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Jason S. Miller Curriculum Vitae JASON S. MILLER CURRICULUM VITAE CONTACT INFORMATION Florida State University 850-644-1483 (office) Department of Philosophy 954-495-1430 (cell) 151 Dodd Hall [email protected] Tallahassee, FL 32306-1500 http://sites.google.com/site/jasonmillerphilosophy EDUCATION 2013 (Expected) Florida State University Ph.D., Philosophy GPA: 4.0 Dissertation: Free Will and Descriptive Adequacy (working title) Committee: Alfred Mele (Chair), Randolph Clarke, Michael Bishop, Michael Kaschak 2013 (Expected) Florida State University Cognitive Science Certificate GPA: 4.0 Cross-Disciplinary Certificate Coursework in Philosophy, Psychology, Computer Science, and Linguistics 2007 Florida State University M.A., Philosophy GPA: 4.0 Exam Topic: “Arguments for Incompatibilism” Committee: Michael McKenna (Chair), Alfred Mele, Randolph Clarke 2002 Ohio University B.A., English GPA: 3.67 Cum Laude Graduate Philosophy Minor AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION Free Will and Moral Responsibility Moral Psychology Cognitive Science Philosophy of Action AREAS OF COMPETENCE Philosophy of Mind Ethics Metaphysics Logic Experimental Philosophy JOURNAL ARTICLES “Frankfurt and the Folk: An Experimental Investigation of Frankfurt-Style Cases” (with Adam Feltz). 2011. Consciousness and Cognition 20.2 (pp. 401-14). DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.015 BOOK REVIEWS Review of Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will by John Martin Fischer. 2010. Analysis 70.1 (pp. 196-8). DOI: 10.1093/analys/anp143 Review of Four Views on Free Will by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. 2009. Philosophical Review 118.3 (pp.409-13). DOI: 10.1215/00318108-2009-012 WORKS IN PROGRESS “Passing on Bypassing: Some Worries for Eddy Nahmias’s Performance Error Hypothesis” “In Defense of Deterministic Frankfurt-Style Cases” “Antecedent Control, the Luck Objection, and Event-Causal Libertarianism” DISSERTATION Extant data suggest that, pretheoretically, many individuals possess notions of free agency that exhibit significant aspects of both compatibilism and incompatibilism. In Free Will and Descriptive Adequacy, I argue that these conflicting elements cannot be ‘explained away’ or ignored, and that an empirically adequate theory of free agency should confront this issue directly by advocating principled revisions of commonsense thought on these issues. In future work, I plan to expand this account by detailing the nature of the required revisions, the methods by which they are best implemented, and their potential social and interpersonal consequences. PRESENTATIONS AND COMMENTARIES “Frankfurt and the Folk” (with Adam Feltz). MidSouth Philosophy Conference: Memphis, TN, April 2009 “Strength of Will without Will-Power: A Reply to Richard Holton.” Southeast Graduate Philosophy Conference: Gainesville, FL, March 2009 “Moral Responsibility and Necessary Truths: Alternative Possibilities and the Direct Argument for Incompatibilism.” Hawaii International Conference on Arts and Humanities: Honolulu, HI, January 2008 “Rejecting Rule A: Necessity, Alternative Possibilities, and the Direct Argument for Incompatibilism.” University of Florida and Florida State University Graduate Student Conference: Tallahassee, FL, February 2007 Comments on Donald Bruckner, “Philosophical Lessons from Positive Psychology” MidSouth Philosophy Conference: Memphis, TN, April 2009 TEACHING EXPERIENCE As Instructor: PHI 2010: Introduction to Philosophy (Fall 2011) PHI 2630: Ethical Issues and Life Choices (Summer 2012) PHI 3130: Introduction to Symbolic Logic (Summer 2010) PHI 3320: Philosophy of Mind (Summer 2011) As Graduate Teaching Assistant: PHI 2010: Introduction to Philosophy (Spring 2007, Spring 2010) PHI 2100: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (Fall 2008, Fall 2012) PHI 2630: Ethical Issues and Life Choices (Fall 2007, Fall 2009, Spring 2009) PHI 3130: Introduction to Symbolic Logic (Fall 2006, Summer 2007, Summer 2008) PHI 3220: Philosophy of Language (Spring 2012) PHI 3320: Philosophy of Mind (Summer 2009, Fall 2010) PHM 4340: Contemporary Political Thought (Spring 2013) PHI 4500: Metaphysics (Spring 2008, Spring 2011) PROFESSIONAL SERVICE AND DEVELOPMENT Research Assistant, Big Questions in Free Will project, funded by the Templeton Foundation under direction of Alfred Mele (Fall 2012) Designer, Student Perception of Teaching Review Summary Form, Florida State University Philosophy Department (Summer 2012) Reviewer for Oxford University Press, The Quest for Truth by Louis P. Pojman and Lewis Vaughn (2010: 8th Edition), in preparation for a new edition of the text (Spring 2012) PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS AND CERTIFICATIONS Member, American Philosophical Association (2007- ) Member, Society for Women’s Advancement in Philosophy (2006- ) Member, Florida State University Philosophy Graduate Student Association (2006- ) Teaching Certificate, Program for Instructional Excellence, Florida State University (Fall 2006) GRADUATE COURSEWORK Free Will and Moral Responsibility Philosophy of Mind and Action Free Will, Compatibilist Style (M. Intentions and Decisions (A. Mele) McKenna) Mental Agency (R. Clarke) Moral Responsibility (R. Clarke) Philosophy of Mind: Free Will, Action Topics in Free Will (M. McKenna) Theory, and Neuroscience (A. Mele) Libertarian Theories of Free Will (R. Philosophy of Mind: Free Will, Action Clarke) Theory, and Experimental Philosophy (A. Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (R. Mele)† Clarke)* Action Theory (A. Mele)* Incompatibilism (M. McKenna)* Philosophy of Mind (A. Mele)* Revisionism (M. McKenna)* Happiness and Well-Being (M. Bishop)* Logic Metaphysics and Epistemology Modern Logic I (P. Rawling) Metaphysics and Epistemology Core Course Computability and Logic (P. Rawling)† (M. McKenna) Non-Classical Logic (P. Rawling)* Identity and Persistence (M. McKenna) Modal Logic (P. Rawling)* Modality (A. Mele)* Gödel’s Theorems (P. Rawling)* Naturalized Epistemology (M. Bishop)* Cognitive Science History of Philosophy Introduction to Computational Theory Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (P. Dalton) (Computer Science: M. Mascagni)†‡ Herakleitos and Parmenides (R. Dancy) Cognition and Perception Wittgenstein (R. Dancy) (Psychology: M. Kaschak)‡ Plato’s Theaetetus (R. Dancy) Introduction to Transformational Grammar Early Modern Philosophy (J. Roberts) (Linguistics: L. Reglero)‡ Frege and Early Russell (R. Dancy)† Ethics Professional Development Ethics Core Course (J. Gert) Supervised Teaching (R. Clarke, P. Moral Virtue (V. Costa) Rawling) Parfit’s Climbing the Mountain (D. Supervised Research (M. McKenna, P. McNaughton)† Rawling) Korsgaard’s Sources of Normativity (D. Writing and Research in Free Will (M. McNaughton)* McKenna)* Wallace’s Normativity and the Will (M. Italian for Graduate Reading Knowledge McKenna)* (Italian: M. Pietralunga)†‡ * = Tutorial † = Audited Seminar ‡ Non-philosophy course (department indicated above) REFERENCES References available upon request. .
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