View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by ResearchArchive at Victoria University of Wellington Consensus Gained, Consensus Maintained? Changing New Zealand’s Electoral Law 1927 – 2007 A Thesis Submitted to Victoria University of Wellington In Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Political Science James Christmas 2010 To JMC 2 Acknowledgments In submitting this work, I acknowledge a substantial debt of gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Elizabeth McLeay, for her guidance, constant attention and interest. For their encouragement, I thank my parents. For his patience, this thesis is dedicated to James. James Christmas Christchurch 2010 3 Contents Abstract 5 List of Tables and 6 Figures Chapter One Introduction 7 Chapter Two The Electoral Law in Context 15 Chapter Three Milestones: Three Eras of Electoral 27 Amendment? Chapter Four Parliament and Electoral Rules 49 Chapter Five Boundaries, Franchise and Registration 70 Chapter Six Election Administration and Electioneering 92 Chapter Seven Assessing Trends and Motivations 112 Chapter Eight Conclusion 132 Appendix A Acts Affecting the Electoral Law 1927 – 2007 135 (in chronological order) Appendix B Unsuccessful Electoral Reform Bills, 1927 – 154 2007 (in chronological order) Bibliography 162 4 Abstract In the eighty years between the passage of New Zealand’s first unified Electoral Act in 1927, and the passage of the Electoral Finance Act 2007, the New Zealand Parliament passed 66 acts that altered or amended New Zealand’s electoral law. One central assumption of theories of electoral change is that those in power only change electoral rules strategically, in order to protect their self-interest. 1 This thesis is an investigation into the way New Zealand governments effect and have effected their desired changes to the electoral law through the legislative process, and the roles self-interest and the active search for consensus between political parties have played in that process. It argues that, while self-interest serves as a compelling explanation for a great deal of electoral law change in New Zealand, altruistic motivations and the development of parliamentary processes influenced behaviour to an equal, and perhaps even greater, extent. 1 Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan and Jeffrey Karp, 'Why Politicians Like Electoral Institutions: Self- Interest, Values or Ideology?', The Journal of Politics , Vol. 68, No. 2, May 2006, p. 434. 5 List of Tables and Figures Table 1 Effect of Electoral Amendment Legislation 27 Table 2 Subject Area of Electoral Amendment 28 Legislation Table 3 Level of Contention over Electoral 29 Amendment Legislation Table 4 Outcome of Electoral Amendment Legislation 30 Table 5 Class of Electoral Amendment Legislation 30 Table 6 Electoral and Electoral Amendment acts 32 passed by National or National-led and Labour or Labour-led Governments 1927–2007 Table 7 Electoral Law Changes introduced by National 34 or National-led and Labour or Labour-led Governments 1927 – 2008 by Subject Table 8 Contention v Outcome of Electoral and 112 Electoral Amendment acts passed under National or National-led and Labour or Labour-led Governments 1927–2007 Table 9 Contention v Category of Electoral and 114 Electoral Amendment acts passed under National or National-led and Labour or Labour-led Governments 1927–2007 Table 10 Outcome v Category of Electoral and Electoral 115 Amendment acts passed under National or National-led and Labour or Labour-led Governments 1927–2007 Table 11 Contention v Class of Electoral and Electoral 116 Amendment acts passed under National or National-led and Labour or Labour-led Governments 1927–2007 Table 12 Outcome v Class of Electoral and Electoral 117 Amendment acts passed under National or National-led and Labour or Labour-led Governments 1927–2007 6 Chapter One Introduction In the eighty years between the passage of New Zealand’s first unified Electoral Act in 1927, 2 and the passage of the controversial Electoral Finance Act 2007, the New Zealand Parliament passed 66 acts that, to varying extents and to varying ends, altered or added to the electoral law. These changes ranged from one-word technical amendments correcting a drafting error to the extension of the franchise to 18 year olds; from the prolongation of the parliamentary term during World War II to the introduction of computer technology in organising the electoral rolls; and from the regulation of election broadcasting to the change from First Past the Post (FPP) to the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) voting system. Not one area of New Zealand’s electoral law remained unamended over the period. This thesis is an investigation into the way in which New Zealand governments and politicians effect their desired changes to the electoral law through the legislative process and the roles self-interest and the active search for consensus between political parties has played in that process. One central assumption of theories of electoral change is that those in power only change rules strategically, in order to protect their self-interest. 3 I argue that, while self-interest serves as a compelling explanation for a great deal of electoral law change in New Zealand, altruistic motivations and the development of parliamentary processes and conventions have influenced behaviour to at least an equal extent. 2 Until 1927, electoral law was contained in the various Electoral acts, Electoral Amendment acts, the Legislature Act 1908 and in various Legislature Amendment acts. 3 Bowler, Donovan & Karp, 'Why Politicians Like Electoral Institutions: Self-Interest, Values or Ideology?’, p. 434. 7 The motivations behind the passing of each of the 66 amendment acts and the ways in which governments and parliaments went about the task are numerous. Some acts amended one area of the electoral law, while others served as omnibus acts amending multiple areas. Several acts were passed by Parliament in a single day under urgency, while the debates over others stretched into weeks of contentious parliamentary sittings. Some acts were arguably self-interested moves by governments seeking to enhance their own prospects of re-election or disadvantage their opponents. Other acts were the product of non-partisan select committees or governments that have sought consensus with the opposition to create durable and non-partisan legislation. The argument that changes to the electoral law should ultimately be consensual was raised by politicians from both of New Zealand’s major parties – National and Labour – throughout the period studied. The last act I consider, the highly contested Electoral Finance Act 2007, brought to the fore the argument that the alteration of the electoral law in New Zealand should ideally be carried out in a non-partisan fashion with consensus between government and opposition. It was expressed by both major parties in relation to the Electoral Finance Act. National Party Member of Parliament, Dr Wayne Mapp, argued during the debate that, “[i]n the past, this country has always created its electoral law on a consensus basis, but that did not serve the purposes of the Government this time, because it knows perfectly well that it wants its own law to suit its own purposes.”4 The argument was also expressed after the 2008 General Election by Labour Party leader, Phil Goff, who said “I don’t think the way the Electoral Finance Act was passed or necessarily its specific detail was as good as it 4 644 NZPD 13532, 5 December 2007. 8 could have been ... Any matter that's constitutional or electoral, we should be seeking consensus for. We didn't have that consensus.”5 It is important to define ‘consensus’ at the outset. The word can describe a process or an outcome. A consensual or co-operative legislative process does not automatically lead to an outcome of consensus and, more rarely, a unanimous outcome may arise from a contentious, non-consensual process. To make clear this distinction, where this thesis considers consensus, it considers outcome. It considers process in terms of contention or lack of contention. The role of consensus in changing the electoral law is an interesting area of investigation, especially because, in New Zealand, the convention of consensus that has arisen in the area of the electoral law stands apart from an otherwise adversarial legislative process. New Zealand has an adversarial legislative process and is, by its nature, a politically combative institution. Many of the procedures of the House are designed specifically to enable the House to scrutinise and control the government. 6As David McGee outlines, “everything the House does potentially gives it the opportunity to probe and criticise the actions of the Government.” 7 This thesis finds that, overall, electoral amendment legislation provides no exception to the general adversarial nature of Parliament, although there are notable specific examples of areas where the House has worked together. As examined in Chapter Two, the electoral law forms part of the New Zealand constitution. Yet an exploration of the electoral law at a purely constitutional level is not the aim of this thesis. Its focus, rather, are the conventions, processes and 5 Claire Trevett, New Zealand Herald , “Goff Admits Mistakes Over Electoral Law”, 13 November 2008. 6 David McGee, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand , 3 nd ed., Dunmore Press, Wellington, 2005, p. 4. 7 Ibid. 9 motivations that characterised change in the electoral law over the eighty year period studied.