The Response of States and Regional Organizations
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CHAPTER 4 THE RESPONSE OF STATES AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Thus far, the focus has been on the Security Council practice with respect to civil conflict and coups d’état in the Balkans, Iraq, and Somalia, since that body has the power to set binding precedent for the conduct of other states, and its practice can be easily identified and col- lated to provide an overview of the direction of evolution of this field. This chapter turns to the response of the international community to the conflicts in Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia, to determine whether, as could be expected, it reflects some of the principles that the Council has formulated that were identified in the previous chapter. In addition, it examines the African Union (A.U.) and Economic Com- munity of West African States (ECOWAS) security treaties, in which the principles emerging in the Council practice are also reflected.1 A. SIERRA LEONE The response of the international community to the conflict in Sierra Leone supports four principles, that echo those identified in the practice of the Security Council. The central principle in this case study is the rejection of violence to overthrow a democratically elected gov- ernment. Three other principles are referred to in the practice: prohi- bitions on, respectively, violence to resolve political disputes, violent breach of a peace or cease-fire agreement, and violence against civilians. These latter three principles, however, are referred to less frequently, in less strongly worded statements, and are relied upon less frequently (if at all) to justify sanctions or forceful measures. Sierra Leone’s devastating civil conflict has been characterized by vested economic interests2 and involved extreme violence against the 1 Note that the purpose of the investigation of the response of the international community to the civil conflicts is not to determine the legality of the interventions or of the treaty provisions (as it was in Nicaragua. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)). Instead, this prac- tice is analyzed to determine whether it supports the emergence of norms of jus ad bellum internum prohibiting certain civil conflicts. 2 International Crisis Group (ICG), Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and 141 142 • Political Violence and the International Community civilian population.3 Although it began in 1991, the international com- munity only began to pay proper attention in 1996. From 1991 until 1996, Sierra Leone went through a period of great instability marked by a wide-ranging violent struggle between rebel forces and the military governments, which were also repeatedly overthrown in a series of coups. The civil conflict is thought to have originated as a by- product of the conflict in adjoining Liberia where the warlord Charles Taylor was fighting to overthrow the Liberian government. Sierra Leone was part of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that intervened in the Liberian conflict. In 1991, apparently in retaliation, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia began making incursions into Sierra Leone and was joined in its attacks by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), headed by Foday Sankoh, a former corporal of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). The rebels engaged in a vicious conflict of intimidation, attacking civilians in what became their hallmark fashion, crudely amputating limbs and ears of women, men, children, and babies. They also kidnapped children as a way of recruit- ing soldiers. In 1996, with the assistance of Executive Outcomes, a mercenary company, the government pushed back the rebels and began the process of running multi-party democratic elections. The elections of March 1996 were declared free and fair by international observers, and Ahmad Kabbah was sworn in as president. On November 30, 1996, a first peace agreement, the Abidjan Peace Accord, was signed.4 However, soon after- ward, the country was again shaken by a military coup. President Kabbah fled to a neighboring country, and Major Johnny Koroma of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) appointed himself Chairman and invited Political Strategy, Africa Report No. 28, at 2 (Apr. 11, 2001); Ian Smillie et. al, The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds, and Human Security, PARTNERSHIP AFR. CAN. INSIGHTS (Jan. 2000), available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/heartmatter.html; Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), Paragraph 19 in Relation to Sierra Leone (Dec. 2000), avail- able at http://www.sierra-leone.org/panelreport.html. 3 Human Rights Watch, Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape: New Testimony from Sierra Leone, 11(3A) AFR. RTS. WATCH (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/ reports/1999/sierra/. See David Pratt, Sierra Leone: The Forgotten Crisis, Report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Apr. 23, 1999), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/library/report/1999/crisis-e.htm, for an insightful overview of the conflict. 4 Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/1996/1034 (Nov. 30, 1996)..