Messing with the •Œrise of the West╊
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The Great Divergence the Princeton Economic History
THE GREAT DIVERGENCE THE PRINCETON ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD Joel Mokyr, Editor Growth in a Traditional Society: The French Countryside, 1450–1815, by Philip T. Hoffman The Vanishing Irish: Households, Migration, and the Rural Economy in Ireland, 1850–1914, by Timothy W. Guinnane Black ’47 and Beyond: The Great Irish Famine in History, Economy, and Memory, by Cormac k Gráda The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy, by Kenneth Pomeranz THE GREAT DIVERGENCE CHINA, EUROPE, AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD ECONOMY Kenneth Pomeranz PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON AND OXFORD COPYRIGHT 2000 BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, 41 WILLIAM STREET, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, 3 MARKET PLACE, WOODSTOCK, OXFORDSHIRE OX20 1SY ALL RIGHTS RESERVED LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA POMERANZ, KENNETH THE GREAT DIVERGENCE : CHINA, EUROPE, AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD ECONOMY / KENNETH POMERANZ. P. CM. — (THE PRINCETON ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD) INCLUDES BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES AND INDEX. ISBN 0-691-00543-5 (CL : ALK. PAPER) 1. EUROPE—ECONOMIC CONDITIONS—18TH CENTURY. 2. EUROPE—ECONOMIC CONDITIONS—19TH CENTURY. 3. CHINA— ECONOMIC CONDITIONS—1644–1912. 4. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT—HISTORY. 5. COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS. I. TITLE. II. SERIES. HC240.P5965 2000 337—DC21 99-27681 THIS BOOK HAS BEEN COMPOSED IN TIMES ROMAN THE PAPER USED IN THIS PUBLICATION MEETS THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (R1997) (PERMANENCE OF PAPER) WWW.PUP.PRINCETON.EDU PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3579108642 Disclaimer: Some images in the original version of this book are not available for inclusion in the eBook. -
The Industrial Revolution As the Escape from the Malthusian Trap
Komlos, John: The Industrial Revolution as the Escape from the Malthusian Trap Munich Discussion Paper No. 2003-13 Department of Economics University of Munich Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Online at https://doi.org/10.5282/ubm/epub.57 The Industrial Revolution as the Escape from the Malthusian Trap John Komlos, University of Munich Need one state the obvious, that the Industrial Revolution has surely fascinated as many historians as any other topic in the history of civilization? It was undoubtedly one of the most momentous development, one which continues to have a major impact on virtually all aspects of human experience. It changed the very basis of our existence: not only in the way we produce and consume, but outside of this realm as well, from our social interactions, to our political system. In short, the processes unleashed by the Industrial Revolution are crucial to understanding the primary forces that shaped the 1 modern world. Yet, in spite of the immense outpouring of literature on the topic, there is much confusion regarding appropriate conceptualizations. I review some of the salient conflicting viewpoints, and outline the complexities of change without claiming to do justice to a literature whose enormity prohibits precision within the modest confines of 2 an essay. I conclude by arguing that it is useful to think of the Industrial Revolution as a multidimensional pan-European process with deep roots in the past, intricately intertwined with demographic developments. Paradigms and Controversies There are a multitude of reasons why the debate over the Industrial Revolution is far from moving toward closure. -
Analysis of the Great Divergence Under a Unified Endogenous
ANNALS OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 13-2, 317{353 (2012) Analysis of the Great Divergence under a Unified Endogenous Growth Model* Kunting Chen Business School, Ningbo University, Ningbo, China, 315211 E-mail: [email protected] Recently published research that attempts to explain the Great Divergence mainly focuses on geography, technological progress, and international trade. However, we do not believe these are its only | or even the most basic | causes. Instead, we submit that the `social culture' of a country or a region is the most fundamental reason and incorporates these other causes, thereby pro- viding a reasonable unified explanation. This paper is mainly based on a very simple two-sector benchmark model that simulates the economic characteris- tics of England and the Yangzi Delta of China during 1400-1850. It explores aspects of this transition period, and obtains many meaningful results that are consistent with Unified Growth theory, which is usually based on very complex models. Key Words: The industrial revolution; The great divergence; Difference of cul- ture and systems. JEL Classification Numbers: O10, O40. 1. INTRODUCTION In the long history of human development, the world's production and population increased very gradually prior to the nineteenth century. Fur- ther, the differences in living standards between countries were very small. However, from 1900 on, the story was different. In some countries, both population and production began exploding in a way that had never be- fore been seen in human history. At the same time, the ratio of the GDP per capita between the richest and poorest regions of the world widened * The paper is supported by the National Natural Science Fund of China (71273146), the Natural Science Fund of Zhejiang Province of China (Z12G030008), the Ministry of Education Social Science Fund of China (10YJA790019), the Natural Science Fund of Shandong Province of China (Z2008H02), and the Soft Science Fund of Shandong Province of China (2008RKB059). -
Globalization and the European Economy: Medieval Origins to the Industrial Revolution
CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Columbia University Academic Commons Columbia University Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series Globalization and the European Economy: Medieval Origins to the Industrial Revolution Ronald Findlay Discussion Paper #:0102-28 Department of Economics Columbia University New York, NY 10027 March 2002 1. Introduction Any consideration of “The Europeanization of the Globe and the Globalization of Europe” must confront the problem of how to specify the spatio-temporal coordinates of the concept of Europe. When does “Europe” begin as a meaningful cultural, social and political expression and how far east from the shores of the Atlantic and the North Sea does it extend? In this paper I will begin with Charlemagne, which is to say around 800. It is at about this time that that the designations of Europe and European first begin to be used. Denys Hay (1966:25) cites an eighth-century Spanish chronicler who refers to the forces of Charles Martel, Charlemagne’s grandfather, at the celebrated Battle of Poitiers in 732 as Europeenses or Europeans, rather than as Christians, and their opponents as Arabs, rather than as Muslims, a nice example of ethnic as opposed to religious identification of “ourselves” and “the other.” In terms of space I will go not too much further east than the limits of the Carolingian Empire at its peak, which is conveniently depicted in the map provided by Jacques Boussard (1976:40-41). In this map it is remarkable to see how closely the empire coincides with the area covered by the “Inner Six” of the European Common Market, with the addition of Austria and Hungary. -
The Three Horsemen of Riches: Plague, War, and Urbanization in Early Modern Europe Downloaded From
The Review of Economic Studies Advance Access published November 2, 2012 Review of Economic Studies (2012) 0, 1–38 doi:10.1093/restud/rds034 © The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of Economic Studies Limited. The Three Horsemen of Riches: Plague, War, and Urbanization in Early Modern Europe Downloaded from NICO VOIGTLÄNDER UCLA Anderson School of Management and NBER http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/ and HANS-JOACHIM VOTH ICREA CREI, Barcelona GSE, and Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra First version received November 2009; final version accepted August 2012 (Eds.) How did Europe escape the “Iron Law of Wages?” We construct a simple Malthusian model with two sectors and multiple steady states, and use it to explain why European per capita incomes and urbanization at University of California, Los Angeles on November 11, 2012 rates increased during the period 1350–1700. Productivity growth can only explain a small fraction of the rise in output per capita. Population dynamics—changes of the birth and death schedules—were far more important determinants of steady states. We show how a major shock to population can trigger a transition to a new steady state with higher per-capita income. The Black Death was such a shock, raising wages substantially. Because of Engel’s Law, demand for urban products increased, and urban centers grew in size. European cities were unhealthy, and rising urbanization pushed up aggregate death rates. This effect was reinforced by diseases spread through war, financed by higher tax revenues. In addition, rising trade also spread diseases. In this way higher wages themselves reduced population pressure. -
The Feudal Revolution and Europe's Rise: Institutional Divergence in The
The Feudal Revolution and Europe's Rise: Institutional Divergence in the Christian and Muslim Worlds before 1500 CE Lisa Blaydes∗ Eric Chaneyy April 1, 2011 Preliminary Draft Abstract This paper investigates the political origins of Europe's economic rise by examining the emergence of increasing ruler durability in Western Europe when compared with the Islamic world. While European rulers were less durable than their Muslim counter- parts in 800 CE, Christian kings became increasingly long-lived compared to Muslim sultans whose rule became less stable over time. The \break date" in Western Euro- pean political stability coincides with the emergence of feudal institutions, suggesting a first step in a political evolution that eventually led to medieval parliaments and the emergence of a unique degree of constraint imposed on many Western European sovereigns. While feudal institutions served as the basis for military recruitment by European monarchs, Muslim sultans relied on mamlukism | or the use of military slaves imported from non-Muslim lands. Dependence on mamluk armies limited the bargaining strength of local notables vis-`a-vis the sultan, hindering the development of a productively adversarial relationship between ruler and local elites. We argue that Muslim societies' reliance on mamluks, rather than local elites as the basis for military leadership, may explain why the Glorious Revolution occurred in England, not Egypt. ∗Stanford University yHarvard University. We thank Phillipe Aghion, Jonathan Leibowitz, Anne McCants, Jim Robinson, -
The Great Divergence*
REVIEW ARTICLE THE GREAT DIVERGENCE* The Rise of the Western World, The European Miracle, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations.1 All of these works attempt to answer a major question in the history of the modern world: why did the path of economic development in Europe diverge radically from that of the great agrarian societies of Asia? Although the works differ widely in their approaches and conclusions, they, along with much else written on the question, share a deeply held belief that Europe was fundamentally different from Asia. It is this difference, whether in the realm of mentalities (rationality, tech- nological creativity), political and economic institutions (property rights, capitalism) or environmental and demographic conditions (protection from disasters, low birth rates), which produced the European breakthrough to self-sustaining growth and industrial- ization. Not surprisingly, specialists in the history of Europe, and to a lesser extent of North America, played a major role in the production of these accounts. Voices from Asia contributed only rarely to the debate, but even they shared the belief in the exceptionalism of Europe.2 The faith in European difference has come to be questioned, however, and much of this questioning has come from historians working on the history of Asia, primarily India and China. Nearly two decades ago, in the pages of Past and Present, Frank Perlin * Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), x, 382 pp. I am very grateful to James Cronin, Robin Fleming and Kevin Kenny for their comments on earlier versions of this essay. -
Bottom-Up Or Top-Down? the Origins of the Industrial Revolution
Bottom-up or top-down? The Origins of the Industrial Revolution Presented to the symposium Innovation and Creative Production: “Innovation from the Bottom-Up” New York University, Dec. 6, 2016 Joel Mokyr, Departments of Economics and History Northwestern University Berglas School of of Economics, Tel Aviv University [email protected] version of July 2017 Note: Some of the below is adapted from my A Culture of Growth: Origins of the Modern Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016. I am indebted to Ashish Aggarwal for research assistance, and the Balzan Foundation for financial support. ABSTRACT Was technological progress during and after the Industrial Revolution top-down or bottom- up? The technology that created the great inventions was driven by a combination of pathbreaking ideas and the dexterity and skills of trained artisans. While those forms of human capital were quite different, they both came out of small elites of intellectuals and craftsmen, what is rapidly becoming known as “upper tail human capital.” I analyze the institutions that drove the incentives for both, and show they came together to produce the Great Enrichment. These incentives were both material and social: between 1500 and 1700, the search for financial security and reputation cooperated in producing a unique institutional environment in which the elites in western Europe produced the three legged-stool of European modernity: the Reformation, the Scientific Revolution, and the Enlightenment. Once these three movements had succeeded, the foundation for modern economic growth had been laid. 2 Introduction Whether we like it or not, elites mattered in economic history. Throughout history, they helped to set up institutions and define the rules of the game of the economy: priests and kings wrote the laws, and judges and generals enforced them. -
Ten Years of Debate on the Origins of the Great Divergence
Ten Years of Debate on the Origins of the Great Divergence Book: The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy Kenneth Pomeranz Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2000, ISBN: 9780691090108; 392pp.; Price: £20.95 Reviewer: Professor Patrick O'Brien London School of Economics Citation: Professor Patrick O'Brien, review of Ten Years of Debate on the Origins of the Great Divergence, (review no. 1008) https://reviews.history.ac.uk/review/1008 Date accessed: 17 March, 2020 Ten Years of Debate on the Origins of the Great Divergence between the Economies of Europe and China during the Era of Mercantilism and Industrialization 1. Smith, Marx and Weber Along with histories of power, histories of material life and economic growth are the most popular of metanarratives currently published in the growing field of global history. Indeed no surprise will be occasioned by the appearance in our times, of accelerated ‘globalization’, of histories seeking to encompass a ‘global economy’, dealing with chronologies going back millennia and written to expound upon the disparate levels of material progress achieved by tribes, societies, communities and national economies located on all the world’s continents. Such concerns continue to be the litmus test of the mission of global economic history to keep ‘humanity in view’. After all, most people, in most places for most of history have been preoccupied with obtaining food, shelter, clothing and other manufactured artefacts that they required to sustain either a basic, a comfortable and only latterly, an agreeable standard of living. Traditions of historical enquiry into the wealth and poverty of nations began with Herodotus but modern paradigms for investigation need be traced no further back than to the towering intellects of two cosmopolitan, but perhaps equally ‘Eurocentric’ Germans: Karl Marx and Max Weber. -
The Politics of Comparison: Connecting Cultures Outside of and in Spite of the West
CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Springer - Publisher Connector The Politics of Comparison: Connecting Cultures Outside of and in Spite of the West Barbara A. Holdrege Wilhelm Halbfass, in his landmark study India and Europe (1988), explores the history of intellectual encounters between India and Europe from classical antiquity to the twentieth century. He concludes his study with a discussion of the “global predicament of Westernization” in the contemporary period, reflecting more specifically on the problems that the so-called “Europeanization of the earth” presents for both European and Indian partners in the “dialogue.” Will the “Europeanization” of the earth be reversed? Are other cultures and traditions…ready to provide alternatives? In the modern planetary situation, Eastern and Western “cultures”…meet in a Westernized world, under conditions shaped by Western ways of thinking. The medium, the framework of any “dialogue” seems to be an irreducibly Western one. But is this factually inescapable “universality” the true telos of mankind? Could it be that the global openness of modernity is still a parochially Western, European horizon (440)?1 Halbfass’s question concerning the European—and more broadly, European-American—presumption that history’s direction is towards a modern, open, universal, and essentially “Western” global culture has been thrown into sharp relief by the events since 9/11 on the world’s stage here and abroad. At a minimum, we can certainly say that all the players in this global drama of cultural and ideological conflict do not International Journal of Hindu Studies 14, 2–3 (2010): 147–75 © The Author(s) 2011. -
Provincializing the First Industrial Revolution
Working Papers of the Global Economic History Network (GEHN) No. 17/06 Provincializing the First Industrial Revolution Patrick O’Brien © Patrick O’Brien Department of Economic History London School of Economics January 2006 For more information about the participants and activities of GEHN, go to http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/economicHistory/GEHN/Default.htm Department of Economic History London School of Economics Houghton Street London, WC2A 2AE Tel: +44 (0) 20 7955 7860 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7955 7730 Provincializing the First Industrial Revolution * Patrick O’Brien ‘Il n’y a pas d’histoire, il y a une histoire du monde’ (Marc Bloch as cited by Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998)). Andre agreed with little I wrote, but I offer this essay to commemorate an intellectual of extraordinary erudition and rare courage. Forthcoming in J. Horn et al. (eds.) Re-conceptualizing The Industrial Revolution (Boston: M.I.T. Press, 2006-07). Do not cite without permission from: p.o’[email protected] 1. Representations of The First Industrial Revolution In 1967 Marshal Hodgson (the godfather of global economic history) wrote these percipient words: “Without the cumulative history of the whole Afro-Asian Oikumene of which the Occident had been an integral part, the western transmutation would be almost unthinkable”.1 Alas, the recommendation by this eminent scholar of Islam to re- conceptualize what his essay refers to as “The Great Western Transmutation” within the wider spaces, longer chronologies and cultural frameworks of the long and interconnected history of Afro-Eurasia was not taken forward until Eric Jones published the first edition of the European Miracle in 1981.2 Since then slowly but surely the bibliography of books, articles and debates relocating and reconfiguring the * My thanks to my friends Bob Allen, Larry Epstein and Giorgio Riello for their helpful suggestions for improvement and the GEHN network for education. -
Mercantilism, the Enlightenment, and the Industrialrevolution
Mercantilism, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution Joel Mokyr Departments of Economics and History Northwestern University [email protected] Presented to the Conference in Honor of Eli F. Heckscher Stockholm, May 2003 revised, October 2003 The comments of Peter Meyer, Maristella Botticini, Avner Greif, Örjan Sjöberg, and the participants at the Heckscher Conference are acknowledged with gratitude. 1 Introduction Economic historians will insist on claiming Eli Heckscher as one of their own. His magisterial Mercantilism has every sign of a true economic historian: a reliance on the sources, a clear and analytic framework, a good “nose” for asking the right questions, and an excellent “feel” for the period. Yet the book seems to have been strangely neglected by economic historians in recent decades.1 Mercantilism as a major topic in the institutional development of Europe has not yet been taken up by the New Institutional Economics. One can only speculate as to the reasons, but it is clear that once the relations between the state and the economy will start to attract the interest of this school, they will find a treasure of insight and information in those two volumes. Where Heckscher’s work has been better appreciated has been among the scholars working on the political economy of the eighteenth century, especially in the work by Ekelund and Tollison (1982, 1997) and Root (1994) whose interest in rent-seeking led them inevitably to the Mercantilist State. While these scholars have not always agreed with Heckscher’s view of mercantilism, they have clearly shown due respect for Heckscher’s work.