DOCSLIB.ORG

9780521663267 Index.Pdf

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
9780521663267 Index.Pdf Cambridge University Press 0521663261 - German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism Terry Pinkard Index More information Index absolute, the in H¨olderlin, reality as Spinozistic, in Fries (as inner necessity), in Fries, in Hegel, ; as historical achievement, in Fichte: as intuition, ;asI, , in Schelling: I, , ; reality, –; in Kant: and art, ; and dignity, ; and indifference point, , ; productivity political order, –; and reciprocity, ; of nature, ; will, , identity, and religion, –; and virtue, ;as in Hegel, , : freedom, ; idea, , self-determination, ; Kantian legacy, –; knowing, , –; spirit, ; of reason, ; – in Kierkegaard, , in later Schelling, in Schelling, , ; as developmental, ; in Schopenhauer, and art, ; later works, in Kierkegaard, despair, space, , Barrow, J. N., Aenesidemus, , , , , , , , Barzun, Jacques, alienation, , , , , , , , beauty Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung, , , beautiful soul: in Kant, , , ; in Fries, Allison, Henry E., , , , , , , , ; Hegel s critique, , , –, Ameriks, Karl, , in Fries, – apperception in Hegel, – analytic unity of apperception, in H¨olderlin, – as the “I think that must accompany all one’s in Kant: and morality, ; as harmony of representations,” , , , , intellect and imagination, –;as in Hegel, , reflective judgment, –; as universally in Kant , , , , communicable, ; of fine art, ;of synthetic unity of apperception, , , , nature, , in Novalis, art in Schelling, in Kant, , –, ; and nature, , , in Schiller, in Schiller, in Schopenhauer, – Romantic sense of disclosing being, Beethoven, Ludwig van , , – in Novalis, Beiser, Frederick C., , , , , , , in Friedrich Schlegel, – , in Schelling, – Berlin, Isaiah, in Fries as beautiful soul, Bildung, –, , in Hegel, , –, , , Blackbourn, David, in Schopenhauer, – Bonsiepen, Wolfgang, , , , , atheismcontroversy (Fichte), – Bowie, Andrew, , autonomy Brandom, Robert, , , in F. Schlegel, Breazeale, Daniel, , , , , , , in Fichte, , , © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 0521663261 - German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism Terry Pinkard Index More information Index Breckman, Warren, evil Bungay, Stephen, discussed by Hegel, Burnham, Scott, , discussed by Kant, –, , , Butler, Judith, , , discussed by Schelling, – Cartesian skepticism, , – fact of consciousness categorical imperative, see morality in Reinhold –, Christianity in Schopenhauer, and Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, fact of reason, , , , , , , , Catholic Christianity, as appropriated by , philosophers, , , , , , , Falke, Gustav-H.H., , , , , , , Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, , , , , , , in the conservative reaction, – –, , , , , , , , in Fichte, , , , , , , , , , in Hegel: and art, –; as Christian , , , , , , , , , culture, –, ; as religion , , , , , , , , , , – , , , , , , , , , in Kant, as moral religion, , , , , , , , , , in Kierkegaard, – Forster, Michael, , in left-Hegelians, – Frank, Manfred, , , , , , , in Novalis, as Christendom or Europe?, – , , , , , in Schelling’s later work, –, , freedom – as legacy of idealism, – in Schleiermacher as the religion of religion, in Fichte, –; and recognition, ; – political, Protestant Christianity, as appropriated by in Fries, , , , –, philosophers, , , , , , , in Hegel, –; actualization of freedom, , , , –; aesthetic presentation of concepts and intuitions freedom, , –; and French as relation of representations to the object Revolution, –; and nature, ; they represent, – Greek freedom, ; in Christianity, , in Kant: as representations –; and –; in history, –; in the state, infinity, , –; pure intuition, –; theory of freedom, – –, , , , , ; combination in H¨olderlin, of intuitions and concepts –, , in Kant: and Kantian paradox, –; and , supersensible substrate, , , , , , in Reinhold, , , , , , ; as autonomy, in Hegel, –, , ; unity of –; as free choice (Willk¨ur), , –; concept and intuition, –, –, civic freedom, , –; nature and , –; as subject-object, freedom, , , , , , –;of in Schelling (later works), reason, –; of will, ; practical Constantine, David, freedom, –; third antinomy, , , Copernicus, , , ; transcendental freedom, , , , , , , , , , ; Darnton, Robert, see also autonomy dignity in Kierkegaard, , , in Fries, – in Schelling, , , –, , , , in Kant, , , –, , –, – in Schopenhauer, in Schlegel, , dogmatism, , , , , , , in Schleiermacher, Dworkin, Ronald, in Schopenhauer, see also Kantian paradox early Romanticism, , , –, , French Revolution, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Eldridge, Richard, , Fried, Charles, © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 0521663261 - German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism Terry Pinkard Index More information Index Friedman, Michael, , , in H¨olderlin: of the self, ; as grasp of Fries, Jacob Friedrich, –, , , being, Fulbrook, Mary, in Schelling, , , , ;ofthe Furet, Fran¸cois, absolute, –, , ;of pre-reflective unity, ; community’s Gay, Peter, , , grasp of itself, ; of the absolute in Gerhardt, Volker, nature, Giovanni, George di, , in Hegel, criticismof Schelling’s conception, Goethe, Johann Wolfgang, , , , , ; critique of, , , , , , , , , intuition (as way of seeing) , in Schleiermacher, –, Guyer, Paul, , , in Schelling, –; as aesthetic intuition, in Fries, – Hamann, Johann Georg, , intuition, pure, –, , , , , Harris, H. S., , , , irony, , –, , Hartmann, Klaus, Hazlitt, William, Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich , –, , , Hegel, Georg WilhelmFriedrich , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , Jacobin, , , , , , , , , , , , Jews in Germany, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Fries on Jewishness, , , , , , , , , , Judaism, , , , , judgment, – Heine, Heinrich, , , , aesthetic, –, , , , Heinrichs, Johannes, analytic and synthetic, – Henrich, Dieter, , , , , as related to object represented, – Herder, Johann Gottfried, , , , categories and, H¨olderlin, Friedrich, , , , –, , determinative, , , , , , , , , , Hegel: judgment and objectivity, ; and , truth, ; and unity of concepts and Holy Roman Empire, , , , , , intuitions, ; and universal Horstmann, Rolf-Peter, self-consciousness, ; of finite and Houlgate, Stephen, infinite, –; of consciousness, Hume, David, , , , , , , , , , –; of reflection, –;in , , , , mastery and servitude, –; of logic of essence, Iber, Christian, H¨olderlin on, –, Idea infinity and, in Kant: regulative Idea, –, , ; reflective judgment, , , , , , , practical Idea, , , ; aesthetic Idea, , schematism, in Schelling, , , synthesis in, , in Fries, synthetic a-priori, –, , , , in Hegel, , , , , , , , teleological, –, , , ; aesthetic Idea, –; Idea as beauty, Kant, Immanuel, , – inferentialism, , , , , , , , Critique of Judgment, –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , inference license, , , , , non-inferential, , , , , Critique of Practical Reason, –, , , , intuition , intellectual intuition: in Fichte, as rational Critique of Pure Reason, –, , , , , insight into things-in-themselves, –; , , , , , , , , , as self-authorization, , , , , , , , © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 0521663261 - German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism Terry Pinkard Index More information Index Kantian paradox, –, Napoleon, , , , , , , , as idealist theme, , , , in early Romantics, naturalism, , , , , , , , , in Fichte, , , , , , , , in Fries, nature, see freedom in Hegel, , , ; as absolute Idea, Naturphilosophie ; as beautiful soul, ; as Christianity, in Schelling, –, , , , , ; as freedom, –, ;asGeist , (spirit), , , , ; in Greeks, , in Schelling’s later works, , , ;inLogic, , ;inPhenomenology,as in Fries, , historical solution, , ;in in Hegel, , –, Phenomenology, as sociality, – Neuhouser, Frederick, , in Kierkegaard, as despair , , Newton, Isaac, , , , , , , , in Schelling’s later works, , , , , , in Schopenhauer, Niethammer, Immanuel, , Kierkegaard, Søren, , , –, Nietzsche, Friedrich, , , , Kinlaw, Jeffrey C., Norton, Robert E., , Korsgaard, Christine, noumena, , , , , , , , , , Lance, Mark, Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg), , , Larmore, Charles, , , , , , , , , , , leap of faith, , , , , Lear, Jonathan, Hymns to the Night, Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, , role in early Romanticism, – Longuenesse, Beatrice, , , , , , , political theory (Christendom or Europe?), Lucinde, , – MacIntyre, Alasdair, , Oelsner, Konrad Engelbert, McDowell, John, , , Maimon, Solomon, Pascal, Blaise, , Martin, Wayne, , , Petry, Michael, Marx, Karl, , , –, , , , Pietism, , , , , , , , , Pinkard, Terry, , , , , , , , mathematics, –, , , , ;as , , , , , iterative procedure, , , , Pippin, Robert, , , , , , , , , Mendelssohn, Moses, , , , , , , , , , , , Mills, Patricia Jagentowicz, P¨oggeler, Otto, Milton, John, Popularphilosoph (popular philosopher), , , monism, , , , , , , , morality purposiveness, , categorical imperative, , , , , , in Hegel, , , , , , in Schelling, , enforceable duties, , , (in Fries) in Schopenhauer, , highest good, , , , , , , , purposiveness without purpose (Kant), , , , , , hypothetical imperative, kingdomof ends, , , , , , , , radical evil, , , , , , , , , , , Ranke, Leopold von, , , moral duty (in Kant), , , , , , , Redding, Paul, , , , Reinhold, Karl Leonhard, –, , , moral order, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , moral perfection, , , , , , , , obligation, , , , , , , , , Elementarphilosophie, – , , Robinson, Henry Crabb, motion, –, , , , , Rockmore, Tom, , ,
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Qualitative Freedom
    Claus Dierksmeier Qualitative Freedom - Autonomy in Cosmopolitan Responsibility Translated by Richard Fincham Qualitative Freedom - Autonomy in Cosmopolitan Responsibility Claus Dierksmeier Qualitative Freedom - Autonomy in Cosmopolitan Responsibility Claus Dierksmeier Institute of Political Science University of Tübingen Tübingen, Baden-Württemberg, Germany Translated by Richard Fincham American University in Cairo New Cairo, Egypt Published in German by Published by Transcript Qualitative Freiheit – Selbstbestimmung in weltbürgerlicher Verantwortung, 2016. ISBN 978-3-030-04722-1 ISBN 978-3-030-04723-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04723-8 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018964905 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019. This book is an open access publication. Open Access This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the book’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
    [Show full text]
  • 'The Supreme Principle of Morality'? in the Preface to His Best
    The Supreme Principle of Morality Allen W. Wood 1. What is ‘The Supreme Principle of Morality’? In the Preface to his best known work on moral philosophy, Kant states his purpose very clearly and succinctly: “The present groundwork is, however, nothing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality, which already constitutes an enterprise whole in its aim and to be separated from every other moral investigation” (Groundwork 4:392). This paper will deal with the outcome of the first part of this task, namely, Kant’s attempt to formulate the supreme principle of morality, which is the intended outcome of the search. It will consider this formulation in light of Kant’s conception of the historical antecedents of his attempt. Our first task, however, must be to say a little about the meaning of the term ‘supreme principle of morality’. For it is not nearly as evident to many as it was to Kant that there is such a thing at all. And it is extremely common for people, whatever position they may take on this issue, to misunderstand what a ‘supreme principle of morality’ is, what it is for, and what role it is supposed to play in moral theorizing and moral reasoning. Kant never directly presents any argument that there must be such a principle, but he does articulate several considerations that would seem to justify supposing that there is. Kant holds that moral questions are to be decided by reason. Reason, according to Kant, always seeks unity under principles, and ultimately, systematic unity under the fewest possible number of principles (Pure Reason A298-302/B355-359, A645- 650/B673-678).
    [Show full text]
  • Individuality and Rights in Fichte's Ethics
    Philosophers’ volume 17, no. 12 Despite sustained and sophisticated philosophical attention in recent Imprint june 2017 years, J.G. Fichte’s 1796–97 Foundations of Natural Right continues to present some of the same interpretive puzzles that it presented to its first readers. Here I propose solutions to two of those puzzles, which concern the nature of political obligation and its relation to moral obli- gation. Both solutions are motivated by a novel approach to the text, which looks at it through the lens of Fichte’s moral philosophy (as pre- sented in the 1798 System of Ethics), into which its results must fit if, as INDIVIDUALITY Fichte believes, the possibility of morally sanctioned interactions with others requires standing in some law-governed political relationship with them. AND RIGHTS IN It is not unusual for interpretive problems that arise when a text is approached in isolation to become soluble when the text is placed against a broader systematic or historical background; and that is the FICHTE'S ETHICS general sort of project I undertake here. The reason this particular ap- proach has not yet been taken with the Foundations has been that no work on Fichte’s ethical theory has, until recently, provided a fruitful point of entry. The interpretation I have defended in work of the past few years,1 on which Fichte’s normative theory is a form of capabilities- maximizing consequentialism, changes the picture, inviting compari- son of Fichte’s treatment of political duties with those of other conse- Michelle Kosch quentialists, and consideration of the role of coordination and agree- ments in consequentialist ethical theory.
    [Show full text]
  • When the Kingdom of God Became the Kingdom of Ends: Altruism’S Development Into a Normative Ideal
    When the Kingdom of God Became the Kingdom of Ends: Altruism’s Development into a Normative Ideal A Senior Honor Thesis Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with distinction in Political Science in the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences by Benjamin T. Jones The Ohio State University December 10, 2006 Project Advisors: John M. Parrish, Department of Political Science (Loyola Marymount University) Michael A. Neblo, Department of Political Science (The Ohio State University) Table of Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgements iii Introduction 1 The Paradox at the Heart of Altruism 4 Defining Altruism and Normativity 6 What Are We Looking For? 11 Roadmap of What’s to Come 14 Part I Towards a Problem: The Ancient Debate over Public Life 17 Eudaimonia and Ancient Ethics 18 Plato and Aristotle 24 Epicurus and the Stoics 40 A Solution from an Unlikely Source 47 Augustine’s Reconciliation of the Two Cities 55 Conclusion 63 Part II Self-Love’s Fall from Grace: How Normative Altruism Developed out of the Augustinian Tradition 65 Entangled in Self-love: Augustine’s Normative Argument 67 Augustine Goes Secular 75 Kant’s Problematic Solution 83 Reworking Kant—And Altruism 89 Conclusion 91 Part III The Problems with Normative Altruism 93 Two Conceptions of Altruism 93 Evidence for Altruism on a Descriptive Level 95 Motivational Barriers to Normative Altruism 113 Changing the Way We Talk About Altruism 121 Conclusion 126 Bibliography 131 i Abstract In contemporary moral philosophy, altruism holds a place of prominence. Although a complex idea, the term seeps into everyday discourse, by no means confined to the esoteric language of philosophers and psychologists.
    [Show full text]
  • {PDF} Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Ebook Free Download
    GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Immanuel Kant,James W. Ellington | 92 pages | 01 Jun 1993 | Hackett Publishing Co, Inc | 9780872201668 | English | Cambridge, MA, United States Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals PDF Book The claims do not conflict because they have different targets. To put the point slightly differently: Because the world of understanding is more fundamental and primary, its laws hold for the world of sense too. It could have just given us instinct, and thus made us simply and naturally happy, and fit to live. This is a negative definition of freedom—it tells us that freedom is freedom from determination by alien forces. At this point, Kant asks, "what kind of law can that be, the representation of which must determine the will, even without regard for the effect expected from it? A maxim of an action is its principle of volition. All that we may know is that we have a concept of freedom of the will, and that morality may be based on this concept. Similarly, ethics contains an empirical part, which deals with the question of what—given the contingencies of human nature —tends to promote human welfare , and a non-empirical part, which is concerned with an a priori investigation into the nature and substance of morality. Freedom is the ability to give your own law to your will. Kant thinks that, with the exception of the good will , all goods are qualified. We also use third-party cookies that help us analyze and understand how you use this website.
    [Show full text]
  • Animals in the Kingdom of Ends
    25 Animals in the Kingdom of Ends Heather M. Kendrick Department of Philosophy and Religion Central Michigan University [email protected] Abstract Kant claimed that human beings have no duties to animals because they are not autonomous ends in themselves. I argue that Kant was wrong to exclude animals from the realm of moral consideration. Animals, although they do not set their own ends and thus cannot be regarded as ends in themselves, do have ends that are given to them by nature. As beings with ends, they stand between mere things that have no ends, and rational beings that are ends in themselves. I propose a broader version of Kant's kingdom of ends, in which rational beings respect the ends of all other beings that have them, including animals. The moral status of animals would still be dependent on the existence of rational beings, but our duty to take their ends into account would be a direct duty to them, rather than being a covert duty to human beings. Introduction Immanuel Kant holds that we have no duties to animals, because they are not ends in themselves, that is, autonomous beings of intrinsic value. Instead, we have indirect duties with regard to them. We ought not treat them cruelly, as it damages our natural sympathies and thus can harden us in our dealings with other human beings. He uses the example of a man who has his dog shot when the animal is no longer of service; this is not a violation of any duty to the dog, but of his duty to cultivate “the kindly and humane qualities in himself, which he ought to exercise in virtue of his duties to mankind” (Kant 1997b 27:459).
    [Show full text]
  • Kantian Decision Making Under Uncertainty: Dignity, Price, And
    Philosophers’ volume 17, no. 7 Abstract Imprint april 2017 The idea that there is a fundamental difference in value between persons and things, and that respecting this difference is an impor- tant moral requirement, has strong intuitive appeal. Kantian ethics is unique in placing this requirement at the center of a moral system KANTIAN DECISION and in explicating the conditions for complying with it. Unlike chal- lenges to Kantian ethics that focus on tragic cases that pit respect for one person against respect for another, this paper focuses on the ques- tion of how we can respect the value distinction between persons and MAKING UNDER things under conditions of uncertainty. After exploring why decision making under uncertainty is a neglected topic among Kantians and demonstrating how uncertainty challenges our ability to comply with UNCERTAINTY: this norm, we propose a notion of morally insignificant risk within a framework that allows agents to navigate real-world decisions involv- ing material benefit and some risk to dignity without violating the DIGNITY, PRICE, Kantian’s core commitments. We conclude by exploring some of the challenges facing this approach. 1. Introduction AND CONSISTENCY There is something compelling in the idea that there is a fundamen- tal moral difference between persons and things, and that a significant portion of ethics is concerned with ensuring that our treatment of our- selves and others reflects this distinction. Kantian ethics places this Adam Bjorndahl, Alex John London, intuitively appealing idea at the center of its moral system. A common challenge to Kantian frameworks concerns how they deal with situa- Kevin J.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Kant's Ethics
    Kant's ethics Quick reminder About Kant Goods Kant's ethics Hypothetical and categorical imperatives Using the CI Objections Thursday, April 23, 2009 Quick reminder Kant's ethics Quick reminder About Kant Goods Hypothetical and Papers are due tomorrow! categorical imperatives Using the CI Objections Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) Kant's ethics Quick reminder About Kant K¨onigsburg,Prussia Goods Hypothetical (now Kaliningrad, Russia) and categorical Enlightenment philosophy imperatives Using the CI Grundlagen der Objections Metaphysik der Sitten Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals Talents and temperament Ex: Intelligence, courage Subjective states and feelings Ex: Happiness, pleasure Choice and reasons for action Ex: hPay your taxes before they're due to avoid going to jail.i Also called rules, principles, intentions, maxims, and imperatives Three kinds of goods Kant's ethics Goods Quick reminder Things with at least some (positive) moral significance or value About Kant Goods Analysis of goods Anti- consequentialism Hypothetical and categorical imperatives Using the CI Objections Subjective states and feelings Ex: Happiness, pleasure Choice and reasons for action Ex: hPay your taxes before they're due to avoid going to jail.i Also called rules, principles, intentions, maxims, and imperatives Three kinds of goods Kant's ethics Goods Quick reminder Things with at least some (positive) moral significance or value About Kant Goods Analysis of goods Anti- Talents and temperament Ex: Intelligence, courage consequentialism Hypothetical and categorical
    [Show full text]
  • Title Response to 'Kant's Concept of Happiness' by Yuzo Hirose Author
    Title Response to 'Kant's Concept of Happiness' by Yuzo Hirose Author(s) Michael Marshall Happiness and Personal Growth: Dialogue between Citation Philosophy, Psychology, and Comparative Education (2010): 51-56 Issue Date 2010-03-31 URL http://hdl.handle.net/2433/143023 The copyright of papers included in this paper belongs to each Right author. Type Article Textversion publisher Kyoto University 51 Response to 'Kant's Concept of Happiness' by Yuzo Hirose MICHAEL MARSHALL Faculty of the Arts Thames Valley University The generalised conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience (James, 1967, p. 136). Kant's mature philosophy is dependent on a synthetic schema or operation of 'faculties' of the human agent as individuated actor. His Second Critique, on Practical Reason, was anticipated with impatience by his contemporaries, who were also increasingly intolerant of the categorial subtleties of these synthetic operations, which seemed to privilege abstraction over political action and radicality. One of these contemporaries was Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who in Kant's native city of Konigsberg published in 1792 an 'Attempt at a Critique of all Revelation', which was taken for a long-anticipated work on religion by Kant (La Vopa, 2001, p. 82). It is perhaps useful, in this context, to point out an interesting inflection and dialectical gesture. Yuzo Hirose bases his account on the canonical 'ought' of the categorical imperative. He seeks to restore his
    [Show full text]
  • Willing the End Means Willing the Means: an Overlooked Reading of Kant
    AN OPEN ACCESS Ergo JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Willing the End Means Willing the Means: An Overlooked Reading of Kant WOORAM LEE (University of Southern California) In his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant famously claims that it is ana- lytic that whoever wills the end also wills the indispensably necessary means to it that is within his control. The orthodox consensus has it that the analytic proposition expresses a normative principle of practical reason. In this paper, I argue that this consensus is mistaken. On my resolute reading of Kant, he is making a descriptive point about what it is to will an end, and not making a normative claim of any sort. Kant’s argument is that when you know that some object is a necessary means to an end, you do not count as willing the end unless you also will the means, because of the distinctive content of willing: when you will an end, what you will is that you do whatever is necessary to bring about the end. I show how the resolute reading of Kant’s analytic proposition explains the possibility of hypothetical imperatives and defend the resolute reading from the charge that it makes instrumental irrationality impossible. n his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant famously calls the follow- Iing proposition “analytic”: “whoever wills the end also wills (in so far as rea- son has decisive influence on his actions) the indispensably necessary means to it that is in his control” (4:417).1 Read naïvely, with little attention to the ca- veat in the parenthesis, this proposition is most straightforwardly interpreted as specifying a descriptive relation between willing an end and willing the necessary means to it.
    [Show full text]
  • Don't Know, Do Not Resuscitate: a Principle for the Creation of the Kingdom of Ends in the ICU
    Colby College Digital Commons @ Colby Honors Theses Student Research 2016 Don't Know, Do Not Resuscitate: A Principle for the Creation of the Kingdom of Ends in the ICU Griffen Isaac Allen Colby College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorstheses Part of the Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons Colby College theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed or downloaded from this site for the purposes of research and scholarship. Reproduction or distribution for commercial purposes is prohibited without written permission of the author. Recommended Citation Allen, Griffen Isaac, "Don't Know, Do Not Resuscitate: A Principle for the Creation of the Kingdom of Ends in the ICU" (2016). Honors Theses. Paper 833. https://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorstheses/833 This Honors Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at Digital Commons @ Colby. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Colby. 1 Don’t Know, Do Not Resuscitate: A Principle for the Creation of the Kingdom of Ends in the ICU Griffen Isaac Allen Colby College Department of Philosophy First Reader: Lydia Moland, PhD Associate Professor of Philosophy Second Reader: Paul Berkner, DO Colby College Medical Director 2 This thesis, Don’t Know, Do Not Resuscitate: A Principle for the Creation of the Kingdom of Ends in the ICU, is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Honors in Philosophy by Griffen Allen ______________________ First Reader: Lydia Moland, PhD Associate Professor of Philosophy ______________________ Second Reader: Paul Berkner, DO Colby College Medical Director 3 Acknowledgements This thesis has been the most challenging and rewarding academic experience I have ever undertaken.
    [Show full text]
  • Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals CAMBRIDGE TEXTS in the HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY
    CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IMMANUEL KANT Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Series editors KARL AMERIKS Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame DESMOND M. CLARKE Professor of Philosophy at University College Cork The main objective of Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy is to expand the range, variety and quality of texts in the history of philosophy which are avail- able in English. The series includes texts by familiar names (such as Descartes and Kant) and also by less well-known authors. Wherever possible, texts are published in complete and unabridged form, and translations are specially commissioned for the series. Each volume contains a critical introduction together with a guide to further reading and any necessary glossaries and textual apparatus. The volumes are designed for student use at undergraduate and postgraduate level and will be of interest not only to students of philosophy but also to a wider audience of readers in the history of science, the history of theology and the history of ideas. For a list of titles published in the series, please see end of book. IMMANUEL KANT Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY MARY GREGOR WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD Harvard University CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, vie 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcon 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org © Cambridge University Press 1997 This book is in copyright.
    [Show full text]