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The European Security and Defence Architecture

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The European Security and Defence Architecture Band 12 / 2019 Band 12 / 2019 The security architecture in Europe has rapidly changed since the end of the Cold War. Since 2015, the fear of immigration is poisoning Western politics. Thus, in the second half of 2018, the third Austrian EU Presidency of the Council took place dur- The European Security ing a rather challenging period – Brexit, immigration, and the debate about the future of the EU in general. This book aims and Defence Architecture – at analysing the state of the EU and particularly those interna- tional organisations which are formative for (Western and Cen- tral) European security. Moreover, Austria’s role within the Eu- Challenges and Austrian ropean security architecture is comprehensively analysed. The status of EU neutral and non-aligned member states is also Security Policy Priorities debated. The book is based on official documents as well as on academic studies and public debates and shall contribute to a better understanding of inter(b)locking processes within the institution-building of European security. The European Security and Defence Architecture - Challenges and Austrian Security Policy Priorities Policy Security - Challenges and Austrian Architecture and Defence Security European The ISBN: 978-3-903121-54-6 Gunther Hauser 12/19 Schriftenreihe der Gunther Hauser Landesverteidigungsakademie Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie Gunther Hauser The European Security and Defence Architecture - Challenges and Austrian Security Policy Priorities 12/2019 Vienna, September 2019 Imprint: Copyright, Production, Publisher: Republic of Austria / Federal Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna, Austria Edited by: National Defence Academy Institute for Strategy and Security Policy Stiftgasse 2a 1070 Vienna, Austria Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie Copyright: © Republic of Austria / Federal Ministry of Defence All rights reserved September 2019 ISBN 978-3-903121-54-6 Printing: ReproZ W 19-3428 Stiftgasse 2a 1070 Vienna Content List of Abbreviations ................................................................................ 7 Foreword ................................................................................................ 13 Introduction ............................................................................................ 15 The EU Global Strategy ......................................................................... 26 EU relations to the Western Balkans ..................................................... 39 On the way toward a Common Security and Defence Policy ................ 42 The European Defence Agency ............................................................. 52 ‘Solidarity Clause’ and ‘Mutual Assistance Clause’ ............................. 55 The institutions coordinating CSDP ....................................................... 57 The High Representative and the European External Action Service (EEAS) ............................................................................................... 60 Council role in CSDP ......................................................................... 64 European Commission coordinated external activities ...................... 67 The European Parliament´s role in CFSP/CSDP ............................... 69 Financing CSDP ..................................................................................... 72 EU crisis management ............................................................................ 75 Military training in the EU ..................................................................... 83 ‘Defence matters’ ................................................................................... 86 The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) ................................. 89 EU relations to the United Nations ...................................................... 101 EU relations to the OSCE .................................................................... 120 Ukraine – an inter-institutional challenge ............................................ 131 NATO ................................................................................................... 137 NATO´s goals and the command structure ...................................... 137 NATO ties with partner nations ....................................................... 143 NATO operations ............................................................................. 147 3 NATO´s force packages and initiatives ........................................... 153 European defence spending – a challenge for transatlantic ties ....... 157 EU-NATO military cooperation ...................................................... 160 NATO relations with Russia ............................................................ 165 Migration policy – political aspects ..................................................... 171 Legal aspects of migration and asylum policy ................................. 179 Frontex – the European Border and Coast Guard Agency ................... 186 Conclusions .......................................................................................... 190 Austrian Security Policy ...................................................................... 199 Introduction ...................................................................................... 199 Austrian approach to neutrality – ‘I do it my way’ .......................... 201 Austrian security policy in transition ............................................... 204 The 2013 Austrian Security Strategy ............................................... 210 Austrian participation in international missions and operations ...... 213 Neutrals and non-aligned states in Europe ........................................... 221 Historical and legal aspects of neutrality ......................................... 221 Switzerland ....................................................................................... 224 Ireland .............................................................................................. 225 Finland .............................................................................................. 228 Sweden ............................................................................................. 231 Malta ................................................................................................ 233 Cyprus .............................................................................................. 235 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 236 ESDP / CSDP missions and operations ............................................... 236 References ............................................................................................ 263 4 5 List of Abbreviations ACO Allied Command Operations ACT Allied Command Transformation AFDRU Austrian [Armed] Forces Disaster Relief Unit APSA African Union (AU) Peace and Security Architecture ARRC Allied Rapid Reaction Corps AU African Union BMD Ballistic Missile Defence CARD Coordinated Annual Review on Defence CDP Capability Development Plan CEDC Central European Defence Cooperation CFE Conventional Armed Forces in Europe CFI Connected Forces Initiative CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU) CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (EU) CMC Crisis Management Concept CMPD Crisis Management and Planning Directorate COE Centre of Excellence CONOPS Concept of [Military] Operations CPCC Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability CRRT Cyber Rapid Response Team CSBM Confidence-and-Security-Building Measures CSCE Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe CSDP Common Foreign and Defence Policy (EU) CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area DPKO Department for Peacekeeping Operations DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo EEAS European External Action Service EAPC Euro-Atlantic-Partnership Council 7 EASO European Asylum Support Office EADRCC Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre ECAP European Capabilities Action Plan ECOSOC Economic and Social Council EDA European Defence Agency EDF European Defence Funds EDIDP European Defence Industrial Development Programme EFTA European Free Trade Association EPAA European Phased Adaptive Approach ERCC Emergency Response Coordination Centre (European Commission) ESDC European Security and Defence College EU European Union EUMC European Union Military Committee EUMS European Union Military Staff EUROSUR European Border Surveillance System EU RRF European Rapid Reaction Forces EU TMCC European Union Training Mission Competence Centre FAC Foreign Affairs Council (EU) Frontex Frontières exterieures, European Border and Coast Guard Agency FSC Forum on Security Cooperation (OSCE) FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia HCNM High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE) HoM Head of Mission HQ Headquarters IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IFOR Implementation Force INTCEN EU Intelligence and Situation Centre IOC Initial Operational Capability IOM International Organization for Migration IPAP Individual Partnership Action Plan 8 IPCP Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme IPP Individual Partnership Program JCC Joint Force Commands JSEC Joint Support and Enabling Command KFOR Kosovo Force LCC Lisbon Capabilities Commitment (NATO) MAP Membership Action Plan (NATO) MENA Middle East and North Africa MND Multinational Division MPCC Military Planning and Conduct Capability (EU) NAC North Atlantic Council NATO
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