify a viable development strategy typology from the literature, and then offer a theoretical linkage between it and foreign policy.
22 23
Next, hypotheses will be generated, followed by an outline of the subsequent chapters, and a conclusion.
Justification for a Development Strategy Approach
Everyday leaders are faced with an overwhelming set of problems with which they must deal. One way humans deal with such problems is to simplify reality. Cottam
(1977; 10) refers to this simplification as a leader's "world view." In a similar vein,
Anderson argues that Latin American leaders rely on a "strategy of development" in dealing with development problems that confront them. He defines development strategy as "a total system demand, a view of the process of economic change compatible with the values and beliefs of a certain set of power contenders. It is in this sense, an ideology, a formula or theory, a view of how the pieces go together, and what pieces are to go together." Thus, according to Anderson (1967, 158), a development strategy is a means of "simplifying" a complex problem and, more specifically, "delimiting the problem of the allocation of resources."
Key to the development strategy approach is the overwhelming importance of economic development to most political leaders in Latin America and its influence on the conduct of their foreign policies. A thorough examination of the literature on Latin
American politics underscores its importance to the policymaker. While economic development is one among many goals, Milenky (1975, 103) highlights its centrality;
"the overriding national priority and key to all others is development. Development is linked to national power and the achievement of meaningful national sovereignty and 24 autonomy." The centrality of economic development to the Latin American leadership is the basis for the alternative approach offered here.
The salience of economic development to Latin American regimes can then be linked to its impact on foreign policy. Evidence highlighting the importance of economic development strategies to a country's foreign policy can frequently be found in the literature. First, evidence can be offered on a more general plane by citing the close connection between domestic politics and foreign policy.1 Cochrane (1978, 460) asserts that "there is no sharp distinction between foreign and domestic policy." This position is echoed by Lincoln (1981; 6): "foreign policy in all Latin American nations has been and continues to be an extension of domestic policy. Linkages between domestic and foreign policies allow foreign policies to be instruments through which policy-makers may accomplish their principal domestic goals."
On a more specific level, the link between developmental ideologies (or models or strategies2) of a regime and foreign policy is asserted by many Latin Americanists,
Several have noted the connection between development strategies and foreign policy behavior. Ferris (Ferris 1981, 247) argues that while "Third World nations seek to increase their development, they have different developmental models as goals; the choice of a developmental model determines the type of foreign policies a Latin
1 Also see Rosenau 1969. 2 These three terms are often used interchangeable in the literature and will be throughout this chapter. I will define them using Hirschman's (1961, 3) definition of economic development ideology: "any moderately consistent body of beliefs, ideas or propositions, tested or untested, that aims at explaining Latin America's economic backwardness and at indicating its cure." 25
American government will pursue." In a recent study of Peruvian foreign policy, St.
John (1992, 5) concludes that the Peruvian case demonstrated a strong connection between domestic economic development policies and foreign policy.3 In the most explicit statement of this link Coleman and Quiros-Varela (1981, 40) assert that
"foreign policy-making is unavoidably veiy much a function of the requirements of development statecraft.11 They then go on to state that "the specific foreign policy pursued by a given group of political elites will be a function of the strategy for national development employed."
This evidence explicitly serves to highlight the importance of development strategies to Latin American foreign policy. In addition to the literature discussed above, this linkage is complemented by three other bodies of evidence~the literature on regime change, the primacy of the executive, and the role of ideas.
In contrast to the compliance approach (which highlights the importance of the international system) and consensus approach (which stresses socio-economic elites), at the root of the development strategy explanation is the importance of the regime. A regime is defined here and throughout this paper as "that role or set of roles in a national political system in which inheres the power to make authoritative policy decisions" (Salmore and Salmore 1978, 103).4 A recent group of studies have
3 See also Alberto van Klaveran (1984; 12 and 1992; 196-97), Braveboy-Wagner (1989; 160), Lincoln (1981; 10-12), Domfnguez 1985; 164-6). 4 The definition of regime adopted here is consistent with its usage in the comparative foreign policy literature and should not be confused with the definition employed in the international relations literature. 26
highlighted the salience of certain regime properties to foreign policymaking in the
developing world. These studies do not represent a coherent research approach, and are
not all directed at the literature discussed above, but they have reached similar
conclusions—a change in regime frequently leads to a subsequent change in foreign policy. For instance, while testing the hypothesized correlation between change in
political structure and change in economic relations with the United States, Andriole
and Hopple (1986; 390) discovered that a change in leadership offered more
explanatory power. Their results led them to conclude that "the key to impact probably
lies more in the nature of the leadership of a country than in its identifiable political
structure." The conclusion of Moon's (1985) second article on dependent state foreign
policy also points to the salience of regime change in foreign policy restructuring. The
concept "foreign policy restructuring" is used to refer to the amount of change or
realignment in a country's foreign policy. In this study it most often refers to changes
in foreign policy resulting from a change in regime. In fact, he concludes by calling for
research which investigates the impact of regime orientation on foreign policy in an
effort to open the black-box of domestic politics (1985, 328). Finally, it should be
mentioned, that these findings also coincide with those of Midlarsky (1981) that
revolutions result in a change in foreign policy. Thus, by measuring the impact that a
change in regime has on its foreign policy, and measuring subsequent foreign policy
restructuring, one can measure the impact that regimes have on foreign policy.
In a more recent study on regimes, Hagan (1989) has attempted to build upon
the empirical findings of these studies. He is interested in the cases of foreign policy 27 restructuring that result from less dramatic changes in regimes (i.e., those other than revolutions). By focusing on regime change he is explicitly contradicting the compliance literature which highlights systemic-level forces, as well as the consensus literature which focuses on the importance of socio-economic elites. To this end Hagan engages in a cross-national, longitudinal study of dependent countries in an effort to see if regime change, based on the magnitude of change in the regime, results in a corresponding change in foreign policy.5 His encouraging results taken in conjunction with these other studies, point to the need to examine shorter-term phenomena, such as regime change.
Hagan's study represents an advance in’understanding developing state foreign policy, and opens the door to further studies. While his expanded conceptualization of regime change encompasses more subtle forms of change, he does not attempt to fully capture the preferences of these regimes. Thus, in his typology the leadership may change, but the essential preferences may not. Yet this would be coded as a change in regime and a subsequent change in foreign policy would be expected. The same is true if only a minor change in regime according to Hagan's typology took place, but the
5 Hagan (1989, 508-9) develops a five-fold typology of regime change: 1) change in the effective head of state, but does not alter the regime's basic political makeup in terms of its component factions or parties; 2) change in the leadership body in terms of its component factions (in the case fragmented single-party regimes) or in terms of parties or other autonomous political groups (in the case of coalitions); 3) replacement of the entire ruling group or coalition by another group from the same end of the established political spectrum; 4) replacement of the entire ruling group or coalition by another group from the opposite end of the established political spectrum; 5) a revolutionary transformation in which a political group is replaced by an "antisystem" group that fundamentally restructures the political system. 28 ideological differences were significant, then he would expect only a minor restructuring of foreign policy. Hagan (1987; 362) acknowledges this point and in other works has called for greater attention to "preferences." The alternative approach developed in this chapter is designed to remedy this by more closely assessing the impact of regime change on foreign policy restructuring by focusing attention on the preferences of the regime.
A second corroborating piece of evidence is the widely held axiom regarding the salience of the Latin American executive to foreign policymaking. At a minimum it is generally agreed upon that the executive is a central actor in foreign policy decision making. For instance, Kaufman (1977, 152) states that "foreign policy formulation, in theory and practice, resides largely in the hands of the Executive Power, and the
President in particular." In an empirical study of Mexican and Cuban foreign policy,
Dominguez and Lindau (1984, 95) conclude that in both countries the presidency clearly exerted the greatest influence over foreign policy decision-making.
Given that the executive is responsible for the development strategy of a specific country, this reinforces the need for examining the link between a governments development strategy and foreign policy.6
6 However, it should be mentioned that despite this evidence for the importance of the executive, critics of its salience persist in warning against overemphasizing its importance (Korany 1986; Van Klaveran 1984). In general, these critics argue that societal and external constraints often minimize the importance of the executive. This issue will be confronted later in this research project when domestic constraints placed on the regime are explored. 29
The concept of development strategies based on a regime's preferences is further support by a third body of research. Recently, there have been an increasing number of publications regarding the role of ideas in policy output (Hall 1989; O'Dell
1982; Pantojas-Garcia 1990; Pion-Berlin 1989; Sikkink 1991). While this literature is in an early stage of development, it does share two basic beliefs.
First, these authors agree that the role of economic ideas have been underestimated, if not ignored, in the past. Second, it is agreed that economic ideas
have a definite impact on political actions. For instance, in Pion-Berlin1 s (1989, 13) study of state terror in Latin America, he argues that different economic doctrines "give rise not only to separate economic strategies but also to distinct political consequences.
Similarly, Peter Hall (1989, 361) asserts that "To neglect the role of ideas in political
economy...is to miss an important component of the economic and political worlds. It is ideas, in the form of economic theories and the policies developed from them, that enable national leaders to chart a course through turbulent times, and ideas about what is efficient, expedient, and just that motivate the movement from one line of policy to another.
Therefore, this literature underscores the point made throughout this study, that by understanding the ideas (and subsequent preferences) that a group of decision
makers, or regime, bring with them to office, expectations of their behavior can be established.
Before continuing it is necessary to mention one other source which lends credence to this research project. It was not mentioned above with the other corroborating bodies of evidence because it is only a single study, but yet incorporates aspects of all three of those discussed above. This study is contained in a chapter by 30
Jorge Domfnguez, one of the leading authorities on Latin American foreign policy.
Dominguez (1985, 166) posits that there is a definite link between the ideology of a country's leadership and change in foreign policy. "The replacement of leaders proclaiming one set of ideologies by leaders with different ideologies explains much policy change." This is quite relevant here, because it incorporates, either implicitly or explicitly, the importance of regime change, the executive, and ideas into a single
study.
Additionally, Domfnguez ties this hypothesis to the impact of domestic economic policy on substantive foreign policy. He argues that decision makers that
conduct a statist domestic economic policy will in turn practice an assertive foreign
economic policy. Conversely, those leaders that are more market-oriented are therefore
less prone to use state intervention. He goes a step further by arguing that "Beliefs in
markets may...facilitate relations with the United States whereas statist preferences may
increase conflicts with the United States" (1985, 166). As will be seen later, this is
virtually the same as the hypotheses that will be developed in this chapter.
Finally, Domfnguez's chapter is supportive of this research project because in
stressing the link between domestic economic policy and Latin American foreign policy
he is rebutting the notion that external variables are the single greatest determinant of
their behavior. Instead, he explicitly argues for a "voluntaristic" view of Latin
American foreign policy. Hence, while his study differs from this one in aspects that
will be discussed in future chapters, it shares many central themes and therefore
enhances the legitimacy of the current study. 31
The next step is to search the literature on development strategies in order to identify a useful typology and establish its connection to foreign policy.
Identifying a Development Strategy Approach
One popular scheme for classifying development strategies can be discerned from Charles Anderson's Politics and Economic Change in Latin America. While the development strategy typology he devises is widely cited in the literature on Latin
America,7 none have endeavored to elaborate upon it through empirical research.
Anderson's typology was chosen for several reasons. First, it is based on his extensive knowledge of Latin America and therefore designed specifically to reflect the political economic realities of these countries. Unlike more universal typologies this one is tailored to Latin America. Thus, a conscious effort is being made in this project to bring together the work of Latin American area specialists and the literature on comparative foreign policy.
A second reason for adopting this typology is that it is domestically-based. By relying on domestic development strategies, rather than externally-oriented ones, to differentiate regimes, a tautological argument can be avoided. In other words, if a regime’s position toward external variables was the basis upon which regimes were classified, then one could argue that this study was tautological. By utilizing domestic indicators this is not a threat.
7See for instance Wynia 1990. He adopts and extensively discusses Anderson's typology in his discussion of Latin American development strategies. 32
Third, it classifies regimes into three broad categories. While it would ideally be more desirable to have a greater number of categories, utilizing three broad categories seems reasonable for a first cut. It is hoped that future studies will divide these three categories into more precise, narrowly-defined ones, allowing for a more refined study of the relationship between development strategy and foreign policy.
Based on these justifications, Anderson's typology, which will be discussed below, has been selected for this study.
Anderson sets forth a three-fold typology that differentiates between what he calls the traditional approach, the democratic reform approach, and the revolutionary approach.8 He does not discuss their link to foreign policy, but rather treats them as models for economic change. Nevertheless, these ideal types can be linked to foreign policy. In the only existing work that explicitly deals with the consequences that different development strategies have on foreign policy, Coleman and Quiros-Varela describe the foreign policy behavior that will result from Anderson's typology. Below, is a discussion of Anderson's typology and Coleman and Quiros-Varela’s description of the foreign policy hypothesized to result from these strategies.
In his typology, Anderson (1967, 163) divides the economic structure of society into two sections-the modem and the traditional. The former is "characterized by the
8 It should be emphasized here that this typology is composed of ideal types. These are theoretical abstractions based upon patterns found in Latin America. There will be a considerable amount of overlap as these categories are not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, the purpose of this typology is not to develop a definitive classification system, rather it is to classify like regimes in order to determine the amount of foreign policy restructuring for which Latin American regimes are responsible. 33 application of technology, and the presence of rationalized, commercial production and exchange patterns within a money economy." The latter is "characterized by subsistence agriculture or the absence of skills pertinent to modern productive or commercial activity." The three development strategy's will be distinguished by the degree to which they seek to incorporate the traditional sector, and in turn, seek to address the inequitable distribution between the rich and poor. This will also have consequences for their domestic policy toward the following: economic mix between public-private companies, foreign investment, land reform, and inclusion of union and peasant groups.9
The first of Anderson's three developments strategy types is the traditional or conventional approach.10 It views the modem sector as the key to economic development. In order to achieve its development goals, a country's economic policy must center around attempts to "elaborate" this sector because it has demonstrated the greatest success in generating growth. The traditional sector is not viewed as essential to economic development and little or no effort is made to incorporate it into the modem sector. Central to modem sector growth are capital and technology and therefore private investment, both foreign and domestic, is encouraged. Private
9This discussion relies heavily on Anderson (1967, 162-96), as well as Wynia (1990, 108-29).
10 Coleman and Quiros-Varela refer to it as the conventional strategy. I will use this term to avoid confusion, since Anderson's traditional strategy excludes the traditional sector, and his reform and revolutionary strategies include the traditional sector. 34 enterprises and investment are preferred as governmental participation in the economy is largely seen as inefficient.
The unequal distribution between rich and poor is largely ignored as it is believed the benefits of increased production will eventually trickle down to the traditional sector. In other words, if the productive resources are concentrated in the hands of the elite (including land), they will invest it in areas that will create jobs and eventually benefit the masses. Therefore, those benefiting from this approach are the more established urban, upper and middle classes. Due to the fact that this development strategy centers around the modem sector, a large number of demands are excluded
(e.g., urban unions and peasant groups) and coercion is often used to maintain stability.11
The subsequent foreign policy of the conventional approach is one which does
"not see a basic contradiction between the interests of the developed capitalist and the underdeveloped countries" (Coleman and Quiros-Varela 1981, 48). Close relations will be viewed as beneficial in that they provide stimulus to the modem sector of the developed country. Therefore, the Latin American country adopting a conventional approach will favor strong ties with the industrialized countries of the West, especially
11 It should be mentioned that radical free trade regimes, such as the Pinochet regime, are not given separate consideration here. Instead, they are incorporated into the conventional strategy. The basis for this decision is that Anderson (1967, 163) considers this strategy an extreme manifestation of the conventional strategy. Although I have considered creating a separate category for the free market regimes, I have declined to do so because I do not anticipate their foreign policies to be significantly different from the conventional regimes. 35 the United States. As a result, trade, aid, and investment will be invited from these countries as it fits their development strategy of fostering the growth of the modem sector. In some cases, advice from foreign economic experts, such as economists from the University of Chicago (known for their expertise in and advocacy of free market principles), will be invited.
The reformist approach differs in several important ways. Central to their strategy is the belief that the traditional sectors must be included in the development effort. The disparity between the modem and traditional sectors is viewed as an obstacle to development since such a large portion of the population is relatively unproductive and the demands of these groups are ignored. Thus there is a concerted effort to include previously excluded groups into the economy in an effort to reduce poverty and increase production. A key to this development strategy is the role of the state. Allowing the market to work will not lead to the incorporation of the masses into the modem sector. Therefore, the government must intervene in order to accomplish this. The result is closer scrutiny of foreign investment, an increase in public works, spending on education, progressive taxation, legislation favorable to unions, and social security legislation.
Just as the development strategy of the reformer differs from that of the conventionalist, their foreign policy differs as well. According to Coleman and Quiros-
Varela, the reformer will adopt a neutral position that is not aligned with the United
States or the Soviet Union (1981, 50). This non-aligned position is used to playoff both domestic and foreign interests in order to obtain the support of both. Domestically, the 36 reformer seeks to portray itself to the left as a favorable alternative to the conventionalist, while it portrays itself to the right as a welcome alternative to the revolutionary (Hirschman 1963, 278). Similarly, on an international level, the reformists portrays itself to the capitalist countries as attractive, not on economic terms, but on political terms. A secondary foreign policy goal for the reformist is national autonomy. While policymakers would ideally like to be autonomous, they also realize the importance of ties to the West. Thus, some trade-offs and compromises will occur; for instance, while foreign investment is generally encouraged, it may be restricted in strategic sectors and attempts at nationalization may even be made. Finally, nationalist technocrats will be appointed in contrast to economic experts from the capitalist countries (Coleman and Quiros-Varela 1981, 49-51).
The revolutionary approach is the third development strategy presented by
Anderson. Before proceeding, it is necessary to mention that Anderson’s revolutionary type was altered slightly in this project. This category has been expanded to include a greater number of regimes. This change was made because the revolutionary strategy, as defmed by Anderson and Wynia is very narrow and would likely only include the
Castro regime in Cuba. In turn, such radically reform oriented regimes such as Allende
(Chile) would be categorized with much more moderate reformers. Therefore, based on the need for a more equitable distribution of cases, and the belief that the radical reform groups are closer in preferences and policy outputs to the revolutionary regimes than the moderate reformers, the third development strategy type has been altered to a 37 small degree and re-named the radical reform.12 In turn, the second development strategy type will be referred to as the moderate reform type.
Whereas the moderate reformist strategy relies on incremental change, the radical reformist approach is more sudden and comprehensive. In contrast to the first two strategies, the radical reformist views the modern sector more critically, because it is believed to exacerbate the gap between rich and poor. Many of the old institutions must be removed in order to mobilize the entire society since they act to stifle the productivity of the masses. The government is the central actor in this process of change. The radical reformist, like the moderate reformer is dismayed at the gap between rich and poor, and both reject the conventional approach as a solution.
However, instead of alleviating this situation by gradually incorporating the masses into the modem economy, the radical reformist seeks to quickly implement more radical change by opening the system to new economic contenders, as well as new political contenders. Thus, the radical reformer attempts to build up a political base to counteract the resistance of the traditional elite.
All of this has important implications for foreign policy. "To begin with, efforts must be made to arrange the international environment in such a fashion that the domestic distribution of privilege in society can be changed" (Coleman and Quiros-
Varela 1981, 53). Strict controls will be placed on foreign investment and
12 Just as the radical free trade regimes are treated as an extreme case in the conventional strategy, Castro's Cuba will be viewed as an extreme case in the radical reformist strategy. 38 nationalization of foreign industries will be more pervasive. Efforts will also be made to secure relations with countries supportive of their radical reformist goals. Finally, technocrats sharing the governments development goals will also be an important endeavor (Coleman and Quiros-Varela 1981, 52-55).
Despite the apparent importance of development strategy to the foreign policy of
Latin American nations, there has been little explicit discussion of the theoretical links between these two. What follows is a discussion of two possible explanations for the link between development strategies and foreign policy. The first is a more immediate, direct explanation, while the second provides a deeper underlying explanation.
Coleman and Quiros-Varela focus on Latin American bureaucracies in order to link development strategies to foreign policy. Specifically, they argue that technocrats, or tecnicos, charged with development will look outside their borders to like-minded actors in order to gain support (both economic and political) for their goals (1981, 40).
They argue that the role of these technocrats has expanded to the extent that it has encroached on the domain of the foreign ministry. Thus the technocrats have engaged in direct relations with foreign governments rendering the latter to a secondary role
(1981, 44). The technocrats can be seen as possessing firm beliefs about the proper strategy to obtain national development, which has consequences for the type of foreign policy followed. "Since there are a variety of externally-sponsored solutions available at any given time, conflict is structured into national bureaucracies by the division of technocrats into competitive groups who prefer different prescriptions for the best route 39
to achieve national development" (1981, 44). This conflict is then "projected into the
international arena" (1981, 41).
Therefore, each development strategy has a corresponding foreign policy
strategy promoted by the technocrats. For instance, technocrats favoring the
conventional strategy will adopt a pro-US foreign policy for reasons discussed above
(access to technology and capital, etc...). Furthermore, they will seek the advice of
foreign experts-traditionally neoclassical economists many of whom were trained at the
University of Chicago. The moderate reformist technocrat will diversify its
international linkages by presenting itself differently to different actors. As mentioned
above, it will attempt to convince the United States and its allies that it is an attractive
alternative to a more radical reform strategy, while persuading the revolutionary that it
is a favorable alternative to the conventionalist (Coleman and Quiros-Varela 1981,
50).13 Therefore, the moderate reformer will seek a "neutralist" foreign policy that is
not centered solely on the Western industrialized countries (Coleman and Quiros-Varela
1981, 50). Finally, the radical reformist technocrat will seek international linkages with
regimes that are supportive of its domestic aims in order to counterbalance its rejection of reliance on the United States.
A regime's concern over distribution is another possible explanation for the link between development strategies and foreign policy. While the moderate reform and
radical reformist strategies are, to differing degrees, concerned with redistribution, the
13 See Hirschman (1963) page 278. 40 question is whether this concern is projected to the international level. In other words, does a concern for a more equitable domestic situation, translate into a similar concern
for equality among nations? It is hypothesized in this paper that this question is answered in the affirmative. It is expected that a radical reformist regime which is highly concerned with altering its domestic distribution will favor Third World policies that promote redistribution at the international level. Specifically, it will support policies that favor authoritative allocations rather than allocations by the free market
(Krasner 1985, 5). Hence, the radical reformist regime, and the moderate reform
regime, to a lesser extent, is expected to resist many of the policies on the international
level that they perceive will exacerbate the distribution of wealth. The outcome is
therefore a foreign policy opposed to the wishes of the advanced capitalists countries,
especially on economic issues.
This connection does not have to be attributed to an altruistic concern for other developing nations, but can be seen as the result of concerns for increasing those
involved in the modem economy by favoring a more equitable domestic distribution.
The logic here is twofold. First, a moderate reform or radical reform regime can be
more successful at redistributing wealth at home, if the living standards in the South are
raised. Second, such a regime will also view itself as better suited for domestic
redistribution if international norms are in place which reflect their anti-free market
preferences; such as the more favorable regulation of transnational corporations,
foreign investment, and international financial institutions. 41
This can also be seen as the desire of developing countries to assert greater control over economic decisions affecting their country. These countries "desire increasing the proportion of economic decisions about national economic conditions which are made by economic actors whose primary affective commitment is to the nation-state" (Coleman and Quiros-Varela 1981, 41). This argument coincides with
Krasner's (1985, 3) assertion that Third World states are as concerned with increasing their power and control in the international arena as much as their wealth. This would explain a tendency for Latin American reformists, moderate and radical, to take positions that conflict with the interests of the United States and its allies.
It is difficult to determine which of the above justifications for linking development strategy and foreign policy is most accurate. It may be that both of the explanations are correct to differing degrees. Therefore, these explanations should not be seen as competing, but rather complementary. It is quite possible that both contribute to a development strategy's foreign policy behavior and predispose it to the specific outputs attributed to the different strategies.
Hypotheses
Based on the discussion above, two hypotheses regarding substantive foreign policy behavior can be generated. The first pertains to the connection between development strategy and foreign policy. While Hypothesis 1 is concerned with foreign policy orientation, Hypothesis 2 focuses on foreign policy behavior as measured by 42 cooperation and conflict with the United States.14 Thus, it is posited that both foreign policy orientation and the degree of cooperation and conflict with the United States will be a function of the type of development strategy pursued by a regime.15
HI: Regimes that follow a conventional development strategy will be most likely to have foreign policies that coincide with that of the United States; regimes with a radical reform strategy will be least likely to possess foreign policies that coincide with the United States; and moderate reform regimes will have a foreign policy that falls in between these two.
H2: Regimes that follow a conventional development strategy will be most likely to cooperate with the United States in their foreign policy; regimes with a radical reform strategy will be least cooperative; and moderate reform regimes will have a foreign policy that falls in between these two.
These hypotheses will be tested in Chapter Three. The rest of the chapter will be devoted to an outline of the remaining chapters and a conclusion.
Outline of Dissertation
Having established a gap in the literature and proposed an alternative in the first two chapters, Chapter Three will consist of an operationalization and explanation of the coding scheme used for the concept of development strategy. Based on this, statistical analyses will be performed and reported in Chapter Four. This chapter will reveal the
14 The term "orientation" is used here, because UN voting is considered a measure of the foreign policy position of a regime, devoid of internal constraints. This will be further explained in the next chapter. 15 As will be discussed in the next chapter, Hypothesis 1 will be tested using UN voting data and Hypothesis 2 will use COPDAB data. Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 will be tested using both data sets. 43 ability of development strategy to explain foreign policy restructuring in Latin
American.
The scope of this research will include the twenty countries traditionally considered part of Latin America. These countries included: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia,
Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Only Latin American foreign policy toward United States is examined.
The dependent variable (Latin American foreign policy), will utilize UN voting
(because it is the predominant measurement used in the literature) and COPDAB
(because it will be sensitive to domestic opposition and will add to the literature which primarily relies on UN voting data). Since an attempt is being made to generate a large number of cases the entire post-War period for which data exists will be included
(1948-1978).
The next three chapters will consist of case studies generated from the statistical analysis in Chapter Four. One chapter will be devoted to each of the three development strategy types. Thus Chapter Five will examine conventional cases, Chapter Six will examine moderate reform cases, and radical reform cases in Chapter Seven. Each chapter will compare a case that conformed to the hypotheses above and one that deviated from the hypotheses. The purpose of these case studies is twofold. First, the cases that conformed to expectations will be examined in order to determine if they were correctly predicted for the "right" reasons. In other words, does development strategy appear to be responsible for the correctly predicted foreign policy. Second, the 44 deviant cases will be examined to determine why they did not behave as expected.
Here, various domestic and foreign variables will be examined to determine if they
influenced the foreign policy of these regimes. In addition, since this research project
represents a first attempt at testing the relationship between development strategy and
foreign policy, the operationalization and conceptualization will be scrutinized to determine if problems can be detected in coding the regimes or the measurement of
foreign policy. The bases for case selection will be explained in Chapter Five.
Chapter Eight will summarize the Endings and discuss their implications for
future research.
Summary
As Chapter One demonstrated, externally-oriented explanations which focus on pro-core foreign policy are, by themselves, inadequate. Given that much of Latin
American foreign policy contradicts the wishes of the United States, a domestic-based, anti-core behavior explanation must be sought. This chapter has attempted to develop an alternative that will resolve the shortcomings of the literature discussed in Chapter
One.
The alternative approach offered here focuses on a country's development strategy. As a starting point, this approach attempts to understand the preferences of the regimes. Thus, in sharp contrast to compliance theory, this alternative centers around a domestic explanation of foreign policy. Instead of focusing on a country's dependent relationship, its preferences are examined. 45
This emphasis on domestic politics, however, does not mean that it is similar to consensus theory. For while consensus theory relies somewhat on domestic variables, these variables are heavily influenced by external factors. Second, while compliance and consensus theory are limited to explaining consensual behavior between the core and periphery, this alternative offers an explanation for consensual as well as conflictual behavior between the United States and individual Latin American countries.
The development strategy alternative can also be distinguished from the consensus approach in that it is more capable of explaining short-term foreign policy shifts. Instead of assuming a steady, long-term relationship between core and peripheral states as the dependency-based consensus approach does, this alternative allows for the possibility of short-term change in foreign policy due to a change in the regime's development strategy.
Thus, it is hoped that by focusing on a country’s preferences, a better understanding of the conditions under which anti-core (and pro-core) behavior will occur can be obtained. For instance, it might be hypothesized that if the dependent and dominant actors preferences coincide, consensus is reasonable to expect; and if they diverge, then the chance of anti-core behavior increases. The third possibility is if the dependent states behavior contradicts its preferences, and the dominant state has made an effort to condition the behavior of the dependent state, then it would appear that the compliance approach is applicable. Thus, if preferences can successfully be estimated, we will have a better idea of whether to expect pro-core or anti-core behavior. In addition to improving upon the compliance and consensus literature, this
project also seeks to expand upon the anti-core literature. While the author agrees with
the notion that anti-core foreign policy has been overlooked and that dependent
development can lead to anti-core behavior (Biddle and Stephens 1989), the
development strategy approach can also be differentiated from the existing anti-core
explanation. Whereas the dependent development approach focuses on the conditions
that make the assumption of power by an anti-core regime likely, and the
counterdependence approach argues that leaders will develop anti-core policies because
they resent their dependent situation (Hey 1994, 245-6), the development strategy
approach offered here focuses explicitly on the preferences of the regime.16 Thus, it
attempts to take the anti-core literature a step further by identifying the conditions
under which anti-core foreign policy will take place. In order to do this, the
preferences of the foreign policy decision-makers are examined. In essence, this
responds to the call (mentioned in the first chapter) for further research on the
ideological preferences of Latin American leaders in order to eventually synthesize the
various approaches to dependent state foreign policy.
In sum, the alternative approach developed in this paper is not meant to replace
the compliance, consensus, and anti-core approaches already established in the
literature. They each make valuable contributions. Instead, this is a proposal based on
16It should be stated that a counterdependent foreign policy based on a leader's resentment of its dependent position is quite similar to die radical reformist development strategy developed in this paper. Thus the development strategy approach is not at odds with the counterdependent approach. 47 empirical impressions and a thorough reading of the literature on economic development and Latin American foreign policy. The degree to which this proposal increases our understanding of Latin American foreign policy will be determined by the empirical research which will be carried out in the following chapters. CHAPTER m
Testing the Relationship Between Development Strategy and Latin American Foreign Policy
Introduction
To a great extent the operationalization of the independent variable, development strategy, has already been discussed in Chapter Two. This chapter will further clarify the operationalization of the development strategy types and discuss how each regime will be coded. Attention will also be given to the dependent variable in this chapter. Once these two have been discussed in detail, the methodological section will discuss how the hypotheses from Chapter Two will be tested. The final section will consist of statistical tests.
Operationalization and Coding of the Independent Variable
As mentioned before, the underlying variable differentiating the three development strategies is the degree to which they incorporate the traditional sector. In order to operationalize this variable, five indicators have been taken from Anderson
(1967) and Wynia's (1990) discussion to differentiate these types. These indicators will be utilized to classify specific Latin American regimes into one of the three development strategy types. Since there is not a precise method for classifying a
48 49 regime, information about five different, although not mutually exclusive, aspects of a regime's development strategy will be gathered. By extracting these five indicators, many aspects of the regime can be measured, while minimizing any single indicator that might be distorted or measured erroneously. The indicators used are as follows: the role of the government in the economy, the national-foreign mix in the economy, the use of land reform, and the degree to which labor and peasants are incorporated. Each of these indicators was carefully chosen to tap a specific aspect of the ideal types. The relationship of each of the indicators to the development strategy concept is discussed below.1
The first indicator is utilized to indicate the degree to which the government is relied upon to incorporate the traditional sector. In the conventional strategy the government is viewed as a tool to encourage privatization, and government intervention is rejected in principle as inefficient. Furthermore, the government will advocate the practice of concentrating productive resources in the hands of a few. Thus, progressive tax reform will be rejected. If government intervention and ownership are perceived as favorable due to their redistributive effect (offering higher wages and attractive benefits), the regime will be considered a radical reformist regime. The moderate reform regime has mixed feelings about the role of government. Although it sees government ownership as a way of incorporating more individuals into the modem sector through employment, it also perceived the government as inefficient. Therefore,
1A summary of the coding questions and indicators can be found in Appendix 1. 50 the moderate reformer will cautiously intervene in the economy and increase the number of government-owned companies, but only at a relatively slow pace and being careful not to alienate private capital.
The next indicator focuses on land reform. A regime's attitude toward land reform can be tapped as an indicator of its attitude toward the traditional and modem sector and its willingness to redistribute the use of land. Thus, the conventional strategist is not interested in short-term redistribution because he believes that land should be in the hands of those engaging in modem agriculture. As a result, the land reform is rejected and in some cases reversed in order to increase the concentration of land in the possession of large landowners. In contrast, the radical reformer will desire redistribution of land as a means toward redistribution of wealth. Furthermore, the radical reformer may even believe that land will be utilized more efficiently by the small farmer. They point to examples of large landowners allowing land to lay fallow while nearby peasants own no land or are pushed of this land when they attempt to cultivate it.
The moderate reformer, again, follows a middle course. While they oppose large landowners that under-utilize their land, they also are pleased that these modem farms are earning foreign currency. Therefore, they will favor mild land reforms that do not result in significant redistribution. This often includes transferring fallow land to peasants. This land may be given to them or simply loaned, but either way the large landowner is not viewed as an obstacle to its economic strategy and their land, if being farmed, is not significantly disturbed. 51 significant redistribution. This often includes transferring fallow land to peasants. This land may be given to them or simply loaned, but either way the large landowner is not viewed as an obstacle to its economic strategy and their land, if being farmed, is not significantly disturbed.
The third indicator is designed to measure the regime's attitude toward foreign investment.2 It is intended to reveal the degree to which a regime desires to control the domestic economy by exerting influence through regulation or nationalization of foreign investment. The key word here is control. Control over these resources can be a tool for creating jobs in specific sectors and in specific geographic areas. It can also be regarded as a means for redistributing income if through nationalization the government shifts the focus from profit to higher income jobs.
The three development strategies—conventional, moderate reform, radical reform-seek increasing degrees of control over the domestic economy. On one end of the spectrum, the conventional strategy strongly encourages foreign investment and regulates it only minimally. The moderate reformer seeks greater control over foreign investment due to the regime's desire to gradually incorporate the masses into the moderate economy. Such a desire for greater control will lead it to place some controls on foreign companies (e.g., laws regarding percentage of domestic ownership, training
2 Weinstein (1976, 20)describes a similar phenomenon in Indonesia. He focuses on what he calls the "dilemma of dependence." This refers to the quandary decisionmakers face when deciding to what degree to allow external forces, in the form of capital to penetrate their country. 52 for nationals, or number of nationals hired) and even to nationalize a small number of industries (often public utilities). However, this intervention is not drastic. Since the moderate reformer wishes to create growth at the same times it increases the numbers involved in the modem sector, the regime will keep this intervention to a moderate level so as not to drive foreign investment out of the country.
Finally, the radical reformer will seek to nationalize without the caution of the moderate reformer. Since this development strategy places a high value on redistribution of wealth, it will seek to exert a great degree of control over foreign investment through multiple nationalizations and strict ownership rules like those listed in the preceding paragraph. Hence, it will be less likely to fear the alienation of foreign investors and more likely to use investment controls for political purposes, such as rallying domestic support.
The next two indicators focus on the degree to which the working class and the peasant are treated by the three development strategies. The basis for their inclusion in this study as indicators is to measure the regime's degree of commitment to incorporating them into the modem economy. It is assumed here that incorporating the working class is an important indicator of this commitment, but the inclusion of the peasants demonstrates an even greater commitment, since this latter group generally has less political leverage. Since these two indicators are measuring similar aspects of the development strategies, they will be treated together below.
The conventional strategy will make only a nominal attempt to incorporate labor into the economy and will generally exclude peasants. Unions may be allowed, but only 53
if they are passive participants. That these demands are ignored is consistent with its
strategy that the business leaders should be left unhindered to create economic growth
that will eventually trickle down to these groups. The moderate reformer will be much
more open to societal demands, including these two groups. Gradually incorporating them into the economy is consistent with its strategy of increasing the number of participants in the modem economy. While efforts will also be made to incorporate these formerly excluded groups politically, they will be careful not to upset the political balance of power by controlling their influence.
The radical reformer will also try to incorporate these groups into the modem economy. In addition, it will seek to utilize the political potential of these groups by
mobilizing them in support of the regime. This will be done despite the possibility that the status quo may be threatened. Hence, this can be seen as a form of coalition building in which the regime is rejecting the existing power structure and enlisting new power contenders.
Based on this operationalization of development strategy, the Latin American regimes from 1948-1978 will be coded into one of the three development strategies. A
sample coding sheet can be found in Appendix B. In order to code the regime within each country, an extensive number of sources were consulted. These sources are listed
Appendix C. 54
Sources Ihr Data Collection
In order to properly classify the Latin American regimes into the appropriate development strategy type, a reliable system had to be developed. In an effort to accomplish this, four types of evidence were utilized. The first type included speeches, interviews, and any other public statements by regime members. The most readily accessible statements generally came from the president, in the form of campaign speeches and inaugural addresses. These statements frequently offered an introduction to their development strategy. Policies toward foreign investment, social programs, austerity programs, and land reform are often mentioned here. However, such statements also have purposes other than revealing their honest preferences. They may simply have been directed at specific domestic or foreign groups to generate support.
Therefore, the actions of a regime were used as another source of evidence to corroborate the statements of individuals. These actions, in the form of policies, were relied upon as evidence of a regime's development strategy. However, as with speeches, they were viewed carefully since policies can be influenced by groups outside the regime. Thus actions were considered in conjunction with the words of the regime.
A third type of evidence used for classification purposes was descriptions of party platforms derived from existing sources. The following three books furnished this information: Political Parties o f the Americas, Guide to the Political Parties o f South
America, and Party Politics and Elections in Latin America. While these sources were not useful for all regimes, they were valuable sources for regimes that were members 55 of highly ideological parties with a long history (e.g., the Christian Democrats of many countries).
Finally, secondary sources were used as a source of evidence to corroborate the statements of individuals. This refers to descriptive statements made by scholars that provide evidence of a regime’s development strategy. These statements included those describing the intentions of the regime, such as, "regime X was able to implement its plan to nationalize foreign firms," or "due to the strength of the opposition, president X was forced to delay plans for reducing the income disparity between the classes." Both of these statements would be appropriate sources of evidence for classifying a regime's development strategy.3
Combining the Multiple Indicators
Although utilizing five indicators for distinguishing development strategy types is somewhat cumbersome, it has a distinct advantage. The advantage is related to the concern that some of the indicators are not equally relevant across cases. For instance, in El Salvador land reform is very critical, but in larger countries with less population density, such as Brazil or Argentina, land reform is not as vital. Thus, according to this scheme, a radical reformist regime in Brazil that does not deal with land reform would
3 It should be noted that the evidence from these four sources conflicted only in a small number of cases. When this occurred, as many sources were sought as possible. In most instances, it was found that these accounts differed because the regime was quite unpredictable and did not follow a single development strategy. Therefore, these regimes were coded as not closely matching the ideal types created in this study (this problem will be discussed below). 56 be considered more conservative than its counterpart in El Salvador that makes a watered-down attempt at land reform. Therefore, this classification scheme allows for some error (which will naturally occur when engaging in cross-country research) by relying on five indicators and allowing a degree of flexibility that would not exist if using a single indicator.
When filling out the coding sheet in Appendix B, each of the five indicators were assigned a score of 1, 2, or 3; in which 1 conservative development strategy;
2 = moderate reform development strategy; and 3= radical reform development strategy.
Each regime was classified based on the mode score of the five variables. For instance, if a regime had the following five scores - 1,2,1,1,1 - it was classified as a conventional regime. There are two primary advantages in using the mode. One advantage is relevant to the discussion in the paragraph above regarding indicators that may not be wholly appropriate in comparing to countries. By using the mode, rather than the mean, the impact of a single score assigned in these rare instances can be minimized.
A second advantage emerges when dealing with lesser known regimes that often do not receive a great deal of attention. In these cases it is exceedingly difficult to find information on every indicator of a country's development strategy. Therefore, in such cases, it was only necessary to obtain information for at least three of the indicators.
Adopting the mode does not imply that research immediately ceased upon finding evidence for three or four of the indicators. Reliance on less than five indicators was only utilized under extreme circumstances of insufficient information. 57
It is possible that after coding a regime according to the above rules, a modal score may not emerge (e.g., 1, 2, 2, 3, 3 or 1, 1,2, 2). In such cases these regimes were coded as being low in confidence. This issue of confidence is described immediately below.
Confidence Measures
Another coding issue concerns coding confidence. The bottom row in the sample "Coding Sheet" in Appendix B deals with this issue. The "Coding Confidence" is a subjective measurement regarding the author's confidence in the validity of the evidence obtained. Here a score of 1 (high confidence), 2 (moderate confidence), or 3
(low confidence) was given to each regime.
The confidence measure deals with the degree to which the regime appears to possess a coherent development strategy. Since the development strategies identified in this study are ideal types, the regimes differed in the degree to which they matched one of the three development strategies. Some regimes closely mirrored the ideal types, while others came to power with a mixed strategy and others had no development strategy and react solely to domestic and international pressures, it seems evident that there is inherent theoretical value in separating such regimes.
This measure of coding confidence allowed for a series of tests. Initially, tests were performed involving all regimes (and their development strategies) to foreign policy, and then tests including the regimes coded as high and medium confidence.
Finally, tests including only regimes of high confidence were run. 58
Caretaker and Short-term Regimes
A final coding issue concerns "caretaker" regimes. These are regimes that are in office for only a short period of time with their prime objective being to maintain stability while more long-term arrangements can be made. These regimes are by design not expected to formulate policies on all or any of the five indicators. Classifying these regimes would require the coder to "force" the regimes into a development strategy type. While it might be instructive to examine the actual foreign policy of these regimes for the purposes of another study, they simply will not enlighten this study on the link between preferred development strategy and foreign policy. Furthermore, on a practical level, these short-term regimes do not receive as much attention from secondary sources, which limits the amount of material available upon which to code these regimes. Therefore, these caretaker regimes will be excluded from analysis in this project.
Regimes occupying office for a short period of time were also excluded. In order to insure sufficient data, regimes lasting less than one year (including non caretaker regimes) were also excluded.
A list of the regimes by country and dates in office (Table 3), as well as development strategy and dates in office (Table 4) are provided below. TABLE 3 List of Regimes by Country and Dates in Office
Argentina Colombia Pen5n (1/1/1948-9/22/1955) Ospina (1/1/1948-8/6/1950) Aramburu (11/13/1955-4/30/1958) Gomez (8/7/1950-6/12/1953) Frondizi (5/1/1958-3/29/1962 Rojas (6/13/1953-5/9/1957) Guido (3/29/1962-10/11/1963) Lleras Camargo (8/7/1958-8/6/1962) Illfa (10/12/1963-6/27/1966) Valencia (8/7/1962-8/6/1966) Onganfa (6/29/1966-6/8/1970) Lleras Restrepo (8/7/1966-8/6/1970) Lanusse (3/26/1971-5/26/1973) Pastrana (8/7/1970-8/6/1974) Perdn (7/1/1974-3/23/1976) Ldpez (8/7/1974-8/6/1978) Videla (3/29/1976-12/31/1978) Costa Rica Bolivia Figueres (1/1/1948-11/7/1949) Hertzog (1/1/1948-10/23/1949) Ulate (11/8/1949-11/7/1953) Urriolagotia (10/24/1949-3/15/1951) Figueres (11/8/1953-5/7/1958) Paz (4/16/1952-8/5/1956) Echandi (5/8/1958-5/7/1962) Siles Suazo (8/6/19568/5/1960) Orlich (5/8/1962-5/7/1966) Paz (8/6/1960-11/3/1964) Trejos (5/8/1966-5/7/1970) Barrientos (11/4/1964-4/27/1969) Figueres (5/8/1970-5/7/1974) Ovando (9/26/1969-10/6/1970) Oduber (5/8/1974-5/7/1978) Banzer (8/21/1971-7/21/1978) Cuba Brazil Prio (10/10/1948-3/10/1952) Dutia (1/1/1948-1/30/1951) Batista (3/11/1952-1/1/1959) Vargas 1/31/1951-8/23/1954) Castro (1/8/1959-12/31/1978) Kubitschek (1/31/1956-1/30/1961) Goulart (9/8/1961-4/2/1964) Dominican Republic Castello (4/15/1964-3/14/1967) Trujillo (1/1/1948-3/30/1961) Costa e Silva (3/15/1967-8/31/1969) Trium/Wessin (9/26/1963-4/25/1965) Medici (10/30/1969-3/14/1974) Balaguer (7/1/1966-8/15/1978) Geisel (3/15/1974-12/31/1978) Ecuador Chile Plaza (9/1/1948-8/31/1952) Gonzalez (1/1/1948-11/2/1952) Velasco (9/1/1952-8/31/1956) Ibiffiez (11/3/1952-11/2/1958) Ponce (9/1/1956-8/31/1960) Alessandri (11/3/1958-11 111 1964) Velasco (9/1/1960-11/7/1961) Frei (11/3/1964-11/2/1970) Arosemena Enriq (11/8/1961-7/10/1963) Allende (11/3/1970-9/11/1973) Castro (7/11/1963-3/31/1966) Pinochet (9/12/1973-12/31/1978) Velasco (9/1/1968-2/15/1972) Rodriguez (2/16/1972-1/10/1976) Supreme Council (1/11/1976-12/31/1978) 60
TABLE 3 (Continued) List of Regimes by Country and Dates in Office
El Salvador Nicaragua Osorio (4/22/1950-10/13/1956) A. Somoza (1/1/1948-9/28/1956) Lemus (9/14/1956-10/26/1960) L. Somoza (9/29/1956-4/30/1967) Rivera (1/25/1961-6/30/1967) A. Somoza (5/1/1967-12/31/1978) Sdnchez (7/1/1967-6/30/1972) Molina (7/1/1972-6/30/1977) Panama Romero (7/1/1977-12/31/1978) Rem6n (10/1/1951-1/2/1955) R. Arias (1/15/1955-9/30/1956) Guatemala de la Guardia (10/1/1956-9/30/1960) AnSvalo (1/1/1948-3/14/1951) Chiari (10/1/1960-9/30/1964) Arbenz (3/15/1951-6/27/1954) Robles (10/1/1964-9/30/1968) Castillo (8/8/1954-7/27/1957) Torrijos (2/23/1969-12/31/1978) Ydfgoras (3/15/1958-3/31/1963) Peralta (4/1/1963-6/30/1966) Paraguay Mdndez (7/1/1966-6/30/1970) Chaves (9/10/1949-5/5/1954) Arana (7/1/1970-6/30/1974) Stroessner (8/15/1954-12/31/1978) Laugerud Garcia (7/1/1974-6/30/1978) Peru Haiti Odria (10/27/1948-7/27/1956) Estime (1/1/1948-5/10/1950) Prado (7/28/1956-7/18/1962) Magloire (12/6/1950-12/6/1956) Belatinde (7/28/1963-10/3/1968) Duvalier (10/22/1957-4/21/1971) Velasco (10/3/1968-8/28/1975) Duvalier (4/22/1971-12/31/1978) Morales (8/29/1975-12/31/1978)
Honduras Ururguav Galvez (1/2/1949-11/15/1954) BatUe (1/1/1948-2/28/1951) Lozana (11/16/1954-10/21/1956) Colorado Party (3/1/1952-2/28/1955) Villeda Morales (12/21/1957-10/2/1963) Colorado Party (3/1/1955-2/28/1959) L6pez Arellano (10/3/1963-6/5/1971) Blanco Party (3/1/1959-2/28/1963) Cruz (6/6/1971-12/4/1972) Blanco Party (3/1/1963-2/28/1967) L6pez Arellano (12/5/1972-4/21/1975) Pacheco (12/7/1967-4/30/1971) Meglar/Sup Coun. (4/22/1975-8/6/1978) NSC (2/11/1973-12/31/1978)
Venezuela Alemtin (1/1/1948-11/30/1952) Pdrez Jim&iez (11/24/1948-1/22/1958) Ruiz (12/1/1952-11/30/1958) Betancourt (2/13/1959-3/10/1963) Lripez Mateos (12/1/1958-11/30/1964) Leoni (3/11/1963-3/10/1969) Diaz Ordaz (12/1/1964-11/30/1970) Caldera (3/11/1969-3/11 /1974) Echeverria (12/1/1970-11/30/1976) AndrSs Ptirez (3/12/1974-1/31/1978) L6pez Portillo (12/1/1976-11/30/1982) 61
TABLE 4 List of Regimes by Development Strategy and Dates in Office
Conventional Regimes
A. Somoza (5/1/1967-12/31/1978) L6pez Arellano (10/3/1963-6/5/1971) A. Somoza (1/1/1948-9/28/1956) Lozana (11/16/1954-10/21/1956) Alemdn (1/1/1948-11/30/1952) Magloire (12/6/1950-12/6/1956) Alessandri (11/3/1958-11/2/1964) Medici (10/30/1969-3/14/1974) Aramburu (11/13/1955-4/30/1958) Meglar/Sup Coun. (4/22/1975-8/6/1978) Arana (7/1/1970-6/30/1974) Molina (7/1/1972-6/30/1977) Arosemena Enriq (11/8/1961-7/10/1963) Morales (8/29/1975-12/31/1978) Balaguer (7/1/1966-8/15/1978) NSC (2/11/1973-12/31/1978) Banzer (8/21/1971-7/21/1978) Odrfa (10/27/1948-7/27/1956) Barrientos (11/4/1964-4/27/1969) Onganla (6/29/1966-6/8/1970) Blanco Party (3/1/1959-2/28/1963) Osorio (4/22/1950-10/13/1956) Blanco Party (3/1/1963-2/28/1967) Ospina (1/1/1948-8/6/1950) Castello (4/15/1964-3/14/1967) Pacheco (12/7/1967-4/30/1971) Castillo (8/8/1954-7/27/1957) Pastrana (8/7/1970-8/6/1974) Castro (7/11/1963-3/31/1966) Peralta (4/1/1963-6/30/1966) Chaves (9/10/1949-5/5/1954) P6rez Jimenez (11/24/1948-1/22/1958) Chian (10/1/1960-9/30/1964) Pinochet (9/12/1973-12/31/1978) Colorado Party (3/1/1952-2/28/1955) Plaza (9/1/1948-8/31/1952) Costa e Silva (3/15/1967-8/31/1969) Ponce (9/1/1956-8/31/1960) Cruz (6/6/1971-12/4/1972) Prado (7/28/1956-7/18/1962) de la Guardia (10/1/1956-9/30/1960) R. Arias (1/15/1955-9/30/1956) Diaz Ordaz (12/1/1964-11/30/1970) Remdn (10/1/1951-1/2/1955) Dutra (1/1/1948-1/30/1951) Rivera (1/25/1961-6/30/1967) Duvalier (10/22/1957-4/21/1971) Robles (10/1/1964-9/30/1968) Duvalier (4/22/1971-12/31/1978) Romero (7/1/1977-12/31/1978) Echandi (5/8/1958-5/7/1962) Ruiz (12/1/1952-11/30/1958) Frondizi (5/1/1958-3/29/1962 Sdnchez (7/1/1967-6/30/1972) Galvez (1/2/1949-11/15/1954) Stroessner (8/15/1954-12/31/1978) Geisel (3/15/1974-12/31/1978) Supreme Council (l/l 1/1976-12/31/1978) Gomez (8/7/1950-6/12/1953) Trejos (5/8/1966-5/7/1970) Gonzalez (1/1/1948-11/2/1952) Trium/Wessin (9/26/1963-4/25/1965) Guido (3/29/1962-10/11/1963) Trujillo (1/1/1948-3/30/1961) Hertzog (1/1/1948-10/23/1949) Ulate (11/8/1949-11/7/1953) Ibdnez (11/3/1952-11/2/1958) Urriolagotia (10/24/1949-3/15/1951) Kubitschek (1/31/1956-1/30/1961) Valencia (8/7/1962-8/6/1966) L. Somoza (9/29/1956-4/30/1967) Velasco (9/1/1968-2/15/1972) Lanusse (3/26/1971-5/26/1973) Velasco (9/1/1952-8/31/1956) Laugerud Garcia (7/1/1974-6/30/1978) Velasco (9/1/1960-11/7/1961) Lemus (9/14/1956-10/26/1960) Videla (3/29/1976-12/31/1978) Lleras Camargo (8/7/1958-8/6/1962) Ydigoras (3/15/1958-3/31/1963) 62
TABLE 4 (Continued) List of Regimes by Development Strategy and Dates in Office
Moderate Reform Regimes
Andris P6rez (3/12/1974-1/31/1978) Lleras Restrepo (8/7/1966-8/6/1970) Arbenz (3/15/1951-6/27/1954) L6pez (8/7/1974-8/6/1978) Arivalo (1/1/1948-3/14/1951) L6pez Arellano (12/5/1972-4/21/1975) Batista (3/11/1952-1/1/1959) Ldpez Mateos (12/1/1958-11/30/1964) Batlle (1/1/1948-2/28/1951) Ldpez Portillo (12/1/1976-11/30/1982) Belaiinde (7/28/1963-10/3/1968) Mdndez (7/1/1966-6/30/1970) Betancourt (2/13/1959-3/10/1963) Odriber (5/8/1974-5/7/1978) Caldera (3/11/1969-3/11/1974) Orlich (5/8/1962-5/7/1966) Colorado Party (3/1/1955-2/28/1959) Paz (8/6/1960-11/3/1964) Echeverrfa (12/1/1970-11/30/1976) Perin (7/1/1974-3/23/1976) Estime (1/1/1948-5/10/1950) Rodriguez (2/16/1972-1/10/1976) Figueres (11/8/1953-5/7/1958) Rojas (6/13/1953-5/9/1957) Figueres (5/8/1970-5/7/1974) Prio (10/10/1948-3/10/1952) Figueres (1/1/1948-11/7/1949) Siles Suazo (8/6/19568/5/1960) Frei (11/3/1964-11/2/1970) Torrijos (2/23/1969-12/31/1978) IlUa (10/12/1963-6/27/1966) Villeda Morales (12/21/1957-10/2/1963) Leoni (3/11/1963-3/10/1969) Vargas 1/31/1951-8/23/1954)
Radical Reform Regimes
Allende (11/3/1970-9/11/1973) Paz (4/16/1952-8/5/1956) Castro (1/8/1959-12/31/1978) Perin (1/1/1948-9/22/1955) Goulart (9/8/1961-4/2/1964) Velasco (10/3/1968-8/28/1975) Ovando (9/26/1969-10/6/1970) 63 The Dependent Variable
/ To measure the dependent variable, two measures of foreign policy were utilized. The first measure was United Nation's General Assembly voting. As Chapter
One demonstrated, this has traditionally been the most popular measure of foreign policy.
Before discussing how United Nations voting was utilized, it is appropriate to discuss the issue of United Nations voting as a dependent variable. United Nations votes are an excellent resource for measuring a country’s foreign policy orientation.
They provide regular and public statements of foreign policy positions and include nearly all of the countries in the international system. Moreover, votes are cast in the
Assembly on a wide range of important international issues (Richardson 1976, 1101).
While these advantages of roll call votes are not reason enough to justify their use, it can also be argued that: "The positions taken on individual issues are highly patterned and generally sum to a visible, coherent and stable outlook on the interests, values and perspectives which dominate-though not so publicly--other aspects of state policy"
(Moon 1987, 41). Furthermore, roll call votes function as an "expression of the stance of the nation. These positions communicate alignment to external actors-which can be of great significance in a variety of ways" (Moon 1987, 42).
Criticisms of UN roll call votes nevertheless exist. UN votes have been criticized for two reasons. The first is that they do not accurately represent foreign policies of countries on international issues. Tomlin (1985), on the basis of an empirical test of UN roll call validity makes such an argument. His empirical analysis 64 tests the correlation between UN voting and global issue positions using events data.
Upon finding no significant correlation, Tomlin (1987; 51 fh.) questions the validity of using UN voting data. In response to Tomlin's critique, Moon writes: "There is no inconsistency in two nations having similar global issue positions, but either strikingly antagonistic dyadic relations (e.g., India-Pakistan) or few dyadic interactions (e.g.,
Mali-Nicaragua)."
Critics also question the degree to which the United States is concerned with
General Assembly voting. A response to these critiques can be found in the Report to
Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations 1990 (1990, 1). This is an annual report given to Congress by the US ambassador to the United Nations. It reviews the voting behavior of the member countries over the past year. In the introduction, it is made clear that UN voting is important to the United States.
Behavior in the United Nations is but one dimension of a country’s relations with the United States. Economic, strategic and political issues can be--and often are--more important to U.S. interests. Even so, UN votes matter. No country's behavior at the UN is irrelevant to its bilateral relationship with the United States. This is a point the Secretary makes in his letters of instruction to new U.S. ambassadors. Decisions and policies reached in key UN bodies affect U.S. foreign policy...The United Nations, as the largest and most important world body, grapples with a variety of other issues~such as disarmament, security, development, human rights, environment, narcotics--that directly affect U.S. interests.
Although these criticisms must be considered in weighing the results of analysis based on UN votes, their frequency and accessibility for all countries in the region makes it a valuable point of departure in a study such as this one. Therefore, UN 65
General Assembly voting will be utilized as an indicator of a countries foreign policy orientation.
While this measure of foreign policy is appropriate for measuring a regime's foreign policy (Hypothesis 1 from Chapter Two) there is some question about its sensitivity to intervening variables, such as the domestic variables examined in the case study section of this project. In other words, it is not certain to what extent UN voting patterns reflect a regime's foreign policy orientation and to what extent these voting patterns reflect intervening variables. On the one hand, it seems intuitive that domestic opposition is not concerned with, at least, many of the votes that occur at the United
Nations. These votes are cast thousands of miles away, often on issues of no direct consequence to the country, and with little or no media coverage.4 However, some research indicates that: UN voting is highly controversial and the object of political pressures from inside as well as outside a nation" (Moon 1985, 300). This dilemma can not be answered at this point, but it must be considered in the follow chapters as the results are interpreted.
In addition to UN voting data, the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) will also be used. This data set contains events from 1948-1978. Over 67,000 international daily event records have been recorded from 70 public sources. These data have been coded into the following categories: initiating actor of the event, the target of the action, and score rating the level of conflict or cooperation present in the
4 A recent discussion with former Costa Rican president Oscar Arias confirmed that while there are exceptions to this rule, this is generally a correct assumption. 66 interaction-ranging from formal unification to full-scale war (Azar 1982). This data set is designed to measure substantive foreign policy behavior between country dyads.
Therefore, the COPDAB data set will be utilized to test the relationship between development strategies of the 121 Latin American regimes and their foreign policy toward the United States.5
Methodology
In order to test the impact of development strategy on Latin American foreign policy, the correlation between the development strategy of a given regime and its foreign policy, as measured by the UN voting data and then the COPDAB data set, was tested. The methodology utilized for testing these relationships is discussed below.
Based on Hypothesis 1 proposed in the previous chapter, a test was performed which consisted of observing whether the conventional, moderate reform, and radical reform regimes fall in decreasing order of agreement with the United States in UN voting.
The method for assessing a regime's level of voting agreement with the United
States was determined by examining each resolution voted on in the General Assembly
5 Data on UN voting behavior [originally collected by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)] were taken from the 1CPSR annual data collections of General Assembly plenary sessions for 1946-1985. The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (originally collected by Edward E. Azar) were derived from the COPDAB, 1948-1978 Daily Aggregations. The author assumes complete responsibility for the analysis and interpretations presented in this study. 67
for each regime and utilizing Lipjhart's (1963) Index of Agreement.6 Based on this
formula, a country's level of voting agreement was determined by coding each
resolution according to whether there was agreement, disagreement, or partial
agreement (one country abstains) between the Latin American country's vote and the
vote of the United States.7 Then a score of +1, -1, or 0, respectively, was assigned. A country's voting agreement was then calculated by taking the sum of these scores for a particular session and then dividing by the total number of votes for that session. The
resulting score represented a raw annual voting score which ranged from +1.0 (in
which the country agreed with the United States on every vote) to -1.0 (in which the
country disagreed with the United States on every vote).
The next step consisted of normalizing this score by subtracting the session's
mean score (the sum of all the scores for all 20 countries divided by 20) from each
country's raw annual voting score. This generated a relative score for each country
(Hagan 1987, 515).8 This was done for each country for the period 1948 through 1978.
6 I have followed the general practice of excluding "near-unanimous" votes (those in which 90% or more of the countries voted for or against a resolution). 7 The countries included in this study are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. "This step is essential for guarding against the problem of a shifting agenda in the United Nations. This refers to the problem that the substance of the issues considered in the General Assembly can vary from year to year. 68
The final step involved creating an aggregate score for each regime by adding together the normalized scores for each regime during the years that it was in power.9
"The end result was a measure of a regime's mean level o f agreement with the US— specifically, an indicator of the degree to which a regime agreed with US positions as compared with that of other regimes within its region for the years during which it was in power" (Hagan 1989, 515; Moon 1985).
Whereas there is some question as to the degree to which UN voting measures domestic opposition, the COPDAB data is seen as being very susceptible to internal pressures. Therefore, a weaker correlation between development strategy and COPDAB may be predicted if, unlike the compliance and consensus theorists, one expects domestic influences to be important.
9 In some cases regime change occurred during a United Nations session. In order to deal with this problem, the exact date in which a regime came to power and left power was determined. Then votes were calculated only for the period in which that regime was in power. The regime's relative score for that year was then recalculated in order to ensure that the regime's position was compared to that of other regimes on the same group of votes. However, in some cases it was determined that the absolute or relative number of votes was too small to justify weighting it as a full session; and in some cases the regime was excluded for the entire session. The following rules were created to determine if a regime was considered to have been engaged for a complete session, a half session, or coded as missing data (See Appendix D for session dates and the number of votes in each session).
If a regime votes on: -90% or more of the sessions votes, its score for that session is weighted as a full session. -50% — 89% of the votes, its score for that session is weighted as a half session. -50% of the votes, its score from that session is excluded. 69
In an attempt to increase the accuracy of this study two different designs were utilized for recording the COPDAB data Dixon (1986). The former consists of taking the original 1-15 ranking and collapsing these measurements of cooperation and conflict into three categories: cooperation (+1), neutral (0), and conflict (-1). This collapsed version, referred to in this study as COPDAB1, ranges from +1 to -1. While this scale does not reflect the intensity of the events, it reduces some of the measurement error and it provides a general measure of a country's foreign policy affect toward another country.
The second scheme recodes the 1-15 scale using Azar and Havener's (1976) subjectively-defined weights. This modified scale was created by asking faculty experts to rank each of the original categories by its intensity and the ratio of these intensities.
The result is a weighted scale which is intended to more accurately reflect the intensity of the COPDAB events. This second scheme is referred to in this study as COPDAB2.
The following chapter will report the results of the tests discussed above. CHAPTER IV
Results and Analysis
Introduction
Having discussed the operationalization, coding, and methodology, this chapter will report and analyze the results. The first section will report the results. This section will begin by summarizing the relationship between development strategy and Latin
American foreign policy toward the United States as measured by United Nations voting. The second section will focus on the results of the correlations between development strategy and the COPDAB data set. The third section will report the results from tests examining the relationship between UN voting and COPDAB.
Specifically, it will analyze the movement of regimes from their position on UN votes to their position with the United States on the COPDAB data.
Next, this chapter will assess the usefulness of development strategy for explaining Latin American foreign policy by analyzing the results. The performance of development strategy will be examined in conjunction with alternative explanations.
Central to this section will be the identification and examination of the outliers in an attempt to detect patterns.
70 71
Results Development Strategy and United Nations Voting
The statistical tests generated encouraging results. The first test measured the strength of the relationship between the development strategy (of the 121 regimes) and
United Nations voting. The results reveal a correlation coefficient between development strategy and UN voting of -.49.1 Since the development strategies are assigned the following scores: conventional = 1, moderate reformist = 2, and radical reformist -
3, and then correlated to each regime's index of agreement, the resulting coefficient is negative. In other words, regimes assigned lower development strategy scores tend to have higher agreement scores, and visa versa. This is consistent with the hypotheses in
Chapter Two, namely that regimes with conventional development strategies will agree more often with the United States than moderate reform regimes, and moderate reform regimes will agree more with the United States than radical reform regimes.
One way to summarize these results is to divide the regimes into four categories of foreign policy toward the United States: Strongly Anti-US, Moderately Anti-US,
Moderately Pro-US, Strongly Pro-US. The results are shown below in Table 5. In order to determine a regime’s proper category, a corresponding z-score was generated for each of the regimes.2 If a regime's z-score was -1 or less, then it was placed in the
1 Pearson's r is utilized here to generate the measure of association.
2 A z-score is a method of standardizing a raw score. It is generated by dividing the difference between the raw score and the mean by the standard deviation. Actual z- scores for the 121 regimes ranged from -4.76662. to +1.83887. 72
Strongly Anti-US category. Likewise, if its score was -I-1 or higher, it was assigned to the Strongly Pro-US grouping. Those scores falling in between these extremes were placed in the moderate group depending on whether their score was positive or negative; that is, positive scores were classified as Moderately Pro-US, and negative scores as Moderately Anti-US.
As expected, regimes that were classified as having traditional development strategies tended to agree more frequently with the United States than those following either of the reform strategies. Approximately 69% of those regimes adopting a conventional development strategy fall into the category of "Pro-US" foreign policy. In turn, those regimes characterized as having radical reform strategies were distinctly more "anti-US" than their moderate reform and conventional counterparts. Here, 100% of the regimes are categorized as "Anti-US," with 57% being Strongly Anti-US. Of the moderate reformers, over 70% of them fall in the "Moderately Anti- or Pro-US categories." The initial impression derived from these results is that development strategy appears to be a useful indicator of foreign policy toward the United States with respect to UN voting. 73
TABLE 5 Relationship Between Development Strategy and Support for US in UN Voting for All Regimes
United Nations Voting
Development Strongly Moderately Moderately Strongly Row Strategy Anti-US Anti-US Pro-US Pro-US Total5
Conventional 6 19 45 10 80 7.5% 23.8% 56.3% 12.5% 100%
Moderate 7 15 9 3 34 Reformist 20.6% 44.1% 26.5% 8.8% 100%
Radical 4 3 7 Reformist 57.1% 42.9% 100%
17 37 54 13 121 14.0% 30.6% 44.6% 10.7% 100%
The next step was to introduce the confidence variable (see Table 6). This provides a method of controlling for regimes based on the degree to which they fit one of the three ideal development strategy types. In other words, those regimes that fit the
ideal type less closely, can be eliminated. This analysis included the 106 regimes whose development strategy classification were coded with a high or medium degree of confidence. Thus those regimes that in no way possessed a distinct development
strategy were excluded. Since the remaining regimes represent those with more distinct development strategies, one would expect the correlation coefficient to increase,
because the development strategies assigned the low confidence regimes were tenuous.
When this variable is introduced, the results are not dramatically altered and they conform to expectations. The result is an increase in the correlation coefficient from -
3 The row totals do not add up to exactly 100% since they are rounded to the nearest .1. 74
.49 to -.53. This demonstrates that as regimes which do not closely approximate the ideal type are excluded, the strength of the relationship becomes stronger. Again, a high percentage of the regimes in Table 6 fall in the predicted foreign policy groupings when placed in a contingency table.
TABLE 6 Relationship Between Development Strategy and Support for US in UN Voting for Regimes Classified with High and Medium Confidence
United Nations Voting
Development Strongly Moderately Moderately Strongly Row Strategy Anti-US Anti-US Pro-US Pro-US Total
Conventional 5 16 41 10 72 6.9% 22.2% 56.9% 13.9% 100%
Moderate 6 13 7 2 28 Reformist 21.4% 46.4% 25.0% 7.1% 100%
Radical 4 2 6 Reformist 66.7% 33.3% 100.%
15 31 48 12 106 14.2% 29.2% 45.3% 11.3% 100.%
Finally, a third correlation brings about a similar increase in correlation coefficient. Here, only the 76 regimes which were coded as having a high degree of confidence are included. As mentioned before, these are regimes that fit one of the ideal types quite closely. The expectations are confirmed as the correlation coefficient between development strategy and foreign policy behavior increases from
-.53 to -.56. Again the correlation coefficient increases. This demonstrates a recurring pattern in which development strategy is more closely correlated to Latin American foreign policy as regimes with less coherent development strategies are eliminated. 75
Over 71 % of the regimes are classified as Pro-US, and, as above, all of the radical reform regimes are Anti-US. In turn, nearly 67% of the moderate reformers exhibit moderate foreign policies toward the United States. These results are shown in Table 7.
TABLE 7 Relationship Between Development Strategy and Support for US in UN Voting for Regimes Classified with High Confidence
United Nations Voting
Development Strongly Moderately Moderately Strongly Row Strategy Anti-US Anti-US Pro-US Pro-US Total
Conventional 3 11 29 6 49 6.1% 22.4% 59.2% 12.2% 100%
Moderate 5 9 5 2 21 Reformist 23.8% 42.9% 23.8% 9.5% 100%
Radical 4 2 6 Reformist 66.7% 33.3% 100%
12 22 34 8 76 IS.8% 28.9% 44.7% 10.5% 100%
Another complementary method of assessing the importance of development strategy is to calculate the mean for each development strategy's z-scoFe. This simply involves adding up the resulting z-scores for every regime in each of the three development strategies and dividing by the number of regimes within that development strategy. If development strategy is truly meaningful, one would expect there to be a significant difference between the mean of each of the three development strategies. If there is little difference or, worse yet, they are not in the expected order of agreement with the United States, then serious doubts are cast upon the development strategy approach. The means for each level of confidence are reported below. The first set includes all regimes within each of the three development strategies. The second and 76 third sets of scores include the means for each of the three development strategies on high and medium confidence regimes and high confidence regimes, respectively.
TABLE 8 United Nations Correlation Means for each Development Strategy Type
All regimes Conventional = +0.06 Moderate Reformist = -0.04 Radical Reformist = -0.37
High and medium confidence regimes Conventional = +0.06 Moderate Reformist = -0.05 Radical Reformist = -0.40
High confidence regimes Conventional = +0.06 Moderate Reformist = -0.05 Radical Reformist = -0.40
It is evident that the means of these three development strategies are in the anticipated order. However, the scores do not represent significant differences between all three levels of confidence. While the difference in means between the moderate and radical reform strategies is relatively substantial, the difference between the conventional and moderate reform regimes is less significant. When all 121 Latin
American regimes are calculated, the mean of the conventional regime is .06, the moderate reformist regime is -.04, and the radical reformist is -.37. The results demonstrate that there is some support for the claim that development strategy is an important indicator of a regime's foreign policy orientation in relationship to the United 77
States; however, it is difficult to determine how significant these findings are since there is nothing with which to compare these scores.
Taken in conjunction, the evidence above demonstrates that development strategy is linked to Latin American foreign policy toward the United States as reflected in United Nations voting. However, despite these relatively impressive results, there are a number of instances in which development strategy is not accurate. A closer examination of these outliers will be taken in the analysis section.
Development Strategy and COPDAB
As mentioned in the previous chapter, two different designs were utilized for recording the COPDAB data. The final correlations between development strategy and the COPDAB 1 and COPDAB2 were similar, but did differ. Depending on which level of confidence was used, the correlation between COPDAB 1 and COPDAB2 ranged from .90 to .92.4 This is consistent with results from other studies (Dixon 1986; 434).
Although the scores for COPDAB2 will be reported for some of the statistical results,
COPDAB 1 will be relied upon as the primary version of the COPDAB data set.5 This decision is based on the belief that it will reduce the amount of human error involved
4 Spearman's rho was utilized here because there were very few ties when the UN and COPDAB results were ranked, and this is the recommended measure of association for untied data. It should, however, be mentioned that the results are virtually the same if Pearson’s r is utilized.
5 However, the case studies in the following chapter will utilize the information obtained from COPDAB2 regarding the intensity of events. 78 since a less complex scale is relied upon. In other words, by using COPDAB 1 the coder is only required to code an event as cooperative, neutral, or conflictual. This logically involves less error than when the coder is required to place an event into one of twenty categories. The results are discussed below.
As with the United Nations voting data, correlations were generated for each of the three coding confidence levels. The resulting correlation between development strategy and COPDAB1 for regimes of all confidence levels was -.43.® This is a moderate correlation which is not quite as high as the correlation between development strategy and UN voting. The somewhat smaller correlation is consistent with the earlier discussion of the two dependent variables, since it is asserted here that the COPDAB data may represents a measure that is more sensitive to domestic and foreign determinants. The correlation coefficient for COPDAB2 was -.39.
Table 9 summarizes the relationship between development strategy and the
COPDAB1 data. It includes regimes of all coding confidence levels. Again, the cases that are classified as Strongly Anti-US and Strongly Pro-US are those that have either a z-score of -1 or +1, respectively. The two moderate categories possess z-scores of less than one (Moderately Anti-US equals a negative z-score less than -1.0 and Moderately
Pro-US consists of positive z-scores less than +1.0). In Table 9, 62% of the conventional regimes are classified as having a Pro-US foreign policy, and 100% of the
6 The number of regimes in this section will be smaller than in the United Nations voting section because if a regime had less than five foreign policy events toward the United States then it was not included in the analysis. 79 radical reformers have Anti-US foreign policies. Approximately 58% of the moderate reformers fall in either the Moderately Pro- or Anti-US columns.
TABLE 9 Relationship Between Development Strategy and COPDAB1 Conflict Behavior Data for All Regimes
COPDAB! Data
Development Strongly Moderately Moderately Strongly Row Strategy Anti-US Anti-US Pro-US Pro-US Total
Conventional 4 21 27 14 66 6.1% 31.8% 40.9% 21.2% 100%
Moderate 9 11 8 5 33 Reformist 27,3% 33.3% 24.2% 15.2% 100%
Radical 5 2 7 Reformist 71.4% 28.6% 100%
18 34 35 19 106 17.0% 32.1% 33.0% 17.9 100%
Table 10 includes regimes that were coded as high and medium confidence.
This excluded the 13 regimes that did not have a discernible development strategy (low confidence regimes) from the analysis. The result is an increase in the correlation coefficient between development strategy and COPDAB1 from -.43 to -.48. Likewise, the correlation coefficient between development strategy and COPDAB2 increases from
-.39 to -.44. Just as the correlation between development strategy and UN data increases as regimes with less coherent development strategies were eliminated, the correlation between development strategy and COPDAB 1 (and COPDAB2) also increases. This strengthens the support for the hypotheses developed in Chapter Two. 80 TABLE 10 Relationship Between Development Strategy and COPDAB1 Conflict Behavior Data for Regimes with High and Medium Coding Confidence
COPDABl Data
Development Strongly Moderately Moderately Strongly Row Strategy Anti-US Anti-US Pro-US Pro-US Total
Conventional 3 19 24 14 60 5.0% 31.7% 40.0% 23.3% 100%
Moderate 8 10 6 3 27 Reformist 29.6% 37.0% 22.2% 11.1% 100%
Radical 4 2 6 Reformist 66.7% 33.3% 100%
15 31 30 17 93 16.1% 33.3% 32.3% 18.3% 100%
The final correlation consisted only of the 66 regimes that were considered to have the most distinct development strategy (see Table 11). The result was a minor decrease in the correlation coefficient from -.48 to -.47. Similarly, the correlation coefficient for COPDAB2 decreased from -.44 to -.41. This is in contrast from the other correlations (including those in the United Nations section) in which regimes assigned a lesser confidence level were eliminated. While an increase in the coefficient might logically be expected, this may simply mean that those regimes that were classified as moderate confidence were as accurately coded as those having a high confidence level despite having less confidence. Furthermore, this is an insignificant change in the correlation coefficient.
The results reveal that 62.5% of the conventional regimes have a Pro-US foreign policy, 55% of the moderate reformers have a moderate foreign policy toward the United States, and 100% of the radical reformers possess an anti-US foreign policy. 81
TABLE 11 Relationship Between Development Strategy and COPDAB1 Conflict Behavior Data for Regimes with High Coding Confidence
COPDAB1 Data
Development Strongly Moderately Moderately Strongly Row Strategy Anti-US Anti-US Pto-US Pro-US Total
Conventional 2 13 18 7 40 5.0% 32.5% 45.0% 17.5% 100%
Moderate 6 8 3 3 20 Reformist 30.0% 40.0% 15.0% 15.0% 100%
Radical 4 2 6 Reformist 66.7% 33.3% 100%
12 23 21 10 66 18.2% 34.8% 31.8% 15.2% 100%
As with the UN voting data, the development strategy means for the varying levels of confidence can also be utilized to assess the utility of the development strategy explanation. These means are reported below in Table 12. 82
TABLE 12 COPDAB Correlation Means for Each Development Strategy Type
COPDAB1 All regimes Conventional = +0.28 Moderate Reformist = +0.09 Radical Reformist = -0.26
High and medium confidence regimes Conventional = +0.29 Moderate Reformist = +0.06 Radical Reformist = -0.28
High confidence regimes Conventional = +0.27 Moderate Reformist = +0. 08 Radical Reformist — -0.28
COPDAB2 All regimes Conventional — +4.66 Moderate Reformist = +1.58 Radical Reformist = -4.94
High and medium confidence regimes Conventional = +5.01 Moderate Reformist = +1.27 Radical Reformist = -5.26
High confidence regimes Conventional = +4.61 Moderate Reformist = +1.40 Radical Reformist = -5.26
Even more than with United Nations voting, a notable difference exists among the means for development strategy types on both COPDAB 1 and COPDAB2. Again, however, an examination of the results reveals that there are a significant number of 83 regimes that do not conform to expectations. These outliers will be discussed in the analysis section.
The findings of the relationship between development strategy and UN voting and between development strategy and COPDAB are summarized in Table 13. Recall that the correlations are negative because of the way in which the development strategies were coded (see page 64), but that they support the hypotheses. As the data in Table 13 show, there is some slight improvement when the sample of regimes is limited to those for which the coder had a moderate or high level of confidence in the appropriateness of his classification. Further narrowing of the data set to only those regimes in which there was high coder confidence increases the correlation coefficient for UN data, but results in a negligible decrease for COPDAB.
TABLE 13 Summary of Correlation Coefficients between Development Strategy and UN Voting and Development Strategy and COPDAB
United Nations Voting COPDAB
All Hi & Med Hi All Hi & Med All Regimes Confidence Confidence Regimes Confidence Regimes -.49 -.53 -.56 -.43 -.48 -.47
Comparing UN and COPDAB Data
Thus far the UN voting and COPDAB data have been analyzed separately. One additional way that this data can be analyzed is by looking at the movement of regimes between UN and COPDAB. In other words, do the regimes tend to occupy a similar 84 relative position on both data sets, or do they change drastically from one to the other?
And if they change in a significant manner, do patterns exist that can be explained by the extant literature? For instance, the compliance literature might be in the best position to explain regimes that are more anti-US on UN votes than they are in their direct foreign policy events toward the United States.7 For this section, the z-scores from the UN voting and the z-scores from the COPDAB data have been ranked in separate columns (see Table 14).x As in the analysis above, there are two spaces separating the data into three groupings. These groupings demarcate where the conventional, moderate reform, and radical reform regimes should ideally be distributed.
7 While the compliance literature argues that dependent countries are influenced in the United Nations by the United States, one would expect this to be more true when dealing directly with the United States outside of the United Nations.
8 The UN voting scores will differ slightly here because they have been re calculated without the regimes that did not have the minimum number of COPDAB events. Hence, the same regimes were utilized in generating both sets of scores. The result is a higher level of accuracy. 85
TABLE 14 UN and COPDAB Z-Scores
UN Z-SCORES COPDAB1 Z-SCORES
Ctv Regime DS Score Ctv Regime m Score Nic Somoza3 1 1.80895 Hon VilledaMor 2 2.30155 Cos Oduber 2 1.51582 Cos Orlich 2 1.60285 Cos Trejos 1 1.38442 Chi Alessandri 1 1.59985 Cos Figueres3 2 1.31871 Par Stroessner 1 1.25500 Nic Somoza2 1 1.29850 Gua Peralta 1 1.23101 Uru Pacheco 1 1.10139 Els Lemus 1 1.11706 Nic Somozal 1 1.04074 Mex LdpezMateos 1.09606 Brz CostaSilva 1 1.01042 Hon LdpezArelll 1 1.09307 Gua Peralta 1 .99526 Cos Trejos 1 1.04209 Gua Arana 1 .94472 Gua Ydfgoras 1 1.01810 Uru NSC 1 .83858 Brz Kubitschek 1 .98511 Par Stroessner 1 .80826 Hai Duvalierl 1 .91614 Bol Banzcr 1 .80826 Nic Somoza2 1 .88615 Hon VilledaMor 2 .79310 Nic Somozal 1 .85017 Brz Castello 1 .77794 Brz Mddici 1 .80819 Brz Kubitschek 1 .77794 Ecu Plaza 1 .78420 Chi Pinochet 1 .66675 Per Prado 1 .72422 Per Prado 1 .63137 Uru NSC 1 .71223 Hai Duvalier2 1 .57072 Hai Estime .69124 Gua Ydfgoras 1 .52018 Hai Duvalier2 1 .66725 Hon LdpezArelll 1 .51007 Cos Figueres 1 .64026 Pan Robles 1 .50502 Cos Figueres3 .60427 Dom Ttujillo 1 .47975 Gua Arana 1 .60127 Col Valencia 1 .43932 Nic Somoza3 1 .53830 Per Odria 1 .41910 Arg Videla 1 .44234 Biz Mddici 1 .41405 Bol Banzcr 1 .30140 Aig Aramburu 1 .39888 Uru Blancol 1 .28341 Cos Orlich 2 .37867 Ecu Ponce 1 .26841 Per Belatinde 2 .33824 Brz Castello 1 .21744 Pan Chiari 1 .29780 Dom Trujillo 1 .05850 Uru Blancol 1 .27759 Per Odria 1 .01652 Ven Pdrez Jimdnez 1 .24221 Col Ospina 1 -.00447 Chi Alessandri 1 .20683 Pan Chiari 1 -.04945 Ven Leoni 2 .19672 Uru Batlle 2 -.05845 Uru Blanco2 1 .17651 Gua Mdndez 2 -.07344 Arg Illfa 2 .14618 Ven Betancourt 2 -.08244 Brz Goulart 3 .00973 Uni Blanco2 1 -.16040 Ecu Ponce 1 -.02565 Biz Goulart 3 -.19939 Arg Ongam'a 1 -.04081 Urn Pacheco 1 -.24437 Els Lemus 1 -.07619 Aig Aramburu 1 -.37331 86
TABLE 14 (continued) UN and COPDAB Z-Scores
Ctv Regime Score Ctv Regime Scop? m m Pan Robles i -.38831 Uru Batlle 2 -.11157 Chi Pinochet i -.39131 Hai Duvalierl 1 -.26824 Cos Oddber 2 -.40930 Ven Caldera 2 -.27330 Brz OeiBel 1 -.42129 Chi Frei 2 -.29351 Ecu SupCouncil 1 -.54424 Gua Mdndez 2 -.32889 Arg Dlfa 2 -.64320 Pan Torrijos 2 -.33395 Per Beladnde 2 -.68518 Cob Figueresl 2 -.39459 Ven Caldera 2 -.72716 Ecu Rodriguez 2 -.70794 Bol Pazl 3 -.76915 Col Ospina 1 -.72816 Ven Pdrez Jimdnez 1 -.77514 Arg Videla 1 -.73321 Mex Echevem'a 2 -.79314 Ecu Plaza 1 -.84440 Mex Ruiz 1 -.84112 Ven Andrds Perez 2 -.87978 Col Valencia 1 -.84112 Arg JPerdn 3 -.89494 Brz CoBtaSilva 1 -.94607 Brz Geisel 1 -.91516 Mex Alemrfn 1 -1.00305 Mex Echevem'a 2 -.94548 Ecu Rodriguez 2 -1.03004 Hai Eatime 2 -.99602 Chi Frei 2 -1.10201 Bol Pazl 3 -1.05161 Pan Torrijos 2 -1.10800 Ecu SupCouncil 1 -1.05667 Arg Onganfa 1 -1.21296 Mex LdpezMateos 2 -1.11226 Per Velasco 3 -1.32391 Ven Betancourt 2 -1.23861 Ven Leoni 2 -1.54882 Mex Ruiz I -1.24872 Chi Allende 3 -1.68976 Mex Alemin 1 -1.26388 Arg JPerdn 3 -1.92366 Per Velasco 3 -1.77939 Ven Andrds Pdrez 2 -2.18455 Gua Arbenz 2 -2.24941 Cub Castro 3 -2.43644 Chi Allende 3 -3.76056 Gua Arbenz 2 -3.09316 Cub Castro 3 -4.58436 87
The correlation between these two data sets is a moderate .47.9 While this is not a weak relationship for the social sciences, it does suggest that these two data sets are measuring somewhat different phenomena. This is one reason that the deviant case studies selected in the next chapter are those regimes that are outliers on both data sets.
The discussion in the analysis section will search for patterns in these results.
Analysis
As noted above, despite the somewhat significant correlations between development strategy and Latin American foreign policy, a substantial number of outliers still exist. The purpose of the following section is to search for identifiable patterns in an effort to understand the shortcomings of this approach and determine in which cases alternative explanations might be more appropriate. These alternative explanations are described below.10
The first alternative is the compliance approach. In cases where the development strategy approach fails to explain the pro-US foreign policy of a particular regime, or a series of regimes, and the regimes are relatively dependent11 on the United States, then
9 The measure of association utilized here is the Pearson's r.
10 Keep in mind that the consensus approach is not listed here as an alternative because it is supplanted by the development strategy explanation. In other words, if a Latin American regime has a conventional development strategy and ranks high on agreement or cooperation with the United States, this can be explained by development strategy, but can also be described as consensus.
"The compliance approach has not discovered a single measure of "dependence" (export dependence, import dependence, aid dependence, etc.) that predicts to foreign 88 the compliance approach must be considered as an alternative explanation. In other words, when regimes that are relatively dependent on the United States exhibit a more pro-US behavior than expected, based on their development strategy, then the compliance approach must be considered the likely alternative explanation.
A second alternative is pertinent if groupings of outliers are from a single time period. This may reveal something about the dynamics between certain key events, such as the policies of specific US administrations toward Latin America. For instance, one could argue that moderate reform regimes having terms that co-exist with the
Kennedy, Johnson, or Carter administration, will result in inflated agreement scores.
This rests on the belief that the foreign policy of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter administrations were more compatible with moderate reformers than those of Truman,
Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford. In other words, since these US regimes tended to be less hawkish and more open to many of the reforms that the moderate reformist regimes adopted than the other US administrations during the 1948-78 time period, it is reasonable to expect the dynamics of the relationship between development strategy and foreign policy toward the United States to change.
The following three sections will analyze the results reported above in an attempt to discover patterns among the deviant or outlying regimes. The results will be
policy well. Therefore, instead of employing a single measure of dependence, this study will seek to find deviant countries that share a common pattern. In other words, deviant countries will be examined to see if they are export dependence, import dependence, aid dependence, small, economically weak, etc. 89 analyzed in the same order in which they were reported (development strategy and UN votes, development strategy and COPDAB data, UN voting and COPDAB data).
Development Strategy and United Nations Voting
To facilitate the search for identifiable patterns, the regimes are listed below
(see Table 15) in descending order of their agreement with the United States; and the outliers have been highlighted. In order to insure that this closer examination includes regimes with a distinct development strategy, only high confidence regimes are listed here. 90 TABLE 15 Regime Voting Agreement in the United Nations with the United States
Strongly Pro-US Development Country Regime Strategy 2-Scores Nic Somoza3 1 1.83887 •yyyyyyyy '/X£ W/A Cos Treios 1.40024
Nic Somoza2 1.31147 Uru Pacheco 1.10783 Nic Somozal 1.04517 Brz CostaSilva 1.01383 Gua Peralta .99817 Gua Arana .94595 Uru NSC .83630 Hon Cruz .82585 Par Stroessner .80497 Bol Banzer .80497 'mym* Biz Castello .77364 Brz Kubitschek .77364 Chi Pinochet .65876 Per Prado .62221 Bol Hertzog .59087 Hon Galvez .56999 Hai Duvalier2 .55954 Gua Ydlgoras .50733 Hon LdpezArelll .49688 Pan Robles .49166 Dom Trujillo .46555 Cot Valencia .42378 Per Odria .40289 Brz Mddici .39767 Arg Aramburu .38201 Els Romero .37678
Hon Lozana 35068
Bo! Urriolagot .31412 Pan Chiari .27757 Uru Blancol .25668 Ven Pdrez Jimdnez .22013 Chi Alessandri .18358 91
TABLE 15 (continued) Regime Voting Agreement in the United Nations with the United States
Development Country Regime Strategy Z-Scores Uru Blanco2 1 .15225 wm.
Gomez -.02529 Ponce -.05662 Onganfa -.07228 Lemus -.10884
Duvalierl -.30726
Moderately Anti-US Caldera 2 -.31248 Frei 2 -.33337 Mlndez 2 -.36992 Torrijos 2 -.37514 Figueresl 2 -.41692 Fijmeres2 2 -.42736
Rodri uez -.76155
1 Ven Andrds P«5rez 2 -.93909 ■ a . %i Echeverrla -1.00697 Estime -1.05919
LdpezMateos 2 -1.17929 Betancourt 2 -1.30983
ly Anti-US
Velasco -1.86856
Allende -3.91547 Castro -4.76662 92
It is hypothesized that the regimes with a conventional development strategy will be toward the top of the list (Pro-US), followed by the moderate reformists, and then the radical reformists. One important factor that must be taken into consideration when analyzing these results is the very unequal distribution of cases. There are 49 conventional strategy regimes, 21 moderate reformers, and only six radical reformers.
In order to deal with this unequal distribution, it will be assumed that the 49 most pro-
US regimes should be conventional regimes, the next 21 should be moderate reformers, and the last six should be radical reformers. Any regimes deviating from this strict ordering are considered outliers. These new categories will be referred to in this section as the first, second, and third grouping, or category, respectively.
As mentioned above, most of the conventional regimes fall in the first category.
However, seven conventional outliers fall in the second category and two in the third category. The conventional outliers in the first grouping include Magloire (1950-56) of
Haiti, Ospina (1948-50) of Colombia, Videla (1976-78) of Argentina, Osorio (1950-56) of El Salvador, Plaza (1948-52) and the Superior Council (1976-78) of Ecuador, and
Geisel (1974-8) of Brazil. The two conventional outliers appearing in the Strongly
Anti-US grouping, when they were expected to be Pro-US based on their development strategy, include Ruiz (1952-58) of Mexico and Alemdn (1948-52) of Mexico.
The compliance approach does not appear to be useful in explaining this set of outliers since the countries are diverse in terms of their relative strength and dependence on the United States. In other words, not all or even a majority of the regimes are from the weak Central American republics; rather they are from a mix of 93 countries, including relatively strong and independent countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina.
With regards to the two most extreme outliers, Ruiz and Alemdn of Mexico, it is interesting that these two are both from the same country. This is especially true given that all six Mexican regimes (Alemdn, Ruiz, Lripez Portillo, Dfaz Ordaz,
Echeverrfa, Ldpez Mateos) exhibited low levels of agreement in the United Nations with the United States, despite their development strategy. Much has been written about the anti-US tradition of Mexican foreign policy (Poitras 1981; McShane 1981).
These authors argue that Mexico's unique history and geographical location have led to this country's steadfast adherence to the principles of anti-imperialism, non intervention, and strong nationalism. The question of whether this truly represents a
"Mexican foreign policy culture," or rather a situation in which domestic politics strongly conditions Mexican foreign policy, will be further discussed in the case studies in the following chapter.
If the two Mexican regimes are ignored a distinct pattern can be discerned from the remaining regimes. This pattern is based on the time period in which the regime is in office. All of these regimes are in power at either the very beginning of this study
(the late 1940s and 1950s) or the very end of this study (1974 through 1978). On the surface, it could be suggested that those in the latter time period have a relatively simple explanation: all three regimes are military regimes which overlap with Carter's term in office. However, this argument loses its validity since the Banzer, Romero, 94
Somoza3,12 and the NSC of Uruguay are military regimes possessing conventional development strategies and overlapping with Carter, but have pro-US foreign policies.
In an attempt to save this explanation, one could argue that the military regimes that
have pro-US foreign policies tend to be weak countries compared to those having pro-
US foreign policies. Unfortunately, there are not enough cases here and this pattern is not distinct enough to draw any conclusions.
The earlier regimes are even more perplexing. These regimes are in power
during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, but this does not provide any clue.
It is hoped that the case study chapter will shed some light on these regimes.
The moderate reform outliers are defined here as those agreeing with the United
States more than Caldera of Venezuela (the 27th regimes from the bottom) and less
than Betancourt of Venezuela (the 7th regime from the bottom). Eight regimes exist
that are more pro-US than expected. These regimes are as follows: Oduber (Costa
Rica), Figueres (Costa Rica), Villeda Morales (Honduras), Orlich (Costa Rica),
Belaunde (Peru), Leoni (Venezuela), Illfa (Argentina) and Batlle (Uruguay).13
The two most extreme pro-US outliers , Oduber and Figueres1 third regime, are both Costa Rican regimes. Here again, extreme regimes are from the same country. In examining other regimes from Costa Rica, it is found that the Trejos and the Orlich
12 "Somoza3" refers to the Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the third Somoza to occupy office in Nicaragua during this study.
13 The Batlle administration is so close to its predicted position that it is considered as a serious outlier here. 95 regimes are both pro-US. This significant pattern is somewhat weakened by the existence of Figueres' two earlier terms in which he is moderately anti-US.
Alternatively, one might argue that since Costa Rica is a relatively small and dependent country a compliance argument might be more appropriate in this case. For more information the other moderate reformist outliers must be considered. The compliance argument can be applied to the Villeda Morales regimes of Honduras, another small and weak Central American regime dependent on the United States. However, this explanation is not viable for the regimes from other, diverse countries such as Peru,
Venezuela and Argentina. Thus the compliance does not appear to be a comprehensive explanation here.
Another explanation that needs to be considered is the time period in which
these regimes are in power. This hypothesis appears viable for Orlich (1962-66),
Belaunde (1963-68), Leoni (1963-69) and Illfa (1963-66), since all four of these regimes fall within the period of 1962 through 1969-the period which Kennedy and
Johnson were in power.14 This logic could also be applied to the regimes of Villeda
Morales and Oduber since their terms overlap with Kennedy and Carter, respectively.
However, a closer look reveals that there is not a dramatic shift in Villeda Morales' foreign policy agreement with the United States when Kennedy replaces Eisenhower.
14 It should be mentioned that the last United Nations session during which Leoni was president ended in December of 1968. Therefore, Leoni was not responsible for any UN voting while Nixon was in office. 96
Similarly, there is no shift in Oduber-US agreement when Carter replaces Ford. Thus, at this point in the study, their is no immediate explanation for Villeda Morales.
The moderate reform regimes that conformed to expectations (the non-outliers) give mixed support for this explanation. Frei, Mdndez, L6pez Mateos, and Betancourt all contradict this because they overlap with the Kennedy and Johnson administration, but maintain the expected anti-US foreign policy. At the same time, Torrijos,
Figueresl, Figueres2, Rodrfguez, Andrds Pdrez, Echeverrfa, and Estime give credence to this explanation because they do not overlap with this time period and follow the predicted foreign policy. This offers some evidence to this explanation, but it is certainly not conclusive.
The only moderate reformer that is more anti-US than expected is Arbenz
(Guatemala). He was in power from 1951 through 1954 and thus does not overlap with any of the more moderate US administrations. Compliance theory is of no use since
Guatemala is a small, weak Central American country. Therefore, there is no immediate explanation for this anomaly.
The final category of outliers to be examined are the radical reformers that are
more pro-US than expected.15 This group includes Goulart (Brazil), Juan Perdn
(Argentina), and Paz Estenssorol (Bolivia). The most obvious outlier is the Goulart regime which is not only classified as Moderately Anti-US, but is only one position
15 This includes those radical reform regimes that are more pro-US than Ruiz (the sixth regime from the bottom). 97 away from being Moderately Pro-US. This could tentatively be explained by the fact that most of his term overlaps with the Kennedy and Johnson administration in the
United States. One could argue that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, given their greater tolerance for reform, might be more tolerant of a radical reformist regime than other US administrations. At this point, this is the only reasonable explanation since Brazil would not be considered a relatively weak and dependent Latin American regime. The only other radical reform regime during this time period is the Castro regime. This does not provide enough evidence to reject this possible explanation.
None of the alternative explanations appear to fit either Perdn or Paz. Here again, there is no immediate explanation for either regime - although there should be less concern about the Paz regime since it is quite close to its predicted position.
Development Strategy and COPDAB
The purpose of the following paragraphs will be to examine outliers generated by the results of the COPDAB data. To facilitate this endeavor, the high confidence regimes have been ranked below (see Table 16) in order of cooperation with the United
States as measured by the COPDAB 1 data. The conventional regimes are defined as outliers if they are ranked below the fortieth regime from the top of the list, which is the Aramburu regime. In theory, the moderate reform regimes should occupy the next
20 positions, and the radical reform regimes should occupy the bottom six position of this list, thereby leaving no room for conventional regimes. However, as will be discussed below, this is not the case. 98
TABLE 16
Regime COPDAB Cooperation Level with the United States
Strongly Pro-US
Development Country Strategy Z-Scores
Alessandri 1.59985 Stroessner 1.25500 Peralta 1.23101 Lemus LI 1706
LdpezArelll 1.09307 Trejos 1.04209 Ydfgoras 1.01810 Kubitschek .98511 Duvalierl .91614 Somoza2 .88615 Somoza 1 .85017 Medici .80819 Plaza .78420 Prado .72422 NSC .71223
Duvalier2 .66725 'A
Arana .60127 Somoza3 .53830 Videla .44234 Banzer .30140 Blanco 1 .28341 Ponce .26841 Castello .21744 Trujillo .05850 Odrfa .01652 -.00447 Chian -.04945
Uru B!anco2 .16040 '////. Pacheco -.24437 Arambuni -.37331 99
TABLE 16 (continued) Regime COPDAB Cooperation Level with the United States
Moderately Anti-US
Development Country Strategy Z-Scores
Oduber .40930
Illfa 2 -.64320 Belaunde 2 -.68518 Caldera 2 -.72716
Echeverria -.79314
Rodriguez 2 -1.03004 Frei 2 - 1.10201 Torrijos 2 -1.10800
Strongly Anti-US m Chl Allende 3 -1.68976 Are JPer6n 3 -1.92366
Cub Castro 100
Several conventional regimes exist here including: Robles (Panama), Pinochet
(Chile), Geisel (Brazil) the Superior Council (Ecuador), Pdrez Jimenez (Venezuela),
Ruiz (Mexico), Valencia (Colombia), Costa e Silva (Brazil), Alemdn (Mexico), and
Onganfa (Argentina).
In terms of the time period in which these regimes were in power, there is not a distinguishable pattern. The regimes are relatively evenly spread out over different time periods. Since Alemdn and Ruiz are once again quite anti-US, the political culture argument can be posited for the Mexican regimes at this initial phase of analysis.
However, in the COPDAB data, the L<5pez Mateos regime is very pro-US. The most interesting pattern, however, is the conspicuous absence of small, weak Central
American regimes in the list of those conventional regimes exhibiting a high degree of conflict toward the United States. Panama is the only Central American or Caribbean regime in this list, and it is so close to the cut-off point for outliers, that it does not seem deviant enough to preclude this generalization. While this does appear to be a noticeable pattern, it should be reiterated at this point that this analysis is quite preliminary and only tentative conclusions can be drawn at this point.
With respect to percentages, the moderate reformers constitute the greatest number of deviant cases per total cases. Twelve of the 20 moderate reformers lie outside their predicted range. The list of those more cooperative with the United States than the Robles regime (the 26th regime from the bottom) includes: Villeda Morales
(Honduras), Orlich (Costa Rica), Ldpez Mateos (Mexico), Estime (Haiti), Figueresl
(Costa Rica), Figueres2 (Costa Rica), Batlle (Uruguay), Mdndez (Guatemala), and 101
Betancourt (Venezuela). The pattern from the conventional regime analysis is complemented by the large number of weak Central American and Caribbean regimes in the list of relatively cooperative moderate reform regimes. Only three of the twelve regimes can not be placed into this category -- Ldpez Mateos of Mexico, Betancourt of
Venezuela, and perhaps Batlle of Uruguay.
The Ldpez Mateos regime is rather disturbing since it deviates from the earlier findings that had been largely supported to this point - that the Mexican regimes may be characterized by anti-US foreign policy as a result of cultural influences. A possible explanation is that the conventional Mexican regimes were pushed by domestic groups to adopt a more anti-US position, due to their more conservative domestic policies. In contrast, the Ldpez Mateos regime, which possessed a more liberal domestic policy, was relatively free to pursue cooperative relations with the United States. It should also be mentioned that much of Ldpez Mateos' (1958-64) term overlaps with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. This latter explanation is also true for the Villeda
Morales, Orlich, Mdndez, and Betancourt. The terms of these regimes overlap with the
Alliance for Progress administrations. However, this line of reasoning must also consider that Illfa and Belaunde are moderate reform regimes that are in power during this period, and are not from overly dependent countries, but are predicted correctly.
While three other moderate reformers are predicted correctly, the presence of the Illfa and Belaunde regimes diminishes the strength of any conclusions that can be drawn from this pattern. 102
The other regime that does not fit this pattern is the Batlle. While there is no immediate explanation for this regime's behavior, it should be noted that this regime is relatively less cooperative with the United States than nearly all of the other regimes and is even classified as moderately anti-US. In other words, it is not a dramatic outlier.
It is interesting to note that four of the five Costa Rican regimes are classified as being cooperative with the United States;16 and while there does not appear to be an explicit pattern with regards to different time periods, regimes like Betancourt and
Orlich may be effected by the time period since they are both moderate reform regimes in power during the Kennedy Administration.
Three moderate reform regimes had a foreign policy toward the United States that was less cooperative than expected for this development strategy. This group consists of Leoni (Venezuela), Andrds Pdrez (Venezuela), and Arbenz (Guatemala). It is interesting to note that the Leoni and Andrds Pdrez regimes are from a relatively strong South American country. This coincides with the above findings. However, the
Arbenz regime is disconcerting since it is from Guatemala and is the most anti-US regime (including Castro). Since degree of dependence and time period do not appear responsible (for this case or the Venezuelan cases), this case will have to remain unexplained at this point.
l6The cooperativeness of Costa Rica with the United States will be further explored in Chapter VI. 103
The last development strategy to be examined is the radical reformist. Goulart
(Brazil), Paz Estenssoro (Bolivia), and Velasco (Peru) are the three outliers. Since there are such a small number, it is difficult to discern any patterns. What can be said is that the Goulart regime, as in the UN voting, is the most obvious outlier. Although it still possesses a moderately anti-US foreign policy, it has a score more characteristic of the conventional development strategy regimes. At this point the only explanation that can be offered is that it coincides with the Kennedy regime. This explanation however is not wholly satisfactory since radical reformers are not expected to possess such consistent beliefs with even a reformist-minded US administration. With regards to the first Paz and Velasco regimes, none of the prominent explanations used in this study seem to fit. And while the Paz regime must remain an outlier at this point, the Velasco regime is so close to its expected position, that it is not a significant outlier.
The two sections analyzing the foreign policy of Latin American countries demonstrate that development strategy is a meaningful political indicator of foreign policy. However, as expected it does have difficulty explaining a significant number of cases. Other explanations have suggested tentative reasons why these outliers exist.
While these alternative approaches offer some possible explanations, the analysis does not generate any clear patterns. Therefore, a more in-depth look at these cases needs to be taken. This will be attempted in the final chapters of this project. Before proceeding to these case studies, the relationship between the regimes' relative position on United
Nations and COPDAB data will be analyzed. 104
Comparing United Nations and COPDAB Data
As mentioned in the results section, the correlation between UN voting and
COPDAB data demonstrates that these two data sets are not measuring the same phenomena. The analysis below will search for patterns in the results. One method for examining the differences between these two data sets is to measure the change in a regime’s z-score from the UN data to the COPDAB data. The results for each regime are reported below (see Table 17).
/ 105 TABLE 17 Net Change in Regime Z-scores from UN to COPDAB
Net Z-Score Change Ctv Regime PS from UN to COPDAB 1 Mex LdpezMateos 2 +2.21 Cub Castro 3 +2.15 Chi Allende 3 +2.07 Hai Estime 2 +1.69 Ecu Plaza 1 +1.63 Hon VilledaMor 2 +1.51 Chi Alessandri 1 +1.39 Cos Orlich 2 +1.22 Els Lemus 1 +1.19 Hai Duvalierl 1 +1.18 Arg Videla 1 +1.18 Ven Betancourt 2 +1.16 Cos Figueresl 2 +1.04 Col Ospina 1 + .72 Cos Figueres3 2 + .71 Hon L<5pezArelll 1 + .58 Ecu SupCouncil 1 + .51 Gua Ydfgoras 1 + .50 Brz Geisel 1 + .49 Per Velasco 3 + .46 Par Stroessner 1 + .45 Mex Ruiz 1 + .41 Brz Mddici 1 + .39 Ecu Ponce 1 + .29 Bol Pazl 3 + .28 Mex Alemdn 1 + .26 Gua Mdndez 2 + .26 Gua Peralta 1 + .24 Brz Kubitschek 1 + .21 Mex Echeverrfa 2 + .15 Hai Duvalier2 1 + .09 Per Prado 1 + .09 Uru Batlle 2 + .05 106
TABLE 17 (continued) Net Change in Regime Z-scores from UN to COPDAB
Net Z-Score Change O x Regime DS from UN to COPDAB 1 Uru Blanco 1 1 -.01 Uru NSC 1 -.13 Nic Somozal 1 -.19 Brz Goulart 3 -.21 Ecu Rodriguez 2 -.32 Uru Blanco2 1 -.34 Gua Arana 1 -.34 Cos Trejos 1 -.34 Pan Chiari 1 -.35 Per Odrfa 1 -.40 Nic Somoza2 1 -.41 Dom Trujillo 1 -.42 Ven Caldera 2 -.45 Brz Castello 1 -.49 Bol Banzer 1 -.51 Arg Aramburu 1 -.77 Pan Torrijos 2 - .77 Arg Illfa 2 -.79 Chi Frei 2 -.81 Gua Arbenz 2 -.84 Pan Robles 1 -.89 Ven PdrezJimdnez 1 -1.02 Per Belaunde 2 -1.02 Arg JPerdn 3 -1.03 Chi Pinochet 1 -1.06 Arg Onganfa 1 -1.17 Nic Somoza3 1 -1.26 Col Valencia 1 -1.28 Ven Andres Pdrez 2 -1.30 Uru Pacheco 1 -1.35 Ven Leoni 2 -1.75 Cos Oduber 2 -1.93 Brz CostaSilva 1 -1.96 107
The net changes in z-scores from United Nations to COPDAB 1 do not result in any clear patterns. However, there are several sets of subtle patterns that can be discovered. For instance, of the eleven regimes moving more than one z-score in the positive direction, five are moderate reformers. Thus, while moderate reformers comprise only 30% of the regimes in this chart, they represent 45% of the "big movers" in the positive direction. In turn, the conventional regimes are under represented in this group since they only make up 36% of this group of big movers, but are 61 % of the total number of regimes. When examining the big movers in the negative direction, the percentages correspond to the overall percentages.
Of those regimes that move more than .5 in either the positive (pro-US) or negative (anti-US) direction, the moderate reformers (40% of the total regimes) are the most mobile and the conventional (53% of the total regimes) are the least mobile when considered as a percentage of the total regimes. Within this pattern one finds that the positive movers tend to be weaker countries when compared to the negative movers.
Such a pattern is consistent with the compliance explanation. One could argue that the weak moderate reformers can afford to be anti-US in the United Nations much easier than they can when dealing directly with the United States. Unfortunately, this is by no means a clear pattern.
An alternative explanation for this phenomenon is that the big movers are the moderate reformers that coincide with the Alliance for Progress and the Carter
Administration. This holds true for four of the six regimes moving .5 or more in the positive direction. All four of these overlap for much of their term with the Kennedy 108 and early part of the Johnson administration. It should be mentioned that one of the two that does not is a Costa Rican regime. Thus Costa Rica continues to be a relatively exceptional case. This hypothesis does not hold true, however, when the regimes moving .5 or more in the negative direction are examined. A majority of the moderate reformers in this category also coincide with the Alliance for Progress administrations in the United States.
The relative stability of the conventional regime can best be explained by the fact that as conventional regimes they are expected to be pro-US in orientation as well as action. Therefore, external forces (in this case US pressure) should play less of a role than they do with the other regimes. In turn, it is reasonable to expect them to differ less on their UN to COPDAB data scores. When the time period and strength of the country are examined, no obvious trends are evident.
No patterns emerge when the radical reform regimes are examined. They are relatively evenly distributed throughout Appendix 4. Neither country strength nor time period appear to have any influence over these regimes.
Similar to the analysis done in the previous two sections, the data in this section reveals partial patterns and possible explanation, but certainly no distinct patterns have been detected. The dependence and time periods explanations have shown some usefulness and therefore can not be rejected at this point. However, the analysis up to this point has only looked for preliminary patterns and has not considered any of the deviant cases in depth. The next three chapter will explore six of the outliers from this 109 chapter by consulting the literature on these regimes by country experts and taking a closer look at the impact of relevant internal and external factors. CHAPTER V
Conventional Case Studies
Introduction
The preceding chapter analyzed the correlation between development strategy and foreign policy. As expected, the results demonstrated that a relationship between the two exists, but a considerable number of deviant cases were present.1 The purpose of the next three chapters is to more closely examine several case studies in order to complement the prior statistical analysis. Whereas, the statistical analysis can help identify patterns by considering a large number of cases, the case study scrutinizes the link between the independent and dependent variable. Or in the words of George
(1979, 46), the case study examines the "intervening process" in order to "assess whether a statistical correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variable is of causal significance." From this project, six cases will be analyzed. Two regimes were chosen from each development strategy-one deviant case and one regime that conformed to expectations. These regimes were then treated as dyads that could, to an extent, be compared.
‘The terms "anomaly" and "deviant case" will be used interchangeably here.
110 Ill
Several criteria were employed for determining which case studies would be selected. In selecting the deviant case, a regime had to be anomalous on both the UN voting data and the COPDAB data. Anomalies are those regimes that defy the predictions based on hypotheses about development strategy on both indicators of foreign policy.2 For instance, a conventional regime that exhibits a strongly anti-US foreign policy or a radical reform regime that is pro-US, as measured by UN and
COPDAB, would be considered anomalies.
Once a list of these regimes was generated, six regimes were selected based on several criteria. These criteria included the time period in which the regime was in power, availability of information, and the degree to which the regime deviated from expectations. With regard to time period, an attempt was made to select a pair of regimes that were in office at roughly the same time. While this was not a necessary condition for the selection of a case, it was given some consideration since it facilitates comparison of specific UN votes and aids in controlling for systemic variables, such as the state of US-Soviet relations or global events such as the 1973 oil shock. It also allows for control for the US administration that is in power. Thus in the COPDAB data, for instance, the two dyads will be directing their foreign policy toward the same
2While it would be interesting and theoretically informative to do case studies on others, such as those that were "big movers" (Strongly Pro-US on UN voting and Strongly Anti-US on COPDAB or visa versa), this is beyond the purview of this research. 112 administration.3 It was possible to follow this criterion in two of the three pairs. Next, cases were selected on the bases of the amount of information available on the regime itself, the domestic situation during its tenure in office, and its foreign policy. In cases where the other selection criteria were equal, the regime that had the most information available was selected.
One other criterion was utilized in selecting the anomalies. With the conditions mentioned above in mind, an attempt was made to choose the more extreme cases.
While not all anomalies selected represent the most extreme cases since the criteria above had to be considered, all three outliers are relatively deviant when compared to the other outliers.
The selection process proved to be relatively easy as few difficult choices were necessitated and most of the criteria were satisfied. Those regimes selected are show below.
3 As mentioned earlier, it is believed that the dynamics may differ between Latin American regimes dealing with, for instance Carter or Kennedy, and Eisenhower or Nixon. 113
TABLE 18 Regimes Selected for Case Studies
Expected Outcome Deviant Case Conventional Kubitschek (Brazil) Ruiz (Mexico) (Expected outcome: 1956-1961 1952-1958 Pro-US) Moderate Reform Torrijos (Panama) Figueres3 (Costa Rica) (Expected outcome: 1969-19784 1970-1974s Moderately Anti-US) Radical Reform Allende (Chile) Goulart (Brazil) (Expected outcome: 1970-1973 1961-1964 Strongly Anti-US)
There is a wide array of factors that may be responsible for causing the deviant cases to be outliers and therefore need to be considered. Therefore, a large number of variables will be examined. While this will prevent these case studies from going into great detail, it will allow for a serious consideration of the variables that are most likely responsible. Such an inclusive study is appropriate for this exploratory project.
The six case studies will be structured in the following manner. Each regime will be examined according to three variable groupings. These groupings are domestic variables, external variables, and the operational/conceptual. The first will examine a wide range of domestic factors, including: opposition groups (e.g., labor, the Church,
4 Although Torrijos' regime runs until 1981, 1978 is written here to avoid confusion since this was the last year of this study.
5 The "3" denotes that this is the third term of Figueres. 114 political parties, student movements, etc...). Specifically, groups wielding enough influence to have an impact on foreign policy will be considered. Thus, not every group will be examined for each regime-only those groups that are considered salient by area experts familiar with the politics of the regime. Conversely, the degree to which regimes are vulnerable to societal demands will also be considered. Hagan
(1993) refers to this concept as "regime vulnerability." It is not enough to simply examine the position of important societal groups. One must also obtain an understanding of the extent to which the regime in power must respond to their demands. According to Hagan (1993, 91), regime vulnerability can be viewed as having two components: "the historical competitiveness of the political system and its regime, and the degree of political uncertainty within the current regime. The former refers to the degree to which the regime is threatened by external groups and its ability to maintain its hold on power. As Hagan points out, this does not necessarily translate into the conclusion that authoritarian regimes are relatively less vulnerable, and democratic regimes-because they must face re-election--are more vulnerable. Regimes such as the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), of Mexico, defy this simplification, due to its ability to maintain power for several decades. The latter focuses on uncertainty within the regime and the ability of a regime's allies to undermine its leadership (Hagan 1993, 91-2).
It logically follows that the greater the regime's vulnerability to societal forces, both internal and external, the greater the influence these societal forces will have over foreign policy (Hagan 1993, 93). In terms of this study, it is expected that the greater 115 the regime's vulnerability, the weaker the relationship will be between development strategy and the expected foreign policy. In other words, since the regime is more vulnerable to domestic forces, it will be less able to implement its preferred foreign policy. Instead, the regime will be forced to make concessions to these groups through a more pro-US or more anti-US policy than desired.
Finally, it should be stated that the search for salient domestic factors will not be confined to these variables. The analysis will also seek residual variables not specifically mentioned here, but which are described by the literature as being central factors. In other words, while this study will actively examine domestic groups and the regime's vulnerability to them, if other important factors emerge from the case studies, they will be included in the analysis.
The external factors refer primarily to the degree to which the country in question is dependent. While this will focus on the United States, in the spirit of
Kegley and Menkhaus' dependent state-centric model, it will consider other possible external factors which may influence the country in question. The context of global events during the regime's tenure will also be considered. The possible effects of special global events such as the oil crisis, the Korean War, or the Cuban missile crisis will also be considered. As in the domestic variable grouping, the examination of external factors will also consider residual factors, not mentioned here, but encountered in the case study.
The final variable grouping will take a critical look at the different aspects of this study's operationalization and conceptualization. The two data sets utilized in this 116 study to measure the dependent variable will be scrutinized to determine if they are measuring the desired phenomena. This will involve the examination of the individual votes in the UN data and the specific events in the COPDAB data. One possible finding that may emerge is the importance of issue area. For instance, it might be discovered that there is a stark difference between voting or behavior toward the United States in the economic versus the political realm. Finally, the concept of development strategy will be investigated to see if there were shortcomings in both its theoretical underpinnings and the individual coding of the regimes in question.
For those regimes incorrectly predicted, these three variable groupings will be examined in an attempt to determine if one or more appears to be causing the discrepancy between expected and actual behavior. This will help to expose some qualifications that need to be made to the relationship between development strategy and foreign policy.6
These variables will also be examined for regimes that were predicted correctly.
The purpose here will be twofold. On the one hand, when certain variables are identified as possibly responsible for causing the deviation by the first regime, the correctly predicted regime (from the same development strategy) will be examined to determine the status of these particular variables. Ideally, if the variable in question in the correctly predicted regime is operating in accordance with expectations, this will
6 As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is not expected that development strategy will explain all Latin American foreign policy behavior. This study seeks to increase our understanding of the relationship between development strategy and foreign policy, as well as identify conditional generalizations (see George 1993, 141). 117
increase the certainty with which conclusions can be drawn about the influence of the
variable in the deviant regime. For instance, suppose the deviant case is a conventional
regime and it is believed that a high degree of opposition, from politically effective
left-wing domestic groups, pressured the regime to adopt a more anti-US position than
the government preferred. And as a result, the regime adopted deviant (anti-US) UN
and COPDAB scores. In this case, the corresponding left-wing parties in the correctly
predicted regime would be examined. If no similar group was found to exist in that
country or the group is politically ineffective, this would buttress the belief that the
left-wing domestic groups were responsible for this deviant foreign policy. If such a
group is present, but does not exert a similar effect on foreign policy, this would
weaken or prevent such an explanation of the deviant case.
Second, and more importantly, the variable groupings will be examined in the correctly predicted regimes to observe if the regime conformed to expectations for the anticipated reasons. In other words, is the relationship between the development
strategy and foreign policy operating in accordance with the proposed causal linkages?
Or is the relationship being caused by unexpected variables (even though the
development strategy seems consistent with their foreign policy toward the United
States)? An example of this would be if a weak, dependent, conventional regime was discovered which harbored strong anti-US sentiment, but nevertheless exhibited a pro-
US foreign policy. If upon closer examination, it was discovered that the regime was
experiencing overt attempts by the United States to influence its behavior, it would be concluded that the compliance approach might offer a better explanation in this case. 118
Thus, on the surface it would appear as though the development strategy was responsible for the conventional regime's pro-US foreign policy. The case study would presumably reveal that though the expectations were confirmed, the causal relationship did not appear to operate as expected.
The case studies will treat one development strategy at a time and will begin with an examination of the deviant regime and then the correctly predicted regime. The conventional development strategy will be first, followed by the moderate (Chapter 6) and radical reform (Chapter 7) strategies.
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines
Ruiz was elected president of Mexico in July 6, 1952 and served from
December I, 1952 until November 30, 1958. He presided over a very peaceful time in
Mexican history, in which the major domestic opposition groups were neutralized through "either reconciliation or outright legal curbs" (Hofstadter 1974, 56).
Domestically, he is remembered most for tough policies on government corruption. He was charged by his party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, (or PRI) to remove the perceptions of a corrupt Mexican elite that had emerged during his predecessor's administration. However, this was to be accomplished without altering the basic policies of the PRI that had ruled Mexico for over 20 years. He also gave women the right to vote, a measure that on the surface appears progressive, but had the effect of broadening the PRI's base of support (Smith 1991, 347). 119
The external relations of the Ruiz regime were also largely uneventful. In general, Mexico was relatively inactive in the international arena and relations with the
United States are described as peaceful. During Ruiz's tenure, the United States continued to provide credit and loans to Mexico, they cooperated on the issue of migrant workers, and on an irrigation and hydroelectric project. While the overall framework of US-Mexican relations were cooperative during this period, some disagreements did occur. Friction was caused over the right of US-owned shrimp boats to fish in Mexican waters and refuel in Mexican ports (Hofstadter 1974, 59). Perhaps the most defiant act by the Ruiz regime concerns its refusal to cave in to US pressure regarding the Aibenz regime in Guatemala. In this case, Mexico and only two other
OAS countries refused to condemn the Arbenz regime’s reformist policies. These foreign policy issues will be discussed further in the following pages.
The question that must be asked for this deviant case study is: why does a regime that is coded as a conventional regime possess a firmly anti-US foreign policy?
In this case, the puzzle is: why does Mexico's Ruiz have an anti-US foreign policy when the conditions existed for Mexican agreement with the United States? There existed an asymmetrical power relationship, strong economic ties, no personal animosity between presidents, yet Mexican foreign policy was characterized by an anti-
US foreign policy. Is there something different about Mexican foreign policy? These puzzles will be addressed below. 120
Interna! Variables
This section will seek to determine if domestic factors, such as domestic opposition and regime vulnerability, can contribute to an explanation of why the Ruiz regime, based on the previous chapter's results, possessed an anti-US foreign policy. In addition, any residual factors that are mentioned in the literature will also be considered. The analysis below will begin with important domestic opposition groups.
Historically, the most important domestic groups in Mexico include the military, the Catholic Church, intellectuals, the press, business, labor unions, and students (Camp 1993, 114; Needier 1982, 59). The Mexican situation is somewhat unique in that the corporatist nature of the PRI encompasses powerful domestic groups within the party, and in turn, the government.7 This is especially true of urban workers and the rural masses, as they are formally incorporated into the PRI. This arrangement
"keepfs] workers and peasants apart from each other, thereby preventing the formation of a lower-class coalition that could threaten the system as a whole" (Smith 1991, 335).
The PRI's long stay in power can be attributed to this strategy of cooptation rather than confrontation and exclusion.8 Although such an arrangement contributes to the
Corporatism is defined as "a political system in which economic interests are organized into hierarchical functional categories that are controlled by the state" (Rossi and Plano 1992, 51).
8 Cooptation is defined by Camp as "the process by which the government successfully incorporates an individual or group into its ranks (1993, 126). While it might be argued that this phenomenon is present in most countries, in Mexico, "the process has been refined by the PRI to the point that it has paralyzed almost all potential opposition" (Heilman 1978, 100). 121 longevity of the PRI it does not mean that their demands can’ be ignored. Instead, influence is exerted from within the party, rather than from the outside.9 The individual actors' relationship to the governing elite and the actors' ideological position will be discussed below.
Unlike most Latin American militaries, since prior to World War II the
Mexican military has been firmly under civilian control. This civilian control has been established in many ways. First, the military strongly emphasizes respect and submission to authority (Camp 1993, 116). Second, salary bonuses and benefits have also been utilized to coopt the military and strengthen civilian control (Needier 1971,
69). Effective control has also been established by allowing the military to participate in politics. This allows them to pursue power through legal, rather than extra-legal means. "The main condition for this has been the existence of a well-developed, powerful party which has been able to coopt the military elite of the nation" (Reyna
1977, 167; see also Needier 1971, 69-71).
Ideologically, the military has been firmly anti-communist and has periodically been called upon to control civil unrest from leftists students and peasants. For example, after Ruiz's election to the presidency, federal troops battled an armed opposition group. This leftist group, known as the Henriquistas, had refused to accept the election results (Hofstadter 1974, 54). Despite this seemingly conservative bias, it must also be mentioned that the military is predominately comprised of individuals
*The section on vulnerability will discuss this in greater detail. 122 from the poorest strata of Mexico. Thus, they the Mexican military is also a highly nationalistic body that has, at times, resisted close relations with the US military
(Riding 1984, 92). Therefore, its influence has been for an anti-communist, yet nationalistic foreign policy.
The Catholic Church has historically been limited by the 1917 Constitution that severely restricted its rights. For instance, under the Constitution, churches were nationalized and clergy were not allowed to own land or participate in education. Since the 1930s, the Church has been allowed to operate in civil society, but has remained constrained. "The state reached an informal understanding with the Church ... that in effect allowed the Church to carry out the spiritual and pastoral functions within the purview of all churches in return for its remaining quiet about political and social issues
(Camp 1993, 117). During the Ruiz regime, however, the Church began to push for a relaxation in restrictions. In particular, the Congress of Catholic Culture held its first session in 1953 and firmly denounced the constitutional article prohibiting religious education (New York Times, January 24, 1953).
Intellectuals are primarily based in the government. The lack of private sector jobs forces many into government positions. Heilman (1978, 103-4). explains that these individuals are often coopted by the government to dilute their political opposition.
"Many of the choicest plums in the government and party hierarchy are reserved for buying off the most articulate, charismatic, and hence, politically dangerous leftist students." Others have gone into either academia or the media and both have utilized the written word to assert their viewpoint. While the former can achieve some success 123
through ties to politicians (the politicians are their former students), limits have been placed on the media's freedom of the press (Camp 1993, 125). For instance, the media
is indirectly regulated by the government through its monopoly on the production and
importation of newsprint and the bribery of reporters and editors (Needier 1982, 60).
Historically, intellectuals, both inside and outside of Mexico have tended to influence
from the left. However, as seen above, many of them have been either coopted or constrained through censorship.
The business sector is arguably the most influential domestic group in Mexico.
More than any other sector,
the group that really emerged victorious from the Revolution was the rising middle class, the industrial and agricultural bourgeoisie, and members of the prerevolutionary elite who managed to preserve their former positions of power and privilege by declaring themselves to be 'with the Revolution' (Heilman 1978, 54).
During the period following World War II, the business sector was incorporated into the system. Government and business were allied during this period as the former protected the latter from foreign competition, controlled the labor movement, and encouraged foreign investment. This conservative economic position was fully supported by the business community in Mexico (Riding 1984, 86-7). The alliance between business and government was an important aspect of Ruiz's policy. As a result, the latter established its control over Mexican labor (Smith 1991, 348).
Labor which leans toward the left on the political spectrum, is limited in its ability to influence policy due to its relationship with the government. Although the
Mexican government possesses a corporativistic relationship with many of the groups 124 mentioned in this section, none compare with government-labor relations. Since most of the labor union members are government employees, the government asserts firm control over them. This control is also facilitated by the continuity in labor leadership.
Fidel Veldzquez, has led the most important union (the Mexican Workers
Confederation or CTM) since the 1940s (Camp 1993, 121-2; Riding 1984, 83-5). On the surface it would appear that this close relationship would allow labor to exercise a great degree of control over the PRI. Instead, the PRI has effectively coopted
Veldzquez and other important union leaders. CTM leaders are frequently assigned relatively prestigious, well-paying government jobs (Heilman 1978, 106; Scott 1964,
75-6).
Given the firm support of the PRI by these coopted leaders, labor has been reluctant to make excessive demands. This is not to say that labor can be ignored. For instance, in the latter part of Ruiz's term, due to falling real wages, railway-workers staged several strikes. "The railway-workers1 union ... had a long tradition of radical nationalism, and their strategic location in the country's transportation network gave them considerable leverage" (Smith 1991, 349). As a result, in September of 1958, due to these and several other protests by leftist students and labor groups, Ruiz devoted a segment of his annual report to these groups. He stressed his confidence in Mexican labor and appealed to them to resist the calls from these leftist groups. '"The
Government is certain, I repeat certain, that the Mexican laborers, will repudiate [the incitements] with a patriotic spirit'" (New York Times, Sept. 2, 1958). Thus, although 125 labor is formally incorporated into the ruling PRI structure, when their demands are not met, they will take a forceful stance.
Students may be the most active group on the left. While they are best known for their protests leading up to the 1968 Olympics, they were also active during the
Ruiz regime. For instance, in March of 1955, students protesting an increase in bus fares surrounded the Government palace (in the state of Tabasco) and destroyed trees, park benches, and a radio station before clashing with police (New York Times, March
18, 1955). In April of the following year thousands of students "staged rowdy demonstration!s| attacking 'Yankee imperialism1" (New York Times, April 18, 1956).
The vulnerability of the Ruiz regime must also be discussed. The preceding discussion of domestic actors and their ideological positions has, to a great extent, already addressed the degree to which the government is vulnerable to these demands.
Central to this question of vulnerability is the structure of the Mexican political system.
In the Mexican political system, the executive branch is the central decision making body, and therefore is the single most significant domestic actor. By the time Ruiz took office, the PRI had been in power for over two decades and had firmly consolidated their power over the executive office. Given the strength of the executive, the PRI's control over it, and its ability to coopt serious opposition leaders, the Ruiz regime, like other Mexican regimes, was not immediately threatened by domestic sources in its ability to exercise ultimate control over the nation.
If the first principle of the operation of the Mexican political system is that of executive dominance, the second principle is that of consultation among major interest groups to attempt to satisfy their demands so far as this is consistent 126
with satisfying the demands of others. The major groups collaborate with this system; even though their wishes may not be fully met, nevertheless they get more by going along than they would by attacking the system from the outside" (Needier 1971, 44).
One of the keys to this invulnerability is that no single group has a great degree of independent power. Riding describes a conscious effort by the PRI to maintain a divided opposition. "In its constant bargaining with the system's key lobbies, the government must... ensure that these groups... develop no common interests other than a selfish commitment to the system's survival" (Riding 1984,193). Although these domestic opposition groups have been brought under the umbrella of the government, it should not be concluded that the government does not have to consider their demands.
To a great extent, the success of the PRI has been its ability to coopt societal demands before they threaten the system. Therefore, while the PRI was firmly in control during the Ruiz regime, it was necessary to maintain its central position by continually offering rewards to potentially influential salient opposition groups. In other words, the system of cooptation had to continue even when the PRI was firmly in control.
But how does all this relate to foreign policy? Given the competing domestic groups of various ideological positions, the lack of a single dominant group, and the firm grip of the PRI over the decision making process, the question must be asked: what implications does this domestic situation have upon substantive Mexican foreign policy? Grabendorff (1978, 88) offers a commonly held explanation to this query.
Because the Mexican system is constantly forced to satisfy: (1) the middle class, which is oriented toward private enterprise and the United States; (2) the 'government class,' oriented toward state planning and the Third World; (3) the well-organized working class, with slightly leftist leanings; and (4) the 127
influential entrepreneurs, foreign policy is frequently used for political compensation.
But why, when no consensus exists among domestic groups, does foreign policy manifest itself in a negative stance toward the United States? To answer this question, a source of foreign policy in addition to domestic political opposition and regime vulnerability must be considered. This residual source, which is encountered in virtually every analysis on foreign policy, will be discussed below.
Unlike the other countries in this study (Costa Rica being a possible exception),
Mexican foreign policy is relatively constant. Whereas the foreign policy of other countries tends to change with the arrival of a new regime, nearly all of the Mexican regimes are anti-US on both data sets, and remain relatively consistent regardless of their development strategy. For instance, of the 121 regimes measured on UN voting, the Lopez Portillo regime is the least anti-US Mexican regime. Yet this regime is the
79th most anti-US of the 121 Latin American regimes. Diaz is the next Mexican regime
(ranked 81st), and the remaining four regimes are ranked 105th, 112th, 114th, and
115th. Thus it is evident that Mexican regimes have been consistently anti-US in the
United Nations.
Although the COPDAB data is not as dramatic, it still supports this anti-US trend. Of the 106 regimes, only the Lopez Mateos and Diaz regimes can be considered pro-US.10 They were ranked 13th and 37th respectively. The other four Mexican
10 Keep in mind that there are only 106 regimes (rather than 121) because 15 regimes were eliminated due to an insufficient number of events. 128 regimes are ranked as follows: Lopez Portillo (80th), Echeverria (83rd), Ruiz (86th), and Aleman (90th). Since none of these regimes are radical reformers, their relatively anti-US position is even more notable.
Further evidence for the relative consistency of Mexican foreign policy is provided by research examining the degree to which a change in regime causes a change in foreign policy. Recent research has buttressed the assertion that Mexican foreign policy is relative consistent. When the degree of change in foreign policy that occurs as a result of a regime change is compared to the degree of fluctuation in foreign policy during a single regime, Mexico has one of the most consistent foreign policies within Latin America (Snarr 1994). Although six other countries had foreign policies more consistent toward the United States, one important factor must be included when interpreting the results. Of these six countries, five countries possessed only regimes with conventional development strategies. Thus, one would not expect the foreign policies of these countries to fluctuate. The only country that had a more consistent foreign policy, and had a variety of regime types, was Panama. Thus Panama's foreign policy was more consistent. However, it should be mentioned that Panama had only one non-conventional regime (Torrijos). Furthermore, its foreign policy was considerably more moderate than that of Mexico's. Thus, Mexico's foreign policy, during the period of this study, was the most consistently anti-US despite having a change in regime from a conventional to moderate reformer (or visa-a- versa) on three different occasions. 129
Due to this consistency in its foreign policy, many scholars have described
Mexican foreign policy "as 'state,' as opposed to 'government,' foreign policy"11
(Gonzdlez 1989, 22). This consistent foreign policy has manifested itself in several principles. Brandenburg (1978, 320) argues that the four "cornerstones" of Mexican foreign policy are "national sovereignty, juridical equality, national self-determination, land] nonintervention in the domestic affairs of another nation." Similarly, McShane
(1981, 192)12 summarizes the literature on this subject by enumerating six principles of
Mexican foreign policy as: "(1) the self-determination of all nations; (2) the principle of nonintervention; (3) nationalism and the right to independence; (4) collective security, disarmament, and the pacific settlement of disputes; (5) the juridical equality of all nations; and (6) respect for and strict adherence to the principles of international law." As one can see, there is wide agreement on the principles of Mexican foreign policy.
If one accepts that Mexican foreign policy is relatively consistent, an explanation for the reasons why still must be addressed. A review of the literature reveals an important residual source of foreign policy influence that is believed to be very influential, but was not part of the initial set of expected domestic variables (i.e., domestic groups and regime vulnerability). Mexican analysts have written about an
"in other words, Mexican foreign policy does not change with a change in president, but remains constant. Such a consistent foreign policy is made possible by the longevity of the PRI. The statistical analysis in Chapter Four supports this assertion to a great extent.
12 See also Smith and Green (1981; 7). 130 underlying influence on Mexican foreign policy that pushes regimes to the left. This underlying influence is the Mexican revolution.
Many scholars argue that the Mexican Revolution plays a central part in
Mexico's external relations (Engle 1969; Gonzdlez 1989; Grabendorff 1978; McShane
1981; Pellicer de Brody 1974; and Poitras 1981). To gauge the Revolution's importance, one must understanding the great extent to which it is revered in contemporary Mexican culture, from history books and monuments placed throughout the country, to the rhetoric of politicians. Engle (1969, 532) aptly draws the connection between the revolution and Mexico's anti-US foreign policy in the following quote:
...the Revolution has played a predominant role in the development of the Mexican attitude toward the social and political development of peoples in all parts of the world, particularly in Latin America. Mexican foreign policy, it may be simply stated, is an extension into international affairs of principles and practices developed and tested in the Mexican Revolution.
This emphasis on the Revolution and its adherence to the principles discussed above, such as non-intervention and self-determination, explains Mexico's support of
Latin American reformist regimes in the face of US opposition. The Cuban Revolution is a prime example of this behavior. Mexico has continued to resist US pressure in its support of the Cuban Revolution. "This opposition has been presented to the Mexican public as supreme proof of its leaders' efforts to defend national sovereignty, to oppose imperialism, and, in short, to follow the traditions of a government having its roots in a nationalistic revolution" (Pellicer de Brody 1974, 316-7). Another such example is its support of the Aibenz regime in Guatemala. The United States feared the specter of communism in Guatemala and was also concerned about land reform plans that 131 threatened major US corporations. Here, as in the Cuban case, Mexico refused to cave in to US pressure. In fact, Mexico was one of only three countries13 to oppose the
Organization of American States resolution, which proved to be a precursor to a US- supported invasion of Guatemala, condemning the Arbenz regime (Riding 1984, 342).
While other such examples could be mentioned here, these two are of particular interest since the first years of the Castro regime and all of Arbenz* s coincided with that of
Ruiz.
In sum, domestic political actors were divided and presented no immediate threat to the Ruiz regime. However, the absence of an immediate threat did not mean that the demands of the domestic groups could be ignored. Domestic support had to be maintained to perpetuate the relative domestic calm. And given that several of the most important groups were working within the system, these groups had the ear of the leadership. If the important domestic actors were not satisfied, the stability of the system could be threatened.14 The discussion above offers an explanation of how this was accomplished through a principled foreign policy based on the principles of the
Revolution. While it is widely held that the Mexican revolution has been betrayed domestically, since the PRI's policies tend to favor business, it is argued that an anti imperialist foreign policy has had the effect of appeasing the groups on the left, without
13 The other was Argentina under Juan Peron, who is coded as a radical reformer and had a very anti-US foreign policy.
>4One could argue that the current crisis in Chiapas resulted when the peasants and indigenous peoples were ignored. 132 threatening the support of the business sectors on the right (Grabendorff 1978, 88).
Whether Mexican foreign policy under Ruiz actually conformed to this explanation will be discussed later in the operational/conceptual section when the data sets are closely examined. First, however, the influence of external variables will be discussed.
External Variables
Simply stated, Mexico is dependent on the United States. "Mexico ha[s] become dependent upon a very asymmetrical relationship with the most developed country in the world. The asymmetry [is] overwhelming and unavoidable" (Poitras 1981, 105).
Given its geography, Mexico's economic and political ties can be viewed as inevitable.
Taking into consideration these facts, one could justifiably expect Mexico's foreign policy to be subordinate. In other words, this asymmetrical relationship would lead
Mexico to comply with the wishes of the United States.
The obvious question at this point is: if external variables point to a subordinate
Mexican foreign policy, then why does Ruiz, and many other Mexican regimes, possess a strongly anti-US foreign policy? One possible explanation is that the United
States not only did not pressure Mexico to comply with US wishes, but was not overly concerned with Mexican compliance. Although this would explain why Mexico's foreign policy was free to pursue an anti-US foreign policy, it would not explain why a regime possessing a conventional development strategy implemented an anti-US foreign policy. Furthermore, it is doubtful that during the peak of the Cold War the United
States was uninterested in Mexican foreign policy. This is especially true given the 133 presence of Arbenz, the reform-oriented Guatemalan regime, on Mexico's southern border.
However, a modified version of this argument is more viable. It could be reasonably asserted that the United States was primarily concerned with important Cold
War votes, and much less concerned with North-South issues, such as self- determination. In such an explanation, US influence on Mexican foreign policy is quite prominent, but is disguised by the data.15 For this to be true, a closer examination of the data would have to reveal that Mexico's anti-US posture is more symbolic than real, thereby occurring on symbolic political issues, without damaging salient political and economic ties between the two countries. In effect, this would satisfy left-wing domestic opposition without threatening the vital interests of the powerful business community and the overall development strategy of the Ruiz regime. This external- oriented explanation is supported by Gonzales who stresses the importance of geopolitical factors on Mexican foreign policy. He notes that Mexican foreign policy can be viewed as a "defensive" policy. It is defensive in that it perceives the external environment as a source of negative impacts to be avoided (Gonzalez, 1989; 29). This perception of the external, coupled with its geographic proximity to the United States, is primary in explaining Mexican foreign policy. According to Gonzalez (1989, 29):
This explains why Mexico's foreign policy comes into play almost exclusively in the political, juridical, and institutional realms of foreign activity, and within the framework of hemispheric relations. It is a regional, rather than global, actor, which considers diplomacy as the basis or core of its foreign activity:
15 This will be referred to as the "symbolic Mexican foreign policy explanation." 134
promoting guidelines for coexistence, downplaying the use of economic instruments, and completely rejecting the option of military force.
Such a foreign policy can be viewed as prudent given Mexico's history. France,
Britain, and especially the United States have intervened in the domestic affairs of
Mexico. Two of the more extreme instances include French occupation and the
Mexican-American War in which Mexico lost a large portion of its territory. Given
Mexico's staunch position on the foreign policy principles discussed above, Mexican foreign policy can be seen as a reaction to its historical context (Astiz 1969, 81;
Gonzalez 1989, 30; McShane 1981, 12-3).
This argument is echoed by Peter Smith (1991, 336). He maintains that
Mexican stability requires "a mutually acceptable relationship with the United States, a kind of bilateral d&ente. While upholding the sacrosanct notions of national sovereignty and self-determination, the Mexican regime assiduously [seeks] to avoid direct confrontations with its neighbour to the north." This explanation allows one to interpret why the foreign policy of Ruiz, who possessed a conventional development strategy and appears to be somewhat dependent on the United States is, on the surface, anti-US.
In order to determine the validity of this explanation, a closer look at the data will be taken in the next section. 135
Operational/Conceptual
Regime Classification. The Ruiz regime was coded as a conventional regime because it was pro-business, its slowed public expenditures, and actively pursued foreign investment through incentives such as tax breaks. While Ruiz did redistribute land during his tenure, the total amounted to less than any other president in the period from 1934 to 1976. Therefore, it was a relatively small amount of land that was distributed. It should also be mentioned that this land was not expropriated, and therefore not an effort at redistribution. Thus when one examines the amount of land distributed, in conjunction with the other indicators mentioned above, Ruiz clearly emerges as a conventional regime that favors growth over redistribution.
United Nations Voting. The next step in this section is to engage in a closer examination of the United Nations and COPDAB data sets. The United Nations voting record of Mexico reveals a very interesting pattern. Simply put, Mexico diverges16 from the United States on votes concerning self-determination and tends to agree with the United States on explicitly "cold war" votes.17 With regard to self-determination, on virtually every resolution Mexico votes in accordance with the principles of Mexican foreign policy outlined earlier. "Mexico's most consistent opposition to the Western
16 Disagreement or divergence between Mexico and the United States is defined as the lack of total agreement. In other words, anytime both countries do not vote "Yes," "No," or "Abstain."
17 Traditionally, a "cold war" vote has been defined as one in which the United States and the Soviet Union disagree. Here, however, it refers simply to votes concerning obvious cold war issues, such as the Korean conflict or the Soviet invasion of Hungary. 136 powers has occurred on roll-call votes on measures to speed up the process toward independence in non-self-governing territories (Faust and Stansifer 1969, 105). Some of the particular votes during the 1952-1958 period include improving the trusteeship system and the self-determination of countries such as: Morocco, Tunisia, Puerto Rico,
Tanganyike, Cyprus, Somaliland, Surinam and Dutch Antilles, Cameroon, West Irian,
Greenland, and Togoland. On each of these votes, Mexico supported the right of self- determination while the United States either opposed or abstained. The issue of self- determination makes up 56% of the votes on which the United States and Mexico disagree.
One of the non-self-determination issues that remains is Apartheid. On this issue, Mexico supports condemnation of the system of segregation in spite of the
United States' support. One could argue that this violates Mexico’s tradition of non intervention. While on the surface this may be a valid point, it could be argued that the present system is the result of past intervention on the part of the white minority and therefore it is not inconsistent for Mexico to oppose Apartheid. Finally, Mexico disagrees with the United States on a handful of what could be considered "cold war” votes. These include a nuclear testing provision requiring full international control and inspection, cessation of nuclear testing, and a Soviet draft resolution establishing an 82- member commission on disarmament. The voting record of Mexico discussed to this point is precisely what one would expect. Mexico is firmly anti-imperialist and with respect to the "cold war" votes, seeks peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. 137
With respect to voting agreement between the two countries, the picture is somewhat less clear. Nearly all of the issues upon which the United States and Mexico agree can be broken down into two groupings. The first is the Korean conflict. Mexico and the United States agree on every resolution.18 Of all the issues voted upon in the
United Nations during Ruiz's tenure this is the only one that the compliance approach might explain. While some resolutions on Korea are relatively neutral, such as a call for a settlement and unification, Mexico takes a definite US position on more political resolutions. These resolutions focus primarily on condemning Chinese and North
Korean treatment of UN prisoners of war, while rejecting similar counter-claims regarding US treatment of prisoners of war. This attitude can be linked to Mexico’s firm position that North Korea was the aggressor (Faust and Stansifer 1969, 102).
Mexico also stands with the United States' draft resolution condemning US aggression in general. Although these voting positions do not provide definitive proof that the
United States has coerced Mexico into voting with the United States, it does acknowledge the possibility that Mexico violated its principle of neutrality on this issue.
It should also be stated that the Korean issue comprises less than ten percent of the resolutions on which Mexico and the United States agreed.
The second issue is that of the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Again, the votes of
Ruiz coincide with the United States on every vote on that issue, which make-up approximately one-fourth of the total votes on which the United States and Mexico
18 Keep in mind that this study, like earlier studies, excludes unanimous votes. 138
agree. Most of the resolutions condemn Soviet actions and call for Soviet withdrawal.
Compliance, however, is much more difficult to prove in this case given that the
student of Mexican foreign policy would expect such a vote regardless of US pressure
and cold war politics, because this is consistent with the principles of Mexican foreign
policy. Thus, the most likely conclusion that can be drawn here is that agreement occurred due to consensus, not compliance.
The examination of Mexico's voting patterns in the United Nations offers no
reason to doubt the validity of the earlier statistical findings. United Nations voting
reveals a Mexican foreign policy that is anti-US. Furthermore, the voting patterns
support the findings in the domestic and external variables section of this study, i.e.,
Mexico closely follows a set of principles in its foreign policy behavior and is effected
little, if any, by US pressure. However, it should be mentioned that Ruiz also deviates
little from the United States on votes that are arguably crucial to the United States, that
is, the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the Korean conflict. The Hungarian issue is not a problem because Mexico's votes coincided with the interests of the United States, but
on Korea, a strong case can be made that Mexico was influenced by the United States.
Before drawing conclusions, the COPDAB data must be analyzed.
COPDAB. A close examination of the COPDAB results reveals that most of the negative Mexican foreign policy events toward the United States are coded as
"symbolic political relations."19 Of the twelve negative events recorded, seven fall into
19 The categories (and the percentage of the whole which they comprise) include: "symbolic political relations" (45%), "economic relations" (21%), "military relations" 139 this category.20 The issue area containing the next highest number of events is the political order category which includes events such as "diplomatic recognition, border disputes, formation of or dissolution of alliances, treaties, or international organizations" (Azar 1982). This supports the symbolic Mexican foreign policy explanation put forth in the external variable section, that is, Mexico is anti-US on symbolic or issues less crucial to the United States. Hence, one would expect the vast majority of its negative events that are more symbolic than real, and therefore directed more toward domestic consumption, without causing too much friction with the United
States.21 It also follows, that some confrontation might occur over international legal issues. For instance, one of the negative events was Mexico's seizure of US fishing boats in disputed waters.22 Likewise, it is consistent that on economic issues cooperation occurred with greater frequency. None of the principles of Mexican foreign policy preclude economic cooperation with the United States.
(6%), "cultural or scientific relations" (0%), "physical environment and natural resource relations" (3%), "human environment, demographic and ethnic affairs" (0%), "political order, political relations, and law/organization," (24%), and "other or residual relations" (0%) (Azar 1982).
^ h e COPDAB data codes issues as having a primary and secondary issue type. This discussion and all others refer to the primary issue type unless otherwise specified.
21 Symbolic political relations are defined as "...activities which express an actor's political affect, either positive or negative. These events are generally statements of intent or policy preferences, expectations or references which convey the subjective aspects of politics. These events are often ideological or propagandists in nature. Examples of events contained in this issue category are accusations, vote abstentions, gestures of friendship, and statements of policy preference" (Azar 1982, 12).
“ Although this might appear to be a serious issue, at the time it was considered only a minor incident (Hofstadter 1974, 59-60). 140
To illustrate this point, it is useful to consider one of the most critical issues which Mexico and the United States interacted upon during the Ruiz regime. This is the issue of communism discussed at the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas in
1954. While the discussion was in terms of the general threat of communism in the hemisphere, it implicitly focused on the Arbenz regime in Guatemala (Engle 1969,
525-6). In line with its principle of non-intervention Mexico, under Ruiz, was one of only three countries that opposed the US initiative. On the surface this appears to be a substantially anti-US action that would both anger the business sector at home and threaten relations with the United States, and therefore debunk the explanation above.
However, Smith (1991, 351-2) argues that Mexico backed Arbenz at the Conference, but declined to take a stance in reaction to the US-backed coup that replaced Arbenz.
When the CIA-sponsored movement overthrew the Arbenz regime in June 1954, Mexico's leftist and nationalist groups protested, but in vain. The Mexican government's stance was most revealing: having upheld the principle of non intervention, it thereafter remained silent. The episode thus revealed the limits of, as well as the capacity for, independent action by Mexico.
One final point deserves to be mentioned regarding the COPDAB data. The
COPDAB 2 results reveal that the Ruiz regime is relatively less conflictual with the
United States than when it is measured using the collapsed COPDAB 1 scale. This means that the negative events initiated by the Ruiz regime were relatively less conflictual of other regimes during that time period. While this difference is rather minimal, it reinforces the findings above, that is, the intensity of Mexican opposition is somewhat lower than the statistical findings reveal. 141
Conclusion
In sum, the COPDAB data is consistent with many of the earlier findings and with the symbolic Mexican foreign policy explanation. It portrays an anti-US foreign policy that is generally consistent with the principles of the Mexican Revolution (Korea may be an exception) and the findings of the United Nations data, yet is not overly antagonistic toward the United States. This helps explain why there appears to be an important discrepancy between the findings in Chapter Four and how some scholars characterize the general relations between Ruiz (and Mexico in general) and the United
States. For instance, one scholar describes Ruiz's foreign policy toward the United
States as a continuation of the Good Neighbor policy (Hofstadter 1974, 59).23 The results of this study portray an anti-US foreign policy during the Ruiz regime, while others describe its relations with the United States as relatively cooperative. This can be explained by the symbolic Mexican foreign policy explanation, that is, most of the negative behavior of the Ruiz regime toward the United States was essentially not a critical threat to the latter. As discussed above, on cold war votes in the United
Nations, Mexico largely agreed with United States. On COPDAB events, the conflictual behavior tended to be on symbolic political issues.
23 It should be noted that the foreign policy of Ruiz and other Mexican regimes does not mean that conflict pervaded all aspects of their relations with the United States. During the Ruiz regime, Mexico and the United States cooperation occurred on a number of issues. For instance, a cooperative hydroelectric and irrigation venture on the Rio Grande was undertaken and agreements were reached on the controversial issue of migrant workers (Hofstadter 1974, 59-60). 142
The example of the Caracas meeting is consistent with the position that Ruiz's anti-US foreign policy revolves around a set of principles and is largely symbolic and helps explains why some scholars describe US-Mexican relations as cooperative and others, including the UN and COPDAB data in this project, portray them as antagonistic. It should also be noted that while Mexico's foreign policy under Ruiz is characterized as Strongly anti-US in Chapter Four, this is in comparison to other Latin
American regimes during the same time period. Therefore, while it may be relatively anti-US, it can still be somewhat cooperative in absolute terms.
In addition to helping to explain discrepancies in the characterization of
Mexican foreign policy, this conclusion also helps inform the questions regarding the importance of internal versus external influences on Mexican foreign policy. As mentioned in the conclusion to the discussion of internal variables, there is evidence that a symbolically anti-US foreign policy is a means of appeasing left-wing groups that do not impose an immediate threat to the stability of the regime, but exert influence from within the party. At the same time it stops short of threatening its relations with the United States, and in turn, alienating the business community. The analysis of the
UN and COPDAB data, and the example involving Inter-American conference is entirely consistent with this explanation. Here, Mexico satisfies its historical position as a defender of sovereignty and, to an extent, appeases domestic leftists groups, but it does not go so far as to alienate the business sector or the United States. Astiz (1969,
82) praises this "compromise'' in which domestic support is secured without alienating the United States. He commends Mexican foreign policy makers for being able to: 143
...find a common denominator between the interest of the United States and what appears to be the feeling of the majority of the Mexican population. The fact that the makers of foreign policy actually found this common denominator and were able to articulate it in legal terms within the general trend of the country's foreign policy is a remarkable achievement.24
The final question that must be addressed is, which variable(s) were responsible
for causing Mexico to be a deviant case in this study. Causation, of course, may be
impossible to determine in such a complex case. The best that can be offered at this point is to identify variables that appear to have been influential. With respect to domestic variables, several groups appear to have exerted influence on Mexican foreign policy. In response, Ruiz appears to have been concerned enough with continuing the
legitimacy of the political system that his foreign policy was sensitive to the demands of left-wing (intellectuals, students, and labor), as well as the right (business). Since much of Ruiz's foreign policy was consistent with the principles of the Revolution, this residual variable must also be recognized as an important factor. These domestic
variables appear to be highly important since in the hypothetical absence of any external pressure, it is reasonable to expect that these variables would have dictated a foreign policy quite similar to the one which it adopted.
The importance of external pressure to Mexican foreign policy is less certain.
On the one hand, it seems reasonable to assume that the presence of the United States
24 Here Astiz is referring to how Mexico defied the United States' pressure to remove Cuba from the Organization of the American States. And although, Astiz is describing Mexican foreign policy toward Cuba under Ruiz's successor, he is describing the same "compromise'' found in Mexican foreign policy in general and toward Guatemala in particular. 144 forced Mexico to operate within certain constraints (i.e. a relatively cooperative economic policy and a political relationship that allowed only symbolic political defiance). However, given no domestic restraints, one would expect Mexican foreign policy to be much more amiable toward the United States. In other words, there is no reason to believe that Mexico's symbolic political defiance can be attributed to external influences alone, since the United States would not pressure Mexico for a foreign policy that conflicted with the United States on the issues of self-determination and non-intervention.
In conclusion, several findings explain why Ruiz, who possessed a conventional development strategy, adopted an anti-US foreign policy. First, a closer examination of the data, revealed that Mexico’s anti-US foreign policy, was to a great extent, symbolic. On issues of less salience to the United States, Ruiz maintained an anti-US posture. However, on critical Cold War-oriented issues, Ruiz was much more inclined to be pro-US. Thus the former issues can be explained by the influence of domestic sources. Here, Ruiz's foreign policy followed the long established principles of the
Mexican Revolution and appeased left-leaning and nationalistic domestic groups. On the more critical issues in which Mexico adopted a pro-US foreign policy, external pressure from the United States likely constrained Mexico's foreign policy. Although these constraints may have been, to a degree, self-imposed by the Ruiz's desire for cooperative relations with the United States (given its conventional development strategy), they nevertheless represent constraints. 145 Juscelino Kubitschek
Juscelino Kubitschek became president of Brazil on January 31, 1956 and served until January 30, 1961. His election followed a period of instability in which two coups occurred only two months before he took office. Kubitschek is best known for his five-year economic plan in which he pledged to create "50 years of progress in five." Although he did not achieve this goal, his economic policies can be largely described as successful. His economic plan relied on private investment and achieved a high rate of industrial expansion. His policy is referred to as "developmental nationalism," because it sought to strengthen basic industries and therefore reduce the number of imports necessary (Skidmore 1967, 164-5). Domestically, he is also known for initiatives such as building a new capital in the city of Brasilia, and improving
Brazil's infrastructure.
With regard to foreign policy, Kubitschek's relations with the United States and the West in general were quite cooperative. He explicitly acknowledged that he desired good relations with the United States. Despite his adherence to "developmental nationalism,” his policies "always stopped short of causing the clashes that would inevitably occur as Brazil defended its interests against those of developed states"
(Selcher 1974, 16).
The Brazilian regime of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961), like Ruiz, is coded as possessing a conventional development strategy. Both regimes were in power during roughly the same time period, both presided over what could be considered middle powers, and both had conventional development strategies. However, in contrast to the 146
Ruiz regime, the foreign policy of the Kubitschek regime conformed to expectations.
It's foreign policy was characterized by agreement in the United Nations and cooperation in bilateral relations. Now that an examination of Ruiz, the anomaly, has been completed, it is worthwhile to examine a case that was predicted accurately.
Given that the Kubitschek regime adopted a conventional development strategy, one would expect it to adopt a pro-US foreign policy in order to increase its economic development. As stated in Chapter Two, the conventional regime desires to incorporate its country into the world capitalist economy in an effort to acquire foreign capital and create economic growth. Domestic distribution of wealth is of secondary concern as it is expected that the prosperity will "trickle down." Domestic groups advocating more radical reform and redistribution are expected to be kept in check through repression or cooptation. While external factors (namely the United States) may also influence them, it is believed that this is unnecessary since the conventional regime and the United
States share similar values and beliefs.
The purpose of this case study will be to determine if the Kubitschek regime conforms to expectations due to the hypothesized reasons. In other words, it is known that the dependent variable corresponds with the earlier hypothesis (conventional development strategy will have a pro-US foreign policy), but do the relationships involving the independent and intervening variables actually appear to affect the dependent variable (foreign policy toward the United States) in the expected way? In other words, it is expected that due to Kubitschek's conventional development strategy he will seek amiable relations with the United States and that intervening variables will 147 either reinforce this desire, or be too weak to disturb it. As in the case study above, the three categories of variables explored will be under the headings of domestic, external, and operational/conceptual.
Internal Variables
Since the Kubitschek regime possessed a conventional development strategy and had a pro-US foreign policy, it is expected that the intervening variables (in this case domestic constraints) were relatively insignificant or supported his wishes. In other words, Kubitschek's pro-US foreign policy can be attributed to the domestic development strategy and was void of serious domestic obstacles and thereby a direct reflection and logical outcome of his conventional development strategy. Furthermore, it is expected that the Kubitschek regime is not highly vulnerable to societal factors, or if it is vulnerable, the societal influences reinforce its pro-US position. The analysis below will examine the strength of the regime vis-a-vis societal groups and their ideological position.
An assessment of the domestic situation in Brazil during the Kubitschek period reveals a number of active and important actors. "The single most powerful group in
Brazil is and was the military" (Parker 1979, 45). In previous years, the military had not hesitated to intervene in Brazilian politics. Just prior to Kubitschek's assumption of office, the military had overthrown the popular regime of Getulio Vargas and then held an election. While most backed Kubitschek's presidency, some factions within the military hesitated to allow Kubitschek to assume power since they viewed him as being 148 closely aligned with the reform-oriented Vargas. As a result, during his tenure, Brazil experienced a number of minor revolts within the military. In February of 1956 and
December of 1959, air force officers staged revolts as a result of their opposition to
Kubitschek. In addition, "[throughout the government of Kubitschek this discontent rumbled on, with, for example, some of his opponents in the navy vehemently objecting to a naval salute to the president in early 1957, while his old enemy, Admiral
Pena Boto, even plotted to seize Kubitschek on board the cruiser Barroso" (Flynn
1978, 193).
Kubitschek, who was not in a position of strength vis-a-vis the military was forced to treat the military with caution. While those military factions opposing
Kubitschek never generated enough opposition to remove him from office, it did force him to offer concessions to the military (Flynn 1978, 192-5). "Kubitschek was assiduous in his wooing of the armed forces and able to carry along with him enough military opinion in support of his policies of rapid national development" (Flynn 1978,
195). Essential to his strategy of placating the military was "his repeated anti-
Communist declarations and his orthodox foreign policy" (Skidmore 1967, 171). Thus the military appears to have been an important factor effecting the formulation of
Brazilian foreign policy friendly to the United States, since it coincides with the foreign policy that was hypothesized for Kubitschek, and the foreign policy he adopted. While a large segment within the military reinforced his development strategy and foreign policy, it should be mentioned that some pushed for a more militant stance toward labor and against communism. 149
If Kubitschek's military problems acted as a force against a return to populism, the working class provided potential opposition from a nationalist position. Given that
Kubitschek's economic policies offered little to the working class, when compared to the benefits offered to the middle class and foreign investors, working class opposition was potentially a real factor. Flynn (1978, 198-9) offers two primary factors that diffused this potential source of opposition. First, Kubitschek's policies were colored by a high degree of nationalism, which can often divert attention from the domestic realities. This nationalism differs, however, from the traditional nationalism characterized by anti-US rhetoric, nationalizations, and a strongly independent foreign policy. Instead, Kubitschek focused on national achievements such as the new capital being constructed in Brasilia and the success of Brazil's soccer team as they brought home their first World Cup championship. This brand of nationalism had the desired effect of rallying working class support without endangering relations abroad. "It caught up many in support of Kubitschek who otherwise might have been expected to resist policies which objectively were not directly in their interests" (Flynn 1978; 199).
Flynn's (1978, 199) second point focuses on the increasing corporatism of the
Kubitschek regime with respect to labor. During his term in power, relations between the government and trade unions became increasingly strong. In effect, such arrangements tended to relax any tensions between these two actors, since the communication lines are more direct and union leaders can be co-opted more readily.
Thus, due to Kubitschek's nationalistic and union policies, the working class became a relatively firm supporter of the regime since unions were associated with the 150 govemment-if not in reality, at least in perceptions. Thus the working class offered support rather than what could have reasonably been expected to be opposition. In sum,
"Kubitschek was both skillful and lucky, with luck playing the more conspicuous part.
His identification with the Vargista PSD-PTB coalition...won him initial sympathy and support..." (Flynn 1978, 203). Although this support gradually dissipated as his term progressed, and the tie between labor and Kubitschek became strained, it did not crumble. For even as social unrest mounted due to inflation, the mainstream labor movement never became an outspoken opponent of Kubitschek (New York Times,
Sept. 4, 1959). Thus even though labor was not a firm supporter of Kubitschek1 s development strategy and pro-US foreign policy, he successfully diverted attention from these policies.
Real and sustained support for the Kubitschek regime came from another central group in Brazilian domestic politics. Since the regime's economic development strategy offered the greatest benefit to the middle class, it was the business sector that provided the primary support. "The most evident reason for Kubitschek1 s survival, and his ability to hold together the leadership of the armed forces, was his relationship with the Brazilian bourgeoisie..." (Flynn 1978, 195). Even before he took his oath, business expressed their support for Kubitschek. "The business community here is showing remarkable faith that the incoming administration will be able to iron out measures to put Brazil back on the tracks of normal development" (New York Times, Jan. 5,
1956). 151
Complementing the support from this group was the overlapping support of the most powerful political party at the time--the Social Democratic Party (PSD). The PSD was basically conservative, but somewhat ideologically ambiguous. While it drew members from all sectors of society, it was primarily a vehicle of the status quo
(Cerqueira 1973, 167-69; Young 1982, 167-8). Support came from these groups due to the success of Kubitschek's import-substitution industrialization program.
Industrialization expanded by over 10% during the latter years of his term and GDP grew between 8.1% and 10.3% from 1957 to 1961 (Flynn 1978, 196). The support that these two groups generated for Kubitschek1 s development strategy and pro-US foreign policy was a powerful counterbalance to the ultra-right opposition by some officers within the military.
A review of the most important domestic political actors within Brazil demonstrates that the Kubitschek regime encountered credible threats to his presidency.
Thus he was vulnerable, at least to the opposition of some factions within the military, given its historical willingness to intervene in national politics. It is difficult to establish causation in this case because Kubitschek's development strategy and subsequent foreign policy coincided with the preferred policies of several important actors (many in the military, the PSD, and business). Since these groups benefited from
Kubitschek’s development strategy, they in turn, supported a pro-US foreign policy.
More specifically, business (as well as most in the PSD) enjoyed the pro-investment policies and the military was adamantly anti-communist. As a result, these groups naturally supported a pro-US foreign policy. 152
Given that his development strategy and subsequent foreign policy coincided with the alignment of several important actors it is difficult to determine causation. At this point it can only be concluded that Kubitschek followed the foreign policy which corresponded with his development strategy, that is, close ties with the United States, and that the military and other important actors either reinforced this position or may have forced him to adopt this foreign policy. Before drawing conclusions, the other two variables must be examined.
External Variables
This section seeks to determine if external factors, primarily the United States, were responsible for Brazil's pro-US foreign policy. Since Kubitschek had a conventional development strategy, it is expected that Brazil would adopt a pro-US foreign policy, and the United States would, in turn, reward Brazil. Of course, this question can only be speculated upon since it is necessary to deal in counterfactuals.
What is known is that the United States desired strong relations with Brazil. The United
States, under Eisenhower, wished to have open markets and an anti-communist foreign policy in their southern ally. The difficulty in determining the strength of this influence is due to the fact that Kubitschek’s own preferences appear to have coincided with the wishes of the United States. Kubitschek1 s development strategy called for an aggressive campaign to attract foreign investment. "From the outset he calculated that the success of his industrialization drive would depend upon close cooperation with the United
States government and American private investors" (Skidmore 1967, 173). With 153 respect to communism, there is no evidence to suggest that Kubitschek harbored any sympathy for communism. Thus the United States was pleased with Kubitschek1 s open door to foreign investment and anti-communist stance. In return, "[he] gladly received abundant loans from Washington" (Wesson and Fleischer 1983, 147).
Given the correspondence between Kubitschek's desired foreign policy and the wishes of the United States, it would be inaccurate to describe Brazilian foreign policy during this period as compliant. Instead, a more accurate description is consensus. This is the term Moon (1983, 1985) has coined to describe the phenomenon of shared values and beliefs between elites in the core and peripheral country. This term fits well since the values of Kubitschek and Eisenhower dovetail, as does their foreign policy behavior. Thus, external influences in this case study, at most, appear to reinforce
Brazilian foreign policy.
Operational/Conceptual
Kubitschek was coded as a conventional regime for apparent reasons. First, he made little meaningful effort to improve the lives of workers or peasants. Although it can be argued that these groups supported Kubitschek, this support was based on rhetoric that did not seek to address the unequal economic distribution. The Kubitschek regime focused on the growth at the expense of these groups (peasants and workers)- they were not truly part of the ruling coalition (Roett 1972a, 168; Rouquid 1987, 281).
This is especially true of agriculture which was relatively ignored during Kubitschek1 s endeavor to industrialize his country (Roett 1972a, 168). This neglect of agriculture 154 policy translated into little or no change for rural workers and peasants through land reform.25
In addition, Kubitschek strongly encouraged private and foreign investment, often favoring the latter (Sikkink 1991, 32-4). This is another indicator of his conventional development strategy. A final indicator is the role of the state in the economy. Unlike most conventional regimes, the Kubitschek regime increased its involvement in the economy. On the surface, this somewhat unconventional behavior might appear to be characteristic of a reformist regime. However, upon closer inspection, it is revealed that this state involvement is an effort to increase industrialization by channelling capital into preferential sectors (Sikkink 1991, 32).
Thus, state involvement is not for the purpose of redistributing wealth through increasing the number of those involved in the modem sector-- which has been identified as the underlying variable for differentiating among the three development strategies. Instead, the role of the state is designed to generate economic growth. The result is that Kubitschek can be viewed firmly in the conventional strategy camp.
In sum, the Kubitschek regime appears to have been coded correctly. All indicators point to a regime consistently displaying attitudes and policies characteristic of a conventional development strategy. The next section will examine the United
Nations data to determine if there are any significant patterns worth noting.
“Generally speaking, Brazilian peasants did not represent a formidable force in Brazilian politics during this period (Flynn 1978, 259). 155
United Nations Voting . As a conventional regime, the Kubitschek regime is anticipated to agree with the United States on a majority of United Nations votes. Since it has already been determined that this is the case, the purpose here is to examine
Brazil's votes in order to determine if any patterns exist that are contradictory to expectations. For instance, it would be puzzling if it was discovered that Brazil's votes did not coincide with that of the United States on what are judged to be critical cold war votes. To the contrary, a conventional regime is expected to agree with the United
States on votes of this important nature. Since a great degree of consensus is anticipated to exist between the United States and a conventional regime, only on votes of a unique or peculiar nature would the latter be expected to diverge. Such votes might include those of an extremely Third World nature which do not threaten cold war positions or capitalist principles (e.g., financial assistance from North to South). In such cases, a conventional regime might disagree with the United States, since it is an issue which the two may have differing positions.
In examining the UN voting data during Sessions 11-15, it is clear that the
Kubitschek regime follows the predicted pattern.26 Brazil agreed with the United States on nearly 90% of the UN votes during the Kubitschek regime.27 On 56% of these
26 Not all of Session 15 is included since Kubitschek leaves office prior to the end of this Session.
27 It should be noted that a small number of procedural votes (those with no discernible political implications) were excluded from the percentages in this section. 156
votes, the United States, Brazil, and Mexico agreed.28 The substance of these votes includes issues such as: Communist China's admission to the United Nations, the condemnation of the Soviet Union with regard to Hungary, and international safeguards
for nuclear weapons.
A more critical indicator of US-Brazilian agreement is on votes in which the
United States and Brazil agreed, but Mexico disagreed, since Mexico represents a Third
World perspective. Mexico disagreed on nearly 44% of the votes on which Brazil and the United States agreed. And while this group of votes includes some of the same issues mentioned above (China in the United Nations and nuclear weapons), several new issues are in this category. These new issues revolve primarily around issues of self-determination, the composition of the Trusteeship Council, the conflict in the
Congo, and French nuclear tests. While Mexico strongly identifies with the developing countries on these issues, Brazil votes like a developed nation. On self-determination,
Mexico votes against Portugal, Belgium, and France in favor of their former and current territories. Mexico also supports the Sahara with regards to French nuclear tests in that region. Yet Brazil diverges from Mexico and the Third World position on these votes. To a great extent, these are non-cold war issues in which Brazil does not adopt a
Third World position.
28 Although Ruiz is not in power during the entire time in which Kubitschek is, Mexico serves as a good point of reference for a Third World perspective whether Ruiz is in power or his successor. 157
In addition to these issue areas, two specific votes deserve special attention. On each of these votes Brazil sided with the United States while Mexico did not. First, is a vote on promoting the international flow of capital. This serves as an excellent example for demonstrating the difference between a conventional and reformist regime. As discussed in the operationalization of development strategy types, the conventional regime is content to submerge itself in a global capitalist economy, and would therefore agree with the United States on this vote. In contrast, the reformist (moderate or radical) is apprehensive about this laissez-faire flow of capital and is much more likely to oppose such a vote. A second vote which illustrates a similar point is a vote regarding the principle of equitable geographical distribution for the election of the
General Assembly president. Here again, Mexico adopted the Third World position by voting in favor of such a measure, while Brazil sided with the United States.
More support for Brazil's pro-US foreign policy comes from examining the votes in which Brazil adopts a Third World position. This category includes the votes on which Brazil disagrees with the United States and concurs with Mexico. This category includes less than 4% of the votes (only four actual votes) and does not represent any pattern. Of those votes in which Brazil disagrees with both Mexico and the United States, a larger number of votes can be found, but it still only comprises less than 9% of the votes. Again, these votes consist of odd votes that do not represent any identifiable pattern. Thus, these two categories of votes do not alter the findings from the first two groupings of UN votes. 158
The question now must be asked whether the Brazilian voting pattern exhibits consensus or compliance? In other words, is Brazil voting with the United States because it is consistent with the desires of the Kubitschek regime? Or is it voting in this
manner, because it is being coerced by the United States? Although a definitive answer is beyond the purview of this study, a few points can be made. First, the degree to which the United States can successfully coerce countries into complying with its wishes is debatable (Kegley and Hook 1991). Even some of the most optimistic accounts argue that this may only be on votes highly critical to the United States. It is especially questionable in the case of a middle power such as Brazil which is geographically quite distant from US borders. Thus when one considers that Brazil voted with the United States on nearly 90% of the votes, it seems likely that consensus is responsible for the vast majority of Brazil's agreement with the United States. This is not to deny that compliance is not occurring in a few instances. But the results on the
United Nation's voting points to the central role of consensus.
COPDAB. With respect to the COPDAB data, a conventional regime would be expected to exhibit highly cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States.
Cooperation would be expected on all issues areas. This is not to say the relationship would be void of conflict. No bilateral relationships exist without some sort of conflict.
Since it has already been determined that the foreign policy events generated by the
Kubitschek regime are high on the cooperation scale, the task that remains is to determine if the COPDAB data is misrepresenting the relationship between the United
States and Brazil. Evidence supporting such a scenario would be if Brazil's cooperative 159 events were primarily on symbolic issues with little meaning and its conflictual events existed on much more salient issues. This is information that would be picked up by the
COPDAB 2 data. Another goal of the COPDAB section is to determine if the same patterns that existed for the Ruiz regime, are manifest in the Kubitschek results. It is not expected that the Kubitschek regime would possess such a Third World-oriented foreign policy.
With respect to the intensity of the Kubitschek regime's COPDAB scores, one point should be noted. When comparing the Kubitschek regime to the other high confidence regimes on COPDAB 1 data, it ranks 15th of a total of 66 regimes. On the
COPDAB 2 data, it climbs to 11th. Therefore, when the intensity of this regime is considered, it is slightly more pro-US, but this difference is not greatly significant.
Nevertheless, it is appropriate to more closely examine by this issue area.
A total of 66 foreign policy events toward the United States are recorded for the
Kubitschek regime. Of those 66, only 14 are coded as conflictual.29 Of those 14, only seven are coded as being more serious than mild verbal hostility. The seven include four events coded as strong verbal hostility, two events as hostile diplomatic or economic actions, and one as political or militarily hostile actions. The events are categorized on several different issue areas, including: military, economic, physical environment, and political order. This demonstrates that with regard to issue area, no patterns appear to exist.
29 This means that 52 were positive since this number includes neutral acts as well. 160
In examining the less serious events, those coded as mild verbal hostility, a pattern does emerge. All seven of these events are coded as either within the realm of economic relations or political order. Their is no doubt that these events do represent some animosity between these two countries, however, what this signifies is not immediately evident.
In order to complete this analysis the cooperative behavior must also be examined. It has already been determined that most of the Brazilian foreign policy events toward the United States were cooperative (50 of 66).30 The events portray a solid degree of, and significant amount of, economic (trade, aid, and investment) and political (high level talks and visits) cooperation. Of these 50 events, no startling patterns emerge. With one exception, the events are relatively evenly spread out with respect to intensity and issue area. The only exception is that 31 of the 50 cooperative events fall into the "political order" issue area. This corresponds to the high number of
"political order" events in the conflictual category (8 of 14). Since "political order" events are prevalent in both the conflictual and cooperative categories, the significance of this pattern is diminished. Hence no identifiable, as well as meaningful patterns can be discerned for this section either.
In sum, the COPDAB data appears to be consistent with that of the United
Nations voting and the hypothesis generated for a conventional development regime. In
30Two events were coded as neutral. 161 other words, the analysis of this data set offers no reason to doubt the expectations of the development strategy approach and the findings of the United Nations voting.
Conclusion
Several initial conclusions can be drawn from these case studies of regimes possessing a conventional development strategy (see Table 19 below for summary of results). First, Mexico may be a unique case given its consistent foreign policy behavior across regimes. Assuming the influences on Mexican foreign policy have been correctly identified, this case offers impressive evidence for the salience of domestic politics (not just domestic groups, but historical principles as well) to Latin American foreign policy. The Brazilian case, while complicated by the multiple groups supporting a pro-US foreign policy, does nothing to discount the importance of domestic influences. With respect to external factors, these cases reveal that they appear to act more as a constraining than a determining factor. In the Mexican case, external factors appear to, at the most, constrain Mexican foreign policy. Given the degree to which
Ruiz was anti-US, one can not conclude that the United States had a great deal of influence over it. In the Brazilian case, since the external forces coincide with the desired foreign policy of Kubitschek, it is difficult to draw decisive conclusions. Thus, although the results of these cases offer little support for compliance theory, some 162 evidence is generated for the consensus (the Kubitschek case) and counterdependence
(the Ruiz case31) approaches.
The operational/conceptual section revealed the importance of scrutinizing the data sets. In the Ruiz case, it was discovered that much of Mexico's foreign policy was symbolic, and therefore, not as radically anti-US as it appeared on the surface. No identifiable patterns were discovered in the closer examination of the Kubitschek operationalization and conceptualization.
In the following chapters, additional case studies will be utilized to help in further clarifying these tentative findings.
31The Ruiz case offers support for counterdependence if it is assumed (as it is here) that Ruiz shares a belief in the historical principles of the Mexican Revolution. If he does not, then this case would be characterized by domestic coercion, in which he essentially agrees with the United States (elite agreement), but is constrained by domestic factors. 163 TABLE 19 Summary of Findings for Conventional Case Studies
^ : * r l S iiia iiilii piaiffflhttayaidoa ' 'j>tr -Strong influence of -US influence -Anti-US behavior 1‘- historical principles constraining, but not largely symbolic ^•LuLtaU*,, > ■, -t , • >. -Cooptation of exceedingly ■ ' j! -*• , , , , _ s r; % opposition restrictive ^ _____ T i -Low vulnerability v . - to domestic forces .. jfrt-,- ..> >■ »T -Little effort by US -Not a factor to influence due to historical principles apparent consensus _ ! 1 * r -Little opposition - - ‘ - „ from domestic factors -Moderately i * . vulnerable to ------, .. - - domestic opposition CHAPTER VI
Moderate Reform Case Studies
The two cases analyzed in this chapter are moderate reform regimes. The first case is the deviant case of Josd Figueres of Costa Rica. The second case will examine the regime of Omar Torrijos of Panama which conformed to expectations. It should be kept in mind that these cases differ from the conventional regimes in that moderate reformists are more to the center of the political and economic spectrum. Therefore, unlike the previous chapter in which opposition potentially came from the center and left, the reformist regime is likely to try to please a wider range of groups by increasing the number of individuals involved in the modem economy. Thus it should be expected that the moderate reform regimes discussed below will differ from those just examined.
As with the Ruiz regime, the purpose of the first case study, the deviant case, will be to determine why it did not conform to expectations. It had been expected that the foreign policy of a moderate reform regime, such as Figueres, would be moderately hostile toward the United States; however it was not. The case study will begin with a brief overview of the Figueres regime. The following three sections will examine
164 165
internal variables, external variables, and the operational and conceptual aspects of the
case, respectively.
Josd ("Pepe") Figueres Ferrer
Josd Figueres, also known as Don Pepe, served his third term in office from
May 8, 1970 to May 7, 1974.1 He has been the principal figure in the dominant Costa
Rican party since World War II. Figueres' political party, the National Liberation Party
(PLN), has held the presidency from 1953-1958, 1962-1966, 1970-1974, and 1974-
1978. Throughout this period, the PLN has been committed to representative democracy and economic and social reform. Figueres was a central figure in Costa
Rica's civil war and played a key role in disbanding the military in the late 1940s. As the de facto leader of the PLN, Figueres, during his terms in office carried out the
reform program of the PLN. Unlike his previous term, Figueres did not actively pursue a large number of new reform-oriented programs. He sought to create more jobs, enforce the minimum wage, raise taxes on the rich, and increase programs for the poor; but in general, his term was relatively quiet. This is not to say that he had altered his views on reform. Rather, Figueres was pleased with the situation in Costa Rica and
1 Most sources refer to his 1953-1957 term as his first, and his 1970-1974 term as his second term. They do not include the 1948-1949 period when he was the leader of the Founding Junta of the Second Republic. Nevertheless, this study includes this term since he was the predominant leader of the government that was willing and able to make important policies. Therefore, in this study the 1970-1974 term is referred to as his third term in office. 166 was inclined to allow the reform programs already in place to evolve (Ameringer 1978,
249-50, 257).
With respect to international affairs, Figueres broke with the policies of his past terms in which he had been a staunch supporter of democracy and had adamantly opposed communism and actively sought to destabilize hemispheric dictators.2 He relaxed his position toward regional dictators, gradually became friendlier with Castro, and opened trade and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In Central America he gave only marginal support to the Central American Common Market, in part, due to the unfavorable treatment of labor and the low wages of the other Central American countries. Relations with the United States were generally cordial and Figueres travelled there on several occasions. However, Figueres' relations with communist countries concerned the Nixon administration.
Internal Variables
An examination of Costa Rican politics reveals that Figueres was the primary foreign policymaker and appears to have had few restraints. Several reasons can be cited to support this statement. First, constitutionally and practically speaking, the president is responsible for foreign policymaking (Furlong 1987, 121). Second, the domestic political dynamics during the Figueres administration were such that he
^ i s is due in part to the fact that many of the foes he had opposed in his previous term had either disappeared or relaxed their anti-democratic policies. 167 possessed wide support. The discussion below will examine various groups within
Costa Rican politics.
At the center of Figueres' support was the National Liberation Party. Through its ability to remain unified, the PLN has clearly been the dominant party in Costa
Rican politics (Ameringer 1982b, 314). During most of the post-war period and
Figueres' third term in power, the PLN controlled the Costa Rican legislature. The
PLN's support can be linked to its popular programs. Its reformist policies have brought a significant portion of the economy under national control, and greatly expanded government services. This has had the effect of generating support among the poorer sectors of the country which generally demand an interventionist government.
To understand the nature of the PLN's control over these groups, one must be familiar with the ideas upon which Figueres and the PLN base their policies.
He abhorred the class struggle, because he felt that class harmony was essential for full production, and he longed for the creation of one vast middle class. For this reason, he promoted education and technical training, so that there might be full utilization of human resources. These ideas were merged with the more doctrinaire programs of the PLN and resulted in the structure of the Costa Rican state as it is today (Ameringer 1982b, 34),
This program has led to the weakening of any efforts to mobilize opposition against the government. This has been especially true in rural areas. In his 1970 presidential campaign, it is estimated that Figueres visited over 800 rural villages propounding his support for and identity with these rural inhabitants (Dunkerley 1988,
612). Whereas the peasants in other Central American countries have organized in opposition to their governments, this has not occurred to the same extent in Costa Rica. 168
"...[T]he key to the Costa Rican peasantry’s different political behavior lies in the reformist policies of the National Liberation Party... Reforms-though far from satisfying all of the campesinos' needs--have undercut other efforts at mobilization"
(Kincaid 1989, 178). Thus, to a great extent, demands of the poor have been coopted by the program of the PLN, resulting in a low level of opposition from these groups
(Palma 1989, 132).
The discussion immediately above is also pertinent to organized labor. The union movement has been highly fragmented and has not been able to create much effect at the voting booth. (Donato 1989, 154-6). "Organized labor...is weak because it is divided and lacks appeal. There are three national labor confederations-one for each of the party lines... Yet, the total membership of these is less than 20,000. Ticos
[Costa Ricans] reject the class struggle and generally prefer to resolve labor disputes amicably" (Ameringer 1982b, 70). It can be concluded therefore, that labor and the poorer sectors of Costa Rican society—groups that might provide opposition from the left—did not provide important sources for change. Instead, they were generally supportive of Figueres and the PLN.
Since the program of moderate reformers is generally attractive to the poorer sectors of a country, the more conservative forces may actively oppose the government's policies since they have the greatest amount to lose. This potential opposition has been diffused by the unique history of Costa Rica. During the colonial period Costa Rica was relatively poor. It lacked a large indigenous population to exploit and the inhabitants were too poor to import slave labor. As a result, Costa Rica 169 consisted primarily of small farmers (Ameringer 1982b, 9-10). "Unlike other countries of Spanish America, Costa Rica's colonial legacy included few traces of an aristocratic elite and wealth based on large landed estates" (Tartter 1984, 210). In dramatic contrast to other Latin American countries, especially, Central American countries, this has translated into a relatively weak landowning class.
Other groups that have traditionally been influential and often been conservative in other Latin America countries are not as salient to Costa Rican politics. The most obvious example is the military. Here again, Costa Rica is a special case since it does not have an army and the Civil Guard is not politically powerful (Tartter 1984, 218).
Neither has the Church (Tartter 1984, 220) nor Popular Church been an important factor in Costa Rican politics. "... the Popular Church ha[s] probably had less impact in Costa Rica than in any other Central American country" (CENAP 1989, 159).
The most salient political challenge from the right comes from business interest groups, such as sugar, livestock, coffee, and banana producers. Predictably, these business groups oppose government interference and champion free market policies
(Tartter 1984, 218). This has placed these groups in direct opposition to the PLN in general, and Figueres in particular. To an extent, these groups have been effective in lobbying for conservative business policies. However, it should be mentioned that these lobbying efforts are not as politically polarizing as in other Latin American countries.
These groups tend to lobby on issues that regard their industry and do not wish to overturn the system (Tartter 1984, 218), as business elites have in neighboring countries. Instead, conservative business elites in Costa Rica have accepted the 170 relatively progressive social system in their country, in order to avoid the social problems experienced by their neighbors (Wesson 1984, 216).
Even though these conservative business elites accept the system, they have supported free market policies in general and a pro-US foreign policy in particular.
Politically, these groups made some efforts to voice their displeasure with the Figueres regime. For instance, an anti-Figueres demonstration, supported by conservative forces, protested against Figueres1 intention to establish economic and diplomatic ties with Moscow. There were even rumors of a possible coup by paramilitary groups
(Ameringer 1978, 259-61). Despite these efforts, protests against Figueres were not widespread and the coup never materialized.
In sum, the Figueres regime had a great deal of support from the poorer sectors of Costa Rican society, and many of the potentially defiant groups, such as the army, were either weak or non-existent. Business elites appear to have been the most salient force for a pro-US foreign policy. Overall, however, it can be concluded that Figueres was relatively invulnerable to this societal opposition, especially given Costa Rica's long tradition of peaceful democracy. The following quote is a telling summary of
Costa Rica: "One of the surviving democratic regimes in Latin America, Costa Rica currently faces no serious problems of either domestic or foreign character." (Banks
1975, 71). 171
Before proceeding to the next section, a residual variable must be considered.3
Costa Rica is unique in that it has avoided the societal conflict that other Latin
American nations have experienced. Since 1948, transitions in leadership have been peaceful and Costa Rica has effectively functioned without a military. As a result, a strong sense of democracy and affinity for the United States has developed. In turn, the anti-US nationalism so characteristic of other countries, is not present in Costa Rica.
This argument is echoed by a recent book of the role of culture in Latin American foreign policy.
The major contours of Costa Rican foreign policy have clearly reflected the nation's democratic culture, namely, a reluctance to associate itself with the other nations of the old 'Gran Patria de Centro America,' a preoccupation with the promotion of democracy outside its borders, and an acceptance of its dependency on the 'democratic caudillo of the north' (Ebel, et. al. 1991, 108).
Thus one feasible explanation of Figueres' foreign policy is that it was in line with Costa Rican political culture, and essentially not a deviant case. This assertion is supported by the statistical data in Chapter Four, which demonstrates that the vast majority of Costa Rican regimes were strongly pro-US, despite having several moderate reform regimes. For example, when the means are calculated for each of the
20 Latin American regimes on UN voting data, Costa Rica is tied with Paraguay as the second most pro-US country. Paraguay, however, is comprised only of conventional regimes and one of those was Stroessner, the pro-US military dictator from 1954
3The following discussion of the residual variable, as well as the external variable section, benefitted greatly from discussions with Professor William Furlong of Utah State University. 172 through the end of this study. Therefore, it should be more pro-US than Costa Rica.
The most pro-US country was Nicaragua. Like Paraguay, Nicaragua had only conventional regimes and it is therefore not surprising that is was so pro-US.
The COPDAB results are similar. Here Costa Rica is tied with El Salvador as the 3rd most pro-US regimes. Only Honduras and Paraguay are more pro-US. As mentioned above, the Paraguay regimes all possessed conventional development strategies. This is also true of El Salvador. Honduras had two moderate reform regimes in power for approximately 8 of the 31 years of this study. This percentage of time, however, does not compare with Costa Rica which had moderate reform regimes in power for approximately 18 of the 31 years of this study. Thus Costa Rica is somewhat unique among Latin American countries for its relatively consistent pro-US posture.
If one accepts this explanation, then it is Figueres' first and second regimes that are the outliers, not his third regime. In this case it would be necessary to explain his first two regimes instead of his third regime. A preliminary explanation is that
Figueres1 anti-US foreign policy was due to his clash over the United States support of dictators, such as Trujillo and Somoza. The United States was supporting these regimes, while Figueres adamantly opposed them. In Figueres' latter term, Trujillo was no longer in office and Somoza Debayle had adopted more subdued policies in
Nicaragua than his father (who was in office during Figueres' first term). This interpretation asserts that Figueres was maintaining a foreign policy true to Costa
Rica's principles, and it was the United States that betrayed its own pro-democracy position. Since this is not a case study on Figueres' first or second regime this is not 173 the appropriate place to engage in an extended discussion on this topic. However, suffice it to say that the political culture interpretation is a tenable argument that must be considered.
External Variables
The Figueres regime is classified as a moderate reformer and therefore was expected to possess a relatively anti-US foreign policy, but instead possessed a pro-US foreign policy. Given this situation, it is especially important to examine the possibility that the United States played a role in influencing Costa Rican foreign policy. Prior to determining if the United States was successful, it must be determined whether or not the United States sought to influence Costa Rican foreign policy.
There can be little doubt that the United States was concerned with the foreign policy direction of Costa Rica during Figueres’ tenure. Given Figueres' relatively anti-
US behavior during his 1953-1958 presidential term, the United States was suspicious of another Figueres term. US concern was magnified since during his campaign he did not hide his intentions to establish relations with the Soviets Union. Given US concern over its Latin American allies establishing relations with the Soviet Union, the United
States would have inevitably reacted against this Costa Rican move. Therefore, it is not surprising that the US embassy in Costa Rica was "dominated by staff extremely hostile to Figueres' policy of opening relations with the Soviet bloc" (Dunkerley 1988, 617).
Thus given Figueres' previous terms, characterized by relatively anti-US policies, his stated goal to establish ties with the Soviets (and later, the fulfillment of this goal), and 174 the US's ideological opposition to these, it is safe to assume that the United States sought to influence Costa Rica.
Having discovered a point of contention between these two countries, the accuracy of the compliance explanation for Costa Rica's pro-US foreign policy can be explored. In order to determine if compliance occurred it is important to re-state the foreign policy goals of Figueres and the PLN. A moderate reformer is expected to adopt a more neutral foreign policy toward the superpowers and seek increased national autonomy. This is consistent with a policy statement of the PLN soon after its inception in the early 1950s. With regards to foreign policy it sought to:
Conduct international relations within the strict rule of law which guarantees the juridical equality of state. To stimulate as much as possible the independence and solidarity of people in the common struggle for integral liberation, in accord with the precepts and orientation of the international organisms which promote the material and spiritual welfare of all men, respecting the customs of each people (Alexander 1973, 225).
While this statement was approximately twenty years old when Figueres took office in
1970, there is no reason to believe it had changed significantly over the years.
In the case of Figueres, his desire to establish relations with the Soviet Union can be viewed as a crucial test for the compliance explanation. On the one hand,
Figueres' desire to establish trade with the communist countries was clearly compatible with the policies of a moderate reformer. Figueres wished to increase trade opportunities abroad in order to improve the economic situation at home and therefore expand his trading partners (Ameringer 1982b, 88-9; Ameringer 1978, 250, 258). On the other hand, the Nixon administration naturally opposed such Costa Rican actions. 175
And since Figueres did not try to hide his desire to trade with the communist countries in his campaign for president it was not a surprise to the United States (Ameringer
1978, 258). Therefore, this was not presented to the United States as a fait accompli..
Since this issue is highly salient to the United States, Figueres' willingness and ability to establish this new relationship with the Soviet Union, demonstrates the weakness of the compliance explanation.
Despite this evidence, it still seems counter-intuitive that a country such as
Costa Rica, which is both relatively weak and is dependent on trade with the United
States, would be able to defy influence attempts from the United States. Nevertheless, this evidence is supported by two others examples. One, which has already been mentioned is Figueres1 1953-1958 term in which he possessed an anti-US foreign policy. A more recent example of Costa Rica's ability is Oscar Arias's defiance of
President Reagan's Central American policy in the 1980s. This represented an issue which was highly salient to the United States, but one in which the Arias regime steadfastly rejected US attempts to alter Costa Rican policy (Hey and Kuzma 1993).
The consensus approach offers an alternative explanation. Such an explanation would assert that despite his obvious differences over policy toward the Soviet Union,
Figueres had values similar to those of the United States. This explanation must start with the argument that Figueres, by 1970, had moderated his foreign policy in general, and in particular toward the United States. For instance, Figueres had married his second American wife and made many trips to the United States (Dunkerley 1988,
617). He was a frequent visitor to Disney Land and in response to President Nixon's 176
invitation, he even traveled to Cape Kennedy to watch the Apollo 16 moon launch
(Ameringer 1978, 264). In fact, his relationship with the United States became amiable
to the point that many inside the PLN felt he had "become excessively accommodating"
toward the United States (Dunkerley 1988, 617). In his hostile foreign policy toward
US-favored dictators in the region, Figueres had relaxed his actions. His friendly
relations towards Anastasio Somoza Debayle, was in stark contrast to his
confrontational policies toward his father, Anastasio Somoza Garcfa. The information
provided here suggests that Figueres’ pro-US foreign policy may have derived from a
genuine attraction toward the United States which manifested itself in a pro-US foreign
policy. In other words, Figueres' foreign policy toward the United States was driven
more by consensus than compliance. He displayed an increasingly favorable personal
disposition toward the United States, apparently grounded in his own values. Without
significant domestic opposition to constrain those personal preferences they were
manifested in Costa Rica's foreign policy.
The discussion here lends some credence to the consensus explanation.
Conversely, based on the discussion in this section, it does not appear that the United
States was overly successful in influencing Costa Rican foreign policy. Final
conclusions, however, must be withheld until after more closely examining the UN and
COPDAB data. There it will be important to determine if Costa Rica's votes in the
United Nations and/or events toward the United States conflict with the foreign policy of a moderate reformer and the PLN. 177
Operational/Conceptual
Regime Classification. There is little evidence to suggest that the Figueres regime was classified into the wrong category. Figueres, in his 1953-1958 administration, had been the ideal moderate reformist. He had increased the role of the state in the economy; engaged in land reform; welcomed foreign investment, but on terms more favorable to Costa Rica; and attempted to improve the lot of the poorer sectors in order to create one large middle class. Even in the source from which the concept of development strategy is borrowed, Anderson (1967, 274-5) describes
Figueres as one of "the most self-consciously ideological of the democratic reform movements in the area." In Figueres' subsequent administration (1970-1974), he is not as active, but there is no evidence that he had altered his basic position as a reformer.
In essence, by the time Figueres took office, Costa Rica had realized many of the goals he had sought in his earlier terms in office. In Figueres' biography, Ameringer (1978,
257) explains this.
One must make a final observation concerning the seeming mediocre record of Don Pepe's last presidency. It has to do with Don Pepe's own perception of Costa Rican society. Essentially, Figueres was satisfied with the political, economic, and social conditions. He did not perceive any need to revolutionize society. Although he was dissatisfied with the distribution of wealth at the time, he believed that Costa Rica was on the right track and that its existing agencies and institutions would gradually provide a better way of life for more and more Costa Ricans.
This passage describes the essence of a moderate reformer-he seeks gradual change toward a society in which an increasing number of people participate 178 economically and politically. Therefore, with regard to development strategy, it can be concluded that Figueres was coded into the correct development strategy.
United Nations Voting. Ideally, one would expect a moderate reform regime, such as Figueres', to adopt a Third World position on economic and non-cold war political issues in order to alter the rules of the game in the international arena. Krasner
(1985, 5) refers to this as an attempt to rely on an authoritative, rather than a market mode of allocation. On cold war issues, it is expected that the moderate reformist would be more pro-United States, since, although it seeks to increase its trading ties, it is nevertheless ideologically aligned with the West.
In examining Figueres' voting pattern in the early to mid-1970s it becomes evident that the developing nations, through their numerical superiority, had begun to control the United Nations agenda. The result is that very few formal cold war votes exist. This is especially true after mainland China achieved membership in 1971. On the issue of China's membership, Costa Rica fulfills expectations by voting in complete agreement with the United States on all eight votes. However, these eight votes only represent five percent of the more than 160 total UN votes during Figueres’ term. The remaining votes are almost exclusively economic and non-cold war political votes.
Therefore, these remaining votes must be considered to determine on which of them
Costa Rica defects from its expected Third World voting position and votes in agreement with the United States.
A close look at the non-cold war votes reveals a somewhat distinct pattern. The votes in which Costa Rica is in complete disagreement with the United States are 179 predominantly economic issues. These include a large number of votes dealing with the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the International
Law Commission, and sovereignty of national resources. On these issues, Costa Rica votes in disagreement with the United States and adopts a typical Third World position.
The votes upon which these two countries agree are non-cold war political votes, such as international terrorism, human rights and armed conflict, apartheid, and the Middle
East (Palestine). And as one might expect, the partial agreement category is comprised of a mix of these two votes. These findings do not present any reason to doubt the validity of the results from Chapter Four.
COPDAB. An examination of the twenty-eight Costa Rican foreign policy events recorded reveals only five events are negative. Of these five, two are coded as
"economic relations" and three as "political order, political relations, and law/organization." A similar distribution of events are also discovered when cooperation is examined. When the degree of conflict is considered (COPDAB 2),
Costa Rica remains in approximately the same rank order of countries.
A closer look at the COPDAB data, however, reveals one reason to question the validity of the Chapter Four results for Costa Rica. The primary concern is that the coded events do not include Figueres' decision to extend diplomatic and economic relations to the Soviet Union and other communist countries. This, of course, is not the fault of those coding Costa Rican foreign policy, since this foreign policy is directed toward the Soviet Union, not the United States (and therefore not included in this study). Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that this is an important event in US-Costa 180
Rican relations that COPDAB does not take into account. Even if this could be factored in, the Figueres regime is still more cooperative toward the United States than one would expect a moderate reformer to be.
Conclusion
In sum, domestic groups do not appear to have heavily influenced Figueres' pro-US foreign policy. However, the consensus approach, based on the political culture argument, must be considered given the statistical evidence demonstrating the tendency for Costa Rican regimes to be pro-US, despite their development strategy. With respect to external factors, the United States does not seem to have been able to exert a great deal of influence. This conclusion is based largely on the Figueres regime's latitude to pursue relations with the Soviet Union despite US opposition.
The examination of the UN voting reinforces the finding in the internal variable
section; that is, Figueres, based on his own values, seems to identify with the United
States on many political issues. His reluctance to agree with Washington on economic issues can be explained as stemming from Costa Rica's egalitarian tradition discussed in the same section. Finally, an examination of the COPDAB data called attention to the limits of examining only Costa Rican foreign policy toward the United States, and not other countries such as the Soviet Union. 181
Omar Torryos Herrera
Omar Torrijos was one of several members of a junta which came to power in
Panama in October 1968. Within a few months he and Colonel Boris Martinez had emerged as the leaders of the new government. In March of the following year, without the consent of Torrijos, Martinez announced a radical agrarian reform and that anti-US demonstrations would be allowed in Panama. Torrijos then ousted him from power.
For the next decade Torrijos ruled Panama. Domestically, he enjoyed widespread support for his economic policies which focused on the poorer sectors, but did not present a significant threat to the economic elite. He engaged in moderate land reform and extended favorable policies toward labor. His term ended in 1981.
The external relations of Torrijos were dominated by the Panama Canal issue.
Although negotiations between Panama and the United States had began prior to his assumption of power, he made it a priority. Torrijos eventually achieved his goal of obtaining a treaty with the Carter administration which secured Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal. Despite this triumph, Panama was not scheduled to gain sovereignty over the canal until the end of the century and therefore Torrijos encountered some domestic opposition from nationalists at home that wished to acquire it sooner. In addition to the Canal issue Torrijos steered a pragmatic foreign policy which was independent in some respects (recognition of Cuba and trade with the communist 182 countries), but not overly antagonistic toward the United States (general support of the
United States on Cold War issues).
In the discussion that follows, influences on the Torrijos regime will be examined to see if his moderately anti-US foreign policy was, as hypothesized, a result of his development strategy or whether other intervening variables were responsible for this foreign policy behavior.
Internal Variables
The moderate reformer wishes to incorporate those of the poorer classes into society and create a more equitable distribution of wealth. Thus, the moderate reformer will attempt to raise their standard of living, but without alienating the economic elites.
This is an accurate description of Torrijos' development strategy. The result was relatively widespread support from a majority of sectors in Panama. His support, as well as his opposition, will be discussed below.
Although some transformation occurred in Torrijos1 support base4 (Ropp 1982,
41) during the ten years examined here, some generalizations can be made. Given the importance of the military in Latin America, it is appropriate to begin with Panama's military. In short, Panama's National Guard has been the single most dominant political institution (Ropp 1982, 177). The coup of 1968, which brought Torrijos to power, was directed by the National Guard. To a great extent, the coup was a reaction
4For instance, the degree to which labor was courted as an ally varied during this period. 183 against civilian interference with the military. Soon after assuming office, the newly elected president, Amulfo Arias, attempted to alter the leadership of the National
Guard. Almost immediately, he was deposed (Black 1980, 42). As a member of the
National Guard, Torrijos' assumption of power immediately resolved the fear of civilian interference. Under Torrijos, the National Guard was a relatively cohesive structure with Torrijos firmly in control. "General Torrijos maintained control of the
National Guard through a highly-centralized administrative structure. Lines of authority ran directly from the commander-in-chief to all military units without being channeled through the General Staff' (Ropp 1982, 43). Furthermore, Torrijos preserved control through re-organization of the military to enable him to have more contact with important subordinates and through generous monetary rewards (Rudolf 1981, 155).
With respect to monetary rewards to the National Guard, Torrijos reportedly said '"If I don't pay them, the CIA will"' (Greene 1984, 89). While there did exist some opposition within the Guard to programs that drifted too far to the left, Torrijos operated relatively autonomously.
Thus as president of Panama and commander-in-chief of the National Guard
Torrijos was the key Panamanian decision-maker in both domestic (Priestley 1986, 5) and foreign policy (Rudolf 1981, 173) with little opposition from the military.
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that Torrijos was immune to domestic pressure. Below, other domestic groups will be examined to determine their influence on the Torrijos regime. 184
Since Torrijos sought policies that would benefit the relatively poor classes, such as labor and peasants, one would expect much of his support to be drawn from them. With respect to labor, this did not prove to be the case. Given labor's history of fragmentation, the union movement did not prove to be a significant factor in
Panamanian politics (McDonald and Ruhl 1989, 243). Thus, although it did not represent an opposition force, labor was not a significant source of support.
Instead, Torrijos relied, in addition to the Guard, on peasants in the countryside, and students. Support was solicited from these agricultural groups through land reform and the organization of cooperatives. Significant amounts of economic and technical assistance were extended to these cooperative farmers. In addition to economic aid, social programs focusing on health and education were also aimed at the rural areas (Eglin 1981, 108). To secure this support, Torrijos made frequent trips into the rural areas to listen to grievances and offer assistance (Greene 1984, 65-8). This policy of generating rural support was emphasized in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
After this initial period, economic factors forced a different approach, based more on economic efficiency. This approach placed more emphasis on agro-industry. Therefore, while support for the rural areas during the last years of the Torrijos regime diminished somewhat, it did not disappear (Eglin 1981, 108).
Another domestic group from which Torrijos received support was students.
Immediately after assuming power, Torrijos sought to gain support from the relatively important and active Panamanian student groups. Torrijos offered governmental positions and other concessions to members of the most important student group, the 185
Panamanian Federation of Students (FEP). In return, he obtained their unconditional support. Challenges to this strong support came from new student groups that were to the left of Torrijos (Priestley 1986, 27-8), "[B]ut those groups never mounted a serious challenge to the Torrijos regime, for most lacked political experience, organizational resources, and theoretical clarity. Torrijos' strategy of co-optation had worked"
(Priestley 1986, 28).
In sum, Torrijos drew his support from the National Guard, peasants, and students. The next groups examined are those that would be the most likely to be opposed to a moderate reformers attempts to distribute wealth to the poorer sectors.
Although these groups are the most likely to oppose a moderate reformer, this opposition is in no way a given, since moderate reformers are expected to avoid alienating the business and agriculture elites which would, in turn, disrupt the modem productive sector.
Both rural and business elites had enjoyed a great deal of power in pre-Torrijos
Panama. However, after the coup, ties between government and the business sector were virtually non-existent. To a great extent, this loss of power occurred soon after
Torrijos assumed power and outlawed political parties. "The business community was isolated from the National Guard by class and social differences and lost an important channel for presenting its views when political parties were abolished” (Ropp 1982,
64). Although business began to re-gain some influence when the economy soured in the mid- to late 1970s, it was still not a dominant group under Torrijos (Ropp 1982,
64-5). 186
With respect to elites in the countryside (or oligarchs), Torrijos wished to avoid alienating them. However, he was aware that land reform and his aggressive attempts to gain the support of peasants would alarm the oligarchy. Thus, as Priestley (1984,
57) explains, Torrijos went out of his way to ensure that he would not excite the opposition of the oligarch:
Politically, Torrijos obviously wanted to include the peasantry in the populist alliance, to bring them into politics for the first time. But he did not wish to do so in ways that would unnecessarily disturb the oligarchy. Thus he and his associates went to great lengths to stress that nonconfrontation and class cooperation were the hallmarks of their economic and political policies.
Torrijos' strategy consisted of generating land for peasants through relatively non offensive ways. For instance, a majority of the land was accumulated from landowners who owed the government back taxes. In these cases, the land was turned over to the government in order to erase their debt (Priestley 1984, 59). This avoided more dramatic and confrontation methods of redistributing land.
In sum, the Torrijos regime does not appear to have been significantly vulnerable to domestic forces. Although some opposition was present, it did not threaten his hold on power. Furthermore, Torrijos maintained support from important domestic groups, such as the military, students and rural peasants. Thus an analysis of the domestic factors does not generate any reason to believe that domestic factors significantly modified Torrijos' preferred foreign policy. 187
External Variables
Based on the results of Chapter Four, Torrijos1 foreign policy toward the United
States conformed with expectations; that is, he conducted a relatively anti-US foreign policy. The question that must be asked in this section is if Torrijos1 moderately anti-
US foreign policy is a result of his development strategy or if he would have preferred another foreign policy, but adopted it because he was influenced by external factors.
First the experts on Panama must be consulted to obtain a description of Torrijos' foreign policy goals.
Based on the writings of country experts, it can be concluded that Torrijos was a nationalist whose primary foreign policy goal was to gain autonomy over the Panama
Canal. "From 1968 until 1978, Torrijos' primary foreign policy goal remained the same as that of his predecessors—to achieve Panamanian control over the Canal Zone"
(Ropp 1982, 120). While this nationalism appears to have been genuine, it also enabled him to consolidate domestic support among students and others to the left. This explains why Torrijos1 foreign policy was anti-US, but it does not explain why he was only moderately anti-US. As a moderate reformer, it is expected that he would desire cordial, but independent relations with the United States. This is exactly what one finds in Torrijos' foreign policy. While Torrijos wished to gain control of the Canal and utilized international pressure to accomplish this, he also wished to remain on good terms with the United States.
Evidence for his desire to establish an independent foreign policy is demonstrated by his move to establish relations with new countries, including Bulgaria, 188
Romania, East Germany, Poland and Hungary (Priestley 1984, 31). In addition,
Torrijos developed close ties with Castro. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that
Torrijos had no desire to emulate the Communist model (LaFeber 1978, 162, 168;
Greene 1984, 32). For instance, LaFeber argues that Torrijos' reformist policies were not inspired by the Cuban model. Instead they were associated with the School of the
Americas, which was a US-led counter-insurgency institution which was first and foremost anti-Communist (Ropp 1982, 49-50; LaFeber 1978, 168). Even as he attempted to generate international support for the Canal issue by reaching out to countries such as Cuba and the USSR, he did so as a pragmatist. "The General did not intend to align himself with Russia or Cuba (he indeed assigned as the Spanish-speaking guide to the Soviet delegation a Hungarian who fought against the USSR during the
1956 uprising)" (LaFeber 1978, 182).
Despite the friction between the United States and Panama over the Canal, relations between these countries are characterized as "excellent in other areas of mutual concern" (Rudolf 1981, 159). For instance, Panama has followed a moderate reform voting strategy in the United Nations, i.e., it has maintained an independent foreign policy on economic matters, but aligned itself with the United States on political issues.5
Panama has long stressed its relationship to the UN, which it views as an important forum for the presentation of views by the small nations of the Third World. In general terms Panama votes with this block on economic matters relating to the debate between developed and less developed nations, but on
5 This will be discussed in greater detail in the following section. 189
political matters that have no direct effect on Panama, such as those regarding Israel, Iran, and Afghanistan, it votes along lines that parallel US interests (Rudolf 1981, 172-3).
But why does Torrijos wish to maintain good relations with the United States? Is this behavior, in which Torrijos pushes the United States on the Canal issue, but agrees
with it on political issues in the United Nations best characterized as a function of the needs of his development strategy or some other external factors? On the one hand, this can be viewed as a foreign policy strategy consistent with his development strategy. As a moderate reformer, it is expected that Torrijos will chart a foreign policy that is
independent of the United States, yet not overly antagonistic. In particular, he will diverge from the United States on social and economic issues, but not on political
(primarily cold war) issues. Since the Canal issue is directly linked to the issue of
sovereignty over domestic economic issues, it seems reasonable that Torrijos stands
firm on the Canal issue, yet still desires cordial relations with the United States. This
argument maintains that Torrijos' foreign policy behavior is consistent with his
development strategy.
Alternatively, one could argue that Torrijos supported the United States on
certain political issues in order to secure the return of the Panama Canal. Such a quid pro quo strategy would ideally make the United States more willing to relinquish
control over the Canal to Panama. This implies that Torrijos preferred a more anti-US
foreign policy, but moderated it in order to influence the Canal negotiations. This
hypothesis is consistent with the view of Torrijos as a pragmatic leader. However, it is 190 a little puzzling why he would antagonize the United States by establishing economic ties with the Soviet Union and China.
Thus in the case of Torrijos, one can conclude that he was able to act with a significant degree of latitude in his policy with the United States. However, on issues of less importance to Panama, one can not discount the possibility that the latter may have moderated its policies in an effort to facilitate negotiations with the United States over the Panama Canal. This interpretation will be tested with a closer examination of
UN and COPDAB data in the next section.
Operational/Conceptual
Coding. There can be little doubt that Torrijos desired to improve the position of the poor within Panama's economy. But although he wished to see the lot of the poor improve, he did not seek to do this by assaulting the economic elites. He sought to distribute land to peasants, but not through radical redistribution methods.
Furthermore, state intervention increased, but private capital, both domestic and foreign was largely protected. This description of Torrijos is quite consistent with that of a moderate reformer. Hence the classification of Torrijos, even after conducting a more thorough examination of his policies, appears to be accurate. Below, the measures utilized to assess his foreign policy will be more closely examined.
United Nations Voting. A closer examination of Panama's voting behavior in the
United Nations presents Torrijos as a moderate reformer. Panama quite consistently adopts a Third World position on economic issues. In virtually all cases, Torrijos votes 191 in accordance with the expected wishes of a moderate reformer. For instance, Panama consistently supports a Third World position on the exploration of the sea-bed by supporting an international machinery to exploit minerals outside the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Likewise, on trade related votes Panama joins those calling for special arrangements for developing countries.
With respect to more politically oriented votes, Panama, as seen in the previous section, adopts a pro-US position-at least for the first several years. Pro-US votes are cast on Apartheid, the Palestinian issue, China, and Korea. The latter of these votes correspond with the assertion that Torrijos had no special ideological affinity toward the Communist countries. However, it must be mentioned that in Torrijos' latter years his pro-US political position on these issues diminished. For instance, by 1975 Panama was abstaining or disagreeing with the United States on Israel, South Africa, and
Korea. In turn, his relative voting scores became significantly more negative in his final four years. It is not immediately evident why this change occurred.
This pattern is especially troubling because one would expect that since Jimmy
Carter was in power for the last two years of the UN voting data, Panama would be more pro-US.6 Although this phenomena can not be fully explained here, one possible
factor may provide a partial explanation for this. This explanation focuses on the total number of votes upon which the UN scores are generated from these years. While prior to these last four years the number of votes per session from 1969 to 1974 averages
'This is based on the belief that a moderate reformer would be ideologically more compatible with a relatively progressive US president. 192 well over 45 votes, the number of votes for the 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978 sessions are 12, 7, 8, and 20, respectively. It should be added that for the 1978 year in which there are 20 votes, Panama's score is much more pro-US than in the previous three years. Although this does not provide a completely satisfactory explanation, it does reduce the impact of these somewhat contradictory results.
COPDAB. The picture that is sketched by the COPDAB data is very similar to the one found in the external variable discussion. One finds a Panama that is intent on recovering the Panama Canal, but is not inherently anti-United States. As a result, the vast majority of Panamanian foreign policy events toward the United States center on the Canal. In fact, of the seventy-six negative Panamanian events, nearly 70% are directly related to the Canal.
The cooperative events confirm the findings in the previous section, as many cooperative events can be discovered between the two countries. Although the Canal does not comprise as great of a percentage of these votes (40%), it still is a significant number. As expected for a moderate reformer, on different occasions the United States and Panama engage in economic cooperation. For instance, attempts are made to increase imports of beef by the United States and cooperation takes place on finishing the Pan-American highway through Panama. Furthermore, Panama sides with the
United States on hemispheric issues, such as denuclearization of Latin American and the selection of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States. This demonstrates that while Panama, under Torrijos, stands firm on the Canal issue, it still seeks cooperation with the United States. 193
When examining the intensity of the Panamanian events toward the United
States (COPDAB 2), Torrijos becomes slightly less conflictual. However, this difference is insignificant as Torrijos moves from the ninth most anti-US regime to the twelfth most anti-US regime. Recall that the range is from first to 106th in terms of hostility, so Torrijos' level of hostility remains relatively low.
Given that a greater number of events regarding the Canal are conflictual, it is reasonable to question whether or not Panama would still conform to expectations (still be classified as a moderately anti-US) if not for the Canal issue. Two points can be made here. First, Torrijos was one of the more negative of the moderately anti-US
Latin American countries. Therefore, Panama's cooperative-conflictual ratio could have become a significant degree more cooperative toward the United States before it would have moved into the Moderately Pro-US category. Second, since much of Torrijos' support came from the domestic left, it is reasonable to conclude that he would have focused on another issue to demonstrate a willingness to "take on" the United States.
While this would likely have been a symbolic issue, it would have appeased the leftist groups at home while not jeopardizing relations with the United States.
Finally, it should be mentioned that Torrijos' COPDAB scores become somewhat more pro-US when President Carter assumes office in the United States.
Although this is an important phenomenon to note, in the case of Torrijos, it represents only a relatively small portion of the total number of events during his presidency and therefore does not significantly alter the overall findings. 194
Conclusion
In conclusion, the evidence above leads to the finding that Torrijos1 preferences, as measured by his development strategy, were a salient feature in the formulation of his foreign policy toward the United States. Since most domestic actors were quite weak vis-a-vis the military (which supported Torrijos), domestic factors do not appear to be important. Although external factors may have had a constraining effect on
Torrijos, this is difficult to determine. For while the Torrijos' foreign policy was only moderately anti-US, there is little indication that Torrijos desired a more radically anti-
US foreign policy. This casts doubt on the quid pro quo argument in which Torrijos moderated his foreign policy in order to facilitate the return of the Panama Canal.
The Figueres regimes may have been affected by the democratic and egalitarian nature of Costa Rican society. Thus Costa Rica, like the Ruiz regime of Mexico, may also be somewhat of a unique case. In comparison to the Torrijos regime, Figueres does not appear to have been significantly influenced by domestic actors. With respect to external factors, Figueres' foreign policy appears to have been in close accordance with his preferred foreign policy. Therefore, the United States does not appear to have been an important factor.
Finally, the operational/conceptual sections generated two notable patterns. In the Costa Rican case, attention was called to the complications inherent in ignoring policy not directed toward the United States. The Panamanian case highlighted the relatively small number of UN votes in the latter sessions. The table below summarizes these findings. 195
TABLE 20 Summary of Findings for Moderate Reform Case Studies
Internal Variables - External Variables Operationalization/ t » 1 t ...... Conceptualization Figueres-Costa -Little domestic -US influence -Costa Rican-USSR Rica opposition minimal relations not (Deviant Case) -Political culture included in possible explanation COPDAB -Little vulnerability to domestic forces Torryps (Panama) -Little domestic -US pressure may -Small number of (Conforming Case) opposition have had slight UN votes may cause -Political culture not moderating effect distortion a salient variable -Little vulnerability to domestic forces Chapter VD
Radical Reform Cases Studies
This chapter closely examines two radical reform regimes. As in the case studies in previous chapters, the goal of the first case study is to determine what intervening factors caused the lack of correlation between development strategy and foreign policy behavior. The question in this chapter is why the Goulart regime, which possessed a radical reform development strategy, possessed a moderate foreign policy toward the United States. In theoretical terms, it was anticipated that Brazil would manifest a hostile policy toward the United States under a regime pursuing a radical program for development. The second case in this chapter will examine another radical reformer, but one which was accurately predicted, in order to determine if the case conformed to expectations. The second radical reformer examined will be Salvador
Allende of Chile.
Jo3o Goulart
Joao Goulart became the president of Brazil on September 7, 1961. Because his assumption of power was opposed by many, especially within the military, Goulart became the leader of a parliamentary system that restricted his powers. In January of
196 197
1963 the parliamentary system was replaced with a presidential system and he became the president. Domestically, Goulart is known for his appeals to the masses through promises for "basic reforms." His agenda included radical changes through land reform and greater control of foreign investment. Such policies served to polarize Brazil. This polarization solidified those on the right that opposed him. In April of 1964, his term as president ended as he was overthrown by the military.
Regarding external relations, Goulart continued the "independent" foreign policy of his predecessor, J&nio Quadros. For Brazil, this policy translated into backing-off from restrictive (i.e., those based on the Cold War) alliances and opening relations with Communist countries that were perceived as potential trading partners
(Parker 1979, 12). Trade missions were initiated with China and diplomatic relations were established with Communist countries, as well as Algeria and Ceylon (Bums
1968, 98). Despite this independent foreign policy, relations with the United States were strained, but generally continued to be cordial. US aid continued to flow to Brazil during Goulart's term, but in the end, the US government was pleased when he was removed from power (Parker 1979, 73-87).
Internal Variables
It is evident that the domestic scene during Goulart's tenure was one of considerable fragmentation and polarization. Following the Kubitschek regime (1956-
61), Quadros was elected and became president in the first peaceful transition between one elected president and another since the 1920s. Within a year, however, Quadros 198 resigned. According to the constitution, Quadros' vice-president, Goulart, became the legal successor. Because the vice-president is elected separately in the Brazilian electoral system, Goulart1 s ideological proximity to Quadros was not a given. In fact, the ideological differences between Quadros and Goulart were substantial, with Goulart more oriented toward ideas associated with the political and economic left. For this reason, the middle class, the dominant party of the right (the UDN), business leaders, and much of the military were fundamentally opposed to Goulart and his ideology.
However, since blocking Goulart’s succession to power would be unconstitutional, these opposition groups were divided as to the appropriate path of resistance (Flynn
1978, 226-9). This lack of cohesion in the powerful opposition groups, allowed Goulart to become president, but not without an important compromise.
This compromise took the form of a parliamentary government. Under the parliamentary system, the cabinet had to be approved by the Congress and all acts of the president required the approval of the Prime Minister and the cabinet minister most directly concerned. Therefore, foreign policy decisions had to be approved by both the
Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. An additional constraint imposed by the
Congress was its ability to dissolve the Cabinet in a no confidence vote (Dulles, 1970,
160). Goulart accepted this compromise, but from the outset worked to restore the presidential system. His desire to restore presidentialism coupled with the constraints imposed by the parliamentary system, left Goulart quite vulnerable. For on the one hand, he had to accommodate the legislature, but on the other he also had to woo domestic support for the presidential system. Eventually, Goulart won out and 199 presidentialism was restored for the last fifteen months of his thirty-one month term.
The powerful domestic groups that had to be reckoned with, along with their strength and ideological position will be discussed below.
The disagreement over whether or not to allow Goulart to assume office not only foreshadowed, but was characteristic of the polarization within Brazilian society during the Goulart administration. Throughout his term he was plagued by extremists on the left as well as the right. And even though a majority of the electorate remained in the center politically, the radicalized left and right presented forces that exerted considerable power. A further complicating factor on the domestic scene was that different societal groups were divided in their positions toward Goulart. A good example of this is the military, which was the most influential group during that period in history (Parker 1979, 45). Many in the military were very suspicious of Goulart and his historical links to labor. In the early 1950s he had been the Minister of Labor under
Getulio Vargas, who as president was forced out by the military on two separate occasions. In fact, some in the military attempted to block the succession of Goulart after Quadros left office. Those in the military that had been ministers under both
Kubitschek and Quadros attempted to steer Congress into rejecting the constitutional procedures which allowed Goulart to assume power. This peaceful move failed, but was not totally unsuccessful. Although Congress did not break in its confrontation with the military, it did bend. The result was the parliamentary compromise (Skidmore
1967, 208-9). 200
At this point in history, a coup against Goulart would not have been a surprise.
Several had been carried out in the previous decade and the resentment by many in the military toward Goulart made it a viable option. However, it should be mentioned that the military was not a completely cohesive group and was divided over Goulart. He received steadfast support from leftists officers, especially those of his home state, Rio
Grande do Sul. The latter expressed their support in such firm terms that the fear of civil war was real. Thus the fragmentation within the military and the militant stance of those in support of Goulart necessitated the compromise (Skidmore 1967, 210-1).
Therefore, throughout his term, whether it be presidential or parliamentary,
Goulart was constrained by the conservative forces within the military. It is reported that anti-Goulart forces within the military had begun planning his overthrow and discussing plans for his replacement in the early part of 1962 (Skidmore 1967, 224).
He created some breathing room for himself by shuffling military officers around so that they provided less of a threat to him. One such strategy was to ensure that opponents were not in command of troops that could be used against him in a coup attempt (Dulles 1970, 190-1). Regardless, the military threat was always a possibility that had to be considered.
With respect to the nature of the political constraints imposed by the military, it is helpful to examine the military's foreign policy after Goulart was overthrown.
Scholars agree that with the overthrow of Goulart, the ensuing military's foreign policy, led by the new president, Castello Branco, took a turn toward the West
(Martins 1974, 276; Reisky de Dubnic 1969, 282; Selcher 1974, 28; Skidmore 1967, 201
329; Wesson and Fleischer 1983, 152-3).1 Though the degree to which the foreign policy was altered is not completely agreed upon, the consensus is that, at the very least, it no longer could be described as "independent."2 In the words of Selcher (1974,
28): "Returning to the East-West image of world politics, Castello Branco emphasized the need for "interdependence" rather than "independence" with the Western democratic system..." It is reasonable to assume that by pressing for a moderate position toward the United States, the military acted as a conservative constraint on
Goulart's foreign policy.
Goulart also encountered a great deal of opposition from business and rural elites. His reformist policies were perceived as quite threatening to these individuals who had enjoyed the domestic situation before he came to power. This opposition was characteristic of the larger dispute within Brazilian society between those that wished a greater role for the government in the economy (including nationalist control and economic redistribution) and those desiring the status quo (Flynn 1978, 230). With respect to the business community, Goulart's conciliatory position toward labor, in the form of wage increases and the presence of communists within the labor unions, antagonized the business community. Furthermore, his negative policies toward foreign capital alienated the business sector. In contrast to Kubitschek's open door policy,
‘This statement is supported by the results in Chapter 4.
2While Skidmore (1967, 329) describes Castello Branco's foreign policy as "unequivocally pro-American," others describe at as interdependent (see the following quote). 202 under Goulart: "Foreign investors were singled out for attack as an affront to national autonomy, their previously enthusiastic welcome was reversed by a new law limiting repatriation of profits" (Sheahan 1987, 186). One of the more militant -business groups sought to promote anti-Goulart public sentiment. In extreme cases this included organizing "vigilantes to silence leftist hecklers at anti-Communist meetings" through violent means (Skidmore 1967, 225).
The opposition of landowners centered around his plans for land reform.
Goulart1 s land reform proposal was quite radical in that it desired the expropriation of land rather than the more traditional taxation on unutilized land. In addition, he offered to reimburse landowners with bonds instead of cash (Dulles 1970, 226-7). In response, some agrarian elites protested not only verbally but also by stockpiling an increasing number of weapons (Skidmore 1967, 154). Because such a land reform law required a constitutional amendment (with 2/3 congressional majority), the reform attempt failed.
Given the position of these two groups, as well as that of the military, it is clear that the Goulart regime encountered significant opposition from some of the most important societal actors. However, Goulart did receive support for his policies from some of the remaining actors. As one might expect, this support came from those segments of society that had been excluded prior to the Goulart regime.
In contrast to the opposition from the right, Goulart1 s support from the left was very fragmented. Skidmore (1967, 218) argues that the Left can be divided into two groups: the "positive left" and the "negative left." The former was more moderate and taken seriously by those representing the center of the political spectrum. It included 203 such individuals as Celso Furtado, a well-known and widely respected technocrat responsible for Goulart's economic stabilization plan. The negative left was a more radicalized group of nationalists that was comprised of fragments from several smaller groups. These groups included "...Catholic literacy teachers, labor union militants,
Trotskyist student organizers, and artistic idealists" and, in turn, this "radical left...gained government blessing, sometimes even government financing and logistical support" (Skidmore 1989, 173). However, some of the actions adopted by these groups led to fragmentation between the positive and negative left. For instance, the antics of the radicalized left included general strikes by the National Confederations of Industrial
Workers (CNTI) which brought public transportation to a halt and resulted in widespread looting (Skidmore 1967, 218-9). This fragmentation proved very detrimental to Goulart's support, since it was these groups from which Goulart's policies would need to derive the greatest support. Yet their fragmentation prevented unified backing from the left.
Perhaps the most vocal threat of the negative left was Goulart's brother-in-law,
Leonel Brizola. He supported the removal of both the American businessmen and the
Peace Corps. As governor of Rio Grande Do Sul he expropriated ITT's subsidiary
(Bums 1968, 99-100). In March of 1964, Brizola made a speech calling for the dismissal of the Brazilian Congress and the creation of a popular congress comprised of
"laborers, peasants, sergeants, and nationalist officers, and authentic men of the people" (Parker 1979, 59-60). Brizola's frequent nationalist appeals energized the 204 forces of the radical left and made it extremely difficult, if not impossible for Goulart to lead a divided Brazil.
Paradoxically, as Goulart introduced reforms, many on the left demanded more.
This placed Goulart in the difficult position of trying to avoid the extreme hostility of the conservative military and economic elite, as well as the increasingly radical forces of the left. Goulart's relationship with labor illustrates this point. Although Goulart had enjoyed the support of labor as Labor Minister in the 1950s, he was in an increasingly difficult position when he served as president. "As head of the government he found himself pressured for inflationary wage increases, greater welfare legislation, strike protection, etc., all issues that would further weaken his administration if granted. [As a result of his hesitation] Labor became more militant" (Roett 1972a, 132). Thus
Goulart was increasingly pulled from both ends of Brazil’s polarized society.
Within the military, Goulart drew support from the more nationalistic individuals. Just as anti-Goulart military commanders had been transferred to remote positions, nationalists were shifted to strategically important positions (Roett 1972a,
105). Furthermore, enlisted men in the military, which traditionally had very few rights
(including being unable to vote), began to organize for greater rights. Some went as far as to promote unionization. This radical posture alarmed even centrist officers
(Skidmore 1989, 173). Thus, even the selective support from some in the military was precarious.
In sum, the strong demands of the extreme left and right, and the center's fear that Goulart was too radical, left Goulart without a significant source of support. "The 205 left refused to retreat from its position calling for immediate and drastic structural changes; the Center and Right, most of whom were loyal to constitutional procedures and the elite conception of political power so long dominant in Brazil, recoiled from the threats of violence and revolution. Immobilism characterized the Goulart years"
(Roett 1972b, 21). This lack of support was further complicated by his high degree of vulnerability.
According to Hagan (1993, 91-3), the Goulart regime was highly vulnerable to domestic opposition. As mentioned above, the military had overthrown presidents in the recent past (1945 and 1954), and there existed a considerable segment of the military that had been opposed to the idea of Goulart as president since before he had taken office. Therefore, the threat of a military revolt was real throughout Goulart's term, and such a revolt eventually led to the overthrow of Goulart.
In addition, the Goulart regime suffered from two types of vulnerability. On the one hand, the first half of Goulart's term was under a parliamentary system which constrained him. Not only did it necessitate that decisions be approved by the Prime
Minister as well as the minister most directly related to the issue, but it allowed congress to approve and dissolve the Cabinet. In practice this restricted the cabinet members with which Goulart was forced to work. On the other hand, his regime suffered from internal instability. Since during his three-year tenure as president
Goulart had several cabinets, the result was an inability to create a cohesive and durable cabinet to confront the fragmented Brazilian society. This, too, created vulnerability to outside forces. 206
According to Hagan (1993, 93), this high degree of vulnerability forces the regime to be especially sensitive to domestic factors when formulating foreign policy.
Thus it can be concluded that domestic constraints were very significant during the
Goulart administration's term in office. Given this information about domestic politics, it is difficult to predict Goulart's foreign policy response to these pressures. One could justifiably predict that he would adopt an either conservative or radical foreign policy in order to solidify his support from one side or the other. Or it would be reasonable to expect a middle of the road foreign policy in an attempt to please those in the center and avoid further alienating the polarized groups. Goulart adopted the latter of these approaches.
The central question to be addressed here is: can domestic politics explain why
Goulart possessed a foreign policy that was quite moderate toward the United States?
At this point in the case study this question can not be definitively answered, but one can viably assert that Goulart may have sought to steer a middle road with respect to foreign policy in order to play to the center and not align himself with either of the extremes. This is a feasible explanation given the conservative factions of the still powerful military and the large sector of the population that still remained in the center of the political spectrum. Wesson and Fleischer (1983, 148) supports this point of view. He argues that prior to taking office, ",. .Goulart was known for pro-Castro, generally pro-Communist anti-foreign capital views. But Goulart was a practical politician as well as a demagogue, and in the first part of his presidency, he partly backed off from Quadros's left-leaning neutralism." Such an argument supports the 207 position that domestic forces acted as an important constraint of Goulart's foreign policy.
Before drawing conclusions, the external forces and the methodological procedures, on which the characterization of Goulart's regime as a deviant case was based, must be examined. These will be analyzed in the next two sections.
External Variables
The central question that must be addressed in this section is whether or not the
United States or other external factors significantly influenced Brazilian foreign policy under Goulart. First, it is appropriate to determine if the United States desired to influence Goulart's foreign policy. The answer to this question is yes. A radical reform regime desires a high degree of government control over the economy, rejects the notion of unconditional foreign investment, and favors labor. Since control of foreign investment threatens US companies investing in Brazil and government control of the economy and alignment with labor is perceived by the United States as bordering dangerously on socialism, it is expected that the United States would actively attempt to influence the foreign policy of a radical reform regime such as Goulart. The salience of these factors is multiplied when one considers that Castro had become the leader of
Cuba only two years prior to Goulart's ascendence to the Brazilian presidency.
Having established the desire of the US government's to influence Brazilian foreign policy, it must be determined whether this effort was successful. On the surface, it appears that the United States may have been successful. This assertion is 208 based on the results from Chapter Four; that is, Goulart was coded as a radical reformer and expected to have a strongly anti-US foreign policy, but in effect had a moderate foreign policy toward the United States. Before drawing this conclusion, it is necessary to more closely examine the interaction between these two countries.
Relations between the United States and Goulart can best by described as mixed.
In some cases, the United States appeared to have been able to exert some influence upon the Goulart regime. For instance, when the privately-owned US company
International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) subsidiary was expropriated in Rio
Grande do Sul, the US ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, threatened to use the
Hickenlooper Amendment. Under this Amendment, US aid would be cut off to countries not providing just compensation for expropriated properties. In fear of losing this US aid, Goulart offered to pay just compensation, $8 million.
However, the degree to which the United States was able to influence Brazil should not be overstated. Reisky de Dubnic (1969) argues that Brazilian foreign policy toward Cuba and the Soviet Union should be viewed as independent of US pressure since occasional acts of non-compliance served no substantive purpose, especially economic development. Furthermore he argues that Goulart's policies alienated domestic support. "If Goulart's foreign policy of nonalignment had brought tangible advantages to Brazil, he would have been able to strengthen his position inside Brazil"
(Reisky de Dubnic 1969, 282). In particular, Reisky de Dubnic is referring to Brazil’s abstention on the OAS vote regarding Cuba's continued membership in the OAS in 209
January of 1962. "This policy could be considered as autonomous since it could not be traced to pressure from the outside" (1969, 281).
Another example of Brazilian defiance occurred in November of 1963. Goulart made a speech at the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. The meeting's purpose was to facilitate the effectiveness of the Alliance for Progress. Instead of focusing on the meeting's agenda, he angered the United States by expounding his views on Brazil's role as leader of a united bloc of underdeveloped nations in opposition to the developed nations (Parker 1979, 49).
These cases demonstrate the mixed US-Brazilian relations through examples of defiance as well as compliance toward the United States. The examples below are even more telling, as they illustrate both cooperation and conflict at the same time. One such example centers around a Brazilian profit-remittance bill. The United States exerted pressure upon Goulart when a profit-remittance bill which he supported passed the
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies.3 In what certainly appeared to be a concession to this pressure, Goulart managed to prevent this bill from becoming law. However, soon after, a milder profit-remittance bill was made into law (Bell 1972, 84-5).
Another example, revolves around Brazil's economic blueprint, the Three Year
Plan. This austerity plan was designed to address Brazil's ailing economy and win US economic assistance. An agreement was settled upon with the United States to receive aid, but several conditions were attached. In addition to domestic belt-tightening called
JA US Senator threatened to end the Alliance for Progress in Brazil if the Brazilian profit-remittance bill passed (Bell 1972, 84-5). 210 for by the Three Year Plan, the United States demanded that Brazil seek to expand exports, encourage foreign investment and seek additional aid from Europe, Japan ,and the IMF (Parker 1979, 34-9). After some hesitation, Brazil signed the agreement.
However, Goulart viewed the strict terms of the US-Brazilian agreement as '"proof of
US mistrust and that embittered him and further deviated him from the road of cooperation"' (Parker 1979, 41). Soon after losing this struggle with the United States,
Goulart dismissed his cabinet, which led to the death of the Three Year Plan. This example illustrates Goulart's desires to maintain decent relations with the United States, but his concurrent wish to preserve autonomy.
These examples demonstrate the mixed relations between these two countries on salient issues such as Cuba, US aid, and profit remittances. It also illustrates that the
United States may have enjoyed a moderate ability to influence issues salient to US-
Brazilian relations. Before drawing a conclusion on the ability of the United States to influence Brazil, it is useful to analyze the UN and COPDAB data in detail. This will be the topic of the next section.
Operational/Conceptual
Regime Classification. Goulart's words and actions demonstrate why he was classified as a radical reformer. He desired relatively radical land reform, foreign investment was attacked through profit remittances and nationalization, and he sought to generate support through mobilizing the previously ignored sectors (peasants and labor). At the heart of his strategy was a shift in wealth and power from the rich to the 211 poor. Despite his attempts to soften the protit remittance plan and disputes with the far left, his record places him into the radical reform category.
It should be mentioned, however, that the three development strategy types utilized in this project do not comprise three distinct categories. Within each category, the regimes vary and some regimes are more proximal to the ideal type than others. In the radical reform category, differences certainly exist. For instance, the Castro regime is the only truly socialist regime and therefore further to the left than any of the other radical reform regimes. If regimes in this category were placed on a spectrum, the
Goulart regime would likely be the closest to the moderate reform category. His words and deeds, while believed by the author to be within the radical reform strategy were the most moderate. Thus it is not surprising that he is the most pro-US of those coded as a radical reformer. However, this does not explain why his regime was so moderate
(more so than a majority of the moderate reform regimes) in its policies toward the
United States.
United Nations Voting. Interpreting Goulart's foreign policy is very difficult.
Based on his foreign policy pronouncements, one would expect him to implement a radically independent foreign policy (Selcher 1974, 23-7; Young 1982, 72). And while some of his policies such as improving relations with the Communist bloc depict a radical foreign policy, an assessment of his foreign policy as a whole reveals a moderate foreign policy. This is especially true in the United Nations. Under Goulart,
Brazil's speeches at the United Nations aligned itself with the rapidly developing Third
World movement. Brazil pledged to be a leader in the areas of the 3D's: development, 212
disarmament and decolonization (Selcher 1974, 23-7). However, as Chapter Four demonstrated, such a foreign policy did not emerge. Other empirical research on
United Nations voting has arrived at this same conclusion. Selcher (1978, 180) notes
that "Even during the 1961-64 ’independent foreign policy1 of Quadros and Goulart,
Brazil scored much lower in support for these Third World issues than did other
LDCs." The question that must be addressed is whether any methodological factor could account for the appearance of a favorable orientation toward the United States
(such as in the Ruiz regime where it was determined that his UN voting was largely
symbolic). In order to address this question it is appropriate to summarize Brazil's
voting behavior.
Of the almost one-hundred votes cast in the United Nations under the Goulart
regime, Brazil was in total agreement with the United States 63% of the them. In terms of partial agreement, the frequency was almost 28%. Thus, Brazil and the United
States were completely opposed on less than 10% of the votes. Unlike Mexican behavior in the United Nations, a clear pattern, based on issue area does not emerge
when examining Brazil's voting record. In each of these three categories of voting agreement with the United States, one can find development, disarmament, and decolonization issues. In the 16th, 17th, and 18th UN session (the three years in which
Goulart was in power) very few development issues were included in these data. This is either because very few development-related issues were being debated, or they received near-unanimous support and therefore were excluded from the statistical analysis. A significant number of issues can be classified as either disarmament- or 213
decolonization-related. Of the two, Brazil adopts a more pro-Third World (i.e., anti-
US) position on the former.
Counting the votes reveals that 13 votes were taken on disarmament issues,
which include nuclear testing as well as strict disarmament votes. Of these twelve,
Brazil partially agreed on 4 and totally disagreed on 4. On the surface this does not appear to represent an important trend, but the votes in which the two countries agreed
upon must be closely examined. Of the 5 votes on which they agreed, 4 of the 5 are
votes in which the United States is in line with a third world position, in that they seek
to restrict nuclear tests. Therefore, Brazil is maintaining what can be considered a
Third World stance on this issue.
The same can not be said, however, with regards to the decolonization (or self-
determination issue). Of the nearly 30 votes on decolonization, Brazil agreed with the
United States on over 60%. Although in a few of these cases, the US-Brazilian agreement is due to an underlying cold war theme (e.g., encouraging Tibetan self- determination from China), Brazil still appears to neglect a Third World position. This
presents a contradiction in Brazil's foreign policy statements and foreign policy behavior. In part, this reluctance to support decolonization can be attributed to the fact that one-fifth of these votes pertained to the Portuguese occupation of Angola. Given
that Brazil was colonized by Portugal and still shared a special relationship with it,
Brazil was reluctant to condemn Portugal. While Brazil's position was less conciliatory toward Portugal under Goulart, it still refrained from outright condemnation of its former colonizer (Selcher 1974, 159-61). On the remaining self-determination issues, 214 such as Oman, West Irian, and Southern Rhodesia, Brazil demonstrates limited opposition to the United States, but not as much as one would expect for a radical reform regime.
It is also instructive to examine the votes on South Africa. While this is not considered a colonial issue, it was an important North-South issue at the time. Brazil, once again, largely agreed with the United States on this issue by refraining from taking a Third World position. In 6 of the 7 votes, Brazil totally agreed with the United
States. In the only remaining vote, the United States voted against boycotts of South
Africa while Brazil abstained. Finally, it should be mentioned that Brazil agreed with the United States almost exclusively on the issue of admitting China to the United
Nations and condemnation of the Soviet Union's occupation of Hungary.
The summary of Brazil's voting behavior does not highlight any significant patterns that would cast doubt on the findings in Chapter Four. Next, the COPDAB data will be examined to determine if there are any such patterns.
COPDAB. As with the UN voting data, the COPDAB data reveals a Goulart that is much more pro-US than one would expect. Of the 41 events contained in this data set, 15 are conflictual. Of these 15, two-thirds are coded as "political order, political relations, and law/organization." Therefore it includes "...major political interactions between countries. Such events as diplomatic recognition, border disputes, formation or dissolution of alliances, treaties, or international organizations" (Azar
1982, 13). The high percentage of negative events coded in this category mirrors the percentage of events coded in this category for cooperative events. Similarly, the 215 category containing the next highest number of events is the economic relations category. This is true for conflictual, as well as cooperative events. Since the categories are quite equal with respect to cooperative and conflictual events, no distinct patterns are revealed.
It should also be mentioned that the intensity of the events do not disclose any important patterns. If it was discovered that the collapsed COPDAB 1 data disclosed a moderately pro-US Brazil, but the COPDAB 2 data revealed a significantly more anti-
US Brazil, this would be an important finding. However, Brazil is even more pro-US on the COPDAB 2 results, which attempts to measure intensity of foreign policy events, than on the COPDAB 1 results that treats all positive and negative events as equal.
Conclusion
In sum, Goulart's foreign policy is difficult to decipher. The results from this study depict a Brazilian foreign policy which is moderate and inconsistent. The section on internal variables portrayed a regime influenced by the unstable and polarized domestic situation. His foreign policy, which was characterized by cooperation one day and conflict the next, is consistent with the explanation that this was the result of an incoherent foreign policy characterized by attempts to please those on the left as well as the right. In other words, Goulart appears to have been a pragmatic leader confronted by a highly polarized domestic situation. An examination of the external variable offered some evidence that the United States may have been a factor in moderating 216
Goulart’s foreign policy. As discussed below, an analysis of UN voting and COPDAB data reinforces these conclusions.
With respect to UN voting, two important components in Goulart's foreign policy emerge--the importance of domestic opposition and pragmatism. With regards to
Goulart's somewhat inconsistent foreign policy toward Portugal and its relationship to
Angola, Selcher (1974, 161) points to the domestic situation as the probable cause.
It [Brazilian delegation to the United Nations] always spoke in favor of independence for the territories but on occasion resorted to abstention on procedural grounds to avoid open condemnation of Portugal. Such painful inconsistency was a function not only of changing figures in the Foreign Ministry and the United Nations but also of the great domestic resistance encountered whenever a vote contrary to Portugal was cast for the supposedly gratuitous purpose of appealing to the anticolonialist bloc. The latter issue of contention was in reality an international ramification of the domestic political struggle between conservatives and developmental nationalists.
That Goulart may have been a highly pragmatic leader is highlighted in Brazil's position on South Africa. It is asserted that while Goulart wished to support the other
African countries on moral grounds, Brazil did not wish to jeopardize its important trade relationship with South Africa (Selcher 1974, 190-1).
Thus the UN analysis offers support for the assertion that domestic opposition, coupled with Goulart's pragmatism were important determinants in Goulart's anomalous foreign policy, in addition, the inconsistent Brazilian foreign policy found in the COPDAB results reinforces the image of a pragmatic Goulart plagued by domestic polarization. For instance, one day Goulart would make friendly overtures toward the 217
United States and the next day he would denounce the United States and the Alliance for Progress.
Given this evidence of pragmatism, the knowledge that the United States attempted to influence Brazilian foreign policy, and the pro-US results of Brazil's UN voting, it is reasonable to posit that Goulart may have been constrained by US pressure.
At the very least, US pressure reinforced domestic pressures toward a more pro-US foreign policy.
Based on this information, Brazilian foreign policy does not appear to be characterized by consensus with the United States. Instead, domestic constraints and possibly external constraints (compliance) appear to be important. This conclusion, that internal, and to a lesser extent, external factors influenced Goulart1 s foreign policy is supported by McCann (1981, 17). He writes:
The interpretation of Brazilian policy in the 1960s is clouded by partisan rhetoric. Quadros and Goulart used foreign policy to improve their credentials with the left. However, their baiting of the United States must be balanced with the image of Goulart traveling to Washington to secure loans and to convince officials that 'anti-Americanism has never caught on here and never will.' Considering the United States had blatantly intervened in internal affairs via the 'islands of administrative sanity1 policy providing aid monies to friendly state governments, Goulart was either extremely patient or helpless to stop the affront to Brazilian sovereignty. 218 Salvador Allende Gossens
11/3/70-9/11/1973
Following his election as President of Chile, Allende was inaugurated on
November 3, 1970 and served until September 11, 1973, before he died in a violent military coup. His support was derived from the Popular Unity coalition (UP)-a broad coalition of leftist groups. Domestically, he sought to take his country down the
"Chilean road to Socialism." This involved the nationalization of various companies and economic sectors, and significant land reform. Foreign investment and the traditional domestic elite of Chile were attacked. Housing, education, and medical care were extended to those previously unable to afford it. In general, these policies were intended to mobilize mass support for the regime. "The policy of the Popular Unity government would be directed at carrying out 'the transition to socialism' through the united action of 'the immense majority' of Chileans (Sigmund 1976, 117).
On the international scene, Allende adopted an active, anti-imperialist position.
Diplomatic and economic relations were extended to communist countries, and Fidel
Castro was warmly welcomed when he visited Chile in 1971. Naturally, US-Chilean relations suffered during this period. In addition to US security concerns in the region,
US companies such as ITT were nationalized. In anticipation of Allende's policies, the
CIA's anti-Allende efforts had begun even before Allende had taken power. For instance, the CIA had heavily funded the campaign of one of Allende* s opponents in the presidential election. Later, the Nixon administration ensured that US and 219 multilateral lending agencies withheld support from Chile. The end of Allende1 s term came when the military took control on September 11th and replaced Allende with
Augusto Pinochet.
Internal Variables
Allende won a three-way election in September of 1973. His 36.3% of the vote narrowly defeated the candidate of the right, Jorge Alessandri, who garnered 34.9% of the vote. The third candidate, whose political orientation was moderate, won just under
28% of the vote and conceded soon after the votes were counted. According to Chilean law, the Senate is to choose between the top two candidates if no candidate receives a majority, and it traditionally chose the top vote receiver. However, given Allende's radical agenda, the Alessandri supporters balked at selecting Allende. In the end,
Alessandri announced that he would not accept the presidency. Despite continued attempts by Alessandri's supporters to block Allende ascension to power, they did not have the numerical strength required of congress and Allende became president
(Sigmund 1976, 117; Sobel 1974, 31-2).
The domestic opposition to Allende was very similar to that of Goulart.
Reactions from similar groups could be expected since they are both radical reformers threatening the interests of the same groups. One of the key opposition groups of
Allende was the armed forces. Some in the military were among those domestic opposition groups that attempted to keep Allende from assuming office; and it was the military that eventually removed him from power in 1973. Although Allende knew 220 from the outset that a military coup against him was a possibility, he underestimated the military's willingness to intervene in civilian politics and overthrow a democratically elected regime. This misplaced trust was largely based on the military's record-they had not successfully removed an elected regime since 19324 (Alexander 1978, 288-9).
In general, Allende and the military enjoyed relatively cordial relations throughout the Allende presidency. He was very respectful of the military as an institution, he appointed officers to civilian administration and cabinet posts, publicly praised them, and allowed them to continue receiving aid from the United States.
According to an agreement he signed prior to taking office, he did not use officer promotions for political purposes. Despite these cordial relations significant opposition within the military existed. Perhaps Allende's greatest mistake was in allowing, through the import of arms, a significant sector of the civilian population to acquire weapons; a policy which had the consequences of arming groups supportive of Allende.
This undermined the monopoly that the military possessed on force and understandably threatened them (Alexander 1978, 292-300).
In September of 1973, the military ousted Allende. The crucial question here is: to what extent did the military constrain Allende's foreign policy? Based on a reading of country experts, these constraints can be described as moderate at best. For while the threat of military opposition was present throughout his term, Allende did not appear to believe that such a coup against him was likely. "Allende believed in the loyalty of the
4While there were a few attempts during this period, none had been successful. 221 top military officers and of the armed forces in general until the end" (Alexander 1978,
300). And it seems these perceptions were not totally displaced, as the constitutional- orientation of the armed forces "were real enough...[that] it took the Right and the
Americans three full years to prepare the Chilean military for the coup" (Roxborough et. al. 1977, 188). Therefore, with respect to vulnerability, the actual influence of the military on Allende1 s foreign policy is not as great as, perhaps, it could have been.
A more cohesive and intransigent opponent of the Allende regime was the civilian Right, composed of the traditional business and landed elite. This broad grouping was composed of those that enjoyed the status quo prior to Allende and opposed socialism. Not surprisingly, the private sector detested Allende. Upon assuming office, Allende attacked foreign investment, nationalized copper, coal, steel, and 60% of the private banks. In addition, he raised wages while freezing prices and called for sweeping land reform. The land reform decidedly favored small farmers and state-controlled cooperatives. "The owners of large firms, banks, and rural estates reacted immediately in vehement opposition to the govemment~a fact which was predictable and inevitable" (Bitar 1986, 203). To demonstrate this opposition to the government, many protest marches were organized. One such March on April 1972 boasted over 200,000 participants (Sobel 1974, 82). Another tact by some within these groups came as a reaction to Allende's move to freeze prices while raising wages. In reaction to this policy, which was designed to benefit the consumer at the expense of the producer, the latter were prompted to ignore orders by merchants (Skidmore 1989,
131). As a result, consumer goods were soon in short supply. 222
While opposition was inevitable from these groups, the middle sectors represented a pivotal group that Allende attempted to court. In order to avoid alienating this sector, comprised of professionals, white-collar workers, and bureaucrats, Allende focused on a gradual nationalization of larger enterprises. However, this proved to be an impossible task given that the interests of these middle sectors were tied to the private sector (Wynia 1990, 182). Skidmore (1989, 136) argues that in addition to these groups, Allende1 s move toward socialism generated opposition from the vitally important militant lower-middle-class activists, which included storekeepers and truckers. Their opposition was manifested in a series of important strikes that polarized
Chilean politics. The strikes consisted of among others, truckers, small businessmen, and private farmers. "Although often orchestrated by opposition politicians, these eruptions showed that widespread sectors of the Chilean public would confront the government in the streets. Virtually all of them stood to lose if a socialist society were achieved..." (Skidmore 1989, 133).
In addition to the opposition from these domestic groups, Allende faced opposition in both houses of congress. This frustrated much of his domestic policies.
Perhaps the most important defeat suffered by Allende was his attempt to merge the two houses of congress into a single Assembly of the People. Similarly, attempts by
Allende to dissolve congress, through a bill that would set up a national referendum, were also defeated (Sobel 1974, 45).
However, despite this significant and relatively cohesive opposition, Allende managed to generate a considerable amount of domestic support. The bulk of Allende's 223 support came from the Popular Unity coalition which included the Movement for
Unitary Popular Action, and the Communists, Socialists, Radical and Social
Democratic parties. As one might expect, this coalition received support from those groups that his policies were designed to benefit, that is, rural and especially urban laborers. This support was greatest in urban areas where "UP could on command turn out several hundred thousand disciplined marchers" (Skidmore 1987, 133; see also
Alexander 1978). For instance, on March 23, 1992 four pro-government marches were coordinated to converge in the center of Santiago. This pro-Allende march was designed to demonstrate widespread support for the Allende regime in its battles against an unfriendly Congress (Sobel 1974, 80).
In another similarity to Goulart's support, the UP was split into moderates and radicals. The latter pushed for more state involvement in the economy and a militant posture toward its opposition. The moderates feared that such a strategy would further alienate the middle sectors and encourage the military to heed the calls from the Right for intervention (Skidmore 1987, 133).
Since the opposition groups comprised the economically most powerful groups in Chilean society, domestic opposition was significant. Although the executive is exclusively responsible for foreign policy, it is reasonable to expect that Allende, like
Goulart, took these groups into consideration when formulating foreign policy. The support for Allende on the left certainly offered a counterbalance to the agitation on the right. Thus, like the Goulart regime, society was polarized. At this point, it appears that Allende could have chosen between opting for a moderate foreign policy, and 224 therefore appeasing the powerful groups on the right, or adopting an aggressively anti imperialist foreign policy to consolidate support on the left. In the end, in contrast to
Goulart, Allende chose the latter. To what extent domestic groups influenced this policy is debatable. However, since Allende's foreign policy does not seem artificially conflictual or cooperative with the United States, but is consistent with his stated foreign policy goals, the role of domestic factors seems minimal. To a great extent, this seems to be due to his firm ideological stance and relative lack of perceived vulnerability. With respect to the former, Allende appears to be highly committed to his radical reformist ideological program. Thus, in contrast to Goulart, he seems much less pragmatic and more ideologically-driven. In addition, it is reasonable to argue that
Allende’s ability to follow through on his ideological program is facilitated by his relatively low level of concern with the Chilean military. Since he did not fear the military to the extent that Goulart did, he was less constrained by their presence. The impact of domestic variables will be discussed in greater detail after considering additional variables below.
External Variables
It is clear that the United States sought to influence Chilean foreign policy. This can be inferred from its aggressive attempt to alter the course of domestic politics. In particular, due to the United States' fear of Allende winning the 1970 election, the CIA funneled over $1 million in order to assist Alessandri's campaign. The CIA was also involved in other covert military options to prevent Allende from becoming president 225
(Sater 1990, 160-4). Concern in Washington stemmed from its own tentative relations with other countries-Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia--in the region and Allende's potential as an exporter of communism. "Thus, Santiago might emerge as the leader of a fracticious Southern Cone, thereby shattering the already fragile inter-American system. If Chile nationalized American holdings without paying compensation, it could set a dangerous precedent" (Sater 1990, 162).
Again, the query must be addressed as to whether the United States was able to influence Chilean foreign policy. This can be determined by looking at the correlation between the foreign policy goals of the UP and its actual foreign policy behavior.
Unlike the foreign policy goals of the Goulart regime, those of the Allende and the UP were quite clear. The foreign policy generated by the UP revolved around the principles of: strengthening national sovereignty, respecting self-determination and non intervention, expanding the scope of its economic and diplomatic relations, strengthening Latin American independence from the United States, supporting movements of national liberation, and condemning racial segregation and anti-
Semitism. It should also be mentioned that, in contrast to domestic politics, this list of foreign principles received broad consensus within the UP coalition (Almeyda 1979,
77-8). It is evident that such a list of foreign policy tenets are quite consistent with those expected to be pursued by a radical reform regime. Therefore, the degree to which Chilean foreign policy deviated from these principles can provide evidence of the
US’s ability or inability to influence it. 226
The results from Chapter Four and the description of Allende's foreign policy by country experts (Alexander 1978; Almeyda 1979; Sater 1990), demonstrate that the
United States had very little impact on Chilean foreign policy.5 During his three years in office, Allende opened relations with the People's Republic of China, North
Vietnam, Albania, and North Korea. In addition, ties were renewed and close relations were established with Cuba. Furthermore, good relations were maintained with the vast majority of Latin American nations and aid was sought from sympathetic Western
European countries (Alexander 1978, 209-16). These foreign policy activities are completely compatible with the above list of principles agreed upon by the UP. Thus, the link between Allende's desired and actual policies appears to be quite direct.
There is, however, some evidence that Allende may have modified his relations with the United States to a small extent. Despite the agreement within the UP regarding foreign policy, Almeyda (1979,, 84) notes that there was a small minority which argued for a more confrontational policy toward the United States. The basis for this position was that it would generate more domestic support for the regime if it adopted such a nationalistic foreign policy. The majority did not endorse this position. In fact,
Almeyda (1979, 90) argues that foreign policy toward the United States was approached with caution.
The basic goal underlying the Unidad Popular's policy toward the United States was to minimize the spread of conflicts which were necessarily going to emerge when the government's program was put into practice. In other words-as noted
5 The results from the former will be discussed in the operational/conceptual section. 227
above-the Chilean government sought to avoid a severe confrontation between the two countries, which could only have a negative outcome for Chile.
Nevertheless, Allende1 s foreign policy toward the United States was very strongly anti-
US when compared to other countries during the same time period. Before concluding on the degree to which the United States was able to moderate Chile's US foreign policy, a closer examination of the UN and COPDAB data is appropriate.
Operational/Conceptual
Regime Classification. There can be no question that Allende is a radical reformist. His "Chilean road to Socialism" quite closely mirrors the ideal type. He checked foreign investment and extended control of the state over the economy through extensive nationalization of the economy and engaged in significant land reform. In addition, he strongly favored labor. He expanded the number of government jobs and experimented with worker-managed cooperatives that were owned by the state. He also
froze prices, while increasing salaries. In essence, Allende sought a redistribution of wealth which included "depriving] the economic elite of its wealth and power..."
(Wynia 1990, 182). Therefore, it is clear that Allende was classified accurately.
United Nations Voting. The expectations, that Allende's regime will vote according to its principles, is confirmed by its United Nations voting record. Of the
141 resolutions upon which the United States and Chile voted, they were diametrically opposed on almost 70%.6 The two countries partially agreed (or partially disagreed) on
6 On a very small number of resolutions, Chile was absent. 228
22% and totally agreed on less than 10%. Thus the radical reform regime fulfilled expectations. However, a more rigorous, in-depth examination of the countries' votes is essential. It is useful to more closely examine these three categories.
With respect to resolutions in which the two countries completely disagreed, as expected, self-determination issues fall into this category. Seventeen resolutions (18%) in all can be placed into this category. Another set of issues debated in the United
Nations concerned various economic issues. These issues included a country's right of sovereign control over its natural resources, the seabed treaty, and various United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) issues. These UNCTAD issues included resolutions on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and developing countries, and assistance to developing countries with debt problems.
This category included nearly one-fifth of the resolutions on which the two countries disagreed.
More importantly, however, are strictly cold war resolutions. During the early
1970s, when Allende was in power, the United Nation's agenda was beginning to change toward more social and economic issues. Therefore, the number of strictly cold war resolutions is quite small in UN voting sessions 25 (1971), 26 (1972), and 27
(1973). The primary cold war issue that does exist is that of admission of China to the
United Nations. On the former, the United States was apparently unable to persuade
Chile to vote against the representation of Communist China in the United Nations. In fact, it was in 1971, that enough countries voted against the United States and its allies, 229 and Communist China became the official representative of the China seat in the United
Nations.7
In order to place voting behavior into perspective, the resolutions on which the
United States and Chile either partially agreed (or partially disagreed) or fully agreed
must be examined. The resolutions on which Chile and the United States partially agreed can be placed in two categories. The first consists of resolutions in which the
United States has moved toward Chile. These are resolutions in which Chile voted as expected, but the United States voted in an unexpected manner. For instance, in the
27th session on a vote regarding the responsibilities of developing countries in (GATT),
Chile adopted its characteristicly pro-Third World position. However, the United States abstained. Votes such as these can not be considered as possible examples of compliance by Chile.
The second, and more prevalent category consists of examples where Chile abstains and the United States adopts its "normal" position. For example, in the 26th
session, for reasons not immediately evident such as the wording of the resolution,
Chile abstained on a vote which questioned South Africa's credentials, while the United
States voted against it. On the surface, such examples appear to suggest coercion by the
United States. However, there are reasons to doubt this conclusion. The first reason concerns the number of resolutions in this category that are important enough for the
7 The rest of the resolutions on which the two countries disagreed on consist of resolutions that are less important to this study, such as UN funding equations, population issues, human rights in armed conflict, the conference on the human environment, and international terrorism. 230
United States to expend diplomatic energy attempting to influence Chile. These include resolutions on South Africa, and the Israeli occupied territories. It should be noted that these comprise only a very small number of these resolutions, and a larger number of votes on these issues can be found in the list of resolutions on which the US and Chile totally disagree. Furthermore, one can not find any votes in this category regarding the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations. The remaining votes occur on issues of self-determination (in which it is doubtful that the United States influenced
Chile's vote, given the far larger number on which they disagreed upon) and less meaningful resolutions, such as, the conference on the human environment, the Middle
East,8 and procedural resolutions. Finally, it should also be stated that an abstention still signifies a significant degree of disagreement.
The final category includes thirteen resolutions on which the United States and
Chile were in full agreement. The discussion immediately above also pertains to this category. These votes were not on cold war issues, and in some instances represent relatively non-controversial issues. A majority of the resolutions in this category appear to represent clear consensus between the two countries. For example, their agreement on assistance to countries in case of a natural disaster, the protection of war correspondents, and condemnation of racial discrimination.
8 It should be pointed out that on all three of these issues, the votes here represent a minority of times these issues were voted upon. On the other resolutions, Chile totally disagreed with the United States with a higher frequency. 231
Based on this summary of UN voting, it is evident that the UN data reflect an accurate picture that Chile and the United States consistently and regularly disagreed on important issues.
COPDAB. During Allende's term in office, 78 events were coded in the
COPDAB data set. Conflictual events represent 58.6% of the total events. The vast majority of the negative events are classified into two categories-'economic relations and political order," "political relations, and law/organization." Fifty-five percent of these fall in the "economic relations" category and 29% in the latter category. Only 6% of all of the negative events are considered symbolic political events. When this evidence is coupled with the intensity of the event, the seriousness of the conflict is evident. Of the 51 total negative events, only 18% fall into the least serious category—
"mild verbal hostility/discord." The majority of the events, "strong verbal hostility" comprise 57% of the events. Even the next two categories-" hostile diplomatic economic actions" (18%) and "political-military hostile actions" (8%), received a significant number of events.9 The latter statistics are meant to demonstrate that there was substance to the conflictual acts initiated by Chile. It is not meant, however, to imply that the intensity of the acts were especially high for a Strongly Anti-US regime.
In fact, when Chile’s relative rank order is compared on COPDAB 1 and COPDAB 2, there is no change in its standing. It is the fifth most anti-US regime on both measures.
9 It should be noted that the next category involves "small scale military acts." None of Chile's events achieved this intensity. 232
As in the UN voting section, the COPDAB data reveals a Chilean foreign policy that is significantly conflictual toward the United States.
Conclusion
The evidence in this case study points to an Allende regime that followed its foreign policy principles and was not influenced by the United States in any significant manner (see Table 21 below for a summary). The domestic situation was such that
Allende could have drifted to the right in an attempt to appease his opposition or move even further to the left to increase support from the radical left. As argued in the internal and external variable sections, the Allende regime maintained its foreign policy principles in spite of its domestic and foreign opposition. The same can be said with regard to the examination of the Allende regime's UN voting record and COPDAB results. In both, Chile remained steadfast in its adherence to an anti-imperialist, pro-
Third World foreign policy. Thus given the support of the operational/conceptual section, (that is, no reasons to question the findings) it can be concluded that, as expected, the relationship between Allende's development strategy and foreign policy behavior was relatively direct and uninhibited by internal or external influences.
Similarly, Goulart faced a highly polarized domestic situation. However, the
Goulart regime appears to have been more vulnerable to its domestic opposition, especially the pro-US military. Given the military's historical willingness to intervene in domestic politics (in contrast to Chile's military), Goulart appears to have reacted to this vulnerability by moderating his foreign policy. This moderation may also have 233
been a result of US pressure on the Goulart regime to temper its foreign policy. The
operational/conceptual section did not generate any significant patterns that would
contradict these findings.
In sum, Allende perceived a less effective opposition and was more
ideologically committed personally from the outset. In contrast, Goulart perceived a
much more effective opposition and responded to it. The United States tried to
influence both regimes, but appears to have had no overt success with Allende, but
mixed results with Goulart.
TABLE 21 Summary of Findings for Radical Reform Case Studies
Regimes Internal Variables ...... 1 f I1- ‘ ’ , t
Goulart (Bradl) -High polarization -Moderately -Not a factor (Deviant Case) -High level of important perceived vulnerability Allende (Chile)::. -High polarization -Little salience -Not a factor (ConforatfnfCaK) -Moderate level of perceived
- ■' : . • \-.V ’ •> vulnerability Chapter VIII
Conclusion
As explained in Chapter One, this study was designed to explore the relationship between development strategy and Latin American foreign policy toward the United
States. These expectations were based on the previous studies by area experts that have
stressed its salience to Latin American foreign policy. Despite this perceived
importance, its effect on foreign policy has never been systematically explored. The purpose of this study, therefore, was to address this gap in the literature. The hypotheses below identity the expected relationship between a Latin American countries' development strategy and its subsequent foreign policy toward the United
States.
HI: Regimes that follow a conventional development strategy will be most likely to have foreign policies that coincide with those of the United States; regimes with a radical reform strategy will be least likely to possess foreign policies that coincide with those of the United States; and moderate reform regimes will have foreign policies that fall in between these two.
H2: Regimes that follow a conventional development strategy will be most likely to cooperate with the United States in their foreign policy; regimes with a radical reform strategy will be least cooperative; and moderate reform regimes will have a foreign policy that falls in between these two.
234 235
In order to test these hypotheses, 121 Latin American regimes were analyzed.
These regimes held power from between 1948 and 1978 in one of the twenty Latin
American countries. The relationship between the development strategy of these regimes and their foreign policy was calculated in several different ways in Chapter
Four. When only the regimes coded with high confidence were examined, 71% of the regimes possessing a conventional development strategy had a Pro-US (Strongly or
Moderately Pro-US) foreign policy for UN voting (see Table 7). For moderate reform regimes, 67% exhibited either Moderately Pro- or Anti-US foreign policy. When radical reform regimes were tested, 100% possessed anti-US foreign policies (either
Moderately or Strongly Anti-US). The corresponding correlations, based on a
Pearson's r statistic was equally impressive. For the high confidence regimes, the correlation coefficient was -.56.1
The COPDAB data results were similar. Sixty-three percent of the conventional development strategy regimes had pro-US foreign policies, and 55% of the moderate reformers possessed either Moderately Anti- or Moderately Pro-US foreign policies. As in the UN results, all of the radical reform regimes had Anti-US foreign policies. The
'The coefficient is negative because the development strategies were number as follows: conventional development strategy = 1, moderate reform development strategy = 2, and radical reform development strategy =3; and the higher the UN or COPDAB score, the higher the degree of cooperation with the United States. Therefore, a high degree of cooperation with the United States would correlate negatively with the conventional development strategy which was assigned a 1, and a low degree of cooperation would correlate negatively with a radical reform regime, which was assigned a 3. 236 correlation coefficient, although not as high as that for the UN data, was still noteworthy at -.47.
These findings are significant when taken in the context of the existing literature. For years, the dominant explanation of dependent state foreign policy was based on the assertion that it complied with core state foreign policy. Recent studies have demonstrated the complexity of dependent state foreign policy. For instance
Biddle and Stephens (1989) and Hey (1994) have called attention to, not only the ability, but, the tendency of Latin American countries to follow foreign policies based on considerations other than US wishes. This research project tested the explanatory value of one such variable, development strategy, to explain Latin American foreign policy. The development strategy variable is based on the belief that economic development is an important, if not the central, concern for Latin America leaders.2
Furthermore, it is posited that different leaders have different viewpoints on how best to achieve economic development. These alternative viewpoints are referred to as development strategies. Which development strategy a regime chooses can be based on various factors, such as: the regimes attitude toward redistribution, the position of its domestic allies, and economic ideology.
In turn, a regimes development strategy has implication for its foreign policy. In short, the desire to control the distribution of economic resources domestically (found in the moderate reform and more so in the radical reform) can best be implemented at
^ e basis for this assertion and those below were developed in Chapter Two. 237 the international level by acting as a buffer (through controls on foreign investment, nationalization, or pushing for greater international controls on economic activity) between the domestic and international economy. For the conventional development strategy, it is hypothesized that they are more comfortable with free market-oriented policies and the resulting distribution of wealth, and therefore less inclined to intervene in the economic realm. The result is that the conventional development strategy is more pro-US since the United States champions pro-market foreign policy. Likewise the radical reformer is expected to be strongly anti-US since capitalism and imperialism are viewed as central causes of Latin American underdevelopment. Finally, the moderate reformer's foreign policy falls in between these two since it desires control over the economy, but doesn't reject the free market.
Thus this exploratory research project, based on three somewhat crude categories of development strategy, has made several contributions to the literature on dependent state foreign policy in general, and Latin American foreign policy in particular. These contributions can be organized into three areas. First, it has demonstrated that a link does exist between development strategy and Latin American foreign policy. Second, the statistical analysis, and especially the case studies, have generated some qualifications to the development strategy approach. Finally, as discussed in the introductory chapter, the concept of development strategy is a meaningful place to start when testing the compliance, consensus, and counterdependence approaches. These three contributions will be further discussed 238 below, followed by a discussion of future research avenues that would complement this research.
The Link Between Development Strategy and Latin American Foreign Policy
A primary contribution of this study is that it has contributed to the literature by operationalizing the concept of development strategy and testing its relationship to Latin
American foreign policy. On the one hand, the results demonstrated that development strategy is a significant factor in Latin American foreign policy that should not be ignored. If one only knows the development strategy of a Latin American country, and nothing else, its foreign policy toward the United States can be predicted with a significant amount of certainty. This conclusion, however, should not be overstated; for while development strategy is a salient factor, the relationship between it and foreign policy in Latin America is complex. As was stressed in the introductory chapter, in no way was it expected that development strategy would explain the foreign policy of all or even a vast majority of the regimes. Instead, this research was intended to extend the literature by exploring the relationship between development strategy and foreign policy. The complexity of Latin American foreign policy is discussed in the section below.
Qualifications to Development Strategy
The findings from the statistical analysis demonstrate that development strategy possesses a significant degree of explanatory value for Latin American foreign policy. 239
This conclusion, however, must be qualified due to the number of cases not satisfactorily explained by development strategy. In Chapter Four, an attempt was made to explain the deviant cases in the statistical analysis. That analysis focused on coercion by the United States, and the time period during which the regimes held power. While this discussion disclosed several possible patterns for explaining the outliers, this evidence was quite tentative. The case studies revealed the complexity of Latin
American foreign policy and offered several qualifications to the link between development strategy and foreign policy. These qualifications are summarized in the table and discussed below. 240
TABLE 22 Summary of Findings for Selected Case Studies
Regime Internal Variables £«|pdVlt$#ti Operationalization/Con • * 4 . *.' * r ‘ < ’ •* ' > \ i n * „ ' - ! Ruiz (Mexico) , -Strong influence of -US influence -Anti-US behavior (D«viaiiittase) • historical principles constraining, but not largely symbolic -Cooptation of exceedingly restrictive opposition -Low vulnerability to domestic forces
Kubifscfaek{Brazfl) -No apparent influence -Little effort by US to -Not a factor (Conforming Cue) of historical principles influence due to apparent -Little opposition from consensus domestic factors -Moderately vulnerable to domestic opposition
FlgutrefrCostftRkft -Little domestic -US influence minimal -Costa Rican-USSR (Deviant Case) . opposition relations not included in -Political culture possible COPDAB explanation -Little vulnerability to domestic forces
T0c*^(ftnuina) -Little domestic -US pressure may have -Small number of UN (Conforming Case) opposition had slight moderating votes may cause -Political culture not a effect distortion salient variable -Little vulnerability to domestic forces
Goulart (Brazil) -High polarization -Moderately important -Not a factor (Deviant Case) -High level of perceived
t I 1 7 > *•! . * vulnerability
AD ead^(Cid)e); :■ : -High polarization -Little salience -Not a factor -Moderate level of perceived vulnerability 241
The columns report the results for each of the three sections examined: internal, external and operational/conceptual.3
The Ruiz case study (Mexico) provided two important insights. First, it demonstrated the importance of examining the content of the United Nations and
COPDAB data. As discussed in Chapter Five, the Ruiz regime was generally anti-US, but a closer look revealed this was primarily confined to issues of low salience to the
United States (i.e., Third World issues, not cold war issues). This does not mean, however, that the statistical analysis should be disregarded for all other regimes. Since the analysis of the data for the other five case studies did not reveal patterns nearly as dramatic as the Ruiz data, this conclusion is not justified. In terms of the development strategy approach, this finding means that researchers must be aware that the UN and
COPDAB data must be closely examined before definitive conclusions can be drawn.
The Ruiz case study also demonstrated that some countries may represent
"unique cases." The statistical analysis demonstrated some evidence for this based on the relative consistency of Mexican foreign policy. The case study of Ruiz reinforced this argument by citing the considerable agreement among area experts that Mexican foreign policy is heavily influenced by its history. In addition, the several decade rule by the PRI has contributed to the ability of Mexico to maintain a relatively consistent foreign policy regardless of the development strategy of the specific leader. This finding from the Mexican case study demonstrates that the development strategy
3It should be pointed out that these are abbreviated summaries, and may not reveal the complexity of the case studies. 242
approach must consider the possibility that the strong presence of historical factors,
such as a country's revolutionary past may supersede a development strategy
explanation.4
Based on this case study, the initial hypotheses pertaining to a conventional
regime's foreign policy must be modified to read as follows:
HI: Regimes that follow a conventional development strategy will be most likely to have foreign policies that coincide with those of the United States, except when their foreign policy is symbolic (issues are of relatively low salience to the core state) or there exists a strong tradition of anti-core foreign policy.
H2: Regimes that follow a conventional development strategy will be most likely to cooperate with the United States in their foreign policy, except when their foreign policy is symbolic (issues are of relatively low salience to the core state) or there exists a strong tradition of anti-core foreign policy.
The Kubitschek (Brazil) case study gave general support to the argument that
development strategy and foreign policy are correlated. As anticipated, the case study
revealed that the domestic groups that would be expected to support a conventional
development strategy (i.e., economic elites and a large majority of the middle class)
also supported the pro-US foreign policy. While this supports the expectations of this
study, it also reveals the difficulty of establishing causation. Given that the desired
foreign policy of the domestic groups coincide with that of the Kubitschek's development strategy, it is difficult to determine whether Kubitschek was forced to
4Cochrane, et. al. argue that political culture is an important variable in Latin American foreign policy. Unfortunately, their recent book on this subject focuses on the salience of political culture to the decisionmaking process, rather than substantive foreign policy outcome. 243 adopt a pro-US foreign policy or his policies were simply reinforced by those groups.
However, given his conventional development strategy, it is likely that the latter is more accurate.
As discussed in Chapter Six, Costa Rica appears to represent a special case, based on its tradition of adherence to democratic principles and anti-communism.
Given Costa Rica's special relationship with the United States, the vast majority of
Costa Rican regimes [including Figueres (1970-4)], regardless of their development strategy, adopt a pro-US foreign policy. This is true for both the United Nations voting data and the COPDAB data. This argument is supported by the case study which revealed that Figueres was quite free from domestic and foreign constraints to implement his preferred foreign policy.
The other moderate reform regime examined was Omar Torrijos of Panama.
None of the findings in this case study contradict the conclusion from the Figueres case. Torrijos, like Figueres, was relatively free to adopt his preferred foreign policy toward the United States; and this foreign policy was consistent with his development strategy. Furthermore, Panama, unlike Costa Rica, is not characterized by a democratic and anti-communist history. Hence, the Panamanian case study does not offer any evidence upon which to reject the findings in the Figueres case.
Based on the Figueres case study the hypothesized relationship between a moderate reformer and its foreign policy toward the United States can be modified as follows: 244
HI: Regimes that follow a moderate reform strategy will have foreign policies that neither coincide as much with the United States' foreign policy as the conventional development strategy, or coincide as little with the United States' foreign policy as the radical reform strategy, except when the country has developed a pro-US political culture.
H2: Regimes that follow a moderate reform strategy will have foreign policies that neither cooperate as much with the United States as the conventional development strategy, or conflict as little with the United States as the radical reform strategy, except when the country has developed a pro-US political culture.
The final outlier examined was the Goulart (Brazil) case. The Goulart case, more than any other, demonstrated the importance of domestic groups. He faced a highly polarized electorate in which both the left and right actively sought to influence his foreign policy. The result, despite his radical reform development strategy, was that he adopted a very moderate foreign policy toward the United States. Two interesting findings are generated by this case. First, Goulart was apparently sensitive to both poles. His policies greatly fluctuated-on one occasion they were pro-US, and on another they were anti-US. To a great extent his concern with the right wing (pro-US) of Brazilian politics can be explained by the centrality of the military and his vulnerability to it. Thus the issue of vulnerability appears to be an important intervening variable in this case. This behavior is similar to compliance, but the regime is complying to the demands of domestic actors, not the United States. Therefore, this case offers some evidence for the "domestic coercion" explanation of dependent state foreign policy.
The Allende cases study highlights the importance of two points. First, it serves to highlight the importance of vulnerability. Although both Allende and Goulart faced 245 highly polarized domestic polities, and firm attempts by the United States to influence their foreign policies, Goulart appears to have been more susceptible to these pressures due to his vulnerability.
Second, the Allende regime draws attention to the degree to which Goulart was a more pragmatic leader than Allende. This may explain why Goulart implemented a much more pro-US foreign policy than Allende. Both regimes faced highly polarized domestic polities attempts by the United States to influence them. The issue of pragmatism will be discussed in the next section.
The Goulart case study necessitates a modification of the hypothesized relationship between a radical reformer and its foreign policy. The revised version can be modified as follows:
HI: Regimes that follow a radical reform development strategy will be least likely to possess foreign policies that coincide with those of United States, except when domestic groups are highly polarized and the regime is pragmatic.
H2: Regimes that follow a radical reform development strategy will be least cooperative with the United States, except when domestic groups are highly polarized and the regime is pragmatic.
Development Strategy as a Conceptual Tool
As discussed at length in the introductory chapter, in order to successfully distinguish between compliant, consensual, and counterdependent foreign policy of
Latin American states, it is necessary to determine the preferences of the regime in question. To assist in understanding this, Table 1 from the first chapter has been reproduced below. 246
TABLE 23 Preferences and Approaches to Dependent State Foreign Policy
Pro-US Foreign Policy Anti-US Foreign Policy
US-Dependent State Agreement CONSENSUS DOMESTIC COERCION Preferences
US-Dependent State Elite COMPLIANCE COUNTERDEPENDENCE Disagreement
As the table indicates, not only must the foreign policy behavior of the core (in this case the United States) and periphery state be known, but the preferences must also be determined. Thus, if the preferences of the states coincide, the resulting behavior will either be consensus or domestic coercion. Neither compliance nor counterdependence can occur in this situation. Likewise, if the elites in the dyad disagree, only compliance or counterdependence can occur. By analyzing preferences, a more sophisticated analysis is possible; one in which a single approach (compliance or consensus) does not take credit for explaining all instances of foreign policy agreement. Instead, a distinction can be made with respect to the accuracy and usefulness of the various approaches.
It should be made clear, however, that this study only represents a step in this direction. The ability of the researcher to identify preferences must first be further refined. This involves obtaining a better understanding of the qualifications which govern the development strategy approach. Although several were identified in the cases studies of this project, additional qualifications and the conditions under which 247 they operate must be better understood. This will involve additional research which builds upon this and other previous studies.
In general, this study provided support for the consensus and counterdependence approaches. It was discovered that in many instances foreign policy agreement and cooperation resulted from shared values, rather than coercion. This supports the consensus approach by buttressing the notion that foreign policy that coincides can not be assumed to be compliant behavior. Likewise, many instances of anti-core foreign policy by regimes with conflicting preferences were discovered. Here, the counterdependence approach is supported. Fewer instances of compliant behavior were discovered. Neither the statistical analysis nor the case studies offered strong evidence supporting the compliance approach. This does not, however, mean that the compliance approach should be discarded. The findings of this study in no way suggest that compliance never occurs. Instead, it suggests that compliance does not appear to effect the overall patterns of Latin American regimes, and therefore, is not as widespread as early studies argued. The key is to determine in which cases it does occur. Previous studies have correctly suggested that factors such as the salience of the issue to the actors must be analyzed. Such a task, however, was beyond the purview of this study since it focused on patterns of Latin American foreign policy.
Two other issues that need to be considered pertain to the degree to which the development typology utilized in this study is useful for other developing regions, as well as contemporary Latin American regimes. With respect to the first, there is no reason to believe that the conventional, moderate reform, and radical reform types 248 would not be applicable to regimes in Africa and Asia, at least during the same time period. Regimes in these regions faced the same "dilemma of dependence," to use
Weinstein's (1976) terminology, that Latin American regimes did. These regimes had to decide to what extent they wished to control the distribution of domestic wealth and to what degree to immerse their country in the global economy. In addition, they had to confront the issues of land reform, foreign investment, and policies toward labor and peasants. Thus, it is reasonable to expect the development strategy approach to be useful for explaining foreign policy in other developing regions during the same time period.
The relevance of the development strategy typology to Latin American and other regions for the contemporary era, however, is a different question. The ambiguity arises from the overwhelming shift in Latin American regimes toward a neo-liberal economic policy. Such policies are characterized by an emphasis on free trade, cuts in social spending, and privatization of formerly state-owned industries.5 This creates two problems for the development strategy typology.
First, it raises the question of whether or not these neo-liberal regimes are essentially conventional regimes, and subsequently, a pro-US foreign policy can be expected. In response to this concern, the answer is that the neo-liberal regime can be considered an extreme form of conventional regime. This assertion is supported when one considers their position on the five indicators used to code regimes in this study. In
5Since this pattern is not relegated to Latin America this concern extends to the other developing regions as well. 249
general, these regimes aggressively seek foreign investment, reject land reform (and
may reverse it in some cases), place no emphasis on incorporating labor or peasant
groups into the economy, and perhaps most important, engage in privatization of state-
owned industries. In terms of redistribution the neo-liberal model can reasonable be categorized as regressive. Hence it is an extreme form of the conventional regime.
Logically, therefore, a very pro-US foreign policy would be expected. This assertion is
supported by the relatively amiable hemispheric relations that currently exist between
the United States and Latin America. A specific example is the recent Summit of the
Americas. It is reported that this December 1994 meeting involving the countries of the
hemisphere was characterized by a high degree of cooperation on trade, the
environment, and other issues of mutual concern.
An additional method of testing this hypothesis is to examine the foreign policy
behavior of the Pinochet regime toward the United States during the time period of this
study. Since the Pinochet regime of the 1970s is a precursor of contemporary neo
liberal regimes its foreign policy can be instructive. Pinochet's UN voting behavior is
relatively pro-US. Of the 76 regimes in Table 15, Pinochet is the 18th most pro-US
regime. This high ranking demonstrates that Pinochet possesses a high level of agreement on issues voted on in the United Nations. However, when the COPDAB data
is examined, the Pinochet regime is not as pro-US. Of the 66 regimes in Table 16,
Pinochet is ranked 42nd. On the surface, this appears to reject the hypothesis that he
should be highly pro-US. However, one important factor must be considered. First,
while Pinochet's economic policies were quite similar to those of contemporary neo- 250 liberal regimes, his anti-democratic tendencies were not. The current neo-liberal regimes are more democratic and more conscious of human rights than the Pinochet regime. This is important to consider when interpreting the COPDAB results. Given
Pinochet's anti-democratic tendency and extreme disregard for human rights, it is reasonable to expect some reaction by its counterpart in the United States. This is especially true when President Carter was in office. A more in-depth examination of the COPDAB data reveals that during the Carter years, Chile's scores are notably more conflictual with the United States. Thus Pinochet may be an accurate economic, but not political, representative of the contemporary neo-liberal regimes. Clearly more research is needed in this area.
The second problem generated by the large shift in regimes to the neo-liberal orientation is that it makes an already large category of conventional regimes even larger. Thus a need exists to devise a method for distinguish among neo-liberal regimes. Such a distinction might examine the pace of privatization and implementation of free trade, or focus on the degree to which the social problems that arise due to neo liberal policies are addressed. With respect to the latter, one might assert that although the regime is sympathetic to the moderate reform development strategy, it felt compelled to adopt a form of the neo-liberal model in order to compete with other neo liberal countries. Yet despite the adoption of a neo-liberal development strategy, it implements a moderate form that keep the needs of the poorer sectors in mind (e.g., social programs for the poor). One possible example of this is the new regime in Costa
Rica. The scnrtNosd Figueres was recently elected president in this country. Soon 251 after taking office he announced that he would implement a neo-liberal policy. Given that Costa Rica has a long history of social equality and his father was an ardent moderate reformist, this may be an example of a regime that felt forced to adopt a neo liberal strategy but is somewhat moderate.6 It is hoped that future research will pursue this problem of seeking a distinction between neo-liberal regimes.
Finally, it should be stated that it is too early to discard the three development strategies utilized in this study. The neo-liberal model is still relatively new and certainly not without problems. Economically, many, especially the poor, are excluded from this model due to cuts in social programs. Many in the working class that enjoyed relatively profitable employment by state-owned enterprises now find themselves competing with others for lower wages. Also, the stress on economic efficiency has also negatively affected those middle class managers of state-owned companies and owners of formerly protected industries. The effects of this dramatic change are not yet known. One possibility is a severe backlash against these policies and an opportunity for moderate or radical reformist-like regimes to win at the ballot box. This possible scenario suggests that it is too early to completely reject the development strategy typology. Furthermore, if distinct types of neo-liberal regimes emerge, the underlying difference between the three types (i.e., the degree to which redistribution is sought) may still be in effect, but on a different scale. In other words, one may be able to distinguish between the neo-liberal regimes based on their relative concern with
6Since Figueres just recently took office it is too early to determine if this scenario is accurate. 252 redistribution, however, this concern will simply be on at a reduced level. In this case, the theoretical link between redistribution and foreign policy toward the United States would still be valid, that is, those concerned more with redistribution would be expected to be more anti-US. Again, this speculation necessitates future research.
Future Research
A great deal of research needs to be conducted in the future in order to further develop the field's understanding of dependent state development in general, and Latin
American foreign policy in particular. For instance, given the diversity of the conventional and moderate reform regimes in their foreign policy behavior, it seems logical that these two types could be further broken down into two or more categories.
One possibility is to create an additional distinction between all regimes based on personal characteristics of the leader. For instance, regimes could be coded as either pragmatists or crusaders. This is based on a distinction made by Stoessinger (1985; xiii). Crusaders are those leaders that tend "to make decisions based on a preconceived idea rather than on the basis of experience. Even though there are alternatives, he usually does not see them." In terms of this study, these leaders fervently adhere to one of the three development strategy types and conformed to the associated (hypothesized) foreign policy. The pragmatist would be more predisposed to departing from his or her 253 hypothesized foreign policy in order to achieve another goal, such as maintaining power.7 The latter is more of a political opportunist.
Although an attempt was made to control for these regimes (opportunists that were not ideologically committed to a specific development strategy) by coding them by their confidence level, it was not entirely successful. Regime coding for confidence was based on the cohesiveness of their development strategy, not the strength of which they adhered to this strategy and its associated foreign policy. It was hoped that those regimes that were pragmatists, and therefore willing to depart from their expected foreign policy, could be controlled for by eliminating those regimes whose development strategy did not closely approximate the ideal type. The problem is that even though some regimes fit a development strategy closely, it does not necessarily mean that they are a crusader and will therefore forego the possibility of utilizing foreign policy for more pragmatic reasons, such as a tool to pacify the opposition.
To further illustrate this point a substantive example from the radical reform case studies can be utilized. Goulart was described as a pragmatist by area experts. This could explain why his foreign policy not only deviated from its expected foreign policy, but also fluctuated a great deal. Allende, on the other hand, is viewed more as a
7That regimes would depart from their preferred policies in order to avoid be deposed is supported by Hagan's (1993) concept of vulnerability and Ames' (1987) research on the use of the public budget in Latin America. Although the latter's book (Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America) focuses on domestic politics, the idea that survival is of primary importance, and will supersede all other goals, is relevant to this study. 254
crusader than a pragmatist. For although he encountered serious opposition, he
maintained a consistently anti-US foreign policy.
Thus, it would be interesting to determine in future research if the foreign policy behavior of the crusaders correlates more closely with their hypothesized foreign policy than do pragmatists. Here, the Pinochet's, Castro's and others crusaders would be expected to exhibit higher correlations than the more pragmatic regimes. This might explain why the radical reform regimes (assuming they tend to be crusaders) comprise a relatively coherent and distinct group when the means of their UN and COPDAB scores are compared to the conventional and moderate reform regimes (see Tables 8 and 12).
The logic here is that radical reformers would naturally tend to be crusaders and therefore were more consistent with the expectations of this study.
Further research also needs to be carried out on the relationship between the two data sets used to measure foreign policy in this study. The moderate correlation between the regimes across these two data sets indicate that they are measuring different phenomena. Obtaining a better understanding of the dependent variable is necessary in order to better understand dependent state foreign policy. This is especially true given that United Nations voting has been utilized in the majority of previous studies on this topic. This study has taken the first step in this analysis by testing the correlation between these two data sets and identifying and comparing the movement of regimes from one data set to another. Since the case studies in the project did not focus on regimes that exhibited significantly different foreign policy on the two data sets, this might be a fruitful place to start for future studies. In order to increase our understanding of the development strategy concept, future research also needs to be tested on different regions. There is no immediate reason why the same relationship between development strategy and foreign policy should not apply to dependent states in Africa or Asia.
In conclusion, much remains to be done in order to increase our understanding of dependent state foreign policy. Many questions remain unresolved. It is hoped that this study has contributed to the research pertaining to dependent state foreign policy in general, and Latin American foreign policy in particular. APPENDIX A
Coding Summary Variable Categories Questions/Indicators Role of State How is the role o fthe state viewed? Conventional State ownership and intervention is regarded as inefficient; privatization encouraged Moderate State ownership and intervention is viewed as more conducive to equality, but recognized as inefficient; mixed economy sought Radical State ownership and intervention for the purpose of distribution is favored
Foreign Investment How is foreign investment perceived? Conventional Foreign investment is crucial Moderate Foreign investment can be exploitative, but is necessary and generally encouraged; some limited controls Radical Foreign investment is exploitative, but necessary in some cases; strict controls; nationalize where economically possible
Land Reform What is the role o f land reform? Conventional Should put land in hands of those engaging in modem agriculture (i.e., large landowners) Moderate Should allow peasants to farm land not being used; don't take away land from those in modem sector that are utilizing it and earning foreign currency Radical Should give peasants land; they will be more productive
Labor W tat is the role o flabor? Conventional Only passive organization of labor permitted Moderate Moderate labor strength as an avenue for economic redistribution Radical Strong labor movement desired for political and economic purposes
Peasants V/hat is the role o f the peasants? Conventional Excluded from the economy Moderate Gradual effort to incorporate them into the economy Radical Strong effort to incorporate diem for political and economic purposes
256 APPENDIX B
Regime Coding Sheet DS Type Government Ownership Land Reform Foreign Investment Labor Peasants
Degree o Certainty Fits a DS type
257 APPENDIX C
Sources Consulted for Classifying Regimes (by Country)
ARGENTINA Alexander, Robert J. 1960. "Argentina After Peron." Current History59:165-169.
Barager, Joseph R. 1970. "Argentina: A Country Divided." In Political Systems o f Latin America. 2nd ed., ed. by Martin C. Needier. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company.
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Crawley, Eduardo. 1984. A House Divided: Argentina, 1880-1980. London: C. Hurst & Company.
Deiner, John T. 1982. "Argentina." In Political Parties o f the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and the Wfesf Indies , ed. Robert J. Alexander. Westport, CO: Greenwood Press.
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Goldwert, Marvin. 1972. Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930- 196&, An Interpretation. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
258 259
Graillot, Hdlfcen. 1973. "Argentina." In Guide to the Political Parties o f South America, 2nd ed., ed. Jean-Pierre Bernard. Trans. Michael Perl. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Inc.
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Senkman, Leonardo. "The Right and Military Rule," 1955-1983. In The Argentine Right: Its History and Intellectual Origins, 1910 to the Present, ed. Sandra McGee Deutsch and Ronald H. Dolkart. Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1993.
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Sheahan, John. 1987. Patterns o f Development in Latin America: Poverty, Represssion, and Economic Strategy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
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Weil, Thomas, et. al. 1974. Area Handbook lor Argentina. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
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Making in a Divided Society. Albuquerque : University of New Mexico Press.
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BOLIVIA Alexander, Robert J. 1958. The Bolivian National Revolution. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Alexander, Robert J. 1970. "Bolivia: The National Revolution." In Political Systems o f Latin America. 2nd ed., ed. Martin C. Needier. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company.
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Beatty, Donald W. 1957. "Bolivia: An Uncertain Future." Current History 56:216-222.
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Heath, Dwight B. 1967. "Bolivia Under Barrientos." Current History 66:275-282. 262
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Malloy, James M. 1970. Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Malloy, James M. 1971. "Revolutionary Politics. In Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia Since 1952,” ed. James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thom. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Malloy, James M., and Eduardo Gamarra. 1988. Revolution and Reaction: Bolivia, 1964-1985. New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Books.
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BRAZIL Ames, Barry. 1987. Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 263
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Flynn, Peter. 1978. Brazil: A Political Analysis. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
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Kantor, Harry. 1969. Patterns o f Politics and Political Systems in Latin America. Chicago: Rand McNally.
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Rouquie, Alain. 1987. The Military and the State in Latin America. Trans. Paul Sigmund. Berkeley: University of California Press.
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CHILE Alexander, Robert J. 1978. Die Tragedy o f Chile. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
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EL SALVADOR Anderson, Charles W. 1970. "El Salvador: The Army as Reformer." In Political Systems o f Latin America. 2nd ed., ed. Martin C. Needier. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company.
Anderson, Charles W. 1967. Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Governing o f Restless Nations. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.
Baloyra, Enrique A. 1982. El Salvador in Transition. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Baloyra, Enrique. 1990. "El Salvador." In Latin American Politics and Development. 3rd ed., ed. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Busey, James. 1991. Latin America Political Guide. 19th ed. Manitou Springs, CO: Juniper Editions.
Dunkerley, James. 1982. The Long W&r: Dictatorship and Revolution in El Salvador. London: Junction Books.
Dunkerley, James. 1991. "El Salvador Since 1930." In Central America since Independence , ed. Leslie Bethell. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Heath, Dwight B. 1973. "Central America: Un-Common Market." Current History 72:72-76.
Heath, Dwight B. 1975. "Current Trends in Central America." Current History 74:29- 35. 273
Kantor, Harry. 1969. Patterns o fPolitics and Political Systems in Latin America. Chicago: Rand McNally.
McDonald, Ronald H. 1982. "El Salvador." In Political Parties o f the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies , ed. Robert J. Alexander. Westport, CO: Greenwood Press.
McDonald, Ronald H. and J. Mark Ruhl. 1989. Party Politics and Elections in Latin America. Boulder: Westview Press.
Montgomery, Tommie Sue. 1982. Revolution in El Salvador, Origins and Evolution. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Schmidt, Steffen W. 1983. El Salvador: America's Next Vietnam? Salisbury, NC: Documentary Publications.
Weeks, John. 1985. The Economies o f Central America. New York: Holmes & Meier.
Wynia, Gary W. 1973. Politics and Planners: Economic Development Policy in Central America. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
White, Alastair. 1973. El Salvador. New York: Praeger Publishers.
GUATEMALA Alexander, Robert J. 1973. Latin American Political Parties. New York, Praeger Publishers.
Anderson, Charles W. 1967. Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Governing o f Restless Nations. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.
Anderson, Thomas P. 1982. Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. New York: Praeger.
Dunkerley, James. 1991. "Guatemala Since 1930." In Central America since Independence, ed. Leslie Bethell. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Black, George. 1984. Garrison Guatemala. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Bulmer-Thomas, V. 1987. The Political Economy o f Central America Since 1920. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 274
Calvert, Peter. 1985. Guatemala: A Nation in Thrmoil. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Ebel, Roland. 1990. "El Salvador." In Latin American Politics and Development 3rd ed., ed. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Granados, Hdctor Rosada. 1992. "Parties, Transitions, and the Political System in Guatemala." In Political Parties and Democracy in Central America, ed. Louis W. Goodman, William M. LeoGrande, and Johanna Mendelson Forman. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Fauriol, Georges A. and Eva Loser. 1988. Guatemala's Political Puzzle. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Jonas, Susanne. 1974. "Guatemala: Land of Eternal Struggle." In Latin America: The Struggle With Dependency and Beyond, ed. Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Kantor, Harry. 1969. Patterns o f Politics and Political Systems in Latin America. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Lieuwen, Edwin. 1964. Generals vs. Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America. New York: Praeger.
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McDonald, Ronald H. and J. Mark Ruhl. 1989. Party Politics and Elections in Latin America. Boulder: Westview Press.
Martz, John D. 1959. Central America: The Crisis and Challenge. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Sanchez, Josd M. 1982. "Guatemala." In Political Parties o f the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and the Wfesf Indies, ed. Robert J. Alexander. Westport, CO: Greenwood Press.
Skidmore, Thomas E. and Peter H. Smith. 1989. Modem Latin America. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wynia, Gary W. 1973. Politics and Planners: Economic Development Policy in Central America. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. 275
HAITI Abbott, Elizabeth. 1988. Haiti: An Insider's History o f the Rise and Fail o f the Duvaliers. New York: Simon & Shuster.
Alexander, Robert J. 1973. Latin American Political Parties. New York, Praeger Publishers.
Logan, Rayford W. 1968. Haiti and the Dominican Republic. New York: Oxford University Press.
Logan, Rayford W. and Martin C. Needier. 1970. "The Dominican Republic: Dictatorship, Development, and Disintegration." In Political Systems o f Latin America. 2nd ed., ed. Martin C. Needier. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company.
Pdan Leslie. 1982. "Haiti." In Political Parties o f the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies, ed. Robert J. Alexander. Westport, CO: Greenwood Press.
Rotberg, Robert I. 1971. Haiti: The Politics o f Squalor. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
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Weinstein, Brian and Aaron Segal. 1984. Haiti: Political Failures, Cultural Successes. New York: Praeger.
HONDURAS Acker, Alison. 1988. Honduras: The Making o f a Banana Republic. Boston, MA: South End Press.
Anderson, Thomas P. 1982. Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. New York: Praeger.
Anderson, Charles W. 1967. Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Governing o f Restless Nations. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.
Brizuela, Pedro Antonio. 1985. "Testimony of a Workers' Leader." In Honduras: Portrait o f a Captive Nation, ed. Nancy Peckenham and Annie Street. New York: Praeger. 276
Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. 1991. "Honduras Since 1930." In Central America since Independence, ed. Leslie Bethell. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Dunkerley, James. 1988. Power in the Isthmus: A Political History o f Modern Central America. New York: Verso.
Heath, Dwight B. 1975. "Current Trends in Central America." Current History 14:29- 35.
Kantor, Harry. 1969. Patterns o f Politics and Political Systems in Latin America. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Kincaid, Douglas. 1985. "We Are the Agrarian Reform: Rural Politics and Agrarian Reform." In Honduras: Portrait o f a Captive Nation, ed. Nancy Peckenham and Annie Street. New York: Praeger
Lapper, Richard and James Painter. 1985. Honduras: State for Sale. London: Latin America Bureau.
Logan, Rayford W. and Martin C. Needier. 1970. "The Dominican Republic: Dictatorship, Development, and Disintegration." In Political Systems o f Latin America. 2nd ed., ed. Martin C. Needier. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company.
Martz, John D. 1959. Central America: The Crisis and the Challenge. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Morris, James A. 1982. "Honduras." In Political Parties o f the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies, ed. Robert J. Alexander. Westport, CO: Greenwood Press.
Morris, James A. 1984. Honduras: Caudillo Politics and Military Rulers. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Rosenberg. Mark B. 1990. "El Salvador." In Latin American Politics and Development. 3rd ed., ed. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Skidmore, Thomas E. and Peter H. Smith. 1989. Modem Latin America. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
Stokes, William S. 1966. "Honduras: Problems and Prospects." Current History 65:22- 31. 277
Weeks, John. 1985. The Economies o f Central America. New York: Holmes & Meier.
Wynia, Gary W. 1973. Politics and Planners: Economic Development Policy in Central America. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
MEXICO Alisky, Marvin. 1982. "Mexico." In Political Parties o f the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies , ed. Robert J. Alexander. Westport, CO: Greenwood Press.
Glade, William. 1984. "Mexico: Party-Led Development." In Policies, and Economic Development in Latin America, ed. Robert Wesson. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
Goulet, Denis. 1983. Mexico: Development Strategies for the Future. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Haggard, Stephan. 1990. Pathways From the Periphery: The Politics o f Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Hofstadter, Dan., ed. 1974. Mexico 1946-73. New York: Facts on File, Inc.
Needier, Martin C. 1970. "Mexico: Revolution as a Way of Life." In Political Systems o f Latin America. 2nd ed., ed. Martin C. Needier. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company.
Needier, Martin C. 1982. Mexican Politics: The Containment o f Conflict. New York: Praeger Publishers.
Riding, Alan. 1984. Distant Neighbors: A Portrait o f the Mexicans. New York: Vintage Books.
Sheahan, John. 1987. Patterns o f Development in Latin America: Poverty, Represssion, and Economic Strategy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Skidmore, Thomas E. and Peter H. Smith. 1989. Modem Latin America. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
Smith, Peter H. 1991. "Mexico Since 1946: Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime." In Mexico Since Independence, ed. Leslie Bethell. New York: Cambridge University Press. 278 NICARAGUA Anderson, Charles W. 1970. "Nicaragua: The Somoza Dynasty." In Political Systems o f Latin America. 2nd ed., ed. Martin C. Needier. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company.
Anderson, Charles W. 1967. Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Governing o f Restless Nations. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.
Black, George. 1981 Triumph o f the People: The Sandinista Revolution Nicaragua. in London: Zed Press.
Booth, John A. 1990. "Nicaragua: Revolution Under Siege." In Latin American Politics and Development. 3rd ed., ed. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. 1991. "Nicargua Since 1930." In Central America since Independence , ed. Leslie Bethell. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hartlyn, Jonathan and Samuel A. Morley. 1986. Latin American Political Economy: Financial Crisis and Political Change. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Martz, John D. 1959. Central America: The Crisis and Challenge. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Millett, Richard. 1977. Guardians o f the Dynasty. Mary knoll, NY: Orbis Books.
Pearson, Neale J. 1982. "Nicaragua." In Political Parties o f the Americas: Canada, Latin America , and the Wfesf Indies, ed. Robert J. Alexander. Westport, CO: Greenwood Press.
Skidmore, Thomas E. and Peter H. Smith. 1989. Modem Latin America. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
Weeks, John. 1985. The Economies o f Central America. New York: Holmes & Meier.
Wynia, Gaiy W. 1973. Politics and Planners: Economic Development Policy in Central America. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
PANAMA Alexander, Robert J. 1973. Latin American Political Parties. New York, Praeger Publishers. 279
Black, Jan Knippers. 1980. "Historical Setting." In Panama: A Country Study. 3rd ed., ed. Richard F. Nyrop. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
Conniff, Michael. 1990. "Panama Since 1903." In Latin America Since 1930: Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean , Vol. VII of The Cambridge History o f Latin America, ed. Leslie Bethell. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Goldrich, Daniel. 1970. "Panama." In Political Systems o f Latin America. 2nd ed., ed. Martin C. Needier. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company.
Kantor, Harry. 1969. Patterns o f Politics and Political Systems in Latin America. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Liss, Sheldon B. 1982. "Panama." In Political Parties o f the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and the Hbst Indies , ed. Robert J. Alexander. Westport, CO: Greenwood Press.
Martz, John D. 1959. Central America: The Crisis and Challenge. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
McDonald, Ronald H. and J. Mark Ruhl. 1989. Party Politics and Elections in Latin America. Boulder: Westview Press.
Phillips Collazos, Sharon. 1991. Labor and Poltics in Panama: The Torrijos Years. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Priestley, George. 1986. Military Government and Popular Participation in Panama: The Torrijos Regime, 1968-1975. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Ropp, Steve C. 1982. Panamanian Politics: From Guarded Nation to National Guard. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
Ropp, Steve C. 1990. "Panama's Struggle for Democracy." In Latin American Politics and Development. 3rd ed., ed. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Rudolph, James D. 1980. "Government and Politics." In Panama: A Country Study. 3rd ed., ed. Richard F. Nyrop. Washington, DC: US government Printing Office. 280
Smith, David A. 1992. "Panama: Political Parties, Social Crisis, and Democracy in the 1980s." In Political Parties and Democracy in Central America, ed, Louis W. Goodman, William M. LeoGrande, and Johanna Mendelson Forman. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
PARAGUAY Deiner, John T. 1982. "Paraguay." In Political Parties o f the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies, ed. Robert J. Alexander. Westport, CO: Greenwood Press.
Graillot, Hdlfeen. 1973. "Paraguay." In Guide to the Political Parties o f South America, 2nd ed., ed. Jean-Pierre Bernard. Trans. Michael Perl. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Inc.
Kantor, Harry. 1969. Patterns o f Politics and Political Systems in Latin America. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Lewis, Paul H. 1991. "Paraguay Since 1930." In Latin America Since 1930: Spanish South America, Vol. VIII of The Cambridge History o f Latin America, ed. Leslie Bethell. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, Paul H. 1990. Paraguay under Stroessner. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Lott, Leo B. 1970. "Paraguay." In Political Systems o f Latin America. 2nd ed., ed. Martin C. Needier. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company.
Miranda. Carlos R. 1990. The Stroessner Era: Authoritarian Rule in Paraguay. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Roett, Riordan, and Richard S. Sacks. 1990. "Authoritarian Paraguay: The Personalist Tradition." In Latin American Politics and Development. 3rd ed., ed, Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
PERU Alba, Victor. 1968. Politics and the Labor Movement in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Anderson, Charles W. 1967. Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Governing o f Restless Nations. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 281
Chang-Rodriquez, Eugenio. 1982. "Peru." In Political Parties o f the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies, ed. Robert J. Alexander. Westport, CO: Greenwood Press.
Dobyns, Henry F. and Paul L. Doughty. 1976. Peru: A Cultural History. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Nyrop, Richard F. 1981. Peru: A Country Study. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
Palmer, David Scott. 1980. Peru: The Authoritarian Tradition. New York: Praeger.
Palmer, David Scott. 1984. "Peru: Military and Civilian Political Economy.1' In Policies, and Economic Development in Latin America, ed. Robert Wesson. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
Sheahan, John. 1987. Patterns o f Development in Latin America: Poverty, Represssion, and Economic Strategy. Princeton, NJ: Princton University Press.
Skidmore, Thomas E. and Peter H. Smith. 1989. Modem Latin America. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
Werlich, David. P. 1978. Peru: A Short History. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
URUGUAY Alisky, Marvin. 1969. Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey. New York: Praeger.
Finch, M. H. J. 1989. Uruguay. Oxford: Clio.
Finch, Henry. 1991. "Uruguay Since 1930." In Latin America Since 1930: Spanish South America, Vol. VIII of The Cambridge History o f Latin America, ed. Leslie Bethell. New York: Cambridge University Press. ~
Gomez, Rosendo A. 1969. "Peru: The Politics of Military Guardianship." In Political Systems o f Latin America. 2nd ed., ed. Martin C. Needier. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company.
Graillot, Hdlfeen. 1973. "Uruguay." In Guide to the Political Parties o f South America, 2nd ed., ed. Jean-Pierre Bernard. Trans. Michael Perl. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Inc. 282
Kantor, Harry. 1969. Patterns o f Politics and Political Systems in Latin America. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Kaufman, Edy. 1979. Uruguay: From Civilian to Military Rule. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
McDonald, Ronald. 1982. "Uruguay." In Political Parties o f the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies , ed. Robert J. Alexander. Westport, CO: Greenwood Press.
Pearce, Jenny. 1980. Uruguay: Generals Rule. London: Latin American Bureau.
Pendle, George. 1963. Uruguay. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
Porzecanski, Arturo C. 1977. "Authoritarian Uruguay." Current History 76:73-76.
Weinstein, Martin. 1975. Uruguay: The Poltics o f Failure. Weinstein, Martin. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Weinstein, Martin. 1984. "Uruguay: Military Rule and Economic Failure." In Policies, and Economic Development in Latin America, ed. Robert Wesson. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
VENEZUELA Alexander, Robert J. 1982. "Venezuela." In Political Parties o f the Americas: Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies, ed. Robert J. Alexander. Westport, CO: Greenwood Press.
Alexander, Robert J. 1990. Venezuela;s Voice Ibr Democracy: Conversations and Correspondence with Romulo Betancourt. New York : Praeger Publishers
Anderson, Charles W. 1967. Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Governing o f Restless Nations. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.
Bernstein, Harry. 1964. Venezuela and Colombia. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Ewell, Judith. 1984. Venezuela: A Century o f Change. London: C. Hurst. 283
Ewell, Judith. 1991. "Venezuela Since 1930." In Latin America Since 1930: Spanish South America, Vol. VIII of The Cambridge History o f Latin America, ed. Leslie Bethell. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kantor, Harry. 1969. Patterns o f Politics and Political Systems in Latin America. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Lombardi, John V. 1982. Venezuela: The Search for Order, the Dream o f Progress. New York: Oxford University Press.
Manigat, Leslie F. 1973. "Venezuela." In Guide to the Political Parties o f South America, 2nd ed., ed. Jean-Pierre Bernard. Trans. Michael Perl. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Inc.
Martz, John D. 1984. "Venezuela: Democratic Politics of Petroleum." In Policies, and Economic Development in Latin America, ed. Robert Wesson. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
Wynia, Gary W. 1990. The Politics o f Latin American Development. 3rd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. APPENDIX D
UN Annual Voting Session Dates and Number of Nonunanimous Votes
Session 3 1948 (84) 9/24/48 - 5/18/49 Session 4 1949 (53) 10/20/49 - 12/9/49 Session 5 ( 950) (37) 9/19/50 -5/18/51 Session 6 ( 951) (19) 12/7/51 -2/5/52 Session 7 ( 952) (32) 10/14/52 - 12/21/52 Session 8 ( 953) (20) 9/17/53 - 12/9/53 Session 9 ( 954) (20) 9/21/54 - 12/17/54 Session 10 1955) (18) 9/20/55 - 12/15/55 Session 11 1956) (29) 11/12/56-9/13/57 Session 12 1957) (24) 9/17/57 - 12/14/57 Session 13 1958) (17) 9/22/58 -3/13/59 Session.!! 1959) (35) 9/22/59 - 12/12/59 Session 15 I960) (74) 10/5/60 -4/21/61 Session 16 1961) (54) 9/25/61 -6/12/62 Session 17 1962) (30) 9/21/62 - 12/20/62 Session 18 Cl963) (16) 9/20/63 - 12/17/63 Session 19 1964) *** Session 20 1965) (20) 11/5/65 -12/21/65 Session 21 1966) (27) 9/24/66 - 12/20/66 Session 22 (1967) (20) 9/28/67 - 12/19/67 Session 23 1968) (30) 6/12/68 -12/21/68 Session 24 .1969) (22) 9/20/69 - 12/17/69 Session 25 1970) (34) 9/18/70 -12/17/70 Session 26 1971) (34) 9/21/71 -12/22/71 Session 27 1972) (85) 9/23/72 - 12/19/72 Session 28 1973) (47) 10/4/73 - 12/19/73 Session 29 1974) (57) 9/30/74 - 12/18/74 Session 30 1975) (12) 11/10/75 -12/15/75 Session 31 1976) (7) 11/9/76 -12/16/76 Session 32 1977) (8) 11/28/77- 12/16/77 Session 33 1978) (20) 11/3/78 -12/31/78
***No nonunanimous votes occurred during this session
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