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Crimean Crisis Background: 1954: Crimea is gifted to Ukraine by Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev 1991: USSR collapses 11/21/13 - President Yanukovych abandons agreement for closer ties to European Union and works to ally more closely with Russia. Over the next several months, protests escalate. Scores are killed, some by government snipers. 2/21/14 - President Yanukovych signs power sharing agreement with opposition 2/22/14 - President Yanukovych disappears; appears on television from undisclosed location denouncing “coup” 2/28/14 - President Yanukovych holds a press conference in Russia insisting he is still president 3/1/14 – Russian parliament approves Russian president Putin’s request for military action to protect Russian interests in Crimea. By the next day, the United States acknowledges that Russia has effective control of Crimea. 3/16/14 – Crimeans vote 97% in favor of declaring independence from Ukraine and seek to join Russian Federation 3/17/14 – EU and US impose travel bans and asset freezes on Russian government officials, oligarchs and one bank and threaten further actions. 3/18/14 – Russia officially annexes Crimea. The international community does not recognize this action. Goal of Sanctions: Squeeze the economic powers in Russia to pressure Putin to change course, leave Crimea and cease provocations against Ukraine Effect so far: Very early, but the Russian stock market has plunged 13.1% this year (at this time last year, down 5.8%) Russian currency performing extremely poorly versus the dollar Fitch Rating and Standard & Poor downgraded their outlook on Russia’s credit rating from stable to negative. Russia has raised its benchmark interest rate, making domestic borrowing prohibitively expensive and further reducing value of ruble Most financial experts predict a recession for the Russian economy. Visa and MasterCard have agreed to freeze assets under their control and not extend lines of credit to certain Russian officials and citizens. Why sanctions will work: Russian economy was not very strong in the first place Putin has demonstrated to his domestic audience that he is powerful and can defy the West. He will be content to rest on his laurels Further incursions into Ukraine proper will bring much more widespread sanctions that would cripple Russian economy. Why sanctions will not work: Russian does not care about Western concerns and has successfully engaged in such actions in the past (Hungary – 1956, Czechoslovakia – 1968, Georgia – 2007) The EU relies on Russia for 1/3 of its energy imports. The US and its allies have no intention of engaging in military conflict over Ukraine and Russia knows it. Prediction: Russia will keep Crimea but not invade the rest of Ukraine (for now…) Sanctions are declared a modest success Sources: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-23/russia-staring-at- recession-on-sanctions-that-could-get-tougher.html http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-us-business-sanctions- hurt/25305933.html Targets for Ukraine-Related Sanctions Information from the U.S. Treasury Department: Government officials: Individuals designated because they are officials of the Russian government. Although not the basis for the designation, several are also very close advisors to senior Russian government officials. Members of the Inner Circle: Individuals designated because each is controlled by, has acted for or on behalf of, or has provided material or other support to, a senior Russian government official. Companies: Entities designated because they are controlled by, have acted for or on behalf of, or have provided material or other support to, senior Russian government officials. Additional information: On March 1, 2014, Bushmin publicly supported the deployment of Russian forces in Sergey V. Aksyonov Ukraine. Born: Nov. 26, 1972 in Balti, Moldova Position: De facto Prime Minister of Crimea following a disputed Feb. 27 vote in the Crimean parliament. Vladimir M. Dzhabarov Born: Sep. 29, 1952 Position: First Deputy Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Evgeni V. Bushmin Federation Council of the Russian Born: Oct. 10, 1958 in Lopatino, Federation Sergachiisky Region, Russia Additional information: On March 1, Position: Deputy Speaker of the 2014, Dzhabarov supported Putin’s Federation Council of the Russian appeal regarding the use of the Russian Federation; Chairman of the Council of Armed Forces in Ukraine. the Federation Budget and Financial Markets Committee Sergei Ivanov Andrei A. Fursenko Born: Jan. 31, 1953 in St. Petersburg, Born: July 17, 1949 in St. Petersburg, Russia Russia Position: Chief of Staff of the Position: Aide to Vladimir Putin. Presidential Executive Office Additional information: Fursenko has held a number of positions in the Government of the Russian Federation since 2001, including Minister of Education and Science from 2004 to Victor P. Ivanov 2012. Although not being designated for Born: May 12, 1950 in Novgorod, being a member of the Russian Russia leadership’s inner circle, Fursenko first Position: Director of the Federal Drug met Putin in 1993 and they remain Control Service of the Russian closely associated. Federation; Member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Additional information: Ivanov has served in a number of other government positions prior to that; he was Assistant Sergey Glazyev to the President of the Russian Born: Jan. 1, 1961 in Zaporozhye, Federation from 2004 to 2008; and Ukraine Deputy Chief of the Administration of the Position: Presidential Advisor to Russian Federation from 2000 to 2004. Vladimir Putin Ivanov joined the KGB in 1977 and eventually rose to become the Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service. Ivanov is a close ally of Putin and Alexei Gromov served alongside Putin as the chief of Born: 1960 in Zagorsk, Russia staff of the St. Petersburg Mayor’s office Position: First Deputy Chief of Staff of in 1994 when Putin was first deputy the Presidential Executive Office; First head of the city’s administration. Deputy Head of Presidential Administration; First Deputy Presidential Chief of Staff Andrei Klishas Born: Nov. 9, 1972 in Yekaterinburg, Valentina I. Matviyenko Sverdlovsk, Russia Born: Apr. 7, 1949 in Shepetovka, Position: Chairman of the Russian Khmelnitsky, Ukraine Federation Council Committee on Position: Federation Council Speaker; Constitutional Law, Judicial and Legal Chairman of the Russian Federation Affairs and the Development of Civil Council Society Viktor Medvedchuk Vladimir A. Konstantinov Born: Aug. 7, 1954 in Pochyot, Born: Nov. 9, 1972 in Crimea, Ukraine Krasnoyarsk Krai, Russia Position: Unavailable Position: Unavailable Vladimir I. Kozhin Yelena B. Mizulina Born: Feb. 28, 1959 in Troitsk, Born: Dec. 9, 1954 in Bui, Kostroma, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Russia Russia Position: Head of Administration under Position: State Duma Deputy; the President of the Russian Federation Chairman of the State Duma Committee Additional information: Kozhin was on Family, Women and Children appointed the Head of Administration under the President of the Russian Federation by Putin on Jan. 21, 2000. He has served continuously in that Sergei M. Mironov position until the present time. Kohzin is Born: Feb. 14, 1953 in Pushkin, St. responsible for overseeing a staff of Petersburg, Russia 60,000, over a hundred enterprises and Position: Member of the Council of the institutions including the Kremlin and State Duma; Leader of "A Just Russia several other government buildings, and Party"; Member of the State Duma over four thousand vehicles. Kohzin’s Committee on Housing Policy and positions have been variously referred Housing and Communal Services to as Head of Administration, Head of the Presidential Affairs Office, Head of the Presidential Business Management Directorate of the Russian Federation, and head of the Presidential Property Management Directorate. Sergey Y. Naryshkin Dmitry O. Rogozin Born: Oct. 27, 1954 in St. Petersburg, Born: Dec. 21, 1963 in Moscow, Russia Russia Position: Deputy Prime Minister of the Position: Unavailable Russian Federation Additional information: Naryshkin has been the Chairman of the Government Duma of the Federal Gathering of the Russian Federation since December 2011. Additionally, he is a member of Nikolai I. Ryzhkov the National Security Council of the Born: Sept. 28, 1929 in Duleevka, Russian Federation and of the United Donetsk Region, Ukraine Russia party. Position: Senator in the Russian Upper House of Parliament; Member of the Committee for Federal Issues, Regional Politics and the North of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation Viktor A. Ozerov Additional information: Ryzhkov Born: Jan. 5, 1958 in Abakan, publicly supported the deployment of Khakassia, Russia Russian forces in Ukraine. Position: Chairman of the Security and Defense Federation Council of the Russian Federation Additional information: On March 1, 2014, Ozerov supported Russian Igor D. Sergun President Vladimir Putin’s appeal Born: March 28, 1957 regarding the use of the Russian Armed Position: Lieutenant General; Chief of Forces in Ukraine. the Main Directorate of the General Staff; Deputy Chief of the General Staff; Head of Russia’s military intelligence service Oleg E. Panteleev Born: July 21, 1952 in Zhitnikovskoe, Kurgan Region, Russia Position: First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Parliamentary Issues Additional information: On March 1, 2014, Panteleev publicly supported the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. Leonid E. Slutsky Vladimir Yakunin Born: Jan. 4, 1968 Born: June
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