NUMBER B • JUNE 1945 S WG L''"! 4CJ HA Battery Pt Morrison Pt W^Vvw
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
UNCLASSIFIED Instructors "Reading tils Document gi<rr! Below (File He ^ ^ 4t NUMBER B • JUNE 1945 s WG l''"! 4CJ HA Battery Pt Morrison Pt w^Vvw. OnvyyW)*^ f s&$&$&£< .X %y\^ Rock Pt^s+rr DOCK L$"QH Jy ' - MONKEY PT «gf ' ORDN ANCE PT EAST CORREGIDOR ISLAND N JOSE HOOK SOUTH DCr&K PT SAN JOSE BAY Wheeler Pt A B A L L Searchlight Geary PI • CABALLO ISLAND NOTE The information contained in Combat Notes is classified as Confidential, principally due to the inclusion of unit and place identifications therein* In general, ty omitting unit and place identifications, the classification of the article may be reduced to Restricted* BoMrGBfib£ir£ir3' Yjii"';, •, . DECLASSIFIED ill TEH 12 YKiiSS.' BIS saoo.io OOKTENTS Goxragidor Pag© 1 Combat Hints from Europe ; Page I9 The Trojan Borse page 26 Know Your Japanese page 31 Assault and Reduction of Cave Positions Page 52 Japanese Artillery in Defense of High-way $5 Pags 38 Artillery in Reduction of Intramuros pa«e 10 GiNSl&L? In the early part of February I9h5» Sixth Arny units were pushing south from the Lingayen Gulf to effect the early capture of the Port of Manila# The XIV Corps was driving into the city frcm the north and east while the I Corps was securing the Army's northeast flank against''stubborn '*• enemy resistance,. South of Manila, the 11th Airborne Division* following its swift advance from Nagsugbu Bay and Tagaytag Ridge, was driving the Jajianese from strong positions in the Nichols Field Area. The XT Corps , which had landed north of Subie Bay, had pushed east and south, seized Olongapo, and was now driving east across the 2&g-Zag Pass to cv off the Bataan Peninsula. In order to utilize the Port of Manila as soon as the city was liber ated it was imperative to secure promptly the entrance to Manila Bay. Seizure of Gorrsgidcr Island was a part of the operation assigned to 32 Corps for accomplishing this objective. The overall plan contemplated an overland attack south from Orani to clear the east coast of Bataan, an amphibious assault op Mariveles, aind a combined airborne-amphibious assault on Corregidor. (See sketch) The Marivelest or South Force* under the conmaM of Brigadier General *• C. Chase* Comnanding General, 38th Infantry Division, wets composed of the 151st Infantry RCT (reinforced). The Corregidcp force* known as the "Rock Farce"* was under the cowannd of Colonel G. M. Jones, Comnanding Officer, $OJi Parachute Infantry RCP, ami was com posed of the 5°3d HOT and the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry (reinforced). D-Day for the landing in MariTeles Bay was 15 February 1945 aQd for the Oorregidor landing, D/l or 16 February. Rear Admiral A. D. Struble* U. S. Navy, was in cocmand of both of the amphibious mores. Since the Corregidor attack was to be a combined operation iwrolring both a parachute drop and an amphibious landing* the 3d Bn, 34th Infan try* accompanied the Mariveles Force in order to be in a better posi tion for the amphibious movement on the following day. Naval units of the S err ©nth Fleet* under command of Rear Admiral Berkey* conducted mine sweeping and bombardment operations in the southern Bataan-Cor- regidor area to pare the way for the isater move to Corregidor. Air operations supporting this action will be discussed with the parachute phase of the assault, inasmuch as they were so closely tied in with the vertical landing. This operation represents one of the most difficult ever, carried out by paratroops, but its complete and overwhelming success fully justified the risks incurred. The Japanese were cau^it off guard where they least expected the blow to fall. THE ASSAULT OF CORREGIDOR t Preparations for the assault on Corregidor had begun as early as 23 January when the Fifth Bomber Command commenced a daily pound ing of the Island. During this period prior to the landing, a total of 3,128 tons of bombs had been dropped on the island - an area less than one mile square. In addition to the naval gunfire preparation on 16 February, continuous air pounding was set up to precede and cover the parachute drop, scheduled for 0830. From 0745 to 0800, one group of heavy bombers dropped 260 lb fragmentation bombs, each plane carrying 40 bombs. This was immediately f oilowed by one group of A-20's which strafed and bombed both Corregidor and Caballo Islands with 250 lb para-demo bombs. After 0830, air support was confined to areas outside the parachute drop zones (see sketch) and from 0830 to 0930 two groups of A-20,s covered these unrestricted areas. By this time the first lift of paratroopers were to be on the ground, and air support was then limited to three squadrons of A-20«s on air alert; one prepared to fly smoke missions**! call, and the other tto to support the second air drop of 1 LUBAO DINALUPIHAN OLONGAPO HERMOSA SffB/C BAY BALANGA BAGAC f><1 RCT (•) The parachute phase of the Corregidor operation was accomplished by the 317th. Troop Carrier Group with two lifts of 51 planes each (G-h-7 type - 15 of which were equipped with artillery dropping para- racks). Each lift was capable of dropping approximately 1#000 troops plus necessary bundles containing supplies and equipment which could not be carried by the individual soldiers. The first lift carried a part of the Regimental Headquarters and Service Company; the 3d Bn, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment; Battery A (75™1 Pack Howitzer) and one platoon of Battery D (.50 caliber M3-) * 462a Parachute Field. Artillery Battalion; and Company C, l6lst Airborne Engineer Battalion. The second lift was composed of the 2d Bn, 503d Parachute Infantry with Battesry B and one platoon of Battery D, 4^2d parachute PA Bn attached. Two drop zones on the "Topside* of Corregidor were selected for the jump and designated A & B (see sketch). Although A was the old parade ground and B the golf course, neither area could be classi fied as an appropriate jumping field. Both were too small to pro vide adequate space for the landing and in addition were littered with wreckaget tree stumps and anti-parachute obstacles. It so happened that these two areas were the only possible drop zones that had any resemblance to open ground on the top of the Rock. The limited» rubble-heaped drop areas and steep cliffs (see photos) pre sented every conceivable hazard for the success of the jump. Because of the size of the fields it was decided to fly the planes over in single file, spaced 600 yards apart. It was initial ly planned that each plane would make two passes, dropping half a stick each tine* However, an aerial reconnaissance of the selected drop zones made by the majority of the jumpmasters indicated that the areas were too small for this method, consequently it was decided to make 3 passes, dropping one third of a stick each time* A confer ence was held between the troop carrier and parachute staffs to se lect "go points" for each field. This necessitated decisions as to the jump elevation and direction of flight. Troops would jump only when given the "go" signal (green ligjit) by the pilot* In the event that the pi*™* was not lined up properly with the field or the pilot was not sure of the "go point", the sigial would not be given and an extra pass over the area would be made. It was evident by this tims that normal wind was 10 to 15 knots from the northeast and, as the direction of flight was from the southwest, it was decided that jumpmasters would count three seconds before jumping. This would further compensate for the drift and prevent the jumpers from going over the cliffs and into the sea* At 08I I of troop carrier planes approached fed by Colonel John Lackey* \ UJ CD \ W r, t« M rV '• : ' *. J Conuaflffiflg-Officer of the'317'th Troop Carrier Group, was the conmand ship and carried Colonel Jones and members of his staff* Preparations had been made that in the event the top of the island was obscured by smoke from the preliminary bombing* the command ship would flash an order back to the other planes to orbit south of Corregidor until the smoke had cleared. A reading on the wind determined it to be 18 knots from the northeast. Upon flying over the Rock the conmand ship found it clear for jumping, and the leading coltnns came over, starting the drop at 0833* The conmand ship, circling over the form ation during the drop, detected that some of the jumpmasters were jumping too soon, the strong wind carrying the chutes to the steep cliffs on the southwest side of the Rock. The jumping altitude had originally been set at 1150 feet above sea level, the jump field being 550 feet above sea level,and as soon as it appeared that the wind was carrying the chutes over the cliff, orders were issued to bring the planes down to 1050 feet, thus shortening the drop time* At the same time jumpmasters were instructed to count six seconds after passing the "go point* instead of the original three seconds. These adjustments, made ty the conmand ship circling the area, mater ially improved the jump pattern on the ground and increased the number of effective troops landing. There was occasional enemy anti aircraft fire during this drop, but the close support of the strafing A-20's on each flank effectively silenced most of this fire.