MASTER'S THESIS M-1080

BOYKIN, Milton Lee. AUTHORITARIAN AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM.

The American University, M.A., 1967 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms. Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan AUTHORITARIAN AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM

by

Milton Lee Boykin

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

MASTER OF ARTS

Signatures of Committee ^-7

Chairman:

Date : ‘T / 9 ■/> ~A Acting Dean of tne School ■ ' /

Date: ^ /uviCiviu,j , LJBRARY October, 1966 | |g5g

The American University WASHINGTON. D. C. Washington, D, C. TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE ...... iv

CHAPTER

I. PRIMACY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OR DEMOCRATIC

MATURATION ...... 1

United Arab Republic's Approach ...... 4

Sweden's Approach ...... 13

II. ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF POWER ...... 26

United Arab Republic ...... 31

Electorial System ...... 31

Political Parties ...... 33

Parliament ...... 36

Executive Authority ...... 40

Sweden ...... 43

Electorial System ...... 43

Political Parties ...... 45

Parliament ...... 50

Executive Authority ...... 53

III. EFFECTIVENESS OF AUTHORITARIAN AND DEMOCRATIC

SOCIALISM—VALUE 5 7

United Arab Republic ...... 60

Agrarian Reform ...... 60

H o u s i n g ...... 65 1X1

CHAPTER PAGE

E d u c a t i o n ...... 67

Sweden 71

Agrarian Reform ...... 71

H o u s i n g ...... 75

Education ...... 79

IV. CONCLUSION...... 82

EPILOGUE ...... 90

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 93 PREFACE

The increasing number of socialist states has caused concern among many who consider democratic socialism con­ tradictory and authoritarian socialism redundant. One witnesses the meticulous care given to the construction of constitutions, parliaments, and electorial systems, and then observes that these institutions rarely seem to func­ tion as designed. This proliferation of democratic insti­ tutions throughout the socialist world raises questions concerning their use. A study of socialism within a com­ parative context will permit us to see whether the socialist phenomenon really means the same thing in a divergent social and political situation.

It is the thesis of the paper that socialism may be characterized by a democratic or authoritarian process.

Without regressing into semantic quibblings about defini­ tions, several concrete problems are raised by this distinc­ tion. The first is to determine the point of departure or fundamental assumption permitting two different interpreta­ tions of socialism. The second concerns the organization and control of human relations within these two systems.

And the third problem is to ascertain the effectiveness of authoritarian and democratic approaches to social change in terms of socialist goals and objectives. V A fundamental assumption separating authoritarian socialism from democratic socialism is the primacy of eco­ nomic factors or political systems. If economic factors are considered the exclusive determinants of a nation’s character, then all things are permissible in the name of economic development. If a political system is valued more than the reflection of economic interest, then one must concern himself with the means of achieving socio-political goals. Undoubtedly, there is an interaction between the economic development and political factors, but the empha­ sis each receives contributes significantly to the demo­ cratic or authoritarian orientation of a nation.

A second problem is the organization and control of human relations as it is observed in two socialist coun­ tries. Indeed, what is the purpose and function of demo­ cratic institutions? The function of political institutions in an authoritarian socialist country is to promulgate the word of higher authority. Their purpose is to control public opinion and to make the masses more amenable to the voice of command. Such discipline is necessary to achieve

the economic goals which will make men free from economic

exploitation. In a democratic socialist system, political

institutions function to control the central authority and

direct the development of the society. They represent the

voice of people free to choose among alternative means of Vi achieving their socio-political goals. Their purpose is to protect the individual not only from economic exploitation but from the abuses of political power.

The third problem focuses attention on the effective­ ness of each system in terms of socialist goals and objec­ tives. Modern socialism has as its basis a demand for the reorganization of the existing order along more equali- tarian and humanistic lines. Possibly authoritarian socialism will be able to raise the standard of living and, in this way, achieve a degree of equalitarianism. It is unlikely that once this economic level is achieved that the system will be able to realize its humanistic goals. The colonialist and feudal landlords can be forcedly expelled by authoritarian means. This method is not effective in creating a political system which encourages the realiza­ tion of individual potentiality. Democratic socialism is able to cope with the economic abuses using evolutionary reforms and, at the same time, maintain an open society which promotes individual freedom. It recognizes that equality of opportunity is necessary but may be rendered useless by political oppressions.

Christian Bay points out the "feasibility of analysing political development in some countries in terms vii of valuable outcomes achieved in others,"^ Since the non-

West has been pressed with two powerful alternatives to modernization, capitalism and communism, perhaps a less- ostentatious yet highly-successful comparison is in order.

The following study is a description of the resem­ blances and differences between several similar institutions and developments in the United Arab Republic and Sweden.

The socialism of the United Arab Republic represents au­ thoritarian socialism, and the socialism of Sweden illus­ trates democratic socialism. The discussion of these two models of applied socialism is intended to clarify the problems raised by the distinction between democratic and authoritarian socialism in Western and non-Western settings.

Before engaging in a comparative study, it is appro­ priate that some attention be given to methodology. Com­ parative government has been a traditiohal approach to 2 political theory since Aristotle’s Politics. The classi­ cal approach in 17üj and IStt century Europe found expression in the search for natural law but was soon replaced in the

Christian Bay, "Political and Pseudopholitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature," The American Political Science Review, LIX, i (March, 19é5), 48. 2 Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter (eds.). Compara­ tive Politics : A Reader (London: The Free Press of G1encoe, dollier-Macmillan Limited, 1963), pp. 726-728. viii 19Ub century by evolutionary advocates stressing positivism, utilitarianism, and "staat" idealism. The earlier meta­ physicians were succeeded by jurists and historians, thus submerging comparative government in descriptive knowledge about specialized political institutions. In Europe, a rational, normative and intuitive approach persists, with history and philosophy remaining the major sources of in- 3 ~ formation.

Rejecting the classical European tradition, American theorists have emphasized a scientific approach to compara­ tive politics. This new emphasis on science, rising from the descriptive efforts of the institutionalist, can be divided into "structural" and "behavioral" perspectives.

1. Structuralists are concerned with "relationships in a social situation which limit the_ choice process to a particular range of alternatives."

2, Behavioralists are concerned with "the selection 4 process in choice," i.e., deciding between alternatives.

According to Dr. David E. Apter, these alternatives stand at opposite ends of the same continuum. Behavior alists

^Medley Bull, "International Theory: The Case for A Classical Approach," World Politics, XVIII, iii (April, 1966), p. 361.

^Eckstein & Apter, o p . cit. , p. 732. ix generally study relatively small units and employ inductive experimental methods; while the structuralists utilize com­ parative studies of large-scale units. Both are concerned with prevailing patterns of behavior, cause-effect relation­ ships and scientific empirical investigation.^

It has been suggested that many American political scientists, in their attempt to achieve science, are avoid­ ing the dangerous subject— politicsCertainly, the behavioralists "are crippled by the assumption that there 7 is only one model of civilized behavior— consensus . . . ."

No absolute structure can be set up as representing the road to modernization, especially in the face of insistent

Afro-Asian assertions of the need for new socio-political institutions rooted in indigenous traditions. Many be- havioralists and structuralists find themselves in the position of trying to maintain "value neutrality" and, at Q the same time, desiring to support Western "democracy."

Even when this is not the case, certain value—loaded ideas, implicit assumptions, and vague terms inevitably influence

^Ibid., p. 733.

^Christian Bay, o£. cit., p. 39.

^Abdul Aziz Said, "The African Phenomenon," School of International Service, The American University, Washington, D. C., 1966, p. IN-14.

Q Bay, o£. cit., p. 46. g the formulation of the "political predicament." The pro­ posed solution may be equally effected by the necessity to select subjectively among the multiplicity of social condi­ tions to verify the scientific hypothesis.

Accepting these limitations, this study recognizes that comparative analysis, at least for the time being, must be approximate in character. This does not relieve the investigator of his responsibility to maintain a scien­ tific attitude and to subject his data rigorously to the criteria of "relevance" and "validity.When the scien­ tific approach offers a more orderly way of thinking and a more precise vocabulary, these tools should be utilized.

If used with discretion, the conceptual techniques of the

"structuralist" and "behavioralist" will permit us to probe, clarify, and formulate tentative answers to the problems raised by authoritarian and democratic socialism. Such concepts as "political development, political systems, and 12 political goods," are more helpful than the traditional

Q Gunnar Heckscher, The Study of Comparative Govern­ ment and Politics (London: Ruskin House, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., , p. 71. ^°Ibid. ^^Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.). The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton Univer- sity Press, .I960). Roland Pennock, "Political Development, XI analogies or metaphors, but they should not be allowed to cut the student off from our classical roots in history and philosophy.

Political Systems and Political Goods," World Politics, XVIII, iii (April, 1966), p. 415. CHAPTER I

PRIMACY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OR

DEMOCRATIC MATURATION

The democratic or authoritarian orientation of a socialist nation is, in large measure, dependent upon the d eg ree^f emphasis placed on the economic development or amount of significance given to the democratic maturation of the country. Besides the intellectual obligation of socialists to rationalize the modus operandi of the state, they sometime make explicit the fundamental assumptions upon which policy is based* In the case of the United Arab

Republic, Gamal Abdel Nasser has made it plain that his primary concern is industrialization and modernization.

The Swedes are committed to the welfare state but, so far, economic development has not been at the expense of civil liberties and democratic maturation.

There has been a great deal of speculation about the failure of democratic institutions in the Middle East, as well as in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Charles Issawi believes that: "Democracy doesn't thrive because the economic and social basis which is required is as yet non­ existent. There are inadequate traditions, customs, and

^Charles P. Issawi, "Economic and Social Foundations 2 attitudes capable of supporting representative institutions,

Other reasons for the dearth of democracy in these areas are the poor, heterogeneous, illiterate masses entrapped in a mosaic of traditional loyalties. In addition to these indigenous factors, colonialism and neo-colonialism negate representative government since decisions affecting the political affairs and economic development were actually made in London, Paris, and Lisbon. What is needed, these critics say, is a complete transformation of the country in order to make it capable of supporting a modern state.

Henry A. Kissinger aptly observes that: "There is no country in which democratic institutions developed

•after' industrialization and as a •result• of economic 2 development," Without being dogmatic, one must admit that by modernizing a country you do not automatically democra­ tize it. Certainly, there is no historical determinism endemic to the evolution of democratic processes as a kind of by-product of industrialization. Even democratic move­ ments which resort to authoritarian methods to gain its immediate economic objectives will not remain democratic long. To assume that traditionally authoritarian nations

of Democracy in the Middle East," International Affairs, XXXII, i (January, 1956), p. 27, 2 Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.l 1962), p~ TOl. 3 engaged in the process of building its economy will be con­ verted to parliamentarism once their economic goals are achieved is chimerical. Democracy involves the acquisition of learned skills, which must be developed if not prior to at least concomitantly with economic development.

The emphasis on economic development to the exclu­ sion of a diversified society means that the United Arab

Republic will have a tendency to become increasingly more authoritarian. This process will be accelerated as the rate of economic growth fails to meet the expectations of the planners and will become institutionalized if and when success is achieved. The same principle applies to Sweden where people have shown a loyalty to the democratic insti­ tutions from which they have profited economically as well as enjoyed the benefits of an open society. Sweden, by emphasizing the importance of democratic maturation of its political institutions, is becoming increasingly more con­ cerned with the humanization of its society and less authoritarian.

This does not mean that it is in the national inter­ est of Western democracies to impose limitations on or try to retard the economic "take off" of the developing nations.

Certainly, it could be in no one’s best interest to in­ crease the difference intentionally between the "have" and

"have not" nations. The revolution of rising expectations 4

has a "flash point" which could conceivably plunge the world into a holocaust as easily as a direct great power

confrontation. On the other hand, it is fatuous to assume

that economic progress inevitably leads to a democratic

society permeated with Western liberal values.

I. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC’S APPROACH

The failure of Egyptian democratic institutions from

1919 to 1952 and the chaos of the political factions after

the Revolution of July 23, 1952, crushed whatever faith

Gamal Abdel Nasser might have had in a Western parliamentary

form of government. The alien-inspired institutions, which

had been superimposed by the British and exploited by a

feudalistic minority in Egypt, collapsed. While the tri­

angular fight for power among local parties, crown, and

colonialist resulted in a precarious parliamentary govern­

ment, the army, as the major support of the King, was

quietly preparing to reverse its role and assert itself as

reformer. A military junta replaced the old order,

Faluja became a symbol to Nasser of the conditions

of Egypt prior to the revolution. The parliamentary system

obviously did not work. Elections were controlled, voters

intimidated, cabinets rose and fell regardless of their

majority in parliament. In 1942, as a result of Churchill’s

need to neutralize Egypt in the face of World War II, 5

British tanks blatantly controlled ministerial appointments demonstrating public apathy and royal impotence. It was at the Battle of Faluja during the war with Palestine that

Nasser felt most keenly that the army had been "duped . . . held under fire unarmed .... There lies our mother coun­ try," Nasser states in The Philosophy of the Revolution, "a second Faluja, on a larger scale.

The military was deeply humiliated because of the arms scandal during the Palestine War, the burning of Cairo in January, 1952, and the constant interference of the palace in political affairs. The growing discontent in the army reached a climax in the Officers’ Club Election. The

King’s candidate was defeated by Mohammed Naguib’s repre­ sentative for the Free Officers. The military had thrown down the gauntlet, and the challenge would undoubtedly be accepted by a purge of the dissentious officers. Without army support, the King was powerless. Ironically, this election was one of the few ever held in Egypt which actu­ ally affected a real transfer of power from one executive to another.

The Free Officers, a group which, for some time, had been discussing the need for reform, were in danger of

^Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolu- tion (Cairo: National Publication House Press, 1954), p. TTT“ 6 being relieved of their duties, or worse. According to

General Mohammed Naguib, the Free Officers numbered several hundred. They were divided into cells of from three to five members each. Security was maintained, as no member of any cell knew more than one member of the executive 4 governing board of fourteen. Nasser, as leader of this group, decided that the time for "positive action" was now.

In his apology for the array’s overthrow of the government and what might be considered a mutiny, Nasser asserts that:

"Events and their development determined the army’s path in 5 the supreme struggle for liberation of the Homeland."

The military coup d'etat of 1952 was intended to

clear the way for a popular revolution. It was a carefully-

planned undertaking but was not backed by a well-organized

popular party. Its purpose was simply to remove the ob­

stacles of colonial domination and feudal suppression. The

Free Officers Movement was to be a "vanguard" to remove the

impediments to progress and prosperity, after which the

"massed regular forces" of the nation would emerge to lead

a "strong liberated Egypt." One wonders how politically

naive young revolutionaries actually are, especially in the

light of Egypt's inept democratic history. Nonetheless,

^Mohammed Naguib, Egypt’s Destiny (New York: Double­ day & Company, Inc., 1955), p. 101.

^Nasser, 0 £. cit., p. 22. Nasser states that the fact this did not occur, "was the most cruel shock I ever felt in my life.

We were in need of discipline, but found nothing but anarchy. We were in need of unity, but found nothing but disunity. We were in need of work, but found nothing but indolence and inactivity.

Hence the motto of the Revolution— Discipline, Unity, and Work.^

A bloodless take over instead of a truly popular revolution permitted Nasser to avoid the reign of terror so frequently following revolutions and preventing them from achieving their objectives. Jacobin spirits called for revenge in Egypt just as they are now doing in Indo­ nesia, but fortunately the military junta had the good sense not to heed their temptation :

Indeed had we acted on all we heaurd we would have destroyed all men and demolished all ideas, being left with no alternative but to sit among dead men’s bones and debris, crying over our misfortune, and blaming our bad lot.®

The impatience of the soldier, mingled with the idealism of the Koran, impelled Nasser to try and bring order out of chaos. To be fair, one must admit that after the coup d ’etat, part of this chaos was Nasser’s own doing.

However, it was natural of the new strong man to fall back on the military, and the army particularly. Egypt, like most other Middle Eastern countries, has seen the

^Ibid. ^Ibid. ^Ibid. 8 transformation of its domestic forces into a modern army developed by using Western technology and organization.

For generations, Egypt did not have an indigenous army, having been ruled by foreigners since Roman times• Even though militarily weak relative to advanced nations, the army was now in a position to regulate internal affairs.

Western methods had not been extended successfully to other institutions of the society, so the army was the logical 9 organization to control the country.

The avant-qard leading the national revolution must now secure the garrison. Nasser systematically set about consolidating power in the Revolutionary Command Council

(RCC). He eliminated his rivals in the best of Machiavel­ lian traditions and emerged as the undisputed ruler of

Egypt.

The Bandung Conference of 1955 was the next signifi­ cant experience in the life of Nasser which affected the development of Egypt. It was at Bandung that Nasser was

"converted to socialism." What began as a coup now evolved into a socialist revolution. The phraseology of socialist humanism became the expression of the Egyptian power elite.

The nation now had an ideology to contain and organize the

Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), p. xii. 9 society. Socialism made intelligible the aspirations of the new leadership in Egypt to the Asian and African nations.

Nasser had a marketable package good for both domestic and foreign consumption.

There were three very significant ingredients in the revolutionary development of the United Arab Republic.

These were personalized in the experience of the leader of the revolution— Gamal Abdel Nasser. After the humiliation at Faluja, the disillusioning chaos after the revolution of

July 23, and the exhilaration of the Bandung Conference in

1955, the course of the revolution was plotted. The funda­ mental principles upon which the nation would develop had been accepted.

Between 1952 and 1956, the new government acted cautiously, avoiding sequestrations and dispossessions.

Concessions were made to foreign capital including a

liberalization of some existing regulations, and new tariff breaks to encourage investment. A permanent Council for

Production was also established. However, a concatenation

of international and domestic events— including the Baghdad

Pact, Israeli attack on Gaza, Czechoslovakia Arms deal,

bargaining with the USSR and United States over financing

the High Dam, nationalization of the Suez Canal— resulted

in the transformation of the economic policy of the Nasser 10

Government. These political events resulted in closer control of business, sequestration of foreign enterprises, and the expansion of the public sector.

Egyptianization and nationalization culminated in the Socialist Decrees of July, 1961:

Law 117 - nationalized all banks, insurance companies as well as 42 large industries.

Law 118 - Partially nationalized 82 other companies.

Law 119 - Prohibited any person or company from owning more than a limited number of shares in 148 companies.H

These three general laws were followed by more specific

ones taking over the gas, electric, and tramway companies.

All in all, the government acquired 70 per cent of Egyptian

company capital, amounting to LE 124 million shares. It is

estimated that 700,000 persons were deprived of their

political rights and subjected to certain social penal- 12 ties. Recently desequestration agreements have been

reached with France, Switzerland, Lebanon, and Denmark for 13 the property confiscated in 1956. This, of course, does

not affect the property of Egyptian citizens.

^^Chaurles P. Issawi, Egypt in Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963;, p. ?4.

^^Ibid., p. 58. ^^Ibid. . p. 62.

^^Middle East Economic Digest, X, xiv (April 15, 1966), p. lès. 11

In order to administer the new task placed upon the bureaucracy, the traditional structure of ministries had to be vastly expanded. Two types of organizations came into being; the Planning Bodies and Public Organizations, The

High Council of Planning, chaired by Nasser, includes all ministers. This is a staff group concerned with receiving proposals and programs of development, and then turning these recommendations into a balanced plan. It has no executive authority to carry out its suggested course of action. The Supreme Council for Public Organization is also chaired by Nasser and includes the vice presidents and certain ministers. Its primary functions are to define production objectives, approve budgets, coordinate activi­ ties and supervise the implementation of public organiza­ tion programs. These public organizations include such important projects as the High Dam Organization, Suez Canal

Authority, Petroleum Authority, Economic Development Organi­ zation which administers all sequestrated businesses, and the Al-Nasi Organization which controls twenty-four com­ panies. The last three organizations control most of 14 Egypt's economic activity.

The vague slogans of "unity, discipline and work" have been transformed into concrete socialist reforms

^^Issawi, o£, cit., p. 64. 12 hierarchically administered by the central government.

State authority is now virtually complete in those sectors of the economy which generate growth— investment and pro­ duction industries. Twenty-five hundred years of cen­ tralized autocracy have accustomed Egyptians to the unitary state and submission to legitimate authority. Further encroachment by Nasser's Socialism is a natural outgrowth of this tradition.

The fundamental assumption emerging out of the his­ torical and revolutionary experience of the United Arab

Republic is that social and economic democracy must precede political liberty. Nasser states in the Charter:

It is an indisputable fact that the political system in any state is but a direct reflection of the pre­ vailing economic state of affairs and an accurate expression of the interest controlling this economic state.

This article of faith makes it possible for the regime to use the political institutions to further the economic goals and objectives of the nation. The political system does not serve the same function that it does in a Western democracy. By accepting the primacy of economic factors,

^^Malcolm H. Kerr, "The Emergence of a Socialist Ideology in Egypt," Middle East Journal, XVI, ii (Spring, 1962), p. 130.

^^Draft of the Charter of the United Arab Republic— May 21, 1$62 (CaTro: Information Department, 1^62), p. 34. 13 all things are permissible in the name of economic develop­ ment*

II. SWEDISH APPROACH

The continuing success of the democratic institu­ tions in Sweden indicates that socialism and genuine repre­ sentative government are compatible. Although Sweden is not a utopia, and given the anamolies of human nature she never will be, it is interesting to note the progress she 17 has made judged by her own past. Early in the 19tb cen­ tury, Sweden was an example of a poor agricultural country.

Many of its rapidly-increasing population were forced to emigrate to America because of famine and the difficulty of finding employment. Sweden is now the most industrialized of the Scandinavian countries and has the highest standard of living in Europe. She has done successfully many of the things Nasser wishes to do domestically and, at the same time, has strengthened her democratic institutions.

Sweden represents an alternative way between at a- 18 vistic anarchy and suffocating statisra. The important economic factors in the "great transformation," include: a

^^Mcurquis W. Childs, Sweden : The Middle Way (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), p. xxi.

^®Ibid., p. XV. 14 great import of foreign capital between 1860 and 1910 pro­ viding vital prerequisites for rapid development, and a revolution in communications making it possible for Sweden to emerge from its isolation. More importantly, these de­ velopments were accompanied by a growth of foreign trade— first with iron and steel, and then with timber and pulp wood; a tremendous increase in international exchange of scientific and technological information; and the depletion of Norwegian forest reserves and the growth of English cities,

There was also an enormous increase in Swedish population from 5 5 per cent in the second half of the iBtb century to

81 per cent in the first half of the 19ü century. Fortu­ nately, the increase was partly siphoned off by emigration and, in Sweden, accompanied by industrialization. The popu­ lation, despite its rapid growth, did not increase as fast as production. 19 Sweden has been able to create a mature economy by exploiting a few natural resources and maximizing its human resource potential. Since Marquis Childs first aroused interest in Sweden as "a middle way," after its remarkable recovery from the depression of the thirties, she has shown that not only can the station be rebuilt

Eli Filip Heckscher, Economic History of Sweden, trans, Goran Ohlin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 210-212. 15 while the trains are running, but that controls can be 20 applied to the system without wrecking the engine.

Yet, one wonders with Professor F. A, Hayek if socialism is not "the road to serfdom." Ample evidence has been given to illustrate that Egypt's democratic organiza­ tions did not in themselves guarantee a real and vital democracy and were, in fact, an impediment to the moderni­ zation of the country. As a reaction to the socio-political consequences of this failure, the U.A.R. has substituted a highly-authoritarian political system now operating under the ideological cover of Arab Socialism and directed almost exclusively by one man. How frequently have we seen the metamorphosis of humanistic ideals into pernicious realities.

Speaking shortly after World War II, Dr. Hayek states:

Few are ready to recognize that the rise of Fascism and Nazism was not a reaction against the socialist trends of the preceding period but a natural outcome of those trends . 2 1

Is there a greater tragedy imaginable than that in our endeavor consciously to shape our future in accordance with high ideals, we should in fact un­ wittingly produce the very opposite of what we have been striving f o r ? 2 2

Command economics in the United Arab Republic operates by

^^Childs, loc. cit.

F. A. Hayek, The Road To Serfdom (London: George Routledge and S o n s , L t d ., 1944), p. 3. ~

^^Ibid., p. 4. 16 coercion and aims at the power of the state through mili­ tary expansion. It is not equivalent to Fascism or Nazism by any means; but Authoritarianism, like the god Anubis, led modern Egypt to Judgment; and if there were any doubt about the verdict for Liberty, the Russian experience pro- 23 vides abundant confirmation of those doubts.

The conflict between political liberty and economic planning is a disturbing problem and one about which the

Swedes are concerned. Is there, in fact, a link between socialism and dictatorship? Can economic planning be carried out under conditions other than totalitarian?^^

Sweden has effectively demonstrated that collective bar­ gaining caua sever the hypothetical connection between socialism and dictatorship, and social responsibility can replace authoritarianism making it possible to "plan for 25 democracy." Ironically, the conservatives who attack

socialism because it is undemocratic are themselves very dubious of the values of popular government preferring an aristocratic oligarchy of enlightened businessmen.

? 3 F, A, Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1948), p. 148.

^^Herbert Lars Gustaf Tingsten, The Problem of Democ­ racy (New York: H. W. Wolff Book Manufacturing Co., Inc., IÏÏS5), p. 159.

^^Karl Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944),'

Tingsten, loc. cit. 17

Welfare economics in Sweden operates democratically and aims at humanistic goals. "If 'freedom' is interpreted as the relative independence of industry vis-à-vis the 27 state then socialism involves a loss of 'freedom.'" How­ ever, since the policies of the "v/elfare state" as opposed to those of the "oppression state" are to encourage the

"spread effect" of market forces, a rational regulation of the economy actually may enhance the freedom of a large 28 segment of the population. This is not an attempt to incorporate normative values into economics but to use 29 practical considerations as a basis for planning. Cer­ tainly, if possible, the laissez-faire system should be ameliorated since it has not proved to be in the interest 30 of society under all circumstances. Voltaire's Candide graphically illustrates the communistic fiction of the

"harmony of interest" which is one of the basic assumptions of this system. Political institutions are necessary to compromise the inevitable conflicts of interest which naturally emerge in a complex modern society as well as to contain the violence which causes these ripplings on the

0 7 00 Ibid., p. 160. °Ibid. ^^Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd., 19É7), p. S9.

^^Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Develop- ment of Economic Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Lt3T, 1953), p. là4. 18 surface. In Sweden, a democratic parliaunent and a workable collective bargaining system have been the major vehicles 31 for carrying out equalization measures.

"The whole discussion of a * free' versus a 'planned' 32 economy has become strangely unrelated to reality."

There is no economy which is "free" to the extent that all planning is excluded and conversely, there is no such thing as a totally "planned" economy. In any case, people are motivated by a multiplicity of interest with economic needs being only one of many reasons for action. Quite obviously, citizens traditionally have demanded idealistic nationals for going to war, and it would be an affront to suggest that they were merely trying to protect their economic in­ terest. What counts is "pride, self-respect and the dignity of the human being." Sweden has not yet discovered

William James' "moral equivalent to war," but over 130 years of peace have given her a good start.

Gunnar Myrdal affirms, "social life is the result of historical development and is anything but a logical sys- 33 tern." This historical experience of Sweden supports the

31 Myrdal, Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions, op. cit., p. 45, Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), p. 11. ^^Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory, op. cit., p. 20Ô. 19 proposition that political systems are more than the re­

flection of controlling economic determinants.

Those early periods in the Middle Ages were marked by the very opposite of unity, and trading areas were then far smaller than modern nation states. This contrast between economic and political develop­ ment is instructive. For one thing, it demonstrates that economic factors do not play the decisive role in social and political change that is sometimes accorded them.^4

By 1809, a new constitutional experiment became a reality in Sweden, thus formally beginning the development of the modern democratic Swedish state. The excessive

absolutism of the Gustavian Monarchy created serious dis­ content among the Estates. The mismanagement of the wars with Russia and Denmark antagonized the army. Being sur­ rounded by enemies from without and confronted with strong opposition from within, the downfall of the King was in­

evitable. In fact, two coups were in progress at the same

time, but General Adlercreutz and a group of officers

arrested King Gustavus Adolphus IV and transferred power to

a provisional government headed by the King's uncle, Duke

Charles.

The four Estates were called into session, and a

committee appointed to draft a constitution. This same

^^Eli Filip Heckscher, o^. cit., p. 210.

Gunnar Heckscher, The Swedish Constitution (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute, 1959), p. 1. 20 procedure had been followed after the July, 1952, coup d ’etat in Egypt, except Nasser rejected the committee’s draft and wrote his own. The Swedish Committee was strongly influenced by the French Revolution as well as

Swedish historical experiences. The works of Grotius,

Montesquieu, Rousseau, Burke, and Bentham were being read and discussed widely at that time. Theories, such as the

"social contract," "natural law," and "separation of 36 powers," are very evident in the Constitution of 1809.

The primary purpose of the constitution was to limit the power of the monarchy and substitute a balance of power between King and Estates. The revolution was not the re­ sult of a popular uprising as in America in 1776 or France in 1789, and the constitution still contains no bill of rights. It did give the power of the purse and authority to appoint the King’s Ministers to parliament. From this period on, the Riksdag continued to usurp the powers of the executive. Theoretically, the principle of separation of powers is written into the constitution but, in fact, a parliamentary democracy has evolved during the past 155 years. In 1865, bicameral government replaced the four

Estates, and freedom of the press and review of government documents were established. By 1921, universal suffrage

^^Ibid., p. 18. 21 was extended to all adult citizens, and the democratization of Sweden was then complete.

Socialism is a modern phenomenon, but democratic institutions are as old as the Greeks. The Swedish politi­ cal system provides a framework capable of supporting democratic processes. The traditional freedoms of assembly and speech have become accepted, and vigorous discussion encouraged. The electorate eventually gained the right to select among alternative policies and the facto right, using parliamentary procedures, to replace a government no longer enjoying the confidence of the people. The major principles of Western democracy are accepted as the rules of the game in the political life of Sweden.

A comprehensive review of the Swedish Constitution is now being undertaken by a Royal Commission of Investiga­ tion. Even though the 1809 Constitution is the theoretical basis for Swedish government, 111 of the 114 articles have been amended and many functional aspects of current prac­ tice, such as political parties, economic organizations, have no constitutional basis. The commission is investi­ gating the laws of ministerial responsibility, the elec­ tor ial system, the function of Upper House, and the princi- 37 pies of separation of powers. The final report of the

3 7 Nils Andren, Modern Swedish Government (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 19èl), p. 170. 22 commission has not been completed, but the emphasis placed on democratic values and the political system can be seen from a quote of preliminary report of this commission:

It is not enough to maintain a formal conformity with democratic principles, i.e. to hold free elec­ tions, to respect the freedom of debate, to have a government responsible to the electorate, etc. Democratic institutions must also, by their very structure, facilitate and stimulate the private citizen's active participation in political w o r k . 38

The work of the commission represents the evolutionary approach of Sweden. The revision of the constitution is a process of incorporating custom into law without losing the continuity provided by the oldest written constitution in

Europe.

Active participation called for by the above report is expressed in a multi-group society. The political sys­ tem provides the framework in which the public interest is determined through the free competition of special interest groups and a rational compromise of their differences.

From the synthesis of individual liberty and social coop­ eration, a realistic appraisal of the national interest

emerges and is formul6 ted into policy. Dr. Gunnar Myrdal

states :

It is not the state that is running Sweden, it is the people's organizations, almost in the

^®Ibid., p. 168. 23

Jeffersonian way . . . you have more state inter­ ference in America than we have in Sweden.

This debatable question suggests an oversimplification, but

Dr. Myrdal•s point is well taken if you consider the signifi­ cant role played by economic interest groups in the Swedish collective bargaining process.

Powerful associations, representing labor, manage­ ment, farmers, white collar workers, professionals, and even civil servants, have developed and thrive in the framework of democratic institutions. The main features of the

Swedish Collective Bargaining System are as follows:

1. The framework of the bargaining institution is both national and industry-wide in character. Uniform standards persist throughout the same industry. 2. Impartial government mediators play an important role, but both sides guard the right to resort to coercive methods if necessary. 3. The bulk of both workers and employers are banded together by industries, in associations of national scope. 4. Compensation is based on amount of work done rather than time spent, where possible.40

In addition to occupational groups, there are consumer and producer cooperatives as well as housing cooperatives which cut across occupational lines. The single strongest and most important organizations are the labor unions, but this

39 Barry Faber, "Well-known Capitalist Economist— Dr. Myrdal," American Swedish Monthly (July, 1964), p. 12.

^^Paul Herbert Norgren, The Swedish Collective Bargaining System (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), p. 267. 24

is broadly interpreted since white collar workers identify

their interest with the proletariat.

The economic groups have a strong sense of social responsibility resulting from historical experience and

growing out of the homogeneous Swedish population. No seri­

ous conflicts of religion, nationality, language, or race

exist to place undue strain on the system. The leveling of

the previous economic and social extremes has created a con­

sensus concerned with stability and maintaining the status

quo. This sense of responsibility has not always existed.

During the twenties, the Scandinavian countries had the

highest record in the world of man days lost through indus­

trial conflict. However, as Marquis Childs points out;

The self-centered pressure tactics which may be suc­ cessful in a fast-developing industrial system must be supplemented at a later stage by cooperative efforts with other groups.41

Labor and management have come to accept collective bar­

gaining without any reservations. Legislation taking the

form of compulsory arbitration to existing contracts,

although not to new contracts under negotiation, helps re­

inforce responsible action. Despite the right to resort to

coercion, the last strike of any consequence occurred over

twenty years ago. During the period from 1901 to the

Marquis W. Childs, This Is Democracy ; Collective Bargaining in Scandinavia (New Haven; Yale University Press, 19 38T7 157. 25 present, approximately the period in which collective bar­

gaining has been in effect, Sweden has made excellent

economic progress. It is significant that this democratic mechanism, collective bargaining, has remained fully opera­

tive during the "great transformation" to a highly— 42 developed state. Because of self-discipline and a har­

monious relationship between labor and management, inter­

ference by the government has been minimal.

The strength and influence of the economic associa­

tions represent a kind of paraeonstitutional separation of

powers.

The principle reason why labor has not "taken out" a disproportionately large share of the fruits of enterprise is that there has been a constant and powerful counterpressure from the employer s i d e . 43

The government recognizes and respects both organizations

as representatives of their membership. Membership, al­

though voluntary, is practically unanimous. The government

seeks their advice about proposed legislation and is 44 increasingly turning to them for administration support.

In fact, it is not at all unusual for association repre­

sentatives to serve on government commissions and boards.

One of the issues before the Royal Commission on Legislative

^^Norgen, o£. cit., pp. 270 and 272.

^^Ibid., p. 278.

^^Andren, o£. cit., p. 2 0 . 26

Reform is how to incorporate economic associations into the constitutional structure.

The trend of interest groups, especially big busi­ ness, consulting directly with the government has been called "Harpsund-Democracy" because these meetings fre­ quently tcüce place at Prime Minister Tage Elander's weekend 45 residence. It might seem unusual, at first, that big business and the political spokesman for the proletariat

should cooperate at this level. It is, however, a recogni­

tion of a mutuality of interest in resolving conflicts before they occur and a recognition of the fact that power

is to be found in a democratic institution responsible for

policy formulation. Economic interest groups in Sweden

seek to influence political leaders who make the decisions determining the future of society.The political system

is more than a mere reflection of these economic interests

and an attempt to "impose a prefabricated utopia" on a

defenseless society.Sweden is an example of a small

country which has made good in relatively recent times.

Moreover, it has accomplished this, "without colonies, 48 without war, and without military bluster."

Donald M. Hancock, "Harpsund— More Than Just A Country Residence," American Swedish Monthly (October, 1964), p. 22. '^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^®Charles Gallagher, "A Small Saga," African Report, IX, iii (February, 1964), p. 6 . CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF POWER

Politics, among other things, is an attempt to maxi­ mize man's capacity to control power responsibly and to use it only for human goals. The Greeks discussed the merits of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy. In more recent times, Thomas Hobbs argued that all power should be trans­ ferred to the sovereign. Montesquieu counseled a "separa­ tion of powers," and Alexis de Tocqueville extolled the virtues of a pluralistic society. On the socialist con­ tinuum, Sweden is tolerant of social cleavage, while the

United Arab Republic is concerned with allegiance. ^ Without erecting a false dichotomy, it is evident that the recon­ ciliation of freedom and coercion remains a fundamental problem today just as it has been historically and philo­ sophically. No eschatological belief in the emergence of

"philosopher kings" is likely to resolve the dilemma.

The phenomenon of civil obedience and the influence of one state on another is related to the power possessed by the center of control. As Bertran de Jouvenel says :

"Who knows the reasons for that obedience knows the inner

Allegiance: The closest equivalent to the Arabic meaning is the concept of consensus, but it is not synono- mous with the Western meaning of the word. 28 2 nature of Power." Probsibly the strangest power configura­ tion of recent history was the confrontation of the United

States, the Soviet Union, and Egypt against France, Eng­ land, and Israel in 1956 after the nationalization of the

Suez Canal. France learned then that she must have a force de frappe even if she is to coerce small nations such as

Egypt.

The "revolt of the masses" leads one to wonder if

Proudhon's denunciation of the "perversion of democracy" into a mere competition for sovereign authority is not cor­ rect. The modern mechanisms which somehow miraculously identify the will of the individual with the will of the state are justifiable by slogans of social welfare. So­ cialists, having domesticated the leviathan, are intent upon harnessings its power for social good. Max Weber tried to demonstrate that socialism would lead to the

"dictatorship of bureaucrats," and Karl Marx, that it would result in the "dictatorship of the Proletariat." Maladroit attempts to fix abstractly that the center of power and control in society is illusory, yet the essence of power is inextricably a part of the organization and control of social relations.

2 Bertran de Jouvenel, On Power (Geneva; The Viking Press Inc., 1948), p. 17. (First published as a Beacon paperback in 1962). 29 All societies have a political system of interaction which performs the essential functions of the state. Such a system monopolizes coercive power and maintains order by physical force or deterrent sanctions. It legitimately utilizes power to transf orm the structure of the society according to the prevailing traditions, customs, and as­ pirations of its members. "Boundary maintenance" between the political system and the society at large is conducted by social institutions. When the traditional system of control is shattered by the "politization of the masses," the economic and administrative power of the old regime flows 3 into new institutions committed to rapid development. In order to accomplish the mobilization of physical and human resources necessary to bring about modernization, the "public sector" is vastly extended into the "private sectors" of the state, thus exercising control previously held by family, clan, tribe, or local community. These policies sometime have substantial support beyond the borders of the state, and this attitude may be manifested as pan-Arabism or wel­ fare stateism. What kind of structures maintain the contact between the polity and the society is a determining factor 4 in whether the state is democratic or authoritarian.

Leonard Binder, The Ideological Revolution ^ The Middle East (New York; John Wiley & ;^ons. Inc., 1 9 M ) , p. 2.

'^Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The 30 By comparing the functions of political institutions, an understanding may be obtained of the manner in which power is regulated in the society and the relative value resulting from a particular type of organization. Gabriel

A. Coleman, in the structuralist tradition, has posed seven functional categories useful in comparing modern Western political systems with transitional and traditional ones:

INPUT FUNCTIONS 1.) Interest articulation function: How are inter­ ests articulated? 2.) Aggregative functions: How are articulated interests combined? 3.) Political communication function: How is political information communicated? 4.) Recruitment and Socialization functions.

OUTPUT FUNCTIONS 1.) Rule making 2.) Rule application 3.) Rule adjudication^

Even though Dr. Almond intended that his categories replace institutional comparison, they may be used effectively to analyze the functions of Western and non-Western institu­ tions. Since all political structures are multi-functional,

they differ markedly in various states. In an attempt to relate political process, whether authoritarian or demo­ cratic, to the socialist humanist goals of the United Arab

Republic and Sweden, we will discuss four conduits of

Politicstics of Developing Areas 0(Princeton: Princeton Uni­ vers ityPress, 19êO),pp. 7-8.

5Ibid., p. 16. 31 power— elections, parties, parliaments, and executive structures. No attempt will be made for precise measure­ ment, but Dr. Almond’s functional vocabulary will assist in overcoming meaningless descriptions or misleading lore in the discussion of the institutions which maintain socio­ political boundaries and regulate power in the society.

I. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Electorial System

In accordance with the National Charter:

The freedom of voting, without the freedom of earn­ ing a living and a guarantee of this freedom, has lost all its value and becomes a deceit

If the peasants in pre-revolutionary days were coerced into voting for the wishes of their landlord, the modern prole­ tariat in the U.A.R. is equally obligated to support the new socialist state. The balloting during the first refer­ endum was memorable, with 99.9 per cent of the votes being 7 cast for Nasser and 99.8 per cent for the new constitution.

The popularity of the government evidently continues ; since in the last Presidential Plebiscite during March, 1965,

^Draft of The Charter of the Uni;^ed Arab Republic— May 21, l962 (dairo: Information department, 1962;, p.35.

^Don Peretz, "Democracy and the Revolution in Egypt," Middle East Journal, XIII, i (Winter, 1959), p. 32. 32 there were seven million votes cast, and President Nasser was re-elected for a six—year term with a 999.999 per cent Q affirmative vote.

The elections are a controlled method of soliciting the confidence of the masses. Nasser was nominated for the

Presidency by the National Assembly and was, in fact, the only candidate on the ballot. The electorate had the choice of voting "yes" or "no." It is reported that even this innocuous ballot was carefully examined at the polls by officials to ensure that there were no "technical irregu­ larities." Since the ballot was not secret and offered no real alternative to current government policy, the election system in the U.A.R. functions simply as a tool of the state to ratify what already existed.

Within the confines of the system, candidates for seats in the National Assembly were quite vocal. They could discuss non-controversial and local issues which did not threaten the revolutionary regime. Individual plat­ forms and personal promises were not permitted. Limited criticism of the government policies did take place as long as it was constructive in nature.

The primary function of elections in Nasser's Egypt is to involve the masses of the people in the workings of

®"News in Brief," Africa Report, X, v (March, 1965) p. 41. 33 the state. Voting is compulsory for all men and permis­ sible for women. Since democracy has been defined as

"popular action," elections Eire an effective way of creat­ ing interest in the affairs of the state and promoting a feeling of national identity. By projecting an image of national consensus, elections become an outward sign of the commitment of the people to the revolution. Thus, voting is an integrative phenomenon in the United Arab Republic.

Political Parties

Approximately fifteen political parties registered for the October 1952 election. They were normally con­ cerned with a specific interest and organized around an individual leader who represented their views. The Wafd,

Saadist, Socialist, Communist, and Moslem Brotherhood were leading political groups. Most important of these parties was the Wafd, intent upon expelling the foreign invaders, and the Moslem Brotherhood, concerned with returning the nation to the traditional principles of Islam. The Saadists were influential, especially in the formation of several coalition governments, and the Communists were also active but ineffective. As early as 1920, the Egyptian Socialists were organized. They called themselves "Misr-al Patat" or

Young Egyptians, and this group evolved officially into the 34 g Socialist Democratic Party in 1946. Because of the cen­ sorship of Paruq, it had little emphasis and is not the beginning of Arab Socialism as defined by Nasser today.

All of the political parties lacked interest in domestic reform, and their proclivity toward unstable government was amply demonstrated by the four changes of cadainets between

January, 1952, and the July 1952 Revolution.

The military regime abolished all political parties, including the Socialist, in January, 1953. Nasser was very severe with the Communists who he thought were agents of a foreign government. Recently he has been equally stringent with the Moslem Brotherhood, arresting over one thousand suspects after his attempted assassination. It is apparent that a political party system is not the mechanism for voicing divergent opinions of the people.

Nasser did recognize that a grass roots organization would be helpful in properly channeling the political ex­ pressions of the masses. The attempt to build such an organization resulted in the Liberation Rally of 1953, re­ placed by the National Union of 1957 and subsequently replaced by the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) of 1962. The

^Ali Yusifi El-Khalil, "The Socialist Parties in Syria and Lebanon" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, Washington, 1962), pp. 69 and 70.

^^U._S. Army Area Handbook for The United Arab Republic (Egypt), Pamphlet No. 550-43 (Washington; Department of the Army, 1964), p. 195. 35

ASU is an attempt to superimpose a one-party system on

Egypt. The party has constitutional authority for its ex­ istence and has a direct role in screening candidates for the National Assembly.

According to Kamal ed-Din Rifaat:

.... The Arab Socialist Union, as an expression of the wishes and hopes of the working people, will be one of the major factors in producing social con­ sciousness, owing to its activity and its being an embodiment of democratic rights as they apply to all citizens in a Socialist System .... It is an important direct democratic instrument and a large school for Socialist thought.H

The function of the Arab Socialist Union is to act as another control mechanism of the executive. If successful, it will divert the attention of the people from other sup­ pressed political parties and will be used to strengthen the revolutionary aims of the new regime.

The Arab Socialist Union is to cooperate with other revolutionary movements in Africa and the Middle East. In this respect, the usefulness of the communist parties has not gone unnoticed. President Nasser has not hesitated to support coup d'etats directed at the conservative states in both Asia and Africa. The ASU does not have a long history of subversion, but it has the potential of communicating

Kamal ed-Din Rifaat, "Development of Socialist Relationships in the U.A.R.," Middle East Forum. XLII, i (Winter, 1966), p. 41. 36 with underground movements in other countries that the official government in Cairo might not want to deal with openly.

Essentially, the Arab Socialist Union can never really serve an "interest articulation" function since in­ doctrination and free expression are incompatible. If overt disagreement is permissible only at the lowest level in the chain of command, complaints will be so attenuated by the time they reach the top echelon that its effects will be nil. In the future, the ASU may legitimately

"communicate political information" to the masses and serve a useful socialization function. Even though potentially an effective political instrument, Nasser has replaced a very psurticularistic and fragmented party system with an artificial and all-inclusive structure having no organic roots in the interest of the people.

Parliament

The U.A.R. Parliament, or National Assembly as it is called in Egypt, is entrusted with the prerogative of sanc­ tioning the presidential will. Historically, Egyptian assemblies have been consultative bodies without any real legislative power. In the 18tt Century, the French created advisory councils and the khedive Ismail issued a decree in

1866 establishing an Assembly of Delegates. These 37 representative assemblies showed flickering attempts to gain financial and ministerial responsibility until 1882, but there were no substantial victories of legislative 12 assemblies over the supreme power of the executive.

One significant outcome of the Nasser/Naguib con­ flict was that it determined the course of the revolution.

General Mohammed Naguib, figurehead for the Revolution

Command Council wished to return the country to a constitu­ tional and parliamentary system. Nasser thought that the restoration of parliamentary government would make it pos­ sible for the corrupt feudalistic forces to reassert their 13 control of the state. Therefore, the National Assembly

is valuable to Nasser only insofar as it expresses and promulgates executive policy.

In accordance with the terms of the 1964 Constitu­

tion, the National Assembly is composed of 350 elected

officials and 10 appointed by the president. Two members

are elected from each of the 175 geographical constituencies,

At least one half of the Assembly must be fellahin (farmers)

and workers.A worker is defined as "a man or woman who

12 U . ^ , Army Area Handbook, op. cit., p. 161.

^^John S, Badeau, "Egypt's Destiny and Egypt's Libera­ tion— A Book Review," Middle East Journal, IX, iii (Summer, 1955), p. 328. Army Area Handbook, o p . cit., p. 184. 38 is a member of a labor union," and a fellah is defined as

"a farmer who together with wife and children owns 25 feddans [1,038 acres per feddan] or less."^^ Candidates must also have been a member of the Arab Socialist Union for at least one year.

The policy of recognizing the status of farmers and workers and guaranteeing them representation in the National

Assembly may resemble proportional representational sys­ tems, but the purpose is different. The Assembly is being used as a weapon to destroy class barriers and create a more fluid social structure. Since these interest groups have no political organization, the members of the Assembly can only speak for themselves. This further weakens the

Assembly since inarticulate representatives are not likely to challenge the system without political support. It is unlikely that any group showing signs of independence will be allowed to exist. This denies the farmers and workers the opportunity to become organically rooted in what might be their constituency. The National Assembly functions just as elections to propagandize and popularize the programs of the regime. It does serve as a sounding board as long as the response is along procedural lines and not directed at the existing

^^Ibid., p. 206. 39 power equilibrium. Social questions, such as education, housing, and agriculture, may be discussed and even criti­ cized. The Assembly can voice its opinion of whether there is too much or too little socialism but not on the via­ bility of the government.

A very importsmt function of the National Assembly is to nominate the President of the Republic. Since devi­ ates from the revolutionary line are selected out of the

Assembly by the Arab Socialist Union nominating procedures for Assemblymen, it is unlikely that this hand-picked parliament would desire to choose anyone but Nasser. Even if they did select someone else, Nasser would undoubtedly override, or ignore, the decision. The source of power is not in parliament but in the executive. The National

Assembly functions to buttress the political structure. It is by no means the foundation for democratic government.

It is evident that the U.A.R. National Assembly does not perform a "rule making" or legislative function. At best, it propagates political information to the workers and farmers who had previously been excluded from participa­ tion in government except as an energizing force. A limited

"interest articulation" function can be faintly observed, but it certainly is not a basis for planning, making decisions, and ruling the state. 40 Executive Authority

The executive authority in Nasser’s Republic is a natural if not organic extension of the centralized power which has dominated Egypt since the Pharaohs. Nasser, as

leader of the Free Officer Movement, rebelled against the

corruption at the core of centralized authority and against

foreign domination by the British. Once these forces had

been removed, the army assumed power under the Revolutionary

Command Council (RCC). This military junta continues to

dominate the executive-legislative function of Egyptian

government at present.

The decision-making process of government is focused

at the top. The military leaders who organized and engi­

neered the coup continue to manage the state despite the

fact that the RCC was dissolved after the 1958 plebiscite

uniting Syria and Egypt. All important decisions are made

by Nasser and a select group of advisers. These men think

of themselves as guardians of the country who must take

care of its affairs until it comes of economic age. In

October, 1965, the cabinet was reshuffled so that it has

eight vice premiers, twenty-two ministers, and four deputy

ministers.^^

^®"News in Brief," African Report, X, x (March, 1965), pp. 48 and 49. 41

The executive is given the authority under the con­ stitution to initiate, veto, and promulgate legislation.

However, Nasser ignores the National Assembly whenever it is convenient. The all-important "socialist decrees" of

1961 were never submitted to the National Assembly even though these decrees drastically affected the future of the country, extending government intervention into all sectors of the economy. The most important laws and programs are originated and promulgated as executive decrees.

The positive role of the central government is to initiate all new reform programs. It is a function of the executive to serve as creative generator for the revolu­ tionary changes it envisions for the country. The execu­ tive also has a negative role. It functions to prevent the recalcitrant political leaders from re-establishing their

"reactionary dictatorship." The Supreme State Security

Court has politico-judicial authority to deal with enemies of the revolution. Whether negative or positive, the executive is all inclusive and continues to increase its role in all facets of the society.

In an authoritarian society such as the U.A.R., there is very little differentiation of function. The executive, atione time or other, usurps all political power.

By suppressing the traditional institutions in order to eliminate corruption, it forges new structures to take over 42 their function, but the necessity of economic development still makes it imperative that power be concentrated in the hands of a ruling executive circle. Nasser, having suc­ cessfully taken over the "rule making" and "rule applica­ tion" functions, is encroaching on the "adjudication" authority of the Islamic courts. A central switchboard will eventually control all channels of communication re­ quired to perform political functions. Broadcast, propa­ gandizing the mystic of the nation state, assures the people of the identity of national purpose and individual needs. By creating an Arab Weltanschanunq or ideologically oriented socialism, Nasser hopes to penetrate deeply into the society replacing traditional social structures with modern ones. This modernization will extend the public sector into all facets of life. Through the executive planning committees, all interests are combined and arbi­ trarily executed through the public organizations.

The administration of the military junta has proved to be far more efficient than the previous constitutional monarchy, but the government bureaucracy still serves as a buffer to authoritarian rulers just as it did in the past.

In order to get the agrarian reform off the ground, it was necessary to create a new organization outside the normal bureaucracy. This has also been true of other programs, 43 but Nasser has certainly been more successful than his predecessors in managing the affairs of Egypt.

II. SWEDEN

Electorial System

If the political apparatus of the state is democra­ tic, it is essential that contact be established between the people and the government. In Sweden, as in most

Western democracies, this channel of communication is in­ stitutionalized in the electorial system. Ideally, votes act as inputs to the system. Elected officials, using their best judgment, initiate programs and policies repre­ senting outputs of the system. Public opinion provides a continuing feedback expressing approval or disapproval.

Communication then implies a reciprocal relationship. Even though the electorial system does not work in this ideal way, it does provide two-way communications between repre­ sentatives and citizens.

Sweden has a voluntary voting system. According to

Rudolf Kjellen, Swedish political scientist:

Non—socialist parties must have enormous reserves among the non-voters, and the present conditions— i without obligatory voting— offers a premium to socialists

^ Herbert Lars Gustaf Tingsten, Political Behavior : Studies in Election Statistics (London: P. 5. king & 5on, Ltd., 19*37), p. làS. 44

Prom a democratic point of view, it has frequently been assumed that, in order to ascertain accurately the wishes of the entire community, it was necessary that everyone vote. As Dr. Tingsten suggests: "This view can now hardly 18 be accepted without reservations." The United Arab

Republic has compulsory voting for all male adults, but the conditions under which the elections are carried out are not conducive to a democratic selection.

In an attempt to measure accurately or weigh the strength of contending policies, the Swedes have adopted a voting system which grants seats in the Riksdag to each of the political parties in proportion to the number of votes received in the general election. This is illustrated by 19 the 1952 election results:

Party Total Value Seats Votes per Seat

Social Democrats 1,739,227 110 15,811 Farmer 405,910 25 16,236 Liberal 929,829 59 15,760 Conservative 538,484 31 17,370 Communist 167,295 5 33,459

This system ensures that all major parties are represented

and deliberately prevents fragmentation into a multiplicity 20 of minority groupings.

^®Ibid., p. 225. ^^Nils Andren, The Government of Sweden (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute,1955), p. 45. 20 Dankwart A. Rustow, The Politics of Compromise (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. lÈ^. 45

Therefore, the major function of elections are not only to demonstrate consensus but to clarify cleavages in the political system. The effective performance of politi­ cal functions in the society requires adequate communica­

tion between rulers and the ruled- Elections in Sweden are

a channel through which citizens can express their approval 21 or disapproval in an orderly and systematic way. It is

possible to nominate candidates in a stable party system who

offer an alternative to the established policy. The funda­ mental democratic freedoms of a secret ballot and freedom

of speech are safeguarded. All opposition parties and

candidates have access to the propaganda medium of press,

radio, and television. Not only is the mass media avail­

able to the public, but all government records, except

those affecting national security, are open for inspection.

Complaints of fraud or curruption are all but unknown and 22 candidates can express themselves on any issue. These

freedoms facilitate the flow of political information and

prevent serious miscalculation since the ruling elite does

not have to guess at unarticulated interest of the people.

Political Pcurties

The most critical concentration of power is found in

^^Ibid., p. 17. ^^Ibid ., p. 16. 46 the hands of the Swedish Prime Minister. This official heads the government and exercises the responsibilities of the state executive. In a parliamentary democracy, the Prime

Minister is also head of his political party. The general electorate, the parliamentary party, and the King all have a role in selecting this leader; however, the real decision is made by the national party. This places a high degree of responsibility in the political party system since it spans both legislative and executive functions of the government.

The proportional electorial system also reduces the 22 personality role of an individual office seeker. Primary emphasis is placed on the party and political issues before the public. Even though the Riksdagmen do not elect the

Prime Minister, he is chosen from the majority party repre­ sented in the Riksdag. Therefore, the government indi­ rectly remains responsible to the people. By changing the majority in parliament during a general election, it is possible to select another Prime Minister.

Except for the Communists, Swedish political parties are organized democratically and are traditionally sup­ ported by democratic leadership. Candidates are nominated

2 2 Nils Andren, Modern Swedish Government (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1961), p. 25. 47 at the local level. They do not have to be approved by the national party. Decisions made at parliamentary party meetings of the Riksdag are not formally binding on its members. Authoritarian direction from the top is not a daily rule of life even though a member of a particular party could not long endure if he continued to reject party policy. Most importantly, the essential prerequisites of freedom of expression and assembly are universally accepted

in Sweden.

There are five political parties represented in the

Riksdag at the present. These are the Social Democrats,

Liberals, Centre (Farmer), Conservative, and Communist.

The Social Democrats and Farmers’ Parties emerged as popu­

lar movements before their ideas were widely represented in

parliament. They were primarily organized to further eco­

nomic interest of laborers and farmers. The Liberals and

Conservative Parties initially represented political blocs

in the Riksdag but gradually they also organized the elec­

torate to support their view. The Communist Party is

generally recognized as an instrument of a foreign power

and enjoys limited support.

^^Ibid., p. 32. ^^Donald M. Hancock, ’’Conservatives Seek New Image,’’ "The Center Party," "Liberals’ Ups and Downs," Social Democ­ racy, For Ever, and Ever ...?,’’ American Swedish Monthly, (January, February, March, April, 1965), pp. 6 , 6 , 7, 9. 48

The Social Democratic Party is the oldest and 2 5 strongest political party in Sweden. In 1881, August

Palm founded the first Swedish Social Democratic Associa­ tion; and during its sustained popularity since it became a political party, it has been led by only three men:

Hjalmar Granting (1896-1925), Per Albin Hansson (1932-1946),

2 6 and Tage Erlander (1946-present). Hjalmar Branting stated at the 1889 Congress of Socialist Workers that:

Revolutions can never be "made," but if the blind­ ness and selfishness of the ruling circles should provoke a violent revolution as an act of desperate self-defence, our place is assigned and we shall stand ready to do everything to obtain and secure for the people as valuable fruits of the struggle as possible, so that its sacrifices shall not have been in vain.27

The Socialist Democratic Party deviated from its Marxist 28 origins at an early date and stressed evolutionary reform.

Its ideological roots in Marxism nourish and support the

Party, but dogmatism has long since been replaced by prag­ matism :

^^Wilfrid Fleisher, Sweden, The Welfare State (New York: The John Day Company^ 1956) , p. 1^0.

2 A Hancock, "Social Democracy For Ever and Ever,..?," op. cit., p. 1 1 . 2 7 Dankwart A, Rustow, The Politics of Compromise (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 195571 pi 5Ô. po Hancock, "Social Democracy For Ever and Ever...?," op. cit., p. 1 1 . 49

Under the impact of the depression the workers relinquished their historic radicalism and the farmers their traditional conservatism .... In contrast to the situation abroad the transi­ tion was achieved without resort to executive emergency power. The success of the depression policies halted the temporary upsurge of totali­ tarian movements long before these could assume menacing proportions. The effective and smooth operation of democratic institutions in time of stress seems the more remarkable when it is recalled that Sweden became a full-fledged democracy only in the wake of the First World War. The period of the Mid-thirties thus marks the full maturation of the most fundamental yet most elusive quality of Swedish politics— the harmonious interplay of rival forces, the tradi­ tion of government by discussion and compromise.29

The policy objectives of the Socialist Democratic

Party include the expansion of existing welfare services, continued full employment, and an extension of the eight hour day to agricultural workers.The recent referendum on "old age pensions" effectively demonstrates the amazing stability and consensus of the Social Democrats. The

Centre, Liberal, and Conservative Parties opposed the meas­ ure and were soundly defeated. The fact that such a coali­ tion was unable to defeat the government has caused a re­ alignment of almost all political parties in Sweden. The established policy of the welfare state receive a strong vote of confidence and opposing parties must adjust to this reality.

29 Rustow, 2R" ci_t. , pp. 2 and 3. ^^Hancock, "Social Democracy For Ever and Ever...?," op. cit., p. 11. 50

Political parties in Sweden perform an essential function by standing between interest groups and policy­ making structures. In this way, they are able to transform general interest expressed by the various economic associa­ tions into specific claims thus confronting parliament with a set of specific demands. Parties share with the govern­ ment agencies and boards the "aggregative function" of com­ bining the "articulated interest" of the society into a

synthesized set of alternative national goals. Being prag­ matically oriented, they are able to bargain, compromise, and function successfully in a pluralistic society. The capacity for stable majority-minority party coalitions demonstrates the consensus supporting a diversified politi­

cal society. Besides combining interest, political parties

also function to "communicate political information" and to

"recruit" prospective leaders.

Parliament

The dualism between the executive and legislative

branches of government has been resolved in favor of the

Swedish Parliament or Riksdag, 31 Since the full democrati­

zation of Sweden, the separation of powers evolved into a

separation of function with the Riksdag acting as a kind of

^^Andren, Modern Swedish Government, op. cit., p. 169. 51 switching mechanism to direct policy in accordance with the pressures of public opinion, political parties, and economic organizations. The pressures have been unusually steady, expressing the homogeneity of this Scandinavian country.

It is in the Riksdag that these social pressures are formu­ lated into law.

The principle that elected representatives are to act according to the dictates of their best judgment and extensive experience is firmly established in the minds of the Swedish public. Exciting floor debates are almost non­ existent, most work taking place in the ten joint standing committees. "The Committees are the very linchpin of the 32 legislative process in Sweden." Bills go straight to com­ mittee after the first reading, usually without debate; and after consultation with experts, including government officials, reports are submitted to the Riksdag for approv&l,

Minority opinions may also be filed as "reservations" but they cannot be used to block committee action. The recommen­ dations of these committees, composed of members from both houses, are normally accepted and enacted into law.

Neil C, M. Elder, "The Parliamentary Role of Joint Standing Committees in Sweden," American Political Science Review, XL.V, ii (June, 1951) , p. 454. 52

The Swedish Parliament became a bicameral body in 33 1866. The Upper House has 150 seats, members are in­ directly elected by county councils for a period of eight years, and candidates do not necessarily have to live in their constituency. The Lower House has 230 seats, members are directly elected by the people for a period of four 34 years, and candidates must reside in their constituency.

The Upper House tends to be more conservative and the Lower

House more liberal reflecting as it does public opinion 35 more quickly. After the extension of universal suffrage there has been little difference between the two parlia­ mentary bodies.

Although the executive initiates most legislation,

it derives its authority to do so from the majority in the

Riksdag. Through the election of Riksdagmen, this majority can be shifted to another party, thus removing the central

authority, or executive head of government. Parliament

acts as a control on the Prime Minister and, at the same

time, provides the necessary consensus for effective execu­

tive action by genuinely reflecting the will of the voters.

33 Rustow, o£. cit., p. 18. ^'^Allan Kastrup, The Making of Sweden (Stockholm: Syensh-Ameriksaska Nyhetsbyran and Tidens Forlag, 1953), p. 54,

Q C Andren, Modern Swedish Government, op. cit., p. 41 O g Rustow, o£. cit., p. 122. 53

The major function of parliament, however, is "rule making."

Individuals transmit their demands through economic asso­ ciations and political parties to the legislature. Instead of complaints and recommendations being attenuated, they are amplified by the "interest articulating" structures, 3 7 thus creating a significant impact on public policy.

Executive

Sweden is historically a hereditary monarchy.

Recently, the Swedish Royal Family has been extremely con­ scientious about its job and effectively works to contribute to the cultural, intellectual, military, and political viability of the state. King Faruk might well have looked to the north for instruction in the art of being royal in a 38 modern democracy. Executive authority theoretically rests with the Crown, and the "King in Council" governs in accord­ ance with the 1809 Constitution. To prevent the arbitrary use of power by the King, he is obligated to take the ad­ vice of his ministers. If a minister refuses to counter­ sign the royal orders, the minister must resign pending an investigation by the Riksdag. The King is inhibited from

37Andren, Modern Swedish Government, op. cit., pp. 41 and 42. O O Marquis W, Childs, Sweden ; The Middle Way (New Haven: Yale University Press^ 1947), p. 117. 54 further action during this period. Symbolically this rep- 39 resents the control of parliament over the monarchy. In actuality, the King's authority has passed to the cabinet and executive decisions are made in the cabinet meetings presided over by the Prime Minister

The Swedish Cabinet consists of the Prime Minister, eleven heads of departments, and three ministers without 41 portfolio. In speaking of the "curious device" of cabinet minutes, Dr. Elder notes that:

In point of fact, the minutes reveal to the inter­ ested eye that anything up to one thousand items of business may be handled in as short a space as half an hour, while the speeches which give the reason for the decisions run to an inordinate length. Clearly there is something odd about the "minutes" and the "meeting," and one is not sur­ prised to find that real decisions are taken in advance of the "cabinet" meeting in the presence of the King at a more informal gathering of the ministry.

These meetings are frequently held during luncheons. The departments are small administrative bodies concerned pri­ marily with conning their organization according to the purposes of the elected party. At this top managerial

39 Andren, Modern Swedish Government, op. cit., p. 100. ^^Rustow, op. cit., p. 175.

"^^Gunnar Hechscher, The Swedish Constitution (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute, Ï959), pTI 11.

^^Elder, 0 £. cit., p. 472. 55 level, they function to direct policy toward the stated goals and objectives of the legally-constituted government.

The "Royal Chancery" has the responsibility of im­ plementing the laws enacted by parliament. It consists of independent agencies and boards designed to carry out the routine administration of government programs. Most of the agency heads are appointed for life and are not subject to the political spoil system. Investigations are conducted within their area of competence and proposals before the

Riksdag must be reviewed by the appropriate board or agency before being submitted to the King in Council for approval.

Preparation of investigations may extend over a period of weeks or even years, but this prevents wild speculation and unrealistic goals from being fostered on the people.The dualism between independent agencies and ministerial de­ partments is maintained to guarantee objectivity in public administration.

The executive authority acts as a coordinate eunong the many economic and political interest groups seeking to

influence the direction of specific programs. It then pro­ vides a coherent national policy in response to these pressures. A great deal of emphasis is given to the admin­

istrative and technical as well as the social and

^^Rustow, 0£. cit., p. 173. 56 psychological aspects of governing a country concerned pri­ marily with internal development. But the primary function 44 of the executive is that of "legislative planner." Be­ cause the political system in Sweden is highly differenti­ ated, the executive authority is not absolute as it is in the United Arab Republic. The Prime Minister, as head of state, performs an aggregative function; and, in his role as head of his party, he fulfills an interest-articulating function. The executive maintains its integrity because of the democratic values which permeate the system, the fact that ministers are responsible to parliament, and, in turn, parliament is accountable to the electorate each election.

"^"^Ibid. , p. 2 1 0 . CHAPTER III

EFFECTIVENESS OF AUTHORITARIAN AND

DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM— VALUE

The previous chapter attempted to deal with the

"specialization of function and differentiation of struc­ ture" in a political system and to come to terms with

"power" as a coercive force monopolized by the polity.

Perhaps the implicit normative liberal bias of this study distorts the achievements of one of the political systems discussed; however, the fulfillment of human needs is what makes the polity valuable. "Political goods" should con­ stitute one important element in a relevant evaluation of political systems.^

J, Roland Pennock has designated four principal values which may be used in comparing the relative "politi­ cal goods" or "outcomes" of a political system. They are, 2 "order or security, welfare, justice and liberty." By means of authoritarian socialism, Nasser claims to have

"imposed order on chaos." That this order was imposed by

J. Roland Pennock, "Political Development, Political Systems and Political Goods," World Politics, XVIII, iii (April, 1966), p. 415.

^Ibid., p. 427. 58 coercion is obvious, but whether it was at the expense of

"justice" and "liberty" is a more relativistic proposition.

The necessity of accomplishing social, political, and eco­ nomic revolutions simultaneously may call for contradictory policies resulting in a curious amalgamation of democracy and authoritarianism. The problem of how to harmonize the principles of humanistic socialism— liberation from exploi­ tation, elevation of human values, provision for social security, and equality of opportunity— may express itself 3 in a genuine ambivalence in the developing nations. When these values are in conflict, one finds it necessary to appeal to more basic values which result in entangling ab­ stract rationalizations. The discussion of means and ends, procedure and substance, raises difficult ethical questions beyond the scope of this paper. In order to avoid the problems of thinking abstractly, Dr. Pennock suggests that one discusses concrete entities or particular situations.

For generations, society revolved around that mys­ terious nexus between man and property. The existing system of land tenure is embellished with religious senti­ ment, lauded as guardian of virtue, and proclaimed pro­ tector of individual rights. Socialism, rational for the

Ali Yusifi El-Khalin, "The Socialist Parties in Syria and Lebanon," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. The American University, Washington, 1962), p. 72. 59 landless proletariat, must inevitably come to terms with agrarian reform as a prerequisite to industrialization of developing nations or as a means of providing the farmer with the equivalent earning power of the urban worker.

Housing is a great deal more than mere shelter, especially in a society attempting to reorient its collec­ tive value structure. Slums produce destructive deviates or indolent drones. Postage stamp apartments house compul­ sive conformists or servile bureaucrats. A nation's hous­ ing should be organically rooted in its traditions and functionally constructed to harmonize humanist and social­ ist values.

The educational systems attempt to bridge the hiatus between the traditional and modern value structure. This is basically a philosophical problem. Intrinsically, the individual must attain a philosophy of life commensurate with his role in an industrial society. Instrumentally, the state must have access to technically-competent workers.

Religion is taught in the schools to lubricate the transi­ tion, but socialism is to provide the real intellectual scheme for the new way of life in both Sweden and Egypt.

The concept of "welfare" is perhaps as amorphous as

"justice and liberty"; however, it is possible to compare specifically agricultural, educational, and housing meas­ ures adopted in the United Arab Republic and Sweden. These 60

"outcomes" of the political systems have definite conse­ quences for the people involved and reflect the achieve­ ments of their society. Housing usually has a low priority in developing nations, but Santon correctly states that:

"Après le pain 1'éducation est le premier besoin du peuple."

A careful statistical measurement of the relative numbers or amounts of houses, products and schools is misleading be­ cause of the divergent socio-political conditions existing in Egypt and Sweden. A "gross comparison" may be more helpful because it reveals the importance placed on these

"political goods" by the polity and the value they are to the population. An examination of what changes are taking place and how these innovations are administered will shed light on the nature of the socialist systems emerging in each nation. A reorganization of the existing agricultural, housing, and educational conditions in the U.A.R. and

Sweden is well under way in each country. An attempt will be made to ascertain the effectiveness of authoritarian and democratic socialism in developing these "political goods."

I. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Agrarian Reform

Agriculture is the foundation of the Egyptian economy and the patriarchal form of family life is the main support of rural society. When Gamal Abdel Nasser came to 61 power in 1952, 65 per cent of the Egyptian people were farmers, 70 per cent of the industrial labor force worked 4 in factories dependent on agricultural products. A mixed system of land tenure sustained a social and political feudalism which thirty years of parliamentary government had failed to change. There was an astonishing inequality of land distribution with the large capitalistic estates getting larger and the small uneconomical tenant holdings getting even smaller. Egypt is still basically an agricul­ tural state although in urban areas the primary family is becoming the independent economic unit.

The aim of the Agrarian Reform Law No. 178/152 is to abolish feudalism. In accordance with the terms of the

law, land owners were permitted to retain 2 0 0 feddans

(1.038 acres per feddan) and an additional 100 feddans for

each child. Within a period of five years, the government was to redistribute all surplus land. Article 4 of the law

allowed land owners to sell land in excess of the legal

holding; but according to the government, this provision

was so abused that it was revoked in 1954— retroactive to

November 1, 1953. It is estimated that compensation to

land owners amounted to about one third of the value of the

land.

^Keith Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960), p. 75. 52

The 1952 agrarian reform was significant for several reasons: one, it redistributed the land without reducing production; two, it transferred the control of capital in­ vestment to the state; and three, and most important, it represented a commitment of the revolutionary leaders to act and rejected the bureaucratic notion that reform can be advised into existence.

The "supervised co-operatives" are established to take the place of the large land owners as sources of tech­ nical "know-how" and capital investment. Membership is compulsory for recipients of government land. The coopera­ tives provide all farming requisites, advance loans, and market all main crops.^ Reportedly, they are highly suc­ cessful in maintaining and increasing production. As soon as the cooperative unit proves its ability to manage its own affairs, government supervision is withdrawn as has already been done with the Zafaran and Bourgaga Co-operatives,

In a country where a holding of less than one feddan still represents 70 per cent of the total number of proper­ ties, fragmentation is equally as important a problem as the capitalistic estates. Fragmentation is politically more

^Doreen Warriner,iner. Agrarian Reform and Community Development in the U.A.^. iCairo: Dar Al— Taawan Publishing and Printing House,”l961), p. 41. 63 difficult to handle. The "Nawag Modelof unified rota­ tion cooperative has given evidence of a creative way to organize fragmentary holdings. The village tried a uniform crop rotation plan, and the land was combined into several large fields each containing a large number of individual holdings. To entice farmers to try this experiment, addi­ tional incentives were also offered the farmer. The ven­ ture proved successful and is being tried in several other areas.

No attempt was made to consolidate these small farms or to change the existing ownership of the land in any way.

It is possible that this cooperative movement may offer the advantage of modern technology and the incentives of indi­ vidual ownership; however, it is unlikely that this method alone will be sufficient to deal with the enormous problem of fragmentation.

In 1961, Nasser issued a decree which reduced the maximum individual holding from two hundred to one hundred feddans, reduced land payments by one half, and abolished 7 interest due on these payments completely. As recently as

6 Nawag is a village where the experiment was first tried. The traditional law of inheritance, requiring land owners to divide their property equally among the heirs, had resulted in excessive fragmentation in this village. 7 Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East (second edition; London: Oxford University Press, 196^), p. 194. 64

May 27, 1966, the Cairo press disclosed that President

Nasser had ordered the seizure of the property of eighty- nine families because of evasion of land reform laws.

These measures basically represent an intensification of the 195 2 reform and adhere to the primary objectives and principles of the agrarian reform movement in Egypt.

Nasser is dedicated to keeping the spirit of the revolution alive and has no faith in democratic evolution­ ary means to realize the objectives of the socialist state.

Field Marshal Amer, recently-appointed head of the Supreme

Committee to Eliminate Feudalism, was quoted as saying:

This regime must remain a revolutionary one . • . the thieves, the deviators, and the opportunists must be liquidated . . . anyone who discovers any political deviation must report it, or face con­ demnation as a deviator himself . , . feudalistic pockets will be liquidated without mercy.®

It is evident that U.A.R. policy is not necessarily con­ cerned with achieving its aims through democratic processes,

No compunction exists against using the agrarian reform as

a political weapon. Nasser is not satisfied with the trap­

pings of democracy but pragmatically implements those measures he believes contribute to the social and economic revolution necessary to modernize Egypt.

8 Hedrick Smith, "Nasser Pressing Curb on Rightist," The New York Times, May 27, 1966, Sec. C, p. 8 , 65 Housing

The United Arab Republic is primarily rural but characterized by high population density and an increasing urbanization. The reduction of infant mortality and suc­ cess of recent health programs are creating a very rapid increase in population, the results of which are evident in that one third of the population of Alexandria lives in slums. Fortunately, the U.A.R. has not become completely preoccupied with the expansion of heavy industry and is concerned with the demographic crisis.

The U.A.R. has gone further than any other Arab country in nationalization and state control of the build­ ing industry. It is now estimated that 90 per cent of the current financing comes from public sources. Prior to the revolution of 1952, the primary means of financing was private, facilitated by access to foreign capital. The

Egyptian Ministry of Housing now has the responsibility for general planning. Basically, the program is decentralized with local provincial governors and town councils receiving long-term loans with reduced interest rates from the

Egyptian Central Bank. The housing program is an integral part of the comprehensive five-year plan for economic 9 development.

9 Report of the United Nations Seminar of Financing 66

The cooperative housing program is administered by an independent government organization. The cooperative societies are given financial and technical assistance.

Land is made available on special credit terms, but the members must contribute one third of the housing cost. In the U.A.R., there are presently about 240 cooperative hous­ ing societies.

The city of Cairo also has an autonomous housing ad­ ministration. As a legacy of the previous order, also as agricultural investment went into high income housing vice industry after reform, a noticeable gap exists between high income apartments and housing for the masses. In accord­ ance with the 1960 census, 37.8 per cent of urban houses in the U.A.R. have electricity, and 21.7 per cent are directly connected to public sewers. In Cairo, 9,000 units are con­ structed annually. Two thirds of these are built by the government.Even so, it appears that new construction totals only one third to one half of new family formations which, in itself, attributes only part of the housing demand.

of Housing and Related Community Facilities for the Arab States, ^/TAC/SER c/72 (New York" United Nations, 1965), p^i 76.

^°Ibid., p. 49. 67 The aim of the United Arab Republic's housing policy is to provide a decent standard of living for the lower and middle class income groups. Much of what is accomplished is associated with new industrial complexes. Housing proj­ ects are built in conjunction with the establishment of a new factory. This sometimes has a reverse effect on hous­ ing, High priority projects, such as the Aswan Dam, heavy industry, and Nasser's international image, severely limit resources for housing and related social welfare programs.

Education

For years, Egypt had an educational system firmly rooted in the agrarian culture and supporting the privileged feudalistic minority. With the revolution of 1952, educa­ tion became a function of the state; the first serious attempts were made to create a system conducive to a modern nation. Through a series of official acts from 1956 to

1961, the unification of the school system became law. An equalitarian educational core replaced the traditional aristocratic systems. There are three major objectives in the expansion and unification of the Egyptian school system:

(a) Increasing the rate of compulsory education. (b) Expanding technical education. (c) Guiding the graduates according to the needs of the state.

^^Revolution in 13 Years— 1952-1965 (Cairo: Informa­ tion Department, 1965?, p. ^5. 68

In order to further these aims, the state focuses attention on primary schools as a means of raising the level of popu­ lar education and on vocational training as a means of providing the skills necessary for an industrial society.

Before the 1952 Revolution, the first stage of

Egyptian education was divided into an elementary and primary school. The elementary schools were free, but terminal. Graduates not only were unqualified to further their education but after a couple of years in the village reverted to an illiterate condition. The primary schools charged a fee, but graduates were qualified to advance 12 through the secondary system to higher education.

In order to remedy this situation, the first stage schools are now consolidated, attendance made compulsory, students automatically promoted, and all fees abolished.

At the new primary school, attendance increased from 40 per cent in 1953-1954, to 80 per cent in 1963-1964. It is 13 hoped that 100 per cent will be reached by 1970. As symbolic of the commitment of the state to education, 350 schools, or almost one per day, are built each year. There have also been significant expansions of the number of

12 Amir Boktor, The Development and Expansion of Education in The United Arab Republic (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1963), p. 27. 13 Revolution in 13 Years, op. cit., p. 71. 69 teachers, and greater financial expenditures.^^ Unfortu­ nately, it is reported that there is a corresponding decrease in the quality of primary education.

Advancement beyond the primary level is severely restricted by the physical educational capabilities of the state. The ability of the society to absorb university graduates is limited to the extent that many seek employ­ ment abroad. Only 20 per cent of the primary school gradu­ ates can enter the preparatory schools, and of those that do only 40-43 per cent can enter the secondary schools

Specialization occurs at age twelve after graduation from the primary school. Highly competitive examinations, relatively speaking, determine which individuals are quali­ fied to continue their education. There is no counseling system to guide students at this stage or at later periods in their educational development. Beyond the primary level, the needs of the state are given first consideration.

Vocational and academic training are now equally emphasized. The preparatory schools are divided into six types: general (academic), industrial, agricultural, commercial, technical schools for girls, and post-primary.^^

^'^Keith Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, IncT^ 1960), p. 113.

^^Boktor, o£. cit., p. 6 .

1 6 Mohammed Khairy Harby and Mohammed el-Hadi Afifi, 70 Some attention has been devoted to adult education and nursery schools, but its effects are marginal. In addition to vocational training in the public schools, Productivity and Vocational Centers are organized with United Nations and International Labor Organization assistance. These centers are especially interested in creating the category 17 of foreman to link engineer and workers. The entire system is increasingly oriented along pragmatic lines.

Despite the equalitarian structural changes, there is still criticism of the traditional hierarchical relation- 18 ship between administrators, teachers, and students.

Excessive attention is devoted to theory and memorizing rather than creative and practical exercises. The funda­ mental principle of "equality of opportunity" as a condi­ tion to the emergence of the Welfare state is paramount in the minds of educational planners; however, a highly authoritarian attitude permeates the existing institution.

This type relationship is traditional and not necesseurily

Egyptian Education in Modern Egypt (Cairo: Documentation Centre for Education, 19^8), p. 4. 17 Mohammed el-Fateh Omar, Productivity and Vocational Training Department— UAR (Cairo: Government Printing Offices, 19b3), pT 7. 18 Sadek H. Samaan, Value Reconstruction and Egyptian Education (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 10. 71 created by the new government. Attempts are being made to decentralize the system, but it has not achieved marked success.

II. SWEDEN

Agrarian Reform

Fortunately, Sweden never had a fully-developed

"feudal system," but the medieval village was an impediment to agricultural production. Organized action of the state to improve the existing system of land tenure occurred toward the end of the 18th Century when the Riksdag abol­ ished traditional-bound communal strip farming and es tab- 19 lished an individualistic system of land holding. Since three quarters of the population were engaged in agricul­ ture, this was a significant economic and social reform.

These new holdings proved more suitable for cultivation and soon justified their existence even to the most recalci­ trant farmer. Ironically, by breaking up these communal societies into individual farms, the foundation was laid for later socialistic reforms.

The improvement of agricultural techniques, includ­

ing artificial fertilizer, scientific drainage, crop

19 Brynjolf Jakob, The Scandinavian Countries— 1720- 1865, I (Boston: Chapman & Grimes, 1943), p. 280. 72 rotation and dairy techniques were begun long before the 20 First World War, By 1950, farmers represented only 10 per cent of the total population. In order to overcome the inevitable wage differentiation resulting from industriali­ zation, the farmers organized into societies, unions, and cooperatives, and eventually solicited the support of the state. Marquis Childs suggests, "that beneath all the com­ plexities of modern society the exchange between farmer and 21 the artisan is still at the base of our society."

The Federation of Swedish Farmers Association (SL) and the Swedish Farmers Union (RLF) represent the interest of the entire agricultural community and are not bound to state or party. No less than 80 per cent of the sales of agricultural products are handled by farmers' economic . 22 associations. The system of collection, transportation, processing, and retailing developed by the cooperative movement was substantiçilly accomplished without state assistance and is based on voluntary membership. Never­ theless, the farm crisis of the thirties resulted in

20 Eli Filip Heckscher, An Economic History of Sweden, trans. Goran Ohlin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 259. 21 Marquis W. Childs, This Is Democracy: Collective Bargaining in Scandinavia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 193BT7 P* 85. 2 2 Swedish Farmers' Organization (Stockholm: Victor Pettersons Bokindustriaktiebolag, 1950), pp. 16 and 23. 73 government subsidies and World War II created a state system of price and wage regulation which continues to this day. The entire agriculture of the country is now treated as a single enterprise, thus eliminating internal competi­ tion and distributing profits and losses evenly over the farm community. This is a system of mutual cooperation and not regulated by official decree.

The general principles of future agricultural policy 23 were approved in 194 7 by the Riksdag. The aim is to raise the income of farmers to that of his urban counterpart and to channel this development rationally. This agrarian policy is intended to adjust the agrarian structure to changing technological needs and to the needs of the man on 24 the land.

The method of achieving these objectives is called the "rationalization of agriculture" and is considered an 25 integral element of general economic planning. The Board of Agriculture, through county agricultural councils, exer­ cises supervision of "external rationalization." This

23 Act of 30 June 1947 relative to Supervision of Agricultural Holdings— S.F.S», No. 288/1947. 24 Erich H, Jacoby, Land Consolidation in Europe (Holland: International Institute for Land Reclamation and Improvement, 1959), p. 111.

^^Ibid., p. 111. 74 program is designed to consolidate small uneconomical farms into "base holdings" of about forty acres and eventually into "normal farms" of from sixty to seventy acres which can better utilize modern mechanized farming techniques

This reform is expected to take two generations to complete and illustrates the methodology of Swedish long- range planning. Except under special conditions, the indi­ vidual farms are not authoritarianly expropriated as was done in pre—socialistic Sweden but will be acquired by the state through a pre-emptive buying prerogative. The indi­ vidual farmer does not have to sell his land and may even receive a subsidy. Subsidies, however, are limited to the present owner of uneconomical holdings, and the government has primary purchasing rights if the farm is put up for sale.

Positive incentives, such as substantial grants, personal advisory assistance, and improvement loans, are also offered to assist farmers enlarge their holdings.

This financial assistance is provided regardless of col­ lateral, since it is considered an investment in the com­ munity as a whole. Approximately 80 per cent of the

Swedish farms still do not measure up to the model family

2 S Ake Gullander, Farmers' Co-operation in Sweden (Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State College Press, 19^1), p. 168. 75 farm. The number of holdings attributable to these enclo­ sure methods have decreased by 17 per cent from 1951 to 1961.

The rationalization of Swedish agriculture has not changed the structure of ownership. Over 90 per cent of 2 7 all arable land is privately owned. Definite limitations are placed on inheritance rights, but the individual prop­ erty rights of the farmers are protected by the Constitution of 1809. Farmers were represented in the earliest assem­ blies of 1835, and they continue to exert considerable influence by virtue of their unions.

Housing

Sweden is predominantly urban and populated mostly by apartment dwellers. Since industrialization was late in transforming the Swedish landscape, most houses are of rather recent vintage. Sweden encourages every family to own its own home ; unfortunately conditions are such that not only is there a five to seven year waiting list, but many young couples are unable to get married even because they have no place to live together. "Nearly half of all city dwellings were found to consist of one room dnd

27 Swedish Agriculture, A short summary of Swedish agriculture and the National Board of Agriculture (Stockholm: n.p., 1965), p. 6 . 76 2 A kitchen," in a report of the Population Commission, This comprehensive and candid report by the commission notes :

Overcrowded homes are in many instances of a character shocking to children and are not infre­ quently of an incestuous nature. This impersonal sexual behavior readily becomes a pattern of con­ duct. It cramps the development of the young, particularly with regard to the need for comple­ tion and psychic individualization of love life. . . o [it further suggested] that the only real gain in housing in the past two decades has come not through the construction of thousands of low cost apartments but through restrictions on the size of families.2 "

Even in view of these failures, Sweden encourages an open and free discussion of the problem. Yet, more attention is now being given to the human aspects of housing development.

Slums, in the traditional sense, do not exist, and coopera- 30 tive methods have made low cost housing possible in Sweden.

In order to alleviate the chronic housing shortage, especially among lower income groups, and to prevent the erection of undesirable substandard housing through specula­ tion, government assumed a more active role in the housing

28 Hudson Strode, Sweden : Model for ^ World (New York : Harcourt, Brace and Company^ 1?49), p. SÔ1; Wilfrid Fleisher, Sweden, The Welfare State (New York: The John Day Company, 1956),p. 123. 29 Marquis W. Childs, This Is Democracy: Collective Bargaining in Scandinavia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19 38T7 pp. 93 and 96. Marquis W, Childs, Sweden : The Middle Way (New Haven: Yale University PresT] 1947) , p. 5l‘. 77 industry. Town planning and public lands are traditional features of Swedish city administration. Despite this precedent, housing was regarded as strictly a private enterprise until the thirties. Public control has expanded since that time, until now a highly complex system of government regulations is in existence. This control has not included nationalization of the industry. Exploratory moves along this line have recently been made by the government; however, the long-range effects of this policy change have not been determined,

Swedish housing planning is based on the principle of official control of private building exercised through an intricate dual system of national and local boards. The national government is mainly concerned with financing and the municipalities with initiating and implementing build­ ing proposals. All building must fit into regional and master plans and the government decides where and when development may take place.

Ostensibly, these policies seem highly restrictive, but they do maintain a democratic orientation while en­ couraging investment in low income housing. Plans origi­ nate in the local communities. The representatives of the municipalities are charged with the responsibility of balancing public and private interest. The central govern­ ment must approve housing plans, but it cannot alter a 78 proposal. If the plan is unsuitable, it must be returned 31 to local authorities for revision.

One of the most humanistic aspects of the welfare program is care for the aged. This has not always been the case in Sweden:

It has been claimed that as early as the beginning of the nineteenth Century, ritualistic clubbing to death of the elderly were carried out in Sweden with all members of the family participating. This was supposed to "purify" the body making it possible to attain Valhalla, ^2

Historically, there are many similar solutions to the prob­ lems of old age. However, one of the most humanistic aspects of Sweden's recent progressive housing program is the attempt of the administration of the modern old age homes to avoid an institutional and depressing atmosphere.

There are many structural considerations designed to give concrete expression to this idea. For example: Bengt

Hedlen, director of Strombacken, says "people here are people, not numbers," and as evidence of this policy, the individual resident's name appears on his door. As opposed to reservation-type compounds, the homes are integrated into the neighborhood so that the residence remains a

^^Per Holm, Swedish Housing (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute, 1957), pi 27.

^^Fleisher, o£, cit,, pp. 189 and 190. 79 member of the community. The "Spector of Illness and Death is largely absent . . . ."

Education

The demands of Sweden's increasingly-industrialized society have caused a radical break of the Swedish educa­ tional system with its classical European traditions. The school inquiry initiated by the Riksdag of 1940, recognized the desirability of improving the standard of population education and the necessity of putting technical education 33 on a parity with classical grammar. Therefore, in 1950, the Riksdag approved in principle the "Unitary School."

Final ratification of the proposal came in 1962.

The unitary school is an "elective" vice "selective" educational system. It combines the traditional dual approach into one nine-year compulsory program. No speciali­ zation or "streaming" as the Swedes call it, is undertaken until the students are about age fifteen. Intensive guidance and counseling is provided prior to the child's decision to specialize. After the nine years of compulsory education, the parents and child may decide whether he should enter the gymnasium, vocational school, or start to work

33 Social Sweden (Stockholm: Social Welfare Board, 1952), p. 564. 80 immediately. Competitive examinations for admission to the gymnasium are not required. The aim of the new school is to provide, "equal opportunity to everyone regardless of social backgrounds, regional differences, and financial ,.34 means."

In addition to Sweden's new unitary school, there is a very progressive nursery and a developing adult education program. The nursery school, under the direction of the 35 Social Welfare Board, is concerned with social training.

Structured play endeavors to teach children to work to­ gether and prepares them to study in group situations. The problem of retraining adult workers displaced by automation is approached systematically through the cooperation of labor unions, private industry, and a series of government boards. Sweden has increased its retraining capacity to an annual intake of about 35,000 people, and about 80 per cent of the graduates receive jobs immediately. The length of the courses vary from a few months to about twenty. Par­ ticipants are paid 410 crowns per month, rents are paid in full, and the family receives an allowance during the

^^Nils-Gustav Nildeman, "Democratic Teamwork or Intellectual Elite?," The American Swedish Monthly (April, 1965), p. 12.

^^Michael E. Salzer, "Education,** The American Swedish Monthly (April, 1966), p. 10. 81 training period. Sweden is highly developed enough that it can accept a high degree of responsibility for the edu­ cational needs of both the young and the old.

Professor Torsten Husen has pointed out, "that the school reform ultimately rests on political evaluations, as 37 expressed in our democratic society by parliament,"

Recognizing the expediency of the school reform as a pre­ requisite for the perpetuation of the socialist state, one might expect a highly-authoritarian system programming individuals as cogs in the socialist mechanized society.

On the contrary, a more democratic individualized classless educational system evolved. The unitary system is locally administered although supervised by fifty—two state elemen­ tary inspectors and under national direction through the

Board of Education. This close supervision undoubtedly in­ hibits a certain amount of creativity, but a great deal of this is overcome because education is such a priority issue

in Sweden. National expenditures on education has increased

five fold since 1950, and polls indicate a university pro­

fessor is the most respected profession in the country.

B. Olsson, "Employment Policy in Sweden," Inter­ national Labor Review, LXXXVII, v (May, 1963), p. 422. 37 Michael E. Salzar, "Sweden's Motto: Focus on Change," The American Swedish Monthly (September, 1965), p. 6 , CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Socialism traditionally was aimed at the ameliora­ tion of the condition of the working classes but has been extended beyond this narrow interpretation to include more equality into all social conditions, Emile Durkheim defines socialism as:

Those theories which demand a more or less complete connection of all economic functions, or of certain of them though diffused, with the directing and knowing organs of society.1

Socialism is not a mere variation of communism, nor should one confuse every action of the state as socialist policy.

Socialism, like any ideology, is a particular way of bring­ ing unity and meaning to human life and thought. While socialists may agree on ultimate values and principles, they disagree on the means of achieving their objectives.

Problem 1

The primacy of economic development or political matu­ ration contributes significantly to the authoritarian or democratic orientation of a state, Sweden has chosen to establish a sophisticated democratic government, while creating a firmer economic basis for social welfare. By

Emile Durkheim, Socialism, ed. Alvin W. Gouldner from original by Marcel Mauss (Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1958), p. 56, 83 emphasizing the importance of political development, a wel­ fare state emerged with sufficient elasticity to support a pluralistic society.

Nasser, on the other hand, criticized the parapher­ nalia of Western democracies as a cruel deception. This did not deter him from engineering successive "democratic" institutions, including constitutions and national assem­ blies, to keep up appearances of representative government.

These warrants of legitimacy receive the approval of the people through carefully controlled plebiscites and permit the regime to attain a certain degree of political support without granting the masses any real participation in the decision-making process of the state.

There is evidence that "political development must 2 precede and is a prior condition to economic development."

Whether this is true or not, certainly an overemphasis on the economic facet of the society may create a disequili­ brium necessitating more rigid or authoritarian controls; while the proper attention to developing a viable and healthy political system is likely to create conditions where the realization of humanistic ideals is possible.

p Abdul Aziz Said, "The African Phenomenon," School of International Service, The American University, Washington, 1966, p. In-8 . 84 Problem 2

The organization and control of political power

limits the alternatives open to an individual and, at the

same time, provides the capacity to fulfill individual

needs and wants. In Sweden, democracy is more than a

formal abstraction, it is a definite political movement

characterized by a free flow of information through its regulatory institutions. Adequate circulation, made pos­

sible by an "open society," provides essential feedback to

the leadership. Policy is formulated at the top, but is

conditioned by the competition of interest groups. Thus,

the public interest emerges as a function of the multi­

group society, operating in accordance with democratic

principles.

In Egypt, democratic political institutions are a

formal rationalization for the existing benevolent military

junta. In a country ruled by foreigners for hundreds of

years, it is important to create cohesion and unity at

least among those Egyptians who are politically self-

conscious; to replace "wrong concepts" and "reactionary

doctrines" permeating the Islamic theocracy with secular

authority; and to imbue the traditional society with

humanistic values of socialism. These inchoate democratic

structures could be strengthened to support representative

government as well as encourage secularism, nationalism. 85 and humanism. But Egypt seeks to modernize by progress­ ively committing its resources, both human and physical, to a strong authoritarian guardian; instead of developing a mature political system, capable of maintaining an open society.

Both Egypt and Sweden claim to be "democratic," yet the authoritearian methods of Nasser thwart the creative energies in the society which he wishes to activate,

Sweden's liberal methods have been successful in maximizing political equality and minimizing violence. In the final analysis, the "classical conception of democracy as a sys­ tem of rational deliberation for settling issues of justice 3 and welfare," is a good definition. Kant's concern for plain human dignity and the importance of treating man as an "end" and never as a "means" persist beyond the perish­

able doctrine of natural law.

Problem 3

The effectiveness of democratic or authoritarian

socialism must be determined by its success in meeting

human "needs" and "wants." The needs of any individual

o Christian Bay, "Political and Pseudopolitics; A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature," The American Political Science Review, LIX, i (March, 1955), p. 47. 86 might be arranged hierarchically from those primary physi­ cal requirements of food and survival to the higher needs including love and self-actualization. Both authoritarian and democratic societies may adequately fulfill the lower requirements of man ; but after a minimum standard of living is achieved, democratic systems offer more "political goods" than an authoritarian system.

In both Sweden and the U.A.R., agrarian reform is integrated into national economic planning. Both countries are trying to redistribute the land into privately-owned, economically-sized family farms. The objectives of each state are similar; however-, contrasting demographic, economic and political circumstances are responsible for the dissimilitude of methods used in achieving these objec­ tives. Egypt, having been dominated by an alliance between owners of large estates and corrupt politicians, and now experiencing a population explosion which almost negates any increase in the Gross National Product, is still serf to King Cotton and to the fluctuations of the international market. On the other hand, Sweden, having had few large estates, and now experiencing a labor shortage, is agricul­ turally self sufficient and is a highly-industralized urban state. Thus, agrarian reform in Egypt comes about by a crude mixture of persuasion and national decree. What would take years to accomplish using the democratic long 87 term planning of the Swedes, Nasser hopes to accomplish

swiftly by authoritarian direction. The socio-political factors in Egypt indicate that the people want and need modernization, but the open question is, can the authori­ tarian regeneration of rural Egypt evolve into a stable

system of land tenure.

There are several similarities between the housing

situation in Sweden and in the U.A.R, The most significant

is the concentration of attention by the respective govern­ ments on the lower and middle class housing needs and the

severe shortage of adequate housing in both countries. In

order to cope with the problems, Nasser has substantially nationalized the housing industry. Plagued with a great deal of substandard buildings and pressed with the need to

invest in industrialization, he has little hope of ade­

quately housing the population. In fact, one of his major

problems is to divert investment in high-rent apartments

into more productive areas. Sweden has been able to

achieve limited success with strict controls, but stopped

short of actual nationalization. With little substandard

dwellings, she had begun to appreciate the importance of

housing as an economic stimulus and socially important

institution. Sweden can concentrate on the psychological

and sociological dimensions of her housing problem as well

as on the need for additional structures. Again, the 88 problem is how effectively the state can serve as catalysis to progress and what method will be used to achieve na­ tional goals.

Both educational systems reflect a genuine concern for "equality of opportunity." This principle receives concrete expression in the compulsory state-controlled system of each country. Despite these similarities, there are sharp contrasts in content, emphasis, and purpose. One of Nasser's major tasks is to educate his people in dis­ content— a rebellion against the status quo and an alle­ giance to Arab nationalism. He is naturally concerned with the technical needs of the_state and uses education as a means of achieving national objectives. Sweden with the highest standard of living in Europe, and no expansionist objectives, is primarily concerned with the needs of the individual as an integrated member of the welfare state, and uses education to develop the potentialities of her citizens. Certainly, education is one of the major achieve­ ments of the New Egypt; and quantitative comparisons are misleading, but the purpose of education is a qualitative difference which can be a valid criteria. An authoritarian system suffocates the inquiring mind by super-imposing upon it the objectives of the state. Equal opportunity for indoctrination does not make up for a democratic system which encourages the self-realization of the individual. 89 It is not possible for these alternative approaches to achieve the same "ends" or type of society. Authoritarian means do not create democratic societies, and democratic means do not create authoritarian societies. They are mutually exclusive. EPILOGUE

The pre-Renaissance period in Europe was charac­ terized by social decentralization operating under the general tutelage of Christiandom. The individual, having little freedom, found security in the primary ties he had with the established Roman Catholic Church and the feudal hierarchy. Man was conscious of himself only in the restricted role assigned to him by the medieval society.

When the Renaissance, Reformation, and Industrial Revolu­

tion swept away these traditional ties, the individual found himself alone, stripped of his raison d ' être and left with nothing but his own efforts for support. This atom­

ized society soon coalesced politically around the concept of the nation state and religiously around the concepts of

Protestanism. The idea of subordinating economic interest

to the salvation of one's soul now was reversed. Both

institutions gratuitously accepted the newly—won independ­

ence of the individual who found it necessary to relate himself to a "Brave New World."

It would appear that the U.A.R. is undergoing a

similar breaking up of the old order. As Egyptians are

released from their traditional culture, Nasser hopes that

"socialism" will provide a new "modus vivendi." One which

will combine the virtue and utility of "God and Country," 91 in building a modern progressive state. Since the freedom of self-determination is worthless unless man knows what he wants to determine, Nasser graciously provides goals and objectives. He hopes that authoritarian socialism will become the repository of the frightened, uprooted, and isolated individuals emerging from the Valley of the Nile,

Nasser's problem is to determine "how" and toward "what" they are developing. It is possible that a concept such as

Senghor's "negritude" or Sweden's democratic socialism could provide a positive and creative way of living; but

Nasserism, although trying to remain free of the guilt of

Stalinist Russia, ironically seeks to create similar condi­ tions voluntarily.

Socialist societies are not posited in a framework of predetermined truths and historically fated only to engage in a process of uncovering these truths, rather they have the capacity to create their own values. It is neither feasible nor desirable for this process to culmi­ nate in a static Utopia. The vision of Aldous Huxley's, where freedom is not just dead, but forgotten, and the

World State's motto is "Community, Identity, Stability," is a possibility for both Sweden and the U.A.R.; but it is also possible for these states to be organized around a concept of evolutionary change. The democratic principles of the West would seem to offer the best hope for creating 92 a socio-political milieu which will permit man to exercise his freedom and provide a hope of spontaneously realizing his potentials. Man must not only be "free from" oppres— i sive forces, he must be "free to" create a life commensu­ rate with his hopes and aspirations. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY

For the convenience of the reader, bibliographical

entries are divided into three sections: general theo- ^— retical publications, Swedish references, and United Arab

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A. GENERAL THEORETICAL PUBLICATIONS

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______and James S. Coleman (eds.). The Politics of Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

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Durkheim, Emile. Socialism. Edited by Alvin W. Gouldner from original by Marcel Mauss. Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1958.

Eckstein, Harry and David E. Apter (eds.). Comparative Politics ; A Reader. London: The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macraillan, Limited, 1963.

Fanon, Franz. The Wretched of The Earth. New York: Grover Press, 1965.

Fromm, Erich. Socialist Humanism. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965. 95 Gallagher, Charles. "A Small Saga," African Report, IX, iii (March, 1964), p. 3.

Hayek, Friedrich A. Individualism and Economic Order. London: George Routledge & Sons, 1948.

The Road to Serfdom. London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1948

Heckscher, Gunnar. The Study of Comparative Government and Politics. London: Ruskin House, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1957.

Jouvenel, Bertran de. On Power. Geneva: The Viking Press, Inc., 1945.

Kissinger, Henry A. The Necessity for Choice. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Incl [Anchor Books], 1962.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. Political Man. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960.

Mannheim, Karl. Diagnosis of Our Time. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944.

Maslow, Abraham H. "A Theory of Human Motivation," Psychological Review, L, iv (July, 1943), p. 370.

Myrdal, Gunnar, "Development and Under-Development," National Bank of Egypt Fifth Anniversary Commemoration Lectures. Cairo : [n.n.J, 1956.

______. Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd., 1957.

Neumann, Franz L. The Democratic and The Authoritarian State. Glencoe, Illinois : The Falcon's Wing Press, 1957.

Pennock, J. Roland. "Political Development, Political Systems and Political Goods," World Politics, XVIII, iii (April, 1966), p. 415.

Rosenberg, Arthur. Democracy and Socialism. Trans. George Rosen, New York: A. Knopf, 195^.

Rostow, W. W. The Stages of Economic Growth. Boston: Cambridge University Pres^s , 19^0. 96

Said, Abdul Aziz. "The African Phenomenon," School of International Service, The American University, Washington, 1966.

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Tingsten, Herbert Lars Gustaf. Political Behavior : Studies in Election Statistics. London: P. S. King & Son, Ltd., 1937.

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"News In Brief," African Report, X, XI (May, June, 1965, 1966).

Apter, David, "New Fashions in Constitution-Making," African Report, XIII, iv (April, 1963), p. 27.

Arateh, Reza, "Some Problems of Education in Underdeveloped Countries," The Middle East Journal, XII (Summer, 1958), p. 270.

Azzam, Omar Abdulraman. The Development of Urban and Rural Housing in Egypt. Zurich: Ed Truninger, 1960.

Badeau, John S. "A Role in Search of A Hero," Middle East Journal, IX, iv (Autumn, 1955), p. 373.

______. "Egypt's Destiny and Egypt's Liberation," Middle East Journal, IX, iii (Summer, 1955), p. 328.

Binder, Leonard, The Ideological Revolution in The Middle East. New York : John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1954.

Boktor, Amir. The Development and Expansion of Education in The United Arab Republic. Cairo: The American Uni- versity in Cairo Press, 1963.

Brockway, Fenner A. African Socialism. London: The Badley Head, Ltd., 19É3.

Draft of The Charter of The United Arab Republic— May 21, 1*^2. Cairo : Information Department, 1962 . 97

El-Khalil, Ali Yusif. "The Socialist Parties in Syria and Lebanon," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, Washington, 1952,

Fisher, Sydney Nettleton (ed,). The Middle East ; A History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959.

Gherson, Randolph. "The Anglo-Egyptian Question," Middle East Journal, VII, iv (Autumn, 1953), p. 415.

Harby, Mohammed Khairy, Wasif Aziz and Esmat Wali. Educa­ tion in The United Arab Republic. Cairo: General Organization for Government Printing Offices, 1962.

Harby, Mohammed Khairy and Mohammed El-Hadi Afifi. Egyptian Education in Modern Egypt. Cairo: Documentation Centre for Education, 1958.

Hoskins, Halford L. "Aid and Diplomacy in The Middle East," Current History, LI, ccic (July, 1966), p. 14.

Issawi, Charles P. "Economic and Social Foundations of Democracy in The Middle East," International Affairs, XXXII, i (January, 1959), p. 27.

______. Egypt in Revolution. New York : Oxford University Press, 1963.

Kerr, Malcolm H. "The Emergence of A Socialist Ideology in Egypt," Middle East Journal, XVI, ii (Spring, 1962), p. 127.

Lacouture, Jean and Simonne. Egypt in Transition. New York: Criterion Books, 1958.

Naguib, Mohammed. Egypt's Destiny. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955.

Nasser, Garaal Abdel. The Philosophy of the Revolution. Cairo : National Publication House Press, 1954.

Speeches and The Joint Communiques Issued on Nasser's Visrt to West Africa States— October 21— November 5l Cairo: Information Department, 1965.

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Omar, Mohammed El—Fateh. Productivity and Vocational Training Department— ^U.A.JR. Cairo: Government Print­ ing Offices, 196 5”.

Peretz, Don. "Democracy and The Revolution in Egypt," Middle East Journal, XIII, i (Winter, 1959), p. 26.

"Project for Urgent Housing," Middle East Economic Digest, X, xii (March 25, 1966), p]l 1%4.

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Rifaat, Kamal Ed-Din, "Development of Socialist Relation­ ships in the U.A.R,," Middle East Forum, XLII, i (Winter, 1966), p. 37.

Sadat, Anwar El. Revolt on The Nile. New York: The John Day Company, Inc., 195 7.

Samaan, Sadek H. Value Reconstruction and Egyptian Educa­ tion. New York : Teachers College, Columbia University, 1955.

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Hildeman, Nils—Gustav. "Democratic Teamwork or Intellec­ tual Elite?," American Swedish Monthly (April, 1965), p. 1 2 ,

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