A Replacement for Trident: Can We Afford It?
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A Replacement For Trident: Can We Afford It? Peter Burt Nuclear Information Service February 2009 www.nuclearinfo.org A Replacement For Trident: Can We Afford It? Page 1 About Nuclear Information Service Nuclear Information Service (NIS) is a not-for-profit, independent information service which works to promote public awareness and debate on nuclear weapons and related safety and environmental issues. To find out more information please visit our website at www.nuclearinfo.org or contact us by email at [email protected]. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank John Ainslie, Maria Della Giusta, Di McDonald, and Carol Naughton for the considerable assistance they have provided in the preparation of this report. Any errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the author. NIS would like to acknowledge the generous support of the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust for our research work. Copyright © Nuclear Information Service 2009 A Replacement For Trident: Can We Afford It? Page 2 Contents Page Headline issues 3 Executive summary 4 Introduction: We’ve been here before 8 1. Costs, risks, and opportunities 11 1.1 Affordability – the key test 11 1.2 How much will the bill come to? 12 1.3 Competing demands: the defence procurement programme 14 1.4 The risk of cost increases: lessons for the submarine sector 16 1.5 Risks to the replacement programme 19 1.6 What else could we do with the money? 20 2. The credit crunch and economic downturn 22 2.1 Where will the money come from? The credit crunch and its implications 22 2.2 The government’s response to the credit crunch 23 2.3 Can spending on Trident’s replacement help insulate us from the crunch? 24 2.4 Project finance issues 25 3. Long term trends 28 3.1 Looking to the longer term: reduced tax income 28 3.2 Looking to the longer term: the impact of oil prices 29 3.3 Looking to the longer term: climate change 30 4. Conclusions and recommendations 32 Appendix: Or we could spend the money on … 34 A Replacement For Trident: Can We Afford It? Page 3 Headline issues • The affordability of remaining a nuclear weapons state has always been an issue for the UK. Britain considered scrapping its nuclear weapons in 1976, when under pressure from the International Monetary Fund to make cuts in public expenditure. Financial pressures also caused the government to abandon the independence of its nuclear warhead design programme and cancel plans for a replacement for free-fall nuclear bombs in the 1990s. • The defence procurement programme is in trouble because of competing demands for military equipment and high cost inflation. If approved, the replacement for Trident would be likely to become the single most expensive scheme in the defence procurement programme, tying up huge sums of money with significant implications, in particular, for the Royal Navy’s equipment programme. • The programme to replace Trident is a high risk initiative because its long lead-in time means that changing circumstances may make it far less relevant to the nation’s security needs by the time it comes into service than it may appear to be at the current time. Considerable financial risks are created by the programme’s reliance on monopoly suppliers and specialist skills, and also the high overhead costs associated with essential on-shore infrastructure. • The credit crunch is likely to magnify the replacement programme’s risks and compound the pressure on its affordability. In the medium term period, when the replacement for Trident is scheduled for construction, the economic picture will be heavily influenced by the need to recover the costs of the short-term spending stimulus which the government is currently applying in the hope of limiting the force of the recession. • Over this period, spending on a nuclear weapons replacement programme would be competing with flagship government goals to halve child poverty, raise the state pension in line with earnings, and keep education spending growing as a share of national income, which now appear to be out of reach as a result of the credit crunch. • Long term trends over the 40 year life of the new weapons system – a decreasing tax base, increasing oil prices, and the encroaching impacts of climate change - can only serve to increase the costs and risks of the UK’s nuclear weapons programme. Elements of the UK’s nuclear weapons infrastructure appear to be particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. • If things go badly wrong during the replacement programme, there is a danger not just of wasting large sums of public money, but of forcing defence and foreign policies in directions that may prove to be dead ends in years to come. • Given the status which the UK government attaches to being a nuclear weapons state, a critical failure which led to the project being dramatically delayed, scaled down, or even cancelled would have implications for national self esteem and our sense of importance as an international player. On the other hand, as well as freeing up resources, a decision not to replace Trident would support other government initiatives to tackle the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A Replacement For Trident: Can We Afford It? Page 4 • Evidence from polling suggests that most Britons would reject replacing Trident if they knew the costs involved and had an understanding of what else might be purchased at the same cost. As a consequence of the credit crunch, public appreciation of value for money is likely to be sharpened, and thus proposals for the new weapons system are likely to face renewed scrutiny. Executive summary The affordability of remaining a nuclear weapons state has always been an issue for the UK. Historical archives and testimony from decision-makers over previous decades show that the very high costs of building nuclear weapons and maintaining the infrastructure needed to support them have always been at the margin of what the country can afford. In December 1976 the Cabinet considered options for cutting military spending to help meet reductions in public spending demanded by the IMF which included the option of scrapping the UK’s Polaris nuclear deterrent, even if it meant the definitive disappearance of Britain as a major military power. At the end of the 1970s it became apparent that the secret Chevaline warhead design programme had placed huge demands upon the defence budget and had proved to be a poor bargain. As a result the UK abandoned its own warhead design programme, relying instead on American design and manufacturing expertise to produce its nuclear weapons. During the 1990s a programme to replace the WE177 nuclear free-fall bomb was abandoned on the grounds of cost. The British establishment has therefore been prepared to abandon nuclear weapons capabilities in the past, if forced to, as a result of harsh economic realities. This report considers whether such a course of action would make sense now, and asks whether the United Kingdom can afford to replace its arsenal of nuclear weapons as the country enters the uncharted economic waters of what looks likely to be the most severe recession in living memory. Costs, risks, and opportunities The first part of the report looks at some of the risks and uncertainties that have traditionally plagued major defence projects and which may add to the costs of replacing Britain’s nuclear weapons. It highlights difficult choices that will have to be made on spending priorities, especially at the Ministry of Defence, and asks whether nuclear weapons are able to address the country’s security needs. The overall procurement costs of a replacement for the Trident nuclear weapon are estimated by the government to be between £15 and 20 billion. Total operating costs over the life of the programme will amount to around £37.5 billion. The costs of replacing Trident would add a heavy load to the already stretched defence procurement budget. Competing equipment demands from the armed forces, high cost inflation driven by rapid technological advances in the defence sector, and the demands of UK military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq have placed considerable strains on the procurement budget, which is currently said to be underfunded by a sum of £15 billion. If approved, the replacement for Trident would be likely to become the single most expensive scheme in the defence procurement programme, tying up huge sums of money, so questions about its purpose and value become particularly pertinent. The implications for the Royal Navy, which has had to bear A Replacement For Trident: Can We Afford It? Page 5 the brunt of recent cost-saving exercises, would be significant. Spending on new aircraft carriers and fuel tankers has already slipped, on top of a previous decision to reduce the number of Type 45 destroyers on order, and the addition of a replacement for Trident to the defence procurement programme can be expected to place substantial further pressure on naval projects. Delays in the procurement programme are particularly acute in the maritime sector. Difficulties in the submarine sector arise because the firms which construct submarines and supply their specialist components are monopoly suppliers, with the Ministry of Defence as their sole customer. The construction programme currently underway for Astute class submarines has seen real difficulties in providing incentives for suppliers to deliver to time and budget. Submarine industry insiders and the National Audit Office have recognised that cost escalation, programme delays, and poor value for money are key areas of risk in the programme to replace Trident. The task of managing these risks is likely to be a harder challenge than originally anticipated as a result of the rocky economic climate within which the programme will be implemented.