DOCSLIB.ORG

Current Situation of the Jihadi Movement.Pdf

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Current Situation of the Jihadi Movement.Pdf 1 Current Situation of the Jihadi Movement Open Interview With Ahmed Al-Hamdan 2 Foreword بسمميحرلانمحرلا هللا I have written the series titled (Current Situation of the Jihadi Movement) in a discontinuous manner and it continued for a year. Since 1st of April 2017 until the 3rd of April 2018, originally it was a collection of questions and their answers from certain people and I saw the appropriate opportunity to translate and publish these in the English language, and that because the Anglophones – perhaps- lacked the availability of basic references, of which most are in Arabic, and would need it more than those for which the original references suffice and could understand it without translation. Most questions as is very clear were about (The Islamic State), because this group perhaps benefited most from translating their productions and publishing them in the English language, therefor those that speak this language would speak about them more, let alone their expansion and their reach to many jihad arenas, this is what caused that most questions would surround it. I saw it appropriate to collect this subject in one file, especially with the deletion of links of these parts in a systematic and repeated manner. I also liked to note that the reviewers of this subject are many, and not merely a single person, therefor you might see a difference between the translation of one answer and another answer, I also liked to thank the brothers in Al Muwahideen Media whom contributed to the review of a part of this series. And meet you soon in another project In Sha Allah. Ahmad Al-Hamdan 21st April 2018 3 Question: Were there any objections from jihadi personalities regarding the operations of Al- Qaeda in Saudi Arabia? The answer: Yes there were objections, from the senior mujahideen within Saudi and some from outside, the situation in Saudi almost lost hold and derailed. And that because the security forces tried to stop any attempt against their western allies, with that the course of the battle changed from targeting the westerners to clashes with the local security forces. Many scholars and preachers who support and sympathize with jihad don’t see these actions as permissible; even if he saw this as permissible originally, but they see it as impermissible when the consequences are corrupt. Your entering in this battle made the people delay in themselves giving support to you, the reality is that the war of the USA on Afghanistan and Iraq generated large empathy and sway from a part of the people to the mujahideen. Because this war is understood and clear, but when a battle happens which he does not understand and sees it as believers against believers, he would withdraw his sympathy from the jihadi faction and takes the stance of the enemy or the uncaring (about the affair). As for the personalities whom objected to this operation, from the most notable among them: - Shaykh Atiyyatullah al-Lībī when saying: (As for Riyadh, the bombing in it ,without a doubt, do not recognize its legitimacy. And most of the scholars and preachers do not see it as legitimate, stopping this operation would not in any situation disrupt the jihad!! This is a mistake we disallow, and an expansion we renounce!)1. - And also Shaykh Sulaymān Al-'Ulwān in a letter (The reality of jihad and the internal events) And this letter I specify it to one of the notable personalities in Al-Qaeda organization in Saudi to respond to it and he is Sultan ibn Bajaad al-’Utaybī in the message with the title:( a quiet debate with Al-'Ulwān). - Also Shaykh Abu ‘Umar AlSayf, The judge of the Arab mujahideen in Chechnya, published a letter urging the brothers to target the US bases in the gulf, but when he saw the course of the battle was not like this he published an audio message ( To the mujahideen in Saudi) and said: (And I advise the brothers around this age to do that which has benefits and to head towards Iraq instead of busying themselves with confrontations with the government of Saudi). Commander in Al-Qaeda Salih Al’Aufi replied in the magazine “Voice of Jihad” on this call and said: (I and the required brothers firmly refuse to go to Iraq)2. 1 The Complete Works of Shaykh Atiyyatullah al-Lībī - Page 1380. 2 magazine: Voice of jihad, Issue 8, Page 25. 4 - Shaykh Nasir Al-Fahd said: ( As for confronting the state (saudi arabia) I used to advise the brothers to stay away from it because of the inequality in power and that the state will use these events to finish off the brothers one after the other and will fill the prisons with them and with others, and what I expected happened exactly like I thought)3. - And a personality close to Shaykh Usamah ibn Laden sent him a letter in which they objected to the military work in Saudi Arabia (which is the letter nr.: SOCOM-2012-0000018 in the Abottabad documents). These were the most notable people that objected. Note: One of the best book regarding Al-Qaeda organization in Saudi Arabia in the English language is (Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979) by the author (Thomas Hegghammer), this because of two reasons, firstly that the researcher was proficient in the Arabic language and secondly because his proficiency in Arabic he laid bare the official sources that were published by Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and he read the information directly without medium. It is one of the best book published in this field whether in the Arabic or the English language. 3 Retraction from the alleged retraction – Page 4. 5 Question: What is your opinion regarding the leaks of Wikileaks on the subject of Spy agencies hacking many devices and phones? The answer: I have the conviction that merely using technology in secret work will compromise you, and the more primitive means of communications you use the more you will be far from being spied on or followed! Large countries such as Russia, China and the US spend millions of dollars on espionage systems and protection from infiltration, even then they still infiltrate each other! And they use the newest devices and technologies and they are used by the most notable and skilled technicians in the country! How can a mujahid, maybe he doesn’t know much about technology and maybe doesn’t even use an antivirus, and when he uses it he’ll use the freeware! If you could hack fortified systems then for sure you could hack this person with ease! Shaykh Usamah knew that the west is superior on the field of technology, surveillance and spying, thus he utterly forbade using the internet and even programs specific to send secret messages to use on external operations or big issues. He said: As for anything dangerous, we should never use any modem devices, especially for the external operations. Also, just because something can be encrypted doesn't make it suitable for use. The enemy can easily monitor all incoming letters to areas where there are Mujahidin and can access all their messages. As you know, this science is not ours and is not our invention. That means we do not know much about it. Based on this, I see that sending any dangerous matter via encrypted email is a risky thing. It is expected that whoever made the program can open the encrypted letters no matter how it's encrypted. Encrypting a message is done so that the general public is not able to open the message)4. And he said in another point: (With respect to the communication over the internet,. However, even with what the brothers had mentioned regarding al-Asrar al- Mujahidin program, the secrecy of the external work does not allow its use. I recommend confirming with the interested brothers that the external work would only be through the trusted messengers)5. Even if the Shaykh did not forbid internet or using devices or phones to communicate completely but he did forbid it in highly secret and dangerous issues. 4 Document: 432-10-CR-019-S-4-RJD-Original. 5 Letter to Shaykh Mahmud 26 September 2010. 6 ‘Abdullah Al’Adam, responsible for security in Al-Qaeda, said: (Al-Qaeda has returned to the stone age regarding its communications operations as if we are using homing pigeons, this of course helps misinform the enemy and bar him from reaching the places of the mujahideen, and stops him from locating and identifying their locations. And if there was anything we have our specific ways to give information to each other. As for the communications means, that try to identify us, we are the farthest people from using it)6. 6 Series creating terrorism, lesson:11. 7 Question From Tore Hamming: what do you know about the initial opposition within Al- Qaeda to the 9/11 attacks and to focus on the west instead of local regimes? I know Saif Al’Adl, Abu Al Yazid and Abu Hafs Al Mauritani were against the attack. Do you know if anyone else were? The answer: Yes, like Shaykh Abu al-Walid al-Ansari, I have (an unpublished) letter from him speaking to one of the leaders: (although the attacks of 9/11 was the disobedience, without a doubt if it was without the permission of the imam). As for the attacks of 9/11, it seems there was confusion or lack of clarity from Al-Qaeda to the Taliban. The commander of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, whom is Shaykh Abu Baseer al- Wuhayshi, was a companion to Shaykh Osama bin Laden and he has a memo titled: ( The untold tale of the 9/11 event), in it he said that Shaykh Osama sent pictures of the victims in Palestine to Mullah Umar, when he looked at them he became angered and sad.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Majmooa'al-Fatwa of Sheikh Ibn Bazz(R)
    English Translations of Majmoo’al-Fatawa of late Scholar Ibn Bazz (R) Second Edition By: Sheikh `Abdul `Aziz Bin `Abdullah ibn `AbdulRahman ibn Bazz (May Allah forgive and reward al-Firdouse to him and his parents) He was The Mufti of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Chairman of the Council of Senior Scholars, and Chairman of Department of Scholarly Research and Ifta' This English Translations are collected from http://www.alifta.com Portal of the General Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta' This file is volume No.01 of 30 ( Part No : 1, Page No: 1) ( Part No : 1, Page No: 2) ( Part No : 1, Page No: 3) ( Part No : 1, Page No: 4) ( Part No : 1, Page No: 5) Foreword All praise be to Allah, the Lord of Existence, and peace and blessings be upon our Prophet Muhammad, his family, Companions, and those who follow their way and guidance until the Day of Resurrection! His Eminence Shaykh `Abdul `Aziz ibn `Abdullah ibn Baz gave permission to collect his Fatwas, articles and lectures in one volume divided into different parts. This permission was granted in response to the requests of many people, hoping that Allah (Exalted be He) extends its great academic benefit to all. We implore Allah (Exalted be He) to add it to the record of his good deeds and make it a disperser of doubts. Many Muslims inside and outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia attempted to collect and distribute the works of his Eminence driven by their love and trust in his knowledge. It gives me great pleasure that his Eminence entrusted to me the task of supervising the process of collecting and publishing his abundant works spread everywhere.
    [Show full text]
  • The Al Qaeda Network a New Framework for Defining the Enemy
    THE AL QAEDA NETWORK A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING THE ENEMY KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN SEPTEMBER 2013 THE AL QAEDA NETWORK A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING THE ENEMY KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN SEPTEMBER 2013 A REPORT BY AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT ABOUT US About the Author Katherine Zimmerman is a senior analyst and the al Qaeda and Associated Movements Team Lead for the Ameri- can Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project. Her work has focused on al Qaeda’s affiliates in the Gulf of Aden region and associated movements in western and northern Africa. She specializes in the Yemen-based group, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab. Zimmerman has testified in front of Congress and briefed Members and congressional staff, as well as members of the defense community. She has written analyses of U.S. national security interests related to the threat from the al Qaeda network for the Weekly Standard, National Review Online, and the Huffington Post, among others. Acknowledgments The ideas presented in this paper have been developed and refined over the course of many conversations with the research teams at the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project. The valuable insights and understandings of regional groups provided by these teams directly contributed to the final product, and I am very grateful to them for sharing their expertise with me. I would also like to express my deep gratitude to Dr. Kimberly Kagan and Jessica Lewis for dedicating their time to helping refine my intellectual under- standing of networks and to Danielle Pletka, whose full support and effort helped shape the final product.
    [Show full text]
  • Observations on the Air War in Syria Lt Col S
    Views Observations on the Air War in Syria Lt Col S. Edward Boxx, USAF His face was blackened, his clothes in tatters. He couldn’t talk. He just point- ed to the flames, still about four miles away, then whispered: “Aviones . bombas” (planes . bombs). —Guernica survivor iulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, Billy Mitchell, and Henry “Hap” Arnold were some of the greatest airpower theorists in history. Their thoughts have unequivocally formed the basis of G 1 modern airpower. However, their ideas concerning the most effective use of airpower were by no means uniform and congruent in their de- termination of what constituted a vital center with strategic effects. In fact the debate continues to this day, and one may draw on recent con- flicts in the Middle East to make observations on the topic. Specifi- cally, this article examines the actions of one of the world’s largest air forces in a struggle against its own people—namely, the rebels of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). As of early 2013, the current Syrian civil war has resulted in more than 60,000 deaths, 2.5 million internally displaced persons, and in ex- cess of 600,000 refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon.2 Presi- dent Bashar al-Assad has maintained his position in part because of his ability to control the skies and strike opposition targets—including ci- vilians.3 The tactics of the Al Quwwat al-Jawwiyah al Arabiya as- Souriya (Syrian air force) appear reminiscent of those in the Spanish Civil War, when bombers of the German Condor Legion struck the Basque market town of Guernica, Spain, on 26 April 1937.
    [Show full text]
  • Aqeedah of the Imams of Ahl-Us-Sunnah the Correct and Upright Creed
    Aqeedah of the Imams of Ahl-us-Sunnah The Correct and Upright Creed A Compilation of Books, Treatises and Statements of Great Imams of Ahl-us-Sunnah concerning Aqeedah (creed) Contents Imam Abu Hanifah (d.150H) .................................................................................................................................................. 4 The Creed of Imam Abu Hanifah .............................................................................................................................................. 4 al-Fiqh al-Akbar by Imam Abu Hanifah .............................................................................................................................. 14 Imam Malik Ibn Anas (d.179H) ........................................................................................................................................... 19 Imam ash-Shaafi’i (d.204H) .................................................................................................................................................. 28 The Last Testament of Imam ash-Shaafi’i ............................................................................................................................ 41 Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d.241H) ..................................................................................................................................... 44 The Creed of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal ................................................................................................................................ 44 Usool-us-Sunnah
    [Show full text]
  • The Dhimmis and Their Role in the Administration of the Fatimid State
    International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 6, No. 2; February 2016 The Dhimmis and their Role in the Administration of the Fatimid State Dr. Saleh Kharanbeh Lecturer of Arabic language and Islamic studies Ohalo College of Education Israel Dr. Muhammad Hamad Lecturer of Arabic language and literature Al- Qasemi College of Education Israel Abstract One of the most recurring questions today is the Islamic state's relationship with the dhimmis (Jews and Christians living under early Muslim rule) and their status in the early days of Islam and up to the late days of the Islamic Caliphate. This relationship may have been varying, swinging up and down. Perhaps the more legitimate questions are: What were the factors that affected the nature of the Dhimmis relationship with the ruling power in the Islamic state? What was the status of the Dhimmis and what roles did they play in the early Islamic states, with the Fatimid Caliphate as a model? The Fatimid Caliphate rose up and centered in Egypt, which was then home for Coptic Christians and Jews, living side by side with Muslims. That is why the author has chosen the Fatimid State, in specific. Another driver for this selection is the fact that when the Fatimid Caliphate was ruling in Egypt, the Europeans were launching their Crusades in Jerusalem, which placed such a relationship between Muslims and Christians at stake. Keywords: The Dhimmis, Fatimid State, Islamic history, Islamic civilization. 1. Internal factors in the Dhimmis relationship with the Fatimid Caliphate The caliphs’ young age was one of the factors that contributed to strengthening the relationship between the Dhimmis and the ruling power.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapters on the Prophetic Visitation1 ‘Allamah Zafar Ahmad Al-‘Uthmani Translation by Zameelur Rahman
    Chapters on the Prophetic Visitation1 ‘Allamah Zafar Ahmad al-‘Uthmani Translation by Zameelur Rahman Chapter on Visiting the Grave of the Prophet (Allah bless him and grant him peace) before or after Hajj2 1. Narrated from Musa ibn Hilal al-‘Abdi from ‘Ubayd Allah ibn ‘Umar from Nafi‘ from Ibn ‘Umar (Allah, Exalted is He, be pleased with them), he said: Allah’s Messenger (Allah bless him and grant him peace) said: ِ َم ْن َزاَر قَ ْبِري َوَجبَ ْت لَهُ َشَفا َعتي “Whoever visits my grave, my intercession becomes necessary for him.” Al-Daraqutni transmitted it. His narrations agree in a number of reliable copies of his Sunan and likewise in other than the Sunan from [al-Qadi al- Husayn ibn Isma‘il] al-Mahamili [with his chain] from ‘Ubayd Allah [ibn ‘Umar] in the diminutive (musaghghar) [i.e. ‘Ubayd Allah and not ‘Abd Allah].3 Al-Bayhaqi narrated it from other than al-Mahamili through the route of Muhammad ibn Zanjawayh al-Qushayri: ‘Ubayd ibn Muhammad ibn al- Qasim ibn Abi Maryam al-Warraq narrated to us: Musa ibn Hilal al-‘Abdi narrated to us from ‘Ubayd Allah ibn ‘Umar from Nafi from ‘Ibn ‘Umar (Allah, Exalted is He, be pleased with them) the hadith. Thus, the narration of ‘Ubayd ibn Muhammad, who is trustworthy, is established in the diminutive [i.e. with ‘Ubayd Allah ibn ‘Umar and not ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar]. 1 A note preceding this section says: “From the wondrous fortunes is the drafting of the chapter of visitation [from I‘la’ al-Sunan] and its completion a year and some months before the completion of the chapters of Hajj in the illuminated [city of] Madinah, at the house of my master, our intimate guardian [Mawlana Khalil Ahmad Saharanpuri], facing the fragrant Rawdah and the illuminated prophetic mosque; and the writing of the last pages of it in the presence of the Prophet (Allah bless him and grant him peace) facing him while standing in front him, fearful and apprehensive of his gaze, with trembling hands due to recalling his eminence and loftiness.
    [Show full text]
  • Research Journal of Social Sciences Shiite Al-Hamdan Government
    Copyright © 2015, American-Eurasian Network for Scientific Information publisher Research Journal of Social Sciences ISSN: 1815-9125 EISSN: 2309-9631 JOURNAL home page: http://www.aensiweb.com/RJSS 2015 September; 8(7): pages 62-64. Published Online 30 June 2015. Research Article Shiite Al-Hamdan Government Formation 1Sakineh Ravand and 2Mozhgan Purfard 1Department of History, Darab Branch, Islamic Azad University, Darab, Iran. 2Associate professor, Department of History, Babak City Branch, Islamic Azad University, Babak City, Iran. Received: 23 April 2015; Revised: 28 May 2015; Accepted: 18 June 2015 Copyright © 2015 by authors and American-Eurasian Network for Scientific Information. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ABSTRACT This article examines Shiite Al-Hamdan government formation and its role in the progress of Shiite with focus on methods of historical research. This article examines the role of this government in promoting the objectives of the Shiite. According to historical documents the Shiite rose at time of the Prophet indicating the claim by the Prophet that said: “Shiite are my best people, and they are in heaven”, but the Shiite title was used after the death of the Prophet (PBUH) for those who loved Imam Ali (AS) and followed him until death. Shiites with cultural power and strong intellectual could win fight against the tyranny of the rulers of the time. Meantime, they have migrated across the world due to Abbasid and Umayyad rulers’ oppression leading to Shiite Islam ideas flourishing in the world. They had cultural power and could gradually strengthen its political power and formed governments around the world, one of these states was that Al-Hamdan with a significant role in the development of Shiism.
    [Show full text]
  • The 12Th Annual Report on Human Rights in Syria 2013 (January 2013 – December 2013)
    The 12th annual report On human rights in Syria 2013 (January 2013 – December 2013) January 2014 January 2014 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 3 Genocide: daily massacres amidst international silence 8 Arbitrary detention and Enforced Disappearances 11 Besiegement: slow-motion genocide 14 Violations committed against health and the health sector 17 The conditions of Syrian refugees 23 The use of internationally prohibited weapons 27 Violations committed against freedom of the press 31 Violations committed against houses of worship 39 The targeting of historical and archaeological sites 44 Legal and legislative amendments 46 References 47 About SHRC 48 The 12th annual report on human rights in Syria (January 2013 – December 2013) Introduction The year 2013 witnessed a continuation of grave and unprecedented violations committed against the Syrian people amidst a similarly shocking and unprecedented silence in the international community since the beginning of the revolution in March 2011. Throughout the year, massacres were committed on almost a daily basis killing more than 40.000 people and injuring 100.000 others at least. In its attacks, the regime used heavy weapons, small arms, cold weapons and even internationally prohibited weapons. The chemical attack on eastern Ghouta is considered a landmark in the violations committed by the regime against civilians; it is also considered a milestone in the international community’s response to human rights violations Throughout the year, massacres in Syria, despite it not being the first attack in which were committed on almost a daily internationally prohibited weapons have been used by the basis killing more than 40.000 regime. The international community’s response to the crime people and injuring 100.000 drew the international public’s attention to the atrocities others at least.
    [Show full text]
  • UK Home Office
    Country Policy and Information Note Syria: the Syrian Civil War Version 4.0 August 2020 Preface Purpose This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into two main sections: (1) analysis and assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note – i.e. the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw – by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general, whether one or more of the following applies: x A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm x The general humanitarian situation is so severe as to breach Article 15(b) of European Council Directive 2004/83/EC (the Qualification Directive) / Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights as transposed in paragraph 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules x The security situation presents a real risk to a civilian’s life or person such that it would breach Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive as transposed in paragraph 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules x A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies) x A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory x A claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and x If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
    [Show full text]
  • “Targeting Life in Idlib”
    HUMAN RIGHTS “Targeting Life in Idlib” WATCH Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure “Targeting Life in Idlib” Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure Copyright © 2020 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-62313-8578 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: https://www.hrw.org OCTOBER 2020 ISBN: 978-1-62313-8578 “Targeting Life in Idlib” Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure Map .................................................................................................................................. i Glossary .......................................................................................................................... ii Summary ........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Syria's Military Opposition
    Jeffrey White Andrew J. Tabler Aaron Y. Zelin SYRIA’S MILITARY HOW EFFECTIVE, OPPOSITION UNITED, OR EXTREMIST? SYRIA’S MILITARY HOW EFFECTIVE, OPPOSITION UNITED, OR EXTREMIST? Jeffrey White Andrew J. Tabler Aaron Y. Zelin POLICY FOCUS 128 | SEPTEMBER 2013 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2013 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Published in 2013 in the United States of America by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036. Cover photo: A member of the Free Syrian Army stands guard at a checkpoint after clashes with pro-government forces in Salqin city in Idlib, October 2012. REUTERS/Asmaa Waguih Contents Update U.S. Military Action in Response to the August 21 Chemical Weapons Attack ■ v Introduction Posing the Question, Patrick Clawson ■ 1 1. The Military Opposition on the Ground, Jeffrey White ■ 3 2. Opposition Unity and Western Supply, Andrew J. Tabler ■ 20 3. Causes for Pause: Spoilers and Risk, Aaron Y. Zelin ■ 25 Conclusion Implications: Realistic Appraisal, Targeted Assistance, Patrick Clawson ■ 35 The Authors ■ 37 ■ Map 1. Areas of Control ■ 2 Tables 1. Areas of Control and in Dispute, July 2013 ■ 4 2. Rebel Combat Effectiveness in Syria ■ 11 3. Examples of Rebel “Operations” ■ 11 4. Claimed Regime Armor Losses, March—May 2013 ■ 14 Figures 1.
    [Show full text]
  • A Turkish Perspective on Syria
    A Turkish Perspective on Syria Ercan Çitlioğlu Introduction The war is not over, but the overall military victory of the Assad forces in the Syrian conflict — securing the control of the two-thirds of the country by the Summer of 2020 — has meant a shift of attention on part of the regime onto areas controlled by the SDF/PYD and the resurfacing of a number of issues that had been temporarily taken off the agenda for various reasons. Diverging aims, visions and priorities of the key actors to the Syrian conflict (Russia, Turkey, Iran and the US) is making it increasingly difficult to find a common ground and the ongoing disagreements and rivalries over the post-conflict reconstruction of the country is indicative of new difficulties and disagreements. The Syrian regime’s priority seems to be a quick military resolution to Idlib which has emerged as the final stronghold of the armed opposition and jihadist groups and to then use that victory and boosted morale to move into areas controlled by the SDF/PYD with backing from Iran and Russia. While the east of the Euphrates controlled by the SDF/PYD has political significance with relation to the territorial integrity of the country, it also carries significant economic potential for the future viability of Syria in holding arable land, water and oil reserves. Seen in this context, the deal between the Delta Crescent Energy and the PYD which has extended the US-PYD relations from military collaboration onto oil exploitation can be regarded both as a pre-emptive move against a potential military operation by the Syrian regime in the region and a strategic shift toward reaching a political settlement with the SDF.
    [Show full text]