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The Ashgate Research Companion to the

James I. Matray, Donald W. Boose

South

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The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 06:50 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315613611, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315613611.ch2 been critical. report oninternalevents inSouthKorea. in annualvolumesStates, whichreprintsprimarydocumentsthat United Relations ofthe from itscreationuntiltheendofKoreanWar istheU.S.StateDepartment’sForeign reunited Koreannation.Perhaps thebestsource of informationabouttheROK’shistory States andtheSovietUnion refused to agreeonaplanforrestorationofsovereignty toa towardin of Korea(ROK) Republic creationofthe AugustUnited the came after 1948 that step first the be would This rule. military three-year their began and (USAMGIK) Korea in Korea. OnSeptember11,the Americans established theU.S. Army MilitaryGovernment Lieutenant GeneralJohnR.Hodgeandhis72,000-strongXXIVU.S. Army Corps landed in Korea belowthe38thparallelcameunderU.S.militaryoccupation.OnSeptember9, Shortly afterKoreawas liberatedfrom Japanese imperialistrulein August 1945,southern 2 the difficult years(Chay2002: 66–7). southern Korea. He believes that no nation could have done a better job than the did during despite manymistakesandproblems, the Americans made“importantandpositive accomplishments”in uncertainties, confusions,andfailures. inconsistencies, from suffered Korea southern in policy occupation U.S. historians, most in attempting to set up a reactionary regime in southern Korea (Halliday 1974). Overall, to Jon HallidayalsoblamestheUnitedStatesforignoring wishesoftheKoreanpeople bulwark tostemthetideofSoviet-inspired anddomesticrevolutioninsouthernKorea. for thoroughgoingpolitical,economic,andsocialchange andsoughtonlytobuilda Similarly, and expectations wishes of Korea’s people. They did not take account of widespread Korean demands the 10). meet to 1974: failing for (Baldwin Americans the counterrevolution” criticizes (1981) Cumings “conscious Bruce a as Korea U.S. policy sees southern Baldwin in Frank perspective. different a from policy occupation U.S. of policy suffered from illogic and inconsistencies. Revisionist writers understand the failure the thatcaused simply “amiserablefailure”(Kim1973:81).JamesI.Matray(1985)stressesthatU.S.Korea was politics it that thinks Chŏm-kon ofKorean Kim 55). 1989: (Merrill 1950 Warin Korean the of polarization outbreak the intensified and elements, unpopular in power rightist entrenched committees, people’s the of popular by represented outpouring participation thespontaneous destroyed division, tragic Korea’s solidified it DC: Government PrintingOffice,1948). United States Korea,Historyofthe Armed Forces inKorea(Washington, in Forces Armed U.S. Korea. 2 1 With fewexceptions,mostauthorswhohave examinedU.S.occupationpolicyhave

A few writers assess U.S. occupation policy affirmatively. For instance, Jongsuk Chay writes that that writes Chay Jongsuk affirmatively. instance, policy For occupation U.S. assess writers few A An official history presents a detailed and valuable account of the U.S. occupation of theU.S. of account andvaluable adetailed presents history official An 1 Inparticular,JohnMerrilljudgesita“failurebyanystandard,”because South Korea Jinwung Kim 2

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 06:50 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315613611, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315613611.ch2 specific qualifications to administer Korea affairs. Korea administer to qualifications specific any had it because not Okinawa, away—on miles nearby—600 relatively stationed was it example of an absence of U.S. preparations. Washington selected Hodge’s force because U.S. militaryoccupationprovideslittleevidenceof American preparednessforit. However, left revisionist views constitute a minority opinion.Moreover, the course of 1981). (Cumings (JANIS-75) Korea” of Study Intelligence “Joint Army–Navy entitled study civil affairs teams had considerable knowledgeand offorces KoreaU.S. because1945, in theythat hademphasize athey massive,particular, In detailed policy. Korea its formulating in premature surrender and fully considered the possible deterioration of Soviet–U.S. relations the UnitedStatesnotonlywas well-informedmade preparationsforJapan’s Korea, but about stress American preparednessforoccupyingandadministeringsouthernKoreainsistthat who Those place. first the in occupation the of logic the dictated this and Korea, in power and policies regarding Korea. The Americans wanted to block the southward flow of Soviet goals definite had States United the time the at that contends (1981) Cumings hand, other the On commander. occupation U.S. the directives for of set definite a completed not had it portion ofKoreaonshortnoticeandtherefore,theeve ofU.S.entryintosouthernKorea, occupation ofa the Trumanadministrationdidnotanticipate Matray (1985)explainsthat of governing resulted infrustration,fumbling,andahalf-heartedcommitment to SouthKorea’s defense. task the for of action effectiveor consistent, informed, an of Lack 1968). Henderson 1967, (Cho Korea later policy plan definite any lacked Americans the that believe Th sought to maintain the social status quo and build a political bulwark against communism against bulwark political a build and quo status social the maintain to sought logic and eager to stop the spread of Soviet power and influence, the officers of theits original USAMGIK objective of seeking to establish a democratic, unified nation. Acting on Cold War barrier a build against Sovietexpansionatleastinthesouthernhalfof Koreanpeninsula,itabandoned to sought States United the As consequences. unfortunate with 1946 than measures to prevent Communistexpansion,waging theCold War inKoreamuchearlier policy” factocontainment a“de as Korea in (Cumings 1983: 16). Jongsuk Chay (2002) also claims that the U.S. government began to take actions U.S. pre-1946 the defines Cumings group, this of Representative 1985). Matray 1983, Pelz 1951, (Meade peninsula Korean the elections (Millett2005). democracy wouldcometosouthernKoreaasaresultof issue, whilehavingnoillusionthat proposal and the U.S.–Soviet Joint Commission. Hodge thought that unification was a dead hand, Allan R. Millett judges Hodge to be realistic, specifically regarding the U.S. trusteeship caliber” adequate to performtheirdutiesinKoreasatisfactorily(Meade1951:225,228,235).Ontheother “an lacked and Hodge’s Korea about R.Langdon, ignorant as just William were counselors, and political Benninghoff Merrell H. him to shortcomings. with his advisor well-qualified moderate no had Hodge that reports rightly USAMGIK, the served in who Meade, Grant E. 282). 1972: Kolko and (Kolko “liberator” a not “conqueror,” Korean, tomention criticize even not Kolko Gabriel and ofAsian, Hodge forperceivingKoreaasapartofenemyterritoryandcomingtothecountry Joyce 1981). Cumings knowledge 1995, (Matray or politics affairs or culture civil of administration the in experience or training no had He Korea. in hold would he job the for suitable not definitely John R.Hodgeto theKoreanconditionsandeffective indealingwithKorean affairs(Stueck2002). had spent years in Asia, he therefore would be much more sensitive and flexible than Lieutenant General Generalissimo JiangJieshivetoed Stilwell. U.S.leadershad believed thatpresumablybecauseStilwell e Ash Assignment of the XXIV U.S. Army Corps to occupy southern Korea represents a prime A fundamental problem that the USAMGIK faced was unpreparedness. Most historians 3 Many historians believe the United States definitely applied the containment policy to policy containment the applied definitely States United the believe historians Many

Initially, JosephW. Stilwell andhisU.S. Tenth Army were scheduledtooccupyKorea,but gate Re s e arch Comp anion toth 24 e Ko 3 MosthistoriansagreethatHodgewas rean W ar Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 06:50 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315613611, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315613611.ch2 of creating a united, democratic, and independent Korea. Unfortunately, by 1946, chances 1946, by Unfortunately, Korea. independent and democratic, united, a creating of this newpolicyinSeptember 1945, itmighthave contributed toachievingtheU.S. objective an interimgovernment. Matray(1985)believes thatiftheUnitedStateshadimplemented establishing toward step first a as coalition moderate a build to directives administration’s government intheU.S.occupation zone. political climate the then, By August.in time last the for adjourned impasse Commission same Joint the Soviet–American The reached July. but in 1947, 21, May on reconvened It 1946. 8, May on deadlock Neither Union. Soviet side would yield. the After sixweeks ofdetaileddiscussion, the commission adjourned in toward favorable leftists, endorsed delegates Soviet the while provisional the Korean government. U.S. delegates supportedrightists,friendlytotheUnited States, control would who conclusion was question foregone underlying the a powers, occupying was two failure its authors, several the For 2002). Chay 1989, Merrill 1985, To (Matray impossible the achieve to sought it because 1946. 20, March on in Matray 1985). WarCold Soviet–American intensifying the of because primarily 1981, Cumings 1967, (Cho trusteeship. Most historians agree thatthetrusteeshipplanfor Korea could not work establishing aprovisional Korean government thatmightresultinitsoperationunder a Moscow agreement, Cumings (1981) stresses that its focus was on the JointCommission the of language final the of neocolonialism. reading simply careful as After trusteeship saw Soviet Unionhadshownnointerestintheconcept.Manynewnations,includingKorea, autumn of1945,theideaappealedtoalmostnooneoutsideU.S.StateDepartment.The terms. But Millett (2005) criticizes the U.S. trusteeship formula for Korea as nonsense. In the only waythe shortofwar toachieve Koreanindependenceandself-government onitsown the To 1967). (Cho same effect, Matray Korea (1985) explains that the United States adhered to the trusteeship idea as of all over domination Soviet possible check could trusteeship consult withtheKoreanstocreateaprovisionalKoreangovernment. The UnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionwere toestablishajointcommissionthatwould administer. would China plus nations three the that Korea for trusteeship five-year a for On 1945. 26, and 16 December December 27,theseleadersannouncedapproval between ofaSovietrevisionU.S.proposal Moscow in met Union Soviet the and Britain, problems post-war unresolved Commission settle To preventing thenegotiationofpeacetreaties,foreignministersUnitedStates, Joint reunification. for Soviet–American plan a on first agree to the meetings was however, development, important coalition, left-right and theeruptionofmassive popularrebellionsinsouthernKorea. Arguably themost amoderate create to efforts establishment of an interim legislative assembly asa step toward Koreanindependence, USAMGIK’s the arena notably political the place, in events took and actions important of number A relations. Korea–U.S. the leadinrealizingvisionofaunited,independentnation(Stueck2002:35). (KPR), thusencouraging“coalition”ratherthan“classpolitics,”Koreansmighthave taken Stueck contendsthathadthe Americans supported theleftistKoreanPeople’s Republic in its occupation zone. Criticizing U.S. policy and especially Hodge for inflexibility, William U.S. militarygovernment refused torecognizetheKPR. The arrived. Americans the before government facto de a as 1945 September 6 on nationalist, leaning 4 Truman the implement to reluctantly began Hodge 1946, of summer the in Meanwhile, Under these circumstances, the Soviet–American Joint Commission held its first meeting onlymultinational that belief U.S. the reflected idea trusteeship controversial The for as well as Korea, for year critical a was 1946 that believes (2002) Chay

h Kra Pol’ Rpbi (P) a etbihd y ŏ nhŏg a elkon left- well-known a Un-hyŏng, Yŏ by established was (KPR) Republic People’s Korean The in Washingtonhad shiftedcompletelytoward a separate creating 25 So uth 4 Ko re a Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 06:50 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315613611, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315613611.ch2 Th ae f aoae n srks ht etss raie set cos h mrcn zone, American the across swept organized leftists that strikes and sabotage of wave and materialsupport. southern Koreaaloneforaseparate governmentmoral then wouldgarnerinternational that in election an sponsor would organization world the hoped it Nations, United the to issue to it. a resolution instructing the UNTCOK to observe elections in those areas of Korea accessible 1948 26, February on adopted body latter the Assembly, General the of Committee Interim Korea, it could operate only in the U.S. zone. After no the UNTCOK occur requested direction would from which the later than March 31, election, 1948. Because the Soviet Union denied the the UNTCOK access to northern supervise to was (UNTCOK) Korea on Commission Temporary Nations United The Korea. united a for government a establish turn in would hold elections throughout Korea for representatives to serve in a National Assembly, which southern Korea(Cho1967,Stueck1981,Matray1985,Gaddis 1987,Merrill1989). to effort an was forum find an escape route minimizing the possible international damage from preparing to withdraw from the to problem Korean the take to decision the U.S. writers, many to According 17. September on Nations United the to issue Korean in intensified leftists and southern Korea,theUnitedStatestookmostimportantactionwhenitreferred rightists the between struggle the While policy. Korea U.S. (Dobbs 1981, Stueck 1981). Certainly, it proved to be an important year of change in the failuresofUSAMGIKtomeetbasichumanneeds. the resultofjustaCommunistplot.Infact,itwas aspontaneousKoreanprotestagainst and and brutality, corruption unemployment astheessentialcausesofrebellion,uprisingscouldnothave been police inflation, collection, rice forced about grievances Technology, 1947). was involved agent Korean northern identifiable one not showed investigations that stresses Richard Robinson KoreanCommunist But 2005). Millett the 1985, (Matray committees people’s toimplicate local surviving and Party evidence found officers counterintelligence U.S. power. seize to plot Soviet a of part was uprising the that explanation simple the accept on November 23,1946. South KoreanWorkers’Partyelements insouthernKoreaunitedtoformthe leftist (SKWP) in thepoliticalbalancefavoringrightandweakeningIn response,all theleftirreparably. collection. Successful suppression of the popularuprisings,however, marked a turningpoint grain forced and inflation mounting in specifically resulted which economy, the regarding The people’suprisingsunderlinedthefailureofU.S.militaryoccupationpoliciesespecially casualties estimatedatmorethan400policemenandover 1,000civilians(Cumings1981). rebellion, it spread to Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla provinces in October and November with heavy precipitated the“OctoberPeople’s Resistance.”Growingintoapeasants’andworkers’ exploded grievances their form ofapeasantrebellion. in the September A railroadworkers’strikeinPusanlate 1946, of fall the In suffering. enormous endured workers, and Commission endeditshopes. Joint Soviet–American the of session second the of breakdown The differences. widening coalition depended entirely onwhetherthetwooccupyingpowers could resolve their rightist, and Yŏ Un-hyŏng, a moderate leftist, were slim because the fortunes of the moderate for the success of the Coalition Committee, which was built around Kim Kyu-sik, a moderate e Ash Meanwhile, thedomesticsituation insouthernKoreaturnedextremelyviolent. A to resolution U.S.-sponsored a adopted Assembly General UN the 14, November On Some historiansstressthat1947was theturningpointbetween 1945and1950 The effectiveness and duration of the “October People’s Resistance” led Hodge to easily peasants specifically liberation, after Koreans ordinary rule, colonial Japanese under As According to Matray (1985), when the Truman administration brought the Korean According toMatray(1985), when theTrumanadministrationbrought gate Re (Richard Robinson, “Betrayal of a Nation,” Massachusetts Institute of Institute Massachusetts Nation,” a of “Betrayal Robinson, (Richard s e Millett (2005) has argued that because Hodge’s investigation found investigation Hodge’s that because argued has (2005) Millett arch Comp anion toth 26 e Ko rean W ar Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 06:50 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315613611, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315613611.ch2 guerrilla activitytothemainland. of of theRheegovernmentdemonstratedfrailty rebellion the to the spreadof andcontributed Team Report Chŏnjaeng 1989, 1992, Merrill Saŏphoe 1967, Korea Kinyŏm of (Republic destroyed were island the on villages Most of them were innocentcivilians government forces massacred, while also half of the island’s population. Cheju-do rebellionhadclaimedsome30,000victims,or10percent ofthe erupted withoutexternalinvolvement ordirection. Millett rebellion. Cheju-do the the rebellion SKWP ledtheriot.Certainly, (2005) countersthattheCheju-dobranchof stage to plan SKWP,notto not the did of Communists, northern the centralleadership mention the that argues (1989) Merrill John 2005). Millett viable economyandestablishthefoundationfordemocracy in southernKorea(Merrill1989, making uprising, this it aclassicpeople’swar. Itscausewas thefailureofU.S.occupationpoliciestopromotea from dated War Korean the that claims (2005) Millett Cheju-do. of before theMayelection,on April 3,aCommunist-inspiredrebellionbrokeoutontheisland many pressing tasks, especiallyreconstruction of the bankrupt economy. Also, a month ambition, refusedtoallowanyonechallengehisauthority. Ultimately, U.S.fearsbecamereality,as the elderly Rhee, havingachieved hislifelong and machinery of democracy for unscrupulous and undemocratic ends” (Gayn 1948: 352). time, passesharshcriticismonRheeas“asinisteranddangerousmantousethecliché (Oliver 1955: 322). But Mark Gayn, a East Asia in valuescherished the Americans promote to much did who man wasthe and conservatives since World War II, stresses that Rhee was a “catalyst of democracy in Asia” the new republic. Onhisdictatorialproclivities,RobertT. Oliver, alobbyistforKorean Syngman RheepresidentofSouthKorea. elected body legislative the 20, July On later. days five it promulgating 12, July on (ROK) of procedure. The National Assembly adopted the first constitution of the Republic of Korea matter a just wasgovernment southern a creating election, the After candidates. particular the popularwill.Theelectoratecastballotsinmanycasesforindependenceratherthanany accurately reflect not did election southern the standard any by that writes correctly (1985) sik, causingtheirvirtualeliminationfromsouthernKoreanpolitics. broke theirwordonMay14,1948.Thispunitive actiondiscreditedKimKuandKyu- Koreans northern the Korea, southern to electricity off cut to not promising after weeks and KimKyu-sik,were deceived bytheirnortherncounterparts.Indeed,lessthantwo in Ku conference Kim particularly leaders, Korean southern the political that believes (1967) Cho failure. utter a North-South in ended but 1948, attend 30, April on convened to gathering That alternative. an P’yŏngyangas decided election the opposed who completely thevoteinelectionscheduledforMay10,1948.Koreanpoliticalleaders a –Korean Democratic Party (KDP) coalition, which would control almost in theseparateelection.Thismeantthatextremerightistelementscoalescedaround atmosphere, moderatesandleftists,aswell asKimKu’srightists,refusedtoparticipate posing a serious challenge to the authority of the USAMGIK. Amid such a turbulent administration’s control. two interpretationsonthesubject, explainsthatRhee’svictorywas farbeyondtheTruman 5 When thegovernment suppression campaignformallyendedinmid April 1949,the faced government inexperienced new, the 1948, 15, August on inaugurated Formally Many U.S. officials worried that Rhee would establish a personal dictatorship in personal dictatorship a would establish Rhee that worried officials U.S. Many The May 10 electionproduced a resounding victory for the extremerightists.Matray

As to the U.S. role in Syngman Rhee’s rise to power, James Matray (1985), after introducing Chicago SuncorrespondentinTokyoandSeoulatthe 1994, Millett 2005). The Cheju-do The 2005). Millett 1994, Chemin Ilbo 27 5 So uth Ko re a Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 06:50 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315613611, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315613611.ch2 removal of its troops from that country” (Stueck 1981: 152–3). To the same effect, Chay (2002) of war,prior totheoutbreak themostimportantUnitedStates actioninKoreawas the a greatthreattoSouthKorea’s nationalsecurity. As Stueckputsit,“intheyear andahalf war totopple theRheeregime. At thisperilous moment, the withdrawal ofU.S.forces posed the of remnants rebels andtheirciviliansupporters whohadescapedtoChiri-sanwaged astubbornpartisan 1948, 27, October After Korea. South within activity guerrilla organized security “national a now state” underRhee’sdictatorialrule. was Korea South men. 100,000 to size army’s the doubling and into a national paramilitary organization, creating a centralizing military intelligence system, introducing compulsorymilitarytrainingintheschools, consolidating rightistyouthgroups Defense (Millett 2005). At the same time, Rhee initiated a major expansion of security forces, ROK the Army and the into Coast Guard into Constabulary the ROK Navy, the along with creating the transformed Ministry of National Act Organization Army the 5, December on 1948, 20, November on Rhee, atmosphere, secured passage tense of the first National Security Law outlawing communism. the Two weeks later, Exploiting army. revolts Korea’s military South further prevented in ordered had he that 1949 July by soldiers and officers its securityforces. Korean societyandstrengthen in South 4,700 of morethan A purge dissent of forms all suppress to quickly moved Rhee crisis, immediate the overcame he as Kinyŏm Chŏnjaeng 1990, Cumings 1989, Merrill Saŏphoe 1992,Millett2005). 1967, Korea of (Republic executed or arrested andchargedwithtakingpartintheriot.Those found guiltywere imprisoned were people Numerous rebels. and loyalistsoldiers, civilians, policemen, many of lives the managed to regaincontrol of the twocities, ending therebellion.The armed revolt claimed warfare.guerrilla protracted governmentconduct 27, and October mountains By forces san Chiri- nearby the into escape to able were rebels the of most result, a 169). As 2005: (Millett far more important thanconductingacoordinated campaign thatwouldeliminatetherebels was cities the retaking Consequently, States. United the and Nations United the from as “an exerciseininternationalpolitics” and concentratedonmaintainingrecognition crisis the with dealt Rhee Millett, to According Seoul. in regime Rhee the to threat grave posed a areas those in elements dissatisfied the and provinces southern the in strong quite rebellion incombinationwiththeCheju-douprisingdemonstratedthatleftistforcewas They transformed Yŏsu-Sunch’ŏn the that observes (2002) Chay districts.” officials. “liberated into areas andoccupied government the activists, rightist officers, army execute and policemen, try to courts” “people’s established they areas, occupied city the nearby In the Sunch’ŏn. 20 October of by by and joined Yŏsu were of control and seize city to SKWP port the the of supporters into local moved rebels the Yŏsu, outside just regiment the initiated bytheSKWP’scentralleadershipinSeoulorNorthKoreans. thiswas onCheju-do, itspredecessor a spontaneousuprisingthatindigenousCommunists staged. Itwaslike neitherplannednor that contend (2005) Millett and (1989) Merrill U.S. occupation. start ofthe in southernKoreadatingtothe the frustratedleftiststruggle of product the was basically uprising the but rebellion, the sparked had uprising the quell Constabulary extensively. TheConstabularyregiment’srefusaltoleave forCheju-dotohelp the time, whereas rightists exclusively populated the police, Communists had infiltrated the as theywereisland. on the to embarkforCheju-dohelpsuppresstheuprising about At province Chŏlla South Yŏsu, of city port the at rebelled Constabulary Korean South the of absorbed much more attention. On October 19, 1948, some 2,000 troops of the 14th Regiment Th e Ash h Ceud ursn ad ŏuSnhŏ rblin rvdd h fudto for foundation the provided rebellion Yŏsu-Sunch’ŏn and uprising Cheju-do The soon As rule. authoritarian Rhee’s toward trend the fed rebellion Yŏsu-Sunch’ŏn The of headquarters the at 19 October of evening the on began rebellion the after Soon With theCheju-douprisingstillunderway, anotherrebellioneruptedinSouthKoreaand gate Re s e arch Comp anion toth 28 e Ko rean W ar Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 06:50 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315613611, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315613611.ch2 economic and politicalconditions in SouthKoreaduringthetwo-year periodbetween the decision tostageanall-outinvasion ofSouthKoreainJune1950. Merrill (1989) believes that thefailureof the DPRK’s guerrilla war withintheROKled to its 2005). Millett 1992, Saŏphoe Kinyŏm Chŏnjaeng 1990, (Cumings guerrillas the out rooted the ROKgovernmentbut by thencarriedoutacampaign that April 1950successfullyhad peaked inmid September 1949. After apause,guerrilla warfare resumed in October1949, the partisans of the SKWP also stepped up their attacks Korea, on South Korean North security forces that from units guerrilla of infiltration Following rival. political chief Rhee’s Ku, create a political crisis in South Korea. That same day, a ROK army officer assassinated Kim DPRK the announced formation of 1949, the Democratic Front 26, for the UnificationJune of the FatherlandOn to Rhee. of opponents with front united a organized had Korea North along the 38th parallel ceased (Republic of Korea 1967, Merrill 1989, Cumings 1990). By then, fighting 1949, September late In conflict. border the for responsibility shared therefore and 5 February and 23 January between engagements major five fought had already sides both that claiming disagrees, (2005) Millett fighting. the initiating for responsible wereprimarily (1989) Merrill 202). 2005: commanders Korean South and (Millett 1949, May early in began Ch’ŭnch’ŏn conflict border the that contends at and Kaesŏng, at peninsula, Ongjin the with northernforcesalongthe38thparallelinsummerof1949. Army reduced the partisan threat internally, its units engaged in a growing border conflict SKWP guerrillasintheeasternandsouthernprovincesonCheju-do. As theROK Rhee government mounted counterinsurgency campaignsinthespringof1949against Amid Korea. South growing uncertainty about South Korea’s security on the eve of left American departure, the forces combat U.S. last the after days two 1, July on officially it formation oftheKoreaMilitary Advisory Group(KMAG)onMay2,1949andestablished the Rheegovernment andbolsterSouthKoreanmorale,Washington announcedthe decided tocompleteitsmilitarywithdrawal fromtheROKbyJune30,1949.Toreassure Washington moved toward setting a firm date to disengage. InAssembly Marchrecognized the ROK as the “only 1949,lawful government” on the Korean thepeninsula, General UnitedUN Statesthe 1948, 12, December on When month. that began that rebellions internal in April 1948,buttheTrumanadministrationhaddelayed departureinresponsetothe inflict seriousdamageonU.S.credibilityandprestige. the forwithdrawing, reasons thecompelling collapse oftheROKgovernmentfeared thattheinevitable Truman administration would Despite of surviving. chance little having thought thatwithdrawingitsforces certainly wouldinviteacivilwar, withSouthKorea economically, militarily, ROK and politically,U.S.withdrawal the wouldimperilSouthKorea’svery existence.Washington than stronger was unquestionably DPRK the Because position. dangerous and embarrassing an in States United the placing Korea, North from Soviet UnionrevealedDecember 27,the States tofollowsuit.On its troopshaddeparted that Korean the from peninsula, Moscow announced its intentiontoleave forces before1948ended and urged theUnited occupation all of withdrawal the requested formally then DPRK Republic ofKorea(DPRK)norththe38thparallelinearlySeptember1948.When causing thefourthevent, theKoreanWar. transfer of the Korean issue to the , and the troop withdrawal) were linked in rightly asserts that threecrucial U.S. decisions in 1945,1947,and1949(theoccupation, the of theKoreanWar.of thepeninsulatooutbreak Korea’s historyfromthepartition He of itsforceswasU.S. pullout the contends that further eventmost important the in South Many writers are critical of the Rhee government for creating theunpleasant on border the along east to west from fighting the “Parallel War” the as labels Millett The United States already had made the decision to withdraw its troops from Korea Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had sponsored the creation of the Democratic People’s 29 So uth Ko re a Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 06:50 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315613611, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315613611.ch2 Th control over all of South Korea. For a time, it appeared that the ROK government would government ROK the that appeared it time, a For Korea. South of all over control a ceremonyinthecapitalon September 28,whereMacArthurrestoredtohisgovernment attended Rhee Seoul, to Returning Korea. North into back scurry to enemy the compelling Army advanced northward andjoinedtheX Corps inassaultingtheCommunist forces, War,Korean the Perimeter.Pusan the of out break to troops Eighth UNC U.S. allowing The duration ofthewar. as its commander. Rhee assigned authority over ROK militaryforces to MacArthur for the MacArthur Douglas General with (UNC) Command Nations United the of creation in The Pusan. United to Nations passed eventually a relocating resolution calling Seoul, for its from members to fled help defend had the ROK, government resulting his and By Rhee peninsula. then, the of corner southeastern the in stabilized lines battle when August, until arrivalCommunist invasion1950 didnotslowthe in July ofU.S.groundcombatforcesearly advance created serious doubts about whether the Rhee government would survive. Even populace. the the however, the alienated rapid first, further KPA’s At that atrocities committed Korean the in soldiers Communist People’sattack. DPRK the about (KPA)angry Army also citizens average from support widespread gained also Rhee leadership. his behind forces unpopular leaderofanationinturmoil,henowwas abletorallyvarious domestic political (Kim 1972,Matray1985). them government rejected Rhee flatly the Naturally, confusion. into ROK the throw to only sought offers These merge. bodies legislative two the that counterpart its to recommended Assembly People’s Supreme DPRK’s the opened, Assembly National ROK new the when Fatherland the of Unification the for proposed all-Korea Front elections in early August Democratic to elect a the unified assembly. On June 19, 1950, the day 7, June on election, the after Immediately ROK. the destabilizing of hopes the in proposals unification last-minute new the when DNP the from assembly convened. His seemingly weakened positionpromptedtheDPRKtopresenttwo challenge renewed a faced therefore Rhee independents. increased itspowermany ofthenewlysuccessfully recruiting through electedopposition soon it seats, parliamentary more many lost DNP the Although supporters. his of percent Matray developments, positive Assembly electionsleftRheebarelyclingingtopower asvotersrejectedmore than 20 same On these democratization. toward progress to Describing well as points (1985) inflation economy. spiraling the ending taxes, stabilizing raised and and spending reduced had government Rhee’s innearly power and effectiveness displayed internal order.Justasimportant, eliminating Communistguerrillaactivitiesthreatening Army ROK The trajectory. upward an on arguing thatbythespringof1950,wholesaleimprovement ofconditionsplacedthenation National Party (DNP). his government and join them in the formation on February 10, 1949 of the new Democratic They convincedseveralparty. ranks with politicianspreviouslyalignedwithRheetobreak ROK, members of the Korean Democratic Party (KDP) created South Korea’s first opposition the National Assembly. Perceiving Rhee as betraying them in the process of establishing the Rhee’s generalmaladministration,however,increased politicaloppositiontohimin greatly distress. economic and inflation, runaway deficit, budget huge a with along Korea, confronted threats from internal rebellions,SKWP guerrillas, and invasion from that onemust understand realistically theenormityofchallengesROKfaced. South insists (2002) Chay But 1990). Cumings 1987, Gaddis 1981, Stueck 1972, Kolko and (Kolko entirely corruptand authoritarian andtheoverall conditions in SouthKoreawere bleak establishment oftheROKandoutbreakwar. Thegovernment underRheewas e Ash MacArthur’s successful landing at Inch’ŏn on September 15, 1950 reversed the course of Ironically, theoutbreakofKoreanWar proved fortuitousforRhee. As an increasingly ROK, the of assessment optimistic more a supporting evidence presents (2005) Millett gate Re s e arch Comp anion toth 30 e Ko rean W ar May 30, 1950, the National the 1950, 30, May Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 06:50 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315613611, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315613611.ch2 i. lhuh oiia cas a aetd te ainl seby a pwres and powerless strengthened then was power political Rhee’s Assembly role. policy-making National effective any from the excluded averted, was chaos political Although him. backing into war, the over insecurity with seized populace, unsophisticated politically the his authority. Assisted by thepowerful police andlocaladministrations,hemanipulated historians agree, Rhee acted purposefully to strengthentheLiberal Party and consolidate Korean War, the of year last the During Korea. South in affairs political to returned peace percent ofthepopularvote. After hesuccessfullyintimidatedhisopposition,anuneasy passedhis they until building Assembly constitutional amendments. the National to them confined and legislators in earlyJuly,notthroughpoliticalcompromise,afterRhee’s policeroundedupallthe but ended crisis The 1991). (Keefer democracy genuine promote to not agenda, political selfish own its advance to leadership his undermine to acting was DNP the that stress others But for notactingtoprevent RheefromimposinghisdictatorialruleontheROK(Palais 1974). saw no realistic alternative to Rhee’s leadership. Some historians have criticized Washington believesadministration’s decisionnottooustRhee,Chay(2002)rightly U.S. leaders that persuasion and encouragement of a politicalcompromise. As to thereason for the Truman anti- Rhee coupandeven planning fordirect military intervention. Ultimately,itchose to use an stage to officers military ROK urging including actions, strong considered United States the moment, a For 1995). (Stueck effort war U.S.-led the for support international the image of the ROK as a nation representing the cause of democracy and thus jeopardized (Henderson 1968,Palaisgovernment 1974,Kim2012). the of control seize to conspiracy DNP a of part was claimed he that himself against attempt assassination an manufactured Rhee later, month A politicians. opposition 50 over of imprisonment the ordered also He 1952. 25, May effective Pusan, around and in the rejected against his opponents. When the opposition legislators overwhelmingly held firm, Rhee declared martial law DNP, opposition the amendments. Rheetheninstitutedacampaignofpoliticalharassmentanddemonstrations of leadership the National under the 1952, Assembly, 18, January On president. the of election amendments popular constitutional direct for proposed providing Rhee power, retain to attempt an In doubt. in was terms aspresident(Kim1972,Kim2012). form theLiberalParty. Itwouldprove tobeasolidpoliticalbaseforRheesecurefuture to combined organizations social pro-Rhee 1951,Rhee’s five and 23, Assembly National the OnDecember in supporters apparatus. his government of backing firm the on reliant political environment, Rhee recognized that it was imperative to create a strong ruling party In therapidlychanging majority ofindependentassemblymenwhoreliedonhispatronage. withthe a and organizations, social rightist conservativeparties, of political collection minor loose a hisrelationship causing rule, arbitrary opposition todeteriorate.Oneyear aftertheKoreanWarhis politicalpower began, basewas to 1951,where committed of summer increasingly the became after Pusan he in remained government his first At extinction. year haddissipated. prior the in caused had twice conquest Communist of fear that atmosphere tense the then, By parallel. 38th the of north just battlefront the stabilized offensives Chinese huge two of defeat UNC the 1951, of spring the By again. Pusan to relocate governmentto his and Rhee (Cumings 1990, Stueck 1995, Millett 2005). But Chinese intervention late in November forced sympathizers and officials Communist against terror of reign a waged operatives political rule areunitedKorea.Indeed,Rheeappointedgovernors forthenorthernprovincesandhis n h peieta eeto hl o Ags 5 15, he aiy o, bann 74.6 obtaining won, easily Rhee 1952, 5, August on held election presidential the In shattered they because allies wartime Korea’s South concerned actions reckless Rhee’s National reelection the his in and support Assembly his of much lost had Rhee 1952, By from ROK the saved UNC the after power political his strengthen to acted Rhee 31 So uth Ko re a Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 06:50 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315613611, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315613611.ch2 Th that did not provide for Chinese military withdrawal, which Rhee had set as a condition fighting condition a as the set had that didnotprovideforChinese militarywithdrawal,end Rhee which to terms on agreed had administration Eisenhower the 1953, June In War. to Rhee’s demand for a U.S. commitment to guarantee the ROK’s security after the Korean with SouthKoreathereafter.Washington agreedtothisbilateraltreatyreluctantly inresponse arrangements security U.S. for basis formal the providing 1954, 17, November on force into Korean War forSouthKorea.SignedinWashington on October1,1953,theagreemententered Defense Treaty,whichwas perhapsthe mostimportantdiplomaticachievement duringthe Nevertheless, the successor Eisenhower administration later negotiated the ROK–U.S. Mutual court- by martial (ChŏnjaengKinyŏmSaŏphoe1992:vol.5). trial stood officers army four and resigned ministers government three result, on May8adoptedaresolutioncensuringthegovernment onthisheinousincident. As a ROK forces perpetrated against civilians became public knowledge, the National Assembly involved inthemassacre burnedthebodiestodestroyevidence. After the atrocity thatthe them ofhavingbetrayed thecountrytoCommunists.MembersofROKunits the victims being children and the elderly. On February 10–11, military authorities accused of percent 75 people, 719 massacred soldiers its 1951, 7, February on township Sinwŏn on advanced Regiment 9th Battalion, 3rd the When area. such one was province, Kyŏngsang daytime and the guerrillas controlled the night. Sinwŏn township, Kŏch’ang county, South ROK forces andtheguerrillas,therewere areaswherethegovernment forcesdominatedinthe between battles of succession a Amid Chiri-san. to wipe around guerrillas Communist operations out difficult conducting while scandal second a creating for responsible of hisregime. while otherwritersviewitasacleardemonstrationoftheundemocraticandcorruptcharacter Kinyŏm Saŏphoe 1992: vol. 3). Millett (2010) blames Rhee for National Defense Forces scandal, (Chŏnjaeng on August1951 execution 13, their with ended scandal The death. to individuals top 11 15, June five sentenced On court-martial the later, Forces. days Four tribunal. Defense military a before appeared National leaders the of leaders of arrest the announced Ki- Yi bung Minister Defense National new later, days Ten 7. May on post conceal his from to incident, attempted the had who Sŏng-mo, Sin Defense National of Minister remove to Rhee compelled also It 1951. 12, May on disbanded which Forces, Defense National the dissolve to illness, andexposure. starvation, of died men goods enlisted 1,000 than more and result, a As organization. money the to allocated misappropriated leaders Forces Defense National training. receive to were they where province, Kyŏngsang inthe North to foot on new enlistees travel to Forces Defense the National ordered staff of chief Army ROK the intervention, China’s after weresouthwardforces retreat UNC headlong when in 1951, January in Then, organization. TaehanYouthCorps appointed Rhee 16, December on law the promulgating defense. After of minister the from instruction on acted who staff, of chief Army ROK the of supervision and command the under was Forces Defense National for except 40, soldiers, police, and public servants, to enlist in the and equivalent of second reserve forces. The 17 of ages the between men required It emergency. national of time in December 11, 1950, which on authorized Act the Forces training Defense of National reservists and the their enacted prompt Assembly mobilization National the intervention, Chinese the ROKarmed forces that hada negative impact on its conduct of the war. After the (Palais 1974,Kim1972,2012). greatly attheexpenseof both theinternationaland domestic legitimacy of his government e Ash These scandals were sources of embarrassment for the Truman administration. In thewinterof1950and1951,soldiersinROK Army’s 11thDivisionwere 1951 30, on April bill a passed it scandal, the about learned National Assembly the When Korean War,During the SouthKoreaexperiencedtwoinfamousscandalsinvolving gate Re s e arch Comp anion toth 32 e Ko rean W leaders to key positions inthenew leaders tokey ar Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 06:50 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315613611, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315613611.ch2 Hsoy f oe: rm Ln o te onn Cl” o tts n Conflict in States to Calm” Morning the of “Land From Korea: of History Kim, J.2012.A Keefer, E.C. 1991. The Truman administration and the South Korean political crisis of 1952: of crisis political Korean South the and administration Truman The 1991. E.C. Keefer, Henderson, G.1968.Korea:ThePoliticsoftheVortex.Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press. Chay, J.2002.UnequalP Chŏnjaeng Kinyŏm Saŏphoe [War Memorial of Korea] comp. 1992. Cho, S.S. 1967. S.S. Cho, adi, . 94 Itouto, in Introduction, 1974. F. Baldwin, References accepted intothe“FreeWorld”andgainedopenaccesstoafreemarketeconomy. sense of social hierarchy. Although it came under military rule, as a U.S. ally, the ROK was to pave theway forSouthKoreanstoabandonnarrowregionalismandtheirtraditional infringements onthebasicrightsofSouthKoreans.Onotherhand,war helped of imposition the justified and anti-communism extreme fueled that insecurity of sense enmity between thetwoKoreas.Inparticular,itgave riseintheROKtoapermanent (Clark 1954,Stueck1995). permanent clientoftheUnitedStatesand recipient ofenormous military and economic aid a into ROK the transforming concessions made administration Eisenhower the that lament Clark,the MarkW. General treaty. the UNC commander, credits Eisenhower administration Rhee with practicing skillful through hardball politics, war,the but other historians guarantee the asecurity end provide to to offered Eager reunification. achieve to fighting to failed continue and control UNC removefrom to forces threatened ROK he agreement, the wreck prisoners Korean North of release his After armistice. an respect to ROK the for Halliday, J. 1974. The United Nations and Korea, in Korea, and Nations United The 1974. J. Halliday, Gayn, M.1948.JapanDiary uig, . 1981. B. Cumings, Clark, M.W. 1954.FromtheDanubetoYalu. NewYork: Harper. Kim, C.1973.TheKoreanWar: TheFirst The Long P Gaddis, J.L.1987.The UnwantedDobbs, C.M.1981.The Symbol: American ForeignPolicy, the ColdWar, and ____. 1990.TheOriginsoftheKoreanWar: TheRoaringoftheCataract, 1947–1950. Princeton, 1943–1950, Relationship, Korean–American The Conflict: of ____. 1983.Introduction,inChild Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press. Relationship Since1945 Development oftheKoreanWar, 1950–1953 . Seoul:Kwangmyŏng Publishing. democracy’s failure? Since 1945,editedbyF.Baldwin.NewYork: Pantheon Books,3–37. Berkeley: University ofCaliforniaPress. States, 1948–1953.Westport, CT:Praeger. The KoreanWar hardenedthedivisionofKoreanpeninsula,addingto University Press. of theKoreanWar]. Vols2,3,5.Seoul:HaengnimCh’ulp’ansa [HaengnimPublishing]. Korea, 1945–1950.Kent,OH:KentStateUniversity Press. NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press. edited byB.Cumings.Seattle: Press,3–55. Regimes, 1945–1947.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversity Press. Korea inWorldPolitics, 1940–1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibility The Origins oftheKoreanWar: LiberationandtheEmergenceofSeparate Pacific Historical Review , editedbyF.Baldwin.NewYork: Pantheon Books,109–42. artners inP artners . NewYork: William Sloane Associates. eace: InquiriesintotheHistoryofColdWarYork:New . 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Han’guk chŏnjaeng sa ar Without P arallel: The [History of Child of