Montenegrin Mirror Polity in Turmoil (1991-2001)
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Milan Popović Montenegrin Mirror Polity in Turmoil (1991-2001) Nansen Dialogue Center Podgorica 2002 Milan Popović Montenegrin Mirror Milan Popović Montenegrin Mirror Publisher Nansen Dialogue Center Podgorica Editor Daliborka Uljarević Reviewers Nebojša Vučinić Srđan Darmanović Language Editor Piter Barsoum Translation of review Ivana Gajović Vesna Bulatović Layout Đuro Stojanović Blažo Crvenica Milan Popović Montenegrin Mirror Polity in Turmoil (1991-2001) Nansen Dialogue Center Podgorica 2002 Montenegrin Mirror Milan Popović Table of Contents Montenegrin Mirror Polity in Turmoil (1991-2001) Part One Essays Montenegrin Alternative: Transition, Identity, State 11 Understanding Neopatriarchy 21 Before The Storm 25 After The Storm 29 Democratic FRY: Mission Improbable 33 The Last Balkan Triangle 37 Between East And West: Two Ideas Of a Nation-State 41 Europe versus Europe 47 New Miscalculations 53 Dances With Wolves 57 Shocking Connection 61 The Curse Of Involvement 65 Imagining Alternatives 69 Part Two Articles Yugoslav Disintegration In A World-System Perspective 75 After The Collapse 121 NATO Expansion And Balkan Testing Ground 143 Unholy Alliance 159 A Tadpole Transition and Its Alternative 165 The Post-Cold War Balkan Chaos And New Ideological Order 177 Appendices Review 197 Acknowledgements 201 Author 205 Part One Essays Montenegrin Mirror Milan Popović Montenegrin Alternative Transition, Identity, State June 1999 The rule of law has never really been a really working and stable principle in the shaky Balkan states. What happened in the second quarter of 1999, during the devastating NATO bombardment, in Montenegro, however, has been unprecedented even for these unstable lands. Two phenomena or sides of this unique process have been the most striking of all. The first one has been the wors- ening of the crisis and the almost total collapse of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, common state of Serbia and Montenegro. As a matter of fact, there are two remaining and functioning quasi- federal institutions on the territory of Montenegro today: the Army of Yugoslavia and the Dinar, the national monetary unit. In other respects, Serbia and Montenegro have been functioning as two de facto separate and independent states. The second phenomenon or side of this very special process has been a bitter internal Montenegrin power struggle between the two extremely opposed political camps, the two pro- and anti-Milošević forces. The strug- gle has already escalated into a kind of extremely unstable duality of power wavering at the very edge of internal fratricidal turmoil. That two differently dressed armed forces, the Army of Yugoslavia and the Police of Montenegro, patrol Montenegrin cities and villages every day in a mutually suspicious, tense and semi-hostile mood, is only the most evident indicator and expres- sion of this duality. To understand fully these and other current Montenegrin political, legal, and constitutional peculiarities, one should put them into a wider time framework. First of all, one should put or back them into the framework of heavy post-communist transition. Globally, as well as in Montenegro this transition began in 1989, but in 11 Milan Popović Montenegrin Mirror Montenegro it has consisted of two essentially different and dis- tinctive phases. In the first phase, during the period 1989-1997, Montenegro passed through a sort of negative transition, substitut- ing one (nationalistic i.e. Greater Serbian) for the other (commu- nist) type of closed society. It goes without saying that the Balkan wars have been the main fuel and force of this negative and devas- tating process. Through out this period, Montenegrin ruling Democratic Party of Socialists was in coalition with Slobodan Milošević’s Socialist Party of Serbia. Together these two extreme- ly authoritarian and hawkish nationalistic parties founded the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992. Given its undemocratic origin and nature, however, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could never become anything more than a facade federation, to use Karl Friedrich’s famous phrase. Needless to say, Greater Serbia has been under this facade. The great, three months of, anti-Milošević protests in Belgrade and other parts of Serbia during fall and winter of 1996-1997 were a prelude to the second phase of the Montenegrin post-communist transition. In Serbia these protests vanished with almost no politi- cal result. In Montenegro, however, they provoked and, in the course of the spring and summer of 1997, led to an open political struggle and a split within the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists. Slobodan Milošević’s supporters led by Momir Bulatović eventually lost the struggle, left the Democratic Party of Socialists, and founded the new and explicitly pro-Milošević Socialist People Party. The disintegration of the old monopolistic Democratic Party of Socialists was a necessary pre-condition for the beginning of the positive transition of the second phase. To fight and resist Slobodan Milošević’s regime, Milo Đukanović’s new Democratic Party of Socialists has been forced to form a coalition with anti- Milošević opposition parties. The Great Montenegrin anti- Milošević coalition was formed and declared on September 1, 1997. As result, Montenegrin pro-Milošević forces suffered two 12 Montenegrin Mirror Milan Popović heavy political defeats in the next several months. On October 19, 1997, a pro-Milošević candidate and puppet, Momir Bulatović, lost the presidential election, and his opponent and anti-Milošević contender, Milo Đukanović, became the new President of Montenegro. More importantly, on May 31, 1998, pro-Milošević Socialist People Party was defeated by the Montenegrin anti- Milošević coalition at the early parliamentary election. Political confrontation between the two main political blocks, pro- Milošević and anti-Milošević forces in Montenegro, has been characterized by standard transitional problems, topics and dis- putes. So, pro-Milošević i.e. anti-modernization forces have been advocating and fighting for Greater Serbian aggressive national- ism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, a closed society, and economic and political conservatism. On the other hand, the anti-Milošević (i.e. pro-modernization forces), quite conversely, have been advo- cating and achieving some nascent but important results in devel- oping multi-ethnic tolerance, an open society, civic culture, reinte- gration into the international community, and economic and politi- cal reforms. Given the situation of prolonged and exhausting Post- Cold War Balkan chaos, uncertainty, fear and war, however, all these and similar problems, topics and disputes have been some- what over shadowed and complicated by one single but most com- plex and difficult question. That question is, the question of State. The question of State marked the very beginning of the second phase of the Montenegrin transition in 1997. Slobodan Milošević’s authoritarian rule affected both human (civil) and Montenegrin (state) constitutional rights. His rule finally provoked not only opposition protests in Serbia but also deep dissatisfaction and divi- sion in Montenegro. The line of division was clear. “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without alternative”. This was the main political idea and slogan used by Momir Bulatović, leader of Slobodan Milošević’s loyalists in Montenegro, in March of 1997. Bearing in mind the real substance of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, however, the slogan should be appropriately translated 13 Milan Popović Montenegrin Mirror and understood as the “Greater Serbia and Slobodan Milošević without alternative”. The Political reaction of the pro-Montenegrin and pro-democratic forces was prompt. Montenegro may only live in a democratic Yugoslavia in which Montenegrin constitutional rights are fully guaranteed and respected from both federal and Serbian authorities. Consequently, if Greater Serbian political re- pression and violation of Montenegrin constitutional rights contin- ue, Montenegro may leave the federation. This was the main polit- ical idea of the reaction. The Montenegrin alternative was born. Being unable to control Montenegro, Slobodan Milošević and his loyalists changed political tactics in the following two years. They did their best to expel Montenegro from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. One after the other, almost all federal constitutional norms and institutions, Administration, Parliament, Constitutional Court and others, were gradually but totally destroyed and emptied out of any credible constitutional substance. Politically, this was executed through a machiavellian, pro-Milošević, but at the same time anti-federal and anti-Montenegrin coalition, which has been concluded between the Serbian political majority (the Socialist Party of Serbia plus Serbian Radical Party) and Montenegrin polit- ical minority (Socialist People Party). Legally, it has been misin- terpreted as a would-be defense of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia through countless and sometimes really incredible decisions of Federal Constitutional Court. In reality, this constitution and federal facade as a whole have been definitely turned into ashes by these very forces and decisions. Not the secession of Montenegro, as a would-be Yugoslav (Greater Serbian) propaganda ceaselessly accuses, but the secession of Slobodan Milošević’s Serbia from Yugoslavia, that has been the real nature of this creeping process. As a result, what can be seen today in Montenegro is a balance of fear and