Karnataka's Recent Experience Gopal K Kadekodi and SV

POWER OF VOTING FOR DEVELOPMENT: Karnataka’s recent experience

Gopal K Kadekodi and S V Hanagodimath1

PREAMBLE:

Beauty of democracy is its voting power by the people, for the people and in ruling by themselves. Apart from ‘Justice, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity’ are standing as the institutional pillars resolved to be guaranteed to every citizen of the country, the driving motto behind a democratic process of seeking votes from the citizen is to deliver welfare through ‘development’ to all of them2. Where do we stand with this democratic power of voting today?

Keeping this question in mind, in an earlier monograph of CMDR (Number 73, 2014), the same authors had analyzed the state election paradigms in Karnataka during the period 1999 to 2013 with some specific questions. The major questions addressed and analyzed were:

First, a question was posed: ‘whether the race between the political parties at the constituency levels resonate the voices of people on their socio-economic development needs, either stated or delivered’. Considering all the elections since 1999, this question was then analyzed with the spatial or geographical spread of development status (measured using a Comprehensive Composite Development Index, CCDI) and votes earned by the contesting and/or wining political parties (or elected candidates). The major findings from four assembly elections then arrived in the 2014 Monograph are summarized in two tables, reproduced below, as Tables 1 and 2.

It was clear from the analysis then, that Janata Dal Secular (JD(S)) had concentrated mainly in poorly and middle level developed regions of the state, over time; the Indian National Congress (INC) had spread its pitch evenly all over the state, specifically concentrated in poor and middle level developed regions. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) on the other hand, has always concentrated in middle and well developed regions of the state.

1 Honorary Professor and Assistant Professor respectively, at Centre for Multi-disciplinary Development Research (CMDR), Dharwad, Karnataka 2 The word ‘development’ appears 26 times in the Indian Constitution (in the context of ensuring justice, liberty, equality and fraternity). 1

Table1: Geographical or Spatial Spread3 of Winning Political Parties in the Constituencies against Development Status (CCDI): 1999 to 2013 Karnataka Elections Election Year INC BJP JD(S) Concentrated in most 1999 Spread evenly In poor and middle level developed region Mostly among the poor Concentrated in most 2004 Spread evenly and below average developed region development regions Concentrated among Mostly concentrated in the poor and middle Concentrated in most 2008 middle level developed level development developed region region regions Concentration in more Mostly concentrating on 2013 Spread evenly and most developed midlevel developed region regions Notes: INC=Indian National Congress; BJP=BharatiyaJanata Party; JD(S)=Janata Dal, secular; CCDI= Comprehensive Composite Development Index Source: Kadekodi and Hanagodimath (2014)

It is a different matter to say that JD(S) had concentrated in the strong southern Vokkaliga belt, and BJP in the northern Lingayat belt, with INC scooping with a mixed bag of castes and communities (Rodrigues, 2018). The statistical analyses more or less matched with this caste realignments (Assadi, 20184).

Several additional observations were then made based on the four assembly elections. At the state level as a whole, the link between ‘Percentage of total votes actually voted in the state’ for all the political parties taken together and the ‘level of development’ (as viewed from the CCDIs) of the constituencies is negative in all the four election outcomes (see negative correlations in col.7, Table 2).

Table 2: Correlation between ‘Party wise Share of Votes’ and the ‘Level of Development (CCDI)’ in the Constituencies Election Major political Parties Year INC BJP JD(S) JD(U) Others All Votes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 1999 0.05 0.41 -0.22 -0.21 -0.11 -0.26 2004 0.18 0.35 -0.28 -* -0.18 -0.23 2008 0.08 0.24 -0.17 -* -0.16 -0.13 2013 0.10 0.30 -0.11 -* -0.24 -0.28 *: JD(U) having won only few seats in these years, their voting patterns are not analysed further. INC=Indian National Congress, BJP=Bharatiya Janata Party, JD(S) Janata Dal (secular), JD(U)= Janata Dal (United), CCDI=Comprehensive Composite Development Index (see Kadekodi and Hanagodimath, 2015)

3 This was done with both a mapping technique and applying several statistical causality tests. 4 He identifies the INC’s alignment with various caste groups as an ‘Ahinda’ approach. 2

By implication this has a message: All through the last four elections, lesser and lesser number of people from ‘more and more developed constituencies’ have ‘actually voted’. Development by itself did not enthuse people to vote or to participate in democratic processes. But there is a puzzle. That refers to the voting patterns for individual political parties and development status of the constituencies.

As far as JD(S) is concerned (col.4), over the last four elections, more and more developed constituencies/regions voted less and less for them (indicated by the negative and declining correlation between share of votes of the candidates and CCDI). This is in line with the overall state level total voting pattern. On the other hand, BJP (as can be seen from col.3) has in all the past four assembly elections consistently maintained voting rates positively linked with the level of development (share of BJP votes positively correlated with the CCDIs). These were noted by Vasavi (2008) as attributed to BJP’s ‘planned assault’ and by Assadi (2013) as ‘caste realignments’. On the other hand, INC has always maintained evenly spread voting rates of about 25% in all the four elections, but positively linked (very marginally) to the rate of development. More recent development ventures by INC in the state are various Bhagya schemes, social security schemes, Indira canteen and implementation of MGNREGS and many others. Some of these findings were also noted by Breeding (2011, p.76), in saying that ‘Increased party competition in Karnataka politics; changes in the structure of caste and identity politics; and economic growth…. have led to changes in the existing social structure of day-to-day life in Karnataka and have enhanced electoral competition, as well as changes in vote bank politics’5.

The question now is: How is the link between voting pattern in 2018 assembly elections with development status of the constituencies?

Second, by using NOTA (None of the Above) criterion do the people express their discontent on either a political party or the candidates standing for elections? Since 2014, NOTA was a new choice option given to the voters by the Elections Commission. The evidence (then studied econometrically, with the 2014 Lok Sabha Karnataka elections) revealed that NOTA votings did not reflect either the poor status of development or discontent with the list of candidates standing for elections representing different constituencies (as revealed by

5 Lee (2013) argues that both self-interest and market forces (in contrast to political forces) have been driving the voters to vote. See also Brennan and Lomasky (1993) for some more theoretical arguments on these lines. 3 statistically insignificant but negative correlations). Secondly, NOTA votings do not necessarily reflect for ‘Not voting at all’, as a choice for some other reason. Therefore, it perhaps did stand for only a marginal degree of discontent with either the candidates or the political parties.

The same question has surfaced now with 2018 state assembly elections.

Third, a peculiarity about Karnataka state elections was also noted (in the 2014 Monograph), namely about the major shifts in the political parties returned over the election years since 1951. At the national scene it may be noted that a single partly namely, INC returned as the majority party to form the government continuously since the elections from 1951 to 1977, again later in the years 1980, 1984, 2004 and 2009.

Karnataka showed a different pattern. Several political parties took turn over the years since 1978, as can be seen from the Table 3. During the last 40 years, INC ruled the state four times, Janata Party twice, Janata Dal (United) once, Bharatiya Janata Party once, and INC in alliance with Janata Dal (secular) twice. With the coalition government after 2018 elections between JD(S) and INC, once again a major switch from INC has been noted. A high degree of ‘discontinuity’ as a model (a phrase coined by Assadi, 2018) seems to have making rounds in Karnataka.

Therefore, understanding the logic of forming the present coalition after 2018 elections is called for, to test for continuity of ‘discontinuity’ model.

Finally, two additional views about the link between state of socio-economic development and electoral preferences can be aired about Karnataka electoral politics. One, there has been a general continuity of socio-economic policies, independent of the political parties returned or their development ideologies. Invariably, the development paradigms in Karnataka are thought to be continuous, following a path of ‘incremental changes’ (Manor, 2008a, Assadi, 2018). Second, wherever coalition occurred, it was on a notion of ‘Rainbow’ coalition (Manor, 2008a), with some compromises on developmental goals. Do these hypotheses do hold water anymore?

Table 3: Turnover of Political Parties Ruling in Karnataka Majority Party that formed Sl. No. Year Chief Minister(s) the government K Hanumanthaiah, 1 1952 Indian National Congress K Manjappa S Nijalingappa, 2 1957 Indian National Congress B D Jatti, S R Kanthi, 3 1962 Indian National Congress S Nijalingappa, 4 1967 Indian National Congress Virendra Patil 5 1972 Indian National Congress D Devraj Urs D Devraj Urs, 6 1978 Indian National Congress R Gundu Rao 7 1983 Janata Party Ramakrishna Hegde Ramakrishna Hegde, 8 1986 Janata Party S R Bommai Veerandra Patil, 9 1989 Indian National Congress S Bangarappa, Veerappa Moily H D Deve Gowda, 10 1994 Janata Dal (undivided) J H Patil 11 1999 Indian National Congress S M Krishna Indian National Congress and Dharam Singh, 12 2004 Janata Dal, secular H D Kumaraswamy B S Yeddyurappa, 13 2008 Bharatiya Janata Party S D Sadananda Gowda, JagdishShettar 14 2013 Indian National Congress S Siddharamaiah Indian National Congress and 15 2018 H D Kumarswamy Janata Dal, secular

WHAT IS NEW IN THIS MONOGRAPH?

The results of the most recent assembly elections in Karnataka in 2018 have revealed some different realization about the voting behavior in the state. Therefore, the major questions summarily raised in the Preamble are now put out for fresh examinations. They are:

As part of a development paradigm, do the people exercise their power of voting, keeping in mind the status of development deliverable or delivered by the political parties? Development is the end result of policies of the governments. But the scholarly views are quite at variance. An economic argument for voting is based on the promise of bringing about social and economic development (Jensen and Justesen, 2014), or the ‘developmental status’ delivered or promised by them (Kaplan, 2006; Chauvet and Collier, 2008). Some scholars like Chauvet and Collier (2008) argue that efficacy of democracy has very little to do with improving economic performance. Good economic performance has to follow good public policies. But at the time of elections, ‘political parties often resort to illicit means of securing electoral victory, such as bribery, ballot fraud, and voter intimidation’; and underplaying the

5 thrusts on policies towards development. Hence the voters do not get a flavor of development assurances. Likewise, Kaplan (2006) argues that election promises made through development budget announcements, are often neglected because of poor capacities of the parties to deliver them, or sloppy implementations leading to inflationary impacts. Based on a 47 country-level data, he shows that pre-election budgetary expansions do not produce any major social welfare or economic development, but rather leave the countries with increased fiscal deficits or detrimental outcomes such as inflation.

There is also an argument to say that ‘incumbency’ of political party regimes brings about higher rates of growth, mainly attributed to experience and continuity in management of public goods and services (Luca, 2016). Therefore, ‘Incumbency’ theory is to be contrasted and distinguished from pure ‘Economic motive of voting for development’ (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2011). However, there can also be some degree of complementarity or substitution between the two6. In good economic times (with or without incumbent political parties performing well) people may vote for the incumbent parties; likewise during bad economic periods, people may throw out the incumbent political parties. Therefore, ‘incumbency’ versus ‘pure economics of development’ can be two contrasting hypotheses for gauging voters’ behavior. This hypothes is looked into with Karnataka’s latest elections in 2018.

Talking of development policies, in the Indian context there has been a long history of planning as a tool for delivering development. That used to remain as the major bait, promising the voters about social and economic upliftment in the country. But, as argued by Kashwan (2014) the wait has been too long for the people. The Nehruvian socialistic pattern of development has been a long drawn vote bank promise. Generations are not keen to wait that long. Instead, the globalization since 1991 and the Gujarat model of development, opening the gates for all in an inclusive manner brought some hope of receiving the benefits of development to the voting citizen. Recent reforms such as Right to Information Act of 2006, or Rural Employment Guarantee Schemes such as MGNREGS and innovative Skill Development

6 During the financial crisis the world over during 2008-09, the UPA government in India returned back to form the government in 2009 mainly because of its delivering reasonably high GDP growth rates of above 7% during 2004-08- an example of incumbency based on good economics. A great humanitarian Herbert Hoover, Republican party President of USA during 1929-33 was defeated by Franklin Roosevelt, a Democratic party President in USA, mainly because President Hoover could not handle the world depression of 1932-33- an example of voting out for bad economic management. 6 program etc., have reinforced people’s faith on development as a drive for voting. Therefore, this question about ‘development motive to vote’ remains to be examined for its dynamics.

As stated in the Preamble, other related issues also to be analyses are: about the relevance of NOTA, and ‘pre-planned versus post alignment’ of political parties to rule. These are the major objectives to which this monograph is addressed, for which the voting out-turns in recent state elections in Karnataka are used as possible empirical outcrops.

DOES DEVELOPMENT EVER MATTER FOR VOTING IN ELECTIONS?

‘Why do the people vote’, has been a continuing question, election after elections7. Kadekodi and Hanagodimath (2015) postulated that apart from the psychological pleasure and self-esteem of going to the polls to vote (Lee, 2013; Christiano, 2014), expressions of democratic power and constitutionally empowering equality of every citizen to vote (Christiano, 2014) are also the common denominators for voting. However, people may vote for different political parties and candidates keeping in mind many other aspirations and objectives. We have already noted that till the 2013 elections the voting out-turns in Karnataka did not support this hypothesis of links between developmental goals and deliverables with the party-wise voting rates of winning parties. What do the outturns in 2018 elections reveal about ‘voting for development’? A major hypothesis that can be examined is ‘Incumbancy’ versus ‘economic development motives or promises’, as discussed earlier.

Before addressing this question directly, the constituency-wise 2018 election returns by the winning political parties are viewed by juxtaposing them with development prospects. This is done in two different stages, by juxtaposing the political party-wise voting rates (a) with the developmental status of the constituencies (in 2015), and (b) the geographically constricted eco-zones in Karnataka. As can be seen from Figure 1 in the 2018 elections, BJP has won as many as 104 seats spread in the western, coastal, parts of northern Karnataka; while JDS has claimed, as expected, substantially the southern parts of the state with 37 seats. INC on the other hand has its spread in both the north and southern Karnataka, winning 80 seats, also covering several backward regions.

7 In brief, four different theories can be postulated on this question. They are, a theory of psychological pleasure, pride or self-esteem; economic theory of elections bringing about economic development and upliftment of social welfare; political theory of ‘vote bank’, monetary rewards and incumbency; Sociological theory of reign based on caste, religion, or sects. 7

Figure 1: Party wise Election Winners in the Constituencies in 2018

The developmental status of the constituencies is measured in terms of a Comprehensive Composite Development Index for the year 2015(CCDI)8 as shown in Figure 2. Clearly, 40 constituencies falling in Hyderabad Karnataka region are most backwards in terms of development; while southern and western coastal Karnataka are relatively more developed with 128 constituencies. Constituencies falling in old Bombay state region reveal a mixed bag of development, with most developed to most backward categories.

A close look at the agro-climatic zones in Karnataka (see Figure 3) or, if one overlays the state level Agro-climatic zones on the map of CCDIs, it is revealing that the Hyderabad Karnataka region seems to be disadvantaged in terms of land and soil capabilities (defined as Northern Dry Zones). The Coastal and Southern Transitional zones are relatively well

8Appendix 2 presents the methodology followed in constructing the CCDI indices for the constituencies (modified from taluka level). 9

endowed with good water and soil endowments; and hence with prospects of higher developmental status.

Figure 2: Constituency wise Development Status (measured by CCDI) in 2015

Figure 3: Agro-climatic Zones in Karnataka

Such development dispositions along with the agro-climatic zones clearly suggest some postulates about the possible links between natural capability (identified with soil quality, forest covers, water availability and biodiversity) and the development status. Zone 9 and 10 consisting of Coastal and Hilly regions of Karnataka seem to reveal very high levels of development, in contrast to Zones 1 and 2 consisting of northern dry zones with extremely low levels of development status.

Viewed by the constituency wise election outcomes, it can be said that while BJP has been able to capture constituencies falling the rich agro-climatic and well developed regions of the state, INC stretched its arms to backward and agro-climatically disadvantaged regions of Hyderabad and former Bombay Karnataka regions, and Dry land regions of Kolar district, or backward district of Chamarajanagar. Similar is the story with JD(S).

In order to examine the link between the voting power and development status vis-a-vis ‘incumbency’ between 2013 and 2018 election winnings, two different types of analyses are performed.

First is to track the major political parties during 2013 and 2018 elections exclusively for their incumbency rates. For this purpose, a definition of incumbency is defined as ‘any specific political party having won a seat in 2013, retaining the same seat in the 2018’. With this definition, the election outcomes in 2013 and 2018 elections are shown in Table 49. Table 4: Retainment or Incumbency Rates of Winning Political Parties between 2013 and 2018 Elections 2013→ INC BJP JDS Others Total 2018↓ INC 49 58 13 2 122 BJP 20 27 3 0 40 JDS 13 10 17 0 40 Others 8 9 4 1 22 Total 80 104 37 3 224 Note: Others=Other parties; a X2test for independence between the 2013 and 2018 election outcomes (excluding ‘Others’ as a category) indicates that the 2013 election outcomes did influence the 2018 results (significant at 5% level, estimated X2 is 30.59 against a significant value of 9.49).

Table 4 shows how the political parties secured the seats out of a total 224 constituencies in the state, in the two elections of 2013 and 2018. For instance, in 2018 BJP won in all 104 seats; of these, 27 seats (out of 40) as retained from 2013; 58 were grabbed from those held by INC (from their total of 122 in 2013); 10 from JDS and 9 from other parties. Clearly, BJP made a major dent into INC holds. Likewise, INC won in all 80 constituencies in 2018; of these, 49 were those retained from 2013, 20 grabbed from BJP holds, 13 from JDS, and 8 from other parties and independents. Alternatively, it can be said that in 2013 INC had won in 122 seats, of which it could retain only 49 seats in the 2018 elections; 58 of those winning seats were grabbed by BJP in 2018, 13 seats by JDS, and 2 by others. JDS also has been able to retain 17 seats in 2018 out of 40 won then in the 2013 elections.

A relevant hypothesis to test is, ’if the returns of political parties in 2018 show any tendency of having retained the wins in 2013’. This is a vote bank dependency incumbency hypothesis. A statistical analysis reveals that the election outcomes in 2018 are in fact influenced by the winning status of respective political parties in 201310.

9 See Appendix 3 for details of the data used. 10A X2 test of independence, with only three major parties (i.e., INC, BJP and JDS) in 200 constituencies (excluding the Bangalore Rural and Urban constituencies) does not support the independency hypothesis of 2013 and 2018 election outcomes. The estimate value of the X2 is 30.60, against a significant value of 9.49 at 5% level with 4 degrees of freedom. 11

Figure 8: Retainment or Incumbency Rates of Winning Political Parties between 2013 and 2018 Elections

The position of such incumbency can be better viewed from the constituency-wise state level map (Figure 8). Will such incumbency regime therefore, become a threat to democratic power of voting is a question to which we will return later.

Geographically speaking, much of such retainment of seats took place in Southern Karnataka and north-west Karnataka. Such retained seats are from one or the other parties-BJP, INC or JDS. The exchange

of seats between INC and S JDS is very scattered, spread all over the state. Such switchings do not seem to have come about from any pre-planned strategy. In the central part of the state, by and large the switching have been odd, not linked to any pre-panned strategies between the political parties.

A second approach is to link directly, the ‘Percentage of votes captured’ by a candidate (and the political party, irrespective of the candidate wins) with the development indicator of the constituency. A correlation between the ‘% Share of vote’ for the competing political parties (and its candidate) in any constituency with the corresponding CCDI can be a reasonable statistical measure of this ‘ex-ante’ behavioral link between the voting rates and

development expectations. Table 5 below shows these for the 2018 and 2013 elections in Karnataka.

Table 5: Correlations between CCDI and Constituency-wise Share of Voting for the Major Political Parties: Year INC BJP JDS Others All Votes 0.10 0.30 -0.11 -0.24 -0.28 2013 (1.50) (4.69)* -(1.65) -(3.68)* -(4.26)* -0.00 0.21 -0.14 -0.09 -0.64 2018 -(0.01) (3.22)* -(2.08) -(1.35) -(12.30)* Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistic values of the correlations; * stands for their significance at 5% level of significance.

Based on these correlations, it can be said that between 2013 and 2018 elections, considering state level ‘All votes’ the ex-ante voting pattern in Karnataka has revealed increasingly declining trend with ‘development’ as a promise11. But two specific observations can be made additionally. First, the outcomes of constituency-wise votings for BJP have shown a positive link with the status of development in 2013 and continued its trend in 2018, but at a lower level (with the correlations being low and having gone down; and statistically significant). Second, on the other hand, the party-wise voting patterns for INC and JDS have grown more and more de-linked with development (as measured by low and declining correlation values with the CCDIs). Surprisingly, by 2018, INC voting patterns went negative with respect to the status of development, which was but positively linked in 201312. This is extremely contrary to what, the then INC Chief Minister had claimed with a host of socio- economic development programs13.The voting link for JD(S) continued to be negative with the developmental deliveries ( the correlations being significant statistically).

A comparative analysis is further attempted for examining the ex-ante and ex-post links between voting pattern and development deliveries. First, the entire 224 constituency wise

11 The correlation coefficient what was negative of -0.28 in 2013 gone down to -0.64 (both correlations also being significant). 12 Moreover, the estimated correlations are not significant statistically, indicating them as good as zero. 13Some examples from INC governed Karnataka are: Krishi Bhagya, Anil bhagya, Anna Bhagya, Ujwala Bhagya, Thai Bhagya, Laptop Bhagya, Manaswini Bhagya, Ksheera Bhagya. Likewise, the currently BJP run and formerly INC run Central programs are: Pradhan Mantri Mudra Yojana; Pradhan Mantri AwasYojana; Rajiv Gandhi Jeevandayee Arogya Yojana; Sansad Adarsh Gram Yojana; Pradhan Mantri Jeevan Jyoti Bima Yojana; Atal Pension Yojana; sukanya samriddhi; Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana; Beti Bachao Betipadhao; Antyodaya Anna Yojana; Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Antyodaya Yojana; Jyotigram Yojana. Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), Sarva Siksha Abhiyan (SSA), Mid Day Meals (MDMs), Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY), Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), Jan DhanYojana. 13 voting rates in the year 2018 for the three major political parties (irrespective of whether they win or lose) are contrasted against the respective CCDI indicators as the drivers for voting14. They reflect the ex-ante behavior. Figures 4-A, 5-A, and 6-A show them for BJP, INC and JDS parties. As against these, the revealed preference of the voters who actually made the party to win are shown in Figures 4-B, 5-B and 6-B for BJP, INC and JDS, respectively. These reflect the ex-post behavior on the part of voters. A linear regression line and the corresponding correlations between the voting patterns and the CCDIs are also shown the same diagrams.

For the BJP party, in the ex-ante analysis (Figure 4-A), a correlation of 0.21was observed between ‘% share of votes’ vis-a-vis the CCDI in the 196 constituencies considered; but the ‘majority of votes’ actually making BJP to win (Figure 4-B) reveal a stronger positive link with ‘development status’ (with a correlation of 0.26). In general, the regressions also indicate that people vote for BJP more and more elastically if the deliverable or delivered development status is higher. There is some evidence of development being relevant in the voting patterns for BJP.

How is the story for INC? As can be seen from Figure 5-A, the correlation between ‘Percentage votings’ for INC party in all the 196 constituencies with the corresponding CCDIs was a very low of (-)0.01. The corresponding regression lines are also not very strong because of a high degree of variability of ‘% voted’ against the CCDI indicators. But the voting rate in the INC winning constituencies (see Figure 5-B) has tuned into pro-development, but very marginally (correlation being 0.18).

As far as JDS is concerned, there is a dramatic message from the voting patterns in general, and exclusively on behalf of their winning candidates/constituencies. As can be seen from Figure 6-A, the general trend in voting rate for JDS is against development (correlation being (-) 0.105). But, wherever JDS has won (see Figure 6-B) the voters have voted in favour of development (the correlation being 0.19).

14 In analyzing the 224 constituency data, Bangalore North and South constituencies are excluded, as they would appear as extreme outliers; and there are no individual estimates of CCDI for those 28 constituencies. Therefore, there are at best 196 observations in these analyses. 14

Figure 4A: Scatter Pattern of ‘% Voted for Figure 4B: Scatter Pattern of ‘% Voted for BJP’, Versus the ‘CCDI’ of the Constituencies Winning BJP’, Versus the ‘CCDI’ of the in Karnataka: 2018 (For 196 Constituencies) Constituencies in Karnataka: 2018 (Only for Winning 93 Constituencies)

Figure 5A: Scatter pattern of ‘% Voted for Figure 5B: Scatter Pattern of ‘% Voted for INC’, Versus the ‘CCDI’ of the 194 Winning INC’, Versus the ‘CCDI’ of the Constituencies in Karnataka: 2018 (For 194 Constituencies in Karnataka: 2018(Only for Constituencies) Winning 65 Constituencies)

Figure 6A: Scatter Pattern of ‘% Voted for Figure 6A: Scatter Pattern of ‘% Voted for JDS’, Versus the ‘CCDI’ of the Constituencies Winning JDS’, Versus the ‘CCDI’ of the in Karnataka: 2018 (For 174 Constituencies) Constituencies in Karnataka: 2018 (Only for Winning 35 Constituencies)

Note: Bangalore South and Bangalore North have been excluded. Further, only 174 constituencies are considered where JDS has contested.

The overall conclusion that can be drawn is that, over the years the winning status of the political parties is increasingly dependent on development deliveries.

An econometric model is also specified to examine both the ‘incumbency’ vis-a vis ‘development’ hypotheses, with the 2018 election returns.

Log Vij(2018)=α+βlogVij (2013)+γlogj CCDI

i=BJP, INC, JDS; three major political parties. j=1….n; number of constituencies, depending upon the parties contesting

Vij=Percentage share of Votes in constituency j for the party i in the year 2018 and 2013 elections CCDI is for the year 2015

The ‘percentage of votings in 2108’ are proposed to be explained by (a) ‘percentage of votings in 2013 election, and (b) the development indicator CCDI of the constituencies. Log- linear regression techniques are deployed. Furthermore, for the ‘ex-ante’ analyses, the ‘voting shares of the candidates irrespective of win or no win’ in 2018 and 2013 are considered. For the ‘ex-post’ analysis, only the ‘voting rates of winning’ in 2018 and 2013 elections are considered. Table 6 A-C show the estimated elasticites for the three major political parties.

Furthermore, the cases of all the 224 constituencies and a special case of 196 (i.e., excluding Bangalore constituencies15) are separately analysed.

Table 6-A: Elasticity of 2018 voting rate wrt 2013 voting rate (incumbency) versus 2015 CCDI (Development) Bharatiya Janata Party: Total constituencies considered 224 196$ Percentage of votes El. Of El. Of El. Of Voting in El. Of captured in a Voting in CCDI 2013 CCDI constituency↓ 2013 Considering all votings irrespective 0.414** -0.118 0.411** -0.157 of whether the candidate wins or not Considering votings of only such 0.016 0.064* 0.013 0.099* constituencies where the candidate wins

$= In this case, all constituencies from Bangalore (28 of them) have been excluded, because, they all get the same estimated CCDI. El= Elasticity: This means, the percentage change in ‘% of votes captured in 2018’, in response to either ‘Percentage of votes capotes in 2013’), or CCDI of the constituency. **= at 10% level of significance; *=at 5% level of significance

Table 6-B: Elasticity of 2018 voting rate wrt 2013 voting rate (incumbency) versus 2015 CCDI (Development) Indian National Congress: Total constituencies considered 224 196$ Percentage of votes El. Of El. Of El. Of Voting % El. Of captured in a Voting % in CCDI in 2013 CCDI constituency↓ 2013 Considering all votings irrespective -0.065 0.560** 0.546** -0.098 of whether the candidate wins or not Considering votings of only such 0.086** 0.066* 0.102** 0.106 constituencies where the candidate wins

15 This special case of ‘196 constituencies only’ is considered for the reason that 28 constituencies from Bangalore North and South have the same estimated CCDI as the development indicator. Therefore, in order to avoid ‘degeneracy’ in the regression estimates, they have been excluded. 17

Table 6-C: Elasticity of 2018 voting rate wrt 2013 voting rate (incumbency) versus 2015 CCDI (Development) Janata Dal, Secular: Total constituencies considered Janata Dal, Secular: Total constituencies considered 224 196$ Percentage of votes El. Of El. Of El. Of Voting in El. Of captured in a Voting in CCDI 2013 CCDI constituency↓ 2013 Considering all votings % irrespective of 0.678** -0.169 0.678** -0.425 whether the candidate wins or not Considering votings % of only such 0.059 0.074 0.046 0.181 constituencies where the candidate wins $= In this case, all constituencies from Bangalore (28 of them) have been excluded, because, they all get the same estimated CCDI. El= Elasticity: This means, the percentage change in ‘% of votes captured in 2018’, in response to either ‘Percentage of votes capotes in 2013’), or CCDI of the constituency. **= at 10% level of significance; *=at 5% level of significance

Several important inferences follow from the above analyses. First, as far as BJP is concerned, as an ex-ante behavior, the party can rely upon encumbrance to return.; but, to win an election in effect, ‘development assurances’ are important. For the INC, as an ex-ante voting pattern, development drives, goals and assurances pay the rewards; but, for actual winning both incumbency as well as development assurances are equally important. The JDS has a different story. By and large, only encumbrance is most reliable force for them to return to win. Development assurance do not seem to pay much return to them.

Likewise, it was thought to be worthwhile to examine the link between the development status and the voting pattern under NOTA during 2018 elections. As can be seen from Figure 7A, one does not see any significant display of discontent as revealed by the poor ‘NOTA voting pattern linked to the development status’16. In other words, ‘None of the Above’ voting rates do not stand out for any good or bad development status either. Moreover, as can be seen from Figure 7B, the link between ‘Not voted at all’ and ‘Voting for NOTA’ seems to be positive, suggesting NOTA perhaps captures disinterest in voting by the potential voters. Whether this reflects discontent with the developmental status is still a major question.

16 The correlation between them is very low at 0.0145 19

Figure 7A: Scatter of CCDI versus the ‘Voting Figure 7B: Scatter of % Non-Voters versus the Rates’ under NOTA in 2018 (For All ‘Voting Rates’ under NOTA in 2018 (For All Constituencies) Constituencies)

Note: Bangalore South and Bangalore North have been excluded. Only 197 constituencies are considered.

POLITICAL COALITION VERSUS CONFLICTS- A continuing affairs?

As stated earlier, in the recent period there has been growing situations of coalition governments in Karnataka (see Table 3 above). But this is very recent in the state. Hence there is a political moot question. Most of such alignments are pre-planned. What prompts such post-election alignments? A related question is have the major political parties continued to depend upon their own ‘vote bank’ constituencies over the elections, or grabbing votes from others’ ‘vote banks’?.

Coalition is an outcome at the end of a race or substitution between parties in different constituencies. Are there any strategies of the political parties, to be in race or to grab the votes from other leading party? This can be viewed only in terms of the voting patterns: There are two possibilities. First, one political party may reduce or replace another political party in terms of ‘percentage of votes’ in the constituencies. In such situations the leading party need not look for a nay coalition with the losing party. Second, if there is a race between them uniformly in all the constituencies, then instead of racing, they may come to some agreements on coalition.

What if, two parties race in some constituencies and substitute in other constituencies? Then, one can look for any structural breaks from ‘racing behind’ being substituted by ‘grabbing votes from the others’. This is a very complicated hypothesis to test. The most glaring case is the recent 2018 elections; though BJP emerged as the leading winning party (in as many as 104 constituencies), it could not form a government by inviting the next racing party, namely INC. Rather, it was the coalition between INC and JD(S) that framed the government (INC winning 80 and JD(S) winning 37 seats); but their interchange rate between 2013 and 2018 elections were just sporadic, and not pre-planned.

The empirical question there is: What is the nature of voting out-turns revealing any racing or substituting in the 2018 elections? Second, is there a strong link in the geographical holds of the political parties in winning the elections17?

Figures 9-12 show the party-wise competitions, as viewed from ‘% votes by the Winning party’ (shown on X-axis), the ‘% of votes by the Runner up parties (on Y- axis). The hypothesis is ‘Do higher winning rates create more and more competition? Or substitute for each other?’ Appendix 1 presents estimated statistical regressions for these scatter diagrams.

BJP wins with strong running race Figure 9: Scatter of ‘% Voted for Winning BJP wins grabbing votes from BJP’, versus ‘% Voted for Runner-up INC’, with INC↓ INC↓ 2018 Chamaraja, Harapanahalli, Gulbarga Rural, Hiriyur, Hungund, Devadurga, Tirthahalli, Yadgir, Chikmagalur, Udupi, Kanakagiri, Kapu, Hukkeri, Chickpet, C.V. Raman Nagar, Bagalkot, Mangalore City South, Mudigere, Gulbarga Dakshin, Raybag, Shorapur, Jagalur, Krishnaraja, Ramdurg, Sirsi, Raichur, Muddebihal, Bantval, Belgaum Uttar, Puttur, Gangawati, Bangalore South, Byndoor, Siruguppa, Dharwad, Channagiri, Rajaji Nagar, Nanjangud, Belthangady, Kalghatgi, Byadgi, Aland, Yelburga, Davanagere North, Mangalore City North, Shiggaon, Bilgi, Hangal, Ron, Kittur, Shikaripura, Sullia, Hosadurga, Virajpet, Kudachi, Honnali, Bommanahalli, Holalkere, Mahadevapura, Bhatkal, Bijapur City, Shirahatti, Moodabidri, Shimoga, Govindraj Nagar, Terdal, Nargund, Hubli-dharwad- West, Karkal, Nippani, Bellary City, Sagar, Haveri, Kundapura, Malleshwaram, Aurad, Sedam, Hubli-Dharwad (31 constituencies) Central, Gundlupet, Mudhol, (49 constituencies)

In Figure 9, as against the winning BJP’s % of voted, the ‘% votes’ of runner-up party of INC are shown for 80 constituencies. As can be seen, up to scoring about 51.76% of total votes, BJP has a

17 This link is also interpreted by different scholars as religion, caste based links. See Assadi (2013) or Assadi (2018) 21

strong running race from INC. There are 49 constituencies in this category. But after that Cut-off winning rate of over 52% of total votes or above, BJP started grabbing votes from INC (thereby replacing them). Major constituencies that fall in this category are 31.

INC wins with strong running race Figure 10: Scatter of ‘% Voted for Winning INC wins grabbing votes from INC’, versus ‘% Voted for Runner-up BJP’, with BJP↓ BJP↓ 2018

Athani, Hirekerur, Gadag, Bellary, Kampli, Yemkanmardi, B.T.M.Layout, Shanti Nagar, Hanur, Kunigal, Gandhi Nagar, Sandur, Chittapur, Anekal, Narasimharaja, Harihar, Badami, Vijayanagara, Shahapur, Bhalki, Raichur Rural, Basavakalyan, Jevargi, Hebbal, Chikkodi-Sadalga, Kolar Gulbarga Uttar, Kundgol, Maski, gold field, Hosakote, Gokak, Bidar, Hagaribommanahalli, Davanagere South, Kushtagi, Byatarayanapura, Chamarajanagar, K.R.Pura, Mangalore, Chamrajpet, Sringeri, Haliyal, Vijay Nagar, Koppal, Belgaum Rural, Humnabad, Yellapur, Afzalpur, Shivajinagar, Varuna, Chincholi, (21 constituencies) Hubli-dharwad-East, Kagwad, Babaleshwar, Sarvagnanagar, (34 constituencies)

Likewise, from Figure 10 one can say that up to about 48% of ‘winning votes’, INC had strong competition from BJP as a Runner up. After that stage, wherever INC won the seat, it was by grabbing the votes from BJP ‘vote banks’ (i.e., replacing them).

In the races between INC and BJP, therefore, there were both the situations of hard racing and bitter substitutions.

Figure 11: Scatter of ‘% Voted for Winning INC’, INC wins with strong running race with JDS↓ versus ‘% Voted for Runner-up JDS’, 2018↓

Bangarapet, BasavanaBagevadi, Bhadravati, Challakere, Chikkaballapur, Doddaballapur, Gauribidanur, Heggadadevankote, Indi, Koratagere, Lingsugur, Malur, Pavagada, Sidlaghatta, Srinivaspur, Yeshvanthapura (16 constituencies)

The picture is quite different on the race between JDS and INC, as can be seen from Figures 11 and 12. Whenever INC won the seats; they had to face continuously increasing competition from JDS. The constituencies falling in this category are 21. But, in situations of JDS winning with a majority, it was by grabbing votes from INC, as its runner up. The constituencies in this category are 16.

JDS wins with strong grabbing race with Figure 12: Scatter of ‘% Voted for Winning JDS’, INC↓ versus ‘% Voted for Runner-up INC’, 2018

Arkalgud, Arsikere, Chamundeshwari, Devanahalli, Gurmitkal, Holenarasipur, Hunasuru, Krishnarajanagara, Krishnarajapete, Maddur, Madhugiri, Magadi, Malavalli, Nagamangala, Periyapatna, Ramanagaram, Shravanabelagola, Shrirangapattana, Sindhanur, Sira, T.Narasipur (21 constituency)

It can be summarized therefore, that whenever JDS and INC candidates were neck to neck, JDS always gave either tough fight to the INC candidate; and JDS winning was always at the cost of grabbing votes from INC. It is the realization of a close race tendency that is perhaps the clue for them to come together to form the government after the 2018 elections. These are uniquely unilateral verdicts of the people. Therefore, as a game, the right strategy was for forming a government was to join hands, by reducing these frictions.

CONCLUDING OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

At the time of elections most political parties in Karnataka (also perhaps everywhere else) promise delivery of development as the primary goal. But, to what extent that is a true reality still remains as a basic question. One finds from the analysis of last several elections in Karnataka, more so from recent 2013 and 2018 elections, that ‘promise and delivery of development’ are reasonably emerging as convincing instruments to win elections, but with varying degree of emphasis between political parties such as BJP, INC and JDS. The present study clearly comes up with a finding that at least the majority of winning political parties do

23 have some clearly stated and delivered development linkages. Secondly, it was always noted that incumbency continues to play its power; but over the elections, it is at a declining rate.

Other factors such as money power, caste politics and bribery and corruption are still very dominant at the election hour. They do provide several private and immediate benefits to the voting community. But the state’s responsibility to provide public goods and services (Luca, 2016) is fundamental, embedded in the Indian Constitution. Under the constitution of India, the Directive Principles (Articles 36-51) stress upon states to become responsible for free primary education (Article 45-46) raising nutritional level and public health delivery (Article 47), public assistance for securing work, assistance to old age and disabled (article 41) and many others. Fundamental Rights Article 21 further speaks about guarantying right to life.

It may still take several more future elections to make people realize to vote with an exclusive objective or receiving some social development benefits from the elected and ruling political parties. One always hopes that, as ‘one man, one vote’ under democracy is a promise for the citizen, it should enable people to realize that such voting powers can be converted to make demands for social, economic and regional development. A recent report by Madheswaran and Vani (2018) highlights the facts that nearly 87% of people in Karnataka have realized that ‘voting is their right; 75% consider voting as their duty’. If so, people should convert their rights into social responsibility by voting and electing a candidate or a political party who can deliver the social goods. It also becomes the responsibility of the governments and Election Commission to create awareness about the importance of voting for deriving development benefits18. It should also become the larger social responsibility of non-governmental organizations to make people aware that the money power, caste politics and incumbency are very discriminatory, against the poor and the needy, reducing the long term social public benefits.

How many more elections do we have to wait to realize these?

18 A most recent evidence on these lines is a report by Madheswaran and Vani (2108) submitted to the Karnataka Election Commission, having studied the ‘attitudes and practices of voters’, highlighting various approaches to make voters aware of ‘knowledge about the importance of voting’. 24

References

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Kadekodi, Gopal K and S V Hanagodimath (2015):‘Does Development Motivate More to Vote?’Economic and Political Weekly, May 2, 2015 vol. l No. 18 ;p.47-57 Kadekodi, Gopal K nad S V Hanagodimath (2014): Relevance of Development for People to Vote, CMDR Monograph No. 73. Kashwan, Prakash (2014):’ Botched-up development and electoral politics in India, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XLIX, No. 34, p. 48-55. Katju, Manjari (2013):’The 'None of the Above' Option’, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. XLVIII, No. 42, October 19, p. 10-12 Lee, Dwight R (2013): ‘Do the poor vote their self- interest?’,http://www.econlib.org/library/columns/y2013/Letransfers.html, viewed on 07-07-2014` 23

Lewis-Beck, Michale Steven and Richard Nadeau (2011):’ Economic voting theory: Testing new dimensions’, Electoral Studies, 30, p. 288-294

Luca, Davide (2016):’ Votes and regional economic growth: evidence from Turkey’, World Development, 78, p. 477-495

Manor, James (2008): ‘Letting a winnable election slip away: Congress in Karnataka’, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. XLIII, No. 47, p. 23-28 Manor, James (2008a): ‘Change in Karnataka over the last generation: Villages and the context’, in Kadekodi, G K, Ravi Kanbur, and VijayendraRao (Eds): Development in Karnataka: Challenges of governance, equity and empowerment, Academic Foundation, New Delhi., p.37-61 Madheswaran, S and B P Vani (2018): Knowledge, Attitude and Practices (KAP): Base line survey, Karnataka 2018, report submitted to the Election Commission, Karnataka Rodrigues, Varian (2018): ‘Changing contours of the political regions of Karnataka’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. LIII, No. 22, p. 10-11 Saikia, Aranyak (2014): ‘A Look at the Economics behind BJP’s Victory’, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. XIIX, No. 29, July 19, 2014, p. 24-26 Tembhekar, Chittaranjan (2014),’Vote for development, dump corrupt, Election Commission says’, Times of India, March 28, Mumbai edition Vasavi, A R (2008): Caste, Capital and Captaincy in the Karnataka Elections, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. XLII, No. 24, June 14, 2008, p. 10-11

Appendix (Table) 1: Depicting the Possible Relationships between Winning and Runner-up voting Rates (parties): 2018 Runner Party: Explained Possible No. of % Votes won, by: Winning 2 Constant form of R B1 B2 Observation being Party: % term Relation s explained Votes won INC BJP Quadratic 0.502 -172.756 8.282 -0.080 80 BJP INC Quadratic 0.206 -131.782 7.165 -0.074 55 JDS INC Linear Reg. 0.450 5.656 0.706* 15 INC JDS Linear Reg 0.335 62.202 -0.451 20 Variables: Dependent variable: % voted to the Runner party; Independent variable: % voted to the Winning party; 2 R =square of the correlation coefficient; Constant, B1, B2 are coefficients of the estimated curves (as either quadratic or linear).

Appendix 2: Using data on 35 major development indicators (based on data in 1999–2000), the D M Nanjundappa Committee (HPC 2002: Chapter 6) estimated a comprehensive composite development index (CCDI) for 175 talukas in Karnataka for 2002. Summarily stated, data on 35 indicators at the taluka level are grouped into (a) agriculture and allied activities (nine); (b) industry, trade and finance (five); (c) economic infrastructure (nine); (d) social infrastructure (seven); and (e) population characteristics (five). All the data were normalised, and indexed to a range between 0 and 1 (using the range and state average as the mean). A composite index is constructed at each taluka level for the five groups of indicators using the inverse of the standard deviation as the weight for each indicator. The five group- level composite indicators are aggregated as the CCDI, using the share of these groups or sectors in the state gross domestic product (GDP) as weights. These form the first set of development indicators ever available for Karnataka (HPC 2002). Subsequently, Hanagodimath and others (2017) estimated it for 2014-15.

Appendix 3: Methodology to extend the CCDI data from talukas to constituencies: There are 224 constituencies and 175 talukas in Karnataka. Constituencies have been adjusted to talukas based on population proportion. If a taluka covers more proportion of population than a constituency, the CCDI value of that taluka has been given to the constituency. During 2008, MLA constituencies of Karnataka were reshuffled, hence adjustments have been given in two tables—one for 1999 and 2004 and another for 2008 and 2013. For 1999 and 2004, CCDI 1999–2000 has been used. For 2008 and 2013, CCDI 2009–10 has been used.

Appendix (Table) 4: Party wise Voting Pattern in Karnataka, 2013 and 2017 % of Votes to different parties, % Voted and winner in 2013 % of Votes to different parties, % Voted and winner in 2013 CCDI AC Name BJP INC JDS OTH % Votes Winner BJP INC JDS OTH NOTA Winner 2015 Afzalpur 8.05 29.62 17.76 44.57 67.57 INC 40.84 47.92 8.91 1.50 0.83 INC 0.73 Aland 1.62 2.96 37.75 57.68 68.60 KJP 47.83 47.39 0.86 3.02 0.90 BJP 0.62 Anekal 35.01 56.56 3.92 4.51 68.86 INC 46.24 50.02 0.00 2.81 0.93 INC 1.41 Arabhavi 68.42 16.58 2.12 12.87 73.98 BJP 54.34 13.14 27.59 4.14 0.79 BJP 0.88 Arkalgud 1.04 36.04 30.88 32.03 86.01 INC 12.01 39.39 45.03 2.94 0.63 JDS 0.93 Arsikere 1.55 29.55 48.20 20.70 80.47 JDS 14.60 29.08 54.34 1.35 0.62 JDS 0.95 Athani 50.79 34.54 10.39 4.28 78.93 BJP 46.76 48.13 1.98 2.63 0.49 INC 0.85 Aurad 47.89 11.97 3.79 36.35 68.27 BJP 50.92 43.73 1.77 2.92 0.65 BJP 0.64 B.T.M.Layout 18.70 63.10 7.55 10.65 53.38 INC 34.29 49.35 12.73 1.89 1.74 INC 3.53 Babaleshwar 3.03 46.19 42.95 7.83 72.98 INC 39.98 57.29 0.00 1.69 1.04 INC 1.01 Badami 21.79 41.31 30.44 6.46 70.72 INC 40.20 41.24 14.94 2.40 1.22 INC 0.87 Bagalkot 46.67 48.74 1.34 3.25 69.51 INC 53.03 43.17 0.00 2.62 1.18 BJP 1.05 Bagepalli 0.72 10.29 11.15 77.84 85.55 IND 2.52 39.94 23.28 33.85 0.41 INC 0.82 Bailhongal 29.25 28.42 7.47 34.85 78.04 KJP 25.90 32.49 9.36 31.33 0.93 INC 1.05 Bangalore South 40.76 25.46 28.73 5.04 56.02 BJP 46.01 36.83 10.91 1.46 4.78 BJP 3.53 Bangarapet 30.45 50.45 16.12 2.98 82.04 INC 21.39 45.18 31.43 1.28 0.72 INC 1.06 Bantval 40.86 52.29 1.23 5.62 79.26 INC 53.57 44.83 0.00 1.08 0.52 BJP 1.35 Basavakalyan 13.82 17.12 29.72 39.35 63.72 JDS 30.38 42.27 21.62 4.76 0.97 INC 0.69 Basavana Bagevadi 28.90 44.42 14.30 12.38 72.12 INC 17.30 39.79 37.63 4.15 1.14 INC 0.72 Basavanagudi 42.33 20.83 23.31 13.53 52.19 BJP 58.46 9.05 29.23 1.84 1.43 BJP 3.53 Belgaum Dakshin 36.47 15.56 1.00 46.97 65.22 IND 57.59 17.59 0.64 23.17 1.00 BJP 1.54 Belgaum Rural 25.20 23.55 1.21 50.04 74.48 BJP 26.99 54.74 2.04 15.19 1.05 INC 1.54 Belgaum Uttar 15.16 39.18 1.11 44.56 59.41 INC 53.63 41.91 0.78 2.76 0.92 BJP 1.54 Bellary 1.90 31.89 3.04 63.17 75.28 BSRC 46.90 48.54 1.97 1.55 1.04 INC 1.25 Bellary City 4.73 43.61 13.63 38.04 61.52 INC 50.63 39.95 4.14 4.61 0.67 BJP 1.25 Belthangady 40.20 50.97 1.83 6.99 75.43 INC 54.81 42.02 0.90 1.58 0.69 BJP 1.38 Belur 7.73 36.71 31.05 24.51 76.03 INC 29.27 25.95 42.20 1.84 0.73 JDS 0.95 Bhadravati 1.24 15.55 54.59 28.61 72.01 JDS 5.87 49.53 41.97 1.70 0.93 INC 1.11 Bhalki 20.19 39.44 1.53 38.84 73.37 INC 37.85 50.68 9.06 1.78 0.62 INC 0.80 Bhatkal 11.00 16.18 20.40 52.43 70.92 IND 50.14 46.56 0.00 2.10 1.20 BJP 0.96 Bidar 5.21 42.62 2.14 50.03 59.38 KJP 44.82 52.10 0.00 2.59 0.49 INC 0.95 Bidar South 1.04 4.09 25.61 69.26 68.94 KMP 30.50 25.29 39.68 3.84 0.69 JDS 0.95 Bijapur City 22.04 40.85 32.96 4.15 56.21 INC 50.30 46.07 1.37 1.33 0.92 BJP 1.01 Bilgi 37.15 44.68 13.45 4.72 78.32 INC 49.12 46.34 1.02 3.02 0.49 BJP 0.99

Appendix (Table) 4: Party wise Voting Pattern in Karnataka, 2013 and 2017 % of Votes to different parties, % Voted and winner in 2013 % of Votes to different parties, % Voted and winner in 2013 CCDI AC Name BJP INC JDS OTH % Votes Winner BJP INC JDS OTH NOTA Winner 2015 Bommanahalli 49.53 34.74 6.08 9.65 54.08 BJP 57.22 33.09 4.80 3.62 1.27 BJP 3.53 Byadgi 25.28 38.51 0.78 35.43 82.99 INC 54.98 42.23 0.00 1.91 0.88 BJP 1.08 Byatarayanapura 30.59 46.14 19.85 3.41 63.05 INC 43.08 45.31 8.86 1.90 0.85 INC 2.71 Byndoor 34.52 55.56 0.69 9.23 75.98 INC 54.34 40.54 1.08 3.11 0.93 BJP 1.14 C.V. Raman Nagar 50.26 42.33 2.99 4.42 53.86 BJP 44.61 35.35 15.51 2.82 1.71 BJP 2.71 Challakere 8.78 40.74 18.52 31.96 78.29 INC 19.81 43.12 35.11 0.94 1.02 INC 0.87 Chamaraja 23.80 38.14 26.39 11.67 55.39 INC 36.77 26.14 19.41 16.56 1.11 BJP 1.60 Chamarajanagar 4.71 37.09 1.84 56.35 78.53 INC 42.52 45.46 0.00 10.79 1.23 INC 0.87 Chamrajpet 16.46 24.31 52.32 6.91 58.84 JDS 26.79 54.35 16.13 2.12 0.60 INC 3.53 Chamundeshwari 4.69 38.86 42.87 13.58 73.90 JDS 5.33 37.69 53.62 2.67 0.68 JDS 1.60 Channagiri 3.16 37.21 20.16 39.48 81.54 INC 46.68 30.37 18.41 3.94 0.60 BJP 0.84 Channapatna 0.95 4.83 43.70 50.52 84.78 SP 35.16 15.98 46.55 1.72 0.58 JDS 1.10 Chickpet 29.09 41.09 22.41 7.41 57.97 INC 44.46 38.30 4.88 11.33 1.04 BJP 3.53 Chikkaballapur 2.67 51.06 40.81 5.47 83.18 INC 3.21 47.27 29.73 19.37 0.41 INC 1.15 Chikkodi-Sadalga 17.17 68.44 1.23 13.15 80.04 INC 45.14 51.04 0.00 3.05 0.76 INC 1.00 Chikmagalur 42.20 34.30 17.92 5.58 72.73 BJP 43.98 27.65 23.78 3.84 0.76 BJP 1.21 Chiknayakanhalli 18.13 6.43 37.78 37.66 81.05 JDS 38.53 25.40 32.84 2.61 0.62 BJP 0.92 Chincholi 10.92 51.87 1.08 36.14 66.72 INC 41.12 55.57 1.22 1.28 0.81 INC 0.63 Chintamani 1.21 8.01 43.61 47.17 84.80 JDS 1.08 1.24 48.55 48.65 0.49 JDS 0.98 Chitradurga 38.09 18.81 21.74 21.36 72.52 BJP 43.78 25.88 26.36 3.23 0.75 BJP 1.04 Chittapur 30.87 56.08 0.77 12.28 64.97 INC 46.53 49.65 0.00 3.07 0.75 INC 0.81 Dasarahalli 30.10 24.44 22.51 22.96 55.50 BJP 38.55 14.66 43.48 2.38 0.93 JDS 2.71 Davanagere North 22.92 65.53 2.63 8.92 64.64 INC 48.65 46.06 3.42 1.19 0.68 BJP 1.33 Davanagere South 17.67 55.08 21.73 5.52 66.03 INC 40.78 52.45 4.42 1.70 0.65 INC 1.33 Devadurga 45.81 48.71 0.00 5.48 69.68 INC 42.58 29.20 4.54 22.46 1.23 BJP 0.61 Devanahalli 6.13 44.53 45.80 3.53 82.83 JDS 5.74 40.87 50.81 1.82 0.76 JDS 1.04 Devar Hippargi 24.41 31.44 7.04 37.10 64.69 INC 34.69 27.35 32.28 4.86 0.82 BJP 0.70 Dharwad 12.70 40.18 26.41 20.70 72.47 INC 54.70 41.63 0.81 1.60 1.26 BJP 1.58 Doddaballapur 22.09 26.21 23.35 28.35 80.99 INC 16.36 43.39 37.50 2.15 0.60 INC 1.12 Gadag 13.73 51.70 0.98 33.59 71.33 INC 47.25 48.41 0.00 3.09 1.25 INC 1.26 Gandhi Nagar 29.20 49.60 6.69 14.51 57.44 INC 29.40 37.34 28.89 2.74 1.64 INC 2.71 Gangawati 24.34 16.15 48.11 11.39 73.36 JDS 45.91 40.50 9.62 2.88 1.10 BJP 0.92 Gauribidanur 21.35 33.61 7.35 37.70 79.89 INC 20.61 40.91 35.47 2.55 0.46 INC 0.92 Gokak 2.97 54.86 35.45 6.71 71.79 INC 43.67 51.87 0.89 2.35 1.22 INC 0.88

Appendix (Table) 4: Party wise Voting Pattern in Karnataka, 2013 and 2017 % of Votes to different parties, % Voted and winner in 2013 % of Votes to different parties, % Voted and winner in 2013 CCDI AC Name BJP INC JDS OTH % Votes Winner BJP INC JDS OTH NOTA Winner 2015 Govindraj Nagar 23.01 55.36 15.74 5.89 54.80 INC 50.33 43.10 4.51 1.05 1.01 BJP 2.71 Gubbi 1.72 13.28 42.09 42.91 83.19 JDS 29.91 8.97 35.76 25.07 0.29 JDS 0.89 Gulbarga Dakshin 31.41 18.82 22.92 26.85 55.34 BJP 44.88 41.12 9.95 3.29 0.77 BJP 0.95 Gulbarga Rural 26.63 32.47 6.98 33.92 58.46 INC 40.49 32.37 19.37 6.71 1.06 BJP 0.95 Gulbarga Uttar 17.78 48.17 1.13 32.92 50.23 INC 39.29 43.29 9.71 6.96 0.75 INC 0.95 Gundlupet 1.23 45.42 2.47 50.88 85.25 INC 51.48 42.35 0.00 5.50 0.67 BJP 0.86 Gurmitkal 7.59 27.94 26.66 37.81 63.55 INC 5.92 36.29 52.40 3.81 1.59 JDS 0.86 Hadagalli 15.96 51.11 3.33 29.61 73.81 INC 20.19 38.65 5.95 33.77 1.45 INC 0.81 Hagaribommanahalli 35.80 16.47 35.89 11.84 78.22 JDS 40.36 44.46 2.89 11.53 0.76 INC 0.91 Haliyal 6.53 45.78 40.84 6.85 76.21 INC 42.54 46.41 5.43 4.66 0.96 INC 1.00 Hangal 4.88 45.93 3.27 45.91 83.02 INC 49.10 45.13 0.63 4.69 0.45 BJP 0.85 Hanur 0.96 40.39 32.02 26.63 76.10 INC 33.42 35.49 26.39 3.89 0.81 INC 0.81 Harapanahalli 32.32 37.91 1.53 28.24 81.24 INC 40.14 34.41 22.38 2.50 0.57 BJP 0.72 Harihar 3.95 26.94 39.58 29.52 77.66 JDS 34.89 39.29 23.16 2.05 0.61 INC 1.14 Hassan 4.64 43.58 46.78 5.01 69.56 JDS 41.02 24.67 32.60 1.10 0.62 BJP 1.53 Haveri 3.42 55.24 0.97 40.36 75.75 INC 50.74 44.12 1.82 2.11 1.21 BJP 1.03 Hebbal 33.03 28.58 21.70 16.69 54.89 BJP 36.34 50.76 9.61 2.31 0.99 INC 2.71 Heggadadevankote 20.98 24.25 32.64 22.13 77.25 JDS 20.13 44.81 31.90 2.23 0.93 INC 0.75 Hirekerur 2.39 37.61 1.42 58.59 82.09 KJP 47.73 48.10 2.39 1.14 0.65 INC 0.89 Hiriyur 1.80 44.68 43.93 9.60 74.20 INC 41.17 34.36 22.27 1.58 0.61 BJP 0.86 Holalkere 4.66 47.16 1.90 46.29 79.71 INC 57.29 36.63 1.89 3.99 0.21 BJP 0.84 Holenarasipur 0.79 38.61 57.14 3.46 81.81 JDS 2.03 35.85 60.13 1.44 0.55 JDS 1.02 Humnabad 4.86 47.56 29.55 18.03 65.98 INC 27.07 47.04 21.51 3.64 0.74 INC 0.71 Honnali 1.71 52.84 0.90 44.56 85.45 INC 49.81 47.19 0.00 2.23 0.77 BJP 0.87 Hosadurga 1.33 41.43 0.44 56.79 79.83 INC 56.66 40.40 0.99 1.13 0.83 BJP 0.90 Hosakote 46.94 51.23 0.78 1.05 90.97 INC 47.25 51.19 0.56 0.72 0.28 INC 0.96 Hubli-Dharwad Central 49.61 34.48 6.73 9.18 55.29 BJP 51.31 36.89 7.28 3.82 0.70 BJP 2.41 Hubli-dharwad-East 26.43 38.82 7.73 27.02 62.57 INC 40.86 56.64 0.00 1.58 0.93 INC 2.41 Hubli-dharwad- West 33.10 24.29 23.88 18.73 57.54 BJP 61.16 35.49 0.00 2.11 1.24 BJP 1.58 Hukkeri 61.53 18.41 14.67 5.39 76.53 BJP 52.94 43.20 0.90 1.80 1.16 BJP 0.95 Hunasuru 41.54 53.07 1.62 3.77 71.38 INC 3.44 44.62 49.22 1.89 0.82 JDS 0.91 Hungund 2.62 51.97 27.07 18.34 79.31 INC 41.53 38.19 0.00 19.19 1.08 BJP 0.84 Indi 11.37 42.20 16.70 29.73 69.13 INC 23.16 29.98 24.07 22.05 0.74 INC 0.75 Jagalur 1.40 58.88 3.27 36.45 78.98 INC 53.22 33.52 9.03 3.64 0.58 BJP 0.94

Appendix (Table) 4: Party wise Voting Pattern in Karnataka, 2013 and 2017 % of Votes to different parties, % Voted and winner in 2013 % of Votes to different parties, % Voted and winner in 2013 CCDI AC Name BJP INC JDS OTH % Votes Winner BJP INC JDS OTH NOTA Winner 2015 Jamkhandi 15.93 37.30 7.84 38.94 74.55 INC 30.24 32.06 0.55 36.90 0.25 INC 1.03 Jayanagar 46.03 33.15 12.66 8.16 55.92 BJP 46.22 48.80 0.78 4.20 0.80 INC 3.53 Jevargi 20.99 46.37 17.24 15.40 73.29 INC 32.43 42.36 22.07 2.34 0.81 INC 0.64 K.R.Pura 41.11 53.10 1.98 3.81 58.92 INC 40.42 53.31 2.59 2.71 0.97 INC 2.71 Kadur 6.59 17.48 48.56 27.36 77.39 JDS 38.97 28.90 29.34 2.12 0.67 BJP 0.90 Kagwad 32.34 25.59 30.11 11.97 79.10 BJP 34.39 56.99 5.03 3.06 0.52 INC 0.85 Kalghatgi 5.22 58.37 9.35 27.07 78.16 INC 54.82 37.70 0.77 5.76 0.95 BJP 0.86 Kampli 1.37 8.69 3.71 86.22 76.96 BSRC 45.27 48.62 2.92 1.91 1.28 INC 1.34 Kanakagiri 2.18 36.51 0.86 60.45 73.76 INC 52.38 43.89 0.87 1.86 1.00 BJP 0.92 Kanakapura 1.03 56.77 38.93 3.27 83.49 INC 3.37 68.52 25.59 1.89 0.63 INC 0.86 Kapu 44.73 46.36 3.80 5.12 73.28 INC 52.54 44.29 0.96 1.62 0.58 BJP 1.58 Karkal 49.85 46.59 1.00 2.57 81.04 BJP 62.52 33.36 0.00 3.20 0.92 BJP 1.56 Karwar 30.84 8.77 1.08 59.32 70.66 IND 37.69 28.15 28.90 3.78 1.47 BJP 1.47 Khanapur 11.88 15.50 11.16 61.47 73.34 IND 20.44 23.76 17.68 37.10 1.01 INC 0.99 Kittur 28.29 42.81 16.40 12.51 76.20 INC 49.26 27.13 2.53 20.10 0.98 BJP 1.05 Kolar 0.99 25.39 30.81 42.81 83.31 IND 6.96 21.52 46.22 24.64 0.67 JDS 1.26 Kolar gold field 46.87 8.71 24.70 19.72 69.20 BJP 21.73 50.98 6.43 19.61 1.25 INC 1.06 Kollegal 11.76 32.36 3.00 52.88 76.46 INC 23.50 30.99 0.00 44.60 0.90 BSP 0.81 Koppal 35.84 53.54 4.50 6.12 73.77 INC 40.07 54.64 2.31 2.17 0.80 INC 0.85 Koratagere 2.03 35.52 47.44 15.01 83.69 JDS 7.12 47.64 43.19 1.27 0.79 INC 0.87 Krishnaraja 36.42 41.16 5.86 16.56 59.08 INC 53.48 35.55 7.90 2.08 0.98 BJP 1.60 Krishnarajanagara 1.18 42.17 51.73 4.92 83.54 JDS 1.55 47.56 48.57 1.64 0.68 JDS 0.97 Krishnarajapete 1.64 30.97 37.00 30.39 81.15 JDS 5.64 40.74 50.58 2.40 0.63 JDS 0.92 Kudachi 12.40 21.52 0.91 65.17 78.07 BSRC 49.60 38.62 1.12 10.41 0.25 BJP 1.05 Kudligi 1.98 35.11 0.81 62.10 77.96 IND 32.93 15.33 25.82 24.56 1.35 BJP 0.74 Kumta 22.86 29.58 29.24 18.31 74.13 INC 40.63 18.23 11.33 28.31 1.50 BJP 1.18 Kundapura 10.45 28.75 0.00 60.80 76.39 IND 65.20 29.64 1.71 2.30 1.14 BJP 1.14 Kundgol 18.25 40.68 12.05 29.01 76.71 INC 43.54 43.97 4.26 7.53 0.70 INC 0.89 Kunigal 24.51 23.79 31.27 20.42 83.44 JDS 32.79 36.25 27.47 2.98 0.51 INC 0.89 Kushtagi 31.83 29.64 19.31 19.23 71.34 BJP 41.88 52.73 2.41 1.86 1.12 INC 0.65 Lingsugur 10.45 23.50 24.49 41.56 65.49 JDS 28.87 33.04 30.02 6.81 1.26 INC 0.75 Maddur 1.12 31.34 51.79 15.76 79.41 JDS 2.42 32.08 63.48 1.24 0.78 JDS 1.19 Madhugiri 1.18 50.97 41.18 6.67 80.70 INC 1.75 42.12 53.31 2.56 0.26 JDS 0.83 Madikeri 36.85 21.00 33.84 8.31 75.85 BJP 41.68 22.55 32.23 2.58 0.95 BJP 1.55

Appendix (Table) 4: Party wise Voting Pattern in Karnataka, 2013 and 2017 % of Votes to different parties, % Voted and winner in 2013 % of Votes to different parties, % Voted and winner in 2013 CCDI AC Name BJP INC JDS OTH % Votes Winner BJP INC JDS OTH NOTA Winner 2015 Magadi 0.94 35.55 44.00 19.51 83.78 JDS 2.27 35.05 61.52 0.73 0.43 JDS 0.95 Mahadevapura 48.62 45.91 2.47 3.00 61.55 BJP 49.83 43.57 2.25 3.13 1.22 BJP 2.71 Mahalakshmi Layout 15.93 34.33 44.73 5.02 60.20 JDS 29.47 12.82 55.18 1.44 1.09 JDS 2.71 Malavalli 0.98 35.86 35.54 27.62 74.85 INC 5.55 39.18 52.93 1.58 0.76 JDS 0.97 Malleshwaram 53.19 33.74 2.61 10.45 62.33 BJP 67.22 23.56 6.38 1.10 1.74 BJP 2.71 Malur 0.00 14.09 40.28 45.64 87.33 JDS 14.80 46.90 35.80 2.07 0.43 INC 1.03 Mandya 2.02 59.11 31.01 7.85 68.55 INC 19.39 28.92 41.99 9.09 0.61 JDS 1.37 Mangalore 32.29 55.59 1.72 10.39 74.22 INC 40.89 54.11 2.47 1.98 0.55 INC 1.98 Mangalore City North 44.24 47.92 1.24 6.60 71.35 INC 56.02 40.88 0.00 2.44 0.66 BJP 1.98 Mangalore City South 41.99 51.26 1.26 5.49 64.52 INC 52.97 43.13 0.47 2.78 0.65 BJP 1.98 Manvi 2.41 41.50 35.77 20.32 61.14 INC 19.64 18.29 34.76 26.10 1.21 JDS 0.75 Maski 4.03 43.08 3.30 49.58 64.12 INC 44.01 44.17 8.33 1.99 1.50 INC 0.95 Mayakonda 13.08 24.02 8.59 54.31 77.19 INC 32.58 28.42 7.14 31.04 0.81 BJP 1.33 Melukote 0.51 1.44 43.63 54.42 84.06 SKP 0.91 0.00 54.87 43.66 0.56 JDS 1.09 Molakalmuru 1.96 42.37 2.58 53.09 79.37 BSRC 43.63 21.80 7.93 25.93 0.71 BJP 0.84 Moodabidri 37.75 41.29 15.89 5.07 74.22 INC 57.44 37.86 1.21 2.81 0.68 BJP 1.98 Muddebihal 8.51 30.29 10.66 50.55 65.86 INC 45.76 39.54 7.09 6.68 0.93 BJP 0.75 Mudhol 50.14 46.13 1.78 1.95 77.60 BJP 51.63 41.17 2.99 3.11 1.09 BJP 1.07 Mudigere 26.59 28.83 29.41 15.18 72.16 JDS 44.76 35.24 16.80 2.19 1.01 BJP 1.15 Mulbagal 1.71 8.28 28.42 61.59 80.88 IND 5.11 0.00 41.03 53.46 0.39 IND 0.98 Nagamangala 0.66 42.07 54.52 2.75 81.49 JDS 1.06 35.67 61.94 0.98 0.36 JDS 1.03 Nagthan 11.16 32.54 32.07 24.23 62.06 INC 30.50 30.81 34.00 3.79 0.90 JDS 1.01 Nanjangud 5.02 36.01 29.67 29.29 76.18 INC 47.59 39.98 8.34 2.91 1.19 BJP 0.85 Narasimharaja 10.75 32.86 25.21 31.19 5.48 INC 27.27 38.46 9.09 24.44 0.74 INC 1.60 Nargund 39.68 46.35 2.31 11.66 74.91 INC 50.52 45.00 1.70 1.97 0.81 BJP 1.17 Navalgund 30.42 22.41 32.36 14.81 75.09 JDS 41.19 24.39 28.33 4.90 1.20 BJP 1.18 Nelamangala 13.87 32.50 43.31 10.32 76.64 JDS 26.44 27.85 42.91 2.08 0.71 JDS 1.10 Nippani 53.61 41.39 0.53 4.47 80.49 BJP 50.51 45.57 0.00 3.08 0.84 BJP 1.00 Padmanaba Nagar 41.82 26.14 20.47 11.56 58.41 BJP 48.18 20.67 28.28 1.38 1.49 BJP 3.53 Pavagada 3.66 43.90 47.25 5.19 78.09 JDS 8.64 44.79 44.54 1.54 0.49 INC 0.84 Periyapatna 2.74 45.52 42.45 9.29 83.89 INC 2.60 45.13 49.94 1.57 0.76 JDS 0.87 Pulakeshinagar 4.57 38.60 48.75 8.08 56.38 JDS 7.50 77.18 12.61 1.60 1.11 INC 2.71 Puttur 43.45 46.46 4.64 5.45 79.51 INC 54.17 42.46 0.86 1.77 0.74 BJP 1.82 Raichur 6.23 37.66 45.59 10.52 53.67 JDS 45.61 36.74 6.29 10.88 0.47 BJP 1.09

Appendix (Table) 4: Party wise Voting Pattern in Karnataka, 2013 and 2017 % of Votes to different parties, % Voted and winner in 2013 % of Votes to different parties, % Voted and winner in 2013 CCDI AC Name BJP INC JDS OTH % Votes Winner BJP INC JDS OTH NOTA Winner 2015 Raichur Rural 37.48 35.05 16.02 11.45 68.89 BJP 35.06 41.23 21.18 1.41 1.12 INC 1.09 Rajaji Nagar 36.45 22.75 15.58 25.22 61.16 BJP 46.86 38.99 11.36 1.19 1.61 BJP 2.71 Rajarajeshwarinagar 26.70 37.40 27.50 8.40 56.80 INC 32.20 42.14 23.54 2.12 1.60 INC 3.53 Ramanagaram 1.19 39.04 56.12 3.65 80.47 JDS 2.84 40.77 53.96 1.76 0.67 JDS 1.23 Ramdurg 28.91 32.76 13.40 24.93 74.93 INC 45.17 43.27 1.50 8.94 1.13 BJP 0.94 Ranibennur 5.95 33.79 8.89 51.37 79.28 INC 27.31 33.22 0.68 38.00 0.79 KPJP 1.15 Raybag 30.74 24.60 6.01 38.65 75.32 BJP 44.88 33.88 0.00 20.45 0.79 BJP 1.05 Ron 38.63 51.12 4.34 5.90 74.54 INC 49.09 44.79 2.01 2.54 1.57 BJP 0.92 Sagar 3.90 52.37 16.90 26.84 76.43 INC 50.65 45.46 1.36 1.56 0.98 BJP 1.29 Sakleshpur 5.22 21.73 45.27 27.77 77.36 JDS 35.60 22.98 38.67 1.76 0.99 JDS 1.16 Sandur 2.58 48.48 21.51 27.42 74.71 INC 40.64 49.53 2.75 5.94 1.14 INC 0.78 Sarvagnanagar 33.28 49.53 5.48 11.71 50.23 INC 31.81 61.74 2.77 2.33 1.35 INC 2.71 Saundatti yellamma 34.87 22.83 1.98 40.32 79.13 BJP 40.65 19.53 0.49 38.70 0.62 BJP 0.85 Sedam 30.63 39.38 19.89 10.10 73.42 INC 50.87 46.33 1.31 0.69 0.79 BJP 0.76 Shahapur 1.17 38.65 9.57 50.62 67.59 KJP 30.47 50.27 14.91 3.43 0.91 INC 0.73 Shanti Nagar 10.55 52.45 32.96 4.04 57.73 INC 34.43 49.42 11.18 3.83 1.14 INC 3.53 Shiggaon 48.64 42.31 1.02 8.03 79.67 BJP 49.02 43.61 0.79 5.94 0.64 BJP 0.85 Shikaripura 1.72 32.26 10.83 55.19 80.22 KJP 56.16 33.31 8.52 1.43 0.58 BJP 0.94 Shimoga 23.96 28.18 15.49 32.36 64.67 INC 60.36 33.61 3.36 2.17 0.51 BJP 1.34 Shimoga Rural 8.68 24.87 33.94 32.50 77.03 JDS 40.25 19.44 38.06 1.48 0.77 BJP 1.34 Shirahatti 33.85 34.09 4.21 27.85 71.80 INC 57.26 38.59 0.00 3.40 0.75 BJP 0.90 Shivajinagar 31.68 54.62 6.58 7.12 13.42 INC 41.19 55.04 1.21 1.03 1.52 INC 2.71 Shorapur 2.22 44.48 41.69 11.60 66.36 INC 52.96 41.51 2.43 2.23 0.87 BJP 0.74 Shravanabelagola 1.27 40.46 55.95 2.31 78.09 JDS 4.49 31.39 63.08 0.50 0.54 JDS 1.04 Shrirangapattana 1.54 17.23 34.98 46.25 80.80 JDS 6.41 32.62 57.35 3.09 0.54 JDS 1.28 Sidlaghatta 1.24 40.62 50.69 7.44 86.93 JDS 2.11 44.76 39.06 13.50 0.56 INC 0.98 Sindgi 29.48 21.50 28.89 20.13 69.42 BJP 38.36 14.22 44.15 2.51 0.76 JDS 0.70 Sindhanur 7.27 33.89 21.28 37.56 72.61 INC 9.05 42.77 43.75 3.61 0.82 JDS 0.95 Sira 11.84 46.47 37.26 4.43 79.12 INC 9.41 35.49 41.24 13.55 0.32 JDS 0.91 Sirsi 32.67 30.33 30.31 6.69 75.29 BJP 45.52 34.26 17.17 1.80 1.25 BJP 1.17 Siruguppa 34.45 51.66 2.51 11.38 74.56 INC 54.25 40.27 1.63 2.53 1.31 BJP 0.90 Sorab 3.70 23.50 41.47 31.32 82.05 JDS 46.15 13.91 37.65 1.62 0.67 BJP 0.83 Sringeri 48.69 45.81 3.29 2.22 79.94 BJP 44.36 45.81 7.15 1.95 0.74 INC 1.82 Srinivaspur 1.41 49.40 47.10 2.09 88.47 INC 2.28 50.71 44.99 1.64 0.37 INC 1.20