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US Policy Toward Frozen Conflicts

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US Policy Toward Frozen Conflicts Atlantic Council DINU PATRICIU EURASIA CENTER A Tool Kit for US Policymakers Agnia Grigas Frozen Conflicts A Tool Kit for US Policymakers Agnia Grigas The author would like to thank Congressman Gerald “Gerry” Connolly, the United States Representative from Virginia’s 11th congressional district, and his staff for feedback in the development of this report. The author would also like to thank Jeanne Frechede for research support. ISBN: 978-1-61977-473-5 Cover photo credit: Mikhail Voskresenskiy/RIA Novosti/Sputnik. Russian troops during exercises at the Kanchaveli advanced outpost in South Ossetia, July 2013. This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. July 2016 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 Introduction 1 Post-Soviet Frozen Conflicts 2 Manufacturing Frozen Conflicts 7 Implications of Frozen Conflict Conditions 8 US Policy Toward Frozen Conflicts Policy Recommendations for the US 12 Government and Congress 15 About the Author 16 Endnotes FROZEN CONFLICTS of international concepts of human rights and self-determination or instead seek integration into INTRODUCTION the Russian Federation. The flaring of violence in Nagorno-Karabakh in mid-2016 shows that the Since the 1990s, a number of separatist movements United States will have to be continuously prepared and conflicts have challenged the borders of the for reignited conflict. Meanwhile, since Russia seems states of the former Soviet Union and created quasi- determined to maintain its occupation of Crimea independent territories under Russian influence despite Western sanctions and non-recognition by and control. Unrecognized by the international the international community, Washington will have community but generally supported by Moscow, to pursue a long-term policy regarding this issue these so-called “frozen conflicts” include the regions vis-à-vis Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea. The following of Transnistria in Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh in policy memo seeks to frame the issues at stake and Azerbaijan, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia in available policy options for both current and future Georgia. Since 2014, Russia’s annexation of Crimea policymakers in the US government and Congress. and the emergence of pro-Moscow separatist territories in eastern Ukraine—the so-called “people’s republics” of Luhansk and Donetsk— created a new set of potential frozen conflicts. These seemingly disparate conflicts across different states POST-SOVIET are, in fact, inherently interconnected; together, they demonstrate a pattern of Russian foreign FROZEN CONFLICTS policy, which manufactures frozen conflicts as a means of increasing Moscow’s long-term influence The term “frozen conflict” is used to describe and leverage over target states in its near abroad. conditions on territories where active armed The resulting separatist territories create “gray conflict may have ended, but no peace treaty or zones” that are problematic for the international political resolution has resolved the tensions to the community and international law because they satisfaction of the different sides. In the separatist challenge the post-Cold War political order, territories that have become frozen conflict destabilize Europe’s frontier states, and because zones, internal sovereignty is often achieved they are often used by local and transnational in the breakaway territory but at the expense groups for money laundering, organized crime, and of “external sovereignty” or recognition in the human and arms trafficking. international system.1 The term frozen conflict is almost completely associated with the breakaway The US government has generally supported the territories of post-Soviet republics. Such conflicts territorial integrity of such states facing separatism emerged as a result of Moscow-stoked separatism and sought to contain the fallout from these frozen often with the ultimate aim of gaining influence conflicts. In the aftermath of Crimean annexation and control over foreign territories. With the sole and war in the Donbas, it is necessary to reconsider exception of Nagorno-Karabakh,2 Moscow’s pretext the successes and failures of past US government and justification for such actions is cited as the policies vis-à-vis Moscow’s manufactured frozen need to protect its so-called compatriots—ethnic conflicts. It is important to establish a policy toolbox Russians, Russian speakers, and other minorities— for policymakers to use in the event of future residing abroad. Usually, but not always, these Russian assaults on the sovereign territories of target territories border the Russian Federation other countries. Moreover, because frozen conflicts (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Donbas, and Crimea) and by their very nature are likely to last for decades, it are inhabited by minorities who are experiencing is important to establish “policy memory” of these some discord with the central government or conflicts and to consider the policy options for who are open in one degree or another to the managing these conflicts in the near and long term. influence of Moscow. With the exception of Crimea, Going forward, the quasi-states of Transnistria, Moscow’s creation of separatist frozen conflicts has South Ossetia, and Abkhazia will continue to seek not escalated to Russia’s annexation. Nonetheless, either independence or integration with the Russian these territories generally become de facto Federation. The US government will have to be separated from the states in question and under prepared to address such processes. Likewise, the Moscow’s direct political influence and military territories of Luhansk and Donetsk are likely to protection.3 seek greater autonomy from Ukraine on the basis ATLANTIC COUNCIL 1 FROZEN CONFLICTS Table 1. Comparative Analysis of the Conflicts MANUFACTURING Countries, Institutions, Year(s) Military Length of and Political Entities that Number of Amount of US Government FROZEN CONFLICTS Conflicts of Active Actors Conflict Recognize the Territory’s Casualties Land Lost Response(s) Conflict Russia’s tools for manufacturing such grey zones Independence/Annexation have been strikingly similar in Moldova, Georgia, and Estimated Ukraine. As outlined in the author’s book Beyond January 5, 1991- Russia-backed South Non Recognition; Russian Federation, Nauru, 1,000 killed and Crimea: The New Russian Empire, the trajectory starts June 24, 1992; Ossetia/Georgia 1 year, 5 months, Policy of Nicaragua, Venezuela, 100 missing; with Russia’s softer means of influence such as an South July-August 19, 2 weeks, and 5 days; 3.885 km2 Engagement OSCE, European Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, dozens killed; appeal to common values and shared membership Ossetia 2004; August 1 month; 9 days Without Union (EU), USA, and Western Sahara, and Abkhazia 44 killed and in the Russian Orthodox Church, cultural, and 7-16, 2008 Recognition United Nations (UN)* i linguistic support. It continues to humanitarian and 273 wounded compatriot policies, which involve aid to Russian- Azerbaijan/Armenia Non Recognition; speaking minorities as well as support for compatriot Armenia, South Ossetia, 20,000-30,000 2 iv Policy of 1991-1994; 11,458 km institutions and organizations. The crucial turning Nagorno- Russian Federation, 3 years; 4 days Abkhazia, Transnistria, and 7 US killed; 95-200 Engagement April 1-5, 2016 point is the handing out of Russian citizenship to Karabakh OSCE, France, and Federal Statesii killediii Without these inhabitants of foreign territories. Thus, Russian USA* Recognition citizens are manufactured from Russian compatriots who then inherently warrant the protection of the Moldova/Russia- Russian Federation. Simultaneously, Russia pursues backed Transnistria Non Recognition; an information warfare campaign declaring an urgent March 2, 1992- Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Estimated 800 2 Short-Term Transnistria 5 months v 4,163 km need to protect Russian citizens and compatriots July 21, 1992 Russian Federation, and South Ossetia killed Sanctions Against from various, mostly imagined, threats. Support for OSCE, Ukraine, USA, Separatists separatists and militants follows. Direct but covert and EU* Russian military involvement is likely—as in the 10,000-15,000 August 14, 1992- Russian Federation, Non Recognition; case of the Donbas and Crimea where “little green Russian Federation, Nauru, lives uprooted September 27, Russia-backed Policy of men” or Russian special forces and troops operated 13 months and 13 days; Nicaragua, Venezuela, and 8000 Abkhazia 1993; Abkhazia/Georgia 8,600 km2 Engagement covertly without their insignia. The end result is 6 days Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, wounded;vi August 9-12, Without armed conflict that resembles “hybrid warfare” or a OSCE, EU, USA, and and South Ossetia reported 3 2008 Recognition military strategy that seamlessly blends conventional UN* killed military tactics with irregular ones, which can include Non Recognition; civilian participation, guerilla warfare, and modern Russian Federation/ Russian Federation, Afghanistan, February Sanctions technology, to achieve an advantage both on land Ukraine Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, 23-March 19, 17 days 6 killedvii 27,000 km2 against Crimean and in cyberspace.4 Moscow generally explains Crimea Syria, Venezuela, Abkhazia, 2014 Great Britain, France, leadership and these
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