An Overview of the Capital Jury Project for Military Practitioners: Jury Dynamics, Juror Confusion, and Juror Responsibility
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Episode Fourteen: Legal Process Hello, and Welcome to the Death
Episode Fourteen: Legal Process Hello, and welcome to the Death Penalty Information Center’s podcast exploring issues related to capital punishment. In this edition, we will discuss the legal process in death penalty trials and appeals. How is a death penalty trial different from other trials? There are several differences between death penalty trials and traditional criminal proceedings. In most criminal cases, there is a single trial in which the jury determines whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. If the jury returns a verdict of guilty, the judge then determines the sentence. However, death penalty cases are divided into two separate trials. In the first trial, juries weigh the evidence of the crime to determine guilt or innocence. If the jury decides that the defendant is guilty, there is a second trial to determine the sentence. At the sentencing phase of the trial, jurors usually have only two options: life in prison without the possibility of parole, or a death sentence. During this sentencing trial, juries are asked to weigh aggravating factors presented by the prosecution against mitigating factors presented by the defense. How is a jury chosen for a death penalty trial? Like all criminal cases, the jury in a death penalty trial is chosen from a pool of potential jurors through a process called voir dire. The legal counsel for both the prosecution and defense have an opportunity to submit questions to determine any possible bias in the case. However, because the jury determines the sentence in capital trials, those juries must also be “death qualified,” that is, able to impose the death penalty in at least some cases. -
A View from the Other Side of the Bench Shirley S
Marquette Law Review Volume 69 Article 2 Issue 4 Summer 1986 A View From the Other Side of the Bench Shirley S. Abrahamson Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr Part of the Law Commons Repository Citation Shirley S. Abrahamson, A View From the Other Side of the Bench, 69 Marq. L. Rev. 463 (1986). Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol69/iss4/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW Volume 69 Summer 1986 No. 4 A VIEW FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BENCH* SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON** After serving on a jury, G.K. Chesterton wrote: Many legalists have declared that the untrained jury should be altogether supplanted by the trained judge .... The Fabian argument of the expert, that the man who is trained should be the man who is trusted would be absolutely unan- swerable if it were really true that a man who studied a thing and practised it every day went on seeing more and more of its significance. But he does not. He goes on seeing less and less of its significance .... .... [T]he horrible thing about all legal officials, even the best, about all judges, magistrates, barristers, detectives, and policemen, is not that they are wicked (some of them are good), not that they are stupid (several of them are quite intelligent), it is simply that they have got used to it ... -
MEMORANDUM ORDER ) Case No
Case 2:07-cr-00023-EJL Document 284 Filed 02/26/08 Page 1 of 4 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff, ) MEMORANDUM ORDER ) Case No. CR07-23-N-EJL vs. ) ) JOSEPH EDWARD DUNCAN, III, ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________) Pending before the Court are the Defendant’s Motions to Declare the Federal Death Penalty Act Unconstitutional. The Government has filed a single response to the motions and the time for filing any reply has expired. The matter is ripe for the Court’s consideration. Having fully reviewed the record herein, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court conclusively finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, this motion shall be decided on the record before this Court without oral argument. Local Rule 7.1(d)(2)(ii). Factual and Procedural Background The Defendant, Joseph Edward Duncan, III, was charged with multiple crimes relating to events occurring in northern Idaho between May of 2005 and July of 2005. Three of the counts carry the potential for a sentence of death: Kidnapping Resulting in Death, Sexual Exploitation of a Child Resulting in Death, and Using a Firearm During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence MEMORANDUM ORDER - 1 Case 2:07-cr-00023-EJL Document 284 Filed 02/26/08 Page 2 of 4 Resulting in Death. The Government filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. -
Judicial Nullification? Judicial Compliance and Non-Compliance with Jury Improvement Efforts
File: Hannaford-Agor Final.doc Created on: 9/4/2008 11:27:00 AM Last Printed: 10/15/2009 1:31:00 PM Judicial Nullification? Judicial Compliance and Non-Compliance with Jury Improvement Efforts PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR* I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 407 II. THE NCSC STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS............................................................................................ 410 III. WHAT CAUSES VARIATION IN TRIAL COURT PRACTICES? .............. 413 IV. JUDICIAL NULLIFICATION? ............................................................... 420 V. CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................. 423 I. INTRODUCTION Over the past two decades, the American jury system has received a significant resurgence in attention from judicial and legal policymakers, academicians, and the general public. The reason for the renewed attention may be attributed to several factors. Some concerns have been raised about juries’ ability to understand trial evidence and to render informed and un- biased verdicts.1 More recently, judicial and bar organizations have noted the precipitous decline in the number and rate of jury trials in state and fed- eral courts and have raised concerns about its implication for the continued viability of the rule of law in the American justice system.2 To address these concerns, many states and federal court districts es- tablished bench or bar commissions to examine the health and -
The Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and Venue Transfers Darryl K
Maryland Law Review Volume 53 | Issue 1 Article 5 The Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and Venue Transfers Darryl K. Brown Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons Recommended Citation Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and Venue Transfers, 53 Md. L. Rev. 107 (1994) Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol53/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE ROLE OF RACE IN JURY IMPARTIALITY AND VENUE TRANSFERS DARRYL IL BROWN* I. INTRODUCrION A. Two Cases in Point In 1990, Washington, D.C., Mayor Marion Barry was indicted on fourteen charges of drug possession and perjury arising from a federal investigation that yielded a videotape of Barry smoking crack cocaine in Washington's Vista Hotel.1 Barry and his attorney chose not to seek a change of venue for the trial, despite overwhelming pretrial public- ity about the case that included constant replays of the incriminating videotape on local television stations.2 The jury, drawn from the Dis- trict and comprised mostly of African Americans,3 convicted Barry, an African American, of only one misdemeanor possession charge-not the one arising from the videotape.4 The verdict was generally viewed as a victory for the defendant.' * Staff Attorney, University of Georgia School of Law Legal Aid Clinic. -
Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation Jeffrey Abramson [email protected]
University of Chicago Legal Forum Volume 1998 | Issue 1 Article 6 Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation Jeffrey Abramson [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf Recommended Citation Abramson, Jeffrey () "Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation," University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 1998: Iss. 1, Article 6. Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1998/iss1/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Chicago Legal Forum by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation Jeffrey Abramsont Several recent works of political theory have put forward a model of democracy that gives deliberation, and popular participation in deliberation, a central place in resolving moral disagreements among citizens.' Rather than shunting moral disputes as irresolvable or leaving their solution to the courts, theorists of democratic deliberation have argued that disputes over fundamental moral values have a place in politics and that citizens motivated by mutual respect toward their opponents or similar constraints can reason publicly to attain justifiable conclusions. As philosophers Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson put it, the "core idea" behind deliberative democracy is simple: even "when citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions." 2 When asked to give a practical example of such deliberation, deliberative democracy theorists often cite the jury as an institution that embodies the ideal of using collective reasoned discussion to attain a common verdict. -
Juries: Nullification
3.3 Juries: Nullification SHOULD JURORS BE INFORMED OF THE RIGHT OF JURY NULLIFICATION? distribute or Learning Objectives 1. Know the definition of jury nullification. 2. Understand the historical background of jury nullification.post, 3. Know the law of jury nullification. 4. Comprehend the arguments for and against jury nullification. copy, OPPOSE INFORMING JURORS OF THE RIGHT OF JURY NULLIFICATION Judge Harold Leventhal, majority opinion,not United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. App. 1972) SUPPORT INFORMING JURORS OF THE RIGHT OF JURY NULLIFICATION Judge David Bazelon, dissenting,Do United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. App. 1972) - Introduction Jury nullification is the conscious and deliberate decision of a jury to acquit a defendant despite the jury’s awareness that the defendant is guilty based on the facts and on the law. The EnglishProof jury was transported to the American colonies. In perhaps the most famous and important jury trial in American history, John Peter Zenger, a German-born publisher and editor of the New York Weekly Journal, was prosecuted for seditious libel based on his articles critical of the English governor, William Cosby. A jury acquitted Zenger despite the judge’s instructions that truth was not a defense. Zenger’s lawyer, Alexander Hamilton, persuaded the jury that they were the “judges of the law” and pos- Draftsessed the authority to disregard a law that was contrary to their own sense of right and wrong. The Zenger case established the jury as a bulwark of liberty against overly zealous prosecutors and affirmed that jurors possessed the authority to be guided by their own conscience in reaching a ver- dict. -
State of Maryland V. Karon Sayles, No. 15, September Term, 2020; State of Maryland V
State of Maryland v. Karon Sayles, No. 15, September Term, 2020; State of Maryland v. Bobby Jamar Johnson, No. 16, September Term, 2020; State of Maryland v. Dalik Daniel Oxely, No. 17, September Term, 2020 JURY NULLIFICATION – JURY QUESTIONS – SUPPLEMENTAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS – PREJUDICE – Court of Appeals held that, despite circumstance that jury nullification sometimes occurs, jury nullification is not authorized in Maryland and jury does not have right to engage in nullification. No case, statute, or rule in Maryland authorizes or gives juries right to engage in jury nullification, i.e., there is no grant of authority permitting jury to utilize nullification. Court of Appeals reiterated that Maryland case law makes clear that it is improper for attorney to argue jury nullification to jury, and that jury instructions on law are binding and trial courts must advise juries as much. On request, during voir dire, trial court must ask whether any prospective jurors are unwilling or unable to comply with jury instructions concerning certain fundamental principles. In addition, legally inconsistent verdicts and verdict resulting from jury nullification are comparable because both involve circumstances in which jury acts contrary to trial court’s instructions as to proper application of law and both are impermissible. Court of Appeals held that, taken together, these principles of law lead to conclusion that jury nullification is not authorized in Maryland and jury may be so advised. Although jury may have inherent ability to nullify and Court recognized that jury nullification occurs, jury does not have right to engage in jury nullification. Rather, in Maryland, jury is required to determine facts and render verdict based on instructions provided to it by trial court. -
An Overview of Significant Findings from The
AN OVERVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS FROM THE CAPITAL JURY PROJECT AND OTHER EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE DEATH PENALTY RELEVANT TO JURY SELECTION, PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE AND JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES JOHN H. BLUME CORNELL LAW SCHOOL 110 MYRON TAYLOR HALL ITHACA, NY 14853-4901 (607) 255-1030 [email protected] FALL 2008 Introduction The Capital Jury Project Studies--and other less comprehensive empirical and mock juror studies--provide extraordinarily useful information for lawyers involved in capital litigation. In this memorandum, I will provide an overview of selected, significant empirical findings, and, in some instances, offer suggestions as to how these findings may be used by capital defense lawyers. There is a temptation to ignore these studies, in part because some of the information contained in them is not encouraging or goes against the “conventional wisdom.” I am convinced, however, that we are better off confronting the information, and making fresh assessments about appropriate responses. This is not to say that there aren’t methodological problems with some of these studies, nor is it to deny that any individual study fail to capture the complexity of capital litigation. But there is valuable information here, particularly about what can go wrong, and what can be done to avoid some well-established pitfalls. I hope that this memorandum will facilitate the discussion and implementation of creative strategies leading to more effective representation of both clients facing the death penalty and those who have been sentenced to death. Additionally, if you have ideas for empirical research projects in your state that may be of interest to the Cornell Death Penalty Project, please do not hesitate to contact me. -
Jury Bias: Myth and Reality Callie K
Ursinus College Digital Commons @ Ursinus College Politics Summer Fellows Student Research 7-22-2016 Jury Bias: Myth and Reality Callie K. Terris Ursinus College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ursinus.edu/pol_sum Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Political Science Commons Click here to let us know how access to this document benefits oy u. Recommended Citation Terris, Callie K., "Jury Bias: Myth and Reality" (2016). Politics Summer Fellows. 3. https://digitalcommons.ursinus.edu/pol_sum/3 This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at Digital Commons @ Ursinus College. It has been accepted for inclusion in Politics Summer Fellows by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Ursinus College. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Jury Bias: Myth and Reality by Callie Terris Mentor: Gerard J. Fitzpatrick Department of Politics Ursinus College Collegeville, PA Submitted on July 22, 2016 as a part of the 2016 Summer Fellows Program 1 I. Introduction At the heart of our justice system is the myth that all people receive an unbiased trial based on the principles of fairness and equality. The symbol of Lady Justice portrays justice as blind and objective, free of any favoritism or bias due to race, gender, or social standing. Bias is defined as a prejudice in favor of or against one thing, person, or group compared with another, usually in a way considered to be unfair. This definition gives the term a stereotypically negative connotation. One rarely thinks of bias as something positive, but the reality is that it can be. -
Are Hung Juries a Problem? Executive Summary
The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: Document Title: Are Hung Juries a Problem? Executive Summary Author(s): Paula L. Hannaford-Agor J.D. ; Valerie P. Hans Ph.D. ; Nicole L. Mott Ph.D. ; G. Thomas Munsterman M.S.E Document No.: 199372 Date Received: 04/03/2003 Award Number: 98-IJ-CX-0048 This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally- funded grant final report available electronically in addition to traditional paper copies. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. NATlONAL 1 INSTITUTE OF JUSllCE Are Hung Juries A Problem? Executive Summary The National Center for State Courts Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, J.D. Valerie P. Hans, Ph.D. Nicole L. Mott, Ph.D. G. Thomas Munsterman, M.S.E. September 30,2002 F This project was supported by Grant No. 98-U-CX-0048awarded by the National 5 of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in :ument are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or 1 of the U.S. Department of Justice or the National Center for State Courts. This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. -
Selecting a Jury in Political Trials
Case Western Reserve Law Review Volume 27 Issue 3 Article 3 1977 Selecting a Jury in Political Trials Jon Van Dyke Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Jon Van Dyke, Selecting a Jury in Political Trials, 27 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 609 (1977) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol27/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. Selecting a Jury in Political Trials* Jon Van Dyke** Because juries exercise the controversial power of tailoring static law to the exigencies of a particular case, it is imperative that the jury constitute a cross- section of the community. Impaneling a representativejury is even more difficult, and more critical, in a highly publicized politicul trial. Professor Van Dyke examines the justifications for the defendant's ue of social science techniques to scrutinize prospectivejurors, andfinds that such practices sometimes lead to public doubt about the impartialityof the jury's verdict. He concludes that although some defense attorneys may be obliged to survey the attitudes of potentialjurors to over- come biases in the jury selection process, the interests of justice would be better served ifthe lists used to impanel jurors were more complete, iffewer excuses and challenges were allowed, and if (as a result) the resulting jury more accurately reflected the diversity of the community.