SIPRI Policy Brief October 2017
ASSESSING MEANING SUMMARY w With an estimated 3.8 billion CONSTRUCTION ON SOCIAL Internet users worldwide, new media in the form of Web 2.0 MEDIA: A CASE OF applications and its user- generated content increasingly rival traditional media as the NORMALIZING MILITARISM means of circulating and gathering information. Central susan t. jackson, jutta joachim, nick robinson and to the power and importance of andrea schneiker* social media is its visuality and the speed with which content can circulate. However, INTRODUCTION project, a three-country team of research and policy often focus researchers working on a four-year on the politics of social media in Social media is a nearly ubiquitous study of the militarization of social aspect of everyday life, with terms of revolutionary change, media. For this brief, the project as a tool of radicalization, or as a political and social implications that examined a crucial aspect of societies are only now starting to resource for disseminating everyday social media usage and information and the challenges approach. With an estimated meaning construction that is almost this poses to states. 3.8 billion Internet users worldwide, totally ignored by policymakers: As a part of the Militarization new media in the form of Web the presence of the military and 2.0 project, this Policy Brief 2.0 applications and their user- content that celebrates militarism. examines the social media generated content increasingly It demonstrates the sheer scale of content that celebrates rival traditional media as the such content, discusses its meaning, militarism as an important means of circulating and gathering shows how it is engaged with and aspect of everyday social media usage and the related meaning information. Central to the power circulated by social media users construction overlooked by and importance of social media is its and discusses the implications for visuality and the speed with which policymakers. The research citizens and government. results indicate that while there content can circulate. Researchers The conclusions are perhaps and policymakers, however, have is an abundance of militaristic counter-intuitive. While the content, much of this content primarily focused on the political research identifies an extraordinary reaches targeted audiences. implications of social media in terms volume of social media content that of promoting revolutionary change celebrates war and militarism, much (e.g. the optimism around the ‘Arab of which is engaged with by tens of Spring’), as a tool of radicalization millions of social media users, it is (e.g. concerns about recruitment to also fair to say that the vast majority terrorist organizations such as the of social media users do not see Islamic State group) or as a resource nor engage with online militarism. for disseminating information and There is, therefore, a highly effective the challenges this poses to states form of ‘targeted militarism’ (e.g. Wikileaks). through which those who heavily This Policy Brief builds on the engage with militarized social work of the Militarization 2.0 media become ever more effectively
*The research for this brief was funded by Vetenskapsrådet (the Swedish Research Council) as part of its ‘Digitized societies: past, present and future’ four-year framework grants. The project ‘Militarization 2.0: Militarization’s social media footprint through a gendered lens’ was conducted by teams headed by Dr Susan T. Jackson (Principal Investigator), Stockholm University; Dr Nick Robinson, University of Leeds, United Kingdom; Dr Jutta Joachim, Radboud University, Netherlands; and Dr Andrea Schneiker, University of Siegen, Germany (Grant no. VR/340/2102/5990). 2 sipri policy brief targeted by the algorithms within understandings of national security social media itself. This Policy associated with militarism. Brief explores the implications this targeting has for policymakers. THE COMMUNICATIONS The discussion seeks to TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION1 inform policymakers and their staff, members of civil society The current global information organizations (CSOs) and others age is soundly centred on a interested in assessing the communications technology political implications of meaning revolution that is redefining ‘the construction related to social media relationship between producers and content more generally, and the receivers of online information’.2 content of the large-scale producers This relationship is a crucial aspect of conventional weapons (major of how policymakers and their arms producers), the military video constituents interact. In addition, games industry, and private military the recognition that information and security companies (PMSCs) in and communication technologies particular. (ICTs) are a central part of modern The findings are particularly society has prompted policymakers important to ministries of and others to include ICTs in foreign affairs and other parts their long-term goals, for example of government that engage through the United Nations internationally or work with Sustainable Development Goals, international politics or are corporate social responsibility concerned with digital diplomacy strategies and state-level education and other more traditional forms plans. In this context, however, of security and communication. there are a number of contributors Similarly, it is vital for CSOs that are often overlooked because working on security issues or they are considered to be non- for disarmament, which face political in their messaging, such challenges from the online as corporate actors that use social activities of those who oppose media to sell products and services disarmament. Given how to general audiences. What does fundamental digital information it mean when corporate branding and online communication are lends itself to national identity for communicating with and construction at the same time as it is connecting people, this Policy Brief geared to wide swathes of the public outlines how social media can be a for general consumption? Crucial political tool in both expected and in the context of militarized social unexpected ways. It highlights the media is the fact that while some of underlying mechanisms that shape the social media content is designed the messaging on social media— to sell products in the conventional specifically in corporate YouTube sense, such as military video game videos, Twitter feeds, Facebook pages, and homepages—and how it 1 The research presented here is based is crucial at this juncture to develop primarily on platforms popular in North America and Europe (YouTube, Facebook and the skills needed to see how these Twitter) and posts primarily in English. mechanisms can be manipulated 2 Carpenter, C. and Drezner, D. W., ‘Inter to emphasize particular national relations 2.0: The implications of new media for an old profession’, International Relations Perspective, vol. 11 (2010), pp. 255–72. social media and the normalization of militarism 3 advertisements that are designed users in the world, over 3 billion are to sell a video game or recruitment on social media platforms at any advertising for the military or a given time.5 Combined, the three PMSC, much of it also is designed major platforms covered for this to sell national security as military work have almost 4 billion users security, and to promote the view worldwide, which indicates multi- that the presence of the military in platform use and the potential for everyday life is natural. cross-platform networks. As of Digital information is becoming mid-2017, Facebook had 2.01 billion a fundamental part of the monthly-active users, Twitter had everyday lives of many people. 328 million and YouTube had More than 98 per cent of stored 1.5 billion logged-in visitors.6 Across information is now in digital all age groups, people average two form. User-generated content and hours a day of social media use other Web 2.0 applications are globally; and one in every three now challenging mass media as minutes of online time is devoted to a central way of gathering news some kind of social networking or and other information.3 The messaging.7 International Telecommunications Recent research also indicates Union (ITU)—the UN’s specialized that the growing positioning of agency for ICTs—issues an annual ICT companies report on the state of ICTs and means that Some military video game advertisements ICT use.4 According to the most online platforms that are designed to sell a video game or recent of these reports, urban and those who recruitment advertising for the military populations have more access to the develop them or a PMSC are also designed to sell Internet and younger generations are increasingly are growing up with social media part of the divide national security as military security, and as an unquestioned part of their that separates to promote the view that the presence of everyday lives. While many parts developers from the military in everyday life is natural of Africa and South East Asia lag in users, and that comparison, 830 million, or the latter are left out of decision- 80 per cent of the young people in making processes on what the the 104 countries covered in the technologies will do.8 Part of the UN report, are online. Regardless 5 of region, men are online more than Kemp, S., ‘Three billion people now use women, and the largest gender gap social media’, Wearesocial.com, 10 Aug. 2017, 4 Sep. 2017. is observed in the Least Developed 6 Matney, L., ‘YouTube has 1.5 billion Countries. Of the 3.8 billion Internet logged-in monthly users watching a ton of mobile videos’, Techcrunch.com, 4 Sep. 2017; Statista.com, ‘Number of monthly active 3 Cukier, K. N. and Mayer-Schoenberger, V., Twitter users worldwide from first quarter ‘The rise of big data: how it’s changing the way 2010 to second quarter 2017 (in millions)’ 4 Sep. we think about the world’, Foreign Affairs, May/ 2017; and Zephoria.com, ‘The top 20 valuable June 2013; and Ghannam, J., Social Media in the Facebook statistics’, updated Aug. 2017, Arab World Electronic Resource: Leading up to accessed 4 Sep. 2017. the Uprising of 2011 (Center for International 7 GlobalWebIndex.net, ‘GWI social: Media Assistance and National Endowment for GlobalWebIndex’s quarterly report on the Democracy: Washington, DC, 2011). latest trends in social networking’, 4 International Telecommunication Union 4 Sep. 2017. (ITU), ‘ICT facts and figures, 2017’, ICT Data 8 Tufekçi, Z., ‘Engineering the public: and Statistics Division, Telecommunication big data, surveillance and computational Development Bureau, accessed 4 Sep. 2017; and politics’, First Monday, vol. 19 (2014), 31 Aug. ITU, ICT Facts and Figures, 2016 (ITU: Geneva, 2017; McCarthy, D., ‘Technology and “the 2016). international”: or how I learned to stop 4 sipri policy brief
power of online platforms is derived Online threat at this level influences from the lack of transparency the widespread withdrawal from in the platform algorithms that contentious, but also often benign, filter or direct how the Internet subject areas on social media. and social media are used. For Self-censorship also means that the example, the ‘recommendations’ algorithms that filter content have a suggested by various platforms, gendered impact, not least because often during searches or while in filtering means that lower levels of the process of viewing something, participation or responses are likely build on the previous searches made to translate into different activations by a particular viewer or from a of the filter choices. particular ISP (Internet service As a structural feature of online provider), seeming to indicate what communication, in particular a user should be interested in or of social media and related what could be seen as popular or functionality such as posting trending at any given moment. comments on webpages, anonymity These filters can have important facilitates trolling and other kinds of impacts on user behaviour because online hate, and also radicalization. what viewers or users are exposed Coupled with distance—often both to online can have an impact on geographic in the physical world whether and how they participate and in real time in the virtual or respond. In particular, it is world—anonymity empowers social important to be aware of self- media users to post and comment censorship and echo chambers. Self- under fewer social constraints. This censorship occurs when individuals type of behaviour strengthens the choose not to engage online links between the algorithms and because of the level of discomfort online behaviour. or the potential In terms of user behaviour, Filters can have important impacts on to feel, or actually however, research has shown user behaviour since what users are to be, threatened that people do not become more online—and at times polarized but rather polarized exposed to online can influence whether in the physical people tend to rely more on the and how they participate or respond world. Because of Internet for information and tend to the level of ‘online rely on sites that confirm what they trolling’ and other threats to already believe—a key contributory women and girls, self-censorship is factor to so-called echo chambers.10 a particularly gendered behaviour. These echo chambers also act as In 2015, the UN Broadband a type of filter by indicating to Commission for the Digital the algorithms what people in a Development Working Group on given network or friend group like. Broadband and Gender reported Networks or groups of people then that 73 per cent of women and coalesce around liked-minded girls in the world had experienced understandings of the information cyber-violence in some form.9
for Digital Development Working Group on worrying and love determinism’, Millennium: Broadband and Gender (UN Women, UNDP Journal of International Studies, vol. 41 (2013), and UNESCO: New York, 2015), p. 2. pp. 470–90. 10 Nie, N. H et al., ‘The World Wide Web 9 United Nations, Cyber Violence Against and the US political news market’, American Women and Girls: A World-Wide Wake Up Call, Journal of Political Science, vol. 54 (2010), Report by the UN Broadband Commission pp. 428–39. social media and the normalization of militarism 5 they share, thereby reinforcing THE MILITARIZATION OF users’ perceptions that what they SOCIAL MEDIA: AN OVERVIEW are seeing is more widespread and Social media and the three socially acceptable than it generally industries is, because people often think that what they are seeing is what others It is in the context of the global are seeing and approve of too. information age and the revolution Living in such echo chambers in communications technology that can have a spiralling effect that the staggering array of militarized essentially limits the types of online content has grown on social media. information to which people are The Militarization 2.0 project exposed. Thus, seeing only what focused on the social media content your one’s network does and being of the top global arms producers, exposed to like-minded comments the military video games industry by like-minded people reinforces and PMSCs—three industries that existing views. Recent research have an official corporate social also suggests that the type of device media presence (see box 1). All of the used to access online information major arms-producing companies, can matter, and these differences such as Saab, BAE Systems and in devices will have an impact on Lockheed Martin, have a social research findings going forward. media presence across YouTube, For instance, in terms of mobile Twitter and Facebook. In the Internet use, people tend to watch popular cultural sphere, military more videos on tablets than on video games such as Call of Duty and smart phones, although social the Swedish developed Battlefield media of all types are accessed series sell many millions of copies more on smart phones than on per annum and the associated 11 tablets. This difference in mobile promotional videos produced access according to device type for the military games analysed might mean that the audiences have been watched over 1 billion looked to for an understanding of times on YouTube. In the case of the militarization of content are PMSCs, their activity on Twitter different depending on the type of and YouTube is integral to their access. recruitment objectives. This polarization effect becomes important in a variety of ways POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND that have broader implications ANALYSIS for how the politics of social media are researched (including Because social media and online further studies on militarism and communications more broadly militarization) and how policy are a vital part of international is formulated. These aspects are relations at the everyday level and discussed below. contribute to how people perceive and respond to the world around them, policymakers and CSOs need the skill sets to be able to critically assess the social media content of international relations, in particular the content produced by actors often 11 Kemp (note 5). thought to produce neutral political 6 sipri policy brief
Box 1. Key facts about the social media presence of arms and military video games industries and private military and security companies
Arms producers According to the most recent figures available from SIPRI, the sales of arms and military services by the SIPRI Top 100 largest arms producers and military services companies totalled $370.7 billion in 2015.a SIPRI’s 2012 Top 100 Arms-producing and Military Services Companies were used as the basis for mapping the arms industry’s social media presence. At that time, these arms producers had 88 official corporate YouTube channels; 69 on Facebook; and 75 on Twitter, not including those channels/ accounts for company divisions and for individual weapon systems such as those for the F-35 and related programmes. b
The military video games industry Video games are the archetypal example of the digitized society. The sector is projected to grow to $93.2 billion per annum by 2019 at an annual growth rate of 5.7 per cent. c Women in key markets such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan now make up nearly half of all players, and players are spending ever longer hours at play. d One of the key industry sub-sectors is that of military combat games. The Call of Duty series (the industry leader in sales terms) has combined sales of over 250 million copies and total revenues of over US$ 15 billion, making it globally one of the largest popular entertainment franchises in terms of revenues generated. e Yet the importance of military video games is also explicitly political. Highly controversially, the military is increasingly moving into video game-based recruitment, through the production of military games such as America’s Army in the USA (2002–ongoing) and Glorious Mission in China (2011–ongoing), and devising recruitment campaigns based on video game-based iconography, such as the 2009 ‘Start Thinking Soldier’ campaign in the UK. f There are also wider concerns and military games are frequently accused of ‘racial othering’ and promoting ‘recreational violence’. g
Private military and security companies Private military and security companies (PMSCs) have been defined as ‘private business entities that provide military and/or security services . . . in particular, armed guarding and the protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel’. h Governments, or rather their militaries, such as US and British governments, have increasingly relied on PMSCs, particularly when engaged in missions in conflict zones, for example, in Afghanistan or Iraq. While it is quite common to define PMSCs in functional terms with respect to their services, a number of scholars have criticized this approach. They argue that focusing on functionality masks the ideational and political aspects of the work—aspects that form an increasingly important part of their commercial transactions and competition. Sharing these concerns—and based on the assumption that it is not just their often claimed efficiency and effectiveness, but rather that PMSCs themselves shape and influence how they are perceived—the project examined their social media use. In 2014, of the 584 PMSCs surveyed by the project, 252 had at least one social media account. Approximately 40 per cent were on Facebook and Twitter and over 10 per cent were on YouTube.
a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), ‘Global arms industry: USA remains dominant despite decline, sales rise in Western Europe and Russia, says SIPRI’, Press release, 5 Dec. 2016,. b Militarization 2.0 Project Data on the Top 100 Arms Producers in 2012 (collected Oct. and Nov. 2014). c PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), ‘Video games: Key insights at a glance’, Global entertainment and media outlook, 2015–19, PWC Outlook Insights, 4 Sep. 2017. d Interactive Software Federation of Europe, Video Games in Europe: Consumer Study, European summary report (London: IPSOS Media CT, November 2012); and Entertainment Software Association, ‘Essential facts about the computer and video game industry: 2017 sales, demographic and usage data’, 4 Sep. 2017. e Activision, ‘Activision Blizzard announces fourth quarter and full year 2015 financial results’, Press release, 11 Feb. 2016, 4 Sep. 2017. f British Army, Start thinking soldier, ‘Mission training: SA80 rifle’; Power, M., ‘Digitized virtuosity: Video war games and post-9/11 cyber- deterrence’, Security Dialogue, vol. 38, no. 2 (2007), pp. 271–88; Chan, D., ‘Dead-in-Iraq: the spatial politics of digital game art activism and in-game protest’, eds N. Huntemann and M. Payne, Joystick Soldiers: The Politics of Play in Military Video Games (Routledge: London, 2010); and Robinson, N., ‘Videogames, persuasion and the war on terror: escaping or embedding the military-entertainment complex?’, Political Studies, vol. 60, no. 3 (2012), pp. 504–22. g Šisler, V., ‘Digital Arabs: Representation in video games’, European Journal of Cultural Studies, vol. 11, no. 2 (2008), pp. 203–20. h Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),The Montreux Document: On Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict (ICRC: Geneva, Aug. 2009), 4 Sep. 2017. social media and the normalization of militarism 7 messaging. Understanding the by assumptions around gender, political importance of social media race, class and ethnicity. Such rests on understanding social media combinations often mirror those content, meaning construction in found in the military video games social media posts and comments, industry, and the messaging from and how users engage with social each industry supports the other. media. Furthermore, because the context in which the viewer receives a Militarized social media content message matters, it is telling that arms producers’ YouTube videos The social media content of the arms are often tagged as ‘entertainment’ industry, the military video games or ‘science’, which can further industry and PMSCs represents obfuscate the types of meaning that a mix of material: the blatantly are being constructed. militaristic alongside more banal Military video games in popular images and text that can in effect be culture were subjected to a more powerful than the militaristic detailed analysis. The more than in normalizing the military as the 500 videos produced by the video natural provider of state security. games industry The research presented here and hosted on its Many of the social media messages related focused on the content of the official official YouTube to the arms and video games industries corporate YouTube channels of the channels have three industries and the Twitter cumulatively are frequently part of a complex branding content of PMSCs. been watched process that is connected to a form of state The arms producers’ corporate over 660 million branding presence on social media— times. The analysis especially on YouTube and the focused on the most popular videos these corporations upload military video games, such as those to other online platforms such as in the Call of Duty and Battlefield Facebook and corporate websites— series. A qualitatively informed is blended in an entertainment coding process was used that mindset that results in short films explicitly set out to capture what is and other outputs that seek to seen in these videos. The variables capture the viewers’ attention in focused on: spatial geography much the same way as Hollywood’s (e.g. urban and rural spaces, deserts output. The research analysed over and jungles); indicators of gender 200 arms-related videos, produced (e.g. male and female combatants by both industry users and ‘fans’, and civilians); the type of military that have been watched over equipment represented (e.g. drones, 570 million times. tanks or aircraft); how violence is Using elements identified in depicted (e.g. terrorism, violence the tropes or rhetorical devices against civilians); and, which described below, the arms industry countries were depicted in the uses combinations of images, conflict. This allowed reflection sounds and texts to draw or build on on the ‘militarization tropes’ of a existing stories that evoke certain ‘clean war’, ‘supporting the troops’, understandings about security. ‘technofetishism’ and ‘good, natural These are often complicated 8 sipri policy brief and necessary’, which are set out way and like the military as below.12 ‘enterprising soldiers’.13 In the case of the PMSCs, YouTube videos often are addressed Meaning construction to veterans for recruitment purposes, but so are Twitter Social media content is composed messages. The PMSCs claim to of combinations of images, sounds understand veterans and promise and/or texts that come together in them jobs that allow them to apply meaningful ways. The messages their unique expertise but that are of the social media covered in this also sensitive to their specific needs. Policy Brief are most often part of Companies also convey the message a complex branding process that is that veterans are irreplaceable and usually thought of in terms of public essential to enabling PMSCs to relations and can be considered a do their work properly—they help form of state branding, especially them to support their mission of for the arms and video games defending the state in a similar vein industries. Intertextuality is a to the supporting the troops trope fundamental aspect of analysing found in the arms producers’ and meaning construction on social military video games industry’s media. This means that what is corporate videos. seen, heard and read have meanings In addition to being a business for people because of how images, asset, much in the same way as the sounds and texts overlap with one arms producers often showcase another. Texts, broadly speaking, veterans in their workforces, are not independent and only take veterans are a means for PMSCs on meaning because other texts to assert their superiority as exist. In addition, the power of security actors. In contrast to social media is that much of it is states, which often are accused of about images—whether moving or abandoning those who have fought still. In part because of social media for them, PMSCs pride themselves and the amount of time spent on in compensating for veterans’ it, more and more of everyday life disabilities while at the same time contains visual elements. restoring their manhood and Images are a specific kind of integrating them into society as text that, because of their nature, civilians. Further, the competition make meaning construction more with states’ militaries in the case complicated. They strike in the of recruitment is apparent in the viewer a sense of immediacy of PMSCs’ Twitter recruitment response, are easily circulated messages, in which companies and are often ambiguous in their brand themselves in an ambivalent intended meaning.14 In videos in particular, images are coupled with
13 Strand, S. and Berndtsson, J., ‘Recruiting 12 Robinson, N., ‘Militarism and opposition the “enterprising soldier”: Military in the living room: the case of military recruitment discourses in Sweden and the videogames’, Critical Studies on Security, United Kingdom’, Critical Military Studies, vol. 4, no. 3 (2016), pp. 255–75; and Robinson, N. vol. 1, no. 3 (2015), pp. 233–48. and Schulzke, M., ‘Visualising war? Towards 14 Hansen, L., ‘Theorizing the image for a visual analysis of videogames and social security studies: Visual securitization and the media’, Perspectives on Politics, vol. 14, no. 4 Muhammad cartoons’, European Journal of (2016), pp. 995–1010. International Relations, vol. 17 (2011), pp. 51–74. social media and the normalization of militarism 9 sounds that further convey meaning Systematic examination of online by aiming to influence, among other content—including of institutional things, whether users feel that a posts by corporations and user- message is authentic. Because these generated content as either a (re)post industry actors often are considered or a comment—makes it possible authorities on representing conflict to identify the mechanisms that and security, and their messaging support intended and unintended is linked to official discourses on meaning constructions. Corporate what national security means, how advertising viewers construct meaning from and branding PMSCs use social media to both shape their social media messaging can are typical their image and ‘hide in plain sight’ reinforce the idea that a strong uses of online state using military methods is the communication and social media— natural security provider. Thus, particularly corporate presence on the underlying mechanisms that social media—that lend themselves influence meaning construction in to political messaging that can these messages can be used both be disentangled from traditional consciously and unconsciously notions of advertising. User reposts in part to evoke emotions tied to of and comments on this messaging identifying national security as can contribute to meaning military security.15 construction. In the case of the videos PMSCs usually are viewed promoting video games, there are as either service providers or two key trends. First, there is the mercenaries. The research shows search for authenticity, which is that they are also political actors; normally invoked by videos that they make use of their discursive promote a game through the use power to shape how they are of ‘real actors’ or ‘veterans’ who perceived, increase their sales and are legitimized as ‘advisers’ to establish themselves as acceptable the developers. That said, there is and superior security actors. Like also a very strong entertainment a chameleon, and depending on strand within video games videos, their clients’ needs, they assume which also can be found in a great the identity of a generic business, many of the military equipment a military actor or a humanitarian videos. Here, infographics, rapid actor. images, bombastic music and so PMSCs use social media to shape on are combined in visually and their image, but in somewhat sonically arresting short videos different ways than more that emphasize excitement and conventional businesses: they ‘hide exhilaration. There is thus an in plain sight’. While posting very important secondary type of little about themselves, companies intertextual synergy between the frequently join in viral debates respective industries, in which posting positive content to distract authenticity is suppressed for from the security matters they are excitement. concerned with, such as when they post news related to charitable activities. PMSCs are not just a 15 Jackson, S. T., ‘“Selling” national security: service provider for the military; Saab, YouTube and the militarized neutrality they are increasingly competing of Swedish citizen identity’, Critical Military with it for recruits, using Twitter as Studies (Forthcoming). 10 sipri policy brief
and the active attempts to use social media messaging to sell ideas that benefit from the privileging of the military, industry actors use messaging games either to make war seem not as bad as it is in reality or to profit from war (e.g. when corporations frame soldiers or veterans as business assets). Through their social media messaging, these tropes are combined in ways that convey this acceptance of military security as Figure 1. Word cloud for identifying tropes in arms industry YouTube natural or ‘common sense’. promotional videos The research identified four overarching tropes that repeatedly Source: Militarization 2.0 arms industry database, 2017. play out in the YouTube videos a primary means and particularly from the arms and military video targeting veterans. games industries and in the Often, the messaging used in the industries’ messaging on Twitter corporate promotional material and Facebook. The tropes examined posted by the arms and military are based on Roger Stahl’s research video games industries as well on the first three tropes he discusses as by PMSCs presents military in Militainment Inc.: War, Media and security as a common sense notion Popular Culture and Susan Jackson’s and a natural assumption about development of ‘good, natural and the provision of national security, necessary’ in her writing on the making it something that is difficult arms industry.17 to question outright or even to think The ‘clean war’ trope is when war of questioning in the first place.16 is presented in a way that alienates Corporations use what academic the viewer from the death caused research identifies as tropes, or a by people at war by referring series of rhetorical techniques using to the violence and those who non-literal descriptions to represent perpetrate it in ways that remove something else (see figure 1). Often the feeling of destruction. The arms resting on gendered and racialized industry’s use of the term ‘customer’ constructions, among other things, accompanying an image of a soldier such tropes tend to obfuscate the in uniform or a company referring reality of something, in this case the to the development of a new attack realities of what these industries helicopter as an ‘adventure’ are are marketing—national security examples of the clean war trope. as military security. In this case, The viewer is prompted to think instead of being open about the of the soldier as a consumer militarism behind the messaging rather than a combatant, and the development of a combat aircraft as similar to an excursion or a fun day 16 Jackson, S. T., ‘Marketing militarism in the digital age: arms production, YouTube and out. The use of language removes or “selling” national security’, eds C. Hamilton and L. J. Shepherd, Understanding Popular 17 Stahl, R., Militainment, Inc.: War, Media Culture and World Politics in the Digital Age and Popular Culture (Routledge: London, (London: Routledge, 2016). 2009); and Jackson (note 16). social media and the normalization of militarism 11 hides the industry’s contribution to USA, which is typically attacked war. Advertisements for video games or invaded by an enemy, making similarly emphasize clean war with a military response essential and an absence of collateral damage and morally unproblematic. civilian casualties. The ‘good, natural and necessary’ The ‘technofetishism’ trope is trope—either singularly or when weapons are presented in a together—arises when the military way that glorifies the technological is presented in a way that makes aspects of war, based on the it unquestionably something assumption that technology is good for the public, and natural desirable in and of itself, and and/or necessary for providing consequently obfuscates the effects security for the state. One way in of using the weapons. The arms which companies use this trope is and video games industries rely on to construct an ‘Us’ who belongs technofetishism as a way to make and is protected and two kinds of the equipment they showcase ‘Them’: those who cannot protect interesting to the layperson while themselves so ‘we’ should; and those hiding behind the technical aspects from whom ‘we’ and the weak must of the weapon as a deflection, for be protected. The military—and the example when referencing forward- companies’ weapons—are painted as looking infrared (FLIR) technology good, natural and necessary ways to but not the implications of using it.18 achieve this protection. When a YouTube video refers to a The research related to PMSCs weapon by name, most social media in this project also addressed the users are unlikely to know what it is normalization of military values or what it does. in everyday life. As with technofetishism, the PMSCs take on Tropes in social media messaging are ‘support the troops’ trope arises multiple identities combined to convey the acceptance of when discussion of a war is removed (military, from those who made the decision business and military security as natural or ‘common to go to war to the people who are humanitarian) in sense’ fighting it ‘on your side’, which an eclectic way makes questioning the legitimacy with which their clients can identify of that war difficult. The support and with the help of which they the troops trope manifests itself establish themselves as acceptable, in references to soldiers on the legitimate and normal security battlefront as ‘people in harm’s actors.19 In addition, corporate way’ or in a ‘danger zone’, so that videos and branding on the Internet questioning the war becomes a questioning of something or 19 Joachim, J. and Schneiker, A., Private somebody else. In this way, the Security and Identity Politics: Ethical Hero troops are treated more as victims Warriors, Professional Managers and New of the war than as having chosen Humanitarians (London and New York: Routledge, forthcoming); Joachim, J. and to embroil themselves in a conflict. Schneiker, A., ‘All for one and one in all: This trope is further emphasized PMSCs as soldiers, business managers in military video games by framing and humanitarians’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 27, no. 2 (2014), most of the games around the pp. 246–67; and Joachim, J. and Schneiker, A., ‘Private Sicherheits- und Militärfirmen: 18 Forward-looking infrared is a type of ein Chamäleon der Internationalen Politik’ thermal imaging that enables people to ‘see’ at [Private security and military companies: a night. chameleon of international politics], Zeitschrift 12 sipri policy brief
Table 1. Overview of engagement with militaristic social media content interest news story rather than one about a weapon. The language in Total number Total number Total number Type of content of videosa of views of comments these kinds of stories tends to centre on the entertainment value of the Video game trailers 583 1 654 807 787 4 617 992 experience for the journalist and b Video game walkthroughs 155 134 584 741 377 398 to obfuscate the fighting purpose Video game reviews 37 26 857 482 167 002 of the aircraft behind its technical aspects. In addition, arms industry Video game fan material 56 183 371 498 307 350 communications personnel claim Subtotal video game 831 1 999 621 508 5 469 742 that their YouTube videos are aimed Mainstream pop videos 19 1 854 404 185 848 387 at those in government who will make decisions on weapons funding Military music memes 20 9 260 005 90 074 and purchases, as well as at the Subtotal music 39 1 863 664 190 938 461 broader communities in which the Industry videos 157 218 042 333 158 882 weapons systems are built. This makes questioning policy decisions Industry fan videos 57 354 866 904 182 108 on weapons procurement more Subtotal military industry 214 572 909 237 340 990 difficult because of the common Total all categories 1 084 4 436 194 935 6 749 193 sense notions on which the meaning construction relies.20 a Views of and comments on 1,084 YouTube videos of military video games, rock Similarly, in the case of popular and pop music, and the arms industry. b A video game walkthrough is video that is recorded by a player of a game in culture and in particular video which the person plays through the game with the specific aim of demonstarting games, complex geopolitical social how to complete it. The walkthroughs in this dataset are complete walkthroughs problems such as humanitarian which are subdivided into multiple videos (typically 15–20 per game). In total, catastrophe are always ‘solved’ the dataset contains walkthroughs for a total of 3 mainstream military shooters militarily—there is no place for (Battlefield ,1 Call of Duty Advanced Warfare, Call of Duty Modern Warfare 3), and diplomacy or negotiation in such 5 other video games in which militarism is engaged with, albeit sometimes in a games. Cumulatively, militarized critical way. Where possible the walkthroughs were all taken from the channel social media serves to make the of the Rad Brad
can be embedded in news articles, Analysis: militarized social media adding a certain kind of authenticity engagement or legitimacy to the corporate messaging by framing the branding The research analysed as news and therefore more likely to approximately 7 million YouTube be a credible—rather than corporate comments made by social media biased—representation. For users on a combination of video instance, these kinds of situations games and pop videos with arise when news outlets post a military theme, as well as stories about weapon systems and military equipment videos, both corresponding videos of journalists official industry videos and those flying in combat aircraft trainers produced by military enthusiasts in much the same way as one might (see table 1). The research sought test-drive a car—a kind of human- to track and map what people are saying in their social media
für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, vol. 1, no. 1 (2012), pp. 44–71. 20 Jackson (notes 15 and 16). social media and the normalization of militarism 13 comments and to explore whether addition, from the sample selected what is said is similar or different for the network analysis, media if they are commenting on a outlets seemed to be the biggest video game advertisement or a content providers in sharing military equipment video. At the militarized messaging about arms time of writing, the results are production, thus dominating any preliminary but strong trends mainstream conversation about have been identified for explicit arms production. These initial endorsements of technologically findings suggest that social media superior weaponry. This shows that users who share arms industry the clean war and technofetishism Facebook posts directly from arms tropes are being reaffirmed by producers remain in fragmented social media users. Importantly, groups, which supports the there are also frequent examples polarization claims made elsewhere, of conversations on social media in and the theories on how echo which posters ascribe credibility chambers work. This Facebook to themselves by identifying as research is a work in progress soldiers or former soldiers, which and will be continued beyond the gives them authority to comment Militarization 2.0 project to include on the authenticity of a video game the remediation of corporate posts or a video’s content. This affirms that are hosted by and shared the importance of the support through fan or enthusiast channels, the troops trope, as responses as these channels often have a wider that fail to value such comments viewership and larger comments are frequently ‘dealt with’ in a sections. very aggressive manner. Finally, Tweets and YouTube videos there are important inter-textual from PMSCs were collected and comments in a significant minority analysed to examine how these of cases in which comments on companies conceive of themselves military equipment videos will, for and construct their identities. A example, mention that the writer focus on the identities of the PMSCs has used the equipment in a military rather than the services they offer video game. sheds light on the discursive power Preliminary research on mapping of companies, social networks across Facebook through which Cumulatively, militarized social media and the sharing of militarized they position serves to make the presence of the content from arms producers themselves in suggests that arms producers’ an increasingly military, war and war fighting seem ‘Facebook friends’ are a fairly competitive ubiquitous and ‘normal’ isolated group of users. The market by telling network of shared information their clients who they are, which from official corporate pages to group or groups they belong to other, non-militarized locations on and what makes them distinctive. Facebook seems to be unstructured Identities also can mean influence: and inefficient in terms of how through them, actors can shape broadly this information is shared. how they are perceived by other The networks through which the actors, reinforce and reproduce the information is shared are more meaning of the particular identities like ‘fan clubs’ than a targeted they appropriate, or even completely spread of militarized messaging. In change how they are constituted. 14 sipri policy brief
From a gender perspective, similar to that already viewed, PMSCs draw on civilized and compounding the echo chamber accepted forms of masculinity and effect. femininity, presenting themselves In order to understand how as ‘highly skilled professional’ militarized social media are military strategists and ordinary experienced by social media users, businesses akin to banks or and the importance of this echo insurance companies. However, chamber effect, a number of focus PMSCs also engage in strategies groups were conducted with social of (hyper)masculinization and media users. The findings were pathologization to set themselves perhaps counter-intuitive. Many of apart from mercenaries, their the respondents reported little or private sector competitors and no experience of militaristic social state security forces. In this media. There are three competing respect, companies appear to view explanations for this: a failure to themselves as ‘ethical hero warriors’ recall, algorithms within social and claim to differ from their media that filter what is seen, and predecessors and black sheep in the self-regulation of social media industry on the grounds that they content. While, on the surface, are not only committed to ethical the capacity of the respondents and moral conduct, but also truly to avoid militaristic social media concerned about peace and order may provide some comfort to those around the globe. concerned about technological determinism and the vulnerability The consequences of militarized of the public to militarization, social media this leads to a deeper cause for concern. While the majority do In addition, there are a number not experience militarism in this of structural issues regarding sphere, the algorithms within social media and the meaning social media and social media construction that centres on practice suggest more effective common sense assumptions about targeting of those predisposed to military security. As noted above, militaristic content and perhaps the algorithms behind the social most susceptible to pro-military media platforms can lead to an messages. User exposure and echo chamber effect in which reaction will be examined further like-minded people gather together, following the Militarization 2.0 causing divisions in the virtual project to explore whether different world. These echo chambers might segments of the online population— mean that only those who are such as members of the military, predisposed to the pro-militarism arms producers’ employees, gamers messaging are likely to be exposed and others—experience higher to it.21 Algorithms can contribute levels of militaristic content due to this exposure by continuing to—or perhaps in spite of—the to recommend content that is algorithms. Understanding the power of
21 Pears, L. and Robinson, N., ‘Seeing not algorithms is fundamental to seeing: the lived experiences of militarization understanding social media and of/on social media’, Paper prepared for the online behaviour. It requires International Studies Association Annual additional attention from academic, Convention, Baltimore, USA, 22–25 Feb. 2017. social media and the normalization of militarism 15 technology and policy circles, the social media messaging used ideally through people from each by a variety of actors. These skills of these fields working together include the ability to identify how to untangle the very real effects social media messages often are that the backend of technology has inserted into non-military spaces on social and political lives. This and people’s everyday lives, and research on algorithms shows that therefore have the potential to while militarism might be widely normalize military security as the circulating in more isolated corners common sense default security. of the Internet, there are potentially The Militarization 2.0 project militarizing effects on social media is developing a short course on users that could have implications learning how to dissect social media for how extremism-promoting content. This course is geared to online materials are studied and policymakers and members of treated elsewhere. Algorithms are CSOs to enable them to understand an important structural component the messaging in the social media of ‘targeted militarism’, not least content discussed here. if society is concerned about the 2. Diversification of staff skill sets potential for radicalization of can facilitate integration of critical social media users by material assessments of social media content posted for recruitment reasons. into international relations work. The militarism research indicates that a broader view of what might Social media messaging and related qualify as radicalizing material is online behaviour are challenging required, which covers both who what is known about how people it is aimed at and who is providing communicate. The interactive it. The current preoccupation structure of social media and the with radicalization by terrorist algorithms that prompt some kinds organizations when reconsidered of behaviour mean that a variety of as a question of recruitment by all people are needed to work together violent social actors suggests the to understand what is happening on need to think seriously about the social media. This challenge means overlap between how the role of that communications and analysis social media in military recruitment staff need to be interdisciplinary and recruitment to extremist and from a variety of backgrounds. and terrorist organizations is Government agencies and understood. CSOs need to bring in staff with backgrounds in critical media studies and political communication RECOMMENDATIONS alongside experts in technology use rather than assuming that 1. Policymakers and their staff, organizational communication members of CSOs and others who and analysis should be conducted engage with the public need training only by those people who are on critical assessment of social media. trained in public relations and The research shows that people and communications, or marketing and agencies that engage with the public branding. It is also important to need to gain the skills necessary work with academics who specialize to understand visual social media in related fields. and to identify the key tropes in SIPRI is an independent 3. These staff should grow they target militarism to vulnerable international institute social media interaction beyond age groups. At present, much dedicated to research into traditional communications to of the concern in the ‘West’ has conflict, armaments, arms be able to critically analyse what centred on how to restrict access control and disarmament. is happening in everyday social to content that might contribute Established in 1966, SIPRI media communication beyond the to ‘radicalization’ and attract provides data, analysis and institutional channels. vulnerable people to pro-terrorist recommendations, based on messaging. The conclusions of this open sources, to policymakers, Research findings on polarization research, however, suggest the researchers, media and the suggest that policymakers and need for a broader public debate interested public. members of CSOs should look about the ways in which content beyond their established networks GOVERNING BOARD that promotes militarism also to understand online behaviour. In should be considered harmful. The Ambassador Jan Eliasson, addition to the militaristic material targeted militarism found suggests Chairman (Sweden) covered in the research, behaviour that audience demographics are Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar around other types of online content central to an understanding of who (Indonesia) would be better understood if receives cross-platform messaging Dr Vladimir Baranovsky analysis included ways of targeting and whether young people’s online (Russia) how algorithms contribute to echo Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi activities need closer monitoring. chambers and the potential effects (Algeria) of targeted messaging. 5. Better understanding is needed Espen Barth Eide (Norway) regarding the ways in which Ambassador Wolfgang 4. National debates on whether algorithms are used in social media Ischinger (Germany) militarized social media content to effectively target specific audiences Dr Radha Kumar (India) should be more effectively restricted for social media content. The Director for minors. Algorithms drive targeted DIRECTOR Given that so much Internet use is messaging. Policymakers, members by minors, and given the ubiquitous Dan Smith (United Kingdom) of CSOs and academics need a fuller growth of mobile social media grasp of how algorithms work usage by this age group, there are and their political implications. important ethical and normative Policymakers must consider questions to be posed about the whether militarized social media responsibility of the state, arms and should be seen in equivalent terms entertainment industries, and how as ‘radicalized social media content’.
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