Abul A'la Mawdudi's Concept of Hakimiyya and Its Critical
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE Вестник СПбГУ. Право. 2018. Т. 9. Вып. 2 UDC 340.1+348 provided by Saint Petersburg State University Abul A‘la Mawdudi’s concept of Hakimiyya and its critical assessment in Islamic legal-political thought V. V. Pugachev Leningrad Regional Division of the North-Western Main Branch of the Central Bank of Russian Federation, 4, Shafirovsky prospect, Saint Petersburg, 195273, Russian Federation For citation: Pugachev, Valerii V. 2018. “Abul A‘la Mawdudi’s concept of Hakimiyya and its critical assessment in Islamic legal-political thought”. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Law 2: 230–241. https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu14.2018.208 The article analyzes the legal-political aspects of the concept of hakimiyya (“divine domination”) devised by the Indo-Pakistani theologian Abul A‘la Mawdudi (1903–1979). The author asserts that the doctrine of hakimiyya is based upon the recognition that Allah is the sole subject empowered to provide legislation to the Muslim community directly (the principle of “legal domination”) and indirectly (the principle of “political domination”).The doctrine of hakimiyya acquires its political shape as the Islamic state (caliphate), wherein the Islamic community is entrusted with a limited right to legislation by means of agency (wikala). Special emphasis is laid on examination into the critical appraisal of the hakimiyya doctrinals in the modern Islamic legal science. The article explores the objections raised against the hakimiyya theory by the Indo-Pakistani religious scholars, including Abul Hasan Nadwi and Wahid al-Din Khan, as well as by a number of modern Arabic legal theorists, such as Hasan al- Hudaybi, Muhammad ‘Imara, Muhammad Sayyid al-‘Ashmawi, Haydar Ibrahim ‘Ali a.o. The author concludes that the concept of hakimiyya underlies Mawdudi’s doctrine of the sources of law and serves as the basis for his theory of the Islamic state, as well as for his concept of the “renewal of faith” through Islamic revolution. Keywords: hakimiyya, legal domination, political domination, caliphate, din, Islamic state. 1. Introduction. Abul A‘la Mawdudi (further referred to as Mawdudi) has long been considered one of the most influential theorists of Islamic law of the twentieth century. Mawdudi’s legal-political doctrine has exerted considerable influence on the current state of the Islamic socio-political thought, with its fundamentals remaining at the center of acute scientific debates in Islamic academia. Of all the various theories introduced by Mawdudi into the Islamic legal thought, it is the doctrine of “divine domination” (hakimi- yya ilahiyya) that deserves the most special attention. So far the conceptual foundations of hakimiyya have not been subject to close examination on the part of the Russian research- ers in the field of Islamic legal studies. Yet, notwithstanding the fact that the doctrine of hakimiyya was developed in the 1930s, it continues to remain a cornerstone of multiple Islamic political theories, such as Qutbism, “Islamic quietism”, and numerous other forms of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism. The present article aims at analyzing the essen- tial features of hakimiyya — the theory which, this author believes, constitutes the most important innovation in Mawdudi’s entire intellectual output. After discussing the fun- damentals of hakimiyya, special emphasis will be laid on the academic debates that have © Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет, 2018 230 https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu14.2018.208 been taking place among the Islamic legal scholars about the extent to which this concept corresponds to the basic tenets of Islamic faith and law. 2. Main text. At the core of the theory of hakimiyya lies the assumption that Islam, unlike other world religions, should not be regarded as a mere aggregate comprising di- verse theological concepts and ritual practices, but rather that it should be looked upon as, what Mawdudi liked to call it, a “political system” (nizam siyasi). In his seminal lecture delivered in Lahore in 1939 he stated the following: “First, we should clearly understand and always be sensible of the fact that Islam is not just a huddle of unrelated theories and various ways of conduct. It is rather a perfect, comprehensive system resting on a set of rational, thoroughly formulated principles. This system is logically connected to these principles from its important fundamentals up to minor unessential details” (al-Mawdudi 1967, 7). It is thus distinctive of the “political system” of Islam that it is rooted in axiomati- cal concepts derived directly from the Qur’anic revelation rather than from the secondary (also known as “rational”) sources of Islamic law. The priority role of the Qur’an in formulating the basic principles of the “political system” of Islam manifests itself precisely in Mawdudi’s negative attitude towards the clas- sical exegetic literature. Mawdudi believed that the genuine meanings of all the most cru- cial political terms of the Qur’an had historically been undergoing a gradual, although hardly noticeable, process of transformation, up until the point at which they had begun to denote only narrow and quite indefinite notions. This development eventually resulted in a situation where in the later dictionaries and commentaries the terms of the original Qur’anic vocabulary began to be interpreted solely according to their then-contemporary meanings. In addition, Mawdudi tended to think of the classical era legists and theolo- gians as unable to differentiate between the absolute atemporal principles of Islam and their particular spatially and temporarily determined manifestations. From his stand- point, any attempts at interpreting the Qur’anic revelation exclusively on the basis of one’s understanding of the needs of the moment would be doomed to failure from the start. Inasmuch as Islam embodies the idea of freedom of will, it is only by means of inde- pendent and unmediated study that a man can understand the true implications of the Qur’anic revelation. “Man has been endowed with reason and intellect. He has the power to think and form judgments, to choose and reject, and to adopt and spurn. He is free to adopt whatever course of life he chooses. He can embrace any faith, adopt any way of life and formulate his living according to whatever ideologies he likes… He has been bestowed with free will and can chalk out his own course of behavior” (Maududi 1960b, 4). Since man exercises unrestricted free will, it is natural for the Supreme Lawgiver to confine himself to defining only the most imperative principles of Islam, making room for a man to act independently beyond the restrictions imposed upon him. “The Qur’an, to put it succinctly, is a Book of broad general principles rather than of legal minutiae. The Book’s main aim is to expound, clearly and adequately, the intellectual and moral foundations of the Islamic programme for life… Its method of guidance for practical Islamic life does not consist of laying down minutely detailed laws and regulations. It prefers to outline the basic framework for each aspect of human activity and to lay down certain guidelines within which man can order his life in keeping with the Will of God” (Mawdudi 1988, 28). The ideological core of the “political system” of Islam is made up of the so-called “four Qur’anic terms”, which may be deduced directly from the text of the revelation. These terms include 1) rabb (“Master”, or “Lord”); 2) ilah (“deity”), and its synonym ma‘bud (“an Вестник СПбГУ. Право. 2018. Т. 9. Вып. 2 231 object of worship”); 3) ‘ibada (“worship”); 4) din (“faith”, “religion”). Mawdudi reckoned that whosoever made more than a perfunctory inquiry into the teachings of the Qur’an would soon realize that its entire contents revolved around these four terms only (al- Mawdudi 1971, 7), and that for the Islamic ideology to be comprehended properly it was essential to fully grasp their respective meanings. It is therefore noteworthy that, in the words of J.-P. Hartung, “although Mawdudi’s first two terms refer to the Qur’anic concept of God, the fundamental doctrine of tawhid seems to have played only an implicit role [in his theory. — P. V. ]” (Hartung 2014, 91). Having excluded tawhid, which he defined as faith in the unity of Allah in its broadest sense1, from the fundamental political terms of the Qur’an, he nevertheless claimed that failure to comprehend the true implications of tawhid would amount to one’s inability to tell it from shirk. The word rabb is supposed to convey the active aspect of the divinity of Allah (rubu- biyya), which manifests itself in the upbringing of man, instilling in him the fervor of piousness, and, last but not least, in the institution of the unrestricted divine domination over the entire humankind. In “The Four Terms in the Qur’an” Mawdudi boldly states that “the term “supremacy” (al-rububiyya) is used in the Qur’an as an equivalent to the term “domination” (al-hakimiyya wa-l-malakiyya), with the Qur’anic description of the “Mas- ter” (al-rabb) being that of the “absolute ruler” (al-hakim al-mutlaq), the king, and the uncontested overlord of all things in existence (al-Mawdudi 1971, 93). Correspondingly, the violation of rububiyya would, from Mawdudi’s standpoint, equal to the ascription of associates to Allah, and, moreover, it would ultimately result in man vesting himself with the right to set his own rules of conduct. As contrasted to rububiyya, the purpose of the term ilah is to reflect the passive aspect of the divinity of Allah (uluhiyya), namely the fact that it is only Allah to whom, as the sole object of worship (ma‘bud), the attributes of divinity are allotted. Once again, it is the idea of Allah’s absolute authority over the entire mankind that appears to be at the core of Mawdudi’s understanding of uluhiyya.