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Prof. H. WILDON CARR 98 NATURE (JULY 18, 1931 value to the College. Pressure of work caused was appointed in the following year, of which Sir him, however, to relinquish the chair in 1923, and Hugh Bell was the chairman, its terms of reference it is significant of the aims of Armstrong College being to consider and report upon the condition that he was succeeded by Dr. Cecil Cochrane, whose and the future development of the Science Museum connexion with iron manufacture is too well known and the Geological Museum. to need emphasising here. Sir Hugh Bell took the keenest interest in Sir Hugh Bell was a notable exception to the this task, and under his guidance the Committee widely held view that an able father does not pro­ prepared a detailed report, which was adopted duce an able son. Although in this case both father by the Board, laying down the lines which the and son were distinguished ironmasters, it must, development of the Museum has since followed. however, be admitted that their mentalities were The report proposed the replacement of the old of an entirely different order. Sir Lowthian Bell buildings by others of modern type, of which the will be remembered best for his scientific acquire­ eastern and centre blocks were to be completed as ments and their application to technology, whilst soon as practicable, but the outbreak of war de­ Sir Hugh Bell's fame is not that of a man of science, layed the execution of this plan and only the former but of a man who devoted his brilliant abilities of these has as yet been constructed. and keen insight to the service of the community. In 1913 Sir Hugh Bell was appointed chairman It is not too much to say that he would have been of the Advisory Council of the Science Museum, and eminent in any profession or career that he had in this capacity for eighteen years he watched over cared to take up. It is a curious comment on the the development of the collections and their ex­ lives of these two great men that Sir Lowthian hibition in the galleries of the new building in Bell, eminent as his scientific acquirements were, accordance with the plan devised by his Com­ is now seen to have thrown back the industries of mittee. Difficulties and delays occurred from coke-making and of pig-iron production, to which time to time, and on all such occasions his tact, he devoted his life, many yea.rs by his obstinate influence, and ready help were of the greatest value preference for the old-fashioned beehive to the in overcoming them. He took a wide view of the more modern retort-oven coke. The future may influence which the museums at South Kensington possibly show that his brilliant son may have re­ might, he thought, exert, and he strongly advocated tarded the progress of the nation to a similar extent a general policy of co-operation in which each by his obstinate adherence to old-fashioned free museum would not only work out its own line of trade principles. He appeared to disregard entirely policy but should also look out for and develop the wise saying, Temporibus mores sapiens sine contact with the others in order that the various crimine mutal, and did not seem to realise that a aspects of human endeavour might be more fully policy which might have been entirely right and represented. sound at one period of the world's history, might The Science Museum owes more to Sir Hugh Bell be disastrous under different conditions. than to anyone, and by his death it has lost a wise As is perhaps only natural in the case of a man counsellor, a ready helper, and a valued friend. who has succeeded in living to an age beyond that of most others, the closing years of Sir Hugh's life were saddened by the loss of many dear to him ; PRoF. H. WILDON CARR. here it is only necessary to mention the death of his gifted daughter, Gertrude Bell, who died in BY the death of Prof. Herbert Wildon Carr, July 1926, and that of Lady Bell, who died a which took place on July 8 at Los Angeles, little more than a year ago. at the age of seventy-four years, philosophy has The whole record of the life and activities of the lost an enthusiastic student and exponent, and man whose loss we mourn is that of a man of keen philosophers in many countries a friend greatly and penetrating intellect, a brilliant speaker, an respected for his single-minded devotion to learning advanced thinker, and a shrewd observer, whose and beloved for his generosity and kindness of keenness was, however, tempered by the geniality heart. of his character, a man who devoted his great gifts Wildon Carr's life had some of the features of unselfishly and unsparingly to the service of his a romance, including (one may be permitted to fellow-men. HENRY Lours. say) a singularly fortunate and happy marriage. Born in circumstances which precluded a pro­ longed education, he had to go out into the world THOUGH the Science Museum at South Kensing­ at the age of fourteen. But even at that tender age ton was established in 1857, the development of he had already marked out for himself what was its collections had lagged far behind those repre­ to be the real business of his life, and addressed senting art ; but in 1909 a number of people dis­ himself deliberately to the task of winning as soon tinguished in science and representing technical as possible a financial competence in order that institutions sought an interview with the President he might thereafter devote himself to philosophy. of the Board of Education in order to represent the Not often have the dreams of boyhood worked out urgent importance of developing its collections and more completely' according to plan'. For in due of providing more suitable buildings for their course Wildon Carr enjoyed in succession the status accommodation. The result of the representation of a member of committee of the London Stock thus made was that a Departmental Committee Exchange and of a president of the Aristotelian No. 3220, VoL. 128) © 1931 Nature Publishing Group JULY 18, 1931] NATURE 99 Society and honorary professor of philosophy in brought together; he also brought science and the University of London. philosophy into their wholesome and natural Nevertheless, all did not go smoothly ; for the contact. He believed that philosophy and science youth who set out on the philosophical quest in belonged together, and that philosophy could not be high hopes found himself as a man brought up indifferent to changes in scientific ideas such as his against the blank wall of Humean scepticism. At time had witnessed. In this he was surely right. a memorable dinner which Carr gave in 1911 in The work of the Aristotelian Society in the last honour of Henri Bergson, he pictured in moving twenty years is a standing witness to his success terms the sadness of his intellectual plight and in this effort and to its fruitfulness. hailed the French philosopher with gratitude as Carr owed both his strength and his weakness to his rescuer. Students who have followed Wildon his open-mindedness; and the personal hold he Carr's work during the last twenty years will, had over philosophers of such differing views indeed, recognise how powerful an impulse he re­ was only the other side of his candour and his ceived from Bergson-an impulse which, reinforced intense effort to understand and assimilate. His by the later influences of Croce and Gentile, carried own originality and independence showed itself him forward to his own monadistic idealism. in the tenacity with which he worked out a doc­ Wildon Carr's development as a philosopher is trine for himself, while making use of what he was dealt with below by •mother hand. It is, however, continually learning from them. You would call fitting to emphasise here what he did for philosophy him markedly suggestible, and impulsive as well, and philosophers, apart from his output as a so that, as each successive thinker like Bergson writer. For many years he was the honorary or Croce or Einstein or Gentile fascinated him, he secretary of the Aristotelian Society, and from the devoted himself to expounding them with enthusi­ death of Shadworth Hodgson onwards to the time asm. When I knew him first, he was still a disciple when the state of his own health compelled him to of Hodgson. Afterwards he leaned towards a seek sunnier skies, he might almost be said to have Humean idealism, and the idealism which began been himself the Society. This does not mean thus early he never ceased to entertain under some that he ruled it as an autocrat, seeking to make its form or other. In the end he worked his way to voice his own. On the contrary, there was never a kind of Leibnizianism which was very much a more generous appraiser of an opponent's merits, his own. But, as anyone may see from his latest nor a scholar who sought more earnestly to let all constructive pronouncement, " Cogitans Cogitata ", sides of a question have the best exposition and it retained plain traces of the doctrines that had the fairest hearing. Nor did an older philosopher influenced his mind, and it would be an interesting ever keep a more watchful eye upon promising and profitable task to follow him from his phase of beginners or give them more encouragement.
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