This Is Para
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
CORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 606-xxxiv HOUSE OF COMMONS HOUSE OF LORDS ORAL EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS BANKING STANDARDS WEDNESDAY 6 FEBRUARY 2013 STUART GULLIVER and DOUGLAS FLINT CBE Evidence heard in Public Questions 3766 - 3869 USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT 1. This is a corrected transcript of evidence taken in public and reported to the House. The transcript has been placed on the internet on the authority of the Committee, and copies have been made available by the Vote Office for the use of Members and others. 2. The transcript is an approved formal record of these proceedings. It will be printed in due course. 1 Oral Evidence Taken before the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards on Wednesday 6 February 2013 Members present: Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chair) Baroness Kramer Lord Lawson of Blaby Mr Andrew Love Mr Pat McFadden Lord McFall of Alcluith John Thurso Lord Turnbull The Archbishop of Canterbury also attended as a Specialist Adviser with power to examine witnesses. Examination of Witnesses Witnesses: Stuart Gulliver, Group Chief Executive, HSBC Holdings, and Douglas Flint CBE, Group Chairman, HSBC Holdings, examined. Q3766 Chair: Good morning. Thank you very much for coming to give evidence. May I begin by asking whether you support the proposal of this Commission that a reserve power be taken for full separation in order to make the ring-fence more robust? Douglas Flint: Yes, we do. In the event that it is judged that participants are circumventing or frustrating the purpose of the ring-fence, it seems to me quite reasonable for there to be a sanction. Yes, we support that. Q3767 Chair: Do you think there should be, as we also propose, a periodic—perhaps five-year, perhaps slightly longer, perhaps slightly shorter—review, independent of the regulator and the Government, of the design and effectiveness of the ring-fence? Douglas Flint: Again, yes. I think it would be remarkable if everybody who has been involved in this process is able to anticipate everything that might arise from the operationalising of the ring-fence over the next three to five years. I actually think that the first independent review might be earlier than five years, because problems, if they arise on either side of this application, will probably arise quickly in its operation, rather than later. So I think maybe three years afterwards would be a good first time. Q3768 Chair: I think we went for four. Douglas Flint: Okay. Well, somewhere between three and five. 2 Q3769 Chair: Four seems roughly in the middle. Do you also support the Commission’s recommendation that the burden of proof for any exemption from the requirements on primary loss-absorbing capacity should rest with the bank? Douglas Flint: On reflection, yes we do. It is clearly going to be a dialogue between the institution, the regulator and the Treasury. The ultimate risk lies with the Treasury, because in the event that the institution does bring risk from overseas to this country, it is the Treasury that ultimately will have to consider what proportion, if any, of that it will bear. As the contingent risk is with the Treasury, it seems to me that it is perfectly reasonable to ask the institution to demonstrate why there is no risk. I think what we would say is that because of the sensitivity and the considerable judgment involved, the test should be one not of absolute risk, because absolute certainty is never going to be possible as you look far into the future, but of reasonably foreseeable risk in that the deliberation should take place, in our view, at the institutional level at board level and at Government level in the highest levels of the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulatory Authority and, indeed, the Treasury. The judgments will be just as much about the people of whom assurances are being sought as about the detailed facts and figures that will be presented by us as an institution and by other institutions that are affected. Q3770 Chair: May I reinterpret that as saying that if we are going to have a system based on judgment, the judgment must be exercised by very senior people with the self- confidence to vary that judgment, not box-tickers? Douglas Flint: I would agree with that. Q3771 Chair: Do you think there needs to be some sort of qualification based on a phrase in statute such as “reasonably foreseeable”? Douglas Flint: I do, because I think if you make it an absolute test it is very easy for someone to say you can never be absolutely certain of anything. Q3772 Chair: You, as a business, have a good opportunity to look at how it is conducted around the world. The US hands out, on the whole, larger regulatory fines—more have been announced today—has a tougher individual sanctions regime and, some say, has more politicisation of its regulation and, to some degree possibly, its judiciary. Is the US a tougher place for banks to do business? Does that toughness help engender a better culture? Douglas Flint: It is certainly a very difficult place to do business when you get it wrong, which I think we know very well. I support the view that tough but fair regulation is a comparative advantage. I think that financial systems benefit from strong, tough but fair regulation. The US has a tough system and it has a particularly penetrating examination of failure. It is the way it is, but I think we should aspire to having a tough, fair system here. That is what you are attempting to achieve. Q3773 Chair: Do you think the American system is fair? You are answering the question already, actually. Douglas Flint: I am not the judge of fairness. I think that where you make a mistake you are punished, and you are punished in a more penal way than other jurisdictions choose to do. The US has a concept of corporate criminal liability, which is not shared by many other jurisdictions. Having said that, those who operate in that jurisdiction are aware that those are the rules under which they operate. So it is not for me to comment on someone else’s legal 3 system. It is the legal system they have. We knew about that, and we know about that when we operate there. Q3774 Lord McFall of Alcluith: Mr Flint, when you were here last time, I asked you about HSBC being too big to manage, and I think you said that it was a good question. I want to look at the issue of the fines that you had over money laundering in the United States. The US Senate’s report has clarified that “overwhelming” amounts of Government information were available to HSBC regarding the specific high risk of money laundering in Mexican banks. This information was “inexplicably excluded” from the HSBC risk assessment matrix every year from 2002 to 2012 and from 2002 to 2009. HBUS gave Mexico its lowest risk rating for AML purposes. However, internal correspondence between members of the London compliance team refers to the “specific risks” of money laundering in Mexico—for example, a 2008 e-mail from Susan Wright, anti-money laundering compliance head for HSBC Group. “People on the ground”, such as John Root and Paul Thurston, also repeatedly expressed concerns about Mexico being a high-risk money laundering jurisdiction. Both of you had engagements in America and were directors of the Latin American holdings, etc. Given that HSBC paid almost $2 billion in fines over the money-laundering scandal, and the Senate reported that HSBC had “long-standing, severe, anti-money laundering deficiencies”, what does that failure tell you about the culture and the organisational weakness in HSBC? Douglas Flint: That is a very good question. One of the clear lessons that we have had as a result of this is that certain of the standards that we believed were being applied globally that were set from the centre were not being applied as they should have been. Certain of the matters that should have been shared and escalated were not being shared and escalated as well as they should have been, and certain of the external data sources—it is absolutely the case, and we have accepted that it is very much true, that there was a great deal of information regarding Mexico that was not taken into account in the risk assessment. That was an error, but I think we have also recognised that there are broader areas of knowledge and intelligence that we ought to now seek very hard to make ourselves knowledgeable of, so that we can ensure that such things do not happen in the future. I would like to ask Mr Gulliver to comment on how we have dealt with the operational side of dealing with these issues that arose, but you are right to say there were things we were not aware of and standards that we believed were being applied that were not. Q3775 Lord McFall of Alcluith: Given the almost cavalier approach of HSBC to the money-laundering issue, to the customer redress on PPI—for which you have put $2.7 billion aside so far—and to the acquisition of Household, which was an absolute disaster in the United States, relating to sub-prime investment quadrants, not one person has stood up and taken responsibility for this and said, “As a result of this shameful situation, I’m out the door.” Why has that been the situation? Why is everybody sat cosy in their chairs? Douglas Flint: I don’t think anyone is sitting cosy in their chair at all.