Use of Internet in Political Participation in South Korea
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
How Law Made Silicon Valley
Emory Law Journal Volume 63 Issue 3 2014 How Law Made Silicon Valley Anupam Chander Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj Recommended Citation Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 Emory L. J. 639 (2014). Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol63/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CHANDER GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/17/2014 9:02 AM HOW LAW MADE SILICON VALLEY Anupam Chander* ABSTRACT Explanations for the success of Silicon Valley focus on the confluence of capital and education. In this Article, I put forward a new explanation, one that better elucidates the rise of Silicon Valley as a global trader. Just as nineteenth-century American judges altered the common law in order to subsidize industrial development, American judges and legislators altered the law at the turn of the Millennium to promote the development of Internet enterprise. Europe and Asia, by contrast, imposed strict intermediary liability regimes, inflexible intellectual property rules, and strong privacy constraints, impeding local Internet entrepreneurs. This study challenges the conventional wisdom that holds that strong intellectual property rights undergird innovation. While American law favored both commerce and speech enabled by this new medium, European and Asian jurisdictions attended more to the risks to intellectual property rights holders and, to a lesser extent, ordinary individuals. -
00-1Kor Low 9-1ºÔ¼ãfi ȍ
ܽ&TLP(SBQIJDT'MPX%SJWFפগ PIO-FJUOFS@ࢎ1.ಕ+ Journal of Korean Law | Vol. 9, 83-108, December 2009 Identifying the Problem: Korea’s Initial Experience with Mandatory Real Name Verification on Internet Portals John Leitner* Abstract In 2007, Korea implemented the world’s only mandatory real name verification system for individuals wishing to post content on popular Korean internet portals. This system, which expanded in 2009 to include additional portals, has so far been relatively ineffective at its stated purpose of reducing instances of online libel. Together with Korea’s censorship of certain internet sites, the real name verification system distinguishes Korea as regulating internet use more heavily than other democratic societies. I argue that the real name verification system is unlikely to successfully deter future acts of cyber libel, but will rather hinder socially useful online activities, such as free expression on matters of social and political significance. Possible means for strengthening enforcement of the real name verification system would provide little promise of preventing defamation while further interfering with freedom of expression and personal privacy. I propose that Korean law can more effectively balance protection of private reputations with individual liberty interests by changing the real name verification system from a mandatory requirement to an internet portal opt-in system. Korea might also consider an emphasis on civil remedies as a means for minimizing the occurrence and consequences of cyber libel while simultaneously preserving a free and collaborative internet. I. Introduction The widespread proliferation of internet access throughout many societies worldwide has facilitated not only socially positive practices, but also detrimental ones. -
Election Observation Table of Contents
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 25 AND 26 SEPTEMBER 1998 ODIHR ELECTION OBSERVATION TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS III THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK III.1 General III.2 The Electoral System III.3 Some Legal Issues IV THE ELECTION ADMINISTRATION V VOTER AND CIVIC EDUCATION VI VOTER REGISTRATION VII CANDIDATE REGISTRATION VIII THE PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN IX THE MEDIA X OBSERVATION ON POLLING DAY XI OBSERVATION OF COUNTING XII AGGREGATION AND VERIFICATION OF RESULTS XIII RECOMMENDATIONS 2 I. INTRODUCTION Upon invitation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic of 18 August 1998, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe=s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) established an Election Observation Mission in Slovakia for the 25 and 26 September Parliamentary elections. Ms. Helle Degn, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Danish Parliament, was designated by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office as his Representative for the Election in Slovakia. Mr. Kåre Vollan was appointed by the ODIHR as the OSCE On-site Co-ordinator and Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission, and Ms Siri Skåre as Deputy Head upon being seconded by the Government of Norway. The OSCE was involved at an early stage in the pre-election process including a visit by the ODIHR Director, Ambassador Stoudmann, on February 6 and May 5-6, and a visit by the former President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Mr. Javier Ruperez on May 4-5. -
Macron Leaks” Operation: a Post-Mortem
Atlantic Council The “Macron Leaks” Operation: A Post-Mortem Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer The “Macron Leaks” Operation: A Post-Mortem Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer ISBN-13: 978-1-61977-588-6 This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Indepen- dence. The author is solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. June 2019 Contents Acknowledgments iv Abstract v Introduction 1 I- WHAT HAPPENED 4 1. The Disinformation Campaign 4 a) By the Kremlin media 4 b) By the American alt-right 6 2. The Aperitif: #MacronGate 9 3. The Hack 10 4. The Leak 11 5. In Summary, a Classic “Hack and Leak” Information Operation 14 6. Epilogue: One and Two Years Later 15 II- WHO DID IT? 17 1. The Disinformation Campaign 17 2. The Hack 18 3. The Leak 21 4. Conclusion: a combination of Russian intelligence and American alt-right 23 III- WHY DID IT FAIL AND WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED? 26 1. Structural Reasons 26 2. Luck 28 3. Anticipation 29 Lesson 1: Learn from others 29 Lesson 2: Use the right administrative tools 31 Lesson 3: Raise awareness 32 Lesson 4: Show resolve and determination 32 Lesson 5: Take (technical) precautions 33 Lesson 6: Put pressure on digital platforms 33 4. Reaction 34 Lesson 7: Make all hacking attempts public 34 Lesson 8: Gain control over the leaked information 34 Lesson 9: Stay focused and strike back 35 Lesson 10: Use humor 35 Lesson 11: Alert law enforcement 36 Lesson 12: Undermine propaganda outlets 36 Lesson 13: Trivialize the leaked content 37 Lesson 14: Compartmentalize communication 37 Lesson 15: Call on the media to behave responsibly 37 5. -
The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovina Suvremene TEME, (2009.) God
Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovina suvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1 CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1 UDK: 342.84:324(497.6) 327.56($+73:497.6) Pregledni rad Primljeno: 27. 8. 2009. The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Short Review of Political Matter and/or Technical Perplexion MAJA SAHADŽIĆ Faculty of Law, University of Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina The Dayton Proximity Talks were held in the Wright - Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, USA from 1-21 November 1995. They resulted with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (e.g. Dayton Peace Accords, Dayton Peace Agreement) that was signed by the Re- public of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Re- public of Yugoslavia and witnessed by USA, UK, Germany, France, Russia and an EU special negotiator. The Dayton Peace Accords ended the conflict in Bos- nia and Herzegovina and shaped a basis for peace. But, the most important issues for democratic functioning of the state have not become conciliated with international legal standards; such as elections and the electoral system. The Dayton Peace Accords arose from compromises and different trade-offs which account for many open questions regarding the Bosnian electoral system. Key words: electoral system, Bosnia and Herzegovina, political and technical issues, elections, Dayton Peace Agreement 1. Introduction and reference groups, the actual political situa- tion, effects of concrete life conditions, political From a scientific view, elections are ex- socialisation of an individual, activity of electoral ceptionally interesting, since they constitute a campaign so as interested political parties and very important decision that, once brought, in candidates, the role of mass media and many next several years, depending on a concrete more unpredictable effects that compress in, at Electoral Law in an individual country, deter- the fist look, simple decision of choosing a cer- mines the repository of political power. -
Retelling the Story of the 2017 French Presidential Election: the Contribution of Approval Voting Antoinette Baujard, Isabelle Lebon
Retelling the Story of the 2017 French Presidential Election: The contribution of Approval Voting Antoinette Baujard, Isabelle Lebon To cite this version: Antoinette Baujard, Isabelle Lebon. Retelling the Story of the 2017 French Presidential Election: The contribution of Approval Voting. 2020. halshs-02926773 HAL Id: halshs-02926773 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02926773 Preprint submitted on 1 Sep 2020 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. WP 2023 – August 2020 Retelling the Story of the 2017 French Presidential Election: The contribution of Approval VotingA Review Antoinette Baujard, Isabelle Lebon Abstract: This paper proposes an alternative reading of the politics of the 2017 French presidential election, using an unstudied source of information on voters’ preferences: experimental data on approval voting. We provide a new narrative of the election process and outcome. The principal approach for understanding the political context has for many decades been a distinction between left and right-wing political forces. We introduce a method for generating an endogenous political axis, and construct three indices so that we might understand how and why the conventional approach has become progressively irrelevant. We find no gender effect, but instead an age effect. -
Internet Diffusion and Adoption Within Arab-Palestinian Society in Israel
RESEARCH PAPERS INTERNET DIFFUSION AND ADOPTION WITHIN ARAB-PALESTINIAN SOCIETY IN ISRAEL By ASMAA N.GANAYEM Al-Qasemi College of Education (ISRAEL) ABSTRACT This study aims to explore the nature of Internet access and use within Arab-Palestinian society in Israel. The research focuses on two points: (i) examining the pace of Internet growth during the last decade and studying the nature of the digital gaps within the studied society in a specific time, (ii) studying the extend of the effect of cultural factors in comparison to demographic factors on Internet diffusion and adoption. Measuring the digital gaps uses a new tool to measure different facets of Internet diffusion and adoption: nature of Internet access (duration of access, use locations) and nature of use (frequency, variety of use, type of use and language/s used when surfing). Arab-Palestinian society in Israel is a minority that has been distanced from the Israeli mainstream because of ongoing Israeli-Palestinian tensions. Wide gaps exist between Arabs and Jews in Israel in different socio-economic aspects. These gaps exist also in the diffusion of the Internet. This study examines the effect of various demographic (such as age and gender) and cultural (such as residency and religion) factors on Internet use and the position of cultural factors among all these factors. This study used data from the CBS (the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics) to track the development of Internet diffusion in the Israeli society, while for studying the digital gaps within the Arab society the study used data provided to the researcher by the Rikaz Center, which carried out the most exhaustive and representative interview survey of Arab- Palestinians in Israel in 2007 (Rikaz data, 2008). -
IFES Faqs Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2020 Local Elections
Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2020 Local Elections Frequently Asked Questions Europe and Eurasia International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2011 Crystal Drive | Floor 10 | Arlington, VA 22202 | www.IFES.org November 9, 2020 Frequently Asked Questions When is Election Day? ................................................................................................................................... 1 Why are these elections important? ............................................................................................................ 1 What is the electoral system? ....................................................................................................................... 2 Who is eligible to run as a candidate? .......................................................................................................... 2 Who can vote in these elections, and how many registered voters are there? ........................................... 3 What is the campaign timeline, and what are the expenditure and donation limits? ................................. 3 What is the election management body? What are its powers? ................................................................. 4 How is the election management body protecting the elections and voters from COVID-19? ................... 4 What provisions are in place that support the equal rights of women, persons with disabilities, internally displaced persons and other marginalized groups? .................................................................................... -
Dr. Krutika Kuppalli Assistant Professor of Medicine, Division Of
Dr. Krutika Kuppalli Assistant Professor of Medicine, Division of Infectious Diseases Medical University of South Carolina Vice Chair, Global Health Committee, Infectious Diseases Society of America Testimony Submitted to United States House of Representatives Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis Ensuring a Free, Fair, and Safe Election During the Coronavirus Pandemic September 9, 2020 Thank you Chairman Clyburn, Ranking Member Scalise and distinguished members of the Select Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am extremely grateful for your interest and commitment towards helping support the novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic efforts in the United Sates as we attempt to contain this deadly disease and ensure we have a free, fair, and safe election for all citizens on November 3, 2020. I am an Assistant Professor of Medicine in the Division of Infectious Diseases at the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) in Charleston, South Carolina and the Vice Chair of the Global Health Committee for the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA), a national professional organization that represents over 12,000 Infectious Diseases physicians, researchers, public health experts, and other health professionals. I am also an Emerging Leader in Biosecurity Fellow at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security. During COVID-19 I have served as a subject matter expert for the San Francisco Department of Health as the city planned for a coronavirus surge and have provided expert scientific commentary -
North Korea Security Briefing
Companion report HP Security Briefing Episode 16, August 2014 Profiling an enigma: The mystery of North Korea’s cyber threat landscape HP Security Research Table of Contents Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 3 Research roadblocks ...................................................................................................................................... 4 Ideological and political context .................................................................................................................... 5 Juche and Songun ...................................................................................................................................... 5 Tension and change on the Korean Peninsula .......................................................................................... 8 North Korean cyber capabilities and limitations ......................................................................................... 10 North Korean infrastructure.................................................................................................................... 10 An analysis of developments in North Korean cyberspace since 2010 .................................................. 14 North Korean cyber war and intelligence structure ................................................................................ 21 North Korean cyber and intelligence organizational chart .................................................................... -
Candidates Or Parties? Objects of Electoral Choice in Ireland*
p. 1 Candidates or parties? Objects of electoral choice in Ireland* Michael Marsh Department of Political Science Trinity College Dublin Republic of Ireland [email protected] http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/Staff/Michael.Marsh Party Politics: Forthcoming * I want to thank John Garry, Fiachra Kennedy and Richard Sinnott for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Versions of the paper have been presented at departmental seminars in Trinity College Dublin and in the Universities of Aberdeen and Trondheim, as well as at APSA in 2003 and Political Studies Association of Ireland meeting in 2005. I am grateful to all participants for their suggestions. I am also grateful to the Irish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences for a senior research scholarship 2002-2003 which gave me time to write the initial draft of this paper. p. 2 Abstract Under many electoral systems voters can choose between candidates and under some, between candidates of the same party, a situation that makes it possible for candidates to seek a personal vote. Studies of particular countries have shown how personal voting is apparent in the success of particular types of candidates, notably incumbents, but there is little systematic study of personal motives among the electors themselves. The single transferable vote system (STV) used in Ireland certainly allows electors to choose between candidates as well as parties and so is seen to provide a strong incentive for candidates to seek personal votes. While aggregate evidence from election results has pointed to the primary importance of party, survey data has suggested that close to a majority of voters are primarily candidate centred. -
Informational Pamphlet for Election Day Voting
Informational Pamphlet for Election Day Voting Prepared and Distributed by: Secretary of State Approved by: Attorney General, Pursuant to La R.S. 18:421 Disposition: Return Pamphlet in the Green Canvas Bag IP-Elec Day (Rev. 01/20) Informational Pamphlet for Election Day Voting Table of Contents 1.01: Emergency Procedures ................................................................................................. 1 1.02: Before the Election ........................................................................................................ 1 1.03: During the Election ........................................................................................................ 1 1.04: After the Election ........................................................................................................... 1 2.01: Secretary of State .......................................................................................................... 2 2.02: Parish Contacts ............................................................................................................. 2 3.01: Voting Hours .................................................................................................................. 4 3.02: Deputy Custodian Responsibilities ................................................................................. 4 Key Envelope A .............................................................................................. 4 List or Supplemental List Envelope (L-SL) .....................................................