This article was downloaded by: 10.3.98.104 On: 29 Sep 2021 Access details: subscription number Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War James I. Matray, Donald W. Boose South Korea Publication details https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315613611.ch2 Jinwung Kim Published online on: 18 Aug 2014 How to cite :- Jinwung Kim. 18 Aug 2014, South Korea from: The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War Routledge Accessed on: 29 Sep 2021 https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315613611.ch2 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT Full terms and conditions of use: https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. 2 South Korea Jinwung Kim Shortly after Korea was liberated from Japanese imperialist rule in August 1945, southern Korea below the 38th parallel came under U.S. military occupation. On September 9, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge and his 72,000-strong XXIV U.S. Army Corps landed in Korea. On September 11, the Americans established the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) and began their three-year military rule. This would be the first step toward creation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in August 1948 that came after the United States and the Soviet Union refused to agree on a plan for restoration of sovereignty to a reunited Korean nation. Perhaps the best source of information about the ROK’s history from its creation until the end of the Korean War is the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States, which reprints in annual volumes primary documents that report on internal events in South Korea. With few exceptions, most authors who have examined U.S. occupation policy have been critical.1 In particular, John Merrill judges it a “failure by any standard,” because it solidified Korea’s tragic division, destroyed the spontaneous outpouring of popular participation represented by the people’s committees, entrenched in power unpopular rightist elements, and intensified the polarization of Korean politics that caused the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 (Merrill 1989: 55). Kim Chŏm-kon thinks that it was simply “a miserable failure” (Kim 1973: 81). James I. Matray (1985) stresses that U.S. Korea policy suffered from illogic and inconsistencies. Revisionist writers understand the failure of U.S. occupation policy from a different perspective. Frank Baldwin sees U.S. policy in southern Korea as a “conscious counterrevolution” (Baldwin 1974: 10). Similarly, Bruce Cumings (1981) criticizes the Americans for failing to meet the expectations and wishes of Korea’s people. They did not take account of widespread Korean demands for thoroughgoing political, economic, and social change and sought only to build a bulwark to stem the tide of Soviet-inspired and domestic revolution in southern Korea. Jon Halliday also blames the United States for ignoring the wishes of the Korean people in attempting to set up a reactionary regime in southern Korea (Halliday 1974). Overall, to most historians, U.S. occupation policy in southern Korea suffered from inconsistencies, uncertainties, confusions, and failures.2 1 An official history presents a detailed and valuable account of the U.S. occupation of Korea. U.S. Armed Forces in Korea, History of the United States Armed Forces in Korea (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1948). 2 A few writers assess U.S. occupation policy affirmatively. For instance, Jongsuk Chay writes that despite many mistakes and problems, the Americans made “important and positive accomplishments” in southern Korea. He believes that no nation could have done a better job than the United States did during the difficult years (Chay 2002: 66–7). Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 06:50 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315613611, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315613611.ch2 THE AshGatE RESEARCH COMPANION TO THE KOREAN WAR A fundamental problem that the USAMGIK faced was unpreparedness. Most historians believe that the Americans lacked any definite plan of action for the task of governing Korea (Cho 1967, Henderson 1968). Lack of an informed, consistent, or effective policy later resulted in frustration, fumbling, and a half-hearted commitment to South Korea’s defense. Matray (1985) explains that the Truman administration did not anticipate occupation of a portion of Korea on short notice and therefore, on the eve of U.S. entry into southern Korea, it had not completed a definite set of directives for the U.S. occupation commander. On the other hand, Cumings (1981) contends that at the time the United States had definite goals and policies regarding Korea. The Americans wanted to block the southward flow of Soviet power in Korea, and this dictated the logic of the occupation in the first place. Those who stress American preparedness for occupying and administering southern Korea insist that the United States not only was well-informed about Korea, but made preparations for Japan’s premature surrender and fully considered the possible deterioration of Soviet–U.S. relations in formulating its Korea policy. In particular, they emphasize that in 1945, U.S. forces and civil affairs teams had considerable knowledge of Korea because they had a massive, detailed study entitled “Joint Army–Navy Intelligence Study of Korea” (JANIS-75) (Cumings 1981). However, left revisionist views constitute a minority opinion. Moreover, the course of U.S. military occupation provides little evidence of American preparedness for it. Assignment of the XXIV U.S. Army Corps to occupy southern Korea represents a prime example of an absence of U.S. preparations. Washington selected Hodge’s force because it was stationed relatively nearby—600 miles away—on Okinawa, not because it had any specific qualifications to administer Korea affairs.3 Most historians agree that Hodge was definitely not suitable for the job he would hold in Korea. He had no training or experience in the administration of civil affairs or knowledge of Asian, not to mention Korean, culture or politics (Matray 1995, Cumings 1981). Joyce and Gabriel Kolko even criticize Hodge for perceiving Korea as a part of enemy territory and coming to the country as a “conqueror,” not a “liberator” (Kolko and Kolko 1972: 282). E. Grant Meade, who served in the USAMGIK, rightly reports that Hodge had no well-qualified advisor with him to moderate his shortcomings. H. Merrell Benninghoff and William R. Langdon, Hodge’s political counselors, were just as ignorant about Korea and lacked “an adequate caliber” to perform their duties in Korea satisfactorily (Meade 1951: 225, 228, 235). On the other hand, Allan R. Millett judges Hodge to be realistic, specifically regarding the U.S. trusteeship proposal and the U.S.–Soviet Joint Commission. Hodge thought that unification was a dead issue, while having no illusion that democracy would come to southern Korea as a result of elections (Millett 2005). Many historians believe the United States definitely applied the containment policy to the Korean peninsula (Meade 1951, Pelz 1983, Matray 1985). Representative of this group, Cumings defines the pre-1946 U.S. actions in Korea as a “de facto containment policy” (Cumings 1983: 16). Jongsuk Chay (2002) also claims that the U.S. government began to take measures to prevent Communist expansion, waging the Cold War in Korea much earlier than 1946 with unfortunate consequences. As the United States sought to build a barrier against Soviet expansion at least in the southern half of the Korean peninsula, it abandoned its original objective of seeking to establish a democratic, unified nation. Acting on Cold War logic and eager to stop the spread of Soviet power and influence, the officers of the USAMGIK sought to maintain the social status quo and build a political bulwark against communism 3 Initially, Joseph W. Stilwell and his U.S. Tenth Army were scheduled to occupy Korea, but Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi vetoed Stilwell. U.S. leaders had believed that presumably because Stilwell had spent years in Asia, he therefore would be much more sensitive and flexible than Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Korean conditions and effective in dealing with Korean affairs (Stueck 2002). 24 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 06:50 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315613611, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315613611.ch2 SOuth KOREA in its occupation zone. Criticizing U.S. policy and especially Hodge for inflexibility, William Stueck contends that had the Americans supported the leftist Korean People’s Republic (KPR), thus encouraging “coalition” rather than “class politics,” Koreans might have taken the lead in realizing the vision of a united, independent nation (Stueck 2002: 35).4 Chay (2002) believes that 1946 was a critical year for Korea, as well as for Korea–U.S. relations. A number of important actions and events in the political arena took place, notably the USAMGIK’s efforts to create a moderate left-right coalition, establishment of an interim legislative assembly as a step toward Korean independence, and the eruption of massive popular rebellions in southern Korea. Arguably the most important development, however, was the first Soviet–American Joint Commission meetings to agree on a plan for reunification.