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Security Schemes for the OLSR Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks Daniele Raffo

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Security Schemes for the OLSR Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks Daniele Raffo Security Schemes for the OLSR Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks Daniele Raffo To cite this version: Daniele Raffo. Security Schemes for the OLSR Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks. Networking and Internet Architecture [cs.NI]. Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris VI, 2005. English. tel-00010678 HAL Id: tel-00010678 https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00010678 Submitted on 18 Oct 2005 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. THÈSE DE DOCTORAT DE L’UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 6 – PIERRE ET MARIE CURIE discussed by Daniele Raffo on September 15, 2005 to obtain the degree of Docteur de l’Université Paris 6 Discipline: Computer Science Host laboratory: INRIA Rocquencourt Security Schemes for the OLSR Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks Thesis Director: Dr. Paul Mühlethaler Jury Reviewers: Dr. Ana Cavalli Institut National des Télécommunications Dr. Ahmed Serhrouchni Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications Examiners: Dr. François Baccelli Ecole Normale Supérieure Dr. François Morain Ecole Polytechnique Dr. Paul Mühlethaler INRIA Rocquencourt Dr. Guy Pujolle Université Paris 6 Guests: Dr. Daniel Augot INRIA Rocquencourt Dr. Philippe Jacquet INRIA Rocquencourt THÈSE DE DOCTORAT DE L’UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 6 – PIERRE ET MARIE CURIE présentée par Daniele Raffo le 15 Septembre 2005 pour obtenir le grade de Docteur de l’Université Paris 6 Spécialité: Informatique Laboratoire d’accueil: INRIA Rocquencourt Schémas de sécurité pour le protocole OLSR pour les réseaux ad hoc Directeur de Thèse: M. Paul Mühlethaler Jury Rapporteurs: Mme Ana Cavalli Institut National des Télécommunications M. Ahmed Serhrouchni Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications Examinateurs: M. François Baccelli Ecole Normale Supérieure M. François Morain Ecole Polytechnique M. Paul Mühlethaler INRIA Rocquencourt M. Guy Pujolle Université Paris 6 Invités: M. Daniel Augot INRIA Rocquencourt M. Philippe Jacquet INRIA Rocquencourt Dedicated to the memory of my grandfather Vincenzo Abstract Within the domain of wireless computer networks, this thesis examines the security issues related to protection of packet routing in ad hoc networks (MANETs). This thesis classifies the different possible attacks and examines in detail the case of OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing protocol). We propose a security architec- ture based on adding a digital signature, as well as more advanced techniques such as: reuse of previous topology information to validate the actual link state, cross- check of advertised routing control data with the node’s geographical position, and intra-network misbehavior detection and elimination via flow coherence control or passive listening. Countermeasures in case of compromised routers are also pre- sented. This thesis also assesses the practical problems concerning the choice of a suitable symmetric or asymmetric cipher, the alternatives for the algorithm of cryptographic keys distribution, and the selection of a method for signature times- tamping. Keywords Ad hoc network, routing, link state, OLSR, security, digital signature Résumé Cette thèse examine les problématiques de sécurité liées à la protection du routage dans les réseaux ad hoc (MANETs). La thèse classifie les différentes attaques qui peuvent être portées et examine en détail le cas du protocole OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing). Une architecture de sécurisation basée sur l’ajout d’une sig- nature numérique est étudiée et proposée. D’autres contre-mesures plus élaborées sont également présentées. Ces dernières incluent: la réutilisation d’informations topologiques précédentes pour valider l’état de lien actuel, l’évaluation de la véridic- ité des messages par analyse croisée avec la position géographique d’un noeud, et la détection des comportements suspects à l’intérieur du réseau par le contrôle de cohérence des flux ou l’écoute passif. La thèse analyse aussi les problèmes pratiques liées à la choix de l’algorithme de signature et la distributions des clés cryptographiques, et propose aussi des parades même en présence de noeuds com- promis. Mots clés Réseau ad hoc, routage, état de lien, OLSR, sécurité, signature numérique Contents Contents 9 Foreword 13 1 Introduction to wireless networking 16 1.1 Standards . 16 1.1.1 IEEE 802.11 . 17 1.1.2 HiperLAN . 18 1.1.3 Bluetooth . 18 1.2 Architecture . 18 1.2.1 BSS mode . 19 1.2.2 IBSS mode . 19 1.2.3 Ad hoc network . 19 1.3 Advantages and disadvantages . 20 1.4 Routing protocols for ad hoc networks . 23 1.4.1 Reactive protocols . 23 1.4.2 Proactive protocols . 24 1.4.3 Hybrid protocols . 25 1.4.4 The Optimized Link State Routing protocol . 26 2 System security 32 2.1 Cryptography basics . 33 2.1.1 Symmetric cryptography . 34 2.1.2 Asymmetric cryptography . 36 2.1.3 Symmetric vs. asymmetric cryptography . 38 3 Attacks against ad hoc networks 40 3.1 Attacks against the routing layer in MANETs . 40 3.1.1 Incorrect traffic generation . 41 3.1.2 Incorrect traffic relaying . 42 3.2 Attacks against the OLSR protocol . 44 3.2.1 Incorrect traffic generation . 45 3.2.2 Incorrect traffic relaying . 47 3.3 Summary of routing attacks . 49 10 CONTENTS 4 Security in ad hoc networks: basic mechanisms 51 4.1 Protection of the routing protocol . 51 4.2 State of the art . 52 4.2.1 IPsec . 52 4.2.2 Routing protocols using digests or signatures . 53 4.2.3 Other solutions . 55 4.3 Secured versions of OLSR . 56 4.3.1 Packet protection . 57 4.3.2 Message protection . 57 4.3.3 Trust Metric Routing . 57 5 The OLSR signature message 59 5.1 Specifications . 59 5.1.1 Format of the signature message . 61 5.1.2 The timestamp . 63 5.1.3 The signature algorithms . 63 5.1.4 Applicability to control messages . 64 5.1.5 Optional features . 65 5.1.6 Interoperability with standard OLSR . 65 5.2 Modifications to the standard OLSR protocol . 65 5.2.1 Sending a signed control message . 66 5.2.2 Changes to the Duplicate Set . 66 5.2.3 Receiving and checking a signed control message . 66 5.3 Resilience . 68 5.4 Overhead . 68 5.4.1 Message sizes for the standard OLSR . 69 5.4.2 Message sizes for OLSR with signatures . 70 5.4.3 Flowrates . 70 5.4.4 Comparison with other solutions . 70 6 Cryptosystems for the ad hoc environment 73 6.1 Requirements . 73 6.2 Algorithm analysis . 74 6.2.1 Benchmarks . 74 6.3 Key management . 76 6.3.1 Threshold cryptography . 76 6.3.2 Self-organized PKI . 77 6.3.3 Identity-based cryptosystems . 77 6.3.4 Imprinting . 77 6.3.5 Probabilistic key distribution . 78 6.3.6 Diffie-Hellman key agreement . 78 6.3.7 A simple PKI for OLSR . 78 CONTENTS 11 7 Timestamps 83 7.1 No timestamps . 84 7.2 Real-time timestamps . 85 7.3 Non-volatile timestamps . 86 7.4 Clock synchronization . 87 7.4.1 Timestamp exchange protocol . 88 8 Security in ad hoc networks: advanced mechanisms 92 8.1 Compromised nodes . 92 9 Using multiple signatures in OLSR 94 9.1 Topology continuity . 94 9.2 Link Atomic Information . 95 9.3 Required proofs . 96 9.4 The Certiproof Table . 97 9.5 The ADVSIG message . 98 9.6 The protocol . 100 9.6.1 Implementation of the algorithm . 101 9.6.2 Outline of the algorithm . 101 9.6.3 Detailed algorithm . 102 9.7 Overhead . 104 9.8 Resilience and remaining vulnerabilities . 105 10 Using information about node location 107 10.1 State of the art . 107 10.2 GPS-OLSR . 108 10.2.1 Specifications . 108 10.2.2 Resilience . 110 10.2.3 The protocol . 111 10.3 Using a directional antenna to obtain extended accuracy . 112 10.4 Numerical evaluation . 113 10.5 Overhead . 114 11 Detecting bad behaviors 116 11.1 State of the art . 116 11.1.1 Watchdog/Pathrater . 117 11.1.2 CONFIDANT . 118 11.1.3 WATCHERS . 118 11.2 A trust system for OLSR . 118 11.2.1 Specifications . 119 11.2.2 Punishment and reward . 120 11.2.3 Detection of a misbehaving node: countermeasures . 121 11.2.4 Variations on the theme of trust evaluation . 121 11.2.5 Precise checks on flow conservation . 122 12 CONTENTS 11.3 A last word about enforcing security . 123 12 Conclusion 126 12.1 Foresights . 127 A Résumé détaillé de la thèse 128 A.1 Introduction aux réseaux sans fil . 128 A.1.1 Les protocoles de routage pour les réseaux ad hoc . 128 A.1.2 Le protocole OLSR . 129 A.2 Sécurité des systèmes . 129 A.3 Attaques contre les réseaux ad hoc . 130 A.3.1 Attaques contre les MANETs au niveau du routage . 130 A.3.2 Attaques contre le protocole OLSR . 132 A.4 Sécurité dans les réseaux ad hoc: mécanismes de base . 133 A.4.1 Protection du protocole de routage . 134 A.5 Le message de signature dans OLSR . 134 A.5.1 Spécifications du projet . 134 A.5.2 Modifications du protocole OLSR standard . 135 A.6 Systèmes cryptographiques pour les environnements ad hoc . 136 A.6.1 La gestion des clés . 136 A.7 Estampillage temporel . 137 A.8 Sécurité dans les.
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