Doing Something
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Doing Something Neoclassical Realism, US Foreign Policy and the No-Fly Zone, 1991-2016 Gustav Meibauer A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy; London, September 2017 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgment is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 101,000 words. 2 Abstract This thesis investigates the continuous use of no-fly zones across different US administrations. In doing so it seeks to advance theories of international relations and foreign policy, conceptualizations of foreign policy executive decision-making processes, and the empirical study of US administrations from 1991 to 2016. No-fly zones were ostensibly employed both for the protection of civilians in intra-state conflict and/or for coercive diplomacy. However, based on theoretical accounts as well as empirical observations, the no-fly zone is not in fact suited for these purposes. As the existing literature on coercive diplomacy, air strategy and no-fly zones is frequently grounded in rationalist and (structural) realist thought, it cannot easily account for continuous “sub-optimal” choices. Therefore, this thesis turns to neoclassical realism, and demonstrates the compatibility of ideational variables with realist ontology, epistemology and methodology. It employs ideas as an intervening variable in the transmission belt from systemic conditions to foreign policy choice to explain no-fly zone use in US foreign policy. In a permissive international environment, decision-makers use ideas to guide their interpretation of systemic conditions, and to wield them as tools of persuasion in foreign policy deliberations. Decision-making in the US foreign policy executive is then conceptualized as a competition between diverging ideas about systemic incentives and constraints, as well as about appropriate strategies to mobilize state power. Absent agreement or presidential leadership and under pressure to act quickly, decision-makers use the no-fly zone to patch over ideational divides in the foreign policy executive and “do something”. This suggested causal mechanism is investigated in three detailed case studies on US foreign policy towards northern Iraq, Bosnia, and Libya. Three deviant case studies on decision-making vis-à-vis Kosovo, South Sudan/Darfur, and Syria delineate scope conditions and illustrate the causal primacy of systemic factors in determining US foreign policy. 3 Acknowledgments Allegedly, there is a fascinating story behind every PhD. Mine, however, started out as a seminar paper during my postgraduate studies, then became a (sloppy) MA dissertation, and slowly developed into the piece of writing you now see before yourself. Its topic has been with me for years, and has (surprisingly, perhaps) mostly survived the many academic loops, empirical hurdles, and intellectual dead-ends I have encountered and tried to overcome along the way. Its creation and current form would not have been possible without the steadfast support of my supervisor Toby Dodge. I cannot thank him enough for his feedback, kindness, and serenity in the face of perpetually missed deadlines. I am very grateful to my two examiners, Lawrence Freedman and Steven Lobell, for their time and effort in reading and providing feedback on this thesis. At LSE and beyond, many friends and colleagues have helped me throughout the dissertation process. Nick Kitchen, James Strong and Luca Tardelli took considerable amounts of time off their busy schedules to read and critique my work meticulously. David Schäfer suffered through an entire draft to provide detailed feedback. Florian Blum, Marian Feist, Aaron McKeil, Andreas Müringer and Andreas Aagard Nøhr have been infinite sources of ideas, debate, support and friendship. A fantastic group of IR PhDs deserve a special shout-out: Maggie Ainley, Emmanuelle Blanc, Tina Blohm, David Brenner, Andrew Delatolla, Jonathan Freeman, Rachel George, Anissa Haddadi, Sidharth Kaushal, Evelyn Pauls, Adrian Rogstad, Joanne Yao – I couldn’t imagine better company when trying to understand fuzzy sets, hammer out research questions, and generally muddle through. The FPA, conflict, theory and security & statecraft workshops had too many members to name them individually, but they all deserve my gratitude (and many more rounds at the George). The 7th floor crowd and their proud motto (procrastinators unite…tomorrow) have made the LSE feel like home for possibly worrisome amounts of time. My parents, Bettina and Jörg, have provided professional co-supervision, demanding peer review, loving encouragement, laughter, counselling, and excellent food at home and abroad all in one masterful combination and in a way only they ever could. For that, I am deeply grateful. My sister Erika has always and generously shared her wealth of expertise, gossip, advice, and comic references (especially her unwavering commitment to knoblismus). Maybe better than anyone, my partner in crime (and PhD-ing), Alina Loth, knows of the ups and downs that research in no-fly zones involves (Haha. Get it? Ups and downs and no-fly zones! … Alina has also had to bear my penchant for obviously hilarious puns, which just as everything else she has managed with grace and astonishing patience). Her love, friendship and support have made and keep making all of it easy. 4 Table of Contents CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 8 1.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 8 1.2. No-Fly Zones as Tools of Intervention ..................................................................................................... 10 1.2.1. Strategic Coercion, Airpower and the No-Fly Zone ......................................................................... 10 1.2.2. The Limitations of No-Fly Zone Literature ....................................................................................... 16 1.3. Coercive Diplomacy and the No-Fly Zone ................................................................................................ 19 1.3.1. The Limitations of Coercive Diplomacy Literature .......................................................................... 26 1.4. Thesis Overview ....................................................................................................................................... 31 CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .............................................................................................. 35 2.1 Introduction: A Neoclassical Realist Framework of No-Fly Zone Use ...................................................... 35 2.2. The Independent Variable: Systemic Conditions ..................................................................................... 37 2.2.1. Neoclassical Realism and Intervening Variables ............................................................................. 41 2.3. Ideas as an Intervening Variable .............................................................................................................. 48 2.3.1. Interests and Ideas .......................................................................................................................... 50 2.3.2. Beliefs and Ideas .............................................................................................................................. 54 2.3.3. Ideational Competition and Foreign Policy Decision-Making ......................................................... 59 2.3.4. Ideational Competition and the No-Fly Zone .................................................................................. 65 2.4. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 69 CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY & METHODS .......................................................................................... 70 3.1. Introduction: Neoclassical Realist Epistemology ..................................................................................... 70 3.2. Methodology and Methods ..................................................................................................................... 72 3.2.1. Neoclassical Realism and the Case Study Method .......................................................................... 72 3.2.2. Case Selection, Generalizability and Validity .................................................................................. 74 3.3. Data Collection ......................................................................................................................................... 78 3.3.1. Archival Research ...........................................................................................................................